Administrative Law Finals Reviewer

AY 2009-2010 2nd Semester Dean Salvador Carlota D2012

Buenaventura, Deveraturda, Esperas, Flores, Gervacio, Go, Mancao, Manotoc, Oposa, Orbeta, Prado, Refran, Santos, Santos

I. HISTORICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AS A DISTINCT FIELD OF PUBLIC LAW 1. Factors responsible for the emergence of administrative agencies
Past: NO need for regulatory agencies because problems were simple and straightforward. Modern Age: Government was NO longer able to employ its powers under the doctrine of separation of powers, hence, there was a NEED for delegation of powers. ! BIRTH of ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES FACTORS (according to Justice Laurel in the Pangasinan case): o Growing complexity of modern life o Multiplication of subjects of governmental regulation o Increased difficulty of administering laws FACTORS (according to Stone): o Lack of TIME ! On the part of government, to respond to problems ! Trichotomy can no longer cope with complexities ! Obvious solution: create admin agencies and delegate powers o Lack of EXPERTISE ! New problems require expertise to solve technical and specific issues (i.e. pollution, energy, labor) o Lack of ORGANIZATIONAL APTITUDE for effective and continuing regulation of new developments in society ! Trichotomy too unwieldy to be able to concentrate on specialized areas Administrative agency than stagnation/decline proliferation rather

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2. The doctrine of separation of powers and the constitutional position of administrative agencies
Doctrine of separation of powers o 3 branches of government not encroaching on the powers of each other o Not ABSOLUTE separation o System of checks and balances More hospitable interpretation of the doctrine (according to Stone) The trichotomy can no longer take care of the problems because society has become too complex thereby preventing the 3 branches from responding to the problems effectively. Delegation of powers emerged because of the necessity under the modern conditions (Dicey) o Administrative agencies became the catch basin for the residual powers of the 3 branches o Without the agencies, the system will COLLAPSE and there would be chaos, confusion and anarchy Agency v. Trichotomy o Agency has expertise and time o Trichotomy lacks expertise, time and organizational aptitude therefore delegates to admin agencies Aim of delegation absolutism/tyranny to prevent

and other than a legislative body, which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule making (Davis) o Any governmental authority: other than a court or a legislative body; can assume many labels (commission, board, authority, office) ! Based on the constitution ! Sovereignty resides in the people and all governmental authority emanates from them TYPES: o Statutory agencies created by law/Congress (NLRC, SEC) o Constitutional agencies created by the Constitution ! COMELEC, COA, CSC ! Insulated from the influence of the 3 branches; cannot be abolished by Congress ! Independent, can only be abolished or modified through a constitutional amendment ! Protective devices: security of tenure, impeachment as method of removal, fiscal autonomy, prohibited from holding other office

C. CASES:
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 1940: Administrative function, involving the use of discretion, to carry out the will of the legislature (National Assembly in this case) can be delegated to admin agencies like the PSC. o The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of power, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.

Admin agencies o Fuses legislative (rule making), administrative (implementing rules) and judicial functions o Hybrid functions do not endanger separation

B. DEFINITION OF TERMS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY; TYPES OF AGENCIES

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW the law concerning the powers and procedures of administrative agencies including specially the law governing judicial review of administrative actions o Powers: corresponding to executive, legislative and judicial o Procedures: in adjudication, licensing, rule making ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY any governmental authority other than the court

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. v. PASAY TRANSPORTATION CO., 1932: SC exercises judicial, NOT administrative, functions. o The SC and its members should cannot be required to exercise any to perform any trust or to assume not pertaining to or connected administering of judicial function. not and power or any duty with the

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NOBLEJAS v. TEEHANKEE, 1968: Investigating and disciplining court officials are executive functions which the Constitution placed under the Presidents supervision and control, NOT the SC. o If the legislature had really intended to include in the general grant of privileges or rank and privileges of Judges of the CFI the right to be investigated by the SC, and to be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it would violated the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.

A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.

GARCIA v. MACARAIG, JR., 1971: The practice of judges collaborating with other offices should be discontinued. o Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of long standing to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.

IN RE: RODOLFO MANZANO, 1988: SC is not allowed to perform administrative functions. o Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

PUYAT v. DE GUZMAN, 1982: Members of the National Assembly are prohibited by the Constitution to appear as counsel before any administrative body.

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II. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

A. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE EXECUTIVE POWER OF THE PRESIDENT
Art. 7, Section 1. Executive Power The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. Art. 7, Section 17. Control over admin agencies The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Executive power: To promulgate or execute laws Control: Power to alter, modify or overturn the judgment of the subordinates o See to it that subordinates are doing their jobs o Limited to executive departments, bureaus, offices Supervision: Ensure that laws are faithfully executed o More encompassing than control no qualification Can the President control ALL admin agencies? ! It depends on whether the enabling statute has given power of review to the President o Under Sec. 17, Art 7, President has control over agencies created by statutes ! Power of legislature over agencies must be subordinate to Sec. 17 o If the law is silent, theres a presumption that the Congress intended for the President to have control. No need to put it in the law. o Constitutional agencies (i.e. Comelec and CoA) are NOT controlled by the President because they are independent constitutional creations

Oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with program objectives; (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered; (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority; and (e) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public interest. Categories of congressional oversight functions: " Scrutiny primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. Based primarily on the power of appropriation and power of confirmation " Investigation recognized under Sec 21, Art. 6 of 1987 Consti " Supervision connotes a continuing and informed awareness regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. Exercised thru the veto power.

C. ARTICLE: LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING (CARLOTA)

Legislative control over Admin agencies: " Power of creation, appropriation and investigation o Creation congress creates rather than abolishes as society becomes more complex. State is compelled to create admin agencies to deal with problems brought by social and economic change. o Appropriation Congress has the power to withhold funds for the agencies but at the end of the day it is reluctant in wielding such power because is recognizes that is it does, it will affect public interest. o Investigation limited tool to provide as effective regular control of improper exercise of admin power. " Non-delegation doctrine and the requirement of legislative standards o The more specific the standards are, the greater are the chances of confining administrative discretion within proper limits. If the standards are too broad or vague, the administrator is virtually left to his own devices, thereby allowing him to exercise discretion in the performance of his functions. o A review of the cases decided by the SC shows that in many instances of delegation, the legislature is unable

B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT POWER

o o o Seeing to it that the agencies follow legislative intention Part of Congress prerogative in delegating powers of Congress to agencies Scrutiny, investigation, legislative supervision

MACALINTAL v. COMELEC (DISSENT AND CONCURRING OPINION OF JUSTICE PUNO), 2003: The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by congress to enhance its understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted.

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to provide definite of specific standards. Administrative procedure as a mode of control o There are certain factors to be considered in prescribing rules: (a) admin agencies are not bound by the same technical rules of procedure and evidence followed in regular courts; (b) agencies are created to deal with specific problems. o Even if it is possible, which is not, to impose uniform rules of procedure in all levels of all agency operations, such a move is clearly unsound o Legislature should only provide minimum procedural guidelines and general principles to be observed by all agencies in the performance of their rule making and adjudicative functions. This will assure sufficient room for the agencies to come up with supplementary rules that may be needed from time to time, while at the same time, it will provide adequate protection to the individuals constitutional right to due process.

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Judicial review of Admin decision making: o The purpose of judicial review is to keep the admin agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestall arbitrary and unjust adjudications. o Class notes: o Judicial review is the most effective form of control provides immediate relief to complainant ! Part of police power ! Channel for adversely affected parties to vindicate constitutional rights o Judicial review is limited or restrained: ! For policy choices: court does not interfere with agencies ! Discretion: no interference UNLESS there is grave abuse of discretion

profession, removable only by impeachment, can appoint all officers and employees of his office o Accessibility and expedition within the reach of ordinary citizens; as opposed to the courts which are not easily within reach of poor o Investigatory power the Ombudsman not only has the power to investigate but also the power to prosecute on his own initiative or upon complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. o Absence of revisory jurisdiction Ombudsman cannot modify or overturn decisions of admin agencies performing rule making or adjudicative functions. He may not exercise the function for an appellate or reviewing court. Is the Ombudsman institution workable in the Philippines? NO o The perception that the Ombudsmans role as Protector of the People has not been satisfactorily performed can be reversed by adopting measures designed to correct perceived shortcomings.

E. CASES:
Absence of Revisory Power CONCERNED OFFICIALS OF THE MWSS v. VASQUEZ, 1995: The Constitution and the Ombudsman Act DID NOT INTEND to confer upon the Ombudsman veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. o In the case at bar, the Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged orders, has not only directly assumed jurisdiction over, but likewise preempted the exercise of discretion by, the Board of Trustees of MWSS.

What are Covered by the Investigatory Power of the Ombudsman LASTIMOSA v. VASQUEZ, 1995: The Ombudsmans power to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by public officials covers those acts and omissions which are related to AND those NOT related to the performance of the public officials duties. It is enough that the act or omission was done by a public official. o The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on

D. ARTICLE: THE OMBUDSMAN: ITS EFFECTIVITY AND VISIBILITY AMIDST BUREAUCRATIC ABUSE AND IRREGULARITY (CARLOTA)
" Essential characteristics of an Ombudsman: o Political independence fiscal autonomy, prohibition to practice

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complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.

impeachment or over Members of Congress and the Judiciary. Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officials. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the SC, for appropriate action. Sec 6, Art. 8 of the Consti exclusively vests in the SC admin supervision over all courts and court personnel. Hence, it is the SC that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the proper admin action against them if they commit any violation of the laws.

BIR v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 2002: The power of the Ombudsman to investigate encompasses ALL kinds of acts or omissions committed by any public official o The power to investigate and to prosecute which was granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The Ombudsman Act makes it perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employeeduring his tenure of office.

Extent of Ombudsmans Investigatory and Disciplinary Powers LEDESMA v. CA, 2005: The Ombudsmans decision in admin investigations is not merely advisory but in fact has a BINDING effect upon the officer to which the decision is directed to. o o The case involved the interpretation of the word recommend as used in Sec 13(3), RA 6770. The Ombudsman has the authority to determine administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. By stating that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken against an erring officer or employee, provisions in the Consti and RA 6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case is the BID.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ENOC, 2002: The Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan AND also those cognizable by regular courts. o The jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Sec 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special Prosecutors power is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutor power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases.

ESTAJIRA v. RANADA, 2006: The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. o Through the enactment of RA 6770, specifically Sec 15, par 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary. Thus, under RA 6770 and the Consti, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.

Those NOT covered by Ombudsmans power to investigate FUENTES v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMANMINDANAO, 2001: Under the Ombudsman Act, the Ombudsman has NO power to initiate or entertain criminal or administrative complaints against the Judiciary (i.e. judges). SC has the power to investigate such complaints. o Sec 21, RA 6770: Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority, Exceptions - except over officials who may be removed only by

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. MASING, 2008: The law gives the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority over erring officials. o The manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full

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administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberationsthe Ombudsman under the Consti and RA 6770 is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees.

III. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

A. LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION 1. Non-delegation Doctrine
Potestas delegate non delegare potest cannot delegate delegated power Completeness Test: o Policy already clearly enunciated o Standard to be observed already fixed delegate must follow Requirements for Valid Delegation PEOPLE v. VERA, 1937: Requirements for proper delegation (1) clear policy and (2) fixed standards. Act 4221 does not meet these 2 requirements therefore there was undue delegation of legislative power. o In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature. ! CLEAR POLICY As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. ! FIXED STANDARDS In the case at bar, the provincial boards of the various provinces are to determine for themselves whether the Probation law shall apply to their provinces or not at all. The applicability and application of the Probation Act are entirely placed in the hands of the provincial boards. If a provincial board does not wish to have the Act applied, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount for the salary of a probation officer.

PELAEZ v. AUDITOR-GENERAL, 1965: Requirements for proper delegation (1) clear policy and (2) fixed standards. Sec 68 of Revised Admin Code does not meet both requirements hence there was undue delegation. o Although Congress may delegate to another branch of Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of law, it is essential to forestall

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a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Sec 68 does not meet these well settled requirements for valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. If the validity of the delegation of powers in Sec 68 was upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or interest. Such grant would be a virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of Executive.

CHIONGBIAN v. OROBOS, 1995: There was a standard provided for by the law. o With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in RA 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business.

ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST v. ERMITA, 2005: The law is complete theres a clear policy and there are standards. o Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what it the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, there is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President.

Valid Delegation PHILPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION v. ALCUAZ, 1989: There is NO undue delegation of power since the law fixes a standard for the exercise of power conferred. o In case of delegation of rate fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. NTC, in the exercise of its rate fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. In Vigan Electric v. Public Service Commission, the SC made a categorical classification as to when the rate fixing power of admin bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative: When such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to ALL enterprises of a given kind throughout the Phils ! LEGISLATIVE function ! NO need for NOTICE and HEARING unless the law requires otherwise (i.e. the Admin Code) When the rate fixing applies to one entity only ! QUASI-JUDICIAL function ! there should be NOTICE and HEARING to allow the party to introduce evidence to disprove findings of admin agency o

FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION v. AL GONQUIN, 1976: There are sufficient standards provided for by the law. o It establishes clear preconditions to Presidential action Inter alia, A finding by the Secretary of the Treasury that an "article is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security." Moreover, the leeway that the statute gives the President in deciding what action to take in the event the preconditions are fulfilled is far from unbounded. The President can act only to the extent "he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national security." And 232(c) articulates a series of specific factors to be considered by the President in exercising his authority under 232(b).

Implied Standards EDU v. ERICTA, 1970: Standards could be implied from the policy and purpose of the law considered as a whole.

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To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, the legislative objective is public safety.

things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action to spend. The Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the GG to say what was and what was not any cause for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn and under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold

SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, 1997: There was undue delegation of power because RA 6735 failed to satisfy both requirements for a valid delegation. o COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the constitution through the system of initiative. It does not have the power under RA 6735.

AGUSTIN v. EDU, 1979: There is NO undue delegation of power since a standard has been set. o o The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the States police power intended to promote public safety. Quoted the ratio in Edu v. Ericta

FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION v. MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, 1931: There was no undue delegation of powers. o BP 130 insofar as it empowers the Minister of Labor to assume jurisdiction over labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest and thereafter decide it or certify the same the NLRC is not on its face unconstitutional for being violative of the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power. It must be stressed anew, however, that the power of compulsory arbitration, while allowable under the Constitution and quite understandable in labor disputes affected with a national interest, to be free from the taint of unconstitutionality, must be exercised in accordance with the constitutional mandate of protection to labor.

Undue Delegation No Fixed Standards CIA. GENERAL DE TOBACCO v. BOARD OF PUBLIC UTILITY, 1916: There was undue delegation of legislative power to the Board. There was no standard fixed by the law and the Board was left to its own judgment and discretion. o The provision complained of does not lay down the general rules of action under which the commission shall proceed, nor does it itself prescribe in detail what those reports shall contain. Practically everything is left to the judgment and discretion of the Board which is unrestrained as when it shall act, why it shall act, how it shall act, to what extent it shall act, or what shall it act upon. The legislature, by the provision in question, has abdicated its power and functions in favor of the Board with respect to matters therein referred to, and that such Act is in violation of the Act of Congress.

PANAMA REFINING CO. v. RYAN, 1935: There was no standard provided for by Sec 9(c). o Sec 9(c) leaves to the states and to their authorities the determination of what production shall be permitted. It does not qualify the Presidents authority by reference to the basis or extent of the states limitation of production. It does not state whether or in what circumstances or under what conditions the President is to prohibit the transportation of the amount of petroleum produced in excess of states permission. It gives to the President an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit. Class Notes:

US v. ANG TANG HO, 1922: There was undue delegation of power when Act 2868 authorized the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. o By Organic Law, all legislative power is vested in the legislature and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the GovernorGeneral, or anyone else. The Legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of

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The dissent of Cardozo is the more persuasive opinion it considered what was the power delegated to the President According to Cardozo there are standards (i.e. natural resources limitation) View the statute as a whole

A.L.A. SCHECTER POULTRY CORP. v. US, 1935: There are no standards provided for by the law regarding the power given to the President. o Sec 3 of the Recovery Act supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact determined by appropriate admin procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe the. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered.

down policies and establishing standards, while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determination of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is to apply. Authorizations given by Congress to selected instrumentalities for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of facts to which legislation is directed, have constantly been sustained. Moreover, the Congress may not only give such authorizations to determine specific facts but may establish primary standards, devolving upon others the duty to carry out the declared legislative policy, that is, to fill up the details under the general provisions made by the legislature.

LOVINA v. MORENO, 1963: Determination of findings of fact may validly be delegated to administrative agencies. o It is true that the exercise of the Secretarys power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of some questions of fact; but these functions, whether judicial or quasijudicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power granted by law to clear navigable streams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and authorities are clear that they are validly conferrable upon executive official provided the party affected is given opportunity to be heard. Delegation by Congress to executive or administrative agencies of functions of judicial, or at least, quasi-judicial functions is incidental to the exercise by such agencies of their executive or administrative powers. It is not in violation of the separation of powers nor is it in violation of due process.

WHITE v. ROUGHTON, 1976: Personal standards cannot be used to determine w/n to terminate welfare assistance. o Defendant Roughton as administrator of the general assistance program has the responsibility to administer the program to ensure the fair and consistent application of eligibility requirements. Fair and consistent application of such requirements requires that Roughton establish written standards and regulations. At the hearing in the district court on the preliminary injunction, defendant Roughton admitted that he and his staff determine eligibility based upon their own unwritten personal standards. Such a procedure, vesting virtually unfettered discretion in Roughton and his staff, is clearly violative of due process. o

b.

Filling in of Details

ALEGRE v. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, 1929: The authority to fill in details in carrying out the law is not legislative power and may thus be validly delegated to administrative agencies. o Board and commissions now play an important part in the administration of our laws. The great social and industrial evolution of the past century, and the many demands made upon our legislatures by the increasing complexity of human activities, have made essential the creation of these administrative bodies and the delegation to them of certain powers. Though legislative power cannot be delegated to boards and commissions, the Legislature may delegate to them administrative functions in carrying out the purposes of a statute and various

2. Permissible Delegation a. Ascertainment of Fact

PANAMA REFINING CO v. RYAN, 1935: Leaving to administrative agencies the determination of facts is not unlawful delegation of legislative power. o The Constitution has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function in laying

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governmental powers for the more efficient administration of the laws. The law provides in detail for the inspection, grading and baling of hemp and by whom and how it should be done, and creates the Fiber Board with power and authority to devise ways and means for its execution. That is not a delegation of legislative power. It is nothing more than a delegation of administrative power in the Fiber Board, to carry out the purpose and intent of the law.

licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are to be determined after hearing. (6) Person includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization of any character other than an agency. (7) Party includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited purposes. (8) Decision means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and granting of rights and privileges. (9) Adjudication means an agency process for the formulation of a final order. (10) License includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege. (11) Licensing includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license. (12) Sanction includes the whole or a part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive action. (13) Relief includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person. (14) Agency proceeding means any agency process with respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing. (15) Agency action includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof. SECTION 3: FILING

c.

Administrative Rule-Making

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE, BOOK VII, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SECTION 1: SCOPE This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole and state universities and colleges. SECTION 2: DEFINITIONS As used in this Book: (1) Agency includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government corporations with respect to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law. (2) Rule means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public. (3) Rate means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including individual or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometerage, and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and followed by any person. (4) Rule making means any agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. (5)Contested case means any proceeding, including

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(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any part or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. SECTION 4: EFFECTIVITY In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. SECTION 5: PUBLICATION AND RECORDING The University of the Philippines Law enter shall: (1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables. SECTION 6: OMMISSION OF SOME RULES (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. SECTION 7: DISTRIBUTION OF BULLETIN AND CODIFIED RULES The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified

rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. SECTION 8: JUDICIAL NOTICE The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules. SECTION 9: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.

i.

Limits Power

on

Rule-Making

OLSEN & CO, INC v. ALDENESE, 1922: The authority of administrative agencies to make rules and regulations is confined to the specific purpose provided in the law. o The power of the Collector of Internal Revenue to make rules and regulations is confined to the making of rules and regulations for the classification, marking, and packing of tobacco as may be necessary to secure leaf tobacco of good quality and its handling under sanitary conditions. It is for such purpose only that the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to make any rules or regulations. Analyzing the power conferred, it will be found that the provisions of the legislative act are not limited to the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya, or to any province, and that there is no limitation as to the place where the tobacco should be grown in the Philippine Islands.

SY MAN v. JACINTO, 1953: Administrative regulations must not be inconsistent with the law. o The Revised Administrative Code provides that every chief of bureau shall prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law to carry into full

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effect the laws relating to matters within the bureaus jurisdiction. A form or regulation promulgated by a Bureau Chief must not be inconsistent with law. Therefore, if the law does not give the Commissioner the power to review and revise unappealed decisions of the Collector of Customs in seizure cases, then the memorandum order even if duly approved and published in the Official Gazette, would equally have no effect for being inconsistent with law. o

PEOPLE v. MACEREN, 1977: An administrative regulation must be in harmony with law. o Administrative regulations should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and should conform to the standards that the law prescribes. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. The regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.

internal revenue laws cannot be controverted. Neither can it be disputed that such rules and regulations, as well as administrative opinions and rulings, ordinarily should deserve weight and respect by the courts. Much more fundamental than either of the above, however, is that all such issuances must not override, but must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. The conclusion is unavoidable that the executive order has been designed to be in the nature of a general grant of tax amnesty subject only to the cases specifically excepted by it.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA, 1995: Administrative regulations cannot extend or amend the law. o The conclusive effect of administrative construction is not absolute. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. In this regard, it must be stressed that the function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. The power of administrative agencies is thus confined to implementing the law or putting it into effect. Administrative regulations cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. And in case there is a discrepancy between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails. The DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power when it issued the Administrative Circular. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account because the law is very specific that the deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP bonds.

TOLEDO v. CSC, 1991: Administrative regulations cannot amend an act of Congress. o The provision on 57-year old persons in the Revised Civil Service Rules cannot be accorded validity. As already pointed out, it is entirely a creation of the CSC, having no basis in the law itself which it was meant to implement. It cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is meant to carry into effect. It was therefore an unauthorized act of legislation on the part of the CSC, it cannot be justified as a valid exercise of its function of promulgating rules and regulations for that function may legitimately be exercised only for the purpose of carrying the provisions of the law into effect. By its administrative regulations, the law itself cannot be extended; said regulations cannot amend an act of Congress.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. CA, 1995: Administrative issuances must remain consistent with the law they seek to apply. o The authority of the Minister of Finance, in conjunction with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of

GMCR INC v. BELL TELECOMMUNICATION PHILIPPINES, INC, 1997: Administrative regulations derive their validity from the law that they were intended to implement. o Administrative regulations derive their validity from the statute that they were intended to implement. The Memorandum Circulars are null and void ab initio for being contrary to the law that constitutes the NTC as a collegial body. The fact that implementation of these

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illegal regulations has resulted in the institutionalization of the one-man rule in the NTC, is not and can never be a ratification of such an illegal practice. ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE COCONUT DESICCATORS v. PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, 1998: Administrative agencies cannot dismantle a legislative policy. o By limiting the purpose of registration to merely monitoring volumes of production and administration of quality standards of coconut processing plants, the PCA in effect abdicates its role and leaves it almost completely to market forces how the coconut industry will develop. Although the present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general welfare. Any change in policy must be made by the legislative department of the government. The regulatory system has been set up by law. It is beyond the power of an administrative agency to dismantle it.

issued from time to time by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It is widely accepted that the interpretation placed upon a statute by the executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is entitled to great respect by the courts. Nevertheless, such interpretation is not conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not countenance administrative issuances that override, instead of remaining consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION v. MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES, HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, 1999: Administrative rules and regulations should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature. o It is well settled that the rules and regulations which are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. Department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute. If the law had intended that the employee should have both a superior provident plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used the words and instead of and/or. By removing the disjunctive word or in the implementing rules the respondent Board has exceeded its authority.

OPLE v. TORRES, 1998: Administrative orders should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. o The Administrative Order involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. It cannot be simplistically argued that the Administrative Order merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987, for the AO establishes a National Computerized Identification Reference System, which requires a delicate adjustment of various contending state policies.

MAXIMA REALTY MANAGEMENT & DEVT. CORP. v. PARKWAY REAL ESTATE DEVT. CORP., 2004: An Administrative order, to be valid, must conform to the provisions of the enabling law. o The period within which to appeal the decision of the Board of Commissioners of HLURB to the Office of the President is 15 days from receipt of the assailed decision, pursuant to Section 15 of PD 957 (Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protection Decree) and Section 2 of PD 1344. The Court ruled that the 30- day period to appeal to the Office of the President from the decisions of the Board as provided in Section 27 of the 1994 HLURB Rules of Procedure, is not applicable, because special laws providing for the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President, such as PD 957 and PD 1344, must prevail over the HLURB Rules of Procedure. [Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987] allows the aggrieved party to file its appeal with the Office of the President within 30 days from the receipt of the decision complained

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, 1999: Administrative issuances should remain consistent with the law they seek to apply. o By changing the prescriptive period of two years to ten years, the circular created a clear inconsistency with the provisions of the law. In so doing, the BIR did not simply interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress. Revenue memorandum-circulars are considered administrative rulings which are

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of. Nonetheless, such 30-day period is subject to the qualification that there are no statutory periods of appeal applicable. If there are special laws governing particular cases which provide for a shorter or longer reglementary period, the same shall prevail over the 30-day period provided for in the administrative order. This is in line with the rule in statutory construction that in an administrative rule or regulation, in order to be valid, must not contradict but conform to the provisions of the enabling law.

ii.

Publication and Affectivity

implementation of the law ! therefore, it has the force and effect of law. In general, rules must not provide penal sanctions, UNLESS o Agency is given rule-making authority o Law itself provides that the act is criminal " Law defining crimes must essentially be from the legislature " Function of defining crimes is essentially legislative; therefore, it cannot be delegated.

PEOPLE v. QUE PO LAY, 1954: As a rule, circulars and regulations which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. o However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code equally provides that laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. Moreover, AS A RULE, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below. Class notes: the circular in this case is not a statute or law but issued in the

PHIL. BLOMING MILLS CO., INC. v. SSS, 1966: Publication of laws in the OG is material for the purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do not so provide. o These rules and regulations were promulgated to provide guidelines to be observed in the enforcement of the law. As a matter of fact, Section 3 of Rule I is merely an enumeration of the "general principles to (shall) guide the Commission" in the determination of the extent or scope of the compulsory coverage of the law. One of these guiding principles is paragraph (d) relied upon by appellants, on the coverage of temporarilyemployed aliens. It is not here pretended, that the amendment of this Section 3(d) of Rule I, as to eliminate the provision granting to these aliens the right to a refund of part of their premium contributions upon their departure from the Philippines, is not in implementation of the law or beyond the authority of the Commission to do. It may be argued, however, that while the amendment to the Rules may have been lawfully made by the Commission and duly approved by the President on January 14, 1958, such amendment was only published in the November 1958 issue of the Official Gazette, and after appellants' employment had already ceased. Suffice it to say, in this regard, that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the date of publication of laws in the Official Gazette is material for the purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do not so provide. In the present case, the original Rules and Regulations of the SSS specifically provide that any amendment thereto subsequently adopted by the Commission, shall take effect on the date of its approval by the President. Consequently, the delayed publication of the amended rules in the Official Gazette did not affect the date of their effectivity, which is January 14, 1958, when they were approved by the President.

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***TANADA v. TUVERA, 1986: Publication is indispensible in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended. o The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows: ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. We have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided." It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate. We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of

the people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government. The term "laws" should refer to ALL LAWS and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. COVERED BY THIS RULE are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Accordingly, even the charter of a city MUST BE PUBLISHED notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce. However, NO PUBLICATION is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code. We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is

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to inform the public of the contents of the laws. Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. Class notes: administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce of implement existing law, EXCEPT o Interpretative regulations (Sir said that it was wrong to except interpretative rules as this may have an adverse impact on private rights) o Internal rules Centerpiece of this decision: due process

PHIL. ASSOC. OF SERVICE EXPORTERS v. TORRES, 1992: Circulars issued by an administrative agency, though a valid exercise of police power as delegated to the executive branch of the government, may be held legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register. o It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino land-based workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents. The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power. The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government. Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.

On the need for publication of subject DBMCCC No. 10, we rule in the affirmative. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the present case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation. It is something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul together. At the very least, before the said circular under attack may be permitted to substantially reduce their income, the government officials and employees concerned should be apprised and alerted by the publication of subject circular in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines to the end that they be given amplest opportunity to voice out whatever opposition they may have, and to ventilate their stance on the matter. This approach is more in keeping with democratic precepts and rudiments of fairness and transparency.

o o

REPUBLIC v. EXPRESS TELECOMMUNICATION CO., INC., 2002: Publication in the OG or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. The fact that rules or regulations were filed and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register does not cure the defect related to its effectivity. o The fact that the 1993 Revised Rules were filed with the UP Law Center on February 3, 1993 is of no moment. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules force and effect. Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3 thereof merely states: Filing. --(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copes of every rule adopted by it. Rules in

DE JESUS v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, 1998: An administrative circular issued to enforce or implement an existing law and affects the rights of certain people must comply with the publication requirement.

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force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain or disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified rules and it is furnished only to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts, the National Library, other public offices or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. In a similar case, we held: This does not imply however, that the subject Administrative Order is a valid exercise of such quasi-legislative power. The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the respondents filed their applications for importations, was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within the context of Article 2 of Civil Code, which reads: "Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette (or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines), unless it is otherwise provided. x x x" The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-0801 were filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative Order.

never published or filed with the National Administrative Register. To show that there was compliance with the publication requirement, respondents MERALCO and the ERC dwell lengthily on the fact that the parties, particularly the distribution utilities and consumer groups, were duly notified of the public consultation on the ERCs proposed implementing rules. These parties participated in the said public consultation and even submitted their comments thereon. However, the fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their respective comments is not compliance with the fundamental rule that the GRAM Implementing Rules, or any administrative rules whose purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, must be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The requirement of PUBLICATION OF IMPLEMENTING RULES OF STATUTES IS MANDATORY and may not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in this case, there was public consultation and submission by the parties of their comments. The public consultation and submission by the parties of their comments were procedures prior to the adoption of the GRAM Implementing Rules. In fact, at the time, the ERCs proposed implementing rules were denominated Implementing Rules for the Recovery of DCOR and DICER. These procedural steps (public consultation and submission of comments) are entirely different from the publication of statutes mandated by law, which occurs after their promulgation or adoption. The obvious purpose of the preliminary procedures of public consultation and submission of comments is to give the parties the opportunity to air their views and express their concerns on particular subject matters before legislative measures or implementing rules and regulations addressing these matters are promulgated. On the other hand, the avowed rationale for the requirement of publication of statutes is to apprise the public of the contents of the laws or rules and regulations that have already been promulgated or adopted.

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ELECTRICITY CONSUMERS FOR REFORMS v. ENERGY REGULARTORY COMMISSION, 2006: Publication of implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether. Publication in the OG or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. o In this case, the GRAM Implementing Rules must be declared ineffective as the same was

GMA NETWORK, INC. v. MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW & CLASSIFICATION BOARD, 2007: Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register are ineffective and may not be enforced. o MTRCB issued an order of suspension against GMA for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it.

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While MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 9817, which was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.

REPUBLIC v. PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORP., 2008: Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that the parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned. o This Court in Taada v. Tuvera enunciated that publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force. Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera, the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 filing with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center for rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers AND as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance. Petitioner also insists that the registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, with the ONAR is no longer necessary since the respondent knew of its existence, despite its non-registration. This argument is seriously flawed and contrary to jurisprudence. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned. Class notes: non-compliance with the 2 mandatory requirements would not give effectivity to the rules: o Publication o Filing with the ONAR

Administrative Code, Book VII, Sections 3-8: Section 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rulemaking requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. Section 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall: (1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and (2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables. Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. (2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.

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iii.

Penal Regulations
o

PEOPLE v. QUE PO LAY, 1954, supra. (similar doctrine as above) PEOPLE v. MACEREN, 1977: Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law. o This case involves the validity of a 1967 regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that penalized electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. The Court held that the Secretary of Agriculture exceeded his authority in issuing said regulation because the Fisheries Law did not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing was not banned under the law, the Secretary and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of penalty provided for in the law itself. Administrative agencies are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law. As he exercises the rulemaking power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bonds demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly

exercising legislative power in his own right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body. Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statue. An administrative agency can have only the administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it.

iv.

Interpretative Rules

HILADO v. COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND COURT OF TAX APPEALS, 1956: A regulation that is merely an interpretation of the statute when once determined to have been erroneous becomes a nullity. o The Secretary of Finance is vested with authority to revoke, repeal or abrogate the acts or previous rulings of his predecessor in office because the construction of a statute by those administering it is not binding on their successors if thereafter the latter become satisfied that a different construction should be given. General Circular V-123, having been issued on a wrong construction of the law, cannot give rise to a vested right that can be invoked by a taxpayer. A vested right cannot spring from a wrong interpretation. An administrative officer cannot change a law enacted by Congress. A regulation that is merely an interpretation of the statute when once determined to have been erroneous becomes nullity. Article 2254 provides that No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others.

VICTORIAS MILLING CO., INC. v. SSS, 1962: A rule which purports merely to advice the people of amendments of the law does not require presidential approval and publication in the OG for its effectivity. o There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with

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the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law. A rule is binding on the courts so long as the procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statutory authority granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or its innate wisdom. On the other hand, administrative interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. Circular No. 22 in question was issued by the Social Security Commission, in view of the amendment of the provisions of the Social Security Law defining the term "compensation" contained in Section 8 (f) of Republic Act No. 1161 which, before its amendment, reads as follows: (f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except (1) that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month; (2) bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and (3) dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do so. Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of "compensation" to: (f) Compensation All remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month. It will thus be seen that whereas prior to the amendment, bonuses, allowances, and overtime pay given in addition to the regular or base pay were expressly excluded, or

exempted from the definition of the term "compensation", such exemption or exclusion was deleted by the amendatory law. It thus became necessary for the Social Security Commission to interpret the effect of such deletion or elimination. Circular No. 22 was, therefore, issued to apprise those concerned of the interpretation or understanding of the Commission, of the law as amended, which it was its duty to enforce. It did not add any duty or detail that was not already in the law as amended. It merely stated and circularized the opinion of the Commission as to how the law should be construed. We find, therefore, that Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise employersmembers of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity.

PERALTA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 1992: Administrative interpretation of the law is not necessarily binding upon the couts. o "When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. It has also been held that interpretative regulations need not be published." "Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment."

v.

Examples of Rule-Making in Various Agencies

DIR. OF FORESTRY v. MUNOZ, 1968: When an administrative agency is empowered by Congress to issue regulations, such regulations issued will be valid provided that these are germane to the objects and purposes of the law. o The validity of Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was questioned in this case. Said Order amended Forestry Administrative Order 12-1 by deleting the paragraph which declared as registrable titles granted by the Spanish government. According to Piadeco, such

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amendment contravenes Section 1829 of the Revised Administrative Code which does not specify the titles that are registrable thereunder. There should be no question now that Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 has the force and effect of law. It was promulgated pursuant to law. Section 1817, Revised Administrative Code, empowers the Bureau of Forestry, with the approval of the department head, to issue regulations "deemed expedient or necessary to secure the protection and conservation of the public forests in such manner as to insure a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products for the future, and regulating the use and occupancy of the forests and forest reserves, to the same end." Forestry Administrative Order 12-2 was recommended by the Director of Forestry, and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. It is no less a valid law. It is an administrative regulation germane to the objects and purposes of the law. A rule shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorized the promulgation of administrative rules and regulations to implement a given legislation, "all that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes. In Geukeko vs. Araneta, we pronounced that the necessity for vesting administrative authorities with power to make rules and regulations for various and varying details of management has been recognized and upheld by the courts.

SAND v. ABAD SANTOS EDUC. INSTITUTION, 1974: Board of Examiners was plainly granted by statute the authority to conduct periodic inspections of nursing schools in order to discharge its supervisory and regulatory functions vested in it under the Philippine Nursing Act. o The case is about a regulation that provided for periodic inspection of nursing schools and barred graduates of such schools that do not comply with the minimum requirements and standards from admission to the nurses examination or registration as a registered nurse. The Philippine Nursing Act, RA 877 as amended by RA 4704 expressly empowers in section 9 thereof the petitioner board subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines to promulgate such rules and regularly as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.

Section 3 of the cited Act specifically empowers petitioner board to inspect nursing colleges and schools and vests it with authority "to issue, suspend, revoke, or reissue certificates of registration for practice of nursing. The Board shall study the conditions affecting nursing education and the practice of the nursing profession in the Philippines, and shall exercise the powers conferred upon it by this Act with a view to the maintenance of an efficient ethical, technical, moral and professional standard in the practice of nursing. The Board shall likewise study and examine the facilities of hospitals or universities seeking permission to open new schools or colleges of nursing or departments of nursing education so as to see if the essential requirements therefor including qualified faculty and adequate budget are properly complied with. The authorization to open schools or college of nursing shall be based upon the written recommendation of the Board and the representative of the Government entity concerned with the granting of school permits or authorization." It further provides that "The Board shall have the power to investigate violations of this Act ... The Board shall from time to time look into the conditions affecting the practice of nursing in the Philippines and whenever necessary, recommend or adopt such measures as may be deemed proper for the advancement of the profession and for the vigorous enforcement of this Act." As regards the petitioner board's power to deny admission to the nurses' examination and registration as registered nurses to the graduates of schools that are found to be sub-standard, i.e. "not being conducted in accordance with the minimum requirements and standards contemplated in (the) regulations," section 20 of the Act expressly provides that "'In order to be admitted to the nurse examination, an applicant must, at the time of filing his or her application therefor, establish to the satisfaction of the, Board that' he has all the requisite qualification provided for by law." Sections 11 to 15 of the same Act ordain in connection therewith inter alia that schools and colleges of nursing should be established for the preparation of qualified applicants for the profession of nursing and should be operated as educational institutions (Section 11); that adequate budget for the operation of said schools or colleges and their libraries, classrooms, teaching equipment and supplies should be provided (section 12); that clinical and public health nursing facilities should be established by said colleges or schools and provisions for required experience of students be made (section 13); and that the prescribed qualification for family

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and instructors in nursing be observed by all colleges, schools or institutes of nursing (section 14) and the general entrance requirements of students to said colleges or schools be followed (section 15). ***AMERICAN TOBACCO v. DIR. OF PATENTS, 1975: While the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. o The case is about the amendment of Rule 168 of the Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark Cases that authorized the Director of Patents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear inter partes proceedings. Under section 3 of RA 165, the Director of Patents is "empowered to obtain the assistance of technical, scientific or other qualified officers or employees of other departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the Government, including corporations owned, controlled or operated by the Government, when deemed necessary in the consideration of any matter submitted to the Office relative to the enforcement of the provisions" of said Act. Section 78 of the same Act also empowers "the Director, subject to the approval of the Department Head," to "promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office." The aforecited statutory authority undoubtedly also applies to the administration and enforcement of the Trade-mark Law. It has been held that power-conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions maybe an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld. There is no provision either in Republic Act No. 165 or 166 negativing the existence of such authority, so far as the designation of hearing examiners is concerned. Nor can the absence of such authority be fairly inferred from contemporaneous and consistent Executive interpretation of the Act. The nature of the power and authority entrusted to The Director of Patents suggests that the aforecited laws should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws.

As such officer, he is required, among others, to determine the question of priority in patent interference proceedings, decide applications for reinstatement of a lapsed patent, cancellations of patents under Republic Act No. 165, inter partes proceedings such as oppositions, claims of interference, cancellation cases under the Trade-mark Law and other matters in connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. It could hardly be expected, in view of the magnitude of his responsibility, to require him to hear personally each and every case pending in his Office. This would leave him little time to attend to his other duties. For him to do so and at the same time attend personally to the discharge of every other duty or responsibility imposed upon his Office by law would not further the development of orderly and responsible administration. The reduction of existing delays in regulating agencies requires the elimination of needless work at top levels. The remedy is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. This subdelegation of power has been justified by "sound principles of organization" which demand that "those at the top be able to concentrate their attention upon the larger and more important questions of policy and practice, and their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important matters of detail." The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to "give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must

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consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them." RABOR v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 1995: The standards for subordinate legislation can be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. o This case is about an old man who, at the age of 66, was asked to retire after only 13 years of government service [which is 2 years short of the 15-year requirement that he needed to complete to avail of the retirement benefits given to government employees]. P.D. No. 1146. Section 11 may be quoted in its entirety: Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who (1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service; (2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and (3) is separated from the service. (b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at sixty-five-(65) years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed the fifteen (15) years. 2 administrative issuances were issued by the Civil Service Commission which prescribed limitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age. CSC Circular No. 27 stated that the extension shall only be granted for a period not exceeding 1 year. Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President stated that employees who have reached the age of 65 shall not be retained in the service, except for meritorious reason in which case the retention shall not exceed 6 months. The SC, in Cena v. Civil Service Commission, declared invalid the 2 administrative regulations. The Court said that the rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The CSC has no power to supply perceived omissions in PD 1146. The Court in Rabor reversed the ruling in Cena insofar as it declared the administrative issuances as invalid. The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative agency are necessarily broad and highly abstract. The standards may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation

objection is easily met. THE STANDARD though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It COULD BE IMPLIED FROM THE POLICY AND PURPOSE OF THE ACT CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE. Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to be implemented, went against prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be very little need (or occasion) for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative bodies to anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes subordinate, delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably demanded is a showing that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are GERMANE TO THE GENERAL PURPOSES PROJECTED BY THE GOVERNING OR ENABLING STATUTE.

THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC. v. POEA, 1995: Administrative agencies may promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation so long as the regulation is germane to the objects and purposes of the law. This is the principle of subordinate legislation. o Assailed in this case is POEAs resolution and Memorandum Circular which increased the compensation and other benefits of Filipino seafarers. It is, of course, well established in our jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. ALL THAT IS REQUIRED is that the regulation should be GERMANE TO THE OBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF THE LAW; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but IN CONFORMITY WITH THE STANDARDS PRESCRIBED BY THE LAW. This is the PRINCIPLE OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION. With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed

o o

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by permitting the delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest. REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP. v. SENDINO, 1994: A statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise. o Petitioner in this case questioned the authority of the HLURB to hear and decide the complaint for specific performance filed by respondent Sendino. Petitioner contends that there was no express grant of quasi-judicial functions in EO 90 which created the HLURB. While E.O. 85 dated 12 December 1986 abolished the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS), it is patently clear from a reading of its provisions that the said executive order did not abolish the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) which continued to exercise its powers and functions even after the Ministry of Human Settlements ceased to exist. In spite of the Aquino Government's stated intention of eradicating what it considered the vestiges of the previous regime, it was not its intention to create a vacuum by abolishing those juridical entities, agencies, corporations, etc., attached to or supervised by the MHS, which performed vital administrative functions. Pertinently, Section 3 of E.O. 85 mandates that: The final disposition and final organizational alignment or attachment of the juridical entities, agencies, corporations and councils attached to, or under the administrative supervision of the MHS including their respective existing projects, appropriations and other assets shall be subject to subsequent enactments by the President. Pursuant to this provision therefore, the President subsequently issued Executive Order No. 90, series of 1986, recognizing the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (renamed the HLURB) as one of the principal housing agencies of the government. Prior to this, Executive Order No. 648 in 1981 transferred all the functions of the National Housing Authority (pursuant to Presidential Decrees Nos. 957, 1216 and 1344) to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC) consolidating all regulatory functions relating to land use and housing development o

o o

in a single entity. Being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development, the renamed body, the HLURB, would have been reduced to a functionally sterile entity if, as the petitioner contends, it lacked the powers exercised by its predecessor which included the power to settle disputes concerning land use and housing development and acquisition. As explicitly provided by law, jurisdiction over actions for specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner or developer, is vested exclusively in the HSRC. Clearly, therefore, the HLURB properly exercised its jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioners with its adjudicative body, the OAALA, in ordering petitioners to comply with their obligations arising from the Reservation Agreement. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasijudicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the agency's enabling act. In view of the Court's pronouncement in United Housing Corporation vs. Hon. Dayrit, recognizing the HLURB as the successor agency of the HSRC's powers and functions, it therefore follows that the transfer of such functions from the NHA to the HRSC effected by Section 8 of E.O. 648, series of 1981, thereby resulted in the acquisition by the HLURB of adjudicatory powers which included the power to "(h)ear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices . . . and cases of specific performance." Obviously, in the exercise of its powers and functions, the HLURB must interpret and apply contracts, determine the rights of the parties under these contracts, and award damages whenever appropriate. We fail to see how the HSRC which possessed jurisdiction over the actions for specific performance for contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots against developers had suddenly lost its adjudicatory powers by the mere fiat of a change in name through E.O. 90. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of such contracts and agreements and the determination of private rights under these agreements is no longer a uniquely judicial function. The absence of any provision, express or implied, in E.O. 90, repealing those quasi-judicial powers inherited by the HSRC from the National Housing Authority, furthermore militates against petitioners' position on the question.

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d.

Fixing of Rates, Wages, Prices

o

Administrative Code, Book VII, Section 9: Section 9. Public Participation. (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. Class notes: o 2 requirements: o publication in a newspaper of general circulation for at least 2 weeks o public hearing o if the requirements were not complied with, a party can go to court [rate is void] o Vigan and PHILCOMSAT cases: o If rate applies to only one entity = quasi-judicial function " This will involve a question of fact: W/N the rate is reasonable, confiscatory or oppressive " Finding of fact is quasijudicial in character, thus there is a need for notice and hearing to comply with procedural due process requirements o If rate applies to all = quasilegislative in character " Jurisprudence: Generally, notice and hearing is NOT required UNLESS the law says otherwise " NOTE: Law now provides the need for notice and hearing [Book VII, Sec. 9] " THEREFORE: Notice and hearing is required for all proposed rates, whether quasi-judicial or quasilegislative PANAY AUTOBUS CO. v. PHIL. RAILWAY CO., 1933: The Public Service Commission cannot delegate the power to fix rates because the Commission has to determine, prior to approval, whether or not the rates applied for is just and reasonable. o Phil. Railway Co. asked the Public Service Commission to allow them to alter their rates at will whenever the former found it

necessary. The Commission granted the request. In our opinion the Public Service Commission was not authorized by law to delegate to the Philippine Railway Co. the power of altering its freight rates whenever it should find it necessary to do so in order to meet the competition of road trucks and autobuses, or to change its freight rates at will, or to regard its present rates as maximum rates, and to fix lower rates whenever in the opinion of the Philippine Railway Co. it would be to its advantage to do so. The mere recital of the language of the application of the Philippine Railway Co. is enough to show that it is untenable. The legislature has delegated to the Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services, but it has not authorized the Public Service Commission to delegate that power to common carrier or other public service. The rates of public services like the Philippine Railway Co. have been approved or fixed by the Public Service Commission and any change in such rates must be authorized or approved by the Public Service Commission after they have been shown to be just and reasonable. The public service may, of course, propose new rates, as the Philippine Railway Co. did in case No. 31827, but it cannot lawfully make said new rates effective without the approval of the Public Service Commission, and the Public Service Commission itself cannot authorize a public service to enforce rates without the prior approval of said rates by the commission. The commission must approve new rates when they are submitted to it, if the evidence shows them to be just and reasonable, otherwise it must disapprove them. Clearly, the commission cannot determine in advance whether or not the new rates of the Philippine Railway Co, will be just and reasonable, because it does not know what those rates will be. In the present case the Philippine Railway Co. in effect asked for permission to change its freight rates at will. It may change them every day or every hour, whenever it deems it necessary to do so in order to meet competition or whenever in its opinion it would be to its advantage. Such a procedure would create a most unsatisfactory state of affairs and largely defeat the purposes of the public service law. CENTER v. GARCIA, 1994: The power delegated to the LTFRB cannot be provincial bus operators. All that the body may do to the delegated power is

KMU LABOR of rate-fixing delegated to administrative

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to implement the policies laid down in the statute by filling in the details which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide. o The petitioner assails the constitutionality and validity of certain memoranda, circulars and/or orders of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) which, among others, (a) authorize provincial bus and jeepney operators to increase or decrease the prescribed transportation fares without application therefor with the LTFRB and without hearing and approval thereof by said agency in violation of Sec. 16(c) of the Public Service Act (CA 146), and in derogation of LTFRB's duty to fix and determine just and reasonable fares by delegating that function to bus operators, and (b) establish a presumption of public need in favor of applicants for certificates of public convenience (CPC) and place on the oppositor the burden of proving that there is no need for the proposed service, in patent violation not only of Sec. 16(c) of CA 146, as amended, but also of Sec. 20(a) of the same Act mandating that fares should be "just and reasonable." It is, likewise, violative of the Rules of Court which places upon each party the burden to prove his own affirmative allegations. Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act, as amended, reads: Sec. 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing. The Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: (c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls, charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may, in its discretion, approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereon within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service equipment of an operator is used principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business,

the net profits of said private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates. Under the foregoing provision, the Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing the rates of public services. Respondent LTFRB, the existing regulatory body today, is likewise vested with the same under EO 202 dated June 19, 1987. Section 5(c) of the said executive order authorizes LTFRB "to determine, prescribe, approve and periodically review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles." Such delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. As subjects for governmental regulation multiply, so does the difficulty of administering the laws. Hence, specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Given the task of determining sensitive and delicate matters as route-fixing and rate-making for the transport sector, the responsible regulatory body is entrusted with the power of subordinate legislation. With this authority, an administrative body and in this case, the LTFRB, may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Legislature may neither have time or competence to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies, the PSC and LTFRB alike, authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport operator, or other public service. In the case at bench, the authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above the authorized existing fare, is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change and increase their fares at will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs.

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This would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares every hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever they deem it "necessary" to do so. One veritable consequence of the deregulation of transport fares is a compounded fare. If transport operators will be authorized to impose and collect an additional amount equivalent to 20% over and above the authorized fare over a period of time, this will unduly prejudice a commuter who will be made to pay a fare that has been computed in a manner similar to those of compounded bank interest rates. Moreover, rate making or rate fixing is not an easy task. It is a delicate and sensitive government function that requires dexterity of judgment and sound discretion with the settled goal of arriving at a just and reasonable rate acceptable to both the public utility and the public. Several factors, in fact, have to be taken into consideration before a balance could be achieved. A rate should not be confiscatory as would place an operator in a situation where he will continue to operate at a loss. Hence, the rate should enable public utilities to generate revenues sufficient to cover operational costs and provide reasonable return on the investments. On the other hand, a rate which is too high becomes discriminatory. It is contrary to public interest. A rate, therefore, must be reasonable and fair and must be affordable to the end user who will utilize the services. Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate-fixing and its far-reaching effects on millions of commuters, government must not relinquish this important function in favor of those who would benefit and profit from the industry. Neither should the requisite notice and hearing be done away with. The people, represented by reputable oppositors, deserve to be given full opportunity to be heard in their opposition to any fare increase. The present administrative procedure, to our mind, already mirrors an orderly and satisfactory arrangement for all parties involved. To do away with such a procedure and allow just one party, an interested party at that, to determine what the rate should be, will undermine the right of the other parties to due process. The purpose of a hearing is precisely to determine what a just and reasonable rate is. Discarding such procedural and constitutional right is certainly inimical to our fundamental law and to public interest.

YNCHAUSTI STEAMSHIP CO. v. PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION, 1922: Rates must be reasonable to the owner and to the public. o There is a legal presumption that the fixed rates are reasonable, and it must be conceded that the fixing of rates by the Government, through its authorized agents, involves the exercise of reasonable discretion and, unless there is an abuse of that discretion, the courts will not interfere. Also that, although the fixing of rates is a legislative and governmental power over which the Government has complete control, it has no power to fix rates that are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily, and that as to whether a given rate is fair and reasonable is a judicial question over which the courts have complete control. In addition to what is known as the net earnings rule, there are four different theories of ascertaining WHAT CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE RATE, each of which is supposed to give a fair return on the reasonable value of the property. First, the original cost; second, cost of reproduction; third, outstanding capitalization; and, fourth, present value. "When a public utility once enters the public service, it is no longer a free agent and the control and operation of its property is subject to reasonable rules and regulations by the public, and to that extent and for that purpose it is a taking of the property by the public. As one of the conditions upon which you can operate a public utility, the public says you must operate it under reasonable rules and regulations, otherwise you cannot operate a public utility. Hence, when property becomes a public utility, it ipso facto, for operating purposes, amounts to an actual taking and appropriation of the property to the public use, so long as it is a public utility. In legal effect such operation amounts to a pro tanto taking and appropriation." "It is elementary constitutional law that private property cannot be taken for public use without just compensation is first assessed and tendered. But where the taking is not full, final, or complete, but is in the nature only of a continuous daily taking and appropriation, it must follow that there will be a fluctuation in the market value of the property during the period of public service, which, as to a vessel, would change with the cost of labor and material necessary for its construction. But in fixing the rate, it would not be fair to the public to base it upon a peak cost, and, for the same reason, it would not be fair to the owner of the property to place it upon a minimum cost. Neither

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o o

would it be fair to either party to base the rate upon any abnormal condition. A JUST RATE MUST BE FOUNDED UPON CONDITIONS WHICH ARE FAIR AND REASONABLE BOTH TO THE OWNER AND THE PUBLIC." "It is therefore of the utmost importance that the Commission should proceed with great care in changing rates." "The purpose of the hearing was to determine what was a just and reasonable rate."

VIGAN ELECTRIC CO. v. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, 1964: Rate-fixing power partakes a legislative character when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines. However, when it is made to apply exclusively to one party, it becomes quasijudicial and character and the party becomes entitled to notice and hearing. o At the outset, it should be noted, however, that, consistent with the principle of separation of powers, which underlies our constitutional system, legislative powers may not be delegated except to local governments, and only to matters purely of local concern. However, Congress may delegate to administrative agencies of the government the power to supply the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by a which is complete in itself. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said Policy. Otherwise, there would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted within the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation would eventually be exercised by a branch of the Government other than that in which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not only of the allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of separation of powers. Hence, Congress his not delegated, and cannot delegate legislative powers to the Public Service Commission. Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office

that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. Indeed, sections 16(c) and 20(a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146, explicitly require notice Indeed hearing. The pertinent parts thereof provide: SEC. 16. The Commission shall have the power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provision of this Act, subject to the limitations and exception mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary: (c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, tolls charges, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage kilometrage, and other special rates which shall be imposed, observed, and followed thereafter by any public service: Provided, That the Commission may in its discretion approve rates proposed by public services provisionally and without necessity of any hearing; but it shall call a hearing thereof within thirty days thereafter, upon publication and notice to the concerns operating in the territory affected: Provided, further, That in case the public service equipment of an operator is use principally or secondarily for the promotion of a private business the net profits of said private business shall be considered in relation with the public service of such operator for the purpose of fixing the rates. SEC. 20. Acts requiring the approval of the Commission. Subject to established limitations and exception and saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful for any public service or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the approval and authorization of the Commission previously had (a) To adopt, establish, fix, impose, maintain, collect or carry into effect any individual or joint rates, commutation mileage or other special rate, toll, fare, charge, classification or itinerary. The Commission shall approve only

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those that are just and reasonable and not any that are unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential, only upon reasonable notice to the public services and other parties concerned, giving them reasonable opportunity to be heard. PHIL. COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORP. v. ALCUAZ, 1989: A rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. o The challenged order in this case was issued by the Commissioner of the NTC which directs the provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by PHILCOMSAT for certain specified lines of its services by 15%, with the reservation to make further reductions later. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof. Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of

the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates. We need not go into an in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of the law in order to conclude that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual. Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearing. The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact, although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists

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that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. While it may be true that for purposes of ratefixing respondents may have other sources of information or data, still, since a hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or information otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity to controvert.

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. AIRSPAIN CORP., 2004: Power to fix rates must be authorized by statute. o o MIAA raised the fees, charges and rates without prior notice and hearing. The Charter of the Manila International Airport Authority, as amended by EO 903, states that: SEC. 17. Increase or Decrease of Rates. The Authority may increase or decrease the rates of the dues, charges, fees or assessments collectible by the Authority to protect the interest of the Government and provide a satisfactory return on the Authority's assets, and may adjust the schedule of such rates so as to reflect the cost of facilities or services provided or rendered. The Authority may periodically review all dues, charges, fees or assessments collectible by the Authority, and shall make such adjustments to the schedule of rates as shall adequately reflect any increase in price levels and (in the case of

concession rental) of volume of traffic through the Airport, subject to the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 325, whenever practicable. The last clause, which incorporated Batas Pambansa Blg. 325 into the MIAA Charter, did not appear in the original Charter of the MIAA. The clause was deliberately inserted by the amending law, E.O. No. 903. In this connection, B.P. Blg. 325,21 provides: SEC. 2. Determination of rates. The fees and charges shall be revised at just and reasonable rates sufficient to cover administrative costs and, wherever practicable, be uniform for similar or comparable services and functions. The revision of rates shall be determined by the respective ministry heads or equivalent functionaries conformably with the rules and regulations of the Ministry of Finance issued pursuant to Section 4 hereof, upon recommendation of the imposing and collecting authorities concerned, subject to the approval of the Cabinet. Thus, under the original Charter of the MIAA, petitioner was given blanket authority to adjust its fees, charges, and rates. However, E.O. No. 903 limited such authority to a mere recommendatory power. Hence, petitioner's Charter itself, as amended, directly vests the power to determine revision of fees, charges, and rates in the "ministry head" and even requires approval of the Cabinet. Worth noting, its Charter established MIAA as an attached agency of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications (now Department of Transportation and Communications). Hence, the "ministry head" who has the power to determine the revision of fees, charges, and rates of the MIAA is now the DOTC Secretary. Clearly, petitioner has no authority to increase its fees, charges, or rates as the power to do so is vested solely in the DOTC Secretary, although petitioner's prerogative to recommend possible increases thereon is of course recognized. As an attached agency of the DOTC, the MIAA is governed by the Administrative Code of 1987.23 The Administrative Code specifically requires notice and public hearing in the fixing of rates: BOOK VII. Administrative Procedure SEC. 9. Public Participation. - (2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. It follows that the rate increases imposed by petitioner are invalid for lack of the required prior notice and public hearing. They are also ultra vires because, to begin with, petitioner is not the official authorized to increase the

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subject fees, charges, or rates, but rather the DOTC Secretary.

e.

Licensing Function

Administrative Code, Book VII, Sections 17-18: Section 17. Licensing Procedure. (1) When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required to be preceded by notice and hearing, the provisions concerning contested cases shall apply insofar as practicable. (2) Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations or when public security, health, or safety require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or annulled without notice and hearing. Section 18. Non-expiration of License. - Where the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the renewal of a license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall not expire until the application shall have been finally determined by the agency. GONZALO SY TRADING v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHIL., 1976: A license is in the nature of a special privilege. It is not in any way vested, permanent or absolute. o It is one of the first principles in the field of administrative law that a license or a permit is not a contract between the sovereignty and the licensee or permitee, and is not a property in any constitutional sense, as to which the constitutional prescription against impairment of the obligation of contracts may extend. A license is rather in the nature of a SPECIAL PRIVILEGE, of a permission or authority to do what is within its terms. It is NOT in any way vested, permanent, or absolute. A license granted by the State is ALWAYS REVOCABLE. As a necessary consequence of its main power to grant license or permit, the State or its instrumentalities have the correlative power to revoke or recall the same. And this power to revoke can only be restrained by an explicit contract upon good consideration to that effect. The absence of an expiry date in, a license does not make it perpetual. Notwithstanding that absence, the license cannot last beyond the life of the basic authority under which it was issued.

Section 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases. (1) In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The notice shall be served at least five (5) days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place of the hearing. (2) The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. If not precluded by law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement or default. (3) The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings. Section 12. Rules of Evidence. - In a contested case: (1) The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. (2) Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily available. Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the original. If the original is in the official custody of a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted. (3) Every party shall have the right to crossexamine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal evidence. (4) The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally cognizable technical or scientific facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. Section 13. Subpoena. - In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt. Section 14. Decision. - Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each case within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision personally or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to them. Section 15. Finality of Order. - The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said period.

B. JUDICIAL FUNCTION
Administrative Code, Book VII, Sections 10-15: Section 10. Compromise and Arbitration. - To expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims and obviate expensive litigations, every agency shall, in the public interest, encourage amicable settlement, comprise and arbitration.

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Class Notes: o Why the general rules on evidence and procedure do not apply to administrative agencies ! to expedite proceedings; administrative agencies are expected to act with flexibility o Agencies must however comply with procedural due process because such is constitutionally guaranteed. o Sec. 10 ! every agency shall encourage amicable settlement, compromise, arbitration o Sec. 11 ! all parties entitled to notice and hearing, at least 5 days before date of hearing + given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues o Sec. 12 ! rules on evidence o Agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent man o Documentary evidence: copies/ excerpts if the original is not available o Right to cross-examine witnesses presented and submit rebuttal evidence o May take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally cognizable technical or scientific facts o Sec. 14 ! decision must be in writing, with factual and legal bases o Decided within 30 days from submission o Notify parties personally or by registered mail o Sec. 15 ! decision shall be final and executory within 15 days after receipt of a copy thereof unless appeal is perfected o Power to issue subpoenas/ declare contempt (Sec. 13) o Subpoena power " To require attendance of witnesses " Production of books, papers, documents or other pertinent data " Upon request of any party before/ during hearing " Upon showing of general relevance " The rule about issuing subpoena is not so strict. o Contempt power " Agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the RTC within whose jurisdiction the contested case falls For contumacy or refusal to obey

Need to seek the aid of the court because power to cite for contempt is inherently judicial " Unless otherwise provided by law Agency may be expressly given the power to cite for contempt by an enabling statute [e.g. PD 902-A] The grant of power CANNOT BE IMPLIED

1. Power to Issue Subpoena, Declare Contempt a. General Statutory Provision

Administrative Code, Book VII, Section 13: Section 13. Subpoena. - In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt.

b. Special Statutory Grant

PD 902-A Reorganization of the SEC with Additional Power and Placing the said Agency under the Administrative Supervision of the OP Section 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission shall possess the following powers: e) To issue subpoena duces tecum and summon witnesses to appear in any proceedings of the Commission and in appropriate cases order search and seizure or cause the search and seizure of all documents, papers, files and records as well as books of accounts of any entity or person under investigation as may be necessary for the proper disposition of the cases before it EVANGELISTA v. JARENCIO, 1975: Administrative agencies may issue administrative subpoenas in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved and whether or not probable cause is shown. o Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO)was vested with the power to summon witnesses by subpoena testificandum or subpoena duces

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tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in EO 4. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable cause is shown and even before the issuance of a complaint. It is not necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. The purpose of the subpoena is to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if the discovered evidence so justifies. Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have information that might shed some helpful light. Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on litigations it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated or even just because it wants

assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is probable violation of the law. IN SUM, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. Class notes: note the 3 tests for the validity of exercise of subpoena power: o Inquiry is within the agencys authority " Granted subpoena power by law o Information sought is reasonably relevant o Demand is not too indefinite " Not a fishing expedition

GUEVARA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, 1958: The agency must exercise its power to punish for contempt in cases calling the agency to exercise quasi-judicial functions and not merely ministerial duties. o The case is about the power and jurisdiction of the COMELEC to conduct contempt proceedings against the petitioner for having published an article in a newspaper which tended to interfere with and influence the COMELEC and its members in the adjudication of a controversy. Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its administrative capacity in relation to the conduct of elections ordained by our Constitution. In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice." The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts. Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony. And the exercise of that power by an

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administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid. We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to submit petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge under consideration. Class notes: COMELECs contempt power can only be exercised as an incident of quasijudicial functions ! to try, hear and decide controversies in connection with elections. o This power cannot be used in connection with its ministerial duties: preparatory processes for elections [e.g. purchase of ballot boxes, machines, etc.]

necessary to give it force and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary as to trench upon private rights of petitioners entitled to priority. No such showing has been made; no such showing can be made. To repeat, there should be no question about the correctness of the order herein challenged. TOLENTINO v. INCIONG, 1979: Contempt power granted by charter can be abused or wrongly used. Agency cannot cite in contempt a party availing himself of judicial remedy, nor the judge for taking cognizance of the case. o In this case, respondent NLRC Chairman cited petitioner (union leader) in contempt for going to the CFI to avail himself of a judicial remedy and the CFI judge for taking cognizance of the case. "Nothing is better settled in the law than that a public official exercises power, not rights. The government itself is merely an agency through which the will of the State is express and enforced. Its officers therefore are likewise agents entrusted with the responsibility of discharging its functions. As such there is NO presumption that they are empowered to act. There must be a delegation of such authority, either express or implied. In the absence of a valid grant, they are devoid of power. What they do suffers from a fatal infirmity. That principle cannot be sufficiently stressed. Neither the high dignity of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute. Otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth. Such an eventuality, we must take all pains to avoid." "He ought to have known that the competence, "to hold any person in contempt for refusal to comply" certainly cannot extend to a judge of the court of first instance. Correctly construed, it cannot cover the case likewise of a party to a controversy who took the necessary steps to avail himself of a judicial remedy. It must ever be borne in mind by an administrative official that courts exist precisely to assure that there be compliance with the law. That is the very essence of a judicial power." "In this particular case, it is admitted that the then Judge Jaime delos Angeles, after hearing the arguments on the propriety of issuing the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for, reserved his resolution in view of the intricacies of the legal questions raised. The proper step for an administrative official then is to seek a dismissal of the case before the court precisely on the ground that the matter did not fall within the domain of the powers conferred on it. Instead, respondent

CATURA v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 1971: Investigative power would be inutile if the agency exercising such power cannot require the parties to produce the documents needed in the investigation. o The issue in this case is whether the Court of Industrial Relations, in the exercise of its power of investigation to assure compliance with the internal labor organization procedures under Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act, can require a labor organization's books of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to its finances be delivered and deposited with it at the hearing to conduct such investigation in accordance with a complaint duly filed without the officials of such labor organization, therein named as respondents and petitioners before us, being heard prior to the issuance of such order. On its face, it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the statutory power conferred. If it were otherwise, the specific provisions of law allegedly violated may not be effectively complied with. The authority to investigate might be rendered futile if the CIR could be held as having acted contrary to law. To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very least, requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents required to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. It is not for this Court to whittle down the authority conferred on administrative agencies to assure the effective administration of a statute, in this case intended to protect the rights of union members against its officers. The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means

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Inciong took the precipitate step of citing him for contempt. That was an affront to reason as well as a disregard of well-settled rules. Neither was there any contumacious act committed by petitioner in seeking judicial remedy. It would be a reproach to any legal system if an individual is denied access to the courts under these circumstances."

2. Warrants of Arrest, Administrative Searches

1987 CONSTITUTION ARTICLE III SECTION 2: SEARCH WARRANT, WARRANT OF ARREST The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. 1973 CONSTITUTION ARTICLE IV SECTION 3: SEARCH WARRANT, WARRANT OF ARREST The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and whatever purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. General Rule on Search and Arrest Warrants QUA CHEE GAN v. DEPORTATION BOARD, 1963: Probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest may be issued, can be determined only by a judge. o The provision of our Constitution which guarantees the right of an individual to be secure in his person is not the same as that contained in the Jones Law wherein this guarantee is placed among the rights of the accused. Under our Constitution, the same is declared a popular right of the people and, of course, indisputably it applies equally to both citizens and foreigners in this country. Furthermore, our Constitution specifically provides that the probable cause upon which a warrant of arrest may be issued, must be determined by the judge after examination under oath, etc., of the complaint and the

witnesses he may produce. This requirement to be determined by the judge is not found in the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, in the Philippine Bill or in the Jones Act, all of which do not specify who will determine the existence of probably cause. Hence, under their provisions, any public officer may be authorized by the Legislature to make such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative office or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt. The contention of the Solicitor-General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas.

VIVO v. MONTESA, 1968: The power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited to judges exclusively. o The issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioners of Immigration, solely for the purpose of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section 1, of the Article III (Bill of Rights) of our Constitution. The power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited by the Philippine Constitution to judges exclusively, unlike in previous organic laws and the Federal Constitution of the US that left undetermined which public official could determine the existence of probable cause. And in Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, this Court

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pointed out that Executive Order issued by President Roxas, in prescribing the procedure for deportation of aliens, only required the filing of a bond by an alien under investigation, but did not authorize his arrest. SANTOS v. COMMISSIONER, 1976: The Presidents power to conduct an investigation leading to deportation does not imply the authority to order an arrest. o Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. Under the present Constitution, a warrant of arrest may issue on a showing of probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law. This case, however, is governed by the former Constitution. The conclusion reached by the lower court, therefore, finds support in Qua Chee Gan.

of Immigration for purposes of investigation only is void. o Coming now to the contention of petitioners that the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion, the court finds the same devoid of merit. The immigration Act of 1940 provides that The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien... From a perusal of the above provision, it is clear that in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional.

SALAZAR v. ACHACOSO, 1990: The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. o Under the new Constitution, it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. In one case, it was declared that mayors may not exercise this power. Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body. We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest of an undesirable alien ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in maters involving foreign affairsThe power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

CAMARA v. MUNICIPAL COURT, 1967: In nonemergency situations, search warrants (issuable only by a neutral magistrate) must be obtained if entry to private residence is refused. o The Fourth Amendment provides that, The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. The basic purpose of this Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. Under the present system, the occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code involved requires inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits of the inspectors power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector himself is acting under proper authorization. These are questions which may be reviewed by a neutral magistrate without any reassessment of the basic agency

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS v. DE LA ROSA, 1991: A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner

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decision to canvass an area. Yet, only be refusing entry and risking a criminal conviction can the occupant at present challenge the inspectors decision to search. The practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party warrant the need to search. Probable cause is the standard by which a particular decision to search is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness. To apply this standard it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen. In the nonemergency situation here, appellant had a right to insist that the inspectors obtain a search warrant.

prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure. Exceptions to the General Rule on Search and Arrest Warrants HARVEY v. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, 1988: The requirement in Qua Chee Gan need not be followed where probable cause had been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued. o In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three months during which period their activities were monitored. The ruling in Vivo v. Montesa is not invocable here. Respondent Commissioners warrant of arrest did not order petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. They were issued specifically for violation of the Immigration Act and of the Revised Administrative Code. Before that, deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation. The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings. There need be no truncated recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board for as stated, probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.

SEE v. SEATTLE, 1966: The Camara doctrine applies to similar inspections of commercial structures. o We see no justification for relaxing Fourth Amendment safeguards where the official inspection is intended to aid enforcement of laws prescribing minimum physical standards for commercial premises. As we explained in Camara, a search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant. We find strong support in the subpoena cases for our conclusion that warrants are a necessary and tolerable limitation on the right to enter upon and inspect commercial premises. The agencys particular demand for access will of course be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved. But the decision to enter and inspect will not be the product of the unreviewed discretion of the enforcement officer in the field. We therefore conclude that administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled through o

LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA v. LIWAG, 1989: The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings. o The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a judge does not extend to deportation proceedings. There need be no truncated recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board for as stated, probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with the

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assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. The particular circumstances obtaining in the case at bar have seriously placed on doubt the legality and propriety of petitioners apprehension by respondent Commissioner. For unlike in the Harvey case where the warrantless capture of two suspected alien pedophiles was based on probable cause ascertained only after close surveillance for a three-month period during which their activities were monitored, herein petitioner was invited by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at his apartment unit on the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a single individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent.

3. Imposition of Fines and Penalties

OCEANIC STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v. STRANAHAN, 1908: A fine which is not a criminal penalty may be validly imposed by an administrative agency. o The enforcement of the exaction of the monetary fine which the Secretary is authorized by the Act, to impose for violations of its provisions against bringing into the US aliens afflicted with dangerous contagious diseases is not necessarily governed by the rules controlling in criminal prosecutions merely because such exaction is a penalty. The Act does not create an offense, within the meaning of the word crime as used in the constitutional provisions, requiring a jury trial. The sole purpose of Section 9 was to impose a penalty based upon the medical examination for which the statute provided, thus tending, by the avoidance of controversy and delay, to secure the efficient performance by the steamship company of the duty required by the statute, and thereby aid in carrying out the policy of Congress. It was within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to impose appropriate obligations, and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking judicial power.

violations of its rules and regulations would amount to an absurd interpretation of the pertinent legal provision because the CAB is given full power on its own initiative to determine whether to impose, remit, mitigate, increase, or compromise fines and civil penalties, a power which is expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator whose orders or decisions may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the CAB. Besides, to deprive the CAB of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its effective general supervision and control over air carriers if they can just disregard with impunity the rules and regulations designed to insure public safety and convenience in air transportation. If every time the CAB would like to impose a civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and regulations it would have to resort to courts of justice in protracted litigations, then it could not serve its purpose of exercising a competent, efficient and effective supervision and control over air carriers in their vital role of rendering public service by affording safe and convenient air traffic. The fine imposed on PAL in CAB Resolutions is an administrative penalty which administrative officers are empowered to impose without criminal prosecution.

SCOTYS DEPARTMENT STORE v. MICALLER, 1956: The power to impose penalties for unfair labor practices is lodged in ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations. o This Court has reached the conclusion that, said provision notwithstanding, that word court used in the Act cannot refer to the Court of Industrial Relations for to give that meaning would be violative of the safeguards guaranteed to every accused by our Constitution. We refer to those which postulate that No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law and that In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf. The power to impose the penalties provided for in RA 875 is lodged in ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the definition of the word Court contained in the Act. Hence, the decision of the industrial court in the present case, in so far as it imposes a fine upon petitioners, is illegal and should be nullified.

o o

CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD v. PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC (1975): CAB has the power to impose administrative fines on erring airlines. o To deprive the CAB of the power to impose fines in the nature of civil penalty for

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US v. BARRIAS, 1908: The fixing of penalties for criminal offenses is an exercise of legislative power which cannot be delegated to subordinate authority. o One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulations with reference to the navigation of the bay, the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature.

of the Commission. The charges, however, do not involve petitioners failure to comply with its certificate of public convenience or any order, decision or regulation of the respondent Board. PEREZ v. LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC, 2006: Where the violation of an administrative regulation is made a crime by the enabling law and the penalty is also provided in said law, the administrative regulation is valid. o For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself. The Circular satisfies the 2 requirements. The Circular merely implements the said law. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law.

C. JUDICIAL DETERMINATION SUFFICIENCY OF STANDARDS 1. Interest of Law and Order

OF

RCPI v. BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS, 1977: It is the courts of justice, and not the Board, which have jurisdiction over breach of contractual obligation and tort liability. o The Public Service Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication, conferred upon it by statute. The functions of the PSC are limited and administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. The Board of Communications has the power to issue certificates of public convenience. But this power to issue certificates of public convenience does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of the certificate of public convenience or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest. Even assuming that the Board has the power of jurisdiction over petitioner in the exercise of its supervision to insure adequate public service, petitioner cannot be subjected to payment of the fine because the pertinent provision of the law subjects to a fine every public service that violates or fails to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any order, decision, or regulation

RUBI v. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDANAO, 1919: The purpose of the statute is to promote law and order in Mindoro, and to encourage development of resources in the island. o The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority in enacting Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development and advancement in civilization. In so far as the relation of the Mangyans to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are to protect the settlers in Mindoro and to develop the resources of that great Island. The Legislature merely conferred upon the Provincial Government with approval of the Provincial Board the power to execute the law. The Provincial Government and the Provincial Board are best fitted to select the most favorable site for improving the lives of the Mangyans. The Government must

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guarantee peace and order to encourage immigrants to invest in Mindoro and to protect crops and persons of settlers of Mindoro from predatory men.

2. Public Interest
PEOPLE v. ROSENTHAL AND OSMENA, 1939: Public interest is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in issuing or cancelling a permit. o We are of the opinion that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. In view of the intention and purpose of the law to protect the public against speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky and against the sale of stock in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations we incline to hold that public interest in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. Appellant insists that the delegation of authority to the Commission is invalid because the stated criterion is uncertain. That criterion is the public interest. It is a mistaken assumption that this is a mere general reference to public welfare without any standard to guide determinations.

discretionary power thus conferred is judicial in character and does not infringe upon the principle of separation of powers, the prohibition against the delegation of legislative function, and the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

4. What is Amusing

Moral,

Educational

or

MUTUAL FILM CORP V INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 1914: The terms of the statute get precision from the sense and experience of men and these become certain and useful guides in determining what is educational, moral, or amusing. o The next contention of complainant is that the Ohio statute is a delegation of legislative power and is thus void. While administration and legislation are quite distinct powers, the line which separates exactly their exercise is not easy to define in words. It is best recognized in illustrations. Undoubtedly the legislature must declare the policy of the law and fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases; but an administrative body may be invested with the power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which the policy and principles apply. If this could not be done there would be infinite confusion in the laws, and in an effort to detail and to particularize, they would miss sufficiency both in provision and execution. The objection to the statute is that it furnishes no standard of what is educational, moral, amusing, or harmless, and hence leaves decision to arbitrary judgment, whim, and caprice; or, aside from those extremes, leaving it to the different views which might be entertained of the effect of the pictures, permitting the personal equation to enter, resulting in unjust discrimination against some propagandist films, while others might be approved without question. But the statute by its provisions guards against such variant judgments, and its terms, like other general terms, get precision from the sense and experience of men and become certain and useful guides in reasoning and conduct. The exact specification of the instances of their application would be as impossible as the attempt would be futile. Upon such sense and experience, therefore, the law properly relies.

3. Justice, Equity and Substantial Merits of the Case

INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER CO v. PANGIL FEDERATION, 1940: Justice, equity and substantial merits of the case is a sufficient standard by which the Court of Industrial Relations is guided in deciding cases before it. o The Court of Industrial Relations has the power to determine minimum wages for an individual employee in connection with an industrial dispute which said court might take cognizance of, and such grant of power is constitutional. The law prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under the law, the court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms. The National Assembly has by this section furnished a sufficient standard by which the court will be guided in exercising its discretion in the determination of any question or controversy before it, and we have already ruled that the

5. What is Sacrilegious
BURSTYN v. WILSON, 1952: No definite meaning of sacrilegious, thus it is an invalid standard. o The lower court provides that sacrilegious means that no religion, as that word is

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understood by the ordinary, reasonable person, shall be treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and ridicule. This is far from the kind of narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state may carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of society. In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive definition of "sacrilegious" given by the New York courts, the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views, with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and powerful orthodoxies. New York cannot vest such unlimited restraining control over motion pictures in a censor. Under such a standard the most careful and tolerant censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another, and he would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of unpopular sentiments sacred to a religious minority. Application of the "sacrilegious" test, in these or other respects, might raise substantial questions under the First Amendment's guaranty of separate church and state with freedom of worship for all. From the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those views. It is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion pictures.

instruction as the basis of government recognition of any private school. The petitioners assert that the Secretary has issued rules and regulations "whimsical and capricious" and that such discretionary power has produced arrogant inspectors who "bully heads and teachers of private schools." Nevertheless, their remedy is to challenge those regulations specifically, and/or to bring those inspectors to book, in proper administrative or judicial proceedingsnot to invalidate the law. For it needs no argument, to show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the execution of a statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute.

7. Reasonableness Standard

as

an

Implied

WISCONSIN INSPECTION BUREAU v. WHITMAN, 1928: Reasonableness is an implied standard in every law = Valid. o While the statute does not in terms provide that the commissioner of insurance shall exercise a sound and reasonable discretion in the disapproval of the proposed rules and regulations, that condition is necessarily implied. Administrative officers or bodies must act, not only within the field of their statutory powers, but in a reasonable and orderly manner. The rule of reasonableness inheres in every law, and the action of those charged with its enforcement must in the nature of things, be subject to the test of reasonableness. In determining whether or not the power granted by legislative act in a particular case to an administrative agency is of the kind which may be delegated, due regard must be paid to the nature of the subject matter with which the act deals. In this case, an attempt to specify a standard for rules and regulations to be prescribed by rating bureaus and approved by the Commissioner of Insurance would be nothing more nor less than the prescribing of the rules and regulations and riders themselves. If this were done by legislative enactment, the flexibility in practice necessary to meet changing conditions in the business world would be destroyed. NOTE: Consider context and nature of the subject matter. Insurance industry requires only general standards, because flexibility is required to make the laws applicable to different situations/ cases such as changing conditions in the markets.

6. Adequate and Efficient Institution

PACU v. SECRETARY, 1955: The regulation of private schools by the Secretary of Education which has as a standard the maintenance of a general standard of efficiency and adequate standard of education to the public is a VALID standard. o Despite such alleged vagueness the Secretary of Education has fixed standards to ensure adequate and efficient instruction, as shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula, the school calendars, entrance and final examinations, admission and accreditation of students etc.; and the system of private education has, in general, been satisfactorily in operation for 37 years. Which only shows that the Legislature did and could, validly rely upon the educational experience and training of those in charge of the Department of Education to ascertain and formulate minimum requirements of adequate

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8. To Promote Simplicity, Economy or Efficiency

CERVANTES v. AUDITOR GENERAL, 1952: Valid standard in delegating reorganization powers - to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in operations. o Republic Act No. 51 was approved authorizing the President of the Philippines, among other things, to effect such reforms and changes in government owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity, economy and efficiency in their operation. Pursuant to this authority, the President on October 4, 1947, promulgated Executive Order No. 93 creating the Government Enterprises Council to advise the President in the excercise of his power of supervision and control over these corporations and to formulate and adopt such policy and measures as might be necessary to coordinate their functions and activities. The Executive Order also provided that the council was to have a Control Committee with the power, among others (1) To supervise, for and under the direction of the President, all the corporations owned or controlled by the Government for the purpose of insuring efficiency and economy in their operations;

the Philippines." (Section 2, Rep. Act No. 265.) These standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority the character of administrative details in the enforcement of the law and to place the grant of said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers

9. Maintain Monetary Stability, Promote Rising Level of Production and Real Income
PEOPLE v. JOLLIFFE, 1959: Valid standard in delegation of legislative power, as contained in the Charter of the Monetary Board. o Section 74 of Republic Act No. 265 conferred upon the Monetary Board and the President the power to subject to licensing all transactions in gold and foreign exchange "in order to protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during an exchange crisis and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in which to take constructive measures to combat such crisis." The Board is, likewise, authorized "to take such appropriate remedial measures" to protect the international stability of the peso, "whether the international reserve is falling, as a result of payment or remittances abroad which, in the opinion of the Monetary Board, are contrary to the national welfare." The powers must be construed and exercised in relation to the objectives of the law creating the Central Bank, which are, among others, "to maintain monetary stability in the Philippines," and "to promote a rising level of production, employment and real income in

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IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987 CHAPTER 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS Section 1. Scope. This Book shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except the Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole, and state universities and colleges. Section 2. Definitions. As used in this Book: "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office, commission, authority or officer of the National Government authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases; research institutions with respect to licensing functions; government corporations with respect to functions regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business; and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law. "Rule" means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an agency, including its regulations. The term includes memoranda or statements concerning the internal administration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of, or procedure available to, the public. "Rate" means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms, including individual or joint rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and followed by any person. "Rule making" means an agency process for the formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule. "Contested case" means any proceeding, including licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or by law are to be determined after hearing. "Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, public or private organization of any character other than an agency.

"Party" includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited purposes. "Decision" means the whole or any part of the final disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and granting of rights and privileges. "Adjudication" means an agency process for the formulation of a final order. "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency permit, certificate, passport, clearance, approval, registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege. "Licensing" includes agency process involving the grant, renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment, withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or conditioning of a license. "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition, limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement, restitution, compensation, cost, charges or fees; the revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive action. "Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of money, assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption, exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right, immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or taking of any action upon the application or petition of any person. "Agency proceeding" means any agency process with respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing. "Agency action" includes the whole or part of every agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial thereof. CHAPTER 2 RULES AND REGULATIONS Section 3. Filing. Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.

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The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. Section 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. Section 5. Publication and Recording.

of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules. Section 9. Public Participation.*** If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. In the FIXING OF RATES, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing thereon. (Source of Notice and Hearing Requirement) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed. CHAPTER 3 ADJUDICATION

The University of the Philippines Law Center shall: Section 10. Compromise and Arbitration. Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding quarter; and Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect, together with a complete index and appropriate tables. Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it, and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text. Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. The University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one (1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President, Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs. Section 8. Judicial Notice. The court shall take judicial notice of the certified copy To expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims and obviate expensive litigations, every agency shall, in the public interest, encourage amicable settlement, comprise and arbitration. Section 11. Notice and Hearing in Contested Cases. In any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. The notice shall be served at least five (5) days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date, time and place of the hearing. The parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. If not precluded by law, informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation, agreed settlement or default. The agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings. Section 12. Rules of Evidence. In a contested case: The agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts, if the original is not readily available. Upon request, the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the original. If the original is in the official custody of a public officer, a certified copy thereof may be accepted. Every party shall have the right to cross-examine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal evidence.

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The agency may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and of generally cognizable technical or scientific facts within its specialized knowledge. The parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. Section 13. Subpoena. In any contested case, the agency shall have the power to require the attendance of witnesses or the production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. Unless otherwise provided by law, the agency may, in case of disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trial Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case being heard falls. The Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt. Section 14. Decision. Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. The agency shall decide each case within thirty (30) days following its submission. The parties shall be notified of the decision personally or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record, if any, or to them. Section 15. Finality of Order. The decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration may be filed, which shall suspend the running of the said period. Section 16. Decisions. Publication and Compilation of

Section 18. Non-expiration of License. Where the licensee has made timely and sufficient application for the renewal of a license with reference to any activity of a continuing nature, the existing license shall not expire until the application shall have been finally determined by the agency. CHAPTER 4 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTESTED CASES Section 19. Appeal. Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an appeal from a final decision of the agency may be taken to the Department head. Section 20. Perfection of Administrative Appeals. Administrative appeals under this Chapter shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after receipt of a copy of the decision complained of by the party adversely affected, by filing with the agency which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal, serving copies thereof upon the prevailing party and the appellate agency, and paying the required fees. If a motion for reconsideration is denied, the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal, reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the aggrieved party shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal. The agency shall, upon perfection of the appeal, transmit the records of the case to the appellate agency. Section 21. Effect of Appeal. The appeal shall stay the decision appealed from unless otherwise provided by law, or the appellate agency directs execution pending appeal, as it may deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of the case. Section 22. Action on Appeal. The appellate agency shall review the records of the proceedings and may, on its own initiative or upon motion, receive additional evidence. Section 23. Finality of Decision of Appellate Agency. In any contested case, the decision of the appellate agency shall become final and executory fifteen (15) days after the receipt by the parties of a copy thereof. Section 24. Hearing Officers. APPEAL IN

Every agency shall publish and make available for public inspection all decisions or final orders in the adjudication of contested cases. It shall be the duty of the records officer of the agency or his equivalent functionary to prepare a register or compilation of those decisions or final orders for use by the public. Section 17. Licensing Procedure. When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a license is required to be preceded by notice and hearing, the provisions concerning contested cases shall apply insofar as practicable. Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules and regulations or when public security, health, or safety require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn, suspended, revoked or annulled without notice and hearing.

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Each agency shall have such number of qualified and competent members of the base as hearing officers as may be necessary for the hearing and adjudication of contested cases. No hearing officer shall engaged in the performance of prosecuting functions in any contested case or any factually related case. Section 25. Judicial Review. Agency decisions shall be subject to judicial review in accordance with this chapter and applicable laws. Any party aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency decision may seek judicial review. The action for judicial review may be brought against the agency, or its officers, and all indispensable and necessary parties as defined in the Rules of Court. Appeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing with the agency within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof a notice of appeal, and with the reviewing court a petition for review of the order. Copies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and all parties of record. The petition shall contain a concise statement of the issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review, and shall be accompanied with a true copy of the order appealed from, together with copies of such material portions of the records as are referred to therein and other supporting papers. The petition shall be under oath and shall how, by stating the specific material dates, that it was filed within the period fixed in this chapter. The petition for review shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the final administrative decision. One (1) motion for reconsideration may be allowed. If the motion is denied, the movant shall perfect his appeal during the remaining period for appeal reckoned from receipt of the resolution of denial. If the decision is reversed on reconsideration, the appellant shall have fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution to perfect his appeal. The review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified by statute or, in the absence thereof, in any court of competent jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the Rules of Court. Review shall be made on the basis of the record taken as a whole. The findings of fact of the agency when supported by substantial evidence shall be final except when specifically provided otherwise by law. Section 26. Transmittal of Record. Within fifteen (15) days from the service of the petition for review, the agency shall transmit to the court the original or a certified copy of the entire records of the proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the

proceedings. The court may require or permit subsequent correction or additions to the record.

A. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN RULE MAKING, PRICE, WAGE OR RATE FIXING B. RULE MAKING: See Sec. 3-9 PRICE, WAGE AND RATE FIXING: See Sec.
9(2)

C. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ADJUDICATION OF CASES 1. Rules of Procedure 2. Due Process a. Cardinal Primary Rights
Requirements of Due Process (In General)

IN

***ANG TIBAY v. CIR, 1950: 7 Cardinal Rights of Due Process 1. RIGHT TO A HEARING " Includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. "The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play. TRIBUNAL MUST CONSIDER THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED " The right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration. DECISION MUST BE SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE " While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. EVIDENCE MUST BE SUBSTANTIAL " Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be "substantial." It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." " The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial

2.

3.

4.

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"

proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. o

5.

TRANSPARENCY: EVIDENCE TO BE CONSIDERED MUST BE THOSE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING OR ON RECORD " Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. " It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. CIR MUST ACT ON ITS OWN INDEPENDENT CONSIDERATION OF THE LAW AND FACTS " The CIR or any of its judges, therefore, must not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. " NOTE: Relate to American Tobacco, where the Court stated that the power to decide involves DISCRETION on the part of the adjudicator. DECISION MUST BE RENDERED SUCH THAT THE PARTIES KNOW THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND REASONS FOR THE DECISION " The CIR should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. ***MEDINA v. COA, 2008: Hearing and formal investigation is discretionary on the part of the hearing officer in Ombudsman Cases (As provided by law) o For Ombudsman Cases: Administrative Order No. 07, as amended by Administrative Order No. 17, particularly governs the procedure in administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was issued pursuant to the authority vested in the Office of the Ombudsman under Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989." When an administrative agency

6.

promulgates rules and regulations, it "makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law. Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute For CSC Cases: On the other hand, the provisions in the Administrative Code cited by petitioner in support of her theory that she is entitled to a formal investigation apply only to administrative cases filed before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). In particular, Section 48(2) and Section 48(3) are subsumed under Subtitle A of Title I, which pertains to the CSC and to the procedure of administrative cases filed before the CSC. The administrative complaint against petitioner was filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, suggesting that a different set of procedural rules govern. And rightly so, the Deputy Ombudsman applied the provisions of Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman in ruling that the prerogative to elect a formal investigation pertains to the hearing officer and not to petitioner. NOTE: If the law specifies the procedure applicable in certain cases, that procedure IS the due process requirement. If such procedure is not followed, there is denial of due process. o Look at the LAW APPLICABLE for that particular case o If the law is SILENT, apply the general rule: requirement is met so long as there is opportunity to be heard.

7.

BACHRACH v. CIR, 1978: Right to Cross-examine witnesses is part of Due Process o Refresher: The witness failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross-examination for the simple reason that he left for abroad. Having been deprived, without fault on its part, of its right to crossexamine Kaplin, respondent association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record. The right of a party to confront and crossexamine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the

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witness, the uncompleted testimony thereby rendered incompetent.

is

AMERICAN INTER-FASHION v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 1991: Non-disclosure of evidence on which decision is based is denial of Due Process o The documents used by the GTEB in its 1984 decision, were either not disclosed to respondent for being privileged or unmarked as exhibits or not presented in evidence.

ZAMBALES CHROMITE v. CA, 1979 and RIVERA v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 1995: A review of ones own decision is a mockery of administrative justice o o In Zambales: Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reviewed his own decision, when he was still Director of Mines In Rivera: Gaminde, who earlier participated in her capacity as the Board Chairman of the MSPB when the latter had taken action on LBP's motion for reconsideration, also took part, this time as a CSC Commissioner, in the resolution of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the CSC. In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce the reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things should have deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision as Director of Mines. He should have asked his undersecretary to undertake the review.

although not controlling, of the basis for the decision. Only when the party adversely affected by the decision has filed and perfected an appeal to the Civil Service Commission may all the records of the case, including the aforesaid Report be forwarded to the CSC. Further, the DECS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondents removal from office was grounded. This resolution, and not the investigation report, should be the basis of any further remedies respondent might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be prejudiced by denying her access to the investigation report. Hearing/Opportunity to Be Heard ASPREC v. ITCHON, 1966: Failure to be heard because of non-appearance in hearing is NOT a denial of Due Process o Where the respondent in a petition for contempt failed to appear on the date set for the hearing, of which he was previously notified, it was held that he was not deprived of his day in court when the judge ordered him arrested unless he pay the support he was adjudged to give, he having been given an opportunity to be heard. (Embate vs. Penolio) Similarly, the defendant's failure to appear with the counsel of his choice at the trial, notwithstanding repeated postponements and the warning that failure to appear would be deemed a waiver of the right to present evidence in his defense and the case will be submitted for decision on the evidence submitted by the prosecution, was a sufficient justification for the court to proceed and render judgment upon the evidence before it. (People vs. Angco)

***PEFIANCO v. MORAL, 2000: A party I entitled to a copy of the decision of his case (with facts and the law used as bases) BUT not to an internal investigation report o The Report of the DECS Investigating Committee is not an integral part of the Decision itself. The report is an internal communication between the Investigating Committee and the DECS Secretary, and, therefore, confidential until the latter had already read and used the same in making his own determination of the facts and applicable law of the case, to be expressed in the Decision he may make. The Report remains an internal and confidential matter to be used as part,

VINTA v. NLRC, 1998: Submission of position papers provides adequate opportunity to be heard o In labor cases, this Court has consistently held that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or a right to be heard. The requirements of due process are deemed to have been satisfied when parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers. The holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. More often than not, a litigant may be heard more creditably through pleadings than

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through oral arguments. In administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Due process was designed to afford an opportunity to be heard, and an actual verbal hearing need not always be held. The necessity of conducting a hearing is addressed to the sound discretion of the labor arbiter. UP BOR v. CA, 1999: Trial type proceeding not required so long as given opportunity to be heard o Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process. In this case, private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation, which she forwarded. Private respondent then met with the U.P. chancellor and the members of the committee to discuss her case. In addition, she sent several letters to the U.P. authorities explaining her position.

SHOPPES MANILA v. NLRC, 2004: A full blown hearing is NOT a matter of right in labor cases, so long as parties are given an opportunity to be heard o Pursuant to Section 5, Rule V of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, the labor arbiter has the authority to determine whether or not there is a necessity to conduct formal hearings in cases brought before him for adjudication. The holding of a formal hearing or trial is discretionary with the labor arbiter and is something that the parties cannot demand as a matter of right. It is entirely within his authority to decide a labor case before him, based on the position papers and supporting documents of the parties, without a trial or formal hearing. o The requirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are supposed to attach all the documents that would prove their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should be conducted or was necessary. AUTENCIO v. MANARA, 2005: No denial of due process since accused filed an Answer and submitted affidavits o In administrative cases, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side suffices to meet the requirements of due process. A formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary. For the purpose of ascertaining the truth, an investigation will be conducted, during which technical rules applicable to judicial proceedings need not always be adhered to. And where the party has the opportunity to appeal or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of, defects in procedural due process may be cured. On the formal charge against her, she had received sufficient information which, in fact, enabled her to prepare her defense. She filed her Answer controverting the charges against her and submitted Affidavits of personnel in the Assessors Office to support her claim of innocence. A pre-hearing conference was conducted by the legal officer, during which she -- assisted by her counsel -- had participated. Finally, she was able to appeal the ruling of City Mayor Badoy to the CSC, and then to the CA.

NAPOLCOM v. BERNABE, 2000: Failure to conduct hearings is not a denial of Due Process, so long as respondent is given the opportunity to be heard o Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trialtype proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of." In this case, the record shows that respondent was given notice of the complaints/charges against him and an opportunity to answer. He submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against him. He even appealed from the decision of the Chief, PNP dismissing him from the police service to the National Appellate Board, and submitted a memorandum.

DOMINGO v. RAYALA, 2008: Substantial Evidence requirement met o That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of sexual harassment is, therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be

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remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. GOSS v. LOPEZ, 1975: Students to be suspended are entitled to be heard, but an informal hearing is sufficient o We do not believe that school authorities must be totally free from notice and hearing requirements if their schools are to operate with acceptable efficiency. Students facing temporary suspension have interests qualifying for protection of the Due Process Clause, and due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story. The Clause requires at least these rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school. There need be no delay between the time "notice" is given and the time of the hearing. In the great majority of cases the disciplinarian may informally discuss the alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred. We hold only that, in being given an opportunity to explain his version of the facts at this discussion, the student first be told what he is accused of doing and what the basis of the accusation is.

fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures would entail The private interest that will be adversely affected by an erroneous termination of benefits is likely to be less in the case of a disabled worker than in the case of a welfare recipient. Eligibility for disability payments is not based on financial need, and, although hardship may be imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient, his need is likely less than the welfare recipient. The medical assessment of the worker's condition implicates a more sharply focused and easily documented decision than the typical determination of welfare entitlement. The decision whether to discontinue disability benefits will normally turn upon "routine, standard, and unbiased medical repots by physician specialists. In a disability situation, the potential value of an evidentiary hearing is thus substantially less than in the welfare context. Written submissions provide the disability recipient with an effective means of communicating his case to the decision maker. The detailed questionnaire identifies with particularity the information relevant to the entitlement decision. Information critical to the decision is derived directly from medical sources. Requiring an evidentiary hearing upon demand in all cases prior to the termination of disability benefits would entail fiscal and administrative burdens out of proportion to any countervailing benefits.

Waiver of Procedural Deficiencies MATTHEWS v. ELDRIDGE: No need for a full blown evidentiary hearing, since the nature of the issue makes it determinable by just considering documents/reports submitted o An evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the termination of Social Security disability payments, and the administrative procedures prescribed under the Act fully comport with due process. Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Resolution of the issue here involving the constitutional sufficiency of administrative procedures prior to the initial termination of benefits and pending review, requires consideration of three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government's interest, including the MONTEMAYOR v. BUNDALIAN, 2003: Active participation in the proceedings cured procedural deficiencies o Petitioner cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross-examine the complainant. Petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the PCAGC by participating in the proceedings before it. He was duly represented by counsel. He filed his counteraffidavit, submitted documentary evidence, attended the hearings, moved for a reconsideration of Administrative Order No. 12 issued by the President and eventually filed his appeal before the Court of Appeals. His active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency, if there was any, and satisfied the due process requirement. He cannot now be allowed to

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challenge the procedure adopted by the PCAGC in the investigation. Exception to Non-applicability of Technical Rules ***SAMALIO v. CA, 2005: Technical rules of procedure may be applied suppletorily, if it will result in justice and fairness in the resolution of the case
o

The provisions of the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers, unless otherwise provided by law or the rules of procedure of the administrative agency concerned. The Rules of Court, which are meant to secure to every litigant the adjective phase of due process of law, may be applied to proceedings before an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers in the absence of different and valid statutory or administrative provisions prescribing the ground rules for the investigation, hearing and adjudication of cases before it. The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise known as the "rule on former testimony," in deciding petitioners administrative case. For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the present case and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to crossexamine the witness in the former case.

in question was claimed by the customs authorities not to be within the exception does not automatically make the vessel liable. It is still necessary that the vessel, its owner or operator, be given a chance to show otherwise. This is precisely what petitioner Rocha has requested in his letter. Not only was he denied this chance, but respondent collector immediately imposed upon the vessel a huge fine.This is a denial of the elementary rule of due process. BAUTISTA v. WORKMENS COMPENSATION COMMISSION, 1979: When a party is not given notice and a reasonable time to prepare for a hearing, there is denial of due process.

o o

The very rules of the Commission require the giving of reasonable notice of hearing to each party interested by service upon him personally or by registered mail of a copy thereof at his last known post office address or if he is represented by a counsel, through the latter (Sec. 2, Rule 15, Revised rules of the WCC, 1973), so as to ensure observance and protection of an interested party's right to a hearing (Sec. 1, Rule 15, Revised Rules of the WCC Patent therefore is the failure of the hearing officer to observe these rules. Under the circumstances, claimant was clearly deprived of his day in court. Consequently, the dismissal of the claim premised on claimant and his counsel's "repeated nonappearance" at the aforestated hearings cannot stand. In this case, counsel for claimant received notices only days after the scheduled hearing. NOTE: Party may have received notice after the hearing, or even if before the hearing but without reasonable time to prepare, there is still a violation of due process and fair play.

b. Notice and Hearing i. When Required

EQUITABLE BANKING v. NLRC, 1997: Notice and hearing required in termination of employment cases, as provided for by law.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO. v. COLLECTOR, 1963: Steamship owner denied due process, when deprived of opportunity to prove that the TV set is not cargo.

Under Section 2521 of the Tariff and Customs Code, in order that an imported article or merchandise may be considered a cargo that should be manifested it is first necessary that it be so established for the reason that there are other effects that a vessel may carry that are excluded from the requirement of the law, among which are the personal effects of the members of the crew. The fact that the set

In order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, however, the act complained of must be related to the performance of the duties of the employee such as would show him to be thereby unfit to continue working for the employer. Here, the grievances of the lawyers, in main, refer to what are perceived to be certain objectionable character traits of private respondent. Although petitioners have charged private respondent with allegedly mishandling two cases in his long service with the bank, it is quite apparent that private respondent would not have been asked to resign had it not been for the letter-

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complaint of his associates in the Legal Department. Confident that no employer-employee existed between the bank and private respondent, petitioners have put aside the procedural requirements for terminating ones employment, i.e., (a) a notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought, and (b) another notice informing the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Failure to comply with these requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This procedure is mandatory, any judgment reached by management without that compliance can be considered void and inexistent. While it is true that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied in administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, meetings in the nature of consultation and conferences such as the case here, however, may not be valid substitutes for the proper observance of notice and hearing.

him an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his defense.

ii. When Not Required

SUNTAY v. PEOPLE, 1957: No notice and hearing required when the decision is based on an undisputed fact.

UY v. COA, 2000: Governor should be notified and given opportunity to be heard, before being held personally liable for the claim of terminated employees.

The decisions of COA presuppose an adjudicatory process involving the determination and resolution of opposing claims. Its work as adjudicator of money claims for or against the government means the exercise of judicial discretion. It includes the investigation, weighing of evidence, and resolving whether items should or should not be included, or as applied to claim, whether it should be allowed or disallowed in whole or in part. Accordingly, the fundamental requirements of procedural due process cannot be violated in proceedings before the COA. In the case at bar, former Governor Paredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the COA. While administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial powers are not hide bound by technical procedures, nonetheless, they are not free to disregard the basic demands of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an indispensable ingredient of due process. It would be unfair for COA to hold former Governor Paredes personally liable for the claims of petitioners amounting to millions of pesos without giving

Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his passport; lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the absence of such hearing. If hearing should always be held in order to comply with the due process of clause of the Constitution, then a writ of preliminary injunction issued ex parte would be violative of the said clause. Counsel for the petitioner insists that his client should have been granted a "quasi-judicial hearing" by the respondent Secretary before withdrawing or cancelling the passport issued to him. Hearing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. But where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued, cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. NOTE: If the factual basis if the agency action is disputable, an evidentiary hearing may be needed.

BISHOP v. GALANG, 1963: Hearing not necessary in making decisions which are purely discretionary as specifically granted by law.

The administration of immigration laws is the primary and exclusive responsibility of the Executive branch of the government. Extension of stay of aliens is purely discretionary on the part of the immigration authorities. Since Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, is silent as to the procedure to be followed in these cases, we are inclined to uphold the argument that courts have no jurisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of

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immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant, for reasons of practicability and expediency. This would not violate the due process clause if we take into account that, in this particular case, the letter of appellant-commissioner advising de Bisschop to depart in 5 days is a mere formality, a preliminary step, and, therefore, far from final, because, as alleged in paragraph 7 of appellant's answer to the complaint, the "requirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to the party that unless he departs voluntarily, the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion". It is already a settled rule in this jurisdiction that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. NOTE: The law specifically grants discretionary power on the part of immigration authorities to decide on applications for extension of the stay of an alien.

The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. NOTE: Permitted by law (as an exercise of police power) in circumstances where the stopping of the act cannot be made to wait until the termination of protracted litigation. Instead, the notice and hearing requirement are allowed subsequently, to question the basis of the order.

c. Form and Judgment

Promulgation

of

POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD v. CA, 1991: Notice and Hearing not required when urgent emergency measures are needed, as provided by law. o P.D. 984, Section 7, paragraph (a), provides: o Public Hearing. . . . Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years.

INDIAS v. PHIL. IRON MINES, 1957: Discussion of the evidence or findings of facts is not needed when it is substantially discussed by the lower tribunal, and the reviewing court fully agrees with such findings. o A discussion by the CIR en banc of the evidence or its own findings of facts is not necessary if it is satisfied with the report of its examiner or referee which already contains a full discussion of the evidence and the findings of facts based thereon The situation differs if the court disagrees with the report in which case it should state the reasons for its disagreement It is purposeless to report what the referee or examiner has already found in it

o o

SERRANO v. PSC, 1968: Quasi-judicial tribunals should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to a proceeding can know the issues involved and the reasons for the decisions rendered. o Each and every application should be considered strictly on the merits and the relevant facts in support of an order, ruling or decision be carefully inquired into and clearly set forth The non-inclusion of the PSC within the scope of the Constitutional provision does not justify the summary disposition of the applications

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH v. CAMPOSANO, 2005: The disciplining authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law in order to inform the respondents of the bases of the sanctions, as part of administrative due process.

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o o

Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions, the disciplining authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision imposing administrative sanctions must show bases for its conclusions While the investigation of a case may be delegated to and conducted by another body or group of officials, the disciplining authority must nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered and indicate the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents would be informed of the bases for the sanctions and thus be able to prepare their appeal intelligently. Such procedure is part of the sporting idea of fair play in a democracy

o o o

The legislature organized the BOC precisely in order that they should deliberate collectively and their views and ideas should be exchanged and determined before reaching a conclusion This process is of essence of a boards action save where otherwise provided by law The decision in extenso must relate back to the day when the resolution to exclude was adopted CLASS NOTES: Voting must be within the 1year period. The writing of the decision in extensor related back to the date of voting

NERIA v. COMMISIONER OF IMMIGRATION, 1968: The date of the agency action is the date when the decision was made and not the writing of said decision. o Under Sec 27(b) of CA No. 613, as amended, the decision of any 2 members of the BSI may be reviewed by the BOC motu propio within 1 year from the promulgation of said decision. The date of promulgation of the decision of the BSI is the date when the said Board voted and resolved to admit an alien which date can be ascertained from the minutes of the proceedings of such board The operative date of the action of the Board of Immigration is that when the resolution of exclusion was voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared, written and signed The SC defined promulgation as the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication

AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. v. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, 1975: While the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. o The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law Neither does the due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof and the decision is supported by the evidence in record, there is no question that the requirement of due process and fair tiral are fully met

GO YUK TAK WAI v. VIVO, 1977: The period within which to review the decision of the BSI must be 1 year from the promulgation of the decision o The operative date of the action of the Board of Immigration is that when the resolution of exclusion was voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared, written and signed because the decision in extenso must relate back to the day when the resolution to exclude was adopted [Arocha v. Vivo] The Commissioners should review the decision of the BSI within 1 year from the promulgation of the BSIs decision and that the minutes of the deliberation should reflect the action which they took within the said statutory

ALBERT v. GANGAN, 1975: The decision of a government agency must state the facts and the law on which the decision is based. o The COA cannot just perform its constitutional function of disallowing expenditures of government funds at sheer discretion. There has to be factual basis why the expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why was there misrepresentation o

AROCHA v. VIVO: The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be exercised by individual members, separately.

SICHANGCO v. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION, 1979: The notice of reversal may be sent even after 1 year from the date of the promulgation of the judgment.

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All that the immigration law requires is that the decision of reversal be promulgated within 1 year from the rendition of the decision of the BSI. Notice of the said decision of reversal may be sent even after the 1-year period has elapsed

Reason: it can only act only if it is authorized by law

Effect on decision on matters not within their jurisdiction: VOID o Ultra vires Importance: In which court/agency action must be filed FELICIANO v. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, 1953: Contract validity is a civil law question which has to be resolved in a regular court, not by the Director of Patents who has no jurisdiction over the same (Buzzwords: dude claiming he owned patent as per contract) o Under the provisions of the Patent Law (Republic Act No. 165), the Director of Patent has no power and authority to compel the party to do what another party is asking them to perform. What was being sought was essentially a judicial function which would require the determination or finding by a court of competent jurisdiction as to whether there was a meeting of the minds of the contracting parties before it could compel one to perform what the other prays the court to order them to do. Aside from want of authority and power, the Director of Patent lacks the means to make such determination and finding which would be necessary before he could act on a partys motion Class notes: it was clear that the law neither expressly nor impliedly give the Director the authority to decide on a case involving specific performance Specific Performance: regular court

REALTY EXCHANGE v. SENDINO, 1994: Rules of procedure are as a matter of course construed liberally in proceedings before administrative bodies (buzzwords: they wanted the decision to be rendered en banc) o One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and agreements, and determination of private rights under said contracts and agreements are acts no longer a uniquely judicial function Look into the law: if there is nothing in the laws (those that provide for the powers and duties of an agency) that either denies or withholds the power or authority to delegate adjudicatory functions to a division, then the agency, for the purpose of effectively carrying out is administrative responsibilities and quasi-judicial power, as matter of practical administrative procedure, should not be denied the power to constitute its adjudicatory boards into various divisions Power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions has been held to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a particular function, unless by express provision of the Act or by implication, it has been withheld. Class notes: due to circumstances (they wanted that the decision be done en banc, not just per division), it is mandated by the act creating it to adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business and perform such functions necessary for the effective accomplishment of its business

SYQUIA v. BOARD OF POWERS AND WATERWORKS, 1976: conditions of lease between landlord and tenant are purely civil in character, hence they are to be adjudged exclusively by the regular courts (buzzwords: dispute over electricity charge) o Question of the proportionate amount that each tenant should bear for the electricity cost for common facilities in an apartment building falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of regular courts of general jurisdiction The Board did not acquire jurisdiction over the contractual relations in this case, because what was involved was merely an agreement between a lessor and a lessee, and the former was not engaged in a public service nor in a sale of electricity without permit or franchise (which were what the law said the board had jurisdiction over) Tenancy Relations: regular courts

3. Jurisdiction
Class Notes: Administrative agencies may only exercise powers that are either: o Explicitly conferred to them by law, or o By necessary implication from the law Bottomline: look into what the law provides What agencies can adjudicate on: matters within their jurisdiction Jurisdiction: conferred by law o The enabling law must be carefully examined

GO TEK v. DEPORTATION BOARD, 1977: under existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien

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may be effected (1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code or (2) by the Commissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section 37 of the Immigration Law (buzzwords: chinese who was a head of a guerilla unit daw) o The President's power to deport aliens and the investigation of aliens subject to deportation are provided for in the Revised Administrative Code Sec 69: the Deportation Board is under the President and it is charged with the investigation of undesirable aliens and to report and recommend proper action on the basis of its findings On the other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law Provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the Commissioner's warrant "after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien." As to the Board of Commissioners: must be strictly on the grounds provided for by the Immigration Law As for the President: The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens, and that power may be exercise by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation. If there are aliens whose continued stay in the country is injurious to the public interest he may, even in the absence of express law, the President may deport them (US Justice Johnson) The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is rental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified. Procedure: Deportation Board, which is not restricted by the grounds provided by the Immigration Law, is a fact finding body under the President whose function is to make a report re: determination on won alien is undesirable, and recommendation to the President in whom is lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien or a deportation proceeding In effect: Decision of President to deport does not require prior conviction of an offense imputed on the alien No legal nor constitutes provision defining the power to deport aliens because the intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive "full discretion to determine whether an alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security welfare or interest of the state. The adjudication of facts upon which deportation is predicated also

o o

o o

devolves on the Chief Executive whose decision is final and executory (Justice Labrador) Doctrine: the Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation of aliens as disclosed in an investigation conducted in accordance with 69. No other tribunal is at liberty to reexamine or to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted. It is fundamental that an executive order for deportation is not dependent on a prior judicial conviction in a case. Thus, it was held that the fact that an alien has been acquitted in of a charge does not prevent the deportation of such alien based on the same charge. Such acquittal does not constitute res judicata in the deportation proceedings. Conviction of a crime is not needed to warrant deportation. Class notes: Jurisdiction of the President is not affected by pendency of a criminal case Deportation: either Deportation Board (if not based on ground under Immigration law) or Board of Immigration Commissioners/Commission on Immigration (if based on a ground under Immigration law)

VERA v. CUEVAS, 1979: repeal of the tax law means the law has lost its tax purpose, and devoid of said purpose, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue necessarily lost his authority to enforce it (Buzzwords: skimmed milk label for babies) o Because the law has been repealed, what it previously made unlawful is no longer unlawful, and the enforcement of what was previously required no longer comes within the jurisdiction of the BIR Opinions and rulings of officials of the government called upon to execute or implement administrative laws command much respect and weight The general clause is restricted by a specific terms (ejusdem generis): general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute BIR can only claim police power when what is involved is collection of taxes, fees and charges BIR and the Fair Trade Board are without jurisdiction to investigate and to prosecute alleged misbranding or mislabeling advertisements of filled milk Jurisdiction: FDA (DOH) Court tried to preclude a stituation wherein allowing BIR to take cognizance of the case would cause an overlapping of powers and functions likely to produce confusion and conflict of official action which is neither practical nor desirable

o o

o o

o o

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DELA FUENTE v. DE VEYRA, 1983: exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes a regular court (RTC) from assuming cognizance over such cases (buzzwords: champion cigs smuggled) o The law provides that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review on appeal decisions of the Commissioner of Customs involving seizure, detention or release of property affected or other matter arising under the Customs Law or law administered by the Bureau of Customs The law affords the Collector of customs sufficient latitude in determining whether or not a certain article is subject to seizure or forfeiture and his decision is appealed to the CTA, not RTC Reason: Collector of Customs constitutes a tribunal when sitting in forfeiture proceedings, expressly vested by law jurisdiction to hear and determine the subject matter of the said proceedings, and is beyond the interference of the RTC As to public policy: Congress intended to divest RTC of prerogative to replevin the things of this nature because if the intention was otherwise, then replevin should have been enough a remedy When the matter involved is a seizure and forfeiture proceeding, RTC is devoid of power to act Jurisdiction: Collector of Customs, appeal to CTA o

o o o o

controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law (CHR doesn't have this power) What CHR can do: investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights, exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person, and exercise it pursuant to rules of procedure as it may adopt (note: if somebody violates these rules, CHR may site for contempt) To investigate is not to adjudicate! Investigate: to inquire into systematically Adjudicate: to settle in the exercise of judicial authority, implying a judicial determination of a fact and the entry of a judgment Jurisdiction: Sec. of Decs, appeal to Civil Service Commission

SIMON JR. v. CHR, 1994: CHRs power to cite for contempt must not arise from and adjudicative power it does not have (buzzwords: vendors sa edsa) o o The constitution had no intention of making CHR a quasi-judicial body Though it has the power to investigate, which bears some kind of a resemblance to adjudication, the resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself 6 areas of CHRs jurisdiction: protection of rights of political detainees, treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, fair and public trials, cases of disappearances, salvagings and hamletting, and other crimes committed against the religious limited to: civil and political rights note of its power to cite for contempt: it should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers it must not prescind from an adjudicative power that it does not possess jurisdiction: for injuctive relief, regular court

o o

CARINO v. CHR, 1991: CHR may investigate, but fact-finding is not adjudication, and the latter the CHR has no power to do (buzzwords: DECS teachers rallying) o CHR may not take cognizance or have adjudicatory powers (power to try and decide, or hear and determine) over alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights It was not meant by the Constitution to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in the country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter At most, it has investigative power i.e. receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights But fact-finding is not adjudication, and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice or even a quasi-judicial agency Function of receiving evidence and ascertaining the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function What is judicial function: faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a o o

o o

LLDA v. CA, 1994: the fundamental rule is that an admin agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, but it is also settled rule that an admin agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers (buzzwords: dumping of garbage) o as a general rule, adjudication of pollution cases generallypertain to the Pollution Adjudication Board except in cases where the special law provides for another forum LLDA, as a specialized admin agency, is specifically mandated under RA 4850 and its

o o

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o o

amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of Laguna Lake and its surrounding areas with due regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances and pollution This is a broad grant of power and authority by its special charter: it is then mandated to, inter alia, pass upon and approve or disapprove plans and programs proposed by local government and private agencies within the region where such programs are related to those of the LLDA for the development of the region It can then take cognizance of issues within the scope of its control As to the cease and desist order LLDA issued: it can issue the same since under the law, it has the authority to make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution as well as to make orders necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise settled rule that an admin agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers So the cease and desist order and the authority to issue the same is implied, otherwise it may well be reduced to a toothless paper agency Jurisdiction: LLDA

performance of the sale or annulment of the mortgage of a condo unit, with damages Jurisdiction: HLURB

AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE v. FACTORA, 2002: specific performance of contractual obligations against condo owners filed by buyer fall within the competence and expertise of the HLURB (buzzwords: acquired by assignment due to debt) o The term buyer is not limited to those who enter into contracts of sale because its concept is broad enough to include those who acquire for a valuable consideration a condo unit A buyer who seeks specific performance or claims damages from a contract may bring an action with the HLURB The HLURB has jurisdiction over all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums, an the enforcement of contractual rights arising therefrom Jurisdiction: HLURB

o o

OSEA v. AMBROSIO, 2006: Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statue creating or empowering such agency (buzzwords: condo walls were cracked) o o PD 1344 clarifies and spells out the quasijudicial dimensions of the grant of jurisdiction to HLURB in specific terms The provisions of law granting HLURB its powers and duties were intended to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and condominiums The intent was to provide an appropriate admin agency to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to real estate may take recourse The business of developing subdivisions is imbued with public interest HLURB has technical known how on the matter In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts this ancillary power is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by the regular courts Doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction: courts will not and cannot determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact Being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development, the HLURB will be

UNION BANK v. HLURB, 1992: failure to acquire the necessary consent of an admin agency and the buyer by a subdivision developer constitutes an unsound real estate business practice (buzzwords: developer of condo mortgaged condo without notifying owner) o The law specifically states that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction over any unsound real estate business practice that is also prejudicial to the buyer The cause of action for annulment of a mortgage in this case falls within unsound real estate business practice The agency has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the rights of parties under the contract to sell a subdivision lot, and it also has jurisdiction to hear and decide a complaint for specific performance of the sellers obligation to deliver title to buyer, including damages The jurisdiction of HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include jurisdiction over complaints for specific

o o o

o o

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reduced to a functionally sterile entity if it lacks the power to settle disputes concerning land use, housing development and acquisition, and damages if necessary. Jurisdiction: HLURB

o o

MATEO v. CA, 1995: employees of GOCCs with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission (buzzwords: general manager of Morong water district fired) o o The hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations A party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services may appeal to the CSC (can be appealed subsequently to the CA) The RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain certain cases involving dismissal of officers and employees cover by the Civil Service Law Jurisdiction: CSC, then CA

o o

The non rate fixing function of ERB has expressly been transferred by congress (law) to the Department of Energy Direct supply or disconnection of power involve the distribution of energy resources, not by any incident the determination of power rates Since the relief was for discontinuation, the issue was one for the distribution of an energy resource Jurisdiction: Department of Energy

UNILONGO v. CA, 1999: jurisdiction of the SEC over homeowners associations has expressly been transferred by law to Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (buzzwords: homeowners associations fighting it out on who has control) o o The jurisdiction of SEC over intra-corporate matters concerning homeowners associations has been transferred by laws Ever if the party involved has been registered with SEC, the purpose for which the neighborhood association was established correspond to the requirements laid down in the HIGC Jurisdiction: HIGC, NOT the trial court
rd

PAL v. CAB, 1997: the trend of modern legislation is to vest an admin agency with the power to regulate and control the operation of public services under reasonable rules and regulations, and as a general rule, the courts will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion (buzzwords: GrandAir given provisional/temporary permit to operate and PAL hated it) o Law expressly authorizes CAB to issue temporary permit, and nothing in the law negates the power to issue said permit before the completion of the applicants and oppositors evidence It can even grant on its own initiative which means it has authority even before presentation of evidence has begun As to legislative franchise: nothing in the law or Constitution which indicates that this is indispensable for the entity to operate Congress has control over franchise to operate a public utility, but it does not mean that it has exclusive authority to issue the same (Congress has actually seen it fit to delegate this function to government agencies specializing in particular areas of public service Jurisdiction: CAB

DELTA VENTURES v. CABATO, 2000: a 3 party claim incident to an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of LA/NLRC is beyond the jurisdiction of a regular trial court (buzzwords: labor cases decision became executory, wants to nullify it) o Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint, which comprises of a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the petitioners cause of action Any court which has issued the writ of execution of a judgment has the inherent power to correct errors of its ministerial officers and to control its own processes Reason: to hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice Jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated Note: NLRC and RTC are co-equal bodies, which means the latter has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to enjoin the execution of any decision of the latter Jurisdiction: NLRC, then CA

o o

o o o

ERB v. CA, 1999: an agency tasked with the ratefixing function does not necessarily have jurisdiction over non rate fixing issues, since the law may vest the latter to another agency (buzzwords: ERB took cognizance of a case involving discontinuance of a direct connection)

CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER v. COLLERA, 2000: power to fix rates doesn't carry with it power to determine whether or not petitioner is guilty of overcharging customers, an issue which falls within the jurisdiction of regular courts (buzzwords: collection due to power adjustment clause)

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o o

Question of determining the breakdown and itemization of the power adjustment billed by an electric power company to its customers is not a matter that pertains to ERBs supervision, control or jurisdiction to regulate and fix power rate but falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts Power to regulate does not necessarily imply power to adjudicate Jurisdiction: RTC

ARRANZA v. B.F. HOMES, 2000: HLURB has jurisdiction over complaint filed by subdivision homeowners against developer that is under receivership for specific performance regarding basic homeowners needs (buzzwords: right of way hehe) o o o o o o This is a case of SEC v. HLURB (so two agencies, as opposed to the usual agency v. regular court!) Jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any court or tribunal It is determined by averments of the complaint and NOT by the defense contained in the answer In this case, due to the nature of the relief being sought, B.F. Homes as a corporation being under receivership is irrelevant The controversy here is not intracorporate relations, but simply one involving basic needs Jurisdiction: HLURB

COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT v. DOLEFIL, 2002: an agency which is to discharge purely administrative functions is not automatically vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate (buzzwords: Coop devt took cognizance of a complaint regarding mismanagement) o Coop devt is only to discharge administrative functions, which consist of policy-making, registration, fiscal and technical assistance to cooperatives and implementation of cooperative laws When the law speaks in clear and unequivocal language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is only room for application The law did not grant the agency authority to adjudicate cooperative disputes Admin agencies only has such powers as are expressly granted to it by law and those which are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof Jurisdiction: not stated but since not the agency, im guessing it's a regular court

regulations in disbursing government funds and to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements o COA is an independent constitutional body, tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the governments, and ultimately, the peoples property o A GOCC with a special charter (created by a special law) is also under the authority of COA in terms of investigation on whether directors, officials or employees of government-owned and controlled corporations, receiving additional allowances and bonuses, are entitled to such benefits under applicable laws they are under the jurisdiction of the COA o Note: what is precluded is the absurd situation wherein the board of an administrative agency, by the mere act of issuing a resolution, can put to naught the broad and extensive powers granted to the COA by the Constitution. This will prevent the COA from discharging its constitutional duty as an effective, efficient and independent watchdog of the financial operations of the government. o Clearly, the COA had ample legislative authority to issue compensation regulations. o Here: the COA was simply exercising its constitutional duty to examine and audit disbursements of public funds that are patently beyond what the law allows. o While the DBM is the government agency tasked to release government funds, the duty to examine and audit government accounts and expenditure properly pertains to the COA o Note: no refund was ordered here because the recipients in good faith believed that they were entitled to the allowances o Jurisdiction: COA

4. Administrative and Judicial Proceedings Arising from the Same Facts

GALANG v. CA, 1961: though two proceedings (one criminal and one administrative) arise from the same set of facts, they are not incompatible with each other o The two proceedings are separate and distinct from one another, and the institution of the court action does not amount to a renunciation of the administrative proceeding Note: filing of one action (i.e. criminal) is not legally inconsistent with the other (i.e. administrative), and the prosecution of the former does not entail a waiver of the action due for the latter The alleged conflict between the two actions is at best purely physical in that the conflicts affect mainly the time and place at which certain things will have to be done i.e. if

o o

DE JESUS v. COA, 2003: COA is specifically vested by the Constitution with the authority to determine whether government entities comply with laws and

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hes tried in one case, it may be impossible for him to appear at the hearing of the other case Note: acquittal in criminal will not be binding on administrative case

o o

CO SAN v. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS, 1961: the Director of Patents, in a cancellation proceedings, is not bound by the findings arrived at in a criminal case o o the issues in the criminal case and the administrative case were distinct and different from one another acquittal in the criminal proceeding was not based on the cancellation of a patent, which is the issue being tried in the administrative proceeding o

VILLANOS v. SUBIDO, 1971: a condemnatory decision in a criminal case, even if final, by itself alone cannot serve as basis for a decision in an administrative case involving the same facts o o reason: the matters that are material in the administrative case are not necessarily relevant in the criminal case even where criminal conviction is specified by law as a ground fro suspension/removal of an official or employee, such conviction does not ex prioprio vigore justify automatic suspension without investigation and an opportunity to be heard in an administrative proceeding there are defenses, excuses and attending circumstances of value in administrative proceedings which are not admissible in the trial of the criminal case the so-called blunting effect Note: notwithstanding that findings in criminal cases must be beyond reasonable doubt, they cannot be conclusive for administrative proceeding purposes o

o o

the only civil responsibility that may be imposed by the court is that which arises from the criminal act note: the acquittal of a defendant does not necessarily mean that he is not civilly liable UNLESS the verdict and judgment of acquittal is that he did not commit the crime charged (in short, this does not apply if reason for acquittal was failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt) note also: the cases referred to here was Consigna, wherein the court found the EE to have been innocent (as in did not commit crime charged) so for justice and equity (a very exceptional case), the court ruled reinstatement following his acquittal matter of reinstatement and backwages fall within the province of the administrative authorities, who are not parties in the criminal case and who exercise control and supervision over the accused in connection with his employment Daleon doctrine: while an acquitted accused may in appropriate cases claim payment of backwages during the period of his suspension, or reinstatement in case of dismissal, his relief lies not in the same criminal case wherein he was acquitted but in the proper administrative or civil action prescribed by law Reason: generally acquittal in the criminal case does not carry with it relief from the administrative liability The administrative case may generally proceed against a respondent independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminal charge

PNR v. DOMINGO, 1971: the RTC in a criminal case has no authority to order payment of back salaries in the event of an acquittal of an accused who is also charged in administrative proceeding o the acquitted employees right to reinstatement and /or back wages lies not in the same criminal case where he was acquitted but in the proper administrative or civil action prescribed by law in a criminal proceeding against an accused, the judgment that the law authorizes to be rendered is either one of acquittal or of conviction with indemnity and accessory penalties provided by law the payment of salary of an employee during the period of his suspension cannot, as a general rule, be properly decreed by the trail court in a judgment of acquittal

THE POLICE COMMISSION v. LOOD, 1980: the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case shall not nullify the dismissal of accused from service as rendered in an administrative case o o o Acquittal merely relieved the accused from criminal liability But this does not in any way carry with it the relief from administrative liability of dismissal Different matters are tried in criminal and administrative proceedings

TAN v. COMELEC, 1994: an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice versa o o Inquiry in the criminal proceeding and the inquiry in the administrative charges are entirely independent proceedings Neither would the results in one conclude the other

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OCAMPO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 2000: in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied o o Administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process n its strict judicial sense Considering the difference between the quantum of evidence as well as procedure followed and sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other The dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action filed against the accused or give him a clean bill of health in all respects The lack or absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which, though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in civil cases preponderance of evidence. As to administrative proceedings: substantial evidence (relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion)

Precisely because the Commission was unable to arrive at a decision based on conflicting evidence as regards the adequacy of present services in the routes applied for, it had to order a survey. The agents made a check up of the number of passengers coming to and from the route for a period of 1 week and thereafter submitted their findings

RIZAL LIGHT CO. v. MUNICIPALITY OF RIZAL AND PSC, 1968: The Supreme Court is not required to examine de novo the decision of an agency but only if there is evidence enough to justify a decision o In reviewing the decision of the PSC, the Supreme Court is not required to examine the proof de novo and determine for itself whether or not the preponderance of evidence really justifies the decision The only function of the Supreme Court is to determine whether or not there is evidence before the PSC upon which its decision might be reasonably based The PSC based its decision on the inspection reports. The Supreme Court held this to be evidence enough as it is the result of the PSCs own observation and investigations which it can rightfully take into consideration.

MIRALES v. GO, 2001: an administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may proceed independently thereof o The quantum of proof in an administrative proceeding is different from what is needed in a criminal case, such that the verdict in one need not necessarily be the same in the other

BORJA v. MORENO, 1964: A conclusion may not be justified if based on an administrative investigation conducted without following due process o The inspectors act of conducting an ocular inspection motu propio and interrogating witnesses during the same is indicative of the arbitrary manner in which the administrative investigation was conducted Evidence received at an administrative investigation conducted with manifest disregard of due process may not justify the conclusion based thereon

5. Rules of Evidence
PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES v. PREMIERE PRODUCTION, 1953: An ocular inspection is merely an auxiliary remedy and may be resorted to only when the court finds it necessary to reach an enlightened determination of the case o An ocular inspection of the establishment or premises involved is proper if the court finds it necessary, but such is authorized only to help the court in clearing a doubt in reaching a conclusion or finding the truth. It is merely an auxiliary remedy which the law affords the parties or the court to reach an enlightened determination of the case

MACEDA v. ERB, 1991: Strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings does not bind administrative agency in exercising a quasi-legislative functions and not as quasi-judicial functions o The order of testimony both with respect to the examination of the particular witness and to the general course of the trial is within the discretion of the court and the exercise of this discretion in permitting to be introduced out of the order prescribed by the rules is not improper Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies such as the ERB, which in matters of rate-fixing, is considered as exercising quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function. As such administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court proceedings

o ESTATE OF FLORENCIO BUAN v. PAMBUSCO, 1956: A survey may be conducted in order to verify the truth between conflicting claims and but not to supplant actual trial

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BANTOLINO v. COCA-BOLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC, 2003: The rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies where decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers only o Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. The Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect Under the rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits

V. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

A. FACTORS AFFECTING FINALITY ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS OF

SWITCHMENS UNION OF NORTH AMERICA v. NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, 1943: There can be judicial review of the decisions of administrative agencies only if authorized by the Congress. o Congress has long delegated to executive officers or executive agencies the determination of complicated questions of fact and of law Where no judicial review was provided by Congress, the Supreme Court has often refused to furnish one even where questions of law might be involved Where Congress has not expressly authorized judicial review, the following become highly relevant in determining whether judicial may nonetheless be supplied: a. The type of problem involved b. The history of the statute in question

CHEVRON USA INC., v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., 1984: A court may not construe or interpret a statutory provision when the Congress expressly delegated the agency to interpret a specific provision of a statute. o If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Sometimes, the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision or a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator or agency

FORTRICH v. CORONA, 1998: Judgments or resolutions of a court or quasi- judicial body must reach a point of finality set by law, rules and regulations for the orderly administration of justice. o Administrative Order 18 provides that decisions/resolution will become final after the lapse of 15 days from receipt of a copy by the parties. Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party. The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments or resolutions of a court or quasi- judicial body must reach a point of finality set by law, rules and regulations. This is a fundamental principle in our justice

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system, without which there would be no end to litigations ANTIQUE SAWMILL INC. v. ZAYCO, 1966: Although technical rules may be relaxed in the interest of justice and equity, a period for appeal is not, merely mandatory, but also a jurisdictional requirement. o In a long line of cases, the Supreme Court ruled that compliance with the period provided for by law for the perfection of an appeal is not merely mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement. Such failure has the effect of rendering final judgment of the court, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter cannot restore the jurisdiction which has been lost. The dismissal of the appeal can be effected even after the case has been elevated to the Court of Appeals. Appellees failure to file a motion for dismissal of appeal in the court of origin before the transmittal of the record to the appellate court does not constitute a waiver on his part to interpose such objection. Even administrative decisions must and sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies. In other words, public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered at every step. The rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what was already terminated should not be disturbed (Espiritu v. San Miguel Brewery)

The absence of statutory provisions for judicial review does not necessarily mean that access to the courts is barred. The silence of the Congress is not to be construed as indicating a legislative intent to preclude judicial review.

MANUEL v. VILLENA, 1971: Courts will not interfere. o The general rule is that courts will refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or officials in the exercise of administrative functions. This is so because such bodies are generally better equipped technically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal factors such as government policy on the matter, are involved in such decisions. Exceptions: administrative proceedings may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that the board or official: (1) Has gone beyond his statutory authority; (2) Exercised unconstitutional powers; (3) Clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty, or with grave abuse of discretion; or (4) The decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake.

SAN MIGUEL v. SEC OF LABOR, 1975: Lack of enabling statute does not bar judicial review. o It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasijudicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. Judicial review is proper in case of lack of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion, error of law, fraud or collusion . The courts may declare an action or resolution of an administrative authority to be illegal (1) because it violates or fails to comply with some mandatory provision of the law or (2) because it is corrupt, arbitrary or capricious

SOTTO v. RUIZ, 1921: Even if discretion in the determination of an administrative matter lies within the agency, the Court may review the same if there is an allegation of abuse of discretion or excess in the exercise of authority. o While the performance of the duty determining whether a publication contains libelous matter involves the exercise of the Directors discretion, and that the courts will not interfere with the decision of the Director unless clearly wrong, still, due process requires that the action of the Director must be subject to revision by the courts in case he has abused his discretion or exceeded his authority.

UY v. PALOMAR, 1969: Courts can review decision of the Director of Post. o Even if the Postal Law contains no provision for judicial review of the decision of the Postmaster General, the action of the Director of Posts is subject to revision by the courts in case he exceeded his authority or his act is palpably wrong. The courts will interfere with the decision of the Postmaster General if it clearly appears that the decision is wrong.

B. EXHAUSTION REMEDIES

OF

ADMINISTRATIVE

General Rule on Exhaustion PASCUAL v. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 1959: Courts will not interfere where the law has delineated the procedure by which administrative appeal or remedy

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could be effected, the same should be followed before recourse to judicial action can be initiated. PAREDES v. CA, 1996: Issue not yet ripe. o Prohibition is not the proper remedy. The enabling law itself has specifically tasked the Cabinet to review and approve any proposed revisions of rates of fees and charges. Petitioners should have availed of this easy and accessible remedy instead of immediately resorting to the judicial process. Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review, and provides a system of administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. Since the challenged administrative orders have not yet been submitted to the Cabinet for its consideration and approval, the questions raised in this petition are not yet ripe for judicial determination Courts should be reluctant to interfere with administrative action prior to its completion or finality, the reason being that absence of a final order or decision, the power of the administrative agency concerned has not been fully exercised and there can be no irreparable harm.

The reason for its filing without awaiting the final action of the Director of Public Schools was the urgency of preventing the automatic reversion of the sum appropriated for the adjustment of salary of public school officials and teachers. If he waited for the final decision on his petition for reconsideration which was not forthcoming, and in fact did not come, whatever action may thereafter be taken by respondent, even if favorable to petitioner, would be of no avail after the reversion of the funds appropriated for the purpose of salary adjustment.

CIPRIANO v. MARCELINO, 1962: Unreasonable or oppressive. o The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without exception, nor is it a condition precedent to judicial relief. The principle may be disregarded when it does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and irreparable damage. To require the petitioner to go all the way to the President of the Philippines on appeal in the matter of the collection P949 pesos, would not only be oppressive but would be patently unreasonable. By the time her appeal shall have been decided the amount of much more than the total sum of her claim. The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies has always been understood to mean that the same have furnished a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

Exceptions to Rule on Exhaustion PASCUAL v. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 1959: Question is purely legal. o Where the only question to be settled in the prohibition proceedings is a purely legal one whether or not a municipal mayor may be subjected to an administrative investigation of a charge based on misconduct allegedly committed by him during his prior term. The rule is inapplicable where administrative remedy is provided. Likewise, the rule will be relaxed where there is grave doubt as to availability of the administrative remedy; where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done; where although there are steps to be taken, they are, under the admitted facts, merely matters of from, and the administrative process, as a process of judgment, is really over; or where the administrative remedy is not exclusive but merely cumulative or concurrent to a judicial remedy.

CORPUZ v. CUADERNO, 1962: Administrative remedy is only permissive or voluntary. o Doctrine does not apply where, by the terms or implications of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy, such remedy is permissive only, warranting the conclusion that the legislature intended to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy has not been exhausted

o o

DE LARA v. CLORIVEL, 1965: Great and irreparable damage which cannot otherwise be prevented except by court action. o The rule is inapplicable if it should appear that an irreparable damage and injury will be suffered by a party if he should await, before taking court action, the final action of the administrative official concerned on the matter. Because of the conflict existing and the petitioners defiance of the order of the

ALZATE v. ALDANA, 1960: Urgency.

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Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to refrain from entering and operating within the contested area. This act of defiance prompted the company to take the needed appropriate action. QUASHA v. SEC, 1968: Limited time. o In view of the extremely limited time, with the commission's hearing officer having issued his questioned order denying injunctive relief only on December 22, 1977 at the height of the Christmas holiday with just a few days before The scheduled deadline of December 28, 1977, petitioner properly filed the present petition directly with this Court without going through the prescribed procedure of filing an appeal with respondent Commission en banc within the 30-day reglementary period since such recourse was obviously not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. 1996:

GENERAL RULE: Exhaustion of Remedies must apply PAAT v CA, 1997: Party must avail all means of administrative processes afforded him before seeking intervention of court. o Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of respondents failure to exhaust of administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.

LOPEZ v. CITY OF MANILA, 1999: o As a general rule, where the law provides the remedies against the action of an administrative board, body or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. The reason rests on the presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. This should be done not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts. Exceptions (mentioned but not present in the case): 1. The question raised is purely legal 2. The administrative body is in estoppels 3. The act complained of is patently illegal 4. There is urgent need for judicial intervention 5. The claim involved is small 6. Irreparable damage will be suffered 7. There is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy 8. Strong public interest is involved 9. The subject of controversy is private land 10. In quo warranto proceeding

REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN, Administrative agency in estoppel. o

Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the court can take cognizance of the case and try it. PCGG should be deemed to have waived its action; for proper time cannot mean nor sanction an unexplained and unreasonable length of time such as 7 years. Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could nor should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. PCGG is guilty of estoppels by laches. Exceptions to the rule on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies: (i) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (ii) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (iii) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; and (iv) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice.

GARCIA v. CA, 2001: o Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action, cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies would have first been exhausted. The doctrine does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve, or interfere in, a controversy the jurisdiction over which is lodged initially with an administrative body, like the PCA Board and its Investigation Committee, of special competence. The rule is an element of petitioner's right of action, and it is too significant a mandate to be just waylaid by the courts. Also,

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When an adequate remedy may be had within the Executive Department of the government, but nevertheless, a litigant fails or refuses to avail himself of the same, the judiciary shall decline to interfere. This traditional attitude of the courts is based not only on convenience but likewise on respect: convenience of the party litigants and respect for a coequal office in the government. If a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to (the) courts. ESTRADA v. CA, 2004: o The principal issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not the instant case falls under the exceptional cases where prior resort to administrative agencies need not be made before going to court. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to a court of justice for review. If a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before going to court. A premature invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground. The reason for this is that prior availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed and complied with. While the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is flexible and may be disregarded in certain instances, such as: 1) when there is a violation of due process, 2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, 3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, 4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, 5) when there is irreparable injury, 6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears [sic] the implied and assumed approval of the latter,

when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, 8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, 9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, 10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, 11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, 12) when no administrative review is provided by law, 13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies, and 14) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot. Petitioners claim that their action before the trial court, without going to the proper agency (the DENR) first, is justified because they are in danger of suffering grave and irreparable injury from the operation of respondents cement repacking plant and the DENR does not have the power to grant them the relief they are praying for. However, the court cited various statutes that proved that the relief they seek for the injury they are alleging to be in danger of suffering is in fact within the power of the agency (the DENR) to grant.

7)

EXCEPTIONS to the RULE DEPT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. APEX INVESTMENT AND FINANCING CORP, 2003: The official indifference of the agency involved to the cause of the petitioner is a circumstance which permits disregarding the principle of EAR. o This Court has consistently held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Among others, it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; and (b) the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Given the official indifference which, under the circumstances could have continued forever, the landowners had to act to assert and protect their interests. Thus, their petition for certiorari was allowed even though the DAR had not yet resolved their protests.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, Inc., v. NTC, 2003; Doctrine of EAR applies only where the act of

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administrative agency was performed in its quasijudicial function o In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasilegislative power. Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

condition precedent to taking action in court. As petitioner is not mandated by any law to seek clarification from the DBM Secretary prior to filing the present acton its failure to do so does not call for the application of the rule.

C. PRIMARY JURISDICTION PRELIMINARY RESORT

OR

Class Notes: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts but have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. The courts yield their authority but are not ousted of such authority. Requisites for the Application of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction: 1. There must be a concurrence of jurisdiction between regular court and administrative agency 2. Question or issue involved requires the technical expertise of the agency 3. The legislative intent on the matter is to have uniformity in rulings 4. Administrative agency is performing a quasijudicial function Application of doctrine of preliminary jurisdiction resulted to the yielding of the courts to the agency TEXAS & PAC RAILWAY v. ABILENE. 1907: o A shipper cannot maintain an action at common law in a state court for excessive and unreasonable freight rates exacted on interstate shipments where the rates charged were those which had been duly fixed by the carrier according to the act and had not been found to be unreasonable by the Interstate Commerce Commission Contributors Translation to Admin terms: An action against a legislative act of an agency (in this case, RATE FIXING) should not be initiated in a regular court where the agency involved has the authority and the power to approve the act (here, the rates). Though the regular court has jurisdiction, it must yield its jurisdiction to the said agency. If this is not done, as in the example of rate fixing, a uniform standard of rates would be impossible as the standard would fluctuate and vary, dependent upon the conclusions reached by the various courts.

REGINO v. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, GAMUROT & BALADLAD, 2004: An action for damages which calls for the interpretation of the Civil Code falls within jurisdiction of trial courts. o o (Khristine does not want to join Rave Party Dance Revolution, hehehe) The exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioners action for damages inevitably calls for the application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within the jurisdiction of the courts.

CSC v. DBM, 2005 o The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies invoked by respondent applies only where there is an express legal provision requiring such administrative step as a

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. v. CA, 1990: o It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that

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its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view" (United States v. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, Emphasis supplied). Cases where courts were allowed to take cognizance of the action PHIL. GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. RELOVA, 1989; When the issue involved is legal and not technical such as the interpretation of law, the courts may take cognizance of the action o The doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for application when there is such competence to act on the part of an administrative body. Petitioner assumes that such is the case. That is to beg the question. There is merit, therefore, to the approach taken by private respondents to seek judicial remedy since a jurisdictional question has arisen and calls for an answer.

connection with the sale, business or services, among other things, bearing such registered mark or trade-name. This, clearly, is a factual question that does not require any specialized skill and knowledge for resolution to justify the exercise of primary jurisdiction by BPTTT. But, even assuming which is not the case that the issue involved here is technical in nature requiring specialized skills and knowledge, still Industrialized Enterprises does not authorize the outright dismissal of a case originally cognizable in the courts; what it says is where primary jurisdiction comes into play in a case "the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view. Contributors annotation: The issue raised before the court is whether or not there was infringement or unfair competition. Such is not a matter which is technical in nature and does not fall under the jurisdiction of the agency involved. There is no application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in this case as there are different causes of action before the agency and the regular court. The second paragraph in the quote tells us that if there is a prejudicial question in the administrative case that is determinative of the outcome in the civil case, the court may suspend the civil action pending outcome of the agencys proceedings BUT this is not exactly an application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. In the application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, there must be a concurrence of jurisdiction and the civil court yields its jurisdiction to the administrative body.

No application of Primary Jurisdiction CONRAD AND CO., INC., v. CA, 1995: o The issue involved in the action a quo is not whether the "SUNSHINE" trademark in question is registerable or cancellable which is the issue pending in BPTTT (Board of Patents) that may be technical in nature requiring "expertise, specialized skills and knowledge" actually, the issue involved in the action a quo is whether CONRAD's acts of importing, selling and distributing biscuits, cookies and other food items bearing said registered "SUNSHINE" trademark in the Philippines without the consent of its registrant (FITRITE) constitute infringement thereof in contemplation of Sec. 22 of Republic Act No. 166, as amended. Under Sec. 22, the elements that constitute infringement are simply (1) the use by any person, without the consent of the registrant, (2) of any registered mark or trade-name in Improper application of doctrine of primary jurisdiction (Court should not have applied the doctrine but used it) VIADAD v. RTC OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, 1993: o While no prejudicial question strictly arises where one is a civil case and the other is an administrative proceeding, in the interest of good order it behooves the court to suspend its action on the cases before it pending the final outcome of administrative proceedings. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate upon itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence. NOTE: This is a misapplication of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. There was no concurrent jurisdiction between the agency and the regular court as one case was a civil case against the officials and the other was

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an administrative case against teachers. Dean pointed out that the Supreme Court has made many misapplications of this doctrine. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK v. CA, 2000: o The issue raised by the petitioners in this case was whether the action for the fixing of the just compensation for lands taken under the CARP should be filed in accordance with the rules of the DARAB or with the Special Agrarian Courts which was granted the original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter. The court held that: The power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. It is error to think that, because of Rule XIII, 11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts. NOTE: According to Dean, the SC was confused as the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not applicable here because there was no concurrence of jurisdiction.

immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. OPOSA vs FACTORAN, 1993: Future generation has standing to sue (even if represented by a jackass). o This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

D. STANDING TO CHALLENGE
Class Notes: o Standing is a threshold issue and not on the merits o Legal interest test has been debunked in favor or Injury-in-fact test which requires that injury must not be speculative but imminent o Doctrine of transcendental importance as an exception to requirement of standing is not intellectually satisfying. # Cases where the Petitioners were held to have standing KILOSBAYAN vs GUINGONA, 1994: A partys standing is a procedural technicality which SC may in the exercise of its discretion set aside. o We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The issues it raised are of paramount public interest and of a category even higher than those involved in many of the aforecited cases. The ramifications of such issues

KMU LABOR CENTER vs GARCIA, 1994: o In Lamb v. Phipps, we ruled that judicial power is the power to hear and decide causes pending between parties who have the right to sue in the courts of law and equity. Corollary to this provision is the principle of locus standi of a party litigant. One who is directly affected by and whose interest is immediate and substantial in the controversy has the standing to sue. The rule

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therefore requires that a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to warrant an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and to justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers in his behalf. In the case at bench, petitioner, whose members had suffered and continue to suffer grave and irreparable injury and damage from the implementation of the questioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with the enforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. KMU members, who avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions of commuters who comprise the riding public. Certainly, their rights must be protected, not neglected nor ignored. Assuming arguendo that petitioner is not possessed of the standing to sue, this court is ready to brush aside this barren procedural infirmity and recognize the legal standing of the petitioner in view of the transcendental importance of the issues raised. And this act of liberality is not without judicial precedent.

Republic Act No. 1125, which was approved on June 16, 1954, became very specific when it gave an enumeration of those who may appeal from a decision or ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the Commissioner of Customs or Board of Assessment Appeals. Under this law, the right to appeal from decisions or rulings of said officials is allowed only to persons, associations or corporations adversely affected by the same, and as well knowing the notation of the legal maxim "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius", the Government is certainly not one of them. Notes: The collector cannot bring a case because the enabling law (RA 1125) gave an enumeration of those who may appeal

LOZADA vs COMELEC, 1983: A taxpayers suit must involve disbursement of tax money. o As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. The act complained of is the inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election, as is allegedly its ministerial duty under the constitutional provision above cited, and therefore, involves no expenditure of public funds. It is only when an act complained of, which may include a legislative enactment or statute, involves the illegal expenditure of public money that the so-called taxpayer suit may be allowed. What the case at bar seeks is one that entails expenditure of public funds which may be illegal because it would be spent for a purpose that of calling a special election which, as will be shown, has no authority either in the Constitution or a statute. As voters, neither have petitioners the requisite interest or personality to qualify them to maintain and prosecute the present petition. The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. In the case before Us, the alleged inaction of the COMELEC to call a special election to fill-up the existing vacancies in the Batasan Pambansa, standing alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest of all citizens. Petitioners' standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here, which is held in common by all members of the public because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury supposedly shared by all citizens. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a

Cases where petitioners were held to not have standing URSAL vs CTA, 1957: Where the law provides an enumeration of who may appeal or bring an action only such persons may bring action o The rulings of the Board of Assessment Appeals did not "adversely affect" him. At most it was the City of Cebu1 that had been adversely affected in the sense that it could not thereafter collect higher realty taxes from the abovementioned property owners. His opinion, it is true had been overruled; but the overruling inflicted no material damage upon him or his office. And the Court of Tax Appeals was not created to decide mere conflicts of opinion between administrative officers or agencies. Imagine an income tax examiner resorting to the Court of Tax Appeals whenever the Collector of Internal Revenue modifies, or lower his assessment on the return of a tax payer! Note: Ursal, as an assessor whose opinion was overruled has no standing to sue since CTA statute specifies those who can bring suit (persons adversely affected) o

ACTING COLLECTOR vs CTA, 1958:

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dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution. When the asserted harm is a "generalized grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction. As adverted to earlier, petitioners have not demonstrated any permissible personal stake, for petitioner Lozada's interest as an alleged candidate and as a voter is not sufficient to confer standing. Petitioner Lozada does not only fail to inform the Court of the region he wants to be a candidate but makes indiscriminate demand that special election be called throughout the country. Even his plea as a voter is predicated on an interest held in common by all members of the public and does not demonstrate any injury specially directed to him in particular. JOYA vs PCGG, 1993: Petitioners must be owners of property being sold; taxpayers suit must involve disbursement of tax money. o Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act

constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money. KILOS BAYAN vs MORATO, 1995: Standing issue is only applicable if constitutional issues are involved. o Not only is petitioners' standing a legal issue that may be determined again in this case. It is, strictly speaking, not even the issue in this case, since standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The issue in this case is whether petitioners are the "real parties in interest" within the meaning of Rule 3, 2 of the Rules of Court which requires that "Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest." The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas. (FRIEDENTHAL, KANE AND MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 328 (1985)) Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have for bringing this suit. It does not detract from the high regard for petitioners as civic leaders to say that their interest falls short of that required to maintain an action under Rule 3, 2.

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It is true that the present action involves not a mere contract between private individuals but one made by a government corporation. There is, however, no allegation that public funds are being misspent so as to make this action a public one and justify relaxation of the requirement that an action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.

DOMINGO vs CARAGUE, 1991: o Petitioners have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. In fact, they admitted that they do not seek any affirmative relief nor impute any improper or improvident act against the respondents and are not motivated by any desire to seek affirmative relief from COA or from respondents that would redound to their personal benefit or gain

those statutes. Both Acts are clearly "relevant" statutes within the meaning of 702. The Acts do not, in terms, protect a specified group. But their general policy is apparent, and those whose interests are directly affected by a broad or narrow interpretation of the Acts are easily identifiable. It is clear that petitioners, as competitors of national banks which are engaging in data processing services, are within that class of "aggrieved" persons who, under 702, are entitled to judicial review of "agency action." SIERRA CLUB v. MORTON, 1972: Injury-in-fact test requires that the party seeking review be himself injured. o Whether a party has sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy is what has been traditionally referred to as the question of standing to sue. Where the party does not rely on any specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to ensure that the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution. Injury-in-fact test requires more than injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be him self among the injured. The Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the Disney development. Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the Club state that its members use Mineral King for any purpose, much less that they use it in any way that would be significantly affected by the proposed actions of the respondents. A mere interest in the problem no matter how long standing the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is not sufficient by itself to render the organization adversely affected or aggrieved.

ASSOC. OF DATA PROCESSING SERVICE ORGANIZATION v. CAMP, 1970: Zone of interests test. o Petitioners have standing to maintain the action. (1) Petitioners satisfy the "case" or "controversy" test of Article III of the Constitution, as they allege that the banks' competition causes them economic injury. (2) The interest sought to be protected by petitioners is arguably within the one of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute, and petitioners are "aggrieved" persons under 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act. The "legal interest" test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different. It concerns, apart from the "case" or "controversy" test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. Thus, the Administrative Procedure Act grants standing to a person "aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." We find no evidence that Congress, in either the Bank Service Corporation Act or the National Bank Act, sought to preclude judicial review of administrative rulings by the Comptroller as to the legitimate scope of activities available to national banks under

SIMON v. EASTERN KENTUCKY WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION, 1976: To establish standing, it must be shown that their injury is a consequence of petitioners action. o When a plaintiffs standing is challenged, assuming justiciability of the claim, the relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision and unless such a showing is made, a federal court cannot exercise its power consistent with the

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case or controversy limitation of Art 3 of the Constitution. LUJAN v. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, 1990: Zone of interest test. o Each affidavit can be read to complain of a particular agency action and whatever adverse effect or aggrievement is established by the affidavit meets the zone of interests test since recreational use and aesthetic employment are among the sorts of interests that the FLPMA and NEPA are designed to protect. However, there has been no showing that those interests of Peterson and Erman were actually affected by petitioners action since the affidavits alleged only that the affiants used unspecified lands in the vicinity of immense tracts of territory only on some portions of which the record shows mining activity has occurred or probably will occur by virtue of the complained actions.

Hardship Test petitioner will suffer injury

ABBOTT LABORATORIES v. GARDNER, 1967: Ripeness doctrines rationale; Test of ripeness. o The ripeness doctrines basic rationale is to prevent courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies and also to protect the agencies from judicial interferences until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging party. The problem is best seen in a two-fold aspect: (1) Fitness of the issues for judicial decision (2) Hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration As to fitness for judicial decision The issues are appropriate for judicial resolution at this time. First, all parties agree that the issue tendered is a purely legal one: whether the statute was properly construed by the Commissioner to require the established name of the drug to be used every time the proprietary name is employed. Second, the regulations are final agency action within the meaning of the APA. An agency action includes any rule defined by the Act as an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement law or policy. As to effect of withholding court consideration. This is also a case in which the impact of the regulations upon the petitioners is sufficiently direct and immediate as to ender the issue appropriate for judicial review at this stage. These regulations purport to give an authoritative interpretation of a statutory provision that has a direct effect on daily business of prescription drug companies. Immediate compliance with their terms was expected. If petitioners wish to comply, they must change all their labels and promotional materials. The alternative compliance continued use of materials which they believe in good faith meets the statutory requirements but which clearly does not meet the regulation of the Commissioner may be even more costly. That course would risk serious criminal and civil penalty for the unlawful distribution of misbranded drugs.

LUJAN v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE, 1992: Three elements of the constitutional minimum of standing. (1) First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact, an invasion of a legally protected interest which is: a. Concrete and particularized b. Actual or imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical (2) Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of. The injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant and not the result of an independent action of some third party not before the court. (3) Third, it must be likely as opposed to merely speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. o The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.

E. RIPENESS
Class Notes: o Ripeness v. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies o Ripeness question deals with rulemaking and policy-making functions of an administrative agency o Exhaustion of remedies question applies only to QJA functions o Ripeness may be viewed as an exception the applicability of doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies o Tests: o Fitness Test legal issue involved

NATIONAL AUTOMATIC LAUNDRY AND CLEANING COUNCIL v. SHULTZ, 1971: General ripeness considerations. o The issue of ripeness not only involves an inquiry into the finality but also to the presumption of reviewability. The court

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interpretation of the provisions of the Admin Procedure Act state that judicial review of a final agency action by an aggrieved person will not be cut off unless there is persuasive reason to believe that such was the purpose of Congress. A person seeking judicial review of an agency action which has adversely affect or aggrieved him will not be frustrated unless there is persuasive reason to believe that judicial review of the agency action was not the purpose or intention of the legislature or that full discretion on the matter was granted to the admin agency. General Ripeness Considerations: (1) WON there is congressional intent negative to judicial review (2) The possibility of the courts entangling themselves in abstract disagreement over administrative policies due to premature adjudication (3) The fitness of issues for judicial determination and hardship to parties of withholding court consideration

VI. MODES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

A.
Art. IX, A. Common Provisions, Sec.7, 1987 Constitution: Constitutional Commissions Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. BP129, Sec.9 as amended by RA7902: Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals 1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; 2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and 3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, Except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph od Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. Rule 43, Rules of Court: Appeals from the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals. Section 1. Scope.

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This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law. Sec. 2. Cases not covered. This Rule shall not apply to judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Sec. 3. Where to appeal. An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. Sec. 4. Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. Sec. 5. How appeal taken. Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be indicated as such by the petitioner. Upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to

the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days from notice of the denial Sec. 6. Contents of the petition. The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the review; (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the award, judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers; and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the last paragraph of section 2, Rule 42. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein. Sec. 7. Effect requirements. of failure to comply with

The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. Sec. 8. Action on the petition. The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice, or dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require consideration. Sec. 9. Contents of comment. The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. The comment shall (a) point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioners statement of facts and issues; and (b) state the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with

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the Court of Appeals. Sec. 10. Due course. If upon the filing of the comment or such other pleadings or documents as may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of the period for the filing thereof, and on the basis of the petition or the records the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the court or agency concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the same. The findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the Court of Appeals. Sec. 11. Transmittal of record. Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been given due course, the Court of Appeals may require the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record. Sec. 12. Effect of appeal. The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just. Sec. 13. Submission for decision. If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by these Rules or by the Court of Appeals.

Rule 65 involves special civil action of certiorari based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES v. NLRC, 1998: Special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for the judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. o The Court, is therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. All references in the amended Section 9 of BP 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals (following the principle of hierarchy of courts).

POLICE COMMISSION v. BELLO, 1971: When abuse of discretion justifies issuance of writ of certiorari. o While findings of fact of administrative bodies are entitled to great weight and should not generally be disturbed, there is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty, or to virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

PUREFOODS CORPORATION v. NLRC, 1981: Requisites of certiorari; Errors of judgment v. error of jurisdiction. o Certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the present case, the plain and adequate remedy expressly provided by law was a motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision and the resolution thereof, which was not only expected to be but would actually have provided adequate and more speedy remedy than the present petition for certiorari. It is settled to the point of being elementary that the only question involved in certiorari is jurisdiction, either the want or excess thereof,

B. CERTIORARI
Class Notes: o Function to set aside a judgment or final order as null and void. o Requisites for certiorari to lie: (1) There must be grave abuse of discretion (2) It must pertain to performance of adjudicative and not ministerial functions. (3) There must be no plain, speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law. o Rule 45 v. Rule 65 o Rule 45 involves purely questions of law

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and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is so grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility and it must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction. An error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not correctible through the original civil action of certiorari.

CIR v. GENERAL FOODS, 2003: Policy and practice of the Court to respect conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies sans an abuse or improvident exercise of authority. o It had been a long standing policy and practice of the Court to respect the conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies such as the Court of Tax Appeals, a highly specialized body specifically created for the purpose of reviewing tax cases. The CTA, by nature of its functions, is dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems. It has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject. We extend due consideration to its opinion unless there is an abuse or improvident exercise of authority. Since there is none in the case at bar, the Court adheres to the findings of the CTA,

AZORES v. SEC, 1996: In a petition for certiorari, inquiry is into errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion, not errors of judgment. o Even assuming that errors were allegedly committed by the SEC en banc, the errors are not errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. It is not disputed that under the by-laws of the PCA, proprietary membership is open only to Filipino citizens and that failure to pay dues for three successive months result in the automatic termination of membership; that petitioner did not pay his monthly dues from 1966 to 1981 when he worked in the United States; and that he did not inform the PCA that he had obtained American citizenship. There was therefore reasonable basis for the decision of the Hearing Officer in dismissing petitioners complaint. The alleged errors assigned by petitioner are mere errors of judgment but since petitioner failed to perfect his appeal to the SEC en banc, he cannot now raise them.

CRUZ v. GANGAN, 2003: Findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. o The consistent ruling of this Court is that findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected, so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. But lacking support, the factual finding of the COA on the existence of negligence cannot stand on its own and is therefore not binding on the Court. While we commend the Commission on Audit for its diligence in safeguarding State properties, we nonetheless hold that a government employee who has not been proven to be culpable or negligent should not be held accountable for the loss of a cellular phone, which was stolen from her while she was riding on the LRT

VILLARUEL v. NLRC, 1998: Certiorari does not include a correction of its evaluation of evidence but is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

C. PROHIBITION
Class Notes: o Function to bar an action o Grounds are the same as for certiorari: o Grave abuse of discretion o No plain, simple remedy in the ordinary course of law o Character of proceedings: o Certiorari acts in the performance of quasi-judicial functions o Prohibition acts both in the performance of quasi-judicial and administrative/ministerial functions CHUA HIONG v. DEPORTATION BOARD, 1955: Exception to the general rule that defense of citizenship must be proven in the deportation proceeding

Grave abuse of discretion is committed when judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. An abuse of discretion does not necessarily follow just because there is reversal by the NLRC of the decision of the labor arbiter, such as the case at bench. Neither does the mere variance in the evidentiary assessment of the NLRC and that of the Labor Arbiter warrant another full review of the facts. The NLRCs factual findings are entitled to great respect and even finality, unless petitioner is able to show that it is simply and arbitrarily disregarded evidence before it or had misapprehended evidence to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence had been properly appreciated.

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o o

When evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings xxx If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability. The legal basis of prohibition is the absence of the jurisdictional fact, alienage. General rule: Present evidence to support defense of citizenship in the deportation proceeding. Exception: He can immediately seek judicial intervention if the following concurs: (1) When there is grave abuse of discretion (2) When there is absolute or substantial evidence to prove Filipino citizenship (3) Only in sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding

Case no. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. PAREDES v. COURT OF APPEALS, 1996: Prohibition is granted only in cases where no other remedy is available which is sufficient to afford redress. o Prohibition is not the proper remedy. The enabling law itself, which is BP Blg. 325 has specifically tasked the Cabinet to review and approve any proposed revision of rates of fees and charges. Petitioners should have availed of this easy and accessible remedy instead of immediately resorting to the judicial process. Prohibition is granted only in cases where no other remedy is available which is sufficient to afford redress. That the petitioners have another and complete remedy at law either by appeal or otherwise, is generally sufficient reason for dismissing the writ.

CO v. DEPORTATION BOARD, 1977: Reiteration of the exception carved out in the case of Chua Hiong. o It was likewise stressed that the judicial determination is allowable in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct xxx It is thus clear that to impute error to the lower court for sustaining the prohibition proceedings against the Deportation Board in view of the status of petitioners having been duly established finds no support from the authoritative doctrines of this court. Calacday v. Vivo reiterated the principle announced in Vivo v. Montesa as to the applicability of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in deportation proceedings, thus precluding judicial intervention until completed. Nonetheless, the opinion made express mention of the exception to the rule set forth in the Chua Hiong decision.

D. MANDAMUS
Class Notes: o Function to compel performance of an act enjoined by law or to abstain from an act o Requisites for Mandamus to lie: (1) Act must be ministerial not discretionary (2) Petitioner must show a clear legal right to the relief (3) There is no other plain, speedy remedy in the ordinary course of law BLANCO v. BOARD OF EXAMINERS, 1924: Mandamus is not proper when act sought involves discretionary duty of public officer. o The writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of the discretion of a public officer. Where the law imposes upon a public officer the right and duty to exercise judgment, in reference to any matter to which he is called upon to act, it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court xxx If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. Under the plain terms of the Medical Law, it is the discretionary duty of the Secretary of Interior to confirm or not to confirm to confirm or, as in this instance, to annul the report of the medical examiners. To hold that the Secretary of the Interior must in all cases confirm, shutting his eyes to any irregularity, no matter how glaring, would convert him into an automatic rubber stamp for imprinting requisite approval.

SIMON v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 1994: Prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done. o The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by petitioners has become moot and academic since the case before it has already been fully heard and that the matter is merely awaiting final execution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR

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It is likewise elementary law that mandamus may issue to correct abuse of discretion, if the case is otherwise proper.

NG GIOC LIU v. SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1950: Issuance of VISA not a ministerial function; therefore, not controllable by mandamus. o The determination of whether or not an applicant for a visa has a non-immigrant status and whether or not his entry into this country would be contrary to public safety is not a simple ministerial function. It involves exercise of discretion and cannot therefore be controlled by mandamus.

POLICARPIO v. PHIL. VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION, 1959: When Mandamus not proper. o Mandamus does not lie to review or control the action or decision of a pension board or other board or officer having authority over pension matters, where the action or decision is one resting in the discretion of such board or officer or where it involves the construction of the law and the application of the facts thereto. Where a pension board or officer simply refuses to take any action whatever, the court will issue a mandamus to compel it or him to take some action but will not attempt to prescribe the action to be taken and thereby control the discretion or judgment of the boar or officer

VDA DE TAN v. VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION, 1959: Duty becomes ministerial after certain facts are established; therefore, they may be subject to mandamus. o The discretion of the Veterans Backpay Commission is limited to the facts of the case; that is in evaluating the evidence whether or not the claimant is a member of a guerilla force duly recognized by the US Army. It has no power to adjudicate or determine the rights after such facts are established. Having been satisfied that the deceased was an officer or a guerilla outfit duly recognized by the US Army and forming part of the Philippine Army, it becomes the ministerial duty of the Commission to give due course to his widows application, For this reason, mandamus lies against the Commission.

Under Sec 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, Mandamus will lie: (1) In case any tribunal unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) In case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and (3) In case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused of a ministerial duty, this being its chief use. But mandamus does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct. The cause under consideration, under the allegations of petition, constitute and attempt to settle contractual rights and obligations, express or implied between the petitioner and the Reparations Commission and to regulate a course of conduct on the part of the respondent Commission. Mandamus is not the proper remedy. It is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely express, it is necessary that it should be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which it is not his duty to do or which it is his duty not to do or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers not imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.

MERALCO SECURITIES CORP V SAVELLANO, 1982: Mandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power. o Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means the power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others. Mandamus may not be resorted to so

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN v. REPARATIONS COMMISSION, 1977: (1) Grounds for the grant of the writ of mandamus; (2) Mandamus available only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty; (3) Requisites for the issuance of writ of mandamus.

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as to interfere with the manner in which the discretion shall be exercised or to influence or coerce a particular determination. "Discretion," when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially, under certain circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or consciences of others. A purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a discretional act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment. the determination of the correctness or incorrectness of a tax assessment to which the taxpayer is not agreeable, falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals and not of the Court of First Instance, for under the provisions of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, the Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review, on appeal, any decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments and other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

was the most expeditious available to the petitioner.

and

speedy

PRC V DE GUZMAN, 2004: Writ of mandamus = legal remedy for a legal right. o The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law. If no legal right has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right. There must be a welldefined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded. It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the government. As a rule, mandamus will not lie when administrative remedies are still available. However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where, as in this case, a pure question of law is raised.

E. DECLARATORY RELIEF
DE BORJA V VILLADOLID, 1949: General purpose of declaratory relief = provide for adjudication of the legal rights, duties, or status of respective parties. o if appellant is prosecuted and found criminally liable, then the punishment prescribed by section 78 of the law, will be imposed upon him; otherwise the charge will be dismissed. In either case, the action is, as stated by the Solicitor General, terminated with finality. It might be argued that no criminal action has as yet been presented. But the law does not require that there shall be an actual pending case. It is sufficient that there is a breach of the law, an actionable violation to bar a complaint for declaratory judgment. It appears that the Director of the Bureau of Fisheries demanded that plaintiff pay the license provided in that Act and in view of the insistent refusal of plaintiff to comply with such demand, he finally turned over the case to the Office of the Fiscal of the City of Manila for appropriate action. However, plaintiff, upon learning of the step taken by the director of the Bureau of Fisheries, countered by filing this complaint for declaratory relief, but this attitude of the plaintiff will only result in multiplicity of actions which should always be invoked and the Rules of Court obviously seeks to prevent when, in section 2 of Rule 66, it provides that the action for declaratory relief must be brought "before there has been a breach" of a contract or statute the construction of which is sought.

CRUZ V CA, 1996: Petitioner must have a clear legal right that may be enforced by mandamus. o Petitioner does not have a clear legal right which may be enforced by mandamus, because her claim of such right is based on a decision and order of an agency which had no jurisdiction over the subject thereof. Writ [of mandamus] will not issue to compel an official to do anything which it is not his duty to do or to which it is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. In certiorari cases, the definitive rule now is that such reasonable time is within three months from the commission of the complained act. The same rule should apply to mandamus cases. The unreasonable delay in the filing of the petitioner's mandamus suit unerringly negates any claim that the application for the said extraordinary remedy

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MIRANDO V WELLINGTON TY & BROS., INC., 1978: Requisites for petition for declaratory relief to be proper: 1) justifiable controversy 2) between persons with adverse interests 3) where party seeking declaratory relief must have legal interest in the controversy 4) which is ripe for judicial determination. o The authorities are unanimous that in order that an action for declaratory relief may be entertained, it must be predicated on the following requisite facts or conditions: (1) there must be a justifiable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) the issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination. All these requisite facts are not present [in the instant case]; the complaint must, therefore, fail for lack of sufficient cause of action. Petitioners-appellants brought this action with a claim that they were deprived of their preferential right to buy the disputed lots by virtue of a contract of sale involving said lots executed between the administrator of the estate of the late Carmen Planas and respondent Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc. But it is evident from the records that from the date of their relocation to the disputed lots in 1950 to the date of the filing of this petition for declaratory relief, at no time did the petitioners-appellants acquire any interest whatsoever in the parcels of land subject of the aforementioned contract of sale. They enjoyed no rights which were violated, or at the least, affected by the exchange of properties between the national government and the late Carmen Planas, and eventually, by the above contract of sale between the administrator of the estate of Carmen Planas and the respondent-appellee Wellington Ty & Bros., Inc.

the officer clothed with the authority to alienate lands belonging to the public domain, renders his decision. From a decision of the Director of Lands an appeal lies to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. until after all these administrative remedies shall have been exhausted, no court may compel the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on appeal to decide one way or another any sales application as that is vested exclusively in them. NATIONAL DENTAL SUPPLY CO. V MEER, 1951: Petition for declaratory relief not proper where taxpayer questions his liability for payment of any tax, duty, or charge collectible under any law administered by Bureau of Customs or BIR o The proviso added by Commonwealth Act No. 55 to section 1 of Act No. 3736, which prohibits an action for declaratory relief in cases where a taxpayer questions his liability for the payment of any tax, duty, or charge collectible under any law administered by the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Internal Revenue', is not incorporated in the above provision in order to make it discretionary upon the courts to apply or not to apply the remedy in such cases. Of course, where the tax is already due and collectible, the tax payer cannot prevent collection by the declaratory action, but he should pay the tax and sue for its recovery within the period limited by law. But, where the tax is not yet due, there can be no valid reason why the tax-payer cannot by declaratory relief test its validity. the failure to incorporate the above proviso in section 1, rule 66, is not due to an intention to repeal it but rather to the desire to leave its application to the sound discretion of the court, which is the sole arbiter to determine whether a case is meritorious or not. And even if it be desired to incorporate it in rule 66, it is doubted if it could be done under the rule-making power of the Supreme Court considering that the nature of said proviso is substantive and not adjective, its purpose being to lay down a policy as to the right of a taxpayer to contest the collection of taxes on the part of a revenue officer or of the Government. With the adoption of said proviso, our law-making body has asserted its policy on the matter, which is to prohibit a taxpayer to question his liability for the payment of any tax that may be collected by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

DE AZAJAR V ARDALES, 1955: Citizenship cannot be determined in a complaint for declaratory judgment or relief. O [A complaint for declaratory judgment or relief] is not the proper remedy or proceedings. If [plaintiff] is a Filipino citizen as she claims, she should go ahead with the administrative proceedings in the Bureau of Lands and submit the evidence to prove her citizenship. The appellant may resort to the courts, if the exercise of her rights as citizen be prevented or denied, to compel the officer, who prevented or denied her the exercise of her rights as a Filipino citizen, to allow her to exercise such rights. A sales application filed with the Bureau of Lands must go through the different stages as prescribed by law until the Director of Lands,

F. HABEAS CORPUS

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LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA V LIWAG, 1989: General rule = release of detained person (instant case, bail) renders petition for habeas corpus moot and academic. Exception = there are restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action. o Release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic, unless there are restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action, in which case the Court can still inquire into the nature of his involuntary restraint Where a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ

is substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds for the belief that the claim is correct, In other words, the remedy should be allowed only in sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding. That sound discretion was properly exercised by the then Judge de Veyra in the judgment now on appeal.

G. INJUNCTION AS PROVISIONAL REMEDY

HONDA V SAN DIEGO, 1966: Writ of injunction may be issued against a court only by another court superior in rank to the former. o A writ of injunction or of prohibition or of certiorari may be issued against a court only by another court superior in rank to the former the Philippine Patent Office and the Public Service Commission are similarly situated and that both are, to say the least, of the same rank or category as Courts of First Instance. Consequently, no one of the latter has jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction against them.

MEJOFF V DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, 1949: Too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. What constitutes reasonable time depends on the circumstances. o Temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable length of time. However, under established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The meaning of reasonable time depends upon the circumstances specially the difficulties of obtaining a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned and the efforts displayed to send the deportee away. unless it is shown that the deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting a chance for deportation or unless the Government admits that it cannot deport him or unless the detainee is being held for too long a period our courts will not interfere.

NOCNOC V VERA, 1979: CFI does not have jurisdiction to entertain a case impugning the validity of an award/decision of the WCU and, in the process, enjoin its execution. o The descriptive phrase [court of general jurisdiction], however, does not and cannot confer CFI's with power to entertain an incident involving a Workmen's Compensation case, which is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC), and of this Court, in case of an appeal. For jurisdiction to be properly vested in a court or body, it must be expressly provided by law, and, in the case of Courts of First Instance, by the Judiciary Act, as amended, not by a phrase descriptive of the extent and scope of the Court's competence.

PINEDA V LANTIN, 1962: CFI has no jurisdiction to grant injunctive reliefs against the SEC. That power rests exclusively with the SC. o Whenever a party is aggrieved by or disagrees with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange Commission, his remedy is to come to this Court on a petition for review. He is not permitted to seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction. [1, R43 of the Rules of Court and 35 of Commonwealth Act No. 83] clearly pronounce that only this Court possesses the jurisdiction to review or pass upon the legality or correctness of any order or decision of the Securities and

CO V DEPORTATION BOARD, 1977: Exception to primary jurisdiction enjoyed by Deportation Board (or when writ of habeas corpus may be issued) = when judiciary believes there is substantial evidence supporting claim of citizenship o Judicial determination is allowable "in cases when the courts themselves believe that there

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Exchange Commission, and, as circumstances might warrant, to modify, reverse, or, set aside the same. Being chargedwith overseeing the operations of those various corporate enterprises from which our government derives great revenues and income, [the SEC] cannot afford to be impeded or restrained in the performance of its functions by writs of injunction emanating from tribunals subordinate to this Court.

COLLECTOR V REYES AND CTA, 1957: Injunction may be granted by CTA without filing a bond or making a deposit o The CTA could restrain the Collector of Internal Revenue from enforcing collection of income tax deficiency by summary proceedings after expiration of three-year period provided for in section 51. The requirement of the bond as a condition precedent to the issuance of the writ of injunction applies only in cases where the processes by which the collection sought to be made by means thereof are carried out in consonance with the law for such cases provided and not when said processes are obviously in violation of the law to the extreme that they have to be SUSPENDED for jeopardizing the interests of the taxpayer.

LEMI V VALENCIA, 1968: Enumeration of instances when courts should grant injunction o While courts should exercise great care in granting preliminary mandatory injunctions because the writ operates not merely to preserve the status quo between the parties but to compel one of them to perform a positive act; nevertheless, we held in Meralco vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. p. 433, that in cases of extreme urgency; where petitioner's right to the writ is clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience are strongly in his favor; where there appears to be a willful invasion of petitioner's right, the injury inflicted upon him being a continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction would not be to create a new relation between the parties but solely to re-establish a pre-existing relation between them recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the respondent, courts should not hesitate in granting the writ. Considering the facts obtaining in the present case, particularly the circumstance that petitioner's inability to continue broadcasting through his radio station affects his contractual relations with third parties, we find it justified to grant the preliminary writ of mandatory injunction prayed for.

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VII. EXTENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Class Notes: 3 Major Issues on Judicial Review: 1) AVAILABILITY Is judicial review available? o Gen. Rule: If Congress states that the courts should not review, then judicial review is not available. o See Rule 43 o Exceptions: o If what the agency did is unconstitutional, you can come to the court to assert your constitutional right. o If what you are asking involves purely questions of law judiciary is the final interpreter of law. 2) MODE OF REVIEW If judicial review is available, what mode or vehicle shall I utilize? o Certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, declaratory relief, habeas corpus, injunction o Take note of the requirements for availing the different modes of review. o See jurisprudence o See Rules of Court o Note: EACH requirement should be present. o COMMON REQUIREMENT: No plain, speedy, ordinary remedy in the ordinary courts of law o E.g. Motion for Reconsideration EXTENT OR SCOPE OF THE REVIEW o Dominant role of substantial evidence rule: Findings of fact of an administrative agency, when supported by substantial evidence with record considered as a whole (Universal Camera) will be respected by the courts. o General rule on questions of discretion: Reviewing court will not intervene in the exercise of discretion. o Except when there is GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION o General rule: Courts will not review policy questions and political questions (questioning the wisdom of the law) o Courts respect the expertise which the agencies have o But the courts will review when you allege that the acts of the agency are o Not authorized by the law o Inconsistent or goes against the enabling statute or the court

While the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies would indeed require an appeal to be taken to the President before resort to the courts can be made, it is equally true that the rule is not without exception. For instance, the rule does not apply where the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. Here the question was whether from the evidence submitted by the parties it could fairly be concluded that appellee's homestead application had been granted. Were the matter a simple process of ascertaining from the records whether the application had been granted, we would agree with appellants that it is a question of fact. But precisely because the records of the Bureau of Lands had been destroyed during the war that circumstantial evidence had to be introduced and it is a rule now settled that the conclusion drawn from the facts is a conclusion of law which the courts may review.

REYES VDA. DE SANTIAGO V. REYES, 1960: The employee is presumed to have complied with his regular obligation. o Presumptions or inference that an unwitnessed death arose out of the employment are allowed in some jurisdictions, where the employer provides no contrary proof, and when last seen deceased was working or had properly recessed. The presumption is that he performed his duties legally and in accordance with the rules and regulations because this was his regular obligation. It was incumbent upon the employer to prove that he did otherwise, or that he failed to comply with the regulations.

3)

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORP. v. PEPITO, 1966: Noncontroversion of a fact that a person is missing is an admission of that fact, but not of fact of actual death, which is a conclusion of law. o The notice and claim for compensation simply says that while the vessel was navigating, "the herein deceased was lost or reported missing". Nobody knows what has happened to him. He could have transferred to another vessel or watercraft. He could even have swam to safety. Or he could have died. Or worse, he could have taken his own life. Legal implications such as right to compensation, succession, the legal status of the wife are so important that courts should not so easily be carried to the conclusion that the man is dead. The result is that death cannot be taken as a fact.

A. THE LAW-FACT DISTINCTION

DAUAN v. SECRETARY, 1959: Where circumstantial evidence had to be introducedthe conclusion drawn from the facts is a conclusion of law which the courts may review.

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Non-controversion in compensation cases, as in the case of pleadings in ordinary civil cases, simply means admission of facts, not conclusions of law. As applied to the case before us, the mere failure to controvert the statement that Demetrio Pepito is believed to be "dead" or "deceased" because he "was lost" or was "reported missing", does not import an admission that the man is actually dead, but that he was just lost or missing. We, therefore, rule that petitioner's noncontroversion admits but the fact that Demetrio Pepito was lost or missing, but certainly is not an admission of the actual fact of death.

law is in no sense conclusive upon the courts, but is subject to review. In other words, any action of the Director of Lands which is based upon a misconstruction of the law can be corrected by the courts. Class Notes: What is required is substantial evidence not just 'some evidence' as penned by Justice Malcolm.

MEJIA v. MAPA, 1954: Erroneous conclusions, even if affirmed by the Secretary, are subject to judicial review. o Having entered into that contractual relation in good faith no other conclusion can be drawn than that such contract has produced as a necessary consequence the relation of landlord and tenant so much so that the respondents worked the land only on the basis of such undertaking. The doctrine laid down in Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion is not applicable in this case. First, the decision of the Director was not approved by the Secretary but was, in fact, reversed by the latter. The philosophy behind the ruling in Ortua is that if the decision of the Director of Lands on a question of fact is concurred in by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, it becomes conclusive upon the courts upon the theory that the subject has been thoroughly weighed and discussed and it must be given faith and credit, but not so when there is a disagreement. Second, even if there is unanimity in the decision, still we believe that the doctrine would not apply if the conclusions drawn by the Secretary from the facts found are erroneous or not warranted by law. These conclusions can still be the subject of judicial review. These are questions of law that are reserved to the courts to determine, as can be inferred from the ruling laid down in the same case of Ortua.

B. QUESTION OF LAW
ORTUA v. VICENTE SINGSON, 1934: Decisions upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts so long as there is substantial evidence upon which the finding in question could be made. o The Director of Lands has been made by law a quasi-judicial officer. As such officer he makes findings of fact, even passes upon questions of mixed fact and law, and considers and decides the qualifications of applicants for the purchase of public lands. A discretion is lodged by law in the Director of Lands which should not be interfered with. The decisions of the Director of Lands on the construction of the Public Land Law are entitled to great respect by the courts. Accordingly, to paraphrase the authorities and decisions coming principally from the United States Supreme Court, we deduce the rule on the subject to be, that a decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to be reviewed by the courts, in the absence of a showing that such decision was rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake, other than error of judgment in estimating the value or effect of evidence, regardless of whether or not it is consistent with the preponderance of the evidence, so long as there is some evidence upon which the finding in question could be made. There is, however, another side to the case. It certainly was not intended by the legislative body to remove from the jurisdiction of courts all right to review decisions of the Bureau of Lands, for to do so would be to attempt something which could not be done legally. Giving force to all possible intendments regarding the facts as found by the Director of Lands, yet so much of the decision of the Director of Lands as relates to a question of

PEOPLE v. SANTOS, 1936: A decision made pursuant to an administrative order which was issued in excess of authority granted is void. o Inasmuch as the only authority granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time to time such instructions, orders, rules, and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as stated, contains no provisions similar to those contained in the above quoted conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the conditional

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clause in question supplies a defect of the law, extending it. This is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him. Such act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore said conditional clause is null and void and without effect. JAPANESE WAR NOTES CLAIMANTS v. SEC, 1957: The interpretation of JWNCA's Articles of incorporation involves a question of law reviewable by the courts. o It is contended that the Commissioner erred (1) finding that petitioner made misrepresentations to the public so as to induce holders of war notes to register them with petitioner, (2) in ordering the petitioner to stop the registration of Japanese war notes, receiving same for deposit and charging fees therefore, and (3) in ordering petitioner to desist from accepting and collecting fees for reparation claims for civilian casualties and injuries. We are not permitted to examine the correctness of the first contention as above set forth as the same involves questions of fact; only questions of law may be raised in this case for review. As to the other contention, it is argued that the registration of war notes and the collection of fees therefor is not prohibited by the corporation law and the authority of the petitioner to engage therein is implied from its articles of incorporation. However, a reading of the articles of incorporation show that it only authorizes collection of fees from members; but it does not authorize the corporation to engage in the business of registering and accepting war notes for deposit and collecting fees from such services. This was the ruling of the Commissioner and this we find to be correct. Neither do we find any merit in the third contention that the association has authority to accept and collect fees for reparation claims for civilian casualties and other injuries. This is beyond any of the powers of the association as embodied in its articles and has absolutely no relation to the avowed purpose of the association to work for the redemption of war notes.

o o

Issue: W/N ER-EE relationship exists. Held: Yes. Most business enterprises have employees of different classes, necessarily requiring different methods of selection and contracts of services or various types, without detracting from the existence of said relationship.

OLEARY v. BROWN PACIFIC- MAXON, (1960) (1951): The standard is that findings are to be accepted unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. o The determination of whether or not the accident arose out of, or in the course of Valeks employment is a question of law that is cognizable by the courts. The test of recovery is whether the obligation or conditions of employment created the zone of special danger out of which the injury arose. Then, it would not be necessary that there exist a causal relation between the nature of employment of the injured person and the accident, nor is it required that the employee be engaged at the time of the injury in activity. The issue of whether or not an employeremployee relationship existed between Valek and BPMI is also a question of law. In this case the question of fact does not connote a simple, external, physical event as to which there is conflicting testimony. The conclusion concerns a combination of happenings and the inferences drawn from them. In part at least, the inferences presuppose applicable standards for assessing the simple, external facts. Yet the standards are not so severable from the experience of industry nor of such a nature as to be peculiarly appropriate for independent judicial ascertainment as "questions of law." Both sides conceded that the scope of judicial review of such findings of fact is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act. The standard is sufficiently described by saying that the findings are to be accepted unless they are unsupported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole. We are satisfied that the record supports the Deputy Commissioner's finding. The pertinent evidence was presented by the written statements of four persons and the testimony of one witness. It is, on the whole, consistent and credible. Class Notes: Zone of Special Danger Test: if the obligations or conditions of employment create a zone of special danger out of which the injury arose, such is deemed as arising out of employment, and therefore, compensable.

YSMAEL v. CIR, 1960: The conclusion of the CIR, drawn from the facts of the case, as to the existence of an Employer-Employee relationship, is a question of law that may be reviewed by the Court on certiorari.

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O'KEEFE v. SMITH, 1965: Inferences are to be accepted unless unsupported by (substantial) evidence taken as a whole. o The rule of judicial review has therefore emerged that the inferences drawn by the Deputy Commissioner are to be accepted unless they are irrational or "unsupported by substantial evidence on the record . . . as a whole." "While this Court may not have reached the same conclusion as the Deputy Commissioner, it cannot be said that his holding that the decedent's death, in a zone of danger, arose out of and in the course of his employment is irrational or without substantial evidence on the record as a whole. The decedent was hired to work in the exacting and unconventional conditions of Korea. His transportation over and back was to be at the employer's expense, and, while there, he was considered to be working on a 365-day per year basis, subject to call at the job site at any time, and quite often he worked Saturdays and Sundays and at other times outside the working day. The employer considered decedent and all other employees at this hazardous overseas base to be "in the course of regular occupation from the time they leave the United States until their return." The accident here occurred on an outing for a short period of time on a lake located only 30 miles from the employer's job site. In the words of the District Court, "It was reasonable to conclude that recreational activities contributed to a higher efficiency of the employer's work, and that, when conducted in the restricted area of employment, on a work day, so to speak, and in a manner not prohibited by the employer, such activity was an incident of the employment." Class Notes: This ruling would result in the imposition of absolute liability upon the employer for any and all injuries. Only injuries arising out of employment should be compensated.

tends to support this contention was that the lower court was almost evenly divided due to the facts, as borne out of the evidence. In such a situation, the SC needs to go over the evidence to determine its substantiality and credibility. In regarding the substantiality of evidence, one must consider not only the quantitative aspect, but also the qualitative aspect. SUARNABA v. WCC, 1978: Substantial evidence, not conclusive evidence, is sufficient to prove the claim for workmen's compensation. o The widow of Suarnaba presented certificate from the parish and testimony of witnesses to the occurrence of the marriage since the marriage certificate was burned during the Japanese occupation. "Respondent Commission was, in effect, insisting that the legal relationship between petitioner and the deceased employee should be established by a conclusive evidence of marriage. It was thus bent on denying any claim for compensation filed by a widow who, through no fault of her own, cannot produce the primary evidence of marriage or secure three witnesses to the marriage. This is clearly violative of the fundamental precept enshrined in the rule of the Workmen's Compensation Commission and Our consistent pronouncement in a long line of' cases that substantial evidence, and nothing more. is required to support a claim for Workmen's Compensation. Such violation is even more regrettable when viewed against the factual backdrop of the instant case where preponderant evidence was showing that the deceased employee and the petitioner have deported themselves as husband and wife thereby giving rise to the presumption of a lawful marriage and whether, as in this case, no other person claimed to be the wife of the deceased employee."

C. QUESTION OF FACT
GONZALES v. VICTORY LABOR UNION, 1969: (on questions of fact) In some cases, the court needs to go over the evidence to determine its substantiality and credibility. o The dismissal was due to pilferage of the employees, and not to their membership in the union. Gonzales did not even know that his employees were members of the union. This lends support to the facts that union affiliation did not come into play in the dismissal of employees. Another fact that

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, 1977: Only errors of law and not rulings on the weight of evidence are reviewable. o Only errors of law, and not rulings on the weight of evidence, are reviewable by this Court. The facts then as above ascertained cannot be disturbed. In our latest decision, there is a categorical assertion that where the question is one of fact, it is no longer reviewable. Such a doctrine is not of limited application. It is a recognition of the wide discretion enjoyed by the Court of Tax Appeals in construing tax statutes. As a matter of principle, it is not advisable for this

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Court to set aside the conclusion reached by an agency such as the Court of Tax Appeals which is, by the very nature of its function, dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, unless, as did not happen here, there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of its authority. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK v. MONETARY BOARD, CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1991: Where the decision is merely based upon pieces of documentary evidence that are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and conclusion they are presented, the standard of fairness mandated in the due process clause is not met. o "In the instant case, the basic standards of substantial due process were not observed. The procedure of administrative tribunals must satisfy the fundamentals of fair play and that their judgment should express a wellsupported conclusion. In the celebrated case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, this Court laid down several cardinal primary rights which must be respected in a proceeding before an administrative body. However, as to the requirement of notice and hearing, Sec. 29 of RA 265 does not require a previous hearing before the Monetary Board implements the closure of a bank, since its action is subject to judicial scrutiny as provided for under the same law. Notwithstanding the foregoing, administrative due process does not mean that the other important principles may be dispensed with, namely: the decision of the administrative body must have something to support itself and the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Hence, where the decision is merely based upon pieces of documentary evidence that are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and conclusion they are presented, the standard of fairness mandated in the due process clause is not met."

not based on a thorough examination of the contending claims, but merely on position papers of the parties. There is grave abuse of discretion when a board, tribunal or officer exercising judicial function fails to consider evidence adduced by the parties. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. v. NLRC, 1991: In administrative proceedings, the substantial evidence rule governs, even where the misconduct charged also constitutes a criminal offense. o In administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required as basis for judgment of the legality of an employers dismissal of an employee, nor even preponderance of evidence, substantial evidence being sufficient. It is absolutely of no consequence that the misconduct with which an employee may be charged also constitutes a criminal offense. The proceedings being administrative, the quantum of proof is governed by the substantial evidence rule and not, as the Commissioner seems to imagine, by the rule governing judgments in criminal actions.

LAMEYRA v. PANGILINAN, 2000: It is axiomatic that such findings of fact should be supported by substantial evidence. o While it is settled doctrine that findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected and this Court should not be tasked to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body, it is axiomatic that such findings of fact should be supported by substantial evidence. We are not convinced that the certification of the personnel officer that petitioner did not report for work constitutes such substantial evidence in light of the petitioners submission that said personnel officer precisely prevented him from signing the log book, that he has been replaced by another and that he has been asked to submit his resignation which he refused to do. Under these circumstances, it is believed that, in equity, and in proper compliance with the requirements of due process, petitioner should be given a last full opportunity to prove his contention that the termination of his services was illegal.

PAL v. CONFESSOR, 1994: Where the issue is the survival of the company, the Court is inclined to review the findings of the Secretary. o While it is true that the findings of fact of the Secretary of Labor are entitled to respect by the SC, the Court is inclined to review the findings when the issue is the survival of the company. The findings of the Secretary are

GERMAN MARINE v. NLRC, 2001: Findings of fact of NLRC is accorded great respect particularly if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter when supported by substantial evidence. o According to the law governing the POEA all that is required is that the company physician be the one to make such finding of disability.

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o o

No distinction in the law is made providing for the additional requirement of accreditation. The extensive medical attention given to private respondent enabled the Manila Doctors Hospital specialists to acquire a detailed knowledge and familiarity with private respondents medical condition. No doubt such specialized knowledge enabled these physicians to arrive at a much more accurate appraisal of private respondents condition, including the degree of any disability which he might have sustained, as compared to another physician not privy to private respondents case from the very beginning. Thus, the appellate court was not mistaken in giving more weight to the certificate issued by Dr. of the Manila Doctors Hospital, than to the one issued by Dr. Cayabyab in support of the contention of the company. The documentary evidence of petitioners was insufficient to support their contentions. The Supreme Court has always accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact of the NLRC, particularly if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, when supported by substantial evidence.

there is reasonable ground to believe that a conclusion, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming. o It bears stressing that in administrative proceedings, the quantum of evidence required is only substantial. It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent is responsible for the misconduct, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. SANTOS, 2006: Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule. o A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. A reading of the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman and a thorough examination of the records of this case show sufficient evidence to prove respondents administrative liability. In its decision, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its Graft Investigation Officer cites the pieces of evidence that support its ruling.

VELASQUEZ v. HERNANDEZ, 2004: The quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings is only substantial evidence. o Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings, and administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This is different from the quantum of proof required in criminal proceedings which necessitates a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Ombudsman, in ordering the withdrawal of the criminal complaints against respondent was simply saying that there is no evidence sufficient to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt which is a condition sine qua non for conviction. Ergo, the dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action against respondent. The desistance executed by three (3) out of the twenty-three(23) original complainants is of no moment. The sworn complaints of the twenty remaining complainants coupled with their positive testimonies in the proceedings below, more than adequately complies with the standard of proof required in administrative cases.

UNIVERSAL CAMERA CORP. v. NLRB, (U.S.) 1951: Upon review, substantial evidence on record must be considered as a whole. o The National Labor Relations Act as amended provides that the NLRB's findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole are to be conclusive upon judicial review. In essence, just because the board made a certain finding of fact, it does not preclude the CA to make certain that such findings were culled from the entire records of the proceedings. (Here, CA reviewed the records of the Board's findings but not those of the Hearing Examiners) Congress has merely made it clear that a reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. CAYOBIT, 2003: The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where

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Class Notes: Most important thing in this case: The reviewing court should not be selective in its review of the cases brought before it, but must refer to the entire records as a whole. Such is embodied in the Phil. Admin. Code wherein it is mandated that cases under judicial review must include the entire records of the case.

MANILA TRADING v. ZULUETA, 1940: An employer cannot be legally compelled to employ a person whose continuance in service is inimical to the formers interest. o An employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with the employment of a person who admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and whose continuance in the service of the latter is patently inimical to his interest. The law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. There may, of course, be cases where the suspension or dismissal of an employee is whimsical or unjustified or otherwise illegal scrutinized carefully and the proper authorities will go to the core of the controversy and not close their eyes to the real situation. This is not however the case here.

D. QUESTIONS OF DISCRETION
LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO. v. PSC, 1957 : Gen rule = Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency. Exceptions [when Court will reverse order] = Order is 1) w/o reasonable support in evidence; 2) rendered against law; or 3) issued w/o jurisdiction. An erroneous application of the significance of the competing facts does not mean that the agency has abused its discretion. o Well-established is the rule that the SC will not substitute its judgment for that of the PSC, and Commonwealth Act 146 emphasizes that its orders should be reversed only if it is 1) without reasonable support in the evidence; 2) rendered against law; or 3) issued without jurisdiction. Although there is no express finding of inadequacy, the finding that residents of Sta. Maria, Mabitac, Siniloan, Pangil, Pakil, Paete, and Longos, being mostly farmers and merchants, need more means of transportation for themselves and their products, and that with the current number of trips provided by the other operators, there is an average interval of 42 minutes between trips, which would be reduced to 30 minutes if Lacdan was granted the provisional permit, are equivalent to a determination that the present services are insufficient. It was for the PSC to weigh the facts; erroneous application of the significance of the competing facts does not mean that it has abused its discretion. Since the PSC could not anticipate how much time would be required by the oppositors to submit their evidence, and the need for services had been duly established, the PSC had the power to authorize Lacdan to provisionally extend his services.
1

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA LA SUERTE-POITAF v. NORIEL, 1977: The determination of an essentially factual matter by the BLR Director is entitled to respect. o After the petition was filed, the employer however submitted a list of its regular rank and file employees with a total number of 4,055. Private respondent, in order to comply with the 30% consent requirement, submitted an additional list of 331 rank and file employees. Thus, the signatories totalled 1,399 or more than 30% of the 4,055 employees." Even if, as contended by petitioner, there were among the signatories submitted 105 falsified or double entries and 7 came from those not qualified to vote or a total of 112, that would still leave 1,287 signatories or more than thirty percent of the 4,055 employees. The matter is thus essentially factual in character, the determination by respondent Noriel being entitled to respect. Such a requirement of thirty percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit is relevant only when it becomes mandatory for respondent Noriel to conduct a certification election. So Article 258 explicitly provides. Petitioner ignored that respondent Noriel is likewise possessed of discretionary power whether or not a certification election should be held. In such a case, there is no such thirty percent requirement.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Caveat: The photocopy in the case pile, Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Regodon, doesnt relate to question of discretion. I searched online, on Lex, and SCRA for the case as cited in the syllabus (and other permutations, trust me), but came up with nothing. This is based on the digest thats in the A2010 compiled digests.

FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS (BISIG NG MANGGAGAWA SA UTEX) v. NORIEL, 1978: Where the law sets limits to the exercise of discretion, such must be observed.

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Where "the law is clear," this Court "cannot over-emphasize the [necessity that there be] adherence." This is not to deny that an administrative agency entrusted with the enforcement of a regulatory statute is vested with discretion. Such discretion, however, is not unbounded. Where, as in this case, the Labor Code itself sets limits, they must be observed. That is the only way to manifest fealty to the rule of law. [LC 258s] last sentence specifically defines what must be done by the Bureau of Labor Relations once the certification election is conducted; it must "certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all the employees in the unit." That is the extent and scope of the authority entrusted to respondent Noriel as Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations. He cannot go further than that.

VIII. ENFORCEMENT OF AGENCY ACTION

A. RES JUDICATA; FINALITY OF JUDGMENT
IPEKDJIAN MERCHANDISING v. CTA, 1963:Defense of res judicata extends to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been conferred.

PLDT v. NTC, 1995: Courts should not intervene in the administrative process, except upon a very clear showing of serious violation of law or of fraud, personal malice or wanton oppression.

It is important to recall that NTC, as the governmental agency charged with passing upon applications for Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCNs) in the field of telecommunications, is authorized to determine what the specific operating and technical requirements of "public convenience and necessity" are in the field of telecommunications, subject of course to relevant limitations established by legislative enactments, if any. The NTC is also authorized to examine and assess the legal, technical and financial qualifications of an applicant for a CPCN and in doing so exercises the special capabilities and skills and institutional experience it has accumulated. Courts should not intervene in that administrative process, save upon a very clear showing of serious violation of law or of fraud, personal malice or wanton oppression. Courts have none of the technical and economic or financial competence which specialized administrative agencies have at their disposal, and in particular must be wary of intervening in matters which are at their core technical and economic in nature but disguised, more or less artfully, in the habiliments of a "question of legal interpretation."

The essential requisites for the existence of res judicata are: 1) the former judgment must be final; 2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; 3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and 4) there must be, between the first and second actions a. identity of parties b. identity of subject matter and c. identity of cause of action To say that the doctrine applies exclusively to decisions rendered by what are usually understood as courts would be to unreasonably circumscribe the scope thereof. The more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom judicial powers have been 1 conferred. The conclusiveness of judgments being a universal principle of jurisprudence, it "does not, and from its very nature cannot, depend upon the particular court whose judicial action has been invoked, so long as its jurisdiction is competent and its judgment final. It applies wherever the parties have so submitted their claims to a final decision by a court of competent jurisdiction, whether that court be inferior or superior, of law or of equity, domestic or foreign." But in order that an adjudication may operate strictly as res judicata it must, of course, be the act of a judicial tribunal in the exercise of its lawful power.

NASIPIT LUMBER CO v. NLRC, 1989: Principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations proceedings.

The Court stated therein that the principle of res judicata may not be invoked in labor relations proceedings considering that Section 5, Rule XIII, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code provides that such proceedings are "nonlitigious and summary in nature without regard to legal technicalities obtaining in courts of law." Said pronouncement is in consonance with the jurisprudential dictum

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that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of administrative powers. DULAY v. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 1993: Res judicata applies as well to judicial and quasi judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards.

It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasijudicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction.

Originally the power to enforce a final award made under the Workmen's Compensation Act was vested "in any court of record in the jurisdiction of which the accident occurred" (Section 51, Act 3428). Subsequently, pursuant to Republic Act 997 as amended by Republic Act 1241, and as effected by Reorganization Plan 20-A adopted in 1956, the authority to enforce awards was transferred from the courts of justice to the Regional Administrator and the Workmen's Compensation Commission. This Court, in a number of cases, nullified writs of execution issued by the Regional Offices and by the Commission on the ground that Reorganization Plan 20-A, insofar as it purported to grant such power, was without legislative authority or sanction.

PHIL. AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, 1993: One of the requisites of the principle of res judicata is that there must be, among other things, identity of subject matters and causes of action between a first and second case in order that the judgment in the prior case may bar that in the subsequent case.

VDA DE CORPUZ v. THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 1978: Mandamus is a proper remedy, when there is no other plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law than the issuance of this writ.

The doctrine of res judicata does not apply in the case at bar, because the Board of Marine Inquiry rendered a decision dated 11 April 1988 (acting on the marine protest filed on 19 October 1985 by the shipmaster of M/V "Crazy Horse") holding that said shipmaster was not guilty of "negligence as the proximate cause of the grounding and subsequent wreckage of M/S "Crazy Horse". The cause of action in the marine protest was to enforce the administrative liability of the shipmaster/captain of M/V "Crazy Horse", its officers and crew for the wreckage and sinking of the subject vessel. On the other hand, the cause of action at bar is to enforce the civil liability of private respondent, a common carrier, for its failure to unload the subject cargo within a period of time considered unreasonably long by the petitioner. While it may be true that the Court is bound to accord great weight to factual 9 findings of the Board, we hold that the protest filed before it and the present case assert different causes of action and seek different reliefs.

A final and executory award entities petitioner to its enforcement according to its letter. It is not susceptible of any change or alteration by the officer charged with its implementation as the latter's duty on the matter constitutes only a ministerial act that does not call for the exercise of discretion. The adamant refusal of respondent to enforce the award completely is also an unlawful neglect to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from his office. Consequently, mandamus is a proper remedy. Clearly, there is no other plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law than the issuance of this writ especially in this case where petitioner had sought the help of the office of the Chief Executive of the land which consistently ruled in her favor but failed to convince respondent to effect the full payment of the award.

AMBROSIO v. SALVADOR, 1978: CFI cannot issue an injunction against the NLRC.

B. WRIT OF EXECUTION; MANDAMUS

APOLEGA v. HIZON, 1968: Duly deputized officials in the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor have no authority to issue writs of executon.

We hold that a Court of First Instance cannot issue an injunction against the NLRC which is the successor of the Court of Industrial Relations and has the same rank as the Court of First Instance. That holding obviates confusion and obstruction in the administration of justice. Section 2, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that a judge of the Court of First Instance may issue a writ of preliminary injunction "in any action pending in an inferior court within its district".

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And section 4, Rule XVI of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, in dogmatic terms provides that "no temporary injunction or restraining order many case involving or growing out of a labor dispute shall be issued by any court or other entity. "

diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. CLAVANO v. HLURB: 2002: Execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision.

MERANO v. TUTAAN, 1982: NLRC has jurisdiction to review decisions of the Labor Arbiter. Mandamus will not lie.

We hold that respondent judge did not err in dismissing Merano's petition for mandamus on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The Court of First Instance is not the proper tribunal to pass upon Merano's complaint against the failure of the Labor Arbiter to enforce the NLRC's decision to reinstate him to his former position of sales staff assistant. His remedy against the refusal or inaction of the Labor Arbiter, who is in charge of executing the awards of the NLRC, is to call the NLRC's attention to the alleged nonfeasance and not to file a mandamus action in the Court of First Instance which has no jurisdiction to interfere with the execution of a final judgment of the NLRC. That labor tribunal has the same rank and is in the same category as the Court of First Instance. Articles 217 and 223 of the Labor Code indicate that the NLRC has jurisdiction to review the decisions, awards and orders of the labor Arbiter. It is elementary that mandamus does not lie if the petitioner has another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

Fundamental is the rule that execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive part of the decision, consequently, where the order or decision is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, the order has pro tanto no validity.

GSIS v. Civil Service Commission, 1991: CSC has the power to enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders.

The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, is a consitutional commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with authority to administer the civil service, but also with quasi-judicial powers. It has the authority to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. The Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision it within sixty days from the date of its submission for on certiorari by any aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof. It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices, which rules should not however

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JURISDICTION, POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF SELECTED ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION [NLRC]
JURISDICTION OF LABOR ARBITERS Unencumbered by technical rules of evidence and procedure prevailing in courts of law, the Commissions and Labor Arbiters shall exert effort at resolving disputes judiciously, fairly and expeditiously with prior resort to amicable settlement. Article 217 of the Labor Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non-agricultural: Unfair labor practice cases; Termination disputes; If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employeremployee relations; Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of the Labor Code, as amended, including questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; Except claims for employees compensation not included in the next succeeding paragraph, social security, medicare, and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not accompanied with a claim for reinstatement; Money claims arising out of employeremployee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract, involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment, including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages; Wage distortion disputes in unorganized establishments not voluntarily settled by the parties pursuant to Republic Act No. 6727; Enforcement of compromise agreements when there is non-compliance by any of the parties pursuant to Article 227 of the Labor Code, as amended; and Other cases as may be provided by law. JURISDICTION OF THE NLRC Article 217 Decision, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiters are appealed to the Commission through its Decisions, with the First, Second and Third, handling cases from the National

Capital Region and other parts of Luzon; the Fourth and Fifth, handling cases from the Visayas and Mindanao, respectively. Article 218 The Commission resolves national interest cases certified to it by the Secretary of Labor, as well as petitions which seek to enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of prohibited or unlawful acts in any labor disputes. Article 129 Decisions of Regional Directors or hearing officers on small money claims are appealable to the Commission.

BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
GENERAL FUNCTIONS Act as the primary enforcement arm of the Department of Justice and the President of the Philippines in ensuring that all foreigners within its territorial jurisdiction comply with existing laws.
[Ledesma, An Outline of the Philippine Immigration and Citizenship Laws, 2006 Rv., p.12]

Assist local and international law enforcement agencies in securing the tranquility of the state against foreigners whose presence or stay may be deemed threats to national security, public safety, public morals and public health.
[Ibid.]

Act as chief repository of all immigration records pertaining to entry, temporary sojourn, admission, residence and departure of all foreigners in the country.
[Ibid.]

SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS In the discharge of its broad functions, the Bureau through its Board of Commissioners, exercises administrative and quasi-judicial powers to; Regulates the entry (arrival), stay (sojourn), and exit (departure) of foreign nationals in the country. Monitors the entry and exit of Filipino citizens, in compliance with Philippine laws and other legal procedures. Issues immigration documents and identification certifications on the following visa categories: o Non-immigrant Visas o Immigrant Visas o Special Non-immigrant Visas Issues special permits in relation to the enforcement of immigration laws (e.g. Special Work Permit (SWP), Provisional Permit to Work (PPW), Special Study Permit (SSP), reentry permits, clearances, etc.) Extends the stay of temporary visitors and implements applications of changes of statuses as provided by law

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Administrative determination of citizenship and related statuses. Investigates, hears, decides, and executes orders pertaining to exclusion, deportation, and repatriation of aliens. Monitors and executes the implementation of the Bureau of Immigration Alert Lists (Watchlist, Blacklist, Hold Departure Orders) Cancels immigration documents upon violation of immigration laws and procedures. Investigates, arrests, and detains foreigners in violation of immigration regulation and other Philippine laws. Accreditation of schools and learning institutions that can officially accept and enroll foreign students. Accreditation of law firms, liaison officers, travel agencies, and other individuals and organizations transacting with the Bureau of Immigration.

LAND TRANSPORTATION AND FRANCHISE REGULATORY BOARD [LTFRB]

Powers and Functions of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board. The Board shall have the following powers and functions: To prescribe and regulate routes of service, economically viable capacities and zones or areas of operation of public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles in accordance with the public land transportation development plans and programs approved by the Department of Transportation and Communications; To issue, amend, revise, suspend or cancel Certificates of Public Convenience or permits authorizing the operation of public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles, and to prescribe the appropriate terms and conditions therefore; To determine, prescribe and approve and periodically review and adjust, reasonable fares, rates and other related charges, relative to the operation of public land transportation services provided by motorized vehicles; To issue preliminary or permanent injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, in all cases in which it has jurisdiction, and in which cases the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court shall apply; To punish for contempt of the Board, both direct and indirect, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of, and the penalties prescribed by, the Rules of Court; To issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum and summon witnesses to appear in any proceedings of the Board, to administer oaths and affirmations; To conduct investigations and hearings of complaints for violation of the public service laws on land transportation and of the Board's rules and regulations, orders, decisions and/or rulings and to impose fines and/or penalties for such violations; To review motu proprio the decisions/actions of the Regional Franchising and Regulatory Office herein created; To promulgate rules and regulations governing proceedings before the Board and the Regional Franchising and Regulatory Office: Provided, That except with respect to paragraphs d, e, f and g hereof, the rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in the courts of laws should not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of said rules that the Board and the Regional Franchising and Regulatory Offices shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain facts in its case speedily and objectively and without

COMMISSION ON AUDIT [COA]

CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION SECTION 2 (1). The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c) other governmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers pertaining thereto. The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties.

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regard to technicalities of law and procedures, all in the interest of due process; To fix, impose and collect, and periodically review and adjust, reasonable fees and other related charges for services rendered; To formulate, promulgate, administer, implement and enforce rules and regulations on land transportation public utilities, standards of measurements and/or design, and rules and regulations requiring operators of any public land transportation service to equip, install and provide in their utilities and in their stations such devices, equipment facilities and operating procedures and techniques as may promote safety, protection, comfort and convenience to persons and property in their charges as well as the safety of persons and property within their areas of operations; To coordinate and cooperate with other government agencies and entities concerned with any aspect involving public land transportation services with the end in view of effecting continuing improvement of such services; and To perform such other functions and duties as may be provided by law, or as may be necessary, or proper or incidental to the purposes and objectives of this Executive Order.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION [SEC]

Under Section 5 of the Securities Regulation Code, Rep. Act. 8799, the Commission shall have, among others, the following powers and functions: (a) Have jurisdiction and supervision over all corporations, partnerships or associations who are the grantees of primary franchises and/or a license or permit issued by the Government; (b) Formulate policies and recommendations on issues concerning the securities market, advise Congress and other government agencies on all aspects of the securities market and propose legislation and amendments thereto; (c) Approve, reject, suspend, revoke or require amendments to registration statements, and registration and licensing applications; (d) Regulate, investigate or supervise the activities of persons to ensure compliance; (e) Supervise, monitor, suspend or take over the activities of exchanges, clearing agencies and other SROs; (f) Impose sanctions for the violation of laws and the rules, regulations and orders issued pursuant thereto;

(g) Prepare, approve, amend or repeal rules, regulations and orders, and issue opinions and provide guidance on and supervise compliance with such rules, regulations and orders; (h) Enlist the aid and support of and/or deputize any and all enforcement agencies of the Government, civil or military as well as any private institution, corporation, firm, association or person in the implementation of its powers and functions under this Code; (i) Issue cease and desist orders to prevent fraud or injury to the investing public; (j) Punish for contempt of the Commission, both direct and indirect, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of and penalties prescribed by the Rules of Court; (k) Compel the officers of any registered corporation or association to call meetings of stockholders or members thereof under its supervision; (l) Issue subpoena duces tecum and summon witnesses to appear in any proceedings of the Commission and in appropriate cases, order the examination, search and seizure of all documents, papers, files and records, tax returns, and books of accounts of any entity or person under investigation as may be necessary for the proper disposition of the cases before it, subject to the provisions of existing laws; (m) Suspend, or revoke, after proper notice and hearing the franchise or certificate of registration of corporations, partnerships or associations, upon any of the grounds provided by law; and (n) Exercise such other powers as may be provided by law as well as those which may be implied from, or which are necessary or incidental to the carrying out of, the express powers granted the Commission to achieve the objectives and purposes of these laws. Under Section 5.2 of the Securities Regulation Code, the Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A has been transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION [CSC]

Admin Code 1987, Book V. Sec. 6. Scope of the Civil Service. - (1) The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Sections 31 and 32, Rule XIV of Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Admin Code.

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SEC. 31. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees. SEC. 32. The secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to Investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department, then to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned. Miralles vs. Go, 2001

Section 5 of RA 7638 defines the powers and functions of the DOE as follows: Sec. 5. Powers and Functions. The Department shall have the following powers and functions: (a) Formulate policies for the planning and implementation of a comprehensive program for the efficient supply and economical use of energy consistent with the approved national economic plan and with the policies on environmental protection and conservation and maintenance of ecological balance, and provide a mechanism for the integration, rationalization, and coordination of the various energy programs of the Government; (b) Develop and update the existing Philippine energy program which shall provide or an integrated and comprehensive exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation of energy resources, with preferential bias for environment-friendly, indigenous, and low-cost sources of energy. The program shall include a policy direction towards the privatization of government agencies related to energy, deregulation of the power and energy industry and reduction of dependency on oil-fired plants. Said program shall be updated within nine (9) months from its completion and not later than the fifteenth day of September every year thereafter; (c) Establish and administer programs for the exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling and storage of energy resources of all forms, whether conventional or non-conventional; (d) Exercise supervision and control over all government activities relative to energy projects in order to attain the goals embodied in Section 2 of this Act; (e) Regulate private sector activities as provided under existing laws: Provided, that the Department shall endeavor to provide for an environment conducive to free and active private sector participation and investment in all energy activities. At the end of four (4) years from the effectivity of this Act, the Department shall, upon approval of the President, institute the programs and timetable of deregulation of appropriate energy projects and activities of the energy industry; (f) Assess the requirements of, determine priorities for, provide direction to, and disseminate information resulting from energy research and development programs for the optimal development of various forms of energy production and utilization technologies; (g) Formulate and implement programs, including a system of providing incentives and penalties, for the

HOUSING AND LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD [HLURB]

PD 1344 Section 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature: (a) Unsound real estate business practices; (b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and (c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. In 1981, NHA functions (PD 957) were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory commission through E.O. 648. Then in 1986 Pres. Aquino changed its name to HLURB through E.O. 90.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY WITH REGARD TO ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7638, which was subsequently enacted by Congress on December 9, 1992, the non-rate-fixing, jurisdiction, powers and functions of the ERB have been transferred to the Department of Energy.

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judicious and efficient use of energy in all energyconsuming sectors of the economy; (h) Formulate and implement a program for the accelerated development of nonconventional energy systems and the promotion and commercialization on its applications; (i) Devise ways and means of giving direct benefits to the province, city, or municipality, especially the community and people affected, and equitable and preferential benefit to the region that hosts the energy resource and/or the energy-generating facility: Provided, however, That the other provinces, cities, municipalities, or regions shall not be deprived of their energy requirements; (j) Encourage private enterprises engaged in energy projects, including corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, to broaden the base of their ownership and thereby encourage the widest public ownership of energy-oriented corporations; (k) Formulate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to implement the objectives of this Act; and (l) Exercise such other power as may be necessary or incidental to attain the objectives of this Act. As to what energy projects encompass, Section 3 of the same law gives this definition: Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. (a) "Energy projects" shall mean activities or projects relative to the exploration, extraction, production, importationexportation, processing, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling or storage of all forms of energy products and resources." (Emphasis supplied.) Definitely, the exploration, the production, the marketing, the distribution, the utilization, or any other activity involving any energy resource or product falls within the supervision and control of the DOE. - Energy Regulatory Board vs. CA (AMI), GR. 127373

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court; (3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; (4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; (5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; (6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families; (7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights; (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority; (9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions; (10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and (11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law. As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS [CHR]

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. Its powers and functions are the following: (1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

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But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasijudicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. - Carino v. Commission on Human Rights