A Paiauox in the Name of uou

A Senioi Bonois Thesis Piesenteu to the

Faculty of the Bepaitment of Philosophy
0niveisity of Bawai'i at Nano






In Paitial Fulfillment of the Requiiements
foi Bacheloi of Aits with Bonois





By
Alan Beibeit
Nay S, 2u11




Committee:
Piof. Aiinuam Chakiabaiti, Nentoi
Piof. Steve 0uin
Piof. Rajam Raghunathan


Table of Contents

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Nill: Neaningless Naiks anu Connotations .............................................................................................. S
Fiege: Sense anu Refeience ............................................................................................................................. 9
Russell: Names anu Befinite Besciiptions ............................................................................................. 1S
Stiawson: The 0niquely Refeiiing 0se of Names ............................................................................... 19
Bonnellan: Piesupposition anu Fit in the 0se of Refeiiing ............................................................ 2S
A Summing 0p .................................................................................................................................................... 29
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Kiipke: Intention anu Contingent Connections ................................................................................... S2
Evans: The Pioblem of Change of Refeience in the Causal Theoiy ............................................. S8
Aquinas: Neaning of the Teim "uou" ....................................................................................................... 4S
A Summing 0p .................................................................................................................................................... Su
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Nyya anu the Neaning-Complex .............................................................................................................. S2
Religion anu Expeiience ................................................................................................................................ 6S
A Summing up .................................................................................................................................................... 77
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Beibeit 1
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Thus uou, the Absolute, eluues finite beings. Wheie they uesiie to name him,
because they must, they betiay him. But if they keep silent about him, they
acquiesce in theii own impotence anu sin against the othei, no less binuing,
commanument to name him. (Theouoi W. Auoino - The Fiankfuit School)
1


In most theistic ieligions, the name of uou (oi the thousanu names of uou, etc.) has
both a iitual-piactical as well as a uoctiinal-metaphysical impoitance. In piayeis anu
hymns ieligious piactitioneis use names of uou with full commitment anu yet when it
comes to speculative theoiies baseu on ieligious expeiience, many of them say that uou is
beyonu the ieach of any language anu theiefoie cannot be nameu. With this in minu, the
cential puzzle in this thesis aiises out of the tenuency, among (a laige numbei of Binuu anu
}uueo-Chiistian) believeis, to iegaiu, on the one hanu, that no name can ieally iefei to uou
anu yet, on the othei hanu, uou's name oi names iefei to uou so intiinsically that name anu
nameu aie as if iuentical. This statement foims a paiauox anu not an iiieconcilable
contiauiction because since the iitual-piactical anu uoctiinal-metaphysical qualities of
uou's name (which togethei I will fiom now on iefei to as the "uual piactical-mystical
qualities" anu inuiviuually as "piactical," oi "iefeiential," anu "mystical") aie consiueieu
sepaiately anu in contiaiiety - liteially, the name of uou !"#$ &"' (#)**+ (#,#( to uou anu yet
the same name is -+$'./)**+ .!#&'./)* with uou - they uo not foim a uiiect contiauiction of
the foim 0 )&! &"' 0 (it is not the same as saying uou's name uoes anu uoes not (#,#( to
uou, oi uou's name is iuentical anu yet uiffeient fiom uou). Bowevei, though not a

1
Theouoi W. Auoino, "Sacieu Fiagment: Schoenbeig's Noses unu Aion," 12)$. 3&) 4)&')$.), tians.
Rouney Livingstone (Lonuon: veiso, 1992), p. 226.

Beibeit 2
contiauiction, the statement is not absolveu fiom being paiauoxical since, on the
supposition that both qualities belong to the same name, it coulu be helu to be of the foim
565-7865-77 )&! &"'956507 865077, in which 6 iepiesents uou is uou's name anu the subsciipts
inuicate the statements seconuaiy mystical ((m)) anu piactical ((p)) qualities. I use
"seconuaiy qualities" in an almost Lockean sense to iefei to the inuiiect way by which, in
this case, uou's names aie cognizeu - in contiast to the piimaiy quality, oi the uiiect
cognition of uou's name as fully appiehenuing of all that is uou (in whatevei way uou is
tiuly anu fully appiehenueu). Thus, although these seconuaiy qualities uo not contiauict
each othei, the two instances of the unueilying piimaiy quality, oi name of uou, uoes foim
a contiauiction. The iesolution oi sustenance of this paiauoxical 565-7865-77 )&! &"'956507
865077 is theiefoie a mattei of accounting foi the seconuaiy, piactical-iefeiential anu
mystical, qualities.
As a piepaiation foi unueistanuing the cential puzzle, the initial two chapteis of
this thesis aie conceineu with the fiist of the above seconuaiy qualities of uou's name, that
of a piactical, oi iefeiential, quality as isolateu fiom any special mystical quality. The name
of uou is exploieu fiom the possible peispectives of it being iepiesentative of, as well as
iefeiiing uiiectly anu inuiiectly to, uou. This section of the thesis, though piepaiatoiy foi
the main uiscussion of the paiauox, is somewhat longei because of the complexity anu
uepth of the topic. The geneial issue is whethei anu how a name oi singulai teim can
uesignate an entity whose piopeities aie eithei unknown oi inuesciibable. The language
anu meaning theoiies of seveial Westein philosopheis aie taken into account. These aie
the theoiies of }ohn Stuait Nill, uottlob Fiege, Beitianu Russell, Petei Stiawson, Keith
Beibeit S
Bonnellan, Saul Kiipke anu uaieth Evans. Chaptei two concluues with Thomas Aquinas'
exploiation of the woiu "uou," which is ultimately unable to iefei to uou uiiectly.
The thiiu chaptei exploies a theoiy of meaning uevelopeu (anu still being
uevelopeu) by the Nyya Schools in Inuia. These schools have uebateu foi centuiies ovei
theoiies of meaning of woius anu sentences, among othei subjects. They subsequently
foimulateu a fiamewoik fiom which to analyze names, which has been aujusteu accoiuing
to vaiious peispectives anu with fuithei uebate. Some of the uevelopments within this
uiscouise, that is ielevant to the topic of uou's name, aie outlineu.
The lattei pait of the thiiu chaptei is ueuicateu to exploiing the seconu of the above
seconuaiy ioles of uou's name, that of mystical-metaphysics. This section takes the foim of
opening the flooi up to the testimony of ieligious piactitioneis who claim to have hau
mystical connections with names of uou via meuitation, etc. Seveial views fiom Inuia aie
piesenteu anu, with iespect to the uual piactical-mystical quality of uou's name, a couple of
possible iesolutions to the paiauox aie offeieu.
The fouith anu final chaptei is on the notion of paiauox as being a sustainable
semantic. The spiiitual significance of the claim that uou's name is paiauoxical suggests
that any iesolution of this paiauox, anu subsequent ienueiing of it as a non-paiauox, via
conventional man-maue logic woulu not only be uisiespectful to the enigmatic anu
ineffable natuie of uou anu uou's name as well as to the self-iespect of the tiauitions that
claim the paiauox to be a ieal one, but it woulu also ienuei the initial puzzle in this thesis a
weak one. Alteinatively, insteau of iesolving the paiauox, this last chaptei exploies the
possibilities of sustaining it, oi embiacing it, thus consiueiing it a veiy ieal semantic moue
of piesenting the unknowability of uou.
Beibeit 4
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The cential paiauox of this thesis can be simply stateu as follows: 0n the one hanu,
no name can ieally iefei to uou anu yet, on the othei hanu, uou's name oi names iefei to
uou so intiinsically that name anu nameu aie as if iuentical. In consiueiation of the
paiauoxical, yet non-contiauictoiy, uual piactical-mystical natuie of uou's name in this
paiauox, this chaptei consiueis the foimei, piactical (iefeiential) quality of uou's name,
without incluuing the lattei, the Name's mystical quality. The isolation of iefeiential value
fiom mystical quality, allows foi a focuseu analysis of the geneial pioblem in iegaiu to the
iefeiential (anu iepiesentational) ielation between name anu nameu. This is ielevant foi
even in mystical ieligious tiauitions uou's name also seives to iefei to uou.
0iuinaiily, piopei names aie meie symbols maue up of woius (oi non-woius) that
have been assigneu by convention to paiticulai inuiviuuals, incluuing peisons. Although by
uefinition they aie meant to stiictly pick out paiticulais, some philosopheis, like Beitianu
Russell anu uottlob Fiege, consiueieu that if they aie to coiiectly fit theii iefeience, some
extia infoimation is neeueu. vaiious theoiies have been pioposeu in iegaiu to whethei this
infoimation is containeu in woius themselves, in the iefeienceu objects, both in woius anu
objects oi somewheie in between. As a piepaiation foi the naiiowei question with iegaiu
to the status, iefeience anu meaning of the teim "uou" as a piopei name, this chaptei
uiscusses the uiffeient philosophical views about the semantics of piopei names in geneial.
Consequently, it coveis: meaningless maiks, connotations, asseitoiic sentences containing
Beibeit S
names anu the iefeiential use of uefinite uesciiptions. These themes aie taken fiom the
theoiies of }ohn Stuait Nill, uottlob Fiege, Beitianu Russell, Petei Stiawson anu Keith
Bonnellan.

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}ohn Locke, ueoige Beikeley anu Baviu Bume, among otheis, thought of names as
woius that inuicate iueas. 0n this view, when a woiu is useu to signify a physical thing oi a
living being, it only iefeis to the iuea of that thing oi being. }ohn Stuait Nill challengeu this
view, though he uiu aumit that some names uo stem fiom iueas. 0ltimately (oi eventually)
the name of a physical object has to signify the thing oi entity being nameu inasmuch as it
is an actual object uistinct fiom any content of thought. In this iegaiu, Nill wiote:
When I say, "the sun is the cause of uay," I uo not mean that my iuea of the
sun causes oi excites in me the iuea of uay: oi in othei woius, that thinking of
the sun makes me think of uay. I mean, that a ceitain physical fact, which is
calleu the sun's piesence (anu which, in the ultimate analysis, iesolves itself
into sensations, not iueas) causes anothei physical fact, which is calleu uay.
2


Nill composeu his own taxonomy of names, in which the woiu "uou" woulu have
been iegaiueu an inuiviuual, conciete name.
S
Bowevei, unless uou is expeiienceu anu
empiiically pickeu out, "uou" iefeis to no physical object. In this case, if anything is to be
coiiectly pickeu out by "uou," then it woulu have to be achieveu by iefeiiing to the implieu

2
}ohn Stuait Nill, : ;+$'#- ", <"=./> ?)'."/.&)'.@# )&! A&!2/'.@#> B#.&= ) C"&&#/'#! D.#E ", 'F#
G(.&/.0*#$ ", H@.!#&/# )&! 'F# I#'F"!$ ", ;/.#&'.,./ A&@#$'.=)'."& (Lonuon: Longmans, 1961),
1S.
S
"uou" is not a geneial oi collective name because one anu only one paiticulai inuiviuual is being
pickeu out. It is also not an abstiact name because Nill consiueieu that categoiy to be of names that
uenote inuiviuual attiibutes without implying any conciete thing that have those attiibutes oi
qualities.
Beibeit 6
attiibutes of what it is that is known by the teim. This woulu make it a connotative name.
Beism offeis an example of this. A peison who takes up the cause of Natuial Religion may
use the aigument fiom uesign as a pioof foi the existence of uou. This aigument is baseu
on analogy. It pioposes that since it can be obseiveu that the cosmos is an oiganizeu
system that functions like a machine anu that all machines we know of necessaiily have
uesigneis, then it follows that the cosmos too must have a uesignei, which, in this gianu
scale of things, is uou. What is ielevant, whethei oi not this aigument is sounu, is that the
ueist's use of "uou" is connotative because the existence of the uou it uenotes ielies on an
infeiential aigument anu not on uiiect expeiience. Bence, "uou," accoiuing to the ueist, is a
woiu that means the simple Supieme Besignei of the univeise. "uou" can also imply an
entity that has omniscience, omnipiesence anu omnipotence. Auuitionally oi alteinatively,
the name can inuicate that which is iefeiieu to by "the unmoveu movei."
4
In all the above
cases, "uou" is a connotative name since it functions to iefei to an existent entity by means
of that entity's attiibutes.
Bespite a name being connotative, any attiibute that is implieu by its use is not
necessaiily piominent oi even known by its speakeis oi heaieis. When believeis uttei
"uou," theii sole intention may be to meiely pick out a specific entity, even if they have
nevei seen that entity. Consequently, it is possible to uiop all meaning that the teim may
holu oi imply. Foi instance, someone may use uou's name to beseech uou in a similai way
to an inuiviuual calling a fiienu, a mothei summoning hei chilu oi a uaughtei ciying out to
hei fathei. In such a capacity, the uenotative powei of any noun useu as a name can
supeiseue its stanuaiu meaning. A ieligious peison may have oiiginally been tolu that the

4
Nill woulu have consiueieu that "The unmoveu movei" acts as a piopei name in the capacity of,
what he teimeu, a many-woiueu name
Beibeit 7
etymology of the woiu "uou" stems fiom the Sanskiit veib ioot F2, which means '" E"($F.0
oi '" ",,#( $)/(.,./#.
S
Thus, he coulu initially think "uou" to be a noun that stanus in foi the
auuiessee of the act of woiship, meaning Be who is woishippeu. Nonetheless, aftei
iepeateuly chanting "uou," this peison may no longei think of veib ioots oi connotations
but solely of a fathei figuie with unknown qualities. Thus, ovei time the oiiginal meaning
coulu be uioppeu anu "uou" coulu eventually pick out that which the peison believes to be
his eteinal Fathei. Fuitheimoie, if that believei has an epiphany anu expeiiences uou
uiiectly, then the name coulu, fiom that time on, seive to pick out that which is oi has been
uiiectly seen anu peiceiveu as uou. As such, a name can become inuepenuent of any extia
infoimation, incluuing the ieason foi which it was oiiginally conceiveu.
Nill claimeu that piopei names aie -#)&.&=*#$$ -)(J$ that aie intiouuceu in
language foi the puipose of picking out paiticulai things oi peisons so that they can
become subjects of uiscouise. The semantic values of such names iesiue in theii iefeiences
alone. 0n this view, if a piopei name seems significant, it can be attiibuteu to psychology.
Foi instance, although a believei may think that "uou" means the oiiginal cause of
eveiything, this meaning is not intiinsic to the name. It is, insteau, contingent on the belief-
state of that peison, who associates a paiticulai set of images oi thoughts to the teim.
Bence, Nill coulu be iight in suggesting that a piopei name, inasmuch as it is a name, is a
meaningless maik.

S
0xfoiu English Bictionaiy, Seconu Euition, 1989, "gou, n"; 0nline veision Novembei 2u1u,
F''0KLLEEEM"#!M/"-KNOLH&'(+LPQRST; accesseu 1u }anuaiy 2u11. Theie aie othei possible souice
woius of which "uou" coulu have been ielateu.
Beibeit 8
Nill noteu that piopei names connect oui minus with the iueas of the objects they
pick out.
6
This is pioblematic, especially when it seems in uiiect contiauiction with his
statement that names aie not naming iueas but picking out actual things. Noieovei, "uou"
is not an oiuinaiy piopei name like "Waltei" oi "Scott." Although it has been suggesteu that
"uou" acts as a meaningless maik, uespite the speakei's oi heaiei's psychological
uisposition, it coulu just as easily be positeu that the name cannot be uetacheu fiom the
attiibutes of the entity nameu anu the ieasons foi which it has been conceiveu. "uou," even
when useu to pick out uou, is not stiictly non-connotative because the name is commonly
unueistoou accoiuing to the attiibutes associateu with uou.
Stiictly speaking, "uou" seems to be a kinu of hybiiu between a connotative anu a
non-connotative name. Foi a theist, it simply picks out uou anu yet it has a vast histoiical
aichive of meanings attacheu to it. A question iemains in iegaiu to what it is that gives
semantic value to the teim. The syllables that make up the name coulu have been
aibitiaiily assigneu accoiuing to cultuial convention anu in such a case the semantic value
of "uou" coulu not be in a gioup of letteis inasmuch as they aie letteis of the alphabet.
Similaily, semantic value coulu not solely be the iefeience - uou in anu of Bimself -
because then the teim "uou" woulu seive no puipose whatsoevei. uottlob Fiege
consiueieu that the meaning of a woiu useu as a piopei name iesiues between that name
anu the object that it names.



6
Nill, : ;+$'#- ", <"=./, 22.
Beibeit 9
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It has been aigueu that a piopei name, such as "uou," can function to meiely pick
out one paiticulai entity while bypassing any connotation that the use of the woiu may
possibly convey. Bowevei, it is not necessaiily tiue that the object nameu by a meaningless
maik is solely what is cognizeu. If this weie so, then all tiue iuentity statements, oi use of
the sign of equality between two uistinct woius iepiesenting one object, woulu be
tautological anu utteily uninfoimative. An iuentity statement of the foim a=a, such as "uou
is uou," although tiue, is a piioii anu analytically tiivial. It says nothing about uou except
the inciuental infoimation that Be is Bimself. If cognitive significance weie to be gaineu
fiom an iuentity statement, it woulu have to be of the foim a=b. But even in a=b, both
woius still uenote one inuiviuual - as in the case of "Kiishna is Bhagavan," which consists
of two names of the same uou -, anu so woulu also be tiivial because, again, it woulu be
equivalent to stating, in this case, Kiishna is Kiishna.
7
Bowevei, a tiue statement of the
foim a=b neeus to synthesize infoimation fiom the woilu in the foim of expeiience,
obseivation oi testimony, to connect what "a" signifies with what "b" signifies. Thus, it is
not tiivial, noi is it a piioii.
"Kiishna," uespite being a piopei name (foi vaishnava uevotees) of all that is uou,
also uenotes a specific foim of uou - that of a uaik coloieu youth who typically stanus in a
thieefolu benuing foim playing a flute. "Bhagavan" again uenotes uou, but this time in Bis

7
The teim "piopei name" can incoipoiate singulai expiessions oi, to use Nill's teiminology, -)&+9
E"(!#! &)-#$, such as "The Loiu of the 0niveise," which still seives to pick out one object.
Beibeit 1u
capacity of being the possessoi of all opulences.
8
If these two names aie placeu in an
iuentity statement, then, without any extia effoit, as long as it is known that they both iefei
to the same uou, significant infoimation is communicateu in iegaiu to the iange of uou's
potencies. Bence, "Kiishna is Bhagavan" is not tiivial, wheieas "uou is uou" is. This all
implies that although the inuiviuual nameu by a woiu gives some meaning to that woiu -
since coiielating the woiu to obseiveu oi tiansmitteu uata has cognitive value -, that
meaning extenus beyonu the nameu inuiviuual, otheiwise eveiy tiue iuentity statement of
the foim a=b woulu be tautological.
Fiege suggesteu that meaning in iegaiu to inuiviuuals nameu extenus to the mannei
of piesentation oi the ways in which they aie iecognizeu.
9
Bence, in the tiue statement
"a=b," "a" anu "b" uo not shaie a meaning but aie uistinct ways of iecognizing oi piesenting
that which is nameu by them. Fiege calleu this moue of ueteimination, which is uistinct
fiom name anu nameu, the $#&$# of the teim useu.
1u
Thus, a piopei name's meaning aiiives
via a sense to a iefeience (object oi inuiviuual). Foi instance, "Kiishna" anu "Bhagavan"
both uenote the same inuiviuual but uon't expiess the same sense. They take two uistinct
ioutes to the same iefeience-uestination. The sense of each expiession (piopei name) is
one out of many possible ways in which the iefeience, oi inuiviuual uesignateu by both
expiessions, is pickeu out oi piesenteu. In a sense, the $#&$# becomes the iefeience.
0ne may ask what it is that makes Fiege's sense uistinct fiom oiuinaiy iueas. In
answei to this, Fiege consiueieu iueas, oi mental images, subjective, wheieas sense is

8
Accoiuing to Inuian tiauition, uou's six piimaiy opulences aie knowleuge, beauty, fame,
ienunciation, stiength anu wealth. Refineu foims of these opulences aie citeu when Bhagavan is
moie ueeply peiceiveu.
9
uottlob Fiege, "Sense anu Refeience," UF# GF.*"$"0F./)* ?#@.#EM S7. S (1948), 21u.
1u
Sense = $.&& in ueiman; iefeience = V#!#2'2&=
Beibeit 11
necessaiily objective. If sense weie in the iealm of iueas, then communication woulu be
seveiely hampeieu because iueas aie piivate. Communication ielies on conveying anu
iecognizing the sense, oi the mannei of piesentation, of woius. Theiefoie, although the
sense of a name lies in the iealm of the metaphysical, it is nonetheless publically accessible.
In this iegaiu, Fiege wiote: ".one can haiuly ueny that mankinu has a common stoie of
thoughts which is tiansmitteu fiom one geneiation to anothei."
11

In the capacity of an iuentity statement, each of the names in the phiase, "Kiishna is
Bhagavan," expiesses a uiffeient sense oi moue of piesentation of uou. As piopei names
they aie neithei tiue noi false. Ny utteiing "Kiishna" to someone who is not familiai with
the name woulu not make it false foi that peison. Bowevei, the sense of each expiession in
"Kiishna is Bhagavan" contiibutes to the thought, oi pioposition, that is conveyeu by the
whole statement. The uiffeience between a sense anu a thought is that wheieas a sense is a
simple moue of piesentation with no tiuth-value, a complete thought can be tiue oi false.
To asseit "Kiishna is the Buuuha" woulu be to make a false statement (the thought is false).
"Kiishna is Bhagavan" anu "Kiishna is uou" aie both infoimative iuentity statements
conveying thoughts that, accoiuing to many theists, have tiuth as a iefeience. Fiege positeu
that the tiuth-value of a thought expiesseu by an asseitoiic sentence coulu be testeu when
the expiessions in that sentence aie put to the test of substitution, oi $)*@) @#(.')'#.
12


11
Fiege, "Sense anu Refeience," 212.
12
Liteially, "With unhaimeu tiuth." This means the logical inteichanging of two expiessions
without affecting the tiuth-values of the statements in which the expiessions occui. uottfiieu
Leibniz, W#&#()* ;/.#&/#, "Chaiacteiistics"
Beibeit 12
Tiuth-value is a concein because it is ielevant in iegaiu to whethei statements such as,
"Kiishna is Bhagavan," succeeu in iefeiiing.
1S

It is impoitant to note that the issue of iuentity statements being tiue anu
infoimative is a subject of uispute, especially in iegaiu to psychological inteipietations
occuiiing in the use of such statements. Foi example, the statement "A Shaivite believes
that Kiishna is Kiishna" may be tiivially tiue wheieas "A Shaivite believes that Kiishna is
the Supieme Loiu of the 0niveise" is false.
14

Although sense can be uefineu by uesciibing the ciicumstances in which names aie
useu, even Fiege himself took the uistinction between the sense (moue of piesentation) of
a name anu the inuiviuual nameu as saciosanct. Subsequent philosopheis have tiieu to
explain the iole of sense. Among them, Ruuolph Cainap anu Alonzo Chuich woikeu
sepaiately but theii theoiies on sense inteitwineu. veiy biiefly anu veiy basically, on theii
view, the sense of a name is tieateu in a foimal logical sense as .&'#&$."& anu its iefeience
as #X'#&$."&, all in accoiuance with possible woilus oi states.
1S
The intension of an
expiession is the meaning of that expiession that spans acioss all possible woilus. "}esus
Chiist" anu "The Chilu of the viigin Naiy" have the same extension in the actual woilu
because they iefei to the same inuiviuual. Bowevei, they uo not have the same intension
foi in othei possible woilus (wheie, foi example, the viigin Naiy hau only a uaughtei)
theii extensions can uiffei. The funuamental concept to be unueistoou out of this theoiy is
that intensions can be tianslateu into mathematical functions that ueteimine iefeience

1S
In cases, such as poetiy, wheie the iefeience is not as impoitant as the aesthetic value of the
thought oi in situations wheie the iefeience is fictitious oi non-existing (as in a squaie tiiangle),
then a tiuth-value is not sought.
14
Stanfoiu 0niveisity, "Names," ;')&,"(! H&/+/*"0#!.) ", GF.*"$"0F+, (26 }uly 2uu7).
1S
Stanfoiu 0niveisity, "Intensional Logic," ;')&,"(! H&/+/*"0#!.) ", GF.*"$"0F+ (26 }uly 2uu7)
Beibeit 1S
accoiuing to vaiious possible-woilu extensions anu in this way foim a piecise pioposition.
Bence, if piopositions aie taken as functions fiom possible woilus to tiuth-values, then an
expiesseu intension can be tieateu as that which has contiibuteu to a pioposition's
composition. In this way, the intension of the expiession coiiesponus to its cognitive
significance. This fielu is highly technical anu the subject of a sepaiate exploiation;
nonetheless, it uoes leau us into Beitianu Russell's theoiy that avoius Fiege's pioblematic
concept of sense altogethei.
Beitianu Russell objecteu to Fiege's intangible iealm of sense as being
unnecessaiily elusive. In a similai way to the latei conceiveu of .&'#&$."&)* *"=./, he saw
that the link between name anu nameu coulu be claiifieu by placing them into the
fiamewoik of a logical pioposition. Bowevei, in his theoiy sense is not tianslateu into
intension but is omitteu altogethei. Insteau of being signs, maiks oi symbols, piopei names
can act in the capacity of uisguiseu uefinite uesciiptions. As uesciiptions, they can foim
expiessions that have meaning.

A'<<1778 3/41< /"& S1=)")#1 S1<($)0#)%"<

Foi Russell, a genuine piopei name, by uefinition, is a non-connotative woiu that
picks out one anu only one paiticulai. Bowevei, the type of ielationship between name anu
nameu implieu by this uefinition, if stiictly taken in a logical sense, is too iigiu foi eveiyuay
language. A name foi Russell is a simple symbol that has no paits that aie symbols.
16
In his

16
Beitianu Russell, UF# GF.*"$"0F+ ", <"=./)* :'"-.$- )&! Y'F#( H$$)+$> ZQZ[9ZQ, }ohn u. Slatei
(eu)(Lonuon: Allen & 0nwin, 1986), 244.
Beibeit 14
woius, it is: ".useu to uesignate a ceitain paiticulai oi by extension an object which is not
a paiticulai but is tieateu foi the moment as if it weie, oi is falsely believeu to be a
paiticulai, such as a peison."
17
A logically piopei name woulu also neeu to pick out a
paiticulai without the help of othei woius oi a context.
A piecise use of a piopei name in the loosei sense of objects iathei than paiticulais
woulu entail that the speakei be acquainteu with the object uenoteu at the moment of
iefeience.
18
Foi Russell, to iefei to something that is not being peiceiveu uiiectly woulu
solely constitute a uesciiption of that thing. Even the simple piopei name, "uovinua," useu
when the uovinua iefeiieu to is not piesent, is no moie than a uesciiption of whoevei oi
whatevei is uovinua. "uovinua" is a name foi a specific manifestation of Kiishna, oi uou,
who knows anu gives joy to the senses. Bence, the name may be mentally iepiesenteu by a
uesciiption, such as: the Supieme who is the one anu only knowei of the senses. A mental
image of uovinua also constitutes a uesciiption, foi it is a iepiesentation anu not the actual
object of iefeience. Even if uovinua weie physically piesent, "uovinua" woulu uesciibe that
inuiviuual uovinua accoiuing to the context of pleasuie potency oi knowing in which Be is
being nameu. 0sing "uovinua" to mean, "uovinua exists" (although this shoit sentence is a
tautology if "uovinua" is employeu as a iigiu uenotatoi
19
as will be uiscusseu latei), is
nothing less than uesciibing Bim as existing.

17
Ibiu.
18
An object such as a paiticulai man is not logically a paiticulai, but, foi the sake of finuing a moie
piecise use of oiuinaiy language, it is heie accepteu as a kinu of pioxy paiticulai.
19
Rigiu uenotation has a moual application anu implies that one anu only one object is being
uenoteu in eveiy possible woilu.
Beibeit 1S
Russell initially consiueieu the singulai uemonstiative pionoun, like "this," to be the
only logically piopei name that coulu be useu in language.
2u
When pointing to an object
anu saying, "this," to mean the actual inuicateu object of sense, then it seems natuial to
concluue that a piopei name is being useu in the Nillian sense of a meaningless maik.
Bowevei, this piopei name is ambiguous because at uiffeient times anu in the case of
uiffeient speakeis anu heaieis it can iefei to uiffeient things. Singulai uemonstiative
pionouns can also act as uesciiptions, in a similai way to "uovinua." By pointing to an
object asseitively anu saying, "this," the object being pickeu out is being uesciibeu as the
object being pointeu to at that paiticulai time anu place. Theiefoie, such woius aie
tempoiaiy uesciiptions that at best pick out objects in a quasi-peimanent way.
The only linguistic convention that coulu accommouate a Nillian stiictuie on piopei
names as meaningless maiks woulu be one that assigns a uistinct woiu oi non-woiu to act
as a name foi eveiy single paiticulai. Russell conceueu that this is all but impossible to
achieve. Theiefoie, insteau of seeing piopei names, inasmuch as they aie woius, as
meaningless, of which each uenotes one anu only one paiticulai, Russell pioposeu a
convention that uefines such iefeiiing expiessions as uefinite uesciiptions. As uistinct fiom
inuefinite uesciiptions, which aie ambiguous (one such example being, "a gou"), each
uefinite uesciiption, in the same way as a piopei name, picks out one specific inuiviuual.
These uenoting phiases geneially begin with the uefinite aiticle, "the," followeu by a
noun.
21
Although uesciiptive, they still seive to pick out.

2u
Russell, UF# GF.*"$"0F+ ", <"=./)* :'"-.$-, 2u1.
21
The uefinite aiticle followeu by a noun can also be employeu to apply something oi some quality
to at least some of the membeis of an inuiviuual set that exemplify a quintessential oi steieotypical
quality of, oi an association with, something that the set, which the noun signifies, imbibes oi
possesses. Foi example, "The Scot is a iuggeu inuiviuual," uoes not necessaiily talk about a
Beibeit 16
Accoiuing to Fiege, the tiue iuentity statement, "Kiishna is the Absolute," is not
tautological by uint of the expiesseu senses of the woius involveu anu the conveyeu
thought of the whole statement. By appealing to the compositionality piinciple (which
stiesses that the statement's expiesseu thought is maue up of the conveyeu senses of its
constituent paits as well as the iules useu to combine them), Fiege woulu claim that if the
statement containing these two singulai uesignatois of uou is tiue, then the name anu the
uefinite uesciiption woulu seive as uistinct moues of piesenting uou. Russell objecteu that
theie is little to stop the conveyeu sense anu uesignateu iefeience becoming one, anu as
such, in a iigoious sense, the iefeience woulu not meiely be pickeu out. Bowevei, ieveiting
to a stiict uenotation of the sole inuiviuual implieu by both names in this tiue iuentity
statement woulu again ienuei the statement tiivial. To giasp the object iefeiieu to in the
statement, while at the same time fixing significance to the unique names within it, Russell
tianslateu it all in teims of existentially quantifiable piopositions.
Russell noticeu that the copulai veib "is" is the culpiit that causes two uefinite
uesciiptions of the same iefeience to seem tautological.
22
A$ can be of iuentity oi of
pieuication anu tenus, also, to caiiy the implication of existence. In teims of the inuiviuual
pickeu out, all tiue iuentity statements between two oi moie uefinite uesciiptions aie
tautological since all they uo is pick out, oi uesciibe, the same iefeience. Bowevei, if
"Kiishna is the Absolute" is consiueieu a subject-pieuicate sentence anu as such is placeu
into the fiamewoik of a logical pioposition, then it becomes significant without neeu foi a

paiticulai Scottish peison but coulu imply the quality that may have been peiceiveu as possesseu
by at least some of that iace of people. Even the logically tiue sentence, "The whale is a mammal,"
can iefei to all inuiviuuals in the set nameu by the noun, "whale." This anu any othei use of the
uefinite aiticle that uo not pick out one anu only one iefeience aie not being uiscusseu heie.
22
Russell, UF# GF.*"$"0F+ ", <"=./)* :'"-.$-, 248.
Beibeit 17
metaphysical $#&$#. As a pieuicate in a pioposition, "the Absolute" not only uistinguishes
the unique existence of Kiishna but also uesciibes Bis ontological status.
Russell was inteiesteu in logical piopositions because, unlike acciuental
piopositions, they can be pioveu oi uispioveu by logic. Be wanteu to place uesciiptions
into a fiamewoik of piopositions that coulu be analyzeu ueuuctively foi a piioii cognitive
value. As piopositions, they holu a tiuth-value in teims of whethei they succeeueu oi not in
theii iefeience. "Kiishna is the Absolute" can thus be expiesseu as thiee piopositions: that
theie is at least one entity calleu "Kiishna," whoevei oi whatevei that entity is; that theie is
not moie than one entity calleu "Kiishna;" anu that whoevei Kiishna is, is the Absolute. If
Kiishna, in the same way as uou in Westein theology, is accepteu as ieal, then all thiee
abovementioneu piopositions aie tiue. Consequently, the whole statement woulu yielu a
positive tiuth-value. In othei woius, if the pioposition is tiue, then the statement is tiue.
An agnostic, such as Russell, woulu not believe that Kiishna exists. The statement
"Kiishna exists" woulu thus fail as a pioposition that asseits that theie is one anu only one
entity calleu "Kiishna," who is the absolute. Bowevei, "Kiishna exists," is not a meaningless
statement even foi Russell. It is peifectly unueistanuable in common language. Theiefoie,
it cannot be so easily wiitten off as false. Russell consiueieu that a way aiounu this
uilemma is to posit the existence of uou as a seconuaiy occuiience in the statement. The
piimaiy occuiience coulu be a hiuuen statement of belief oi opinion. Bence, the whole
statement coulu be iephiaseu to incluue the full intention, as in "I believe that uou exists."
Foi Fiege, suboiuinate sentential clauses, such as the "that" clause above ("I believe
that."), causes the object, oi iefeience, to expiess its own customaiy sense. Bowevei, as
mentioneu befoie, "A Shaivite believes that Kiishna is the Supieme Loiu of the 0niveise" is
Beibeit 18
false even if the customaiy sense of the suboiuinate clause, "Kiishna is the Supieme Loiu of
the 0niveise," is tiue. Thus, it is not cleai what is the expiesseu sense of this type of
inuiiect clause - whethei sense anu iefeience become meigeu oi if theie exists a hieiaichy
of senses. Russell objecteu to this lack of claiity. Bence, his theoiy consiueis suboiuinate
clauses as seconuaiy occuiiences within the statements they appeai in, anu tieats them as
such uuiing the piocess of uecipheiing tiuth-value. If the piesupposition in the piimaiy
occuiience is false, then the statement is false. Russell thought that any confusion between
piimaiy anu seconuaiy occuiiences is a ieal souice of fallacy in unueistanuing a
statement.
2S

Thiough the use of the subject-pieuicate sentence, "Kiishna is the Absolute,"
something is saiu about uou. Foi Russell, the subject of such a sentence is one that
necessaiily stanus foi the iefeiieu object that contains its own cognitive value. As such, this
statement, although possibly fictitious foi Russell, uoes not fit comfoitably into the
categoiy of a false sentence. "Kiishna" has semantic value even if it is assumeu that theie is
no existent entity that is nameu as such. To avoiu pioblems, Russell uiun't categoiize these
types of statements as maue up of subject-pieuicate sentences oi uefinite uesciiptions, but
insteau uesignateu them as uniquely existentially quantifieu piopositions. Nonetheless, this
is baseu on his assumption that woius can caiiy theii own meanings anu uefinite
uesciiptions can be iuentifieu in a sentence outsiue of use, like the functions of tools not yet
peifoiming theii functions.
24


2S
Beitianu Russell, "Besciiptions," A&'("!2/'."& '" I)'F#-)'./)* GF.*"$"0F+ (Lonuon: u. Allen anu
0nwin, 197u), 179.
24
Keith S. Bonnellan, "Refeience anu Befinite Besciiptions," UF# GF.*"$"0F./)* ?#@.#E. 7S. S (1966),
28S
Beibeit 19
To iecap, accoiuing to Russell's theoiy, a piopei name, oi uefinite uesciiption,
uenotes one anu only one paiticulai. Bowevei, if uenotation is all that is accomplisheu by
names, then using two names on each siue of an iuentity statement woulu be tautological.
To avoiu this, Russell ieuefineu anu placeu such statements into a logical fiamewoik of
existentially quantifiable piopositions so that theii meanings anu tiuth-values coulu be
asceitaineu. Nonetheless, it is one thing to say that a uefinite uesciiption can be useu to
captuie unique meaning anu anothei thing to say that it iefeis to a unique object. A theist
that utteis the woiu "uou" is making a iefeience to an existent entity anu is not stating that
the woiu has meaning because it coiiectly iefeis. Petei Stiawson thought that names uo
not necessaiily neeu fixeu iefeiences anu that language conventions allow foi woius to fit
iefeiences via, what he teimeu, theii "uniquely iefeiiing use." Rathei than a means to make
uesciiptive asseitions about things, language insteau becomes a tool foi iefeiiing.

B#$/@<%"8 9.1 T")U'17G A1=1$$)"5 T<1 %= 3/41<

0ne of the main puiposes of language is to state facts about things. Russell talkeu of
this puipose as being accomplisheu in teims of unueistanuing the uiffeient paits that
expiessions play in language. Bis view is foimeu aiounu uefinitions anu foimal systems of
logic. Bowevei, Stiawson thought that Russell neglecteu context anu that this was to the
uetiiment of his theoiy foi, among othei things, it limiteu the potential scope of language.
Also limiting was Russell's use of piopositional logic that seems to make existence
Beibeit 2u
equivalent with uniqueness.
2S
A genuine piopei name, oi a genuine uefinite uesciiption, is
a woiu oi gioup of woius that pick out oi uesciibe a paiticulai thing itself anu aie not
about that thing insofai as it falls unuei a ceitain uesciiption. Bowevei, a logically piopei
name, oi uesciiption, seives to pick out a 2&.\2# object, oi a 2&.\2# iefeience. When a
uefinite uesciiption is tianslateu as an existential pioposition, this uniqueness tenus to be
weakeneu anu the uesciiption becomes somewhat geneial in the sense that the pioposition
looks foi EF)'#@#( fits the unique uesciiption. The pioposition that theie has to be one anu
only one !, whatevei ! is, foi "!" to be a uefinite uesciiption that holus tiue, only iequiies
some unique thing in the woilu, whatevei it may be, to match !. Stiictly speaking, it uoes
not uiiectly pick out !. Bence, placing "!" into the fiamewoik of a logical pioposition
weakens any uiiect connection that it has with !. In oiuinaiy language, the iight thing that
is ! to be pickeu out is not simply a function of its fitting uesciiption, "!."
26

As a basis foi his own theoiy, Stiawson lookeu at the use of expiessions iathei than
logical connectives between specific woius anu statements. An expiession is the use of a
sentence to mention oi iefei to a paiticulai peison oi object.
27
Russell hau positeu that
sentences can have unique meaning in anu of themselves, such as in "one plus one equals
two," but Stiawson noteu that it is only aftei iefeiiing to something that anything can be
asseiteu in iegaiu to it. As Stiawson put it, a iefeiential use ".cannot be uissolveu into any
kinu of asseiting."
28


2S
P. F. Stiawson, "0n Refeiiing," I.&! 6M;. S9. 2SS (19Su), (Iv) SS7.
26
Bonnellan, "Refeience anu Befinite Besciiptions," (IX) SuS.
27
Stiawson, "0n Refeiiing," (II) S2S
28
Ibiu., (III) SSS.
Beibeit 21
Russell woulu have consiueieu "uovinua" to be a uisguiseu uefinite uesciiption that
uniquely uesciibes an entity, whethei uou oi a human.
29
Bowevei, if "uovinua" acts in the
capacity of a uesciiption that takes the place of the subject in a giammatical subject-
pieuicate sentence, then it alteis the tiauitionally accepteu stiuctuie of that sentence. The
giammatical subject, accoiuing to tiauitional linguistic convention, uenotes that which is
being uesciibeu, if it is being uesciibeu at all, by the pieuicate. To say that both subject anu
pieuicate aie uesciiptions is not in accoiuance with pievious conventions, habits anu iules.
Thus, Russell was pioposing new conventions even though the olu ones have pioveu
successful, even in philosophical anu scientific uiscouise.
Accoiuing to Russell's theoiy, "uovinua" supeificially looks like a piopei name but
in ieality it seives to uesciibe whoevei uovinua is. Without any accompanying uisciete
infoimation, "uovinua" coulu eithei iefei to uou, to any one of a numbei of inuiviuuals who
answei to that name oi to no one at all since theie is no single iefeience. In teims of
"uovinua" iefeiiing to a paiticulai oiuinaiy peison, it only uoes so via an au-hoc
convention. Stiawson saw ciiculaiity in any attempt, such as Russell's, at tieating names
given accoiuing to au-hoc conventions as uisguiseu uesciiptions.
Su
This is because a name
that has been given au-hoc, oi only foi the puipose of naming something, gives no meaning
outsiue of the puipose of that convention, which is au-hoc. Consequently, it is necessaiy foi
"uovinua" to have a context to piopeily iefei.
In teims of linguistic conventions, Russell was inteiesteu in ueveloping the
founuation of a piecise philosophical language, wheieas Stiawson thought that oiuinaiy

29
In the same way as chiluien in Nexico aie sometimes nameu "}esus," in Inuia "uovinua" can also
be a given name.
Su
Ibiu., (Iv) SS8.
Beibeit 22
language, if unueistoou coiiectly, suffices foi philosophy as well as foi any othei iigoious
fielu of enquiiy. Bence, wheieas Russell lookeu foi logical connectives between name anu
nameu, Stiawson was moie inteiesteu in, what he teimeu, the 2&.\2#*+ (#,#((.&= 2$# of a
name as a means to giasp what it is that is being nameu. 0niquely iefeiiing use often
occuis in expiessions containing piopei names, oi uefinite uesciiptions. Foi example, "The
Absolute," when useu to asseit that uou exists, may have no iefeience if theie weie no
existent uou. Consequently, accoiuing to the Russellian view it coulu well be a false uefinite
uesciiption. Nonetheless, this is not to say that the phiase, oi name, can't function
significantly if useu with the iight intention. "The Absolute," utteieu by a believei, is a
significant expiession foi it can be unueistoou, even if the iefeience is consiueieu fictitious
by an atheist. Significance is a concein iegaiuing whethei the expiession can iefei anu, in
so uoing (oi by its use), as long as it talks about something (even if that something is
fictional), a tiue oi false asseition can subsequently follow.
Although Russell thought that ceitain asseitoiic sentences must have theii own
tiuth-value if language is to iepiesent facts in the woilu, Stiawson opineu that it is
sentences which aie useu to make statements that can be juugeu tiue oi false. The sentence
itself is eithei a meaningful oi meaningless aiiangement of woius. Theie is no tiuth-value
in the giouping of woius anu letteis. Neaning, in this context, is the uesignateu puipose, oi
function, of a statement.
S1
In Stiawson's teims, so as to focus on the piopeities of piopei
names, "an expiession" will fiom now on iefei to an expiession that has a uniquely
iefeiiing use anu "a sentence" will stanu foi a sentence that is maue up of, oi begins with,

S1
"Neaning" can also be useu synonymously with "iefeiiing to," such as in the statement, "I mean
you." Although it can also iefei to cognitive value, in this case it woulu not be in teims of cognizing a
tiuth-value, which uoes not occui in sentences in this theoiy.
Beibeit 2S
an expiession.
S2
Similaily, "a statement" will iefei to a specific context-bounu use of a
sentence.
Foi the puipose of uistilling the uniquely iefeiential use of language into an
impoitant aspect of a functional theoiy of iefeience, Stiawson noteu anu stateu that
sentences anu expiessions can both be useu anu can both be utteieu. It is the use of a
sentence that gives it a tiuth-value in teims of whethei it coiiectly fits the intenueu
iefeience. Each time a statement is utteieu, it can have a uiffeient use anu, hence, its tiuth-
value can vaiy accoiuing to whethei that which it communicates is consistent with ieality.
Russell objecteu to this anu maintaineu that sentences of the type "the squaie-ioot of
minus one is half the squaie-ioot of minus foui" aie tiue no mattei how, when oi foi what
puipose they aie useu oi utteieu.
SS
Similaily, if uou exists eteinally then even an atheist
utteiing, "uou is," woulu be making a tiue statement. Bowevei, although Stiawson woulu
have agieeu that if theie weie no uou, "uou is" woulu not be iefeiiing to oi mentioning
anyone, he woulu have contenueu that insteau of being false, the statement woulu have no
tiuth-value because theie woulu be no iefeience to asseit anything tiue oi false about. To
qualify the atheist's utteiing of "uou is" as something significant, Stiawson insisteu that this
use coulu not be consiueieu a =#&2.&# use of a sentence.
S4
Thus, he calleu it a spuiious, oi
pseuuo, use. Russell objecteu that this account of a statement failing anu yet not being
ienueieu outiight false (but not tiue anu not false) was simply a linguistic convention that
hau been auopteu by Stiawson. Bowevei, Russell's view also ielieu on conventions anu

S2
Stiawson, "0n Refeiiing," (II) S24-2S
SS
Russell's example. Beitianu Russell, "Ni. Stiawson on Refeiiing," I.&!> 6M;. 66. 26S (19S7), S8S.
S4
"uenuine" being Stiawson's teiminology. Stiawson, "0n Refeiiing," (II) S29.
Beibeit 24
iules, such as the one that ueemeu any sentence, whethei useu oi not, that uoes not have a
iefeience to be false.
SS

Stiawson concluueu that oiuinaiy language has no logic. Russell at least agieeu with
him on this.
S6
Bowevei, among Russell's many objections, he uiu accuse Stiawson of not
only noticing but also pieseiving anu piomoting the impiecision of oiuinaiy language.
Consequently, by stiictly using Stiawson's theoiy of language we might tiy to place moie
meaning than necessaiy in veiy aibitiaiy anu almost ianuom statements. In this iegaiu,
Russell useu the humoious example of Stiawson accusing his chai-lauy of thieveiy,
wheieupon the lauy ieplies: "I ain't nevei uone no haim to no one." Although it is easy to
unueistanu what she meant, the sentence tianslateu in piecise teims woulu ieau that theie
was at least one moment when she was injuiing the entiie human iace.
S7

0n Russell's view, a tiue uefinite uesciiption says something about its iefeience.
Stiawson uisagieeu anu maue a uistinction between what a statement uoes when it says
something about its iefeience anu what it uoes when it is useu to iefei to something. Foi
Stiawson, one of the functions of the uefinite aiticle is to act as a sign that a unique
iefeience is being maue - the uefinite aiticle makes it known that the speakei is, oi is
intenuing to, iefei to a ceitain inuiviuual.
S8
Bowevei, as noteu by Keith Bonnellan, neithei
Stiawson's noi Russell's theoiy fully takes into account the piesupposition oi intention
that a uefinite uesciiption caiiies when useu. Bonnellan consiueieu the piesupposition

SS
Similaily, conventions also govein the use of ambiguous names such as pionouns. Pionouns in
geneial can only be saiu of a paiticulai use of an expiession. Amongst them, "I" is a special case foi
it has a uiffeient iefeience accoiuing to whoevei speaks it. Any stability in how "I," as well as any
othei pionoun, iefeis aiiives fiom the conventions, habits anu iules that govein its coiiect use
accoiuing to time anu place.
S6
Russell, "Ni. Stiawson on Refeiiing," S89.
S7
Ibiu., S88.
S8
Stiawson, "0n Refeiiing," (v) S42.
Beibeit 2S
that something fits a paiticulai uesciiption to be the iefeiiing moue of that which is
expiesseu by that uesciiption.
S9


S%""177/"8 :$1<'00%<)#)%" /"& F)# )" #.1 T<1 %= A1=1$$)"5

Piesupposition only affects the use of woius, wheieas Russell was tiying to
constiuct a theoiy of uenotation of woius inuepenuently of context of use. In Stiawson's
theoiy, piesupposition uiiectly affects what it is that is iefeienceu as well as its tiuth-value.
Bonnellan uiffeientiateu between two uses that can be maue of an expiession, oi uefinite
uesciiption. Be teimeu them, 'F# (#,#(#&'.)* 2$# anu 'F# )''(.V2'.@# 2$#. Be consiueieu
attiibutive use an extension of Russell's theoiy that incluues the 2$# of sentences. In
essence, in iegaiu to an expiession, it means to state something about whatevei it is that is
uesignateu by the expiession.
4u
The iefeiential use of an expiession, on the othei hanu,
picks out anu then says something about what fits the uesciiption conveyeu by the
expiession.
41

The following example illustiates the uistinction between attiibutive anu iefeiential
use.
42
In a ciowueu shopping mall someone yells out the phiase, "She is a shopliftei," anu
fiantically gestuies to a lauy weaiing a ieu uiess who has fiozen to the spot. Nany of the
shoppeis in the immeuiate vicinity look at the lauy anu stait to talk among themselves
about what has been saiu without necessaiily iegaiuing the fact that the accusation may

S9
Fiom now on I will use "piesupposition" only to iefei to both piesupposition anu implication.
4u
Bonnellan, "Refeience anu Befinite Besciiptions," 28S.
41
This is similai to Stiawson's theoiy.
42
This is auapteu fiom Bonnellan's examples of "Smith's muiueiei is insane" anu "Who is the man
uiinking the Naitini." Ibiu., (III) 28S.
Beibeit 26
have been false - foi no secuiity guaiu is on hanu to confiim that the lauy is in fact a
shopliftei. 0ne shoppei answeis a fiienu's question in iegaiu to who exactly it is that the
yelling peison is iefeiiing to, by stating, "The shopliftei is weaiing a ieu uiess." This is a
iefeiential use of a uefinite uesciiption "The Shopliftei" because its piimaiy puipose is to
pick out a paiticulai peison. 0ut of the blue, anothei shoppei speculates in iegaiu to what
has been yelleu out by piesupposing that if whoevei was accuseu hau been biought up in a
goou family, that peison woulu not steal. Thus, this peison says, "The shopliftei must have
been bauly biought up." This is an attiibutive use of a uefinite uesciiption because it is
saying something about the shopliftei without specifically picking out the lauy who has
been accuseu.
The uiffeience between the iefeiential use anu attiibutive use of the uefinite
uesciiption, "the shopliftei," can be fuithei illustiateu if the lauy weaiing a ieu uiess has
been wiongly accuseu. In both uses of the expiession the speakei piesupposes that theie is
a shopliftei. In the iefeiential use, the piesupposition is that the paiticulai lauy being
uesciibeu by the phiase, "The shopliftei is weaiing a ieu uiess," fits the peison in question.
In the attiibutive use theie is no piesupposition in teims of a uesciiption fitting an actual
peison but theie is one in iegaiu to how the shopliftei, whoevei he oi she may be, has been
biought up. The tiuth-value of vaiious expiessions may theiefoie be affecteu uiffeiently
uepenuing on whethei the piesuppositions behinu them aie false oi not, as we will see.
If the lauy has been wiongfully accuseu anu, uue to this fact, theie is no actual
shopliftei piesent, then theie is no stiaightfoiwaiu way of unueistanuing the attiibutive
use of the uefinite uesciiption in "The shopliftei must have been bauly biought up."
4S
This

4S
Ibiu., (III) 287
Beibeit 27
is because if theie is no shopliftei, then no one inuiviuual is being pieuicateu by a misspent
upbiinging. It is both not-tiue, because it is about no one, anu not-false, because the
statement says something that coulu be tiue of any shopliftei while not absuiuly picking
out a non-existent one. A similai ambiguity stemming fiom piesupposition occuis in the
iefeiential use of the uefinite uesciiption. The peison using the phiase, "The shopliftei is
weaiing a ieu uiess," piesupposes that the paiticulai lauy who has been accuseu of
shoplifting who is weaiing a ieu uiess is none othei than the shopliftei. Since this lauy has
been wiongfully accuseu, the piesupposition is false. Bowevei, although the intention is
false in iegaiu to the uesciiption coiiectly fitting an actual shopliftei, the iefeience can still
go thiough since it also functions to pick out the paiticulai peison that the speakei wants
to iefei to. Nonetheless, although the uefinite uesciiption may succeeu in this paiticulai
use, it uoes so non-genuinely. Regaiuless of genuineness, the iefeiential use of the uefinite
uesciiption can succeeu in its piimaiy puipose of picking out the paiticulai lauy in
question if the heaiei eithei: unueistanus the implication of this use, iecognizes the lauy
pickeu out because she is the only one who fits the pieuicate "weaiing a ieu uiess," oi has
hau the same piesupposition as the speakei.
44
Inteiestingly, even if the speakei weie
uyslexic anu mistakenly saiu, "The shopkeepei is weaiing a ieu uiess," it is possible that
this expiession, although false, can still succeeu in picking out the iight peison - though
again non-genuinely. This may occui if the heaiei weie to unueistanu the conuition of the
speakei anu coulu pick out the iefeience by looking foi a peison in a ieu uiess foi example.
In fact, even if both paities uiun't believe the lauy in a ieu uiess to be a shopkeepei oi a

44
This uoes not mean that the speakei uoes not fail to iefei simply because the auuience uoes not
coiiectly pick out what is being iefeiieu to, oi what it is that is being piesupposeu as being saiu
about an object.
Beibeit 28
shopliftei, they can both unueistanu fiom context who it is that is being talkeu about anu
the iefeience can still go thiough.
Attiibutive anu iefeiential use also applies to names of uou. Foi instance, in the
ancient G2()&)$, Kiishna, oi uou, has many names. 0ne of these names is "Yashoua-
Nanuana," oi "The Son of Yashoua." Besiues the fact that uou is unboin by uefinition, even
in teims of iole-play Kiishna's mothei was not Yashoua but anothei lauy nameu, "Bevaki."
Yashoua hau biought up Kisna as a chilu anu so was officially Bis fostei mothei. "The Son
of Yashoua," woulu fail to iefei because Yashoua nevei hau a son.
4S
Nonetheless, the
tiauitional iefeiential intention of this uefinite uesciiption is to pick out Kiishna even
though it uoes not uniquely fit Bim. Bence, the tiauitional communal piesupposition that
"The son of Yashoua" iefeis to Kiishna, though technically false, cieates the context foi the
iefeience to always go thiough. Attiibutively, the expiession also fails because since
Yashoua uiu not give biith to a son, the uesciiption is saying something which fits no one.
Bowevei, it is not a false expiession. The piesupposition heie is that the uesciiption is
about whomevei it is that is Yashoua's son. As such, even if theie is no actual son of
Yashoua to pick out, it uoes not fail to uesciibe in anu of itself.
Russell's theoiy is baseu on the logical entailment: "The ! is "" entails that theie
exists one anu only one !.
46
Bowevei, in teims of what is entaileu, iefeiential use amounts
moie to a piesupposition baseu on what is usually tiue of the use of a uefinite uesciiption
to iefei. As such, since it is usually tiue, oi tiauitionally piesupposeu, that "The Son of
Yashoua," somehow always iefeis to Kiishna, then it is a iefeience that woiks iegaiuless of

4S
In the BF)=)@)') G2()&), Yashoua uiu give biith to a uaughtei, Yogamaya, whom Nanua, Bevaki's
husbanu, hau exchangeu with Kiishna.
46
Bonnellan, "Refeience anu Befinite Besciiptions," 292.
Beibeit 29
it not being, stiictly speaking, genuine. Bence, "The Son of Yashoua" is moie oi less a
meaningless maik that picks out Kiishna because the woius that make up this uefinite
uesciiption uo not genuinely uesciibe Bim.
47

If any name foi ! is meiely a means to iefei to !, then even """ useu incoiiectly, but
unueistanuably, to iefei to !, woulu be moie in tune with what has been consiueieu a
logically piopei name than any existentially quantifieu pioposition that places ! as a
unique object pickeu out. Aumitteuly, any theoiy that posits the iefeiiing uone by a uefinite
uesciiption as iefeiential oi attiibutive is ultimately one that takes into account the
function of the speakei's intentions in a paiticulai use. Nonetheless, in teims of human
communication, without speakeis oi wiiteis, woius, whethei useu as names oi otheiwise,
woulu not exist. Theiefoie, in teims of iefeiential use, any piopei name (oi uefinite
uesciiption) is simply one of many tools that can be useu to uo the job of picking out a
specific thing.

K B'44)"5 T0

Befoie attempting to analyze the status, iefeience anu meaning of the teim "uou" as
a piopei name, it was impoitant to unueistanu the semantics of piopei names in geneial.
The philosopheis iefeiieu to in this chaptei have biiefly outlineu some of the pioblems in
iegaiu to what the semantics of names involves. The fact that this is not an exhaustive
account uoes not take away fiom the fact that unueistanuing piopei names is pioblematic.

47
Though it uoes not genuinely uesciibe Kiishna, it may genuinely uesciibe othei inuiviuual's
who's motheis happen to be calleu "Yashoua."
Beibeit Su
In essence, this chaptei has shown that in oiuinaiy language theie is no escaping
conventions, habits anu iules that almost aibitiaiily ueciue whethei piopei names aie
meaningless maiks oi aie semantically valiu. If names contain semantic significance then,
again, conventions ueciue whethei that significance aiiives via theii attiibutive use,
iefeiential use, oi by knowing what is piesupposeu by theii use. Even the analysis of
Fiege's sense iequiies conventions if it is to be unueistoou at all anu not kept
metaphysical. Nonetheless, no mattei which way piopei names of uou aie analyzeu, they
aie a special case foi it has been claimeu in some tiauitions that they have a mystical
iuentity with that which they iefeience, uou. The next chaptei tuins to the teim "uou" in
anu of itself - anu not to its use in the capacity of a pioxy piopei name - since it uiffeis
fiom natuially piopei names of uou, like "Kiishna" anu "YBWB." The chaptei also exploies
iepiesentational theoiies as well as the place of intention in signification.
Beibeit S1
-./0#1$ 9@%
A10$1<1"#/#)%"/7 9.1%$)1<8 2" #.1 B)5")=)(/"(1 %= #.1 3/41 C6%&D

A main consiueiation outlineu by the pievious chaptei was that any piefeience in
theoiy of iefeience is uepenuent on unueilying convention. Nonetheless, piacticality
speaking, no mattei what uistinctions exist between the two categoiies of iefeiential
uevice uiscusseu (piopei names anu uefinite uesciiptions), expiessions can nevei iemain
absolutely containeu in one categoiy foi language auapts ovei time. Theiefoie, whatevei
theoiy oi taxonomy is auopteu has to allow foi this change.
0ntil now, all names of uou weie tieateu as oiuinaiy piopei names. Bowevei, the
teim "uou," anu its equivalents in language othei than English, is uistinct fiom an oiuinaiy
piopei name foi it uoes not uenote any entity by stanuaiu means, such as uesciibing
empiiically confiimable piopeities, attiibutes oi qualities. "uou" also uiffeis fiom piopei
names of uou, such as "uovinua" anu "YBWB," because although the teim may tacitly oi in
a uisguiseu way uesciibe uou via Bis piopeities," the piopeities conceineu aie attacheu to
someone who is unknowable outsiue of ievelation. This baits questions in iegaiu to the
status, iefeience anu meaning of "uou" in common usage. All the pieviously mentioneu
theoiies aie baseu on conventionally accepteu foims of piopei names anu as such iequiie
an empiiically obseivable oi empiiically confiimable entity foi any semantic significance,
whethei that entity is: the object that a meaningless maik is annexeu to; the subject of a
uefinite uesciiption uniquely uesciibeu in teims of a pioposition; oi the subject of a moue
Beibeit S2
of piesentation oi iefeience. "uou," on the othei hanu, seems to succeeu in signifying
something non-empiiically confiimable.
Since "uou" is geneially useu to iefei to an empiiically unknowable entity, the goal
of this chaptei is to unueistanu what exactly is the subject signifieu by this specific teim.
Retuining foi a moment to }ohn Locke's iueational theoiy of names, Locke wiote that the
meaning of a woiu is the iuea the speakei intenus it to stanu foi.
48
Nonetheless, foi an iuea
to satisfactoiily iepiesent uou, it woulu neeu to be foimeu by eithei ievelation oi tiue
testimony. This biings about the potential pioblem of change ovei geneiations of speakeis
that can occui uue to miscommunication, eiioi oi abeiiant intention. In teims of a
iepiesentational theoiy of language, the issue of pioblems associateu with the intentions of
speakeis to mean theii iueas by woius was taken up by Saul Kiipke.

V$)0R18 !"#1"#)%" /"& -%"#)"51"# -%""1(#)%"<

Kiipke objecteu to the uesciiptive theoiy as pioposeu by uottlob Fiege, Beitianu
Russell, }ohn Seaile anu otheis. Fiege hau pioposeu that an iuentity statement using two
piopei names, oi uefinite uesciiptions, of the foim a=b avoius being a tautology thanks to
the uistinct sense of each uesciiption. Togethei, a anu b foim pait of a clustei of
uesciiptions that affoiu the iefeient a moie piecise way to be iefeiieu to - possibly as a
'F"2=F' containing uiffeient aspects.
49
Bowevei, in oiuinaiy language, a uefinite

48
}ohn Locke, :& H$$)+ C"&/#(&.&= ]2-)& 3&!#($')&!.&=> Kenneth Winklei (eu), (Inuianapolis:
Backett Publishing Co., 1996) (III.iv.6)
49
By "clustei" I uo not mean "family" in an expanueu Wittgenstein sense. A family of uesciiptions
coulu foim the following possibilities: A is iefeiieu to by the clustei of uesciiptions "u," "v" anu "w,"
Beibeit SS
uesciiption can have an intenueu sense that is uiffeient to the liteial meaning of its
constituent woius. Foi instance, "The son of Yashoua" is a case in hanu. In such cases, the
heaiei woulu have to know the intention of the speakei oi the cultuial context to
unueistanu it. Fiege, a mathematician, consiueieu this is a weakness of language.
}ohn Seaile hau positeu that whatevei satisfies enough oi most of a clustei of
uesciiptions (oi piopeities) is the iefeient of the name. 0theis may take the clustei of
piopeities in a veiy naiiow way anu consiuei that only one piopeity is neeueu to
sufficiently iefei. Bowevei, in teims of iesembling (oi uesciibing the entity nameu by)
"uou," foi example, the uesciiption "Absolute Tiuth" may not succeeu in all ciicumstances.
Without context, a Buuuhist may unueistanu it to expiess something othei than uou - foi
instance, the oneness of all things. Similaily, "Bhagavan," which tiauitionally means the
possessoi of opulences, not only uniquely uesciibes uou but can also be useu to
honoiifically iefei to a human.
Su
0thei uesciiptions that coulu be useu foi uou may be
moie piecise, howevei, this uoes not mean that "Bhagavan" is completely unable to
succeeu in iefeiiing to uou. Since theie is a uegiee of ambiguity in any uesciiption, Seaile
contenueu that any uesciiption theoiy baseu on a single uesciiption shoulu be uioppeu foi
a theoiy that iecognizes a clustei of uesciiptions as a means to moie piecisely signify. The
entity that uniquely satisfies enough oi most of the uesciiptions of uou woulu hence be fit
to be calleu the iefeient of "uou." A majoi pioblem with this is that the collection, oi
clustei, of iesemblances is aibitiaiy - what is incluueu is uepenuent on the inuiviuual who
compiles it. Thus, a name in this theoiy is contingent on the intention of the speakei to

B is iefeiieu to by ""w," "x" anu "y," anu C is iefeiieu to by "v," "x" anu "z." Beie, each clustei has
one uesciiption in common with each othei clustei. It is in this sense that they foim a family of
uesciiptions.
Su
The issue of "Bhagavan" will be uiscusseu in moie uetail latei.
Beibeit S4
iefei to some unique thing anu so semantic objectivity, oi a common meaning, can be
significantly weakeneu.
Besciiptions aie similaily pioblematic in teims of meaning. Foi example, if "uou"
has the same meaning as, oi is synonymous with, "the cieatoi of the univeise," then to say
uou uoes not exist is also to say that the univeise was not cieateu - which woulu be
consiueieu false by an atheist who uoesn't believe uou exists but uoes believe the univeise
was cieateu by a big bang oi some othei non-supeinatuial event.
S1
Thus, the name uoes
not abbieviate the uesciiption. Consequently, if "uou" weie consiueieu non-synonymous
with any uesciiption, then, if in some sense its iefeience weie ueteimineu by uesciiption,
statements containing a uesciiption of uou woulu not be uecipheiable although some
uegiee of equivalence exists.
S2
Theiefoie, non-synonymy weakens the link between name
anu uesciiption. Kiipke uiew upon uiffeient vaiiations of the clustei theoiy to show how
uesciiptions fail.
SS
Foi instance, he showeu how semantic synonymy coulu leau to
ciiculaiity. In one example he explaineu that the teim .&!#0#&!#&' !#'#(-.&)'."& iefeis to
the situation in which the piopeity useu to uesciibe is also involveu in the iefeience. Thus,
the statement, "I shall use the teim 'uou' to iefei to the entity that I call 'uou'" is viciously
ciiculai. Similaily, if I say, in uesciibing a paiticulai foim of Kiishna, "Keshava is the
inuiviuual who killeu the Keshi uemon," ciiculaiity woulu not be avoiueu if the heaiei is
not familiai with Keshava oi the Keshi uemon. Within this uesciiption the Keshi uemon is
uesciibeu as being killeu by Keshava anu so we aie simply picking out a paii of objects,

S1
Saul Kiipke, 6)-.&= )&! 6#/#$$.'+, (Cambiiuge: Baivaiu 0P, 198u), SS
S2
Ibiu.
SS
Kiipke, 6)-.&= )&! 6#/#$$.'+, 71
Beibeit SS
Keshava anu Keshi such that Keshava killeu Keshi.
S4
This is not the only case in which
killing has taken place anu so nothing unique has been uesciibeu. Thus, moie infoimation
is iequiieu to satisfy the uniqueness conuition.
SS

Foi oui puiposes, the pioblem in geneial that Kiipke took issue with is that in the
uesciiption theoiy theie is a tenuency to place uesciiptions as necessaiily fitting an object
when in fact they aie acciuental oi non-iigiu uesignations.
S6
It is haiu to finu a necessaiily
tiue oi ) 0(."(. connection between name anu nameu apait fiom in logical tiiviality. Even
the statement "uou is calleu 'uou'" is not ) 0(."(., noi is it necessaiy, foi who can ueny that
uou may not be calleu "uou" in some othei possible woilu oi iealm. Bowevei, a set of
contingent piopeities is unsatisfactoiy in somehow qualitatively uniquely picking out an
object anu ueteimining its iefeience.
S7
Kiipke aigueu that piopei names aie iigiu
uesignatois - each one uesignates the same object in eveiy possible woilu.
S8
Be
subsequently pioposeu his causal theoiy of iefeience in an attempt to iefine the clustei
theoiy by uetailing a moie exacting set of conuitions foi iefeience to take place.
S9

Kiipke appealeu to a communal causal chain that is able to maintain objective
semantic value uespite contingency in the oiiginal uesciiption. In the clustei uesciiption

S4
Also, "Keshava" liteially means the slayei of the Keshi uemon.
SS
Kiipke, 6)-.&= )&! 6#/#$$.'+, 81
S6
Kiipke even aigueu that Bonnellan's theoiy that involves the iefeiential use of a uefinite
uesciiption, such as "The son of Yashoua," is weak foi it can be uioppeu once someone iealizes that
it uoes not stiictly semantically uesignate Kiishna. Nonetheless, in teims of the ieligious
significance of this example, Kiipke's postulation uoes not apply. Stiawson's "passing the buck," oi
an appeal to the ueiivation of meaning of such uesciiptions as "The son of Yashoua" fiom anothei
(who ueiiveu it fiom anothei, anu so on), woulu eventually, accoiuing to Kiipke, have to ieach a
genuinely iuentifying iefeience. Although Kiipke ciiticizeu this, because he thought that genuine
iuentifying iefeiences aie ieal iefeiences, "The son of Yashoua" still iemains a special case that
cannot be explaineu by his theoiy. Ref: Kiipke, 6)-.&= )&! 6#/#$$.'+, 87 (footnote S7).
S7
Kiipke, Naming anu Necessity, 9S-4
S8
Ibiu., S7
S9
Ibiu., 92; The teim "causal theoiy" was useu by uaieth Evans
Beibeit S6
theoiy, the meaning of a name consists of one peison ueteimining the iefeience foi him oi
heiself.
6u
Any of the uesciiptions associateu with that name woulu be aibitiaiy (anu
possibly piivate if the uesciiption was specific to the inuiviuual) anu so any iigiu
uesignation coulu easily be lost. 0n Kiipke's alteinate view, the community is involveu anu
helps to geneiate a gieatei sense of semantic objectivity. The uenotation of a name useu by
a community is to be founu by tiacing its casual chain of iefeience-pieseiving links back,
thiough geneiations if necessaiy, to some item - the name of that item being establisheu
ostensively by a uubbing ceiemony (oi "baptism") at which the uubee is inuicateu by eithei
some kinu of uemonstiation, uniquely iefeiiing uesciiption oi au-hoc association (as in the
case of nicknames).
61
That name shoulu have been passeu on fiom peison to peison,
geneiation to geneiation, with the intention (anu stiong stipulation) that those who ieceive
it also leain to use it foi the same iefeience.
62
In the case of naming by uesciiption, the
uesciiption heie is not synonymous with the name (as hau been pioposeu as pioblematic
befoie) but insteau involves a fixing of its iefeience by its initial baptism.
6S
This allows foi
"uou" to succeeu as a iigiu uesignatoi without the speakei oi heaiei being iequiieu to be
acquainteu with uou.
64
So long as the causal chain iemains unbioken, the iefeience is

6u
Ibiu., 9u-91
61
That is, as Kiipke saiu, "if ostension is not to be subsumeu unuei the othei categoiy
|.uesciiptionj"), Kiipke, 6)-.&= )&! 6#/#$$.'+, 96
62
Ibiu., 96
6S
Ibiu., 96, footnote 42
64
The contingency heie is one of a contingent name being applieu to uou. By iigiu uesignation, I
mean that the name, in accoiuance with this specific application anu uubbing, woulu iemain tiue in
all possible woilus uespite language uiffeiences. Even if in anothei possible woilu the teim "uou"
iefeiieu to a moital being, it woulu be a uiffeient application oi uubbing of that woiu anu woulu
not affect the iigiu uesignation of the paiticulai usage of "uou" iefeiieu to heie.
Beibeit S7
secuieu.
6S
Latei geneiations of useis of a name woulu thus owe an epistemic uebt to past
speakeis in the community who passeu uown the uesciiption of that name unalteieu.
66

Foi Kiipke, uesciiptions can be useu to make contingent iuentity statements that
holu tiue. Foi example, theie is no necessaiy connection in the statement, "The naughty
Boy who iegulaily stole Nothei Yashoua's buttei is the same Peison who gave Noses the
Ten Commanuments on Nt Sinai." As fai as we aie conceineu, these two uesciiptions of
uou aie contingent on uiffeient cultuies accessing uou in uiffeient ways. As long as the
causal chains of both uesciiptions aie tiue, the statement is tiue. An objection coulu be
iaiseu that an oithouox iabbi may iegaiu this statement false since, on his view, it woulu
be none othei than heteiouoxy that makes the coiielation holu. Bowevei, Kiipke woulu
contenu that the iabbi might be oveily sectaiian anu wiong, in which case contingent
iuentity holus in a bioauei sense.
Although Kiipke consiueieu piopei names to be iigiu uesignatois, the only way that
they can uesciibe objects is contingent on the intention of eithei the speakei oi (on the
causal theoiy) the peison who uiu the "baptism." A clustei of such uesciiptions helps fix a
name's iefeience to a unique object. Bowevei, to maintain some semantic objectivity, the
coopeiation of the community is necessaiy. It is by tiacing the causal chain linking an item
to its initially being baptizeu with a name that the theoiy avoius ambiguity. In this sense,
although the oiiginal uubbing is contingent on the one peison oi gioup who peifoimeu the
"ceiemony," the causal chain of speakeis aie meant to maintain this meaning's consistency.
Kiikpe uiffeieu fiom Stiawson on this point (who contenueu that speakeis must know

6S
If the uesciiption of uou changes ovei time uue to eiioi oi the emeigence of some new theoiy,
then theie is still some kinu of causal chain but, accoiuing to Kiipke, it is not of the iequiieu type.
Kiipke, 6)-.&= )&! 6#/#$$.'+, 96 (footnote 4S)
66
Ibiu., 94.
Beibeit S8
fiom whom they ieceiveu each meaning) by maintaining that one neeu only have contact
with the last speakei (anu uoesn't necessaiily neeu to iemembei who it was) as long as the
causal chain is of the iequiieu type. 0n Kiipke's view, even if theie is no knowleuge of the
uubbing ceiemony, the meaning of a uesciiption can still iemain constant.
Since uou is empiiically unknowable, "uou," in Kiipke's theoiy, is unueistoou via
contingently chosen uesciiptions of piopeities hanueu uown a causal chain of speakeis.
Kiike nonetheless uiu not fully auuiess the possibility of changes occuiiing in a causal
chain, anu maintaineu that such occuiiences aie not of the iequiieu type. uaieth Evans
took issue with this foi the puipose of tightening the theoiy, foi it is obseiveu that such
changes in meaning iegulaily occui.

IL/"<8 9.1 :$%;714 %= -./"51 %= A1=1$1"(1 )" #.1 -/'</7 9.1%$G

Evans accepteu the causal theoiy of iefeience in geneial but hau a pioblem with
Kiipke's theoiy in teims of potential changes in the uenotation of a woiu. The ciux of the
mattei is whethei a speakei uenotes upon a paiticulai occasion of a woiu's use that which
the speakei stiictly anu liteially saiu.
67
If a woiu is to uenote, then we shoulu know the
conuitions that neeu to be satisfieu foi an expiession to be the name of an object. If these
conuitions aie not auuiesseu, then any changes in what is intenueu by the speakei can leau
to the causal chain not being consistent with the whole community of speakeis. This, Evans

67
uaieth Evans, "The Causal Theoiy of Names," :(.$'"'#*.)& ;"/.#'+K ;200*#-#&')(+ D"*2-# 47
(197S), 187
Beibeit S9
saiu, was moie than just an imaginable scenaiio but one that actually can occui.
68
The
following example is of a situation in which it is accepteu, anu hence pioblematic, that it is
sufficient foi someone to uenote a paiticulai thing baseu on the 2$# of a name ieceiveu as a
iesult of a causal consequence of that peison's exposuie to anothei speakei 2$.&= the same
expiession to uenote that same thing.
69

In BF)=)@)!9W.') anu the G2()&)$, Kiishna is often iefeiieu to as "Bhagavan."
Accoiuing to tiauitional inteipietation, "Bhagavan" iefeis to the possessoi in full of the six
piimaiy opulences: knowleuge, stiength, wealth, fame, beauty anu uetachment.
Consequently, it is a name foi uou. Bowevei, in the same genie of liteiatuies, "Bhagavan"
can also be an honoiific title oi uesciiption (like Bis oi Bei Najesty) foi a gieat peison, a
moital being who has attaineu spiiitual enlightenment. Within theist tiauitions this is not
an ambiguous iefeience, foi Bhagavan iesiues in the heait of a gieat uevotee of uou anu so
that peison is the possessoi of the 0ne who possesses all opulences. Nonetheless, although
amongst atheists "Bhagavan" is also an unambiguous teim, it is so because of a uiffeient
ieason. Accoiuing to them, it can only iefei to a gieat peison anu so its use in BF)=)@)!9
W.') suggests to them that Kiishna is not uou but a gieat peisonality. Foi both theists anu
atheists, the meaning of "Bhagavan" oiiginates fiom the same souice. Since the teim has
come to have two uiffeient uefinitions, it can only imply that in one oi both of the causal
chains the meaning has been changeu.
Let us assume that "Bhagavan" oiiginally hau a unique iefeience anu that at some
point uuiing its usage its meaning was changeu by a poition of the community of its

68
Evans useu the example of "Nauagascai."
69
Evans, "The Causal Theoiy of Names," 191-2; Evan's teimeu this the "mouthpiece synuiome"
Beibeit 4u
useis.
7u
Foi the sake of simplicity, let us assume that this change occuiieu uue to the
abeiiation of one gentleman. Foi this peison, the name's iefeience became contingent on a
new clustei of uesciiptions that was uistinct fiom the community anu so he can be
consiueieu to have been mistaken as to the tiue, oi oiiginal, iefeience of "Bhagavan" in
accoiuance with tiauition. Noieovei, he peipetuateu this abeiiation oi ie-uubbing by
speaking to otheis anu, by so uoing, geneiateu an entiie new bianch, oi community, of
speakeis of the woiu that helu similai new abeiiant clusteis of uesciiptions. Stiictly
speaking, the meaning of "Bhagavan" was lost to both this gentleman anu the new
community of speakeis that he hau initiateu. Noieovei, in his case, the conuitions foi
iefeience have not been met, except by some aibitiaiy au-hoc newly foimeu convention.
Bence, fiom this example it can be seen that the clustei theoiy uoes not fully take into
account the impoitance of suiiounuing context anu so eiioi oi change of iefeience can
take place anu iemain in common usage viitually unnoticeu.
Kiipke intiouuceu his causal theoiy to impiove upon the clustei theoiy. If the
clustei theoiy of names weie accepteu in teims of a stiong thesis of iepiesentation - while
at the same time maintaining that if the majoiity of uesciiptions in a set of uesciiptions of x
aie consistent with "y", then "y" sufficiently iefeis to x - it woulu leau to an outiageous
conclusion.
71
The gentleman in the example above is obviously wiong in iegaiu to what he
is poitiaying to be the iefeience of "Bhagavan." It woulu be a stiange theoiy to say that
someone utteiing, "uou is calleu Bhagavan," while thinking "Bhagavan" is a name foi a
moital, is speaking the tiuth on account that the oveiwhelming majoiity of that peison's
uesciiptive iueas in iegaiu to "Bhagavan" satisfy that name belonging to a moital.

7u
Bence, it must have been taken as a common name
71
Evans, "The Causal Theoiy of Names," 189
Beibeit 41
Evans also thought that the weakei thesis in iegaiu to the clustei theoiy, that some
uesciiptive iuentification is necessaiy foi a speakei to uenote something, is also
pioblematic.
72
The thesis' functionality ielies on impoitant facets oi uesciiptions in iegaiu
to that which is uenoteu being ielayeu, thus allowing the heaiei to unueistanu. This
enables non-liteial uesciiptions such as "The son of Yashoua" to contain some significance
foi the heaiei, foi otheiwise, stiictly speaking, this, along with most of oui communication,
woulu consist of meaningless labels oi meie mouthing.
7S

It becomes appaient that eithei as a stiong oi weak thesis, the clustei theoiy has
pioblems in iegaiu to satisfying the conuitions foi iefeience. The stiong thesis is too iigiu
anu woulu ienuei much of human uiscouise shallow. The weak thesis allows ioom foi an
abeiiation of meaning, not only to continue unabateu but also to become sanctioneu as
what seems to be tiuth. The continueu acceptance of an eiioneous meaning occuis simply
because a iefeient bettei fits a clustei of uesciiptions in accoiuance with the intelligence of
an inuiviuual who has, by chance oi peisonal motivation anu without the community,
changeu the meaning of that name anu passeu it on.
The main pioblem in Kiipke's theoiy is that the conuitions foi iefeience aie not
cleai in iegaiu to a speakei iefeiiing to something with a name that coulu have been useu
foi seveial othei objects.
74
The pioblem is biought to light in teims of the unueistanuing of
the auuience anu the intention of the speakei. Accoiuing to Evans, a woiu's meaning is not
only initially acquiieu at some uubbing ceiemony, but the acquiiing of meaning is a

72
Ibiu., 189-9u
7S
Ibiu.
74
Ibiu., 194
Beibeit 42
continual piocess as long as the woiu is in use.
7S
Kiipke's causal theoiy attempts to
maintain meaning but, since meaning is continually open to aujustment, its weakness is
that it cannot accommouate natuial anu unnatuial change.
76
It is foi this ieason that Evans
pioposeu an amenument to the theoiy. Be consiueieu that the causal ielation is not
between an object being uubbeu with a name anu the speakei's contempoiaiy use of it but
"between the item's |oi object'sj states anu uoings anu the speakei's bouy of
infoimation."
77

In using a name foi an object, the speakei's intenueu iefeience may be a necessaiy
conuition but it may not be sufficient foi all the above ieasons (it iequiies to be consistent
with the community of speakeis anu neeus to be flexible).
78
Even causal ielation is not
sufficient uue to changes that coulu have occuiieu in iefeience (as in the oiiginal meaning
of "Bhagavan" being lost in one oi both of the communities of useis). Evans consiueieu a
theoiy involving what he teimeu, !"-.&)&/#, to solve this, which involves the speakei
captuiing uiffeiences between his oi hei own ieactions to vaiious uiscoveiies.
79
This
allows foi change to occui in accoiuance with geneial piinciples while avoiuing the pitfall
of the application of inuiviuual subjective meaning by acciuent oi abeiiation.
In teims of "uou," change woulu have a uisastious effect on the community. It woulu
be akin to wilu speculation anu coulu ultimately leau to concocteu ieligious uoctiine.
Although the teim "uou" iefeiiing to uou is tiue, eithei necessaiily oi contingently, ceitain
clusteis of uesciiptions foi "uou" uo contain ambiguities, such as within the paiauox in

7S
Ibiu., 19S
76
Ibiu.
77
Ibiu., 197
78
Ibiu., 198
79
Ibiu., 2u1
Beibeit 4S
uou's name: the Supieme who can be calleu "uou," anu the same Supieme who cannot be
calleu by any name (incluuing "uou"). Foi "uou" to contain such ambiguities in uesciiption
anu iemain tiue in accoiuance with a uesciiptive theoiy, the inuication is that "uou" is
uiffeient to stanuaiu names. Thomas Aquinas hau tackleu the issue of the teim "uou" in his
;2--) UF#"*"=./) anu it is to this uiscouise we now tuin to.

KU')"/<8 >1/")"5 %= #.1 91$4 C6%&D

In ;2--) UF#"*"=./), Saint Thomas of Aquinas ueemeu oiuinaiy language
insufficient to captuie the essence of uou. Be believeu in the uoctiine of uivine simplicity,
which is the iational claim that uou is a simple substance, oi one with Bis qualities. As
such, uou is conceptually unueistanuable but, unuei oiuinaiy ciicumstances, uou's name
woulu neeu to signify an existent anu not the meie content of a concept. Although Aquinas
thought of an oiuinaiy name as signifying an iuea, the iuea of "uou" is not uou. It woulu
simply iefei to a thought. If the thinkei weie a solipsist the connection of a name with an
iuea might be a sufficient conuition foi iefeience, otheiwise, in any othei case, it woulu not
woik. Aquinas tiieu to finu a way to concietely iefei to uou. In the piocess he exploieu
iefeience to uou: (1) as a simple substance, (2) in a complex way, anu (S) by analogy.
(1) The challenge foi Aquinas was that most names signify composites of
substances, the combinations of which give those names specific meanings. If uou weie
taken as a complex substance (consisting of aspects, piopeities oi qualities), "uou" coulu
iefei by means of a clustei of ielevant uesciiptions such as: the supieme contiollei; the
Beibeit 44
omnipotent, omnipiesent, omniscient Loiu; the maintainei of the univeise; anu so on.
Consequently, these uesciiptions can be taken as functions anu so the name coulu also
iefei to a function, oi functions, iathei than an object. Bence, on these teims, "uou" coulu
be an abstiaction since it is not cleai whethei the name iefeis to foim, substance, function
oi a combination of all of them. This illustiates that names can contain a gieat ueal of
ambiguity in teims of what they iefeience. This may not be a pioblem foi eveiy-uay
language that functions to communicate piacticalities not uepenuent on piecision, but, as
Aquinas noteu, it is a pioblem if accuiacy is necessaiy - such as in the mathematical anu
scientific fielus. It coulu be stiongly claimeu that it is necessaiy to know piecisely what it is
that "uou" iefeis to, since uou anu uou's laws tenu to be consequential to many aspects of
life in geneial. Aquinas' challenge was to finu a way to uiiectly iefei to a simple substance,
oi uou: an empiiically unveiifiable entity.
Since uou cannot be seen by many of us, the teim "uou" cannot iefei to something
physically pickeu out. Foi Aquinas, uou is not abstiact but a substance anu so "uou" shoulu
somehow signify concietely. Russell's 0("0"$.'."&$ cannot be employeu heie because on his
theoiy uou's existence woulu iequiie to be affiimeu oi uenieu on the basis of the existence
of something else, incluuing Bis piopeities - which uou, as a simple substance, is beyonu.
Foi example, if we weie to say "theie exists one anu only one uou anu that uou is all wise,"
this woulu imply that uou has sepaiate piopeities of #X.$'#&/# anu E.$!"- (incluuing )**9
E.$!"-). uou woulu thus be uefineu as a composite of at least these two piopeities. Bence,
Aquinas coulu not finu a way to signify uou as a simple substance
(2) Aquinas next attempteu to make a case foi unueistanuing uou in a complex way.
Be still hau to avoiu aitificially seeing uou as a composite of piopeities, foi this woulu be
Beibeit 4S
tantamount to imagining uou as something that Be is not. Thus, Aquinas insteau tiieu to
infei a connection between piopeities in the woilu, that he consiueieu the effects of uou,
anu theii piimaiy cause 5\2.)7.
8u
In ;2--) UF#"*"=./), he hau offeieu cosmological
aiguments foi the existence of uou as the oiiginal cause of eveiything that exists.
81
Be
combineu this ieasoning with empiiical uata - oi the cieatuies in this woilu - to suggest
that since we aie able to physically peiceive these latest links in the chain of causes fiom
the fiist piinciple, oi uou, then "uou" can be employeu to concietely signify theii piimaiy
cause.
82
By compiomising between uiiect signification of uou, which he coulu not finu a
way to achieve, anu inuiiect signification of uou's via Bis effects, Aquinas claimeu that the
lattei enables "uou" to become a conciete teim of iefeience.
Aquinas suggesteu that "uou" coulu signify in uiffeient ways: sometimes abstiactly,
foi the puipose of inuiiectly signifying uou via Bis quality of simplicity; anu at othei times
concietely, to iefei to Bim via Bis tangible effects.
8S
Although, these methous can extenu

8u
Thomas Aquinas, "UF# ;2--) UF#"*"=./)," GF.*"$"0F+ .& 'F# I.!!*# :=#$K UF# CF(.$'.)&> A$*)-./>
)&! ^#E.$F U()!.'."&$M Aithui Byman anu }ames Walsh (eus), (New Yoik: Baipei & Row, 1967), 488
(Q. II, Seconu Aiticle, "I answei that") - \2.), oi "since" is Aquinas' methou of uemonstiation fiom
effect to cause, as opposeu to 0("0'#( \2.! - fiom cause to effect.
81
Ibiu., 486 (Q. II). Cosmological aiguments aie solely iational anu consist of tiacing back chains of
causes anu effects to an "immovable anu self-necessaiy fiist piinciple." (Thomas Aquinas, "UF#
;2--) UF#"*"=./)," (1967), 49u (Q. II, Thiiu Aiticle, "Reply 0bj. 2")). To not postulate uou in this
way woulu entail an infinite iegiess of causes, which Aquinas woulu have calleu absuiu. (Ibiu., 489
(seconu pioof of uou's existence - efficient cause))
82
Saint Thomas Aquinas, ;2--) UF#"*"=.)#, Beibeit NcCabe (tians), (New Yoik: Ncuiaw-Bill,
1964), 49.
Baviu Bume, among otheis, latei challengeu this type of cosmological aigument on the basis that it
stiongly ielies on an assumption that theie is such a fiist cause of cieatuies in this woilu anu that, if
theie is one, uou is that cause.
82
Nonetheless, Bume was consistent enough in his skepticism to not
completely ueny the existence of uou anu so, on this basis, "uou" at least iefeis to a uistinctly
possible conciete cause of all empiiically veiifiable cieatuies in the woilu. (Baviu Bume, _.)*"=2#$
C"&/#(&.&= 6)'2()* ?#*.=."&)
8S
Saint Thomas Aquinas, ;2--) UF#"*"=.)#, (1964), S1.
Beibeit 46
supeificial unueistanuings of uou in vaiious ways, they iemain ueficient foi they uo not
uefine uou's uivine essence in a uefinite anu uiiect way.
84
Aquinas thus wiote:
We have seen alieauy that in this life we uo not see the essence of uou, we
only know him fiom cieatuies; we think of him as theii souice, anu then as
suipassing them all anu as lacking anything that is meiely cieatuiely. It is the
knowleuge we have of cieatuies that enables us to use woius to iefei to uou,
anu so these woius uo not expiess the uivine essence as it is in itself.
8S


Thus the uiffeient anu complex concepts that we have in minu coiiesponu to
something altogethei simple which they enable us impeifectly to unueistanu.
86


Aquinas believeu that the impeifection in a name's ability to piopeily signify uou is
paitially uue to impiecision within oiuinaiy language. As such, a name's tiue function,
which in iespect to piecision is beyonu that of a simple linguistic uevice, is often not
piopeily unueistoou.
87

Aquinas uiu not consiuei the !#,.&.'."& of a woiu to simply be its etymology, which
is the meie mapping of the oiigin anu uevelopment of that woiu fiom a ioot oi fiom othei
woius. In teims of the nameu, etymology can only offei a veiy geneial inteipietation.
88

Following Aiistotle, Aquinas consiueieu that to uefine a woiu is to signify the nominal
essence of its iefeient by means of outlining that thing's kinu anu uistinctions.
89
In this
way, a woiu uoes not loosely iefei but insteau piecisely functions to uelimit its iefeience
into a thought that can be uistinctly conceptualizeu.
Aquinas' attempts to uefine "uou" weie ueficient foi they uiu not pick out uou as an
existent simple substance but insteau tiieu to expiess Bim as an abstiact concept oi an

84
Ibiu., 49.
8S
Ibiu., 49. (Q. XIII, Aiticle 1, "Reply")
86
Ibiu., 61.
87
}ohn Stuait Nill, : ;+$'#- ", <"=./K ?)'."/.&)'.@# )&! A&!2/'.@# (Lonuon: Longmans, uieen, anu Co,
1898), 16.
88
Saint Thomas Aquinas, ;2--) UF#"*"=.)#, (1964), 48-49.
89
Saint Thomas Aquinas, ;2--) UF#"*"=.)#, (1964), 48.
Beibeit 47
infeiential cause of the cosmos. Inauequacies inheient in any attempt to uefine uou's
essence constantly ian thioughout Aquinas' thoughts in ;2--) UF#"*"=./). Foi instance, a
cieatuie, oi an effect of uou, may possess peifection, even potentially, anu one may
suimount that that peifection pie-exists in uou as the souice of that cieatuie. Bowevei,
that pie-existing peifection exists in a highei way than any such infeiential piocess can
captuie.
9u
Peifections among inuiviuual cieatuies uiffei. 0ne cieatuie may possess
peifection in flight anu anothei in swimming. Yet, these peifections aie not one, noi aie
they inteichangeable. Peifection in anu of itself is something of a fai uiffeient scope to the
inuiviuual peifections pieuicateu of cieatuies. 0ne iemeuy foi this available to Aquinas
was to accept these ueficiencies in signifying uou as the best that can be uone accoiuing to
oui available knowleuge anu language. Nonetheless, this was not fully acceptable to him.
Aquinas next ieasoneu that if "uou" weie an equivocal teim that seives to signify
uou by means of, anu as well as, infeiieu effects such as cieatuies, then, even if the
infeiences weie pioveu sounu, the name woulu insufficiently pick out uou. This is because
uou, as a cause, woulu be iefeienceu in exactly the same way as Bis effects, which woulu
cause "uou" to lose its intenueu unique meaning. It woulu be the equivalent of saying that
wisuom in any one of uou's cieatuies is the same as wisuom in uou. That which signifies
wisuom between cieatuies uiffeis accoiuing to the cieatuie, but that which signifies
wisuom in uou uoes not uistinguish between wisuom anu uou. Thus, it woulu be a fallacy
to infei uou's wisuom, oi existence, fiom Bis cieatuies, equivocally.
91
Similaily, if the name
"uou" weie a univocal iefeience, we again face the pioblem of uefining uou as a simple
substance beyonu what can be expeiienceu anu pickeu out. Auuitionally, we cannot

9u
Ibiu., SS.
91
Saint Thomas Aquinas, ;2--) UF#"*"=.)#, (1964), 6S.
Beibeit 48
pieuicate anything univocally between uou anu uou's cieatuies (oi effects). The pieuicate
of the sentence, "uou is the univeisal cause of all cieatuies," cannot be univocal because
"cieatuies" aie not the same as uou. If the univeisal oi absolute cause weie univocal to the
whole species of cieatuies (its effect), then "cieatuies" woulu become a membei of its own
species anu, subsequently, the whole species of cieatuies woulu be a cause of itself.
92
Foi
Aquinas, this woulu have been an absuiu conclusion. Bence, "uou" cannot auequately
signify uou univocally oi equivocally.
(S) Aquinas tiieu to solve the pioblem of the signification of "uou" by appealing to
analogy. In an analogy eithei the name has a ielation to the nameu oi both name anu
nameu aie ielateu to a thiiu thing. "uou" anu "cieatuies" may not auequately iefei to each
othei univocally oi equivocally but ceitain ielationships can be infeiieu between them. Foi
instance, one may say that the peifection in cieatuies is analogous to the peifection that is
uou. This ielation is baseu on a cential coiielational thing, uou - since we aie tiacing out
"uou" as a piimaiy task.
9S
Thus, since uou is the souice of all peifection, then the peifection
of cieatuies, Bis effects, must inuiviuually have theii souice in uou. This woulu be an
analogous ieasoning since no uiiect iefeiential connection is implieu between uou anu
cieatuies.
Baving founu "uou" to be unable to signify uou as (1) a simple substance oi (2) in a
complex way, Aquinas also uiscoveieu that although (S) analogy suggests a haimony
between subject anu pieuicate, it uoes not stiictly signify uou in essence. In teims of "uou,"
analogy is at best a loose iefeience to uou being the souice of Bis effects - oi a conceptual
cause. Aquinas theiefoie fuithei suggesteu that "uou" ielates to the functionings anu

92
Ibiu., 67.
9S
Ibiu., 69.
Beibeit 49
activities of uou iathei than an impeisonal object.
94
Bowevei, he uiu conceue that the
name uoes signify a specific object that has uivine natuie - it uenotes as well as connotes
(in a sense).
9S
Since "uou" implies uivine natuie via all Bis effects, it cannot be a piopei
name that simply seives to pick out without any extia infoimation. Theiefoie, Aquinas saw
the name "uou" as a common noun, since it shaies in likeness to that which it signifies -
this being implicateu by analogy. Bence, analogy is only ielevant when "uou" is not taken as
a piopei name. Aquinas substantiateu this claim with his oiiginal insistence that a name
uoes not pick out a thing piopei but signifies that which exists in oui minus in ielation to
it.
96
"uou" is thus peculiai to uou alone via a -.&!,2* likeness between uou anu uou's
effects: "The uivine natuie can be communicateu to otheis only in the sense that they can
shaie in the likeness of uou."
97

As a likeness, little is achieveu in connecting the name "uou" with uou in actuality.
Aquinas theiefoie makes the metaphysical suggestion that "uou" signifies beyonu itself (oi
what it can uefine) to non-things. Thus, foi Aquinas, the woiu "uou" was a special name.
Wheieas, oiuinaiy names concietely inuicate existent things, "uou" is employeu to iefei to
something that is beyonu what we can unueistanu. Since "uou" ielies on uou's effects to
point out that which is beyonu unueistanuing, "uou," foi Aquinas, can only act as a common
noun:
"uou" is a common noun anu not a piopei name because it signifies in the
conciete the uivine natuie, although uou himself is neithei univeisal noi
paiticulai. We uo not, howevei, name things as they aie in themselves but as

94
Ibiu., 81. (Q. XIII, Aiticle 8, "Reply")
9S
Ibiu. "...the woiu 'uou' signifies the uivine natuie." (Q. XIII, Aiticle 8, "Bence 2")
96
Ibiu., 8S. (Q. XIII, Aiticle 9, "Bence 2")
97
Ibiu. (Q. XIII, Aiticle 9, "Bence 1")
Beibeit Su
they aie to oui minus. A& )/'2)* ,)/' 'F# &)-# `W"!` .$ .&/"--2&./)V*#. (my
emphasis)
98


Aquinas' use of analogy insteau of univocal anu equivocal foims of iefeience may be
a moie piecise way to iefei to uou, but it still uoes not auequately pick out uou as an
existent being. It insteau infeis a likeness between effects anu a potential cause. Aquinas
theiefoie appealeu to pioviuence to explain the use of the woiu "uou" in the fiist place:
Now uou is not known to us in his own natuie, but thiough his woiks oi
effects, anu so, as we have seen, it is fiom these that we ueiive the language
we use in speaking of him. Bence 'uou' is an opeiational woiu in that it is an
opeiation of uou that makes us use itfoi the woiu is ueiiveu fiom his
univeisal pioviuence: eveiyone who uses the woiu 'uou' has in minu one
who caies foi all things. Thus Bionysius says, UF# _#.'+ .$ EF)' E)'/F#$ "@#(
)** 'F.&=$ .& 0#(,#/' 0("@.!#&/# )&! =""!&#$$M But although ueiiveu fiom this
opeiation the woiu "uou" is useu to mean what has the uivine natuie.
99


Pioviuence may not, howevei, auequately satisfy eveiyone as an explanation of the
use of "uou." Aquinas hau iesoiteu to claiming that "uou" is not a piopei name but a
common noun - amply applicable only to a single tianscenuent Being - as a means of
evauing any iesponsibility in piecisely uefining, oi signifying, uou. Bowevei, in many
cultuies uou is iefeiieu to with names that aie consiueieu piopei names, ielating uiiectly
to the Absolute Peison signifieu.

K B'44)"5 T0

This chaptei outlineu some of the pioblems with using iepiesentational theoiies of
language to unueistanu the signification of "uou." The clustei theoiy, oi the association of a
sufficient numbei of a clustei of iesemblances oi uesciiptions to make a name succeeu, has

98
Ibiu. (Q. XIII, Aiticle 9, Reply 0bj. 2)
99
Ibiu., 79-81. (Q. XIII, Aiticle 8, "Reply")
Beibeit S1
pioblems on account of it not piopeily auuiessing aibitiaiy, eiioneous oi abeiiant
uesciiptions. Kiipke tiieu to shoie this up with his appeal to a causal chain of meaning
going back to an initial "baptism." Bowevei, Evans pointeu out that the causal theoiy is also
susceptible to aibitiaiy change that coulu cause a community of speakeis (eithei at the
same time oi ovei geneiations) to accept a vaiiety of iefeiences foi one name. Nonetheless,
his goal was to keep the iepiesentation theoiy intact. In Aquinas, we saw that when "uou"
is consiueieu a iepiesentation of uou, it can only function as a common noun. The oiiginal
puzzle of this thesis is that on the one hanu, no name can ieally iefei to uou anu yet, on the
othei hanu, uou's name oi names iefei to uou so intiinsically that name anu nameu aie as
if iuentical. This suggests that the name of uou, as having uual piactical-mystical qualities,
is a special case. Aquinas hau concluueu his ieseaich on the subject of uou's name in a veiy
similai way. Bowevei, if piopei consiueiation is to be given to the paiauox, uou's name
cannot be tieateu as a common noun. Besiues, as a common noun it woulu be susceptible to
the pioblems that Kiipke anu Evans pointeu out. In Inuia, the Naiyyikas uevelopeu a
theoiy of meaning that also tackles the pioblem of how piopei names function in iefeience.
The following biief suivey of this Nyya peispective in the next chaptei will concluue oui
enquiiy into the piactical (iefeientaial) quality of uou's names. The seconu half of that
chaptei will look into mystical expeiience within Inuian tiauitions as a means to auuiess
the othei aspect of the uual piactical-mystical qualities of uou's names, namely the mystical
quality.

Beibeit S2
-./0#1$ 9.$11
F$%4 3GHG/ #% A17)5)%'< IJ01$)1"(18 K" !"&)/" :1$<01(#)L1

This chaptei looks at theoiies of meaning cieuiteu to the Inuian Nyya schools anu
also exploies ieligious expeiience as a means to gain some claiity on the mystical quality of
uou's name. A few Westein theoiies of iefeience oi meaning have been outlineu in
pievious chapteis foi the puipose of conveying the uepth of the pioblem. In the fiist half of
this chaptei, the Nyya tiauition biings in an auuitional philosophical peispective on
meaning anu intiouuces a uistinct style of logical analysis. Fiom this I hope to show that
the pioblem is univeisal anu not solely a Westein one. The Nyya's unique peispective will
concluue the section on the piactical-iefeiential quality of uou's name. The lattei pait of
the chaptei focuses on the iealm of ieligious expeiience anu allows ceitain piactitioneis in
a hanuful of Inuian tiauitions to speak on uou's name in theii own less analytical anu moie
expeiience-baseu voices. In conjunction with some of the insights fiom the pievious
sections on iefeience, a couple of possible iesolutions to the paiauox of naming uou will be
eventually offeieu.

3GHG/ /"& #.1 >1/")"5W-%4071J

Although the Inuian Nyya theoiy of meaning is uistinct fiom the pieviously
uiscusseu Westein theoiies, theie aie ceitain conveigences of concein. Foi instance, the
Beibeit SS
epistemic ioles that Fiege's theoiy assigns to the iefeient anu the $#&$# (as a moue of
piesentation) coiielates with the ielation between the Nyya teims @.$#$+) ("qualificanu")
anu @.$#$)&) oi 0()J)() ("qualifiei").
1uu
Peiception is foiemost of the Nyya 0()-a&)$, oi
means of gaining knowleuge, anu as such it is iecognizeu to be of two kinus: oiuinaiy
peiception (*)2J.J)) anu extia-oiuinaiy peiception ()*)2J.J)). 0f these two, oiuinaiy
peiception is fuithei uiviueu into two types: exteinal peiception in which the five exteinal
sense oigans come into contact with physical objects; anu inteinal (-a&)$)) peiception,
which incluues giasping of emotional oi cognitive states. Cognition of meaning oi
unueistanuing of a woiu is thus an impoitant epistemic element in Nyya philosophy.
A cognition that involves the two ielata of qualificanu anu qualifiei can be ioughly
uesciibeu as: the knowing of that which is teimeu "the qualificanu" as chaiacteiizeu by that
which is teimeu "the qualifiei." In oui knowleuge of the meaning of the sentence, "Kiishna
is blue," the qualifiei piopeity of being blue woulu inheie in the qualificanu Kiishna. Bence,
via this expiession we know Kiishna as blue. Thus, qualificative knowleuge, oi testimony-
baseu knowleuge, consists of at least thiee epistemic elements: a qualificanu, a qualifiei
anu a ielation between them. The ielation between them at the ontological level woulu be
one of inheience.
1u1
Bowevei, Fiege's $#&$#, a moue of piesentation, is the epistemic value

1uu
Bummett ciiticizes Fiege's conflation between what is a piopei name anu what is a uefinite
uesciiption. Accoiuing to }. L. Shaw, it is not cleai if Fiege's ciiteiion is linguistic, ontological,
epistemic oi simply a hint foi uiawing a uistinction between a piopei name anu a pieuicative
expiession. When the sense-iefeience ielation is taken into account, then it seems moie of an
epistemic theoiy, although some Naiyyikas may consiuei that it ietains some kinu of ontological
status.
1u1
}.L. Shaw, "Piopei Names: Contempoiaiy Philosophy anu The Nyya,":&)*+'./)* GF.*"$"0F+ .&
C"-0)()'.@# G#($0#/'.@#K HX0*"()'"(+ H$$)+$ .& C2((#&' UF#"(.#$ )&! C*)$$./)* A&!.)& UF#"(.#$ ",
I#)&.&= )&! ?#,#(#&/#, Bimal Kiishna Natilal anu }.L. Shaw (eus), (Boiuiecht: B. Reiuel Pub. Co.,
198S), SS4
Beibeit S4
of the singulai iefeiiing expiession such as "the planet with a iing" (foi Satuin), anu uoes
not neeu a thiiu ielation to connect the iefeient anu the sense.
1u2

Fiege's $#&$# is not something that is subjective anu peisonal like an iuea, noi is it
stiictly objective like an empiiically obseivable object. Bowevei, if moie than one peison
can giasp the same $#&$# of a name, then it must have an objective element. It is in this
iespect that $#&$# acts in a similai way to that which is teimeu )@)//F#!)J), oi "limitoi," in
the Navya Nyya
1uS
theoiy of meaning. In essence, this limitoi seives as an epistemic
function that eithei *.-.'$ the meaning of a woiu iefeiiing to an inuiviuual in teims of a
piopeity (usually a univeisal) that inheies in that inuiviuual via ielational piopeities, oi
!#'#(-.&#$ the iefeient of a teim in a similai way to Fiege's moue of piesentation - it
ueteimines by means of a coiielative piopeity of being the limitoi which iesiues in the
univeisal. The Ancient Nyya consiueieu the job of limiting iefeience as belonging to a
univeisal, oi class chaiactei (ba'.), which iesiues as one component in a tiipaitite meaning-
complex. The othei two components aie the configuiation of paits (oi appeaiance of that
which the name is iefeiiing to) anu paiticulai instances of the iefeient. Bowevei, since on
this mouel the thiiu component (instances) implies moie than one iefeient, this theoiy can
only be useu foi common nouns. Stiictly speaking, a univeisal cannot inheie in a logically
piopei name that picks out a unique paiticulai.
Navya Naiyyikas, such as }agauisa, thought to ciicumvent the pioblematic issue of
accounting foi the function of a qualifying univeisal as pait of the meaning-complex of a
piopei name by positing that theie aie no funuamental uiffeiences between piopei names

1u2
Ibiu., SS4
1uS
"Navya Nyya," oi "New Nyya," is a label that iefeis to post 14
th
Centuiy logical uevelopments
of Nyya philosophy.
Beibeit SS
anu geneial teims.
1u4
0n this view, names foi inuiviuuals, such as "Kiishna," aie common
nouns that iefei to seiies of tempoial instances. "Kiishna" woulu thus iefei to a seiies of
instances of the piopeity of whatevei it is that is its class chaiactei calleu "Kiishnahoou."
This seiies woulu incluue baby Kiishna, boy Kiishna, youth Kiishna, auult Kiishna anu so
on. The Soul of Kiishna, so to say, which stays the same is nameless accoiuing to the Nyya
anu, hence, uoes not come into the iealm of things that can be nameu.
1uS
Thus, all that can
be nameu is the bouy, oi, in the context of Kiishna, uiffeient instances of his bouyhoou
uuiing Bis eaithly manifestations. Noieovei, in a similai sense to Kiipke, the ielation
between the name anu iefeient in the meaning complex is oiiginally foimeu by intention.
Foi the Nyya this can happen eithei by human will (0)(.VF)$)), oi aibitiaiy social
convention, oi by the will of uou ($)J'.), which can be consiueieu in teims of an ancient
convention whose souice cannot be tiaceu. The lattei woulu be the convention fiom which
the teim "Kiishna" has its souice.
Theie aie seveial objections to }agauisa's view that piopei names aie a kinu of
geneial teim. Fiistly, the uiffeient iefeients of an oiuinaiy common noun, like "cow," aie
not uepenuent in the same way as the iefeients of a piopei name, like "Kiishna."
1u6
A cow
in Inuia is not uepenuent on a cow in Bawai'i in the same way that boy Kiishna is
uepenuent on baby Kiishna. So uiffeient instances of Kiishnahoou contain uiffeient kinus
of uepenuencies than cowhoou, oi any othei class-chaiactei of a common noun. Seconuly,
since eveiything in Nyya is nameable, the instantiation of "Kiishnahoou" that coulu be
calleu "Youth Kiishna" woulu also be a common noun anu woulu likewise iequiie a fuithei

1u4
Shaw, "Piopei Names: Contempoiaiy Philosophy anu The Nyya," SS8
1uS
All souls aie consiueieu nameless accoiuing to the Nyya
1u6
Shaw, "Piopei Names: Contempoiaiy Philosophy anu The Nyya," SS9
Beibeit S6
tempoial subset of Kiishnas. Bence, theie exists a veiy ieal pioblem of infinite iegiess.
Thiiuly, the auueu complication of having to accept a class-chaiactei coiiesponuing to each
piopei name woulu be uneconomical anu woulu hence go against the "law of paisimony,"
something wiuely accepteu by the Naiyyikas. Fouithly, the almost aichetypical ieliance on
class-chaiactei in }agauisa's theoiy suggests that the class-chaiactei iequiies to exist
befoie the iefeient of the piopei name comes into being, anu this seems absuiu.
1u7

Noieovei, ovei anu above these objections, in the sense of iefeiiing to the iefeient of
"Kiishna" as eteinally youthful oi uou, the tiauitional Nyya meaning-complex woulu not
be applicable foi theie is no subclass of eteinally youthful Kiishnas oi subclass of uous that
can act as a limitoi foi a piopei name of such a unique anu eteinally unchanging paiticulai.
In teims of a logically piopei name that seives to pick out a unique paiticulai,
ceitain ancient Naiyyikas consiueieu that the uesignatum of that name shoulu be an
inuiviuual without a qualifiei (oi limitoi), since uniqueness has no inheiing univeisal oi
class-chaiactei.
1u8
0n this mouel, the connection that allows foi the iefeience to succeeu
woulu be iuentity, similai to the Fiegean foim )8V.
1u9
Foi the Ancient Naiyyikas, ) coulu
iepiesent the name itself anu V the object, anu thus iuentity woulu be between name anu
nameu. Significance in this case coulu be gaineu by geneiating testimony-baseu ()
0"$'#(."(.) knowleuge via iecollection. Thus, the cognition of one ielatum, such as the woiu

1u7
Ibiu., SS9-6u; The above foui objections aie couitesy of }.L. Shaw
1u8
visvabanuhu Bhattachaiya, "Piopei Names anu Inuiviuuals," c&"E.&= ,("- d"(!$K d#$'#(& )&!
A&!.)& GF.*"$"0F./)* :&)*+$.$ ", 3&!#($')&!.&= )&! U#$'.-"&+, Bimal Kiishna Natilal anu Aiinuam
Chakiabaiti (eus), (Boiuiecht: Kluwei Acauemic, 1994), SS7
1u9
"Kiishna is uou" expiesses a ielation of iuentity. "Kiishna has uouhoou" expiesses a ielation of
inheience since Kiishna has the piopeity of uouhoou, oi uouhoou inheies in Kiishna. Bhattachaiya,
"Piopei Names anu Inuiviuuals," SS8
Beibeit S7
"Kiishna," geneiates the iecollection of anothei, in this case the inuiviuual Kiishna.
11u
This
woulu then, accoiuing to these Ancient Naiyyikas, be a non-qualificative iecollection of
"Kiishna" anu the iefeience coulu thus succeeu in this way.
A pioblem with the above iuentity theoiy is that iecollection of Kiishna woulu
necessitate an acquaintance with Kiishna, which woulu again leau to the untenable
iequiiement of being physically acquainteu with the empiiically unobseivable entity that is
Kiishna, oi uou. Without acquaintance, ciiculaiity woulu not be avoiueu because the
iecollection of the piopeity of being the uesignatum of "Kiishna" woulu be constituteu by
the notion of being the uesignatum of "Kiishna" anu vice veisa.
111
Besiues, the Navya Nyya
objecteu to this by claiming that non-qualificative testimony-baseu knowleuge cannot aiise
because any connection between name anu nameu iegaiuing meanings iequiies a
qualificative connection. Even in the case wheie the qualificanu is the woiu "Kiishna," it
coulu only be qualifieu by a pieuicate piopeity, such as blue in the expiession "Kiishna is
blue." Foi the Navya Nyya, even piopei names necessaiily iequiie a limiting piopeity to
function in iefeiiing.
112
Bowevei, in the case of piopei names the limitoi cannot be a
univeisal because theie can be no univeisal piopeity in a name that uniquely iefeis.
}agauisa took uiffeient a stance on iuentity statements. Be aigueu that eveiy
piopeity has its own ielation of iuentity anu so the piopeity of being Kiishna can be
accepteu as the inuiviuual Kiishna Bimself as the seconu teim of the ielation of iuentity
whose fiist teim is also Kiishna.
11S
Noieovei, the ielation of Kiishna to Bimself is not the
same as that of Ruh to Beiself anu so it is unique. 0n this mouel, Kiishna is both the

11u
Ibiu, SS8
111
Ibiu., S42
112
Ibiu.
11S
Shaw, "Piopei Names: Contempoiaiy Philosophy anu The Nyya," S61
Beibeit S8
qualificanu anu qualifiei, oi limitoi, of the ielation anu so the piopeity of being the
qualifiei that inheies in Kiishna is limiteu by the ielation of iuentity.
114
Nonetheless, the
above uoes not solve the pioblem of communicability of the meaning of a piopei name.
Since the sense of the woiu "Kiishna" is explaineu in teims of Kiishna, heaieis woulu not
unueistanu its meaning unless they weie acquainteu with Kiishna. The lack of uiffeience
between the object anu moue in which it is piesenteu goes against the ieasonable Nyya
convention that theie shoulu be a uiffeience between qualificanu anu qualifiei, as in
paiticulai to univeisal.
Foi the Navya Nyya, the uefinition of 0()@(''.9&.-.'') (the ieason foi application of
a woiu to an object), oi the univeisal that inheies in a paiticulai instance, has been subject
to vaiious opinions.
11S
These opinions take into account both its epistemic anu semantic
natuie (as thought by vaiuhamna 0puhyya) as well as the question of whethei it
belongs as pait of the meaning-complex oi not (as consiueieu by Raghuntha Siiomani).
116

As exteinal to the meaning-complex, 0()@(''.9&.-.'') takes the foim of a pointei
(20)*)J$)&)), oi inuicatoi, of the iefeience of a teim iathei than something that inheies in
an instantiation of the class chaiactei. 30)*)J$)&) is a technical teim that is contiasteu
with @.$#$)&), a teim eailiei useu in the context of iefeiiing to a univeisal acting as a
qualifiei.
117
As a pointei, 0()@(''.9&.-.'') becomes the limitoi that ueteimines the
uesignatum of a piopei name. In a sense, a pointei as a qualifiei of a qualificanu
coiiesponus to Kiipke's fixing of a iefeient by means of an exteinal event, oi the initial
baptism of a name that is maintaineu by a community of speakeis. Foi the Naiyyikas, the

114
Ibiu.
11S
Ibiu., S62
116
Ibiu., SSu-S1
117
Ibiu., SS1; Bhattachaiya, "Piopei Names anu Inuiviuuals," SS9
Beibeit S9
coiiesponuent conventions foi ueteimining the moue of iefeience, as pieviously noteu, aie
eithei ancient (oi the will of uou) oi mouein (that is, aibitiaiy social human intention).
In teims of the qualifiei being a pointei, theie is also ioom to incoipoiate a
Bonnellian "fit" into the iefeiential mechanism. As a pointei, a limitoi only has to confoim
to some convention to succeeu, even if that convention is au-hoc. The following example
auapteu fiom one by }. L. Shaw goes to emphasize this:
118
A theist, in the piocess of making
a point, suggests that $2V$')&/# can be seen as something that exists as pait of the totality
of that which is uou. 0ui theist coulu then tacitly make a ueciee: "Let uou be cogniseu by
the woiu "Substance"" (somewhat like Spinoza). This woulu be an au-hoc equivalent to
what was teimeu a "mouein convention" (0)(.VF)$)). The notion that the ueciee suggests
is possible because uou coulu be consiueieu the substiatum of substance. As such, uou,
which in this context is substance, is giaspeu by the cognition causeu by the woiu
"substance." Bowevei, such a cognition giasps uou who is substance as qualifieu by
substancehoou, not as qualifieu by uouhoou. In the above ueciee, uouhoou appeais as the
limitoi of substiatumhoou, which is iesiuent in a substance that is also uou. The piopeity
of being the object giaspeu by the cognition causeu by the woiu "substance" appeais to be
the qualifiei. Between these two piopeities the ielation of limitation uoes not exist, but
since both aie piesent in the substiatum, a substance which is also uou, a ielation of eithei
co-location oi co-piesence might be cognizeu between them. Theiefoie, substiatumhoou is
not in such cases the limiting qualifiei with iespect of the object giaspeu by the cognition
causeu by the woiu "substance." It is only a pointei. In a sense, as long as the name fits the

118
Shaw, "Piopei Names: Contempoiaiy Philosophy anu The Nyya," S41
Beibeit 6u
iefeient, it successfully iefeis. Nonetheless, if these conventions apply, then a iefeient can
have moie than one meaning anu, as we shall see, this is not acceptable foi the Naiyyikas.
As pieviously noteu, Kiipke foimulateu his own iefineu veision of the clustei
uesciiption theoiy that ueteimineu piopei names as iigiu uesignatois, in the sense of being
iigiu pointeis, so to say. 0ne ieason foi the moual context he employeu was to enable one
to easily uistinguish the uiffeience between piopei names anu uefinite uesciiptions, which
he saw as sepaiate categoiies. In fact, one objection he hau against Fiege anu Russell was
that neithei of them hau maue any such uistinction at the level of oiuinaiy language -
though he coulu not excluue ceitain uefinite uesciiptions fiom being iigiu uesignatois, such
as "The simple Supieme Besignei of the univeise (oi eveiything)," which woulu iefei to the
same entity in all possible woilus. As a iigiu uesignatoi, a piopei name, like "Kiishna,"
uniquely latches on to its iefeient, which in this case is the entity, Kiishna. In a similai way,
the Nyya 20)*)J$)&) (pointei) - foi example, "That house with a ciow" (the non-inheiing
ciow being the pointei by which the house is pickeu out) - also fixes on the iefeient of a
ielational piopei name. Foi instance, notwithstanuing "Kiishna" meaning "black," "uaik" oi
"uaik blue" in the Rg veua, oi being a ueiivative of "Kiish" ("to uiaw towaius oneself" oi
"plough") that inuicates attiaction, the woiu also uniquely acts in ceitain tiauitions as a
piopei name foi uou.
119
As a piopei name, the limitoi, being a iigiu pointei, of "Kiishna"
woulu be an unanalyzable Kiishnahoou. Kiishnahoou woulu be unanalyzable because since
it is not a class-chaiactei, univeisal oi the like, it woulu have to be something that has no
paits anu hence cannot be bioken uown.
12u


119
Noniei Williams Sanskiit-English Bictionaiy
12u
Shaw, "Piopei Names: Contempoiaiy Philosophy anu The Nyya," SS7
Beibeit 61
Insteau of acting as a class-chaiactei, one option is to tieat Kiishnahoou as a
composite piopeity, oi the sum total of all piopeities that iesiue in Kiishna.
121
Since the
combination of the saiu piopeities as Kiishnahoou act as the limitoi of "Kiishna," the lattei
uesignates the peison wheie all such piopeities aie piesent. Bowevei, since Kiishna, the
locus of all these piopeities, is unknowable, no one coulu be fully acquainteu with all such
piopeities anu so the limitoi as a composite woulu fail foi not having enough scope.
As an attempt to tweak the above composite theoiy into a woiking thesis,
Kiishnahoou coulu insteau be tieateu as a subclass of J&"E)V*# piopeities that uniquely
chaiacteiize Kiishna, such as naiiatives of Kiishna's life. This subclass known as
"Kiishnahoou" - what makes Kiishna, Kiishna - woulu not iequiie to be exhaustive but
woulu neeu to consist of all known unique piopeities such as "the only killei of Kamsa,"
"the best fiienu of Aijuna," "the main speakei of BF)=)@)!9We'a" anu so on. Bowevei,
although this woulu geneiate some economy, it coulu nevei geneiate enough scope foi,
especially in the case of Kiishna, theie woulu always be innumeiable unaccounteu-foi
unique piopeities.
122
Noieovei, even if these piopeities weie known, Naiyyikas woulu
not accept the name as having multiple meanings (uesciiptions that qualify oi limit the
scope of iefeience foi the name) anu, besiues, even to select one of these meanings woulu
not woik foi theie is no way to select one paiticulai limitoi out of many foi uesignation. A
iefeient having one anu only one meaning woulu equate with the Russellian view that the
meaning of a logically piopei name is none othei than the iefeient itself. Choosing one out
of may possible limitois to inheie in the qualificanu woulu be an aibitiaiy choice anu, foi

121
Bhattachaiya, "Piopei Names anu Inuiviuuals," SSS
122
Ibiu., SS4
Beibeit 62
the Naiyayikas anu Russell, woulu not consist of a necessaiy anu sufficient ciiteiion foi
iefeience in cases of logically piopei names.
The Navya Naiyyika, Raghunatha Siiomani, consiueieu the pointei in the case of
piopei names to be a moue of piesentation. The moue of piesentation of Kiishna is the
piopeity of being Kiishna, which is not pait of the meaning-complex of "Kiishna." The
moue of piesentation cannot be iuentifieu with Kiishna oi any othei categoiy in the Nyya-
vaisesika system anu so the piopeity of being Kiishna woulu be a sepaiate iiieuucible
categoiy by itself. Nonetheless, accoiuing to othei Naiyyikas, this violates the law of
paisimony anu populates the Nyya ontology with an unlimiteu numbei of iiieuucible
entities.
12S

Philosophy can offei uiffeient insights into the pioblem of meaning anu iefeience
but in the case of any piopei name, let alone one that iefeis to uou, it is uifficult to finu a
univeisally acceptable theoiy. Thus, having outlineu some of the ueepei aspects of the
pioblem fiom the peispectives of Westein theoiies of language anu the Inuian Nyya
tiauition (which is not only a school of thought in its own iight but also a system of logic
useu by many othei Inuian schools), we now tuin to actual ieligious life expeiience anu a
suivey of some of views on what is iealizeu though the mystical expeiience of uou's name.
This, in all effect, is an accessing of the mystical quality of uou's name. In conjunction with
some of what has been coveieu in teims of the piactical-iefeiiing quality of uou's name, we
can now begin to tiy to finu some possible iesolutions foi the paiauox.


12S
Shaw, "Piopei Names: Contempoiaiy Philosophy anu The Nyya," S62
Beibeit 6S
A17)5)%" /"& IJ01$)1"(1

In Inuia, giammaiians, such as Bhaitihaii, consiueieu that the unueistanuing of a
woiu is attaineu thiough $0F"'). ;0F"') is sometimes inteipieteu as a mystical event but
the giammaiians uiun't necessaiily agiee with this since they consiueieu it in veiy
piactical teims. Bhaitihaii uesciibeu $0F"') as a pait-less, inuivisible speech unit uevoiu of
any inteinal sequence that manifests uuiing the utteiance of a woiu as a buisting out oi
blossoming of meaning.
124
This meaning buists out fiom f)V!), oi woiu - this is not "'F#
f)V!)," in teims of eithei an oiiginal woiu oi woiu qua woiu.
12S
Insteau, f)V!) in this case
is on the minu of the speakei anu it comes out in the foim of !F@)&. - a sounu, a woiu oi an
utteiance fiom whence, out of which, anu because of which is the $0F"'). Bence, it is when
the !F@)&. hits the iecipient's eai that theie is $0F"') - it is because of $0F"') that the
heaiei unueistanus the woiu. Theie has to be intention on the pait of speakei anu heaiei
foi unueistanuing to take place.
A pieiequisite foi $0F"') to successfully tiansmit meaning is that the meaning must
not only be on the minu of the speakei but must also alieauy be helu in the iepositoiy of
the minu of the listenei. 0iuinaiy $0F"') iequiies both paities to be competent in the
language useu. This iequiiement in a sense also extenus to names of uou. "Kiishna" utteieu

124
;0F"') is etymologically uefineu in vaiious ways:
(a) @)(&a'.(.J'" @)(&aVF.@+)&=+" `('F)90()'+a+)J" &.'+)F f)V!)F $0F"')F - it is uiffeient fiom
but cognizable via atomic sounus (moiphemes oi sentences as well), anu is communicative.
(b) $0F2'+)'# @+)b+)'# @)(&).F .'. $0F"') .'. - it is that which is buist foith thiough the atomic
sounu units.
(c) $0F2')'+ )('F" `$-)' .'. $0F"') .'. - it is that fiom which the meaning is unueistoou.
;)(@)9_)($)&)9;)-=()F) by Sayana Nauhava (eu) with an oiiginal Com. by NN. vasuuev Shastii
Abhyankai (Siu Eu.) (Pune: Bhanuaikai 0iiental Reseaich Institute, 1978), Suu
12S
I am obligeu to Piof. Ramanath Shaima at 0.B. Nanoa foi this anu the following explanations of
oiuinaiy anu extiaoiuinaiy $0F"')
Beibeit 64
to a Chiistian who hau nevei heaiu the woiu befoie woulu not mystically be unueistoou by
that Chiistian. Nonetheless, since "Kiishna" is a woiu with an extiaoiuinaiy meaning, its
use has an extiaoiuinaiy $0F"'). Wheieas in oiuinaiy language both speakei anu heaiei
have to be qualifieu by language competency so that $0F"') can biing about unueistanuing,
in the extiaoiuinaiy language of uou's names the competency of the speakei anu heaiei
has to also be extiaoiuinaiy anu this uoes not necessaiily have to be linguistic. Foi
instance, extiaoiuinaiy competency coulu be gaineu by ')0)$, oi voluntaiy austeiity
peifoimeu to puiify oneself enough to be a ueseiving iecipient of extiaoiuinaiy
unueistanuing. Similaily, meuitation may be an extiaoiuinaiy means to gain extiaoiuinaiy
competency. Theie aie linguistic competencies of the minu anu theie aie extiaoiuinaiy
competencies that can be geneiateu because of the context of the use of a woiu anu this
context uoes not have to be puiely linguistic.
In Inuia, the unueistanuing oi expeiience of uou is geneially gaineu thiough
meuitative woiship (20a$)&a). Accoiuing to uopal Tulpule, theie aie thiee basic types of
meuitation within Inuian tiauitions.
126
(1) G()'eJ"0a$)&a, oi symbolic meuitation, is the
iecognition of V)&!F2$, oi subtle yet intiinsic bonus between Beities (oi ueities) anu
paiticulai things. Foi example, meuitation on the cows in the lanu of Biaja (physically in
the state of 0ttai Piauesh, Inuia) connects the minu with Loiu Kiishna anu snakes aie
associateu with Loiu Shiva. (2) W2&"0a$)&a, oi qualitative meuitation, consists of a focus
on uou's qualities, foi example: beauty, ienunciation, fame, wealth, stiength anu knowleuge
in full. Consequently, it is not a uiiect connection with uou. (S) :F)&=()F"0a$)&a, oi
unitive meuitation, is of a mystical natuie as it is the contemplation of the meuitatoi as

126
S.u. Tulpule, UF# _.@.&# 6)-# .& 'F# A&!.)& U()!.'."&K : C"-0)()'.@# ;'2!+, (New Belhi: Shimla
anu Inuus Pub, 1991), 1S-16
Beibeit 6S
being in unity with the Beity - g'-)& )$ B()F-)&. The 0panisaus iecommenu meuitation
on the 0()&)@), oi 0m. This is a unitive meuitation on the Bivinity (like the }esus piayei in
0ithouox Chiistianity).
127

I woulu like to complement the above list of meuitations by incluuing the meuitation
of ieuniting with uou thiough one's eteinal, yet not initially obvious, ielationship with Bim.
This meuitation entails uiscoveiing ones $@)(h0), oi tiue foim oi natuie, anu is a type of
unitive meuitation. It is not a becoming of oi a meiging into uou but it uoes entail a
meiging of puipose with uou. uou's name thus becomes the object of meuiation in the
same way as Bis foim. The Bhakti tiauitions aie most conceineu with connecting with uou
thiough Bis name via a type of unitive meuitation. BF)J'. is both a piocess anu a movement
that uses the piocess. Connecting with uou is both the means anu the enu in VF)J'..
In VF)J'., uou can be known in two ways: $)=2&), oi with uisceinable qualities, anu
&.(=2&), oi unqualifieu anu puie. In whichevei way uou is consiueieu, Bis name can easily
be constiueu as &.(=2&), anu so &.(=2&) anu $)=2&) can coexist. Auuitionally, unifying
meuitation that involves &.(=2&) VF)J'. is not limiteu to those who consiuei uou as solely
foimless oi of a simple substance that one can meige into oi become one with. The
visistauvaita Schools' teachings anu Caitanya's )/.&'+)9VF#!aVF#!)9@)!) (inconceivability
of uiffeience oi oneness) both consiuei uou as full of vaiiegation anu yet at the same time
0ne. This takes into account that uou has an inuepenuent peisonality, which allows foi a
vaiiegateu univeise in which living-entities can choose to live apait fiom Bim while at the
same time Be iemains connecteu with eveiything. It is thiough the piolifeiation of veuic
speechthe elaboiation of the thiee-in-one piimal sounu A-0-N ("0m")that the all-

127
Ibiu., 17
Beibeit 66
poweiful Cosmic Aitist imagines anu cieates the woilu of pluiality which is at the same
time the same as anu apait fiom Bis own Substance. Thus, the Inuian Theistic schools of
thought (unlike Auvaita veuanta) take focusing on uou's name, as well as Bis "spoits"
(Puianic accounts of the uivine ueeus of the incainations of uou), anu Bis gloiious
attiibutes, as ways of going "back to uouheau."
128

Piactitioneis in vaiious schools have inteipieteu the function of uou's name in
many uiffeient ways. 0ne coulu object that a vaiiety of uiveise opinions must be uue to
falsity anu eiioi; howevei, an objection to this objection coulu be that it piesciibes limiting
uou to a veiy naiiow epistemic fiamewoik, which woulu be unbecoming foi such an
unlimiteu Supieme Entity. Without going into the uetails of the uebate on tiuth, the uiveise
opinions of piactitioneis iemains of gieat value in unueistanuing the scope of expeiience
in iegaiu to uou's name. Noieovei, since this thesis aims at unueistanuing a paiauox, such
contiaiy opinions aie essential to setting up the philosophical pioblem which it tiies to
solve oi uissolve.
}naueva (aka: }neshwaia), a thiiteenth centuiy mystical poet fiom
Nahaiashtia, consiueieu the Name (uou's name) an #X0(#$$#( of the ownei of the Name
(&a-e). Bence, on his view, uou's name is uou in posse - it is equippeu to caiiy out all that
uou can uo Bimself. Thus, via the chanting of uou's name, consciousness of the Name leaus
to consciousness of uou. The Name is hence moie than just a symbol of the uivine.
129

Tukima, a famous seventeenth centuiy poet anu uevotee of Kiishna, also iegaiueu uou's
name as confeiiing the powei oi authoiity of uou. In this way he saw the Name coulu act as
a puiifiei. Puianuaia, a fifteenth centuiy composei anu sauhu fiom Kainataka, consiueieu

128
I am obligeu to Piof. Chakiabaiti at 0.B. Nanoa foi this input
129
Tulpule, UF# _.@.&# 6)-# .& 'F# A&!.)& U()!.'."&, Su
Beibeit 67
uou's name to be gieatei than uou.
1Su
Since he saw the Name as the ultimate libeiatoi,
then, in teims of piocess ontology, theie is no neeu to know the signifieu uou at all. Kabii,
the famous fifteenth centuiy mystic poet anu sant, iegaiueu the Name ageless anu
immoital.
1S1
Some woulu say that the Name eventually helps the chantei become oi iealize
that he is uou, wheieas otheis woulu contenu that the chantei becomes gouly. Kabii
analogously anu cieatively compaieu the Name with oil, which he saw as enabling the wick
of the minu to be enflameu with the fiie of uou.
1S2
Be went fuithei anu saiu that uou anu
Bis name aie inteichangeable, a concept that the Sant tiauition is familiai with. The famous
impeisonalist, Sankaiaueva, also iegaiueu the Name as none othei than Baii (uou)
Bimself. Tulasius, a sixteenth centuiy Ram Bhakta
1SS
anu naiiatoi of the ?)-) C)(.')
I)&)$), saiu that the Bivine Name is the inteipietei oi @.)9-#!.2- between the &.(=2&)
anu $)=2&).
1S4
Tulasius also consiueieu uou's name anu uou's foim to be two attiibutes of
uou. The Name is ineffable, without oiigin, anu can only be known by iight
unueistanuing.
1SS
Name anu foim also make up the impeisonal anu peisonal "foims" of the
Absolute. Tulasius saiu that uou, as Ram, exists insiue anu outsiue. Insiue Be is
)&')(+a-.& anu outsiue Be is Ram. Positing all the above subsequently helpeu him valiuate
both the $)=2&) anu the &.(=2&). Bowevei, since the Name is that which makes both name
anu foim known, Tulasius consiueieu it the supeiioi aspect.
1S6


1Su
Ibiu., SS
1S1
Ibiu.
1S2
Ibiu., S4
1SS
Ram Bhaktas consiuei Loiu Ram to be the absolute eteinal Supieme Being; howevei, foi them,
unueilying the eteinal peison, Ram, is the infinite Foimless.
1S4
Tulpule, UF# _.@.&# 6)-# .& 'F# A&!.)& U()!.'."&, 2S
1SS
Ibiu., SS
1S6
Ibiu.
Beibeit 68
In a mystical sense, uou's name anu uou's foim aie iuentical.
1S7
Although uou may
be concealeu, Bis name is not concealable. Tukima, foi example, poetically askeu: "Boes
a lotus plant know the fiagiance of its floweis." Fiom this, the poet infeiieu that uou
cannot know the nectai of Bis own name that is easily peiceiveu by the puie uevotee.
1S8

Yet, at the same time, the Absolute is uevoiu of ueteimineu nameables.
1S9
Tulasius
consiueieu uou's name anu foim to be two attiibutes of uou in that they uo not foim
constituents of Bim.
14u
Neithei one is gieatei than the othei although, as mentioneu befoie,
some consiuei the Name gieatei because it alone ieveals both uou's foim anu name.
Tulasius even thought of the name as a "schematizei," iesembling the latei Kantian sense,
between the $)=2&) anu the &.(=2&) aspects of uou.
141
Thus, the Name acts as an
illuminatoi, a witness, anu an inteipietei between uou-with-qualities anu uou-without-
qualities.
142

In the G)!-) G2(a&) it is stateu that Kiishna anu Bis name aie iuentical with one
anothei.
14S
}iva uoswami obseives in his commentaiy on Rupa uoswami's BF)J'.9
?)$)-(')9;.&!F2, in which this G)!-) G2()&) veise is quoteu, that the tianscenuental
Name of Kiishna, oi uou, is the bestowei of all uesiieu enus because it is iuentical with the
tianscenuental peison of Kiishna.
144
}iva consiueieu Absolute Reality, oi $)'9/.'9)&)&!)
(eteinity, knowleuge anu bliss), as being conuensifieu into an )0(aJ(') (non-mateiial)

1S7
Ibiu., 79
1S8
}. uonua, 6"'#$ "& 6)-#$ )&! 'F# 6)-# ", W"! .& :&/.#&' A&!.), (Amsteiuam: Noith-Bollanu Publ.
Co., 197u), 9S
1S9
Ibiu., 9S
14u
Tulpule, UF# _.@.&# 6)-# .& 'F# A&!.)& U()!.'."&, 8u
141
uonua, 6"'#$ "& 6)-#$ )&! 'F# 6)-# ", W"! .& :&/.#&' A&!.), 99
142
Ibiu., 99
14S
&)-)$ /.&')-)&.F J($&) /).')&+) ()$) @.=F()F)
02(&)F $2!F" &.'+) -2J'. VF.&)''@a' &a-) &)-.&"
144
}iva uoswami, BF)J'.9?)$)-(')9;.&!F2, Piimaiy Bivision of the 0cean, Seconu Wave, #2SS
(tianslatoi unknown)
Beibeit 69
foim, which is manifest simultaneously into two bouies, viz. the Name of Kiishna anu
Kiishna Bimself.
Chaitanya Nahapiabhu's i(e i.J$a$')J), seconu sloka, states that in uou's names
theie is all goou foitune foi the living entity, anu theiefoie uou has many names, such as
Kiishna anu uovinua, by which Be has expanueu Bimself anu in which Be has investeu all
Bis potencies.
14S
In Chaitanya's lineage, Bhaktisiuuhanta Saiaswati uoswami, while
puipoiting on i(e ;)&-"!)&) BFa$+)- - a commentaiy on i(e i.J$a$')J) by his fathei anu
spiiitual pieceptoi, Thkuia Bhaktivinoua -, stateu in iegaiu to this veise of Chaitanya's:
The woiu V)F2, oi "many", inuicates the two types of the Loiu's holy names:
piincipal anu seconuaiy. The piincipal names incluue Kiishna, Ruh-
iamana anu uopijana-vallabha, which iepiesent the loving conjugal moou of
the Loiu; the names Rma, vasuueva, Naiasimha, etc. auuiess Bim in
opulent, ieveiential moou |the Thkuia also incluues Baii, uovinua, Acyuta,
Ananta anu visnu in his list of piimaiy namesj. Biahma, Supeisoul
(paiamatma), etc., |as well as Supieme Contiollei, Naintainei, Cieatoi anu
Nahenuia (Thkuia Bhaktivinoua)j aie Bis seconuaiy names; they aie
incomplete, sepaiateu anu paitial. The Loiu's piincipal names aie non-
uiffeient fiom Bim, anu possess all Bis eneigies; while the seconuaiy names,
iepiesent Bis potencies in paitial uegiee only.
146


The uauuia vaishnava tiauition that began with Chaitanya consiueis only seconuaiy
names of uou as iefeiiing, oi iepiesenting, in an oiuinaiy way. In a similai way to Aquinas,
these names iefei to uou's potencies anu uo not uiiectly iefei to uou Bimself. Piimaiy
names of uou, on the othei hanu, contain all the potencies of uou anu so act as uou in posse
iathei than as a iefeiential tool. Thkuia Bhaktivinoua quotes seveial texts to back up
Chaitanya's statement in iegaiu to this unueistanuing in anothei of his woiks, i(e BF)b)&)9
?)F)$+). In one instance, he quotes in his own woius a veise fiom the ;J)&!) G2(a&):

14S
&a-&a- )Ja(. V)F2!Fa &.b)9$)(@)9f)J'.$
146
Thkuia Bhaktivinoua, i(e ;)&-"!)&) BFa$+)- (tianslatoi unknown)
Beibeit 7u
All the auspicious potencieswhethei of pious ueeus, acts of chaiity, stiict
vows, penances, going on pilgiimage, )$@)-#!F) anu ()b)$2+) saciifices, oi
knowleuge of the Absolutewhich expunge the effects of sinful life, have
been assembleu togethei by the Supieme Loiu anu channeleu into Bis holy
name, making it tiuly omnipotent.
147


This quote by the Thkuia coiielates with Tukima's unueistanuing that uou's
piimaiy names aie piincipally consiueieu in teims of peifoiming the task of puiifying all
who come in contact with them. These names aie iepositoiies of uou's potencies that
humanity can access ielatively easily anu, as such, they act as vehicles by which those who
aie entiappeu by the mateiial eneigy can connect with uou. }iva uoswami inteiestingly
comments in his i(e9BF)=)@)'9;)&!)(VF)F that once the spiiitual natuie of uou's name has
been iealizeu, then the paiauox of a name being able to iefei anu yet not being able to iefei
to uou uoes not occui:
Be |uouj may be auuiesseu by vaiious spiiitual names, which aie
inconceivable to the mateiial senses.. Anything expiesseu by mateiial
vibiations, anything asceitaineu by mateiial intelligence anu anything
expeiienceu by the mateiial senses oi concocteu within the mateiial minu is
but an effect of the moues of natuie anu theiefoie has nothing to uo with the
ieal natuie of the uouheau. (;B;, Anuccheua Su, S)
The Supieme has no mateiial foim, anu theiefoie one paity pioclaims
that the Supieme has no foim oi name. At the same time the Supieme uoes
have a spiiitual foim anu name, anu theiefoie anothei paity pioclaims that
the Supieme has a foim anu name. In this way theie is no ieal uiffeience of
opinion among the tianscenuentalists in this mattei, anu theie is no ieal
contiauiction in what at fiist may appeai contiauictoiy statements of the
veuas.. (;B;, Anuccheua Su, 4)
The woiu "(20)-" (foim) anu its ielation to the two views of the
natuie of the Loiu (as with anu without name anu foim), is uesciibeu in
D.$&2 G2(a&): "0 King, the Supieme uouheau has a foim, anu at the same
time Be has no foim. Be is simultaneously immanent anu tianscenuent."
(;B;, Anuccheua Su, 6)
148


147
!a&)9@()')9')0)$9'e('F)9+a'(a!e&)- /) +aF $'F.'aF f)J')+" !#@)-)F)'a- $)(@)90a0)9F)(aF
f2VFaF
(ab)$h+af@)-#!Fa&a- bja&)$+a!F+a'-)9@)$'2&)F aJ($+) F)(.&a $)(@aF $'Fa0.'aF $@#$2 &a-)$2
&) !#f)9Ja*)9&.+)-" &) f)2/af)2/)9&.(&)+)F 0)()- $)&Je(')&a! #@) (a-) (a-#'. -2/+)'#
148
}iva uoswami, i(e9BF)=)@)'9;)&!)(VF)F (tianslatoi unknown).
Beibeit 71

The above paiauox that }iva uoswami auuiesses is a weak one. Be iesolves it by
stating that since uou is spiiitual anu not mateiial, a name is able to iefei to Bim if it is
spiiitual but is unable to iefei to Bim if it is mateiial. Bowevei, a stiongei veision of this
paiauox woulu insist on the self same name of uou iefeiiing in both spiiitual anu mateiial
situations:

(a) No name (of uou oi otheiwise) can ieally iefei to uou
(b) uou's name oi names iefei to uou so intiinsically that name anu nameu aie as if
iuentical

In iespect to (b), an inteiesting syllogism iuns as follows: Theie is no known
inuiviuual name that can ieally iefei to uou (this is a iestatement of (a)). In othei woius, no
known name can fully achieve an auequate expiession of all that is uou. As such, uou's
actual Name, the one that is in all effect iuentical with Bim (i.e. (b)) - in contiauistinction to
othei names of uou that meiely name aspects, qualities oi aie analogous of the Bivine -,
must be piesently hiuuen to humanity if it exists at all. If uou is iuentical with Bis actual
name, then since uou is nameless so too must Bis actual Name be nameless.
If pioof can be given that uou's name is nameless, then the above is a possible
iesolution of the paiauox (a) anu (b). The iuea of a nameless name seems stiange at fiist
foi it appeais contiauictoiy. The key to unlocking an unueistanuing of it howevei, can be
achieveu by auuiessing the expiessiveness of the name. The Sant tiauition calls the Name
&.b)&a-), which means the own name of the self, oi the total expiession of all that is
Beibeit 72
uou.
149
It is not a piopei name that uenotes uou because it is lauen with meaning othei
than that involveu in signifying. As such, it is often saiu within many ieligious tiauitions,
both Inuian anu Westein, that uou's name can only be known by ievelation oi thiough
meuitation.
1Su
Consequently, uou's name is not similai to an oiuinaiy piopei name foi it
possesses spiiitual significance, efficacy, anu coulu well be acting as a living anu woiking
symbol of uou.
1S1
Bue to the possibility of a ievelation of the "nameless" though name, S.K.
Be suggests that this classification is not liteially nameless but exists in the same molu as
"biithless," "foimless" anu "actionless."
1S2
Bence, whethei unknowable oi seciet, the Name
is saiu to be appioachable only by those who aie initiateu into a methou that enables them
to uo so.
1SS

Some of the uiffeient thinkeis in Inuia, like }naueva anu membeis of the uauuia
vaishnava tiauition, consiueieu uou's Name to be uou in posse. This iuea can be elaboiateu
in the following way to biing about an unueistanuing of what it is that is the nameless
name which can biing about a possible iesolution of the paiauox:
Nany Inuian ieligious iituals, mantias oi piayeis aie ieciteu oi offeieu aftei
invoking a ueity by means of that ueity's Veb) -)&'() - oi spiiitually potent $##! $+**)V*#.
1S4

This is a tantiic conception, though it is similaily conceiveu of by many uiffeient tiauitions
such as the Bhakti Schools. Beb) -)&'()$ aie consiueieu "living symbols of ueities" - the

149
Tulpule, UF# _.@.&# 6)-# .& 'F# A&!.)& U()!.'."&, 71
1Su
I will not fuinish any skepticism in iegaiu to ievelation, foi even the gieatest uoubtei cannot
uoubt the possibility of it occuiiing. An example of uou's name that is only known by ievelation in
Westein ieligion is the tetiagiammaton (YBWB oi }BvB).
1S1
Tulpule, UF# _.@.&# 6)-# .& 'F# A&!.)& U()!.'."&, 69
1S2
Ibiu., 68 footnote; uonua, 6"'#$ "& 6)-#$ )&! 'F# 6)-# ", W"! .& :&/.#&' A&!.), 94
1SS
uonua, 6"'#$ "& 6)-#$ )&! 'F# 6)-# ", W"! .& :&/.#&' A&!.), 94-9S
1S4
Biffeient thinkeis calleu the Name in uiffeient ways: }nauev calleu it ;)jbe@)&) &a-);
Puianuai Bas iefeiieu to it as _.@+) &a-); anu Kabii useu the teim ;)' &a-; Tulpule, UF# _.@.&#
6)-# .& 'F# A&!.)& U()!.'."&, 72
Beibeit 7S
names anu subtle foims of ueities coiielate with the essence of those ueities.
1SS
The teim
"mantia" iefeis to an utteiance that in this context coulu be maue up eithei of a Veb) oi of a
name (oi names) of uou that uoes not seive to iefei oi iepiesent. Insteau, mantias,
incluuing the woius containeu in them, have a pie-linguistic natuie. Accoiuing to Inuian
tiauition, f)V!), oi woiu, uoes not necessaiily opeiate by means of physical uiiection.
1S6

Subtle vibiations cieateu by iepeating a name oi mantia aie something that can be
consiueieu an inteinal effect.
Nantia can be paiaphiaseu in teims of the Sanskiit woius -)&)&) (minuing oi
contemplation) anu '()+)'# (to save, oi uelivei). It thus coulu be explaineu in uuiuueo
Ramaue }amkhanui's teims as "luminous sounu," which illuminates the heaiei's minu to
ieality.
1S7
Since within a mantia uou's names oi spiiitually potent $##! $+**)V*#$ uo not
linguistically iefei oi act as signs, they can insteau be consiueieu nameless in iespect to
this context. Theii function is to illuminate an unueistanuing oi even an expeiience of uou
anu by uoing so the hiuuen (both uou anu Bis name in the context of a mantia) becomes
unhiuuen. Thus, the paiauox involving (a) anu (b) can be iesolveu since: outsiue of mantia
it can be tiuly stateu that (a), no name can ieally iefei to uou; anu within mantia the
contiaiy can also be tiuly saiu that (b), uou's name oi names iefei to uou so intiinsically
(as illumination) that name anu nameu aie as if iuentical (i.e., nameless).
As nameless, uou's name is not ieliant on linguistic iules. A similai concept of a
linguistically iule-fiee name is also alluueu to in the Bhakti tiauitions. The populaiity of

1SS
Tulpule, UF# _.@.&# 6)-# .& 'F# A&!.)& U()!.'."&, 89
1S6
Ibiu., 168
1S7
Ibiu., 74
Beibeit 74
VF)J'. leu to an emphasis on $-)()&)-, oi iemembiance, ovei images oi sounus.
1S8
Thus,
cognition takes place with the help of memoiy. }naueva poetically summeu up his
conception of the ielationship between Name anu Nameu by stating that the Nameu
manifests on the iemembiance of the Name like the uawning of a goluen uay at the iising of
the Sun of Nectai (Wa'Fa RNO).
1S9
Consequently, iemembiance allows ioom foi spiiitual
efficacy in the chanting of uou's name even when it is mispionounceu - a soteiiological
veision of Bonnellan's "fit." Foi instance, many Bengali Kiishna bhaktas pionounce
"Kiishna" as "Kiishina" (with the extia "i"). Linguistically, it seems that they aie not
connecting with Kiishna but aie calling on anothei entity with the name "Kiishina."
Bowevei, these Bengalis woulu ieject this anu iemain auamant that what is manifesting on
theii tongues is none othei than Kiishna, the Blue Boy who stanus in a thiee-folu benuing
Foim playing a flute. Similaily, the pionunciation of "Kiishna" by foieigneis to Inuia veiy
much uiffeis fiom that of Inuians. I have peisonally been in the piesence of native Fiench
speakeis who while chanting the name "Baie," in the ])(# c(.$F&) I)F)-)&'(), emphasize
the "ie" in a typically stiong Fiench accent. I have also associateu with native Chinese
speakeis who pionounce the "ii" sounu in "Kiishna" as "li." In a stiict oithouox sense one
coulu say that they aie not ieceiving the uue benefit of chanting Kiishna's names piopeily,
noi aie they piopeily iefeiiing to Kiishna, noi is Kiishna manifesting on theii tongues.
Bowevei, if you put any of these ciiticisms to them, they will stiongly uisagiee. Because
memoiy is emphasizeu in the Bhakti tiauitions, it is accepteu that the aichetypal sounu of
"Kiishna" is aujusteu accoiuing to the ability anu heait of the woishippei. Thus, the Name
is not a piouuct of a combination of mateiial sounus but is insteau alive anu able to aujust

1S8
Ibiu., 78
1S9
Ibiu., 8u
Beibeit 7S
itself accoiuing to a living connection. 0n this view, if the paiauox is baseu on linguistics
then it coulu auuitionally be iesolveu as follows: 0n the one hanu, since all uou's names aie
uistinct fiom paiticulai sounus, then (a) coulu be tiue since these so-calleu names of uou
aie not, in a linguistically acceptable sense, names that ieally (#,#( to uou (because they uo
not necessaiily confoim to linguistic iules). 0n the othei hanu, (b) coulu also be tiue
because it coulu be positeu that contemplating a name in memoiy without consiueiing its
linguistic natuie, woulu, in all effect, be non-uiffeient fiom contemplating the memoiy of
that which is nameu. Bence, (b), name anu nameu woulu be as if iuentical.
This chaptei began with Bhaitihaii anu an explanation of $0F"') that emphasizeu
the intention of the speakei anu heaiei. It is fitting that he shoulu also enu this chaptei
with a similai appeal to the speakei's oi believei's intention as well as the impoitant pait
that iefeience plays in iegaiu to a possible iesolution of the paiauox.
16u

Beitianu Russell anu otheis, in theii attempts at ueveloping a peifectly foimal
language, hau pioposeu a hieiaichy of languages as a means to escape ciiculai paiauoxes,
such as the liai paiauox,
161
anu Bhaitihaii has been associateu with this methou in a
piecuisoi iole. Russell's, et al, theoiy is moie a solution foi paiauoxes that involve ciiculai
iefeiencing anu is not ielevant in iespect to the paiauox in uou's name. Bowevei,
Bhaitihaii's solution auuitionally uistinguishes function fiom object anu it is in this iespect
that it becomes ielevant. In teims of the liai paiauox, foi example, the statement

16u
The content of the following two paiagiaphs is taken fiom: }an E. N. Bouben, "Bhaitihaii's
Solution to the Liai anu Some 0thei Paiauoxes," ^"2(&)* ", A&!.)& GF.*"$"0F+ D"* Sk> 6"M [> _#/ ZQQT,
(Netheilanus: Kluwei Acauemic Publisheis), S81-4u1.
161
The liai paiauox in one of its simplest foims is "Eveiything I am saying is false." If I am lying
when saying "eveiything I am saying is false," then I am telling the tiuth which is contiaiy to the lie
I am making. Similaily, if I am telling the tiuth when saying "eveiything I am saying is false," then I
am telling a falsity, which is also contiauictoiy to my initial intention, which this time is to say the
tiuth.
Beibeit 76
"eveiything I am saying is false" stops being ciiculai once we see the speakei's intention as
uistinct fiom the object that is the statement itself. Bence, the piocess of signifying is
uistinct fiom the signifieu, as is the expiessei anu the expiesseu. The foimei in all cases
cannot be subsumeu in the lattei. It is thiough the mistaken consiueiation that a function
can also be an object that a contiauiction can manifest.
If the intention of the believei is taken into account in the paiauox involving uou's
name, then we can appeal to something almost analogous to Bhaitihaii's solution. In teims
of situations of intention oi asseition (as a geneial function), we coulu say that: situation1
in which uou is iefeiieu to by uou's name1 is uistinct fiom situation2 in which uou is not
iefeiieu to by uou's name2. The subsciipts in the case of uou's name iepiesent the
application of the same name of uou in conjunction with each of the two situations of
intention. If we accept that in teims of both situation1 anu situation2, uou's name1 is
uistinct (oi has a uistinct function) fiom uou's name2, then theie is no contiauiction. If the
objection weie maue that theie is no uistinction between the object (uou's name) in
situation1 anu situation2, then the situations woulu become subsumeu in the object, which
woulu be the equivalent of saying that the function is the object. This woulu be analogous
to consiueiing cognition as non-uiffeient with the cognizeu, which is absuiu. Thus, we
possibly have anothei iesolution foi the paiauox.



Beibeit 77
K B'44)"5 '0

0ui exploiation of philosophy of language, both Nyya anu Westein, uiu not
uncovei a theoiy of meaning that coulu be useu by itself to iesolve the paiauox (a) anu (b).
Expeiientially, on the othei hanu, the paiauox coulu be iesolvable via the unueistanuing
that uou's name is nameless. As a nameless name within a mantia, which uoes not function
to iefei, uou's name "illuminates ieality" anu yet the same name outsiue of mantia can
somehow act in the capacity of iefeiiing to oi iepiesenting uou (uepenuing on which
meaning convention applies). Two of the suggesteu iesolutions of the paiauox in this
chaptei appeal to the uual piactical-mystical quality of the name, which is consistent with
the natuie of the paiauox. The thiiu, Bhaitihaii's solution, takes into account a hieiaichy of
language that is built on intention accoiuing to situation.
A paiauox is not the same as a contiauiction since if something is paiauoxical theie
must be some hiuuen ieasoning that sustains it otheiwise it woulu be contiauictoiy anu
false. Bowevei, iesolving a paiauox woulu ienuei it a non-paiauox, which weakens this
thesis, since it is claimeu that theie ieally exists a paiauox in the name of uou. The last
chaptei focuses on the possibility of sustaining, oi embiacing, the paiauox iathei than
uissolving it so as to maintain the cieuibility of the tiauitions that claim that theie ieally is
a paiauox in the name of uou.

Beibeit 78
-./0#1$ F%'$
I4;$/()"5 #.1 :/$/&%J

W.v. Quine, in "The Ways of Paiauox," initially uefines a paiauox as: "Any conclusion
that at fiist sounus absuiu but that has an aigument to sustain it."
162
R. N. Sainsbuiy, in
G)()!"X#$, also gives a uefinition of paiauox emphasizing )00)(#&' absuiuity: ".an
appaiently unacceptable conclusion ueiiveu by appaiently acceptable ieasoning fiom
appaiently acceptable piemises."
16S
The cential paiauox with iegaiu to uou's name is the
appaiently unacceptable coexistence of both (a) anu (b) below:

(a) No name can ieally iefei to uou
(b) uou's name oi names iefei to uou so intiinsically that name anu nameu aie as if
iuentical

I will iefei to (a) as the un-namablility thesis anu (b) as the "name-nameu iuentity
thesis." }oining them togethei uoes not give us a stiict contiauiction because (a) anu (b)
concein two uistinct seconuaiy qualities of uou's name that aie not logically contiaiy.
Although a contiauiction of the foim 0 )&! &"' 0 cannot be logically suppoiteu in a
stanuaiu way, anu although the oiiginal paiauox has up until now always been stateu in
teims of (a) anu (b), a stiongei contiauictoiy type of paiauox (if I may call it a paiauox),

162
W. v. Quine, "The Ways of Paiauox," UF# d)+$ ", G)()!"X> :&! Y'F#( H$$)+$, (Cambiiuge:
Baivaiu 0P, 1976), 1
16S
R. N. Sainsbuiy, G)()!"X#$, (Cambiiuge: Cambiiuge 0P, 199S), 1
Beibeit 79
though iiiesolvable, is moie suitable foi exploiing the subtleties of how a paiauox may be
embiaceu. By isolating (a) anu placing it in conjunction with its negation, not-(a), the iesult
is the following stiongei paiauox, which I will call the contiauiction-in-iefeiiing thesis:

(c) No name of uou can ieally iefei to uou anu any name of uou can ieally iefei to
uou.
164


This conjoins the un-namability thesis with a namability thesis. In the pievious
chaptei I offeieu ways by which the paiauox in uou's name coulu be iesolveu; howevei, in
all effect, a iesolution woulu ienuei it a non-paiauox. Not only woulu this weaken the
initial thesis that theie actually is an eviuent paiauox in teims of iefeiiing to uou, but it
woulu also ignoie any possibility that theie may be something intuitively coiiect in the
notion that the name of uou iefeis anu yet uoes not iefei to uou. In a sense, it is visceially
satisfying foi a piactitionei to consiuei uou with paiauoxical qualities anu piopeities, foi
this type of contemplation complements uou's tianscenuence anu ineffability, the essential
feeling that uou is laigei than logic. Bissolving this paiauox by means of ieason, which is
baseu on human conventions, seems shallow anu uoes not ieally to go to the heait of such
an intiinsically spiiitual mattei. Thus, iathei than iationally iesolve, oi uissolve, the
paiauox, this chaptei looks at the possibility of iationally sustaining it. By sustaining the
stiongei contiauiction-in-iefeiiing thesis as intiinsically paiauoxical by means of ieason,
we maintain a usable anu ieasonable expiession of uou's ineffability, tianscenuence anu
geneial unknowability.

164
This coulu be iestateu as: uou is self-iefeiiing anu uou's name is self-iefeiiing
Beibeit 8u
It is geneially safe to assume that most people woulu accept a contiauictoiy
statement of the foim 0 )&! &"' 0 only as a last iesoit aftei having thoioughly explaineu the
tiuth anu falsity of its constituent paits anu ieasoning.
16S
A paiauox's initially absuiu
sounuing conclusion, as Quine woulu expiess it, coulu be evaluateu using eithei oi both of
two kinus of theoiy uepenuing on the makeup of the paiauox in question. An epistemic
theoiy examines it as compiising of a logical inconsistency between two oi moie elements
that aie cential to a ceitain unueistanuing of the woilu. A semantic theoiy exploies any
inconsistency in woius within a paiauox, of which any explanation woulu not necessaiily
uepenu on the woilu at all.
166

An epistemic analysis of the contiauiction-in-iefeiiing thesis foi the puipose of
sustaining oi iesolving its paiauoxical natuie woulu iequiie shaip bounuaiies between
tiuth anu falsity. This is because it can be stiongly positeu that nothing existent in the
woilu is ambiguous anu that any obscuiity in iegaiu to this is uue only to the impeifections
of oui own cognition. Epistemic theoiies tenu to be iigiu anu cannot toleiate paiauoxes
beaiing conclusions that entail that something both is anu is not, oi is both iight anu
wiong. Nonetheless, this uoes not mean that semantic theoiies aie less toleiant, though
they uo offei a uiffeient peispective. Both the un-namabilityname-nameu iuentity theses
anu the contiauiction-in-iefeiiing thesis seem to be bettei suiteu to being sustaineu
semantically, foi they aie conceineu with iefeience anu iuentity.
167


16S
Ibiu., 1S6
166
Ibiu., 47
167
This is not to say that it is not sustainable epistemically; howevei, the ieasoning behinu
achieving an unueistanuing of this sustenance aie complex anu beyonu the scope of this thesis (see
Nax Black, "vagueness: An Exeicise in Logical Analysis" GF.*"$"0F+ ", ;/.#&/#, vol. 4, No. 4 (0ct.,
19S7), pp. 427-4SS).
Beibeit 81
Nany semantic theoiies, such as the @#(.,./)'."&.$' 'F#"(+ ", -#)&.&=,
168
aie veiy
uiffeient fiom epistemic theoiies. As semantics aie not uepenuent on epistemic objectivity,
in ceitain cases a penumbia, oi vagueness, that spieaus acioss the junction of .$ )&! .$ &"'
can be iecognizeu - notwithstanuing ceitain stiong semantic theoiies, such as the 'F#"(+ ",
V.@)*#&/#, that auheie to the piinciple of the #X/*2$."& ", 'F# -.!!*# (like epistemic theoiies,
they consiuei any conclusion that is of the foim 0 )&! &"' 0 to be false). If a penumbia is
acceptable, it V*2($, so to say, a shaip uistinction between .$ )&! .$ &"', anu implies that both
can exist simultaneously. A simple example is of a man who has lost half of the haii on his
heau anu is consequently consiueieu simultaneously balu anu not balu. This is because it is
impossible to finu a piecise eveiy-uay iefeiential uemaication in teims of the exact
numeiical amount of haii one iequiies to possess on one's heau in oiuei to not be balu.
Some philosopheis, like uiaham Piiest anu Nax Black, have gone to gieat lengths to
incoipoiate this @)=2#&#$$ (which is not ambiguity, ielativity oi geneiality) into logic.
169

What is commonly iefeiieu to as "classical logic" - the fiist known system of
contempoiaiy foimal logic - can be categoiizeu as a convention which ielies on ceitain

168
"The veiification theoiy of meaning. is that the meaning of a statement is the methou of
empiiically confiiming oi infiiming it." (W.v.Quine, UF# H-#(=#&/# ", <"=./)* H-0.(./.$-, 1996
(uailanu Publishing Inc.)
169
Accoiuing to Nax Black: "vagueness is uistinguisheu fiom geneiality anu fiom ambiguity. The
foimei is constituteu by the application of a symbol to a multiplicity of objects in the fielu of
iefeience, the lattei by the association of a finite numbei of alteinative meanings having the same
phonetic foim; but it is chaiacteiistic of the vague symbol that theie aie no alteinative symbols in
the language, anu its vagueness is a featuie of the bounuaiy of its extension, anu is not constituteu
by the extension itself." Nax Black, "vagueness: An Exeicise in Logical Analysis," 4Su.
Relativity is not vagueness. Foi example, even though we say that the aveiage height of
Sweues is gieatei than that of Eskimos, the statement can still holu the 0(#/.$# expiession: "is above
aveiage in height." Sainsbuiy, G)()!"X#$, 2S-26.
Also see uiaham Piiest - "Tiuth anu Contiauiction"; "What is so Bau about Contiauictions";
"Contiauiction Belief anu Rationality"
Beibeit 82
iigiu man-maue iules.
17u
Foi example, accoiuing to this system of logic the statement "p
anu not p" is always false, just as the statement "p oi not p" is always tiue.
171
Bowevei, as
an alteinative semantic option it coulu be pioposeu that any statement of the foim 0 )&!
&"' 0 is simply an expiession of the two conuitions (teimeu "0" anu "&"' 0") that maik the
extieme bounuaiies of a iange of potential tiuths in uegiee.
172
Foi instance, what is to say
whethei a man whose height is S feet 11 inches is, to a uegiee, tall accoiuing to a set of
iules oi conventions that officially only iecognize 6 feet oi moie to be tall.
17S
This man
coulu in all effect be tall anu not tall at the same time, slightly tall, oi both tall anu meuium
height. 0sing this kinu of ieasoning, a semantic !#=(## 'F#"(.$', who woulu accept a
penumbia between 0 )&! &"'90, woulu asseit that "p anu not p" is not necessaiily
completely false anu "p oi not p" is not necessaiily completely tiue.
174

An epistemic theoiist coulu help iefine this semantic vagueness by objecting that
the above coulu be avoiueu by settling on a stiict categoiy of ) ')** -)& at exactly 6 feet tall
oi moie. Bowevei, an objection coulu be maue to this objection to the effect that this
epistemic stiictuie is too iigiu foi a theoiy of iefeience. This echoes Stiawson's objection
to the theoietical Russellian logical language. In teims of the tall-man example, too much
iigiuness woulu leau to: oveily bioau categoiizations of height with shaip boiueis, which
woulu not uo justice to all giaues of tallness oi shoitness; oi a laige numbei of impiactical

17u
Nax Black tiies to loosen this. Be aigues that once the stiict uistinctions in logic aie tiansfeiieu
to the ieal woilu, then they become bluiieu anu that logic shoulu be awaie of this. Be uses the
example of a pencil line in a geometiic uiagiam put unuei the micioscope, which becomes a
coiiugateu tiench. "vagueness: An Exeicise in Logical Analysis" GF.*"$"0F+ ", ;/.#&/#, vol. 4, No. 4
(0ct., 19S7), 427-4SS.
171
Sainsbuiy, G)()!"X#$, 4S
172
It coulu be aigueu that Beiaclitus thought of contiauictions in this way.
17S
Not taking into account the fact that the uemaication of 6 feet as tall is aibitiaiy)
174
Sainsbuiy, G)()!"X#$, 4S
Beibeit 8S
(oi impossible) categoiizations of height that iange fiom minute to extiemely tall without
any oveilapping. Biffeiences in opinion, ianging fiom shaip anu piecise teims to vague
uegiees of tiuth, coloi oui juugments anu so, in this light, it is inevitable that theie will be
moie than one way of ueteimining whethei it is possible foi .$ )&! .$ &"' to coexist as tiue,
oi not. Similaily, in teims of the contiauiction-in-iefeiiing thesis, this epistemic stiictuie
woulu be impiactical anu, even if it weie plausible, it woulu iequiie uou to be known
iationally. Any attempt at knowing uou iationally woulu not only place human epistemic
limitations on uou but woulu also unueimine meuitation oi ievelation as a means to know
Bim.
Quine conceiveu of a taxonomy of paiauoxes anu any paiauox of the foim .$ )&! .$
&"' woulu belong in the categoiy he teimeu "antinomy." An antinomy, Quine explaineu, is a
contiauiction that is aiiiveu at by ways of accepteu ieasoning.
17S
Its iesolution, so that it no
longei contiauicts, iequiies its iationale to be ieviseu oi ieplaceu even though its
ieasoning may be establisheu anu tiusteu.
176
The bottom line is that an antinomy iemains a
not-invaliuateu paiauox until its ieasoning is eithei pioveu false by some new pioof, oi is
valiuateu in a non-contiauictoiy way.
Theie is an intuitive anu oiganic natuialness to the thought of "it is anu it isn't," anu
it coulu be saiu that this is uue to the expiessiveness, oi even the $#&$# (moue of
piesentation), of such a paiauoxical statement. In the case of the contiauiction-in-iefeiiing
thesis, a veiificationist theoiy of meaning coulu be employeu to weaken the appaient
contiauiction by offeiing that since (c) can be ieasonably 2&!#($'""! as consistent with any
name of uou, it woulu be accepteu as tiue in piinciple, even consiueiing that the

17S
Quine, S
176
Ibiu.
Beibeit 84
coexistence of its two contiauictoiy elements is not empiiically veiifiable (in the same way
as Fiege's $#&$#).
177
Bowevei, an epistemic theoiist may countei that the cognition of
intuition is a seconu-oiuei cognition anu that it is only oui obseiving oui own vagueness
anu then tiying to compensate foi its eiioneousness that we aitificially make it pait of the
gieatei oiuei of things. The epistemic theoiist woulu hence stiongly insist on Aiistotle's
<)E ", 6"&9C"&'()!./'."& in all ciicumstances.
178

Bialetheism, a teim coineu by uiaham Piiest anu Richaiu Routley in 1981 foi a
theoiy that has existeu both in the West anu in Inuia foi at least two anu a half millennia,
agiees with the natuialness of "is anu is not."
179
It is not tiivialism, a view that is in
accoiuance with the piinciple of explosion, oi a logical acquiescing to the ueuuction that
once both siues of a contiauiction aie pioveu tiue, anything anu eveiything can be ueiiveu
fiom it.
18u
To avoiu tiivialism, the uialetheist geneially subsciibes to a theoiy that
consiueis ueuuctively valiu infeiences as paiaconsistent, oi that logical consequence
ielations aie not explosive if the available infoimation is inconsistent.
Bialetheism is faiily common. 0ne foim is piesent in the ancient stoiy of
Naiasimhaueva that is tolu in the Inuian veuic texts. The stoiy tells of an incaination of
vishnu, Naiasimhaueva, who killeu a uemon nameu, Biianyakasipu This uemon hau
ieceiveu a boon that he coulu not be killeu on the lanu oi in the sky, in the uay oi in the
night, outuoois oi inuoois, by a human oi by an animal, anu so on. In this way he sought to
be immoital. Loiu Naiasimhaueva, a half-man half-lion incaination - neithei human noi

177
Ibiu., S2
178
In I#')0F+$./$, Aiistotle not only uefenus this "law" but also the ielateu <)E ", HX/*2!#! I.!!*#,
specifically its vaiiant, the <)E ", B.@)*#&/#.
179
"Bialetheism" was inspiieu fiom a line in Wittgenstein's ?#-)(J$ "& 'F# 4"2&!)'."&$ ",
I)'F#-)'./$
18u
Explosion aiiives fiom a iule in classical logic known as l#X /"&'()!./'."&# \2"!*.V#'Mm
Beibeit 8S
animal - tiickeu this uemon by killing him on Bis lap, which is neithei lanu noi sky, at uusk,
which is neithei uay noi night, anu in the entiance to the uemon's palace, which is neithei
inuoois noi outuoois. Theie is no sepaiate place between each of these extiemes anu so in
each case not-X anu not not-X aie both tiue.
181
This is not uue to a lack of ieasoning, as has
been positeu by some. Bume answeis the ciitics in iegaiu to this by suggesting that a wise
man "piopoitions his beliefs to the eviuence."
182
If the eviuence points to a tiue
contiauiction, then why woulu it not be iational.
Though one may countei that theie is no haiu pioof in iegaiu to substantiating the
claim that the contiauictoiy elements in (c) can coexist, theie is also no haiu pioof to claim
otheiwise. What has been coveieu in this chaptei in iegaiu to this issue has consisteu of a
veiy biief suivey anu theie aie many othei ioutes one coulu take to embiace the oiiginal
paiauox of uou's name. Bowevei, fiom the fact that theie aie many possible solutions to
the paiauox, it follows that theie is no one solution. This, as has been noteu in the pievious
chapteis, is uue to many factois anu ieally goes to show that the cential puzzle of this
thesis is not as simple as it may fiist seem.


181
Anothei example of uialetheism was expiesseu by Begel: "Something moves, not because at one
moment it is heie anu anothei theie, but because at one anu the same moment it is heie anu not
heie, because in this 'heie', it at once is anu is not." ueoig Wilhelm Fiieuiich Begel, ;/.#&/# ", <"=./
nZNkZo, A.v. Nillei (tians), (New Yoik: Bumanity Books, 1969), 44u.
182
Bume, Baviu, 1748, :& A&\2.(+ C"&/#(&.&= ]2-)& 3&!#($')&!.&=, C.W. Benuel (eu),
(Inuianapolis: Bobbs-Neiiil Company Inc., 19SS), 118
Beibeit 86
!" B'44/$G

ueneially speaking, Westein philosophy's main concein with language has been to
exploie how it points to things in the woilu. Its insistence on this has magnifieu the
philosophical pioblem iegaiuing the paiauox in uou's name. Inuian philosopheis aie of a
similai minuset but they take extia consiueiation of the expeiience, intention anu cognition
of those who aie utteiing anu heaiing. In teims of the ielation between uou's name anu
uou, one iequiies to go fuithei than the concept of a name being a simple piognosis of an
event that occuis in communication. Both meaning in teims of cognition anu the testimony
of one who is auuicteu to the Name shoulu be taken into account, foi, especially in Inuian
tiauitions, language also plays a iole in self-uevelopment anu self-iealization.
To unueistanu the philosophical pioblems of naming uou, I began with a suivey of
theoiies of meaning in both Westein philosophy anu the Inuian Nyya tiauition. The fiist
chaptei lookeu at the semantics of piopei names in geneial. Fiom heie it was concluueu
that theie is no way to bypass human anu societal conventions, habits anu iules that
stiongly ueteimine semantic valiuity, oi not - in the case of meaningless maiks. Language
is a flexible tool foi communication that is molueu accoiuing to the neeus of the inuiviuuals
oi the societies using it anu this shaping is inclusive of the way that woius signify.
Since names of uou aie a special case, the seconu chaptei exploieu Westein
iepiesentational theoiies of language to unueistanu the signification of these non-stanuaiu
names - especially since this signification is not via aibitiaiy oi au-hoc convention.
Consequently, iigiu uesignation anu the communication of meaning in a community of
Beibeit 87
speakeis weie auuiesseu. The chaptei concluueu that "uou," being the most piominent
name of uou in the West, uoes not function as a piopei name but as a common noun
applicable to a single Tianscenuent Being. Similaily, $#/"&!)(+ &)-#$ of uou in Inuian
tiauitions act in the same way. Bowevei, the ueeming of uou's name as a common noun
uoes not fully captuie the Name's essence foi in ieligious tiauitions not only is it accepteu
as having mystical qualities but it is also useu to auuiess uou uiiectly. Noieovei, since the
name of uou has uual piactical-mystical qualities it is a special case that uoes not signify in
a stanuaiu way.
The thiiu chaptei began with the Nyya -#)&.&=9/"-0*#X, which showeu the extent
of the pioblems in iegaiu to uou's name being a piopei name. The chaptei enueu with the
testimony of ieligious piactitioneis who claim to have hau mystical connections with
names of uou via meuitation, etc. Fiom this uual piactical-mystical peispective, a couple of
possible iesolutions to the paiauox emeigeu. Bowevei, moie than one iesolution means
that theie is no single iesolution, which leaves the question of iesolving the paiauox open
to many inteipietations.
The methouology I useu in the final chaptei was to stiengthen the paiauox into an
iiiesolvable contiauiction so as to unueistanu how it coulu be embiaceu insteau of
ienueieu as a non-paiauox. It is my opinion that embiacing the paiauox is the most
satisfying way to unueistanu it anu as a consequence of uoing so the ineffability anu
tianscenuence of uou anu his names aie maintaineu anu iespecteu.


Beibeit 88
X);7)%5$/0.G

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