G.R. No.

143398
October 25, 2000
RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION, FORMERLY SECOND
DIVISION) and JOSE T. RAMIREZ, respondents.
FACTS:
Ambil and Ramirez were candidates for the position of Governor where Ambil
was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Governor.
Ramirez filed an election protest with the COMELEC challenging the results in a total of
201 precincts.
Petitioner and respondent received a purported resolution in favor of private
respondent. The COMELEC later declared that the parties should ignore the resolution
since it was not yet promulgated. Later it issued an order setting the promulgation of a
resolution of the case. The petitioner filed this case to annul the order for the
promulgation of the resolution and to direct the First Division to deliberate anew on the
case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to annul an order before its
resolution?
HELD:
The SC dismissed the case for prematurity. It ruled that it has no power to review
via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of the
Commission on Elections. The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized
exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a motion for reconsideration
prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the exceptions do not apply to election cases
where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case
to the Comelec en banc, whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari before
the Supreme Court.

G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES,
SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT,
SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect. The League of Municipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his
personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos
election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the US as
alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. He added that he had
returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of
democracy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo is qualified to hold public office?
Held:
Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered.
Citizenship once lost may be reacquired either by naturalization or repatriation or by
direct grant by law (CA 63) which was not invoked by the petitioner. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to
serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country
only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.

G.R. No. 149036

April 2, 2002

MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner,

vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A.
TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C. DE GUZMAN in his capacity as
Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission on Elections,
respondents.

FACTS:
Benipayo was appointed as Comelec Chairman together with other
commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment,
Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring
Matibag, who was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelecs in a temporary
capacity, to the Law Department which Matibag sought to be reconsidered but was
denied.
Matibag filed the instant petition, among other, questioning the appointment and
the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and
Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively, claiming that their ad interim
appointments violated the constitutional provisions on the independence of the
COMELEC.
ISSUES:
Whether or not ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason issued by
the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by the Constitution.
RULING:
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent
Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. They were extended permanent appointments during
the recess of Congress. The ad interim appointments of them are expressly allowed by the
Constitution which authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make
appointments that take effect immediately. While the Constitution mandates that the
COMELEC "shall be independent", this provision should be harmonized with the
Presidents power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold that the independence of
the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm an interim
appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the Presidents power to
make ad interim appointments.

G.R. No. 180088

January 19, 2009

MANUEL B. JAPZON, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S. TY, Respondents.
Facts
Japzon and Ty were both candidates for Mayor. Japzon sought to disqualify his
opponent for he is guilty of misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy for although
the latter was a natural born Filipino he acquired American citizenship and lived in the
States for almost 25 years, therefore, could not have met the required citizenship and
residency requirement. Ty argued that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and
renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a resident for more than one year
prior to the elections.
Issue
Whether or not a natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine
citizenship, may run public office
Held
A natural born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he must: (1) meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing
laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The challenge against Tys
qualification to run is on his purported failure to meet the one-year residency
requirement. The term "residence" is to be understood as referring to "domicile" or legal
residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends
to return and remain. Tys reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile Ty merely had the
option to again establish his domicile in the said place becoming his new domicile of
choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it
his domicile of choice and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. Ty being able to
establish it acquired residence requirement. There is no question that Ty meets the second
qualification when he renounced his American citizenship before a notary public and,
resultantly, became a pure Philippine citizen again.

G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995

JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent
Facts:
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy
for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.
On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy. In M.R.Nos. 932654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994respectively, the
COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos for failure to file his
statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but the same was denied by the COMELEC.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is liable for failure to file a statement of contributions
and expenditures notwithstanding his having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three
days after his filing.
Held:
The petitioner is liable. Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that every candidate
has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Wellrecognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is
indicated. In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to
whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term every
candidate must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign,
but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.

G.R. No. 161265

February 24, 2004

LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, represented by its Chairman EDGARDO

J. ANGARA
vs.
THE COMMISION ON ELECTIONS and AGAPITO A. AQUINO
FACTS: The General Counsel of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), a
registered political party, informed the COMELEC by way of Manifestation that only the
Party Chairman, Senator Edgardo J. Angara, or his authorized representative may endorse
the certificate of candidacy of the partys official candidates. The same Manifestation
stated that Sen. Angara had placed the LDP Secretary General, Representative Agapito
A. Aquino, on "indefinite forced leave." In the meantime, Ambassador Enrique A.
Zaldivar was designated Acting Secretary General.
However, Rep. Aquino filed his Comment, contending that the Party Chairman does not
have the authority to impose disciplinary sanctions on the Secretary General. As the
Manifestation filed by the LDP General Counsel has no basis, Rep. Aquino asked the
COMELEC to disregard the same.
ISSUE: Is the ascertainment of the identity of political party and its officers within
COMELEC jurisdiction?
RULING: Yes. The court ruled that the COMELEC correctly stated that "the
ascertainment of the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers" is a matter
that is well within its authority. The source of this authority is no other than the
fundamental law itself, which vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In
the exercise of such power and in the discharge of such function, the Commission is
endowed with ample "wherewithal" and "considerable latitude in adopting means and
methods that will ensure the accomplishment of the great objectives for which it was
created to promote free, orderly and honest elections."
In the case at bar, the Party Chairman, purporting to represent the LDP, contends that
under the Party Constitution only he or his representative, to the exclusion of the
Secretary General, has the authority to endorse and sign party nominations. The Secretary
General vigorously disputes this claim and maintains his own authority. Clearly, the
question of party identity or leadership has to be resolved if the COMELEC is to
ascertain whether the candidates are legitimate party standard bearers or not.