A Cultural Perspective On Negotiation

A Cultural Perspective on Negotiation:
Progress, Pitfalls, and Prospects

Michele J. Gelfand* and Naomi Dyer
University of Maryland, USA
Cet article passe en revue les vingt dernie res anne es de recherche sur la culture
et la ne gociation et pre sente les progre s qui ont e te faits, les pie ges dont il faut
se de fier et les perspectives pour de futurs travaux. On a remarque que
beaucoup de recherches avaient tendance a suivre ces deux mode les implicites:
(1) l'influence de la culture sur les strate gies et l'aboutissement de la ne go-
ciation et/ou (2) l'interaction de la culture et d'autres aspects de la situation
imme diate sur les re sultats de la ne gociation. Cette recherche a porte sur un
grand nombre de cultures et a mis en e vidence plus d'un mode le inte ressant.
Nous signalons cependant trois pie ge caracte ristiques de cette litte rature, pie ges
qui nous ont handicape s. Tout d'abord, la plupart des travaux se satisfont de
de nominations ge ographiques pour de signer les cultures et il est par suite
souvent impossible de de terminer les dimensions culturelles qui rendent compte
des diffe rences observe es. Ensuite, beaucoup de recherches ignorent les pro-
cessus psychologiques (c'est-a -dire les motivations et les cognitions) qui sont
en jeu dans les ne gociations prenant place dans des cultures diffe rentes si bien
que nous apprenons peu de choses a propos de la psychologie de la ne gociation
dans des contextes culturels diversifie s. On se heurte ainsi a une bote noire
que les travaux sur la culture et la ne gociation se gardent ge ne ralement d'ouvrir.
Enfin, notre travail n'a recense qu'un nombre restreint de variables situation-
nelles imme diates intervenant dans des ne gociations prenant place dans des
cultures diffe rentes; notre compre hension des effets mode rateurs de la culture
sur la ne gociation est donc limite e. Nous proposons un troisie me mode le, plus
complet, de la culture et de la ne gociation, pre sentons quelques donne es
re centes en sa faveur et esquissons quelques perspectives pour l'avenir.
In this article, we review the last 20 years of research on culture and
negotiation, and discuss progress that has been made, pitfalls which exist, and
prospects for future research. Our review discerned that much research tends
to examine the following implicit models: (1) the influence of culture on
negotiation tactics and outcomes, and/or (2) the interaction of culture and
other proximal situational conditions on negotiation outcomes. This research
has been conducted in a wide variety of cultures, and has illuminated a number
of interesting patterns. However, we describe three pitfalls characterising much
of this literature, which have limited our progress. First, most research uses
________________
* Address for correspondence: Michele J. Gelfand, Department of Psychology, University of
Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742, USA. mgelfand@psyc.umd.edu
APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, 2000, 49 (1), 6299
#International Association for Applied Psychology, 2000. Published by Blackwell Publishers,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
geographical location as a surrogate for culture, and consequently, it is often
not possible to specify the aspects of culture which account for observed
differences. Second, most research ignores the psychological processes (e.g.
motives, cognitions) that are involved in negotiations in different cultures,
and consequently, we know very little about the psychology of negotiation
in different cultures. As such, there is a ``black box'' that remains generally
unopened in culture and negotiation research. Lastly, research has examined
only a limited number of proximal situational conditions in negotiations
across cultures, and thus our understanding of the moderating effects of
culture on negotiation is limited. Based on these concerns, we advance a third
model of culture and negotiation, describe recent support for some of its
relations, and delineate prospects for future research.
INTRODUCTION
Social conflict is ubiquitous, making our ability to understand, predict, and
manage conflict one of the most important challenges facing humankind.
Fortunately, over the last several decades, we have witnessed an explosion of
theory and research on ways to constructively manage conflict (Kramer &
Messick, 1995). Most notably, scholars have offered important conceptual
perspectives and empirical insights on the use of negotiation as one way to
deal with social conflict. Such perspectives include economic models and
game theory (Raiffa, 1982), which offer prescriptive accounts of negotiation
behaviour, as well as motivational (Pruitt, 1981), cognitive (Bazerman &
Carroll, 1987; Thompson & Hastie, 1990), and individual differences models
(Rubin & Brown, 1975), which offer descriptive accounts of negotiation
behaviour. Advances in the science and practice of negotiation are also
evidenced in the proliferation of journal articles, books, and edited series, as
well as courses, seminars, and trainings devoted to this topic. Undoubtedly,
such diverse perspectives have enriched our understanding of this important
conflict resolution technique.
Notwithstanding this progress, in this paper we argue that there is a need
for the development of yet another perspectivea cultural perspectiveto
build on the existing science and practice of negotiation (see also Cai &
Drake, 1998; Janosik, 1987). Theoretically speaking, such a perspective is
important given that the vast majority of studies on negotiation have been
done in Western contexts (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993; Triandis, 1994). As
such, there is a great need to understand what is universal (etic) and culture-
specific (emic) about negotiation theory and research. Practically speaking,
given that the world is becoming increasingly interdependent, such a
perspective would ideally illuminate advice for negotiators who operate
in the global arena. Below, in the spirit of further developing a cultural
perspective on negotiation, we first provide a basic overview of conceptual-
isations of both ``negotiation'' and ``culture''. Next, we review research that
has been conducted on culture and negotiation in the last 20 years.
CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE ON NEGOTIATION 63
# International Association for Applied Psychology, 2000.
Throughout our review, we highlight some of the progress that has been
made as well as some of the pitfalls that exist in research on culture and
negotiation. Lastly, we offer an integrative framework that builds and extends
on this research, and discuss some specific prospects for future research.
NEGOTIATION
Negotiation has been defined as the process by which two or more parties
attempt to resolve perceived incompatible goals (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992).
It is a pervasive form of social interaction that is conducted frequently in
formal arenas, such as international relations, industrial relations, and
managersubordinate relations, as well as in informal arenas, such as
interpersonal relations and marital decision making (Pruitt & Carnevale,
1993). Although these arenas are quite diverse, there are some common
elements of negotiation that are applicable across contexts. Specifically,
negotiation situations have at least five core characteristics: (1) parties
have, or perceive that they have, a conflict of interest over one or more
different issues; (2) parties are engaged in communication designed to
divide and exchange one or more scarce resources, which can be either
tangible (e.g. money, goods) or intangible (e.g. information, rights,
privileges); (3) compromises are possible; (4) parties make provisional
offers and counteroffers to each other; and (5) parties are temporarily joined
together voluntarily, and their outcomes are determined jointly (Chertkoff
& Esser, 1976; Cross, 1965; Rubin & Brown, 1975).
The basic theoretical goal of research on negotiation is to understand the
processes and outcomes of negotiations, whereas the practical or applied
goal is to help negotiators effectively resolve conflicts. While there is not one
specific model or theory of negotiation, within the behavioural tradition of
negotiation, research on negotiators' psychological states, including motives
(Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993) and cognitions (Bazerman & Neale,
1983; Thompson, 1990), has been very useful in understanding negotiations
processes and outcomes. For example, a decade of research has illuminated
the role of motivational variables, such as aspirations and goals, on nego-
tiation tactics and outcomes (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986; Pruitt & Carnevale,
1993). Most notable in this regard is the dual concern model (Pruitt &
Rubin, 1986), which has delineated the effects of different motivational
orientations on strategic preferences in negotiation. Another important line
of research has focused on negotiators' information processing capabilities
and how they impact judgments, behavioural processes, and outcomes in
negotiations (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987; Thompson, 1990). More recently,
there has also been a resurgence of interest on the impact of the social
context on negotiations (Kramer & Messick, 1995), expanding our under-
standing of such issues as negotiators' relationships (e.g. Greenhalgh &
64 GELFAND AND DYER
Chapman, 1995), negotiation teams (e.g. Thompson, Peterson, & Kray, 1995),
and social norms (e.g. Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Below, we continue this
trend by focusing on research on the cultural context of negotiations, which
is arguably the broadest social context in which negotiations occur (Carne-
vale, 1995). Before turning to this literature, we first provide a definition of
culture, and describe ways in which cultures have been found to vary.
CULTURE
Culture has been very broadly defined as the human-made part of the
environment (Herskovits, 1955), consisting of both objective elements (e.g.
tools, roads, housing), and subjective elements, or a ``group's characteristic
way of perceiving its social environment'' (Triandis, 1972, p. 3). The latter
includes a multidimensional array of shared beliefs, norms, ontological
assumptions, roles, and values of a particular group (Triandis, 1972) that
are instantiated in everyday social practices and social institutions, and
which have been historically cultivated and deemed functional across time.
Such elements of culture constitute distinct themes or dimensions, which
are often organised in response to important group and societal concerns
(Schwartz, 1994).
Although early research in cross-cultural psychology was largely
atheoretical and focused mainly on geographical differences, in the last 20
years, there have been numerous dimensions of cultural variation which
have been empirically derived (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994; Triandis,
1982). The most recent research in this area is that provided by Schwartz
and his associates (Schwartz, 1992, 1994; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1990). Based
on extensive research in more than 40 countries, Schwartz theoretically
proposed and empirically validated a circumplex structure of specific
cultural value types. These cultural value types represent different socially
shared abstract ideas about what is good, right, and desirable in a society or
in any culturally bounded group within nations (Smith & Schwartz, 1997).
More specifically, cultures may be differentiated on the degree to which they
value (1) Conservatism (Collectivism): the importance placed upon
interdependence and embeddedness of people in closely knit groups, and
the promotion of group goals; (2) Hierarchy: the importance placed on fixed
(i.e. ascribed) hierarchical roles in structuring interactions and allocating
resources; (3) Mastery: the importance placed on active efforts to modify
the environment and get ahead of others through self-enhancement and
achievement; (4) Autonomy (Individualism): the importance placed on
independence and the pursuit of personal interests and goals, which can
be further differentiated into two components, affective autonomy (i.e.
valuing stimulation and hedonism) and intellectual autonomy (i.e. valuing
flexible thinking and self-direction); (5) Egalitarian Commitment: the
importance placed on transcendence of selfish interests, commitment to
abstract principles, and the promotion of the welfare of others; and
(6) Harmony: the importance placed on the acceptance of the world as it is
and preservation of the larger environment.
According to Schwartz's theory, any nation, or subgroup in a nation may
be characterised by a distinct cultural value pattern or profile which maps
onto the circumplex (Smith & Schwartz, 1997). For example, cultural values
of autonomy are consistent with an emphasis on ambition, competition,
achievement, and success (i.e. mastery), which is most characteristic of the
USA and the UK (Schwartz, 1994). Autonomy values may also be patterned
with egalitarian commitment and harmony values, which is characteristic
of many Western European and Scandinavian cultures (e.g. Norway and
Sweden). Likewise, conservatism values may be patterned with hierarchy
values, which is often found in East Asia, Turkey, and many Latin American
cultures. However, there are also cultures in which conservatism is patterned
with egalitarian commitment, such as the Israeli kibbutz and among
Quakers in the United States.
1
While Schwartz's conceptualisation provides an in-depth understanding
of value importance at the culture level, still another aspect of culture not
represented in his circumplex, which we will argue is relevant to negotiation,
is the degree of variability that characterises cultures. Historically,
variability has been conceived of as a statistical issue, yet at the cultural
level, scholars have also argued that it represents an important cultural
construct. More specifically, cultures can be differentiated on tightness
looseness, which refers to the degree to which situational norms are clearly
defined and reliably imposed across cultures (Chan, Gelfand, Triandis, &
Tzeng, 1996; Gelfand, Chan, Triandis, Yamaguchi, & Nishii, 1998; Pelto,
1968). In tight cultural systems, such as Japan and Germany, there is less
variability in the perception of situational norms, and there is greater
``situational constraint'' on the behavioural patterns that are appropriate
across a wide range of situations. In other words, there is a restricted range
of behaviour that is tolerable within situations, and sanctioning systems are
well developed (Gelfand et al., 1998). By contrast, in loose cultural systems,
such as the USA and Thailand, there is more variability in the perception
of situational norms, and there is a greater range of behaviours that are
appropriate across situations. In such cultures, sanctioning systems are less
well developed (Gelfand et al., 1998).
________________
1
Very similar cultural patterns have been identified by Triandis and colleagues (Triandis,
1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), who discussed patterns of vertical individualism (combination
of autonomy and mastery), horizontal individualism (combination of autonomy and egalitarian
commitment), vertical collectivism (conservatism and hierarchy), and horizontal collectivism
(conservatism and egalitarian commitment).
66 GELFAND AND DYER
Importantly, while all of these cultural patterns can become explicit (as
when one is transplanted to a different culture), they are more often implicit,
and operate at a level of consciousness outside of awareness. For instance,
with respect to individualism, which pervades American culture, Markus,
Kitayama, and Heiman (1997, p. 861) explain that:
the culturally shared idea of the individual self is a pervasive, taken-for-
granted assumption that saturates all of lived experience. It is held in place by
language, by the mundane rituals and social practices of daily life, by the
foundational texts like the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights,
and by virtually all social institutions including the legal system and the media.
In our view, one of the goals of a cultural perspective on negotiation is to
make such implicit themes more explicit, and thus to delineate the myriad of
ways in which aspects of culture become manifest in negotiations. Next, we
review some of the research on culture and negotiation that has been
conducted in the last two decades.
CULTURE ANDNEGOTIATIONRESEARCH
Speculation on cultural influences on negotiation dates back to the early
20th century, as evidenced by the statement made by the diplomat Harold
Nicolson (1939; in Druckman, Benton, Ali, & Bagur, 1976, p. 414):
There exist certain standards of negotiations which might be regarded as perma-
nent and universal. Apart from these standards, which should be common to
all diplomacy, there are marked differences in the theory and practice of the
several great powers. These differences are caused by variations in national
character, tradition, and requirements. One can thus distinguish types or
species of diplomacy and it is important that these distinctions should be
recognized.
Though speculation on cultural influences on negotiation has a long past,
the scientific study of the subject has a short history. It is only in the last 20
years that we have seen an increase in the amount of research on cultural
differences in negotiation. Perhaps most apparent is the abundance of
articles and books providing descriptions and advice on how to negotiate in
numerous countries. To date, one can find information about negotiating
in China (Blackman, 1997; Goh, 1996; Pye 1982; Shenkar & Ronen, 1987),
Japan (Hawrysh & Zaichkowsky, 1989; March, 1988; Van Zandt, 1970),
Korea (Tung, 1991), Mexico (Harris & Moran, 1979), Russia (Schecter,
1998; Smith, 1989), Spain (Burton, 1994) among others (Acuff, 1997; Cohen,
1997; Salacuse, 1991). Likewise, there are a number of in-depth case studies
and archival studies of intercultural negotiations that are available (Anand,
1981; Cohen, 1991; Cohen, 1987; Faure & Rubin, 1993; Glenn, Witmeyer,
& Stevenson, 1977; Kimura, 1980; Strazar, 1981). While such discussions
offer rich accounts of culture-specific negotiation styles and specific
intercultural clashes, they are less useful for testing theories about culture
and negotiation across a variety of contexts.
There are, however, a growing number of empirical cross-cultural
negotiation studies that do offer such potential. Our review of the last 20
years of empirical journal articles discerned that, generally speaking,
researchers studying culture and negotiation examine one or both of the
following implicit models: The influence of culture on negotiation tactics and
outcomes (Model 1) and/or The interaction between culture and proximal
situational conditions on negotiation outcomes (Model 2). To preface the
following discussion, research has been conducted in a wide variety of
cultures, and has illustrated some interesting similarities and differences in
negotiation across cultures. However, for the most part, there is an
abundance of conflicting and unexpected patterns in the literature, making
it difficult to make any generalisations. In our view, this is due to three
general pitfalls. First, much research uses geographical location as a
surrogate for culture, rather than theoretical accounts of culture previously
discussed (Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1994). Consequently, it is not possible
to specify the aspects of culture which account for any differences. Second,
much research ignores the psychological processes (e.g. motives, information
processing) that are involved in negotiations in different cultures, and as
such we know very little about the psychology of negotiation in differ-
ent cultures. Generally speaking, there is a ``black box'' that remains
unopened in the area of culture and negotiation research. Third, research
has examined the effect of only a limited number of proximal situational
conditions (e.g. buyerseller roles) on negotiations across cultures, and thus
our understanding of the moderating effects of culture (e.g. its interaction
with situations) is limited. Below, we will describe some of the previous
research within the aforementioned models, and elaborate on these points.
We then build on this and advance a third model of culture and negotiation
that we offer as a more comprehensive framework. Recent studies that
support components of this model will be described, and numerous
prospects for future research will be delineated.
2
________________
2
This review mostly contains journal articles published in the last 20 years listed in
Psychological Literature (PSYC LIT). Only articles which explicitly considered the role of
culture in negotiation contexts are reviewed. Studies that included samples from other cultures
but did not specifically address the issue of culture were not included, nor were studies on
preferred methods of conflict resolution and conflict styles (i.e. based on Rahim, 1983) which
were more general than negotiations per se. Several recent theses and conference papers which
could be located were also included.
68 GELFAND AND DYER
Model 1. Cultural Influences on NegotiationTactics and
Outcomes
Over the last few decades, numerous studies have examined whether there
are cross-cultural differences in the use of certain tactics and outcomes in
negotiations. The general approach in many of these investigations was
to examine, in laboratory simulations, whether people located in different
nations use different negotiation tactics and/or achieve higher/lower out-
comes. Existing research can be found comparing the tactics and outcomes
of Americans with Brazilians and Japanese (e.g. Graham, 1984), Canadians
(e.g. Adler, Graham, & Gehrke, 1987), Chinese (e.g. Adler, Brahm, &
Graham, 1992), French (e.g. Campbell, Graham, Jolibert, & Meissner,
1988), and Russians (e.g. Graham, Evenko, & Rajan, 1993), among others.
Fig. 1 illustrates the implicit model being tested in many of these studies.
In general, differences are found in most of these studies, yet most used
geographical location rather than cultural dimensions, and thus the reasons
why these differences exist are often unclear. Additionally, the psycho-
logical processes involved were not investigated in most studies, lending
little understanding to the cognitive or motivational underpinnings of the
results.
Culture and Negotiation Tactics. Several studies have examined whether
people use different tactics in negotiations across cultures. Many of these
studies examined one or both of the following questions: (1) Do people
use problem-solving tactics to the same extent in different nations? and/or
(2) Do people reciprocate problem-solving tactics to the same extent in
FIGURE 1. The influence of culture onnegotiation tactics and outcomes.
TACTICS
COUNTRY
(i.e. geographic location)
NEGOTIATION
OUTCOMES
"
"
!
different nations? Because of the aforementioned pitfalls, it is difficult to
discern definitive patterns in the results. For example, Adler and Graham
(1987) and Adler et al. (1987) found that French-speaking Canadians
used fewer cooperative tactics than either Americans, English-speaking
Canadians, or Mexicans in a laboratory simulation of negotiation. Such
results were opposite to what was predicted, namely that French-Canadians
would engage in more cooperation. In a later study, Adler et al. (1992)
found that Americans used fewer cooperative tactics (i.e. questions and self-
disclosure), and more instrumental tactics (i.e. threats and commitments to
positions) as compared to Chinese negotiators. The country of origin also
affected negotiators' nonverbal behaviours. For example, Chinese subjects
interrupted each other less often, and used the terms ``no'' and ``you'' less
often than US subjects. In another study, Graham (1985b) found no dif-
ferences in the degree to which American, Japanese, and Brazilian subjects
used aggressive tactics. However, American negotiators were found to use
aggressive tactics earlier than Japanese or Brazilian subjects. Similar to the
other studies reviewed, the theoretical mechanisms underlying the effects are
unclear.
Other research has examined whether problem-solving tactics are
reciprocated, or matched to the same extent in negotiations in different
cultures (Adler et al., 1987; Adler et al., 1992). However, research on this
question has also yielded equivocal results. Some studies show that, regard-
less of culture, negotiators report that they reciprocate problem-solving
tactics. For example, Graham et al. (1993) found that both Soviet and
American negotiators reported they matched their counterparts' problem-
solving strategies, and Adler et al. (1992) found that American and Chinese
negotiators reported matching their counterparts' tactics as well. On the
other hand, Allerheiligen, Graham, and Lin (1985) found that Japanese
subjects reported more similarity in the use of ``honest tactics'' between
themselves and their counterparts, as compared to both Brazilian and
American negotiators. Likewise, Adler et al. (1987) found that French-
speaking Canadians were much less likely to report that they and their
counterparts reciprocated problem-solving tactics, as compared to Ameri-
cans, Mexicans, and English-speaking Canadians. The authors concluded
that cooperative behaviours are not always reciprocated in negotiations in
all cultures, yet the theoretical underpinnings allowing for predictions were
not specified.
Recently, McCusker (1994) has avoided these pitfalls by offering a
theoretical foundation upon which the reciprocation of tactics may be
based. Specifically, he argued that reciprocation of tactics is more likely to
occur in cultures that emphasise exchange over communal relationships
(Mills & Clark, 1982). In exchange relationships, which tend to be
emphasised more in individualistic cultures, participants keep track of the
70 GELFAND AND DYER
exchanges that occur, and reciprocate them immediately and in kind. By
contrast, in communal relationships, which tend to be emphasised more
in collectivist cultures, benefits are given according to other's needs, and
there is less of an emphasis on reciprocating exchanges. In support of this
theory, McCusker found that immediate reciprocity was more characteristic
of negotiations in the USA as compared to Korea. This study is notable for
its a priori theory regarding reciprocity scripts in negotiation, as well as its
focus on dimensions of cultural variation (e.g. individualismcollectivism)
rather than geographical location.
Culture and Negotiation Outcomes. Another area of inquiry that has
received attention is the influence of culture on negotiation outcomes, such
as individual and joint profits. Several researchers have postulated that
negotiators in certain cultural groups will achieve lower outcomes than
negotiators in other cultural groups. For example, Adler et al. (1987)
predicted that French-speaking Canadians and Mexicans would place less
emphasis on profits and therefore achieve lower monetary outcomes than
English-speaking Canadians and Americans. However, there were no
significant differences among the four groups on profits achieved in a
negotiation simulation. Likewise, Allerheiligen et al. (1985) predicted that
joint outcomes would be lowest for Brazilians, next highest for Americans,
and highest for the Japanese. Their results, however, did not support this
hypothesis. By contrast, Shapira and Bass (1975) did find cultural differ-
ences in outcomes in a study conducted in Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK, and the USA. They found
that Americans were more likely to settle and less likely to deadlock than the
other groups, yet the reason for this difference is unclear.
In a recent study examining outcome differences in negotiation, Nat-
landsmyr and Rognes (1995) did make predictions based on dimensions
of culture, rather than on geographic location. Based on Hofstede (1980),
they created two opposing hypotheses: Norwegians would have more inte-
grative outcomes than Mexicans based on their low masculinity, weak
uncertainty avoidance, and low power distance scores. Alternatively, based
on Hofstede's (1980) individualism scores, they hypothesised that Mexicans
would have more integrative outcomes than Norwegians. Support was
found for their first hypothesis, in that Norwegians had more integrative
outcomes than Mexicans. In addition, supplementary analyses illustrated
that Norwegian offers became more and more integrative as compared to
Mexican offers. Unlike the previous studies, this study did explore some of
the mechanisms underlying differences in outcomes, albeit post hoc, which
represents an important advance.
Studies have also examined whether there are certain tactics (e.g. problem
solving) which are instrumental to attaining high outcomes in all cultures
(Adler et al., 1987; Allerheiligen et al., 1985; Graham, 1983; Graham et al.,
1993; Graham, Kim, Lin, & Robinson, 1988). Again, the evidence regarding
this line of inquiry is mixed. In some studies, Graham and his colleagues
illustrated that an opponent's use of problem-solving tactics increased the
other negotiators' individual profits among certain cultural groups, in-
cluding Americans, Chinese, Soviets, Anglophone Canadians, and French
(Adler et al., 1992; Graham et al., 1993; Graham, Mintu, & Rodgers, 1994).
Other studies by the same authors, however, show no relationship between
opponents' use of problem-solving tactics and individual profits among
Mexicans, Francophone Canadians, British, Chinese in Taiwan, Koreans,
Germans (Graham et al., 1994), as well as Japanese and Brazilian nego-
tiators (Graham, 1983). However, the theoretical rationale for these findings
is lacking.
Finally, some studies have also examined the relationship between nego-
tiators' own problem-solving tactics and their own outcomes across cultures.
While differences have been found, they are difficult to interpret. Some
studies have shown that the use of problem-solving tactics is inversely re-
lated to profits among Soviets (Graham et al., 1993), Mexicans (Adler et al.,
1987; Graham et al., 1994) and French-speaking Canadians (Adler et al.,
1987). Likewise, Allerheiligen et al. (1985) found that Brazilian and Chinese
subjects achieved higher profits when they rated themselves as less honest.
On the other hand, Graham et al. (1994) found there was no relationship
between problem solving and profits for Germans, British, French and
Anglo Canadians, yet there was a positive relationship among problem
solving and outcomes among Taiwanese and Koreans. In sum, these studies
suggest that tactics do not seem always to affect outcomes in the same way
across cultures, yet the particular mechanisms underlying such differences
are not delineated.
Model 2. Culture and the Proximal Context in Negotiation
Our review also found that there were a variety of studies that examined
how culture interacts with proximal negotiation conditions to predict
negotiation outcomes (Fig. 2). Most of the research done in this line of
inquiry has focused on whether negotiators' roles (i.e. buyer or seller)
differentially affect outcomes across cultures. These questions are impor-
tant, as they focus on the interaction of culture with contextual factors, and
thus illustrate the moderating effects of culture on negotiation (in addition to
the main effects). However, as mentioned in the previous discussion, most
studies rely upon geographic location, rather than on dimensions of cultural
variation, and there is a dearth of clear theoretical explanations in this area
of inquiry, making generalisations difficult.
72 GELFAND AND DYER
Culture and Negotiators' Roles. Research suggests that in some cultures
the role of the negotiator (e.g. buyer or seller) is a more important deter-
minant of outcomes than in other cultures. For example, using regression
analysis, Graham (1983) examined the variables that explained the most
variance in outcomes in Brazil, Japan, and the USA. He found that the role
of the negotiator was the most important predictor of outcomes in Japan,
deceptive tactics were the important predictors in Brazil, and represen-
tational (i.e. cooperative) tactics were the most important predictors of
outcomes in the USA. Other studies have demonstrated that negotiators
occupying certain roles (e.g. buyers) obtain higher outcomes in negotiations
in some cultures, but not in others. Specifically, studies have demonstrated
that there are no differences in buyerseller outcomes among Americans
(Adler et al., 1987; Adler et al., 1992; Campbell et al., 1988; Graham et al.,
1988), Chinese (Adler et al., 1992; Graham et al., 1988), French-speaking
Canadians (Adler et al., 1987), and Germans (Campbell et al., 1988). Alter-
natively, buyers outperformed sellers among Japanese (Graham et al.,
1988), Koreans (Graham et al., 1988), Anglo-Canadians (Adler et al., 1987),
FIGURE 2. The interaction between culture and proximal situational conditions on nego-
tiation outcomes.
TACTICS
NEGOTIATION
OUTCOMES
COUNTRY
(i.e. geographic location)
PROXIMAL SOCIAL
CONTEXT
.
Negotiator roles
.
Constituencies
.
Inter versus intracultural
!
"
!
~
British (Campbell et al., 1988), French (Campbell et al., 1988), and Mexicans
(Adler et al., 1987). In most of these studies, the mechanisms underlying
the differential effects of negotiators' role were not assessed. Recently, in a
post hoc analysis, Graham et al. (1994) explored the possibility that cultures
high on power distance (Hofstede, 1980) would place more emphasis on
role-relations, and consequently, roles would have a greater influence on
outcomes in these cultures. In support of this, using Hofstede's (1980)
rankings, Graham et al. (1994) found a significant correlation between the
power distance scores of a nation and the relationship between role and
outcomes. This study is notable in its attempt to integrate a dimension of
culture, with aspects of the proximal negotiation context.
Culture and Negotiators' Relationships. Surprisingly, there have been
few cross-cultural studies on other aspects of the negotiation context in the
last 20 years (e.g. formality of social setting, time pressure, within-team
dynamics). There are a few studies, however, that have looked at aspects of
negotiators' relationships and their impact on negotiations in different
cultures. An early study by Druckman et al. (1976) examined whether
constituents have a differential impact on negotiators across cultures.
Druckman et al. (1976) found that group representation had differential
effects on negotiators in India, Argentina, and the United States. For
example, Americans who negotiated with an audience present made more
offers than with no audience whereas Argentinians with an audience present
made fewer offers than with no audience present. Theoretically speaking,
these effects are hard to interpret, and as we will argue later, this is a ripe
area for research.
With regard to other aspects of negotiators' relationships, there are some
studies that have compared outcomes in intracultural versus intercultural
negotiations, and examined whether such effects vary across cultures. For
example, Adler and Graham (1989) compared outcomes in intracultural and
intercultural negotiations, yet it is difficult to discern definitive patterns in
their results. Americans were more satisfied with their profits in intercultural
as compared to intracultural negotiations, and Japanese and Anglophone
Canadians achieved lower joint profit in intercultural negotiations as
compared to intracultural negotiations. In another study, Graham (1985a)
predicted that outcomes would be lower in intercultural negotiations (i.e.
JapaneseAmerican) as compared to intracultural negotiations (i.e. Japanese
Japanese, or AmericanAmerican), yet no differences were found in this
study. Graham did demonstrate, however, that intracultural dyads used
more problem-solving and cooperative tactics than intercultural dyads.
More recently, Natlandsmyr and Rognes (1995) found that intercultural
groups of Mexicans and Norwegians achieved lower profit than intracultural
groups of Norwegians, yet again there was little empirical attention given to
74 GELFAND AND DYER
the reasons for these differences. The authors speculate that language defi-
ciencies may account for these results. In sum, while it appears that nego-
tiation outcomes (and tactics) can differ in intercultural and intracultural
negotiations, and that such effects can vary by culture, the factors that
contribute to such differences in these studies are not evident.
In a recent study, Chan (1992) provided a theoretical account of why
negotiations with people from one's own group (i.e. in-groups) may differ
from negotiations with people from other groups (i.e. out-groups), and how
this varies across cultures. Based on individualismcollectivism theory,
Chan (1992) proposed that Chinese negotiators would make greater
distinctions between in-groups and out-groups in negotiations, whereas
American negotiators would not make such distinctions. Consistent with
this hypothesis, he found that Chinese negotiators, who were shown to be
more collectivistic, made fewer concessions when negotiating with out-
groups than with in-groups. On the other hand, behaviour of Americans,
who were more individualistic, did not vary as a function of in-group
out-group distinctions. His study departs from others within Model 2 by
examining the moderating impact of culture on negotiation behaviours.
Chan's study is notable in that he measured aspects of individualism
collectivism, and demonstrated that the same negotiation condition
(in-groupout-group) may have differential effects across cultures.
General Summary
As evidenced in this review, existing cross-cultural negotiation research is
quite varied in terms of the topics and cultures investigated. Such research
illustrates the importance of culture, and thus advances the development
of a cultural perspective on negotiation. Indeed, research on this topic
has surely advanced from Harold Nicolson's 1939 speculation on different
``species'' of diplomacy. However, conceptual limitations in this line of
inquiry have impeded our understanding of cultural effects (cf. Zartman,
1993). With some notable exceptions, researchers often utilised post-hoc
explanations to interpret unexpected patterns of results, and generally used
geographical location as a surrogate for culture. For example, culture has
been defined as `à difference in national heritage and permanent residence
of the parties in negotiation'' (Graham, 1983, p. 198). As such, there is a
need to shift the focus from using ``location'' to infer culture, and merely
documenting differences, to making a priori predictions from profiles of
shared cultural values (Schwartz, 1994), and verifying those cultural
assumptions with existing measures. Moreover, most research ignores the
psychology of negotiation in different cultures, and thus we know little
about the cognitive and motivational mechanisms that mediate cultural
effects. This knowledge base would not only help us to understand and
predict negotiations across cultures, but would also aid practitioners in
developing training programmes that help negotiators understand their own
and others' behaviours in intercultural negotiations. Lastly, existing cross-
cultural research treats the system of negotiation simplistically in only
examining a limited range of proximal negotiation conditions. Negotiations
do not occur in a vacuumthey are characterised by a host of contextual or
situational variables (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). In this respect, current
research neglects not only cultural variation in the types of conditions that
may be characteristic of negotiations, but also cultural variation in the
impact that conditions have on negotiators. Below, we build on these
previous models and describe a third model of culture and negotiation
which has received some recent empirical support (i.e. Brett & Okumura,
1998; Gelfand & Realo, in press; Shapiro & Rognes, 1996; Tinsley, 1998).
Model 3: Toward a Dynamic and Psychological Model of
Culture and Negotiation
Fig. 3 illustrates the complexity through which culture is expected to
influence the system of negotiation. Central to this model is that culture is
operationalised on a variety of specific value dimensions. Also paramount
to the model are negotiators' psychological states, which broadly encompass
negotiators' implicit theories and metaphors, judgment biases, reasoning
processes, motives, self-regulation, and affect. As can be seen, aspects of
culture are expected to have direct effects on negotiators' psychological
states. In this respect, the framework advanced is consistent with field
theory (Lewin, 1935), which posits that accounts of social behaviour should
be based on psychological events which exist in the ``life space'' at the time
behaviour is occurring (McCusker & Gelfand, 1997). The framework is also
consistent with culture theory, which asserts that culture affects the psyche
or how people `ènter into meaning'' in social situations (Bruner, 1990;
Markus et al., 1997).
As seen in the model, culture is also expected to moderate certain com-
ponents in the system of negotiation. Specifically, culture is expected to
(1) moderate the influence of proximal situational conditions on nego-
tiators' psychological states (and indirectly influence behaviours), and
(2) moderate the influence of negotiators' psychological states on nego-
tiators' behaviours. Finally, although culture is not shown to have direct
effects on outcomes, we will highlight some indirect effects that culture may
have on outcomes in negotiation, through the dynamic interplay between
culture, psychological states, and negotiation behaviours.
3
________________
3
This builds upon Bazerman and Carroll's (1987) framework which illustrates that nego-
tiators' behaviours affect their counterparts' psychological states.
76 GELFAND AND DYER
FIGURE 3. Towards a more dynamic and psychological framework.
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This perspective highlights the multiple ways in which culture may exert
influence in the system of negotiation. By incorporating theoretical accounts
of culture, psychological processes, and a range of proximal situational
conditions, this model allows for a more complex account of cultural effects
in negotiation. As such, it begins to open the ``black box'' that exists by
attempting to model how and why culture affects negotiation. Below we
elaborate on the relationships depicted in Fig. 3. When possible, we describe
recent studies which support aspects of the model and will also offer a
number of specific prospects for future research.
CULTURAL INFLUENCES ONNEGOTIATORS' PSYCHOLOGICAL
STATES (ANDINDIRECT INFLUENCES ONBEHAVIOURS)
According to Fig. 3, aspects of culture play an important role in directing
negotiators' psychological states, and restricting attention to particular
aspects of the self and the environment. In this view, culture provides the
shared meaning systems, as well as the practices and symbols, through
which individuals understand their environment (Markus et al., 1997). In
the domain of negotiation, we expect that culturally shared meanings will
be reflected in the way negotiators make sense of negotiations (e.g. their
implicit theories, judgments, and ways of reasoning), as well as the way
negotiators are motivated to action (e.g. goals and self-regulation), both of
which are expected to relate to the types of behaviours or scripts which are
enacted in negotiations. Below, we discuss recent research that provides
some support for these notions, and also discuss unexplored questions
regarding cultural influences on negotiators' cognition and motivation.
4
Culture and Negotiator Cognition
Culture and Implicit Theories. Culture is expected to affect negotiators'
`ìmplicit theories'' or schemas (Brett & Okumura, 1998; Gelfand, Nishii,
Dyer, Holcombe, Ohbuchi, & Fukuno, 1998; Tinsley, 1998) and metaphors
invoked (Gelfand & McCusker, forthcoming) about the generalised
negotiation context. All negotiations begin with the implicit recognition
by parties that there is something to negotiate. However, the meaning of
the negotiation context is not `òbjectively'' defined; rather, negotiators
cognitively construct the reality of the social context in which they are
negotiating (Bazerman & Carroll, 1987). In the current view, such
interpretations are grounded in the meaning systems and practices which
________________
4
For space limitations, we will not discuss negotiator affect (see George, Jones, & Gonzalez,
1998, for a recent discussion).
78 GELFAND AND DYER
pervade the larger cultural context, and thus, what negotiators pay attention
to will vary across cultures.
Consistent with Fig. 3, Gelfand, Nishii, et al. (1998) illustrated that
Japanese and American students have different cognitive interpretations
of identical conflict episodes. For instance, American students perceived
conflicts to be concerned with individual rights and autonomy, whereas
Japanese students perceived conflicts to be concerned with violations of
duties and obligations. American students also perceived conflicts to be
more about competition, whereas Japanese students perceived conflicts to
be more about cooperation. Moreover, in a recent study of American and
Japanese negotiators, Brett and Okumura (1998) demonstrated that cultural
differences in cognition have important consequences for negotiation
outcomes. Specifically, they measured aspects of culture (individualism
collectivism and hierarchyegalitarianism) and illustrated that they affected
negotiators' schemas and scripts (i.e. related to self-interest, power, and
information sharing). Their results strongly suggest that incompatible
schemas and scripts made it more difficult to achieve integrative outcomes
in intercultural, as compared to intracultural negotiations (see also Adair,
1999). In related research, Gelfand and McCusker (forthcoming) have also
recently argued that culture is related to ``metaphors in use'' in negotiations,
and proposed that negotiations in the USA are often conceived through
sports metaphors, whereas negotiations in Japan are often conceived in
terms of family household metaphors. They illustrate how these two
metaphors may direct negotiators' attention to particular goals, scripts, and
criteria in negotiations.
The foregoing studies illustrate that conflicts and negotiations are likely
to be perceived quite differently in two cultures, the USA and Japan. Future
research is needed to examine the nature of negotiation schemas and
metaphors in other cultures, which vary on additional dimensions of
culture. One notable study which furthers this endeavour is that of Tinsley
(1998), who linked dimensions of culture with negotiators' beliefs about
normative conflict models. In particular, cultural differences on hierarchical
differentiation (acceptance of social inequality, such as in Japan), explicit
contracting (using formal agreements, such as in Germany), and poly-
chronicity (processing many tasks simultaneously, such as in the USA) were
related to preferences for using authorities, relying on external regulations,
and integrating interests in conflicts, respectively.
Research is also needed on how culture affects other implicit theories in
negotiation, such as negotiators' theories of their counterparts. To date,
there is little known about the factors that contribute to perceptions of trust,
credibility, and competence of negotiators, and how this varies across
cultures. In an early study on person perception and intentions to trust,
Bond and Forgas (1984) illustrated that Hong Kong Chinese placed a
greater weight on perceived conscientiousness in forming trust judgments,
as compared to Americans. Future research can examine these notions in a
negotiation context, as well as examine how other value dimensions affect
expectations that negotiators have of their opponents. Such research may be
very useful to negotiators in intercultural negotiations, who may need to
adapt their styles to develop trust (see Francis, 1991, for an interesting
discussion of adaptation in cross-cultural negotiations).
Additionally, whereas this discussion has focused on culture and the
content of schemas, it is also likely that there will be cross-cultural
differences on the degree of intersubjectivity in negotiators' implicit theories
and metaphors (i.e. degree of socially shared cognition; Resnick, Levine, &
Teasley, 1991), which could have consequences for coordination and
outcomes achieved. For example, there may be more divergence in cognitive
representations of negotiations in loose cultures, as compared to tight
cultures, in which there may be more convergence in cognitive representa-
tions. Such greater equivocality in negotiations in loose cultures may result
in longer negotiations and less coordinated action, yet ones in which there
are more creative solutions, given that such negotiators may have a greater
number of perspectives than in tight cultures.
Culture and Judgment Biases. As illustrated in Fig. 3, culture is expected
to influence the nature and extent of negotiators' judgment biases. To date,
much research has illustrated that negotiators rely on cognitive heuristics
or ``rules of thumb'' which, although useful in simplifying the environment,
can bias negotiator performance (Neale & Northcraft, 1991). For instance,
negotiators have been found to be consistently overconfident and self-
serving (Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992), to view negotiations in fixed-pie
perspectives (Thompson & Hastie, 1990), and tend to devalue the con-
cessions of others (Stillenger, Epelbaum, Keltner, & Ross, 1991), all of which
engender competitive tactics and, often, nonoptimal performance (Neale &
Northcraft, 1991).
From a cultural perspective, while all humans are expected to rely on
heuristics in order to simplify reality, biases in negotiator cognition are
likely directed and sustained by dominant cultural ideals and values, and
thus, the types of biases that are prevalent in negotiation may vary across
cultural contexts. An important area for future research, then, would be to
examine whether biases consistently found in the USA are also found in
other cultural contexts. In a recent study, Gelfand and Christakopoulou
(1999) found that fixed-pie biases, or the degree to which negotiators fail
to understand the interests of their counterparts, were more prevalent in
negotiations in individualistic cultures (the USA) versus collectivist cultures
(Greece). Future research is needed to examine whether judgment biases
such as reactive devaluation (the tendency for the negotiator to devalue an
80 GELFAND AND DYER
opponent's concessions, i.e. what is good for the other must be bad for me),
and negotiators' overconfidence, are exacerbated and sustained in cultural
systems where competition and self-enhancement are natural and expected
(i.e. cultures high on mastery and individualism). An important implication
of this analysis is that there may be unexamined judgment biases which are
more characteristic of negotiators in other cultures. More generally, cross-
cultural research on negotiators' judgments may assist in building more
comprehensive negotiation theories by illuminating a wider range of judg-
ment phenomena.
Culture and Reasoning Processes. Another important area for future
research is how culture affects the way in which individuals process
information and reason in negotiations (Fig. 3). In previous research,
scholars have proposed that there are at least two distinct modes of
processing information, namely an analytical-rational mode and an intuitive-
experiential mode (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). However,
there is little research on cultural differences in the use of these modes in
negotiation. Based on culture theory, we may posit that negotiators in
cultures high on autonomy may rely more on analytical-rational thinking
styles and associated tactics (e.g. development of positions, limits, and use
of logical argumentation and presentation of facts). Indeed, in their well-
known book, Fisher and Ury (1981) advise that successful negotiators are
those who adopt a principled approach, in which they use logic and
deductive thinking, and ``separate the person from the problem''. However,
this esteem for logical thought, which has its roots in individualism and the
Enlightenment (Markus et al., 1997) may not be as valued in negotiations
in other cultures. Negotiators in cultures high on collectivism may rely
more on intuitive-experiential thinking styles and tactics (e.g. appeals to
emotions, presentation of concrete personal stories, and metaphors).
Anecdotal evidence for this can be found in March (1988), who noted that
in Japanese culture, negotiators often appeal to the feelings and goodwill
of others (e.g. the use of amae, ningensei and naniwabushi; see March, 1988,
for descriptions), while the use of logic is generally eschewed (Goldman,
1994; see also Glenn et al., 1977). The important implication of this
analysis is that styles of thinking and associated persuasion tactics may be
effective in one cultural context, but may be ineffectual in other cultural
contexts.
Culture and Motivation
In the current view, negotiators' motivation is also conditioned by the
cultural context in which they are embedded. Much research needs to be
done to illustrate the impact that culture has on the types of goals being
pursued (McCusker & Gelfand, 1997), as well as the impact that culture has
on the way negotiators regulate their goals during negotiations.
Culture and Negotiation Goals. The role of goals has had a long tradition
in negotiation research (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Conceptualisations
include, for instance, the level of concern for self and others (Pruitt &
Rubin, 1986), levels of aspiration (Pruitt, 1981), and particular objectives
which negotiators pursue. From a cultural perspective, such goals and
associated strategies are affected by prevailing meanings and practices in
the larger cultural context, which highlight what is important to the self
in negotiation situations. In support of this, Lytle (1994) found that
dyads' collectivist values were related to relationship goals and priorities
on issues concerning group welfare (and to behavioural tactics, such as
priorities discussion, voicing of agreement, and trading issues). Moreover,
dyads' uncertainty-avoidance values were negatively related to persuasion
goals and priorities on issues involving risk-seeking actions (and to tactics
of procedural remarks and trading of issues). Indeed, as depicted in Fig. 3,
such differences in goals and tactics affected outcomes, in that more
collectivist cultural values were positively related to dyads' negotiated
outcomes on group welfare issues, and this relationship was mediated by the
dyads' priorities on issues concerning group welfare.
Future research would benefit from examining additional cultural values
and their link to negotiators' goals. Wilson and Putnam (1990) have
discussed a variety of negotiators' goals, including instrumental goals
(removing obstacles to a task), identity/face goals (creating and sustaining
positive identities and respect), and competitive/cooperative goals, which
are assumed to affect the types of strategies enacted in negotiations (Wilson
& Putnam, 1990). For example, negotiators in cultures high on conservatism
may be more likely to pursue identity/face goals, and therefore, use tactics
such as social exchanges, questions, and reflective listening in negotiation.
On the other hand, negotiators in cultures high on autonomy may be more
likely to pursue instrumental goals (e.g. removing specific obstacles block-
ing a task) and therefore use tactics such as formal argumentation and
information exchange. It may also be predicted that negotiators in high
mastery cultures will be more likely to focus on winning (e.g. competitive
goals), and therefore use more dominating tactics such as threats or
warnings. Finally, future research may also investigate how aspects of
culture are related to justice motives (e.g. procedural, distributive, inter-
actional) within a negotiation context (see Morris & Leung, this special
issue). For example, we may find that negotiators weigh justice concerns
differently across cultures, with negotiators in cultures high on mastery
prioritising outcome fairness, and cultures high on harmony prioritising
interactional fairness in negotiations.
82 GELFAND AND DYER
Culture and Self-regulation in Negotiation. In addition to the content of
negotiators' goals, we also posit that aspects of culture will impact the ways
in which negotiators regulate their goals. One relevant distinction is whether
individuals regulate their behaviour though primary or secondary control
mechanisms (Weisz, Rothbaum, & Blackburn, 1984). Primary control refers
to attempts to change others and situations to meet one's needs, whereas
secondary control refers to changing oneself to fit with the environment.
Based on Schwartz's (1994) research, it might be posited that negotiators
would be more likely to use primary control mechanisms to regulate goals
in cultures which are high on mastery, whereas negotiators would be more
likely to use secondary control mechanisms to regulate goals in cultures
which are high on harmony. The implication of this analysis is that nego-
tiators' views of the appropriate way to achieve their goals may be quite
different, depending on their particular cultural vantage point.
In sum, future research would benefit from examining how culture affects
negotiators' cognitions (e.g. implicit theories, judgment biases, reasoning
processes) and motives (e.g. goals and self-regulation), each of which are
expected to relate to different negotiation strategies. With respect to inter-
cultural negotiations, this analysis suggests that parties may be construing
identical situations differently, processing the same information differently,
and pursuing different goals, all of which may make it more difficult to
coordinate and come to high quality agreements.
CULTURE, PROXIMAL SITUATIONAL CONDITIONS, AND
NEGOTIATORS' PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES
As illustrated in Fig. 3, there are a number of ways in which culture and
proximal situational conditions are related, including both main effects and
moderating effects. First, culture is expected to affect the types of proximal
situational conditions that characterise negotiations (i.e. have main effects
on situational conditions). There are a variety of situational conditions
which differentiate negotiations (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), including the
nature of the relationship between the parties (e.g. power differentials),
party configurations (e.g. dyadic, group, and the use of third parties),
deadlines (e.g. time constraints), and the social setting (e.g. public or private,
formal or informal). Because cultural contexts differ in terms of distribution
of social practices and everyday situations (Markus et al., 1997), it is likely
that the prevalence of certain types of proximal conditions which are
characteristic of negotiations will vary across cultural contexts (cf. Adler,
1991; Lewicki, Litterer, Minton, & Saunders, 1994; Triandis & Bhawuk,
1997).
Based on Schwartz's research, we may expect that negotiations in cultures
high on conservatism (collectivism) are more likely to involve groups and
third parties, while negotiations in cultures high on autonomy (individual-
ism) are more likely to involve individuals or representatives of groups.
Even when negotiations are between representatives in different cultures, it
is likely that the criteria for their selection will vary across cultures (Lewicki
et al., 1994). For example, cultures high on autonomy (e.g. the USA) may be
more likely to choose representatives based on achieved status (e.g. expertise
or accomplishments), while cultures high on hierarchy (e.g. China) may be
more likely to choose representatives based on ascribed status (e.g. age,
social class). Indeed, other aspects of culture may affect components of the
social setting which are characteristic of negotiations. For example, the
formality of negotiation situations may be linked to tightnesslooseness. We
may expect that in tight cultures (e.g. Germany), negotiations will be more
likely to adhere to more precise protocol and formality (e.g. dress, seating
arrangements), as compared to loose cultures (e.g. Thailand). Likewise, the
degree to which time constraints are imposed on negotiations may also be
linked to the cultural context. In particular, we may find that in cultures
high on mastery, which promote individuals' striving for achievement and
success, there is less time afforded for negotiations, as compared to cultures
high on harmony. Indeed, this is consistent with a ``time is money''
metaphor prevalent in many Western contexts, in which time can be wasted,
spent, and saved (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). While these examples are far
from exhaustive, one important implication of this discussion is that
negotiators in different cultures may invariably face a different pattern of
socially constructed proximal conditions. In the event of intercultural
negotiations, then, it is likely that the situational conditions that the parties
expect and see as natural to the negotiation context are quite different,
which may result in confusion, and perhaps frustration among the parties.
Thus far, we have discussed the ways in which culture is likely to have
direct or main effects on the proximal negotiation context. However, in the
system of negotiation, culture is also likely to interact with proximal
conditions to predict negotiators' psychological states and tactics nego-
tiations (and thus culture will have moderating effects). Put differently, the
impact of proximal situational conditions on negotiators' psychological
states is likely to vary depending on the cultural context. In this respect,
the same `òbjective'' social conditions (e.g. constituents, time pressure,
surveillance, power differentials) are expected to be ascribed different
meanings, and evoke different behaviours, across cultures. Thus, the
meaning of proximal situational conditions is culturally contextualised and
experienced. Importantly, and consistent with Fig. 3, this also suggests that
negotiators' schemas and cognitions within cultures are not staticthey can
change depending on the situation.
Along these lines, Gelfand and Realo (in press) argued that accountability
to one's constituents would differentially affect negotiators' construals,
84 GELFAND AND DYER
tactics, and outcomes among individualists and collectivists. In a negotia-
tion context, accountability is typically activated when representatives are
required to justify their actions after the negotiation, when they are going to
be evaluated, or when their rewards or punishments are in their constituent's
control (Carnevale, 1985). Gelfand and Realo (in press) reasoned that since
accountability is fundamentally a norm-enforcement mechanism (Tetlock,
1992), and norms and standards for behaviour vary for individualists and
collectivists (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Triandis, 1995), accountability to
constituents would activate different cognitive construals and behaviours
across cultures. As predicted, the results of two laboratory studies illustrated
that among collectivists, accountability activated cooperative construals and
behaviours, and resulted in higher outcomes. Among individualists, how-
ever, accountability activated competitive construals and behaviours, and
resulted in lower outcomes. These studies illustrate that the same situation
differentially affected negotiators, depending on their cultural background.
Likewise, Tinsley and Pillutla (1998) demonstrated that identical coopera-
tive instructions activated different meanings among negotiators in the USA
and Hong Kong. Specifically, negotiators in Hong Kong interpreted co-
operative instructions to mean they should strive for equality in outcomes,
whereas US negotiators interpreted the same instructions as indicative of
the need to strive for joint gain. Consistent with Fig. 3, both of these studies
underscore the notion that aspects of culture interact with proximal nego-
tiation conditions to affect cognitions, which can, in turn, affect tactics and
outcomes.
There is much research that needs to be done to further our under-
standing of how culture moderates the impact of proximal situational con-
ditions on negotiators' psychological states and tactics. By way of example,
below we discuss research prospects for additional ways in which relation-
ships with constituents, relationships with opponents, and deadlines may
have differential impact on negotiators' psychological states and tactics
across cultures.
Culture and Constituencies
Parties in negotiation situations often consist of groups of people who are
attempting to reach agreement. These groups often rely on individual agents
to represent their interests, and to conduct transactions that affect the
group's welfare (Rubin & Sander, 1988). For instance, in a business context,
negotiations often take place between representatives of different commit-
tees, departments, or organisations. In such situations, constituents often
give instructions to their representatives with respect to specific limits and
priorities, as well as general strategies in the negotiation (e.g. to compete or
cooperate) (Adams, 1976). As depicted in Fig. 3, the nature and extent of
constituents' influence on negotiators' psychological states is expected to
vary across cultures. For instance, based on the notion that cultures vary on
the degree to which the self is embedded or detached from collectives
(Schwartz, 1994), future research may test the possibility that negotiators'
cognitions and tactics may be more affected by their constituent's instruc-
tions in cultures high on conservatism, whereas they might be more affected
by the process that ensues at the negotiation table in cultures high on
autonomy. In this respect, we may find that in cultures high on
conservatism, negotiators feel they have their ``hands tied'', psychologically
speaking, to a greater extent when given instructions by constituents, as
compared to negotiators in cultures high on autonomy.
Likewise, another dimension on which representative negotiations vary
is on the degree to which constituents are actually observing negotiations
(i.e. representatives are under surveillance versus in private). However, con-
sistent with a cultural perspective, the presence or absence of constituents
during negotiations activates different perceptions, depending on the cul-
tural context of the negotiations. In particular, in high autonomy cultures,
in which independence and privacy are valued, the presence of others may
be interpreted as a sign of distrust, which has been found to increase
competitive construals and behaviours in negotiations (Carnevale, Pruitt, &
Britton, 1979). Yet the presence of constituents in cultures high on con-
servatism may be more natural and expected, and thus may be associated
with perceptions of trust and support among representatives.
Culture and Negotiator Relationships
Future research would benefit from examining the interaction of culture and
other situational conditions that are present in negotiations, such as the
particular relationship that exists between negotiators at the table. For
example, it is likely that negotiators' relative power will have a differential
impact on psychological states and tactics across cultures. Power can be
derived from ascribed status (e.g. one's role), or achieved status (e.g. that
which is gained through acquired resources, such as concessions acquired
in the negotiation, or one's best alternative to negotiated agreements, or
BATNA) (Lewicki et al., 1994; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Based on Schwartz's
research, we may expect that power derived from these two sources will have
different effects in cultures high on mastery versus those high on hierarchy.
For instance, research in the USA has consistently illustrated that nego-
tiators who have power based on a high BATNA, or achieved status, are less
willing to concede, and obtain higher outcomes as compared to negotiators
with a low BATNA (e.g. Bacharach & Lawler, 1981). At the same time,
existing cross-cultural research by Graham and associates has illustrated
that negotiators' status derived from ascribed roles (e.g. buyer versus seller)
86 GELFAND AND DYER
is more predictive of outcomes in hierarchical cultures. Based on this
analysis, it seems plausible that in cultures high on mastery, BATNAs will
have more of an effect on negotiators' intentions and behaviours than
attributes of ascribed status (e.g. age), while the reverse should be true in
cultures high on hierarchy. Indeed, we may also find that neither ascribed
nor achieved status has as much of an impact on negotiators' intentions
and behaviours in cultures high on egalitarian commitment, since status
and power differences are generally eschewed in these cultures (e.g. Israeli
kibbutzim, Finland) (cf. Brett, Adair, Lempereur, Okumura, Shikhirev,
Tinsley, & Lytle, 1998).
Along the same lines, there is virtually no existing research on whether the
behaviour of high power negotiators is invariant across cultural contexts.
Research in Western contexts has illustrated that high power negotiators
typically make fewer concessions and more threats in negotiations, as
compared to low power negotiators (Michener, Vaske, Schleiffer, Plazewski,
& Chapman, 1975). It is important to examine whether this finding is
universal or culture-specific. Perhaps in cultures high on conservatism and
hierarchy, wherein superiors are expected to take care of their subordinates,
high power negotiators will not use competition and threats. Likewise, a
related area ripe for future research is how negotiators respond to relative
power differences that exist between the negotiators. Hornstein (1965) found
that dyads with small power differentials achieved fewer agreements as
compared to dyads with large discrepancies or no discrepancies in power.
In effect, negotiators with small power differentials enter into ``power
struggles'' because lower status negotiators are not willing to accept such
power differences (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). However, it is likely that
discrepancies in power are interpreted differently across cultures, and thus,
relate differentially to negotiators' psychological states and behaviours.
For example, in negotiations in which there is a discrepancy in power,
negotiators in cultures high on mastery values, who gain status through
competition, will be particularly likely to perceive such situations as
competitive.
Culture and Deadlines
Lastly, as illustrated in Fig. 3, an important area for future research is how
deadlines affect negotiators' cognitions and behaviours in different cultures.
In negotiations, there may be situations in all cultures in which deadlines are
imposed by the other party or by one's constituents. From a cultural view,
however, the psychological states activated in such situations are expected to
be influenced by the shared meanings and practices which are prevalent in
the particular cultural context. In this respect, Kruglanski's research on time
pressure may be very relevant to research on culture and negotiation. In
particular, time pressure has been found to activate chronically accessible
schemas (Ford & Kruglanski, 1995). Given that cognitive schemas are
expected to be mediated by the cultural context, we may find that time
pressure will augment the psychological states which are already prevalent in
any particular culture. For example, we may find that time pressure imposed
in the USA (which is high on autonomy and mastery), enhances schemas of
self-interest and competition, since these schemas are assumed to be more
accessible in this context. By contrast, time pressure may enhance schemas
of cooperation in Scandinavian cultures, since these schemas are assumed to
be more accessible in cultures high on harmony.
In sum, in this section, we have argued that future research would benefit
from examining culture and negotiation while incorporating an analysis of
proximal situational conditions. This will allow managers to understand the
types of situational conditions which are likely to characterise negotiations
in other cultures, as well as the differential impact conditions may have on
negotiators.
CULTURE AS A MODERATOR OF THE EFFECT OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES ONNEGOTIATORS' BEHAVIOURS
As illustrated in Fig. 3, we expect that the relationship between psycho-
logical states and negotiators' behaviours will be moderated by aspects of
culture. In this respect, it is argued that the same motivational or cognitive
orientation may have differential effects on tactics, depending on the
cultural context of the negotiations. This is predicated on the notion that
cultures differ not only on prevailing motives and goals, but also on the
instrumentalities of the behaviours that are necessary to achieve goals
(Leung, 1987). Below, we discuss two areas of inquiry as prospects
representing this moderating relationship.
Culture and the Relationship between Motives andTactics
As mentioned previously, the dual concern model (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986)
has been very useful in predicting negotiators' tactics based on negotiators'
concern for self or concern for others. Specifically, contending tends to
occur when negotiators have high concern for self, and low concern for
others; problem solving tends to occur when negotiators have high concern
for self and high concern for other; inaction tends to occur when negotiators
have low concern for self and low concern for others; and yielding tends to
occur when negotiators have low concern for self and high concern for
others (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). This model has received support in a
variety of studies in the USA, using different methodologies (Carnevale &
Pruitt, 1992). While the elements of this theory may be universal, a question
88 GELFAND AND DYER
for future research is whether the relations between selfother concern and
particular tactics are culture-specific. It is possible, for example, that in
cultures high on conservatism, that high self and other concern would result
in the use of indirect and avoiding strategies, given that maintaining
relatedness with the other party is likely to be paramount. This would
suggest that even given the same levels of concern for self and others, differ-
ent strategies may be enacted by negotiators in different cultures. Applied to
an intercultural context, then, it is possible that parties may infer that their
opponents have different goals based on their differing actions, even if they
in fact do share similar goals.
Culture and the Relationship between Cognitions andTactics
Along the same lines, Fig. 3 illustrates that aspects of negotiators' cognition
(e.g. schemas) may not be universally related to negotiation tactics. For
instance, it is possible that in cultures high on autonomy, loss frames will
lead to less concession-making in attempts to minimise personal losses. Yet
loss frames may promote cooperation in cultures high on conservatism,
especially in interactions with in-group members, wherein negotiators may
attempt to minimise group losses through collaboration.
The general implication derived from this analysis is that negotiators'
psychological states may not always relate to the same behaviours
depending on the cultural context. Although we have not discussed other
psychological states, such as negotiators' affect, research may also find that
the same emotions experienced (e.g. anger) may not relate to the same
tactics (e.g. aggression) because of different cultural display rules (see
Mesquita & Frida, 1992, for discussion of the expression of anger in Japan,
for example). As with the previous discussion on motives, this implies that
negotiators may misattribute others' cognitions or emotions of negotiators
in different cultures because they may mistakenly infer that tactics are
invariantly used to express the same psychological states as in one's own
culture.
CULTURE AND THE DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
NEGOTIATORS' BEHAVIOURS, PSYCHOLOGICAL
STATES, AND OUTCOMES
Thus far, we have focused primarily on static relationships between the
constructs in Fig. 3. However, as Bazerman and Carroll (1987) have illus-
trated (and as depicted in Fig. 3), negotiation involves the dynamic inter-
play between a negotiator's behaviours and how they are interpreted by
the negotiator's counterpart; how these interpretations in turn affect the
counterpart's behaviours; and how the counterpart's behaviours are in turn
interpreted by the first negotiatora dynamic process which ultimately
affects negotiators' outcomes. In the current view, this dynamic process is
influenced by culture, based on the notion that culture affects psychological
states, namely expectations and interpretations of the environment. More
specifically, when one's counterpart's behaviours are consistent with one's
cultural expectations, then negotiators may be better able to focus on using
persuasion and information exchange to create value in negotiations, and
thus achieve higher outcomes in negotiations (Shapiro & Rognes, 1996).
Indeed, a recent study by Shapiro and Rognes (1996) provides some
evidence that expectations derived from cultural experiences are import-
ant in the interpretation of tactics, and ultimately outcomes. They found
that higher levels of a dominating orientation (Rahim, 1983) enhanced
integrativeness or joint outcomes among Americans, but reduced the level
of integrativeness among Norwegians. They argued that Americans, who
are from a more individualistic culture, may be more comfortable with
dominating behaviour of their opponents, which would enable them to
continue focusing on creating value in the negotiation. In support of this,
American subjects expected more competition from their counterparts than
did Norwegian subjects. Thus, in this study, because tactics were likely
interpreted differently, they differentially affected outcomes across cultures.
Additional evidence of this phenomenon can be found in studies by Brett
and colleagues (1998), who found that different tactics related to the
creation of joint gain across cultures, and also found that there were cultural
differences in the beliefs about the behaviours which are important in the
creation of value.
Future research is needed to further our understanding of this dynamic
process, in other words, how psychological states derived from the larger
cultural context affect how negotiation behaviours are interpreted, and how
this affects negotiation outcomes. Below, we offer two examples as a further
illustration of such possibilities.
Culture,Task versus Relationship Frames, and the Creation
of Value across Cultures
One example of this relationship pertains to the belief suggested by
negotiation scholars that a focus on the task leads to higher negotiation
outcomes, as compared to a focus on emotions or relationships (Drake &
Donohue, 1994; Fisher & Ury, 1981; Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). For
example, Fisher and Ury (1981) caution negotiators that extensive concern
with the relationship will inhibit effective conflict resolution and lead to
suboptimal outcomes, and argue that negotiators should ``separate the
person from the problem''. Likewise, Carnevale (1985) warns that a focus on
emotions can lead to suboptimal outcomes. Presumably, relationship or
90 GELFAND AND DYER
emotional frames distract negotiators from uncovering trade-offs, which
results in poorer integrative agreements. Consistent with these premoni-
tions, research in the USA has illustrated that a focus on the task, rather
than relationships or emotions, leads to higher outcomes (Drake &
Donohue, 1994; Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). From a cultural perspective,
however, what is implicit in this analysis is that such frames and behaviours
are consistent with the psychological states or expectations and norms
relevant to individualism and autonomy. Yet since a focus on relationship
and emotional aspects of situations is presumed to be adaptive for
negotiators in cultures high on conservatism, these frames and related
tactics may afford negotiators in these cultures the ability to discover more
creative solutions. In other words, we may find that ``merging the person
with the problem'' is more sage advice for creating value for negotiators in
these contexts.
Culture, Patterns of Offers and the Creation of Value
across Cultures
Following from the above logic, another important area for future research
is how patterns of offers are related to outcomes across cultures. A common
finding in the USA is that higher first offers, which are combined with many
concessions, are more effective in obtaining high outcomes, as compared to
moderate first offers and fewer concessions (Lewicki et al., 1994). In the
current view, this ``door in the face'' script is likely grounded in cultural
expectations about the importance of creating an impression of strength,
and making use of norms of reciprocity (e.g. give-and-take concession
making). In other cultural contexts, however, these tactics are likely to take
on different meanings. In cultures high on conservatism, for example,
extreme bids may be perceived as interfering with interdependence and
embeddedness in groups. In these cultures, research may find that a ``foot in
the door'' technique, in which negotiators made moderate first offers to
signal flexibility, is more conducive to obtaining high outcomes. The
important implication of this analysis is that a particular pattern of offers
may be more or less effective depending on the cultural context.
In sum, culture is expected to influence the dynamic interplay between the
behaviours and psychological states within a negotiation dyad, and
ultimately, the outcomes achieved, and future research is needed to illustrate
such effects.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have documented some of the progress and pitfalls in
culture and negotiation research. Undoubtedly, the scientific study of
culture and negotiation has burgeoned in the last several decades, and we
have made much progress since Harold Nicolson's original speculations in
1939. We have detailed two implicit models that have been investigated in
culture and negotiation research, and illustrated that this research has been
subject to a number of pitfalls. We then offered a third model, which
illuminates the multitude of ways in which aspects of culture may influence
the system of negotiation. While there are some studies which are supportive
of the relations in this model, there is much to be done, and we discussed
some specific, testable possibilities for future research. Ultimately, by
examining specific value dimensions, negotiators' psychological states, and
proximal situational conditions in negotiations, and by examining both
main and moderating effects of culture, we will build a theoretical under-
standing of culture and negotiation, and begin to see into the ``black box''.
This research will also invariably help us to advance a cultural perspective
on negotiation, as well as to understand what is universal (etic) and culture-
specific (emic) about negotiation theories which have been developed in
Western contexts.
Practical Implications
In addition to the added theoretical knowledge, the advancement of a
cultural perspective has important practical implications. As world trade
and global economic activity have grown exponentially, many organisations
have become primarily international in their strategy, structure, markets,
and resource bases (Adler, 1991). As a result, there has been a great increase
in the frequency of intercultural negotiations. Unfortunately, managers who
are negotiating across cultural borders still do not have much in the way of
theoretically based knowledge to rely on during such encounters.
The framework discussed can provide some practical advice for managers
who are negotiating across cultures. Specifically, managers will be in a better
position to negotiate more effectively if they understand that in intercultural
situations, negotiators from different cultures may (a) be used to different
proximal situational conditions, (b) hold different implicit theories and
judgment biases, (c) process information differently, (d) pursue different
goals, regulate goals differently, and use different tactics, and (e) react dif-
ferently to conditions, cognitions, goals, and behaviours, all of which may
in turn, impact negotiated outcomes. Furthermore, given that aspects of
culture are generally implicit, these differences may be particularly difficult
to recognise in intercultural negotiations. Indeed, as argued previously, it
may even be difficult for parties in intercultural negotiations to recognise
when they have similarity in goals, especially if they are using different
tactics to achieve them. To help managers negotiate more successfully,
cross-cultural training programmes need to be designed that focus on
92 GELFAND AND DYER
theoretically based frameworks which try to make the implicit more explicit,
and delineate the reasons why such differences exist.
Implicit in this analysis is that intercultural negotiations may result in
more coordination problems and lower outcomes, as compared to intra-
cultural negotiations (Brett & Okumura, 1998). However, it is important
to examine the conditions under which such differences actually benefit
negotiators in intercultural situations. Often research assumes that inter-
cultural negotiations are always more difficult and result in lower outcomes
than intracultural negotiations, yet the opposite may be found as well. For
example, intracultural negotiations may actually be more competitive and
result in lower outcomes in cultures high on mastery, as compared to inter-
cultural negotiations between negotiators from cultures high on mastery and
negotiators from cultures high on harmony. In the latter case, both parties
may not be equally susceptible to self-enhancement biases and competition,
which may result in more cooperative processes and higher outcomes. Indeed,
Schwartz's research may allow for more precise predictions regarding the
conflict and complementarity of cultural value types in intercultural
negotiations, and thus, may ultimately afford a more refined understanding
of both the difficulties and opportunities found in intercultural negotiations.
In conclusion, in the coming 21st century, a cultural perspective on
negotiation will undoubtedly benefit both scholars and practitioners alike.
As cross-cultural ventures are becoming increasingly pervasive in organ-
isations, strong a priori theory and research on negotiation is crucial to the
success of global business endeavours. We are optimistic that in the next
review of cross-cultural industrial and organisational psychology in Applied
Psychology: An International Review, the field of culture and negotiation will
have advanced considerably, offering much to our science and practice.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors thank Todd Betke, Harry Triandis, Kwok Leung, Dean Pruitt,
Debra Shapiro, Alexandria Dominguez, and Jana Raver for comments on
earlier versions of this manuscript. Portions of this paper were presented at
the 1996 conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational
Psychology, St Louis.
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