Framing decisions Practical reasoning and values

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show the relationship between evaluative classifications and practical reasoning, analyzing the various types of definitional criteria we use to judge an action or a state of affairs as good or better. The problem of evaluative classifications leads to another crucial distinction, i.e. the difference between the type of reasoning we use ideally and in ordinary life. When faced with everyday situations, we have hardly time and efforts to spend in a systematic assessment of what is absolutely or relatively good, taking into account all the possible information and scenarios. We usually draw a fast and easy evaluative conclusion based on the most accessible information. We rely on how a state of affairs appears more than how it is, i.e. on how reality and actions are presented and framed. For this reason, investigating the strategies of framing and the types of evaluative reasoning they trigger can help understand the defeasibility of the judgments grounded thereon, and the potential manipulative risk of the strategies of shaping reality.

Practical reasoning can be considered as one of the crucial dimensions of the decisionmaking process. An agent selects the best means to achieve a desired result, which corresponds to a positively evaluated state of affairs that he commits himself to bringing about. This type of reasoning from end to means has been analyzed as a defeasible argumentation scheme in (Walton 1990), a form of argument that is provisionally acceptable under condition of lack of knowledge, but that can be defeated if a stronger argument is advanced or new relevant knowledge is acquired. This pattern of argument can explain the quasi-logical structure of the process of selecting the best action to achieve a goal, but at the same time it opens up some fundamental problems concerning one of its essential aspects, the evaluative steps that it presupposes. Practical reasoning presupposes that a state of affairs is evaluated as desirable, but what desirable means and how is it possible to classify a state of affairs as such? The choice between various courses of action presupposes a classification of one of them as the best one. However, how can we establish what option is the best one? These issues bring to light the ethical and classificatory foundations of this type of reasoning. The logic of selecting the means for an end lies on the complex classification of what is good and what is better, which brings reasoning and decision-making in the field of ethics and turns it into a problem of definition. The purpose of this paper is to show how reasoning from evaluative classification is crucial in practical reasoning, and analyze the structure and the kinds of classification and classificatory criteria. This issue leads to another more practical problem, i.e. the distinction between the ideal process of evaluation and the ordinary one. When faced with everyday situations, we have hardly time and efforts to spend in a systematic assessment of what is absolutely or relatively good, taking into account all the possible information and scenarios. We usually draw a fast and easy evaluative conclusion based on the most accessible information. This difference between the ideal and the real evaluative reasoning can be investigated by distinguishing between a systematic and a heuristic evaluative classification process. In particular, this latter type of reasoning depends on how a state of affairs appears more than how it is, i.e. it relies on how reality and actions are presented and framed. For this reason, framing becomes an instrument for shaping decisions. Different descriptions of an action or entity suggest

distinct evaluations, and guide an agents actions accordingly. Extending or reducing the paradigm of the possible means to achieve a goal affects differently the decisionmaking process. In order to understand how framing affects our decisions, we need to examine first the evaluative classification mechanism that it triggers, i.e. on what is the heuristically simplified notion of good and better. 1. Commitment to actions In order to analyze the decision-making process from a (quasi-)logical point of view it is necessary to understand the structure of a decision-making process, linking a desire to a decision to act accordingly. A clear description of the relationship between desires and decisions is represented by the following diagram (Rigotti 2005, 64):
knows the world

singles out a desire Agent A decides to pursue this goal

a new responding state of affairs

realizing

and activates
Figure 1: The action model

a causal chain

The agent acts based on general desires (to have fun; to have a family, both regarded as good), which are related to specific goals (to go to a party; to get married). In order to achieve such goals, he decides to act accordingly, i.e. he selects the productive or necessary means to realize the wanted state of affairs (he looks for parties, drives to the party, etc.; he finds a girlfriend, proposes to her, etc.). This apparently simple mechanism is actually complex if we examine it from a logical and philosophical point of view. On the one hand, from a logical perspective it is problematic to take desires and intentions into account, i.e. intentional, psychological states. On the other hand, from a philosophical perspective it is necessary to explain the role of the free will in this decision-making process. How is desire related to a goal and a decision? A possible approach to this issue can be found in the notion of commitment, which links the modern inferentialist approach with the medieval ethical theories. According to Brandom, intentions can be understood in terms of commitments to bring about a specific type of action (Brandom 1998b, 129):
The thought is that there are two species of discursive commitment: the cognitive (or doxastic), and the practical. The latter are commitments to act. Acknowledgments of the first sort of commitment correspond to beliefs; acknowledgments of the second sort of commitment correspond to intentions. The first are takings-true, the second makingstrue. Practical commitments are like doxastic commitments in being essentially

inferentially articulated. They stand in inferential relations both among themselves (both means-end and incompatibility) and to doxastic commitments

The idea of treating intentions in terms of commitments (see von Wright 1972: 41) leads to investigating the relationship between the agents will and the different passages constituting the structure of a decision-making process (Searle 2001: 13). In particular, two steps (or as Searle called, two gaps, see Searle 2001: 15) are of fundamental importance: 1) the passage from a desire and the knowledge of a specific object or state of affair to an intention; and 2) the relationship between a specific goal and the means to bring it about. Both passages, which involve the freedom of the will (Searle 2001: 13), can be explained in terms of commitment, or rather as the decision to assent to a specific action. Desire is causally moved by what is good, or what seems to be good or desirable. As Thomas Aquinas put it, the desirable moves desire as its final cause, as the desirable has the nature of an end and every efficient cause acts for the sake of an end and some good (Thomas Aquinas, On Evil. Q. 1., art. 1., 53, 58; see id., Q. 3, art. 3, 152). The good, or the desirable, is an object or a state of affairs that is classified as such (Nicomachean Ethics, 1113a15) correctly or incorrectly, i.e. according or not to reason. However, in order to be considered as an end, i.e. a goal, it needs to be assented to (or acquiesced, see On Evil, Q. 1, Article 3, 71) by the will (On Evil. Q. 3 art. 3, 151):
For we say that the apprehended object moves the will, and we say that one who commends or persuades moves the will in this way, namely, inasmuch as such a one makes something seem good. And the will is moved by something internal, for example, what produces the very act of the will. And the object proposed to the will does not necessarily move the will, although the intellect sometimes necessarily assents to a proposed truth.

The commitment to an end, i.e. an object that is classified as good by the reason , becomes the final end which needs to be brought about by an efficient cause. The commitment to bring about a goal is linked to the possible causes as the latter ones constitute the reasons (prima facie reasons) for acting in a specific way (Brandom 1998a, 244-250). The other crucial passage of practical reasoning is the step from the general intention (commitment to pursue a goal) and the commitment to the inference providing the reasons for acting to a commitment to a specific action (Brandom 1998a, 237; Broome 2001). This specific commitment is an act of will, which Abelard would call the consensus, i.e. the decision to engage in a specific (good or bad) activity, aimed at pursuing a specific (good or bad) goal (Abaelardus, Ethica, 636 A):
It shows us, in short, that in such matters also the will or desire to do that which is not licit is not at all to be called sin, but rather, as we have said, the consent itself. And indeed, we consent to that which is not licit at the point at which we do not at all draw back from doing it, and are inwardly prepared to carry it out if given the opportunity. And anyone who is found in this resolve incurs full guilt, nor does the performance of the deed added to this add anything to increase the sin. Moreover, before God he who strives to accomplish it, and he who actually does accomplish it as far as he has it in him, are equally guiltyjust as if, as the blessed Augustine reminds us, he too had also been caught in the act.

The idea of consensus (or acquiescence), which corresponds to a kind of practical commitment, can explain the passage from a desire to a goal and a decision to act

accordingly. The reasoning involved in the choice of the means to achieve a goal leads to the selection of actions that are necessary or sufficient causes of the wanted effect. In both cases, the agent needs to decide to commit himself to such actions. When they are sufficient means, the agent is simply provided with a reason to commit himself to the action. In case the actions are necessary means, the transfer of commitments from the goal to the action seems to be direct (Brandom 1998a, 237-238). However, as Cicero underscored in his De Inventione (II, 57), practical necessity needs to be understood as a conditional, in which the commitment to the action needs to be evaluated against the commitment to the consequences of a non-action:
For we say in very different senses:--"It is necessary for the people of Casilinum to surrender themselves to Hannibal;" and, "It is necessary that Casilinum should come into the power of Hannibal." In the one case, that is, in the first case, there is this addition to the proposition--"Unless they prefer perishing by hunger." For if they prefer that, then it is not necessary for them to surrender. But in the latter proposition such an addition has no place; because whether the people of Casilinum choose to surrender, or prefer enduring hunger and perishing in that manner, still it is necessary that Casilinum must come into the power of Hannibal. [] when a thing is only necessary provided we wish to avoid or to obtain something, then it will be necessary to state what advantage or what honour is contained in that addition.

An agents commitment to his goal leads to the commitment to the necessary means to achieve it, which needs to be assessed and upheld or discarded by comparing it with possible conflicting commitments (Brandom 1998a, 237-238). This structure of desires, reasoning, and commitments can be quasi-formalized using the argumentation schemes, which can bring to light the types of warrants used in the different steps of decisionmaking. 2. Values and evaluations As noticed above, Thomas Aquinas pointed out how the desirable moves the desire, which is the ground of the voluntary assent to a goal. On this view, the decision-making process is based on what is classified as desirable () or objectionable (), or more desirable or less objectionable. As Aristotle put it, everything aims at the good (Topics III, 1, 116a 18). The decision making process can be described in this perspective as the reasoning at the basis of action, in which an agent is lead to action on the basis of reasons grounded on what he considers desirable. The first and fundamental step of reasoning in decision-making is the classification of an object or a state of affairs as good or desirable, absolutely or relatively. We can formalize this type of reasoning as a kind of classification (Macagno & Walton 2010; Walton & Macagno 2009), represented as follows (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 319):
Argumentation scheme 1: Argument from classification

PREMISE 1: PREMISE 2: CONCLUSION:

If some particular thing a can be classified as falling under verbal category C, then a has property P (in virtue of such a classification). a can be classified as falling under verbal category C. a has property P.

This pattern of inference can describe the process of evaluation and in particular the step leading to an evaluation of a state of affairs as desirable or not. However, the definitional premise that is presupposed by premise 1, which makes the relation between C and P reasonable, needs to be adapted to a predicate, desirable, which is vague, extremely hard to define, and whose definition is contested. The crucial problem is to establish what is good, and how to classify something as good absolutely and relatively. In the Aristotelian tradition, the idea of good is related to function. In this sense, an entity can be classified as such if it fulfils its function well (see Vendler 1964). However, this type of definition is hard to apply to everyday reasoning, and is hard to use in specific instances. In order to classify something as good or not, other types of definitional statements can be more useful. For instance, Aristotle provides in the Rhetoric and in the Topics a set of topics setting out operational definitions of what is good or desirable, such as the following ones (Rhetoric I, 7):
We may define a good thing as that which ought to be chosen for its own sake; or as that for the sake of which we choose something else; or as that which is sought after by all things, or by all things that have sensation or reason, or which will be sought after by any things that acquire reason; or as that which must be prescribed for a given individual by reason generally, or is prescribed for him by his individual reason, this being his individual good;

This type of definitions also applies to the classification of what is better, i.e. what is desirable relatively to a certain situation (Topics 116a 28-34):
That which is desired for itself is more desirable than that which is desired for something else; e.g. health is more desirable than gymnastics: for the former is desired for itself, the latter for something else. Also, that which is desirable in itself is more desirable than what is desirable per accidens; e.g. justice in our friends than justice in our enemies: for the former is desirable in itself, the latter per accidens: for we desire that our enemies should be just per accidens, in order that they may do us no harm.

Aristotle provides other definitional criteria in the Topics and the Rhetoric. In particular, he provides definitions by listing the various species of what is good, i.e. by enumerating its essential parts. For instance, the following topics include different types of good states of affairs, objects, or dispositions (Rhetoric, 1362b 2-18):
The virtues, too, must be something good; for it is by possessing these that we are in a good condition, and they tend to produce good works and good actions. They must be severally named and described elsewhere. Pleasure, again, must be a good thing, since it is the nature of all animals to aim at it. Consequently both pleasant and beautiful things must be good things, since the former are productive of pleasure, while of the beautiful things some are pleasant and some desirable in and for themselves. The following is a

more detailed list of things that must be good. Happiness, as being desirable in itself and sufficient by itself, and as being that for whose sake we choose many other things. Also justice, courage, temperance, magnanimity, magnificence, and all such qualities, as being excellences of the soul. Further, health, beauty, and the like, as being bodily excellences and productive of many other good things: for instance, health is productive both of pleasure and of life, and therefore is thought the greatest of goods, since these two things which it causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things most highly prized by ordinary people.

The various species of good, i.e. what is to be chosen for its own sake, can be considered as specific reasons for acting, i.e. values. However, the abstract species hardly provide useful criteria for evaluating entities or states of affairs immediately. More heuristic and immediate definitions need to be provided, which list the various instances of what can produce what is good. Such heuristic criteria of classification set out possible things that are good relatively, i.e. when they are considered as instruments for achieving what is desirable in itself. Such relative values, however, when are considered as absolutely become subject to personal choices, i.e. they are organized in hierarchies (Nicomachean Ethics 1095a 18-27). For someone culture is the ultimate good; for others it is not desirable in itself, as only money matters. Therefore, these heuristic criteria for classifying the principles of action need to be applied to mens dispositions, characters and hierarchies of values:
Further, a man of a given disposition makes chiefly for the corresponding things: lovers of victory make for victory, lovers of honour for honour, money-loving men for money, and so with the rest. These, then, are the sources from which we must derive our means of persuasion about Good and Utility. (Rhetoric 1363b 1-5) In the same way also it is in certain places honourable to sacrifice one's father, e.g. among the Triballi, whereas, absolutely, it is not honourable. Or possibly this may indicate a relativity not to places but to persons: for it is all the same wherever they may be: for everywhere it will be held honourable among the Triballi themselves, just because they are Triballi. Again, at certain times it is a good thing to take medicines, e.g. when one is ill, but it is not so absolutely (Topics 115b 19-27).

These heuristic and specific relative criteria for classifying what is good play a crucial part in the decision-making process and the description, or framing, of a situation in order to elicit a specific action. Depending on the way a situation or an entity is described, it can be classified as desirable in relation to certain relative values, which it instantiates. The importance of the value judgment for the decision-making process depends on the further steps of reasoning, linking the assessment to the commitment to a goal and to the means to achieve the latter. 3. Values and commitments The classification of an entity or a state of affairs as desirable or not does not correspond to the decision, or rather commitment, to obtain it or not, or to bring it about or not. A dangerous person or situation can be negatively judged as not desirable, but a subsequent step is needed to link a judgment with a commitment, or a potential disposition, i.e. with the decision to make the avoidance of such a person or situation an agents goal. The type of reasoning providing this passage describes the voluntary assent to a goal based on a value judgment is called argument from values and can be represented as follows (Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008, 321; see also see Bench-Capon 2003a; 2003b):

Argumentation scheme 2: Argument from Values

PREMISE 1:

The state of affairs x is positive/negative as judged by agent A according to Value V (value judgment). The fact that x is positive/negative affects the interpretation and therefore the evaluation of goal G of agent A (If x is good, it supports commitment to goal G). The evaluation of x according to value V is a reason for retaining/retracting commitment to goal G.

PREMISE 2:

CONCLUSION:

The reasoning from classification mentioned in the section above describes the mechanism that is implicit in the first premise of this type of argument. The evaluation of a state of affairs, made based on values, leads to the evaluation of a goal, i.e. a situation, related with the agent, which can be brought about by him. For instance, since traffic jam is unpleasant (time consuming), it is bad for the agent. This evaluation leads to the individuation of the related goal, i.e. the agent commits himself to avoiding the traffic jam. Similarly, if a person is described as untrustworthy, he is consequently classified as bad or undesirable based on the value of trust (or other reasons such as negative consequences). This evaluation leads to the specific goal of avoiding certain types of relationships with this person (such as friendship or other relations based on trust). This type of argument describes a reasoning step and an act of free will. A generic evaluation concerning an entity or a state of affairs is specified by relating it to the agent. In this fashion, a bad (or good) situation becomes a situation that can be bad (or good) for the agent; a bad (or good) person (or object) becomes a person (or object) that can be bad (or good) for the agent. The evaluation is projected onto a future state of affairs that represents a possible instantiation of it concerning the interests of the agent. This specific projection becomes a goal when the agent commits himself to bringing it about or avoiding it. In order for a goal to become a decision to act accordingly, another reasoning step is required. The goal needs to be related to the means to bring it about, i.e. the possible efficient causes need to be found. However, this is not sufficient. The agent needs to assess them considering them as actions, i.e. evaluating them as good or the best actions. 4. From goals to actions The reasoning from goals to actions is the basis for the assent, or commitment, to a specific action, i.e. the decision to act. It can be thought of as a pattern of reasoning connecting a desired goal, or commitment to bringing about a state of affairs (von Wright 1972: 41), with the means to achieve it (Anscombe 1998, 11). This reasoning provides a reason for acting, which becomes a decision when the agent assents to it. Von Wright (1963b, 161; 1963a, Ch. VIII) distinguished between two distinct types of reasoning that can be used to reason about actions: reasoning from goal to means, and reasoning from a consequence to its causes. The first type of reasoning proceeds from a commitment to bring about a specific state of affairs, and specifies means that are necessary for or productive of to the desired situation. The generic pattern of reasoning can be represented as follows:

Argumentation scheme 3: Practical reasoning

Premise Evaluation Conclusion

I (an agent) have a goal G. Carrying out this action A is a means to realize G. Therefore A should (not) be brought about.

This scheme needs to be further specified by taking into account the distinction between the necessary and productive means. In the first case, the reasoning can be represented as follows (adapted from Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008, 94-95):
Argumentation scheme 3a: Practical reasoning necessary condition

Goal premise

My goal is to bring about G.

I reasonably consider on the given information that bringing Alternative premise about at least one of [B0, B1, , Bn] is necessary to bring about G. I have selected one member Bi as an acceptable, or the most Selection premise acceptable necessary condition for G. Nothing unchangeable prevents me from bringing about Bi as Practicality premise far as I know. Bringing about G is more acceptable to me than not bringing Side-effect premise about Bi. Conclusion Therefore I should bring about Bi.

In this scheme, the agent needs to act in a specific fashion (according to the possible alternatives) if he wants the state of affairs to occur. Unless he acts according one of the possible alternatives, the desired state of affairs will not be brought about. We can simplify the scheme by reducing the alternatives to the one possible necessary means. A different type of reasoning is the sufficient scheme (adapted from Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008, 96):
Argumentation scheme 3b: Practical reasoning sufficient condition

Goal premise Alternative premise Selection premise

My goal is to bring about G. I reasonably consider on the given information that each one of [B0, B1, , Bn] is sufficient to bring about G.

I have selected one member Bi as an acceptable, or the most acceptable sufficient condition for G. Nothing unchangeable prevents me from bringing about Bi as Practicality premise far as I know. Bringing about G is more acceptable to me than not bringing Side-effect premise about Bi. Conclusion Therefore I should bring about Bi.

In this latter scheme it is not possible to reduce the possible alternatives to one means. The paradigm of the possible efficient causes of the desired state of affairs remains open. For this reason, the two patterns have different criteria of evaluation. In the necessary condition scheme, the agent needs to assess whether acting is more desirable than non-acting, i.e. whether the quality of the action is better than the quality of the situation characterized by not bringing about the desired state of affairs. In this sense, the choice of non-acting needs to be considered as an omission, i.e. a kind of action consisting in the the intrinsic voluntary decision not to bring about the sufficient (or necessary) cause of the occurrence of a specific consequence at a later time (von Wright 1963a, 130; Aqvist 1974; Chisholm 1976; Walton 1980, 317). In both cases, it depends on the agent whether a certain state of affairs (resulting from the action or the nonaction) will occur. However, in the necessary scheme, the agent needs to evaluate the quality of an action in comparison with the quality of its omission. In the sufficient scheme, the agent needs to assess whether the action is good or not without comparing it with the quality of its omission. This type of distinction can be shown by taking into account an application of this type of reasoning (Foot 1967, 9):
A party of potholers has imprudently allowed the fat man to lead them as they make their way out of the cave, and he gets stuck, trapping the others behind him. Obviously the right thing to do is to sit down and wait until the fat man grows thin; but philosophers have arranged that flood waters should be rising within the cave. Luckily (luckily?) the trapped party have with them a stick of dynamite with which they can blast the fat man out of the mouth of the cave. Either they use the dynamite or they drown.

In this case, the killing of a person is the necessary condition for the survival of several others. The reasoning needs to take into account the evaluation of an action compared with the evaluation of its omission. The decision of killing a man needs to be compared with another decision, i.e. to let many people die. However, in a scenario in which it is possible that the miners survive in the cave, or that they can find a way out in time, the decision to act in this way needs to be assessed in itself, and not as an alternative to the contrary choice. These distinct types of evaluation need to be analyzed together with a third one, which is involved in both patterns. In both schemes, the agent can or needs to choose between alternatives, and select the best possible action.

These three types of evaluation, i.e. the evaluation of an action in itself, in comparison with its omission, and in comparison with its possible alternatives, lead to the problem of how to assess an action. Von Wright underscored how in the evaluation of an act, the assessment of the intentions underlying it are not enough (Von Wright 1963a, 129, 130):
If the intention in acting is morally good but the good, which is for its own sake intended, fails to materialize--either because the intention fails in regard to its factual or in regard to its axiological object--then the act is not morally good (but morally neutral). If, on the other hand, the intended good materializes, then the act too may be called morally good. Similarly, if the intention in acting is morally bad but the harm, which is foreseen, does not come about, then the act is not morally bad (but morally neutral). If, on the other hand, the foreseen harm comes about, then the act too is morally bad. It is a noteworthy asymmetry between moral goodness and moral badness that the first presupposes that some good should be intended and, moreover, intended for its own sake, whereas the second only requires that some bad should be foreseen to follow from the act.

An action (or an omission) needs to be evaluated by taking into account its foreseeable consequences (the wanted effect and the side-effects). However, its intended effect needs to be compared with all its possible negative consequences, which, even if unintended, determine whether the act is good or not. The unavoidable harm (or negative consequences) needs to be compared and minimized; the avoidable harm needs to be simply avoided (von Wright 1963a, 131). According to this criterion, the agent in the necessary scheme needs to assess the possible good and harm resulting from performing and forbearing an act, while in the sufficient scheme he needs to consider only the intended and foreseeable consequences of the act. Finally, the choice between the possible means to bring about a desired state of affairs needs to be made considering the possible harm resulting from each option, and the good and negative consequences resulting from the choice of the ones that minimize the harm. This type of evaluation corresponds to a pattern of reasoning linking actions and goals different from the practical reasoning. It proceeds from an action to its effect, evaluating it as the necessary or productive cause of a desirable or undesirable state of affairs. We can represent this type of reasoning as the argument from consequences (from Walton, Reed & Macagno 2008: 332):
Argumentation scheme 4: Argument from consequences

Premise Evaluation Conclusion

If action Q is brought about, good (bad) consequences will plausibly occur. Good (bad) consequences are (not) desirable (should (not) occur). Therefore Q should (not) be brought about.

For instance, the choice of blasting the man blocking the exit from the cave (in a scenario without raising water) can be evaluated in comparison with other possible options (waiting until help comes, finding another exit, etc.). Each one of them has a more or less positive outcome, and more or less positive consequences. However, the choice of blasting the man has the consequence that it harms another human being,

while not performing this action results in no harm for anyone. For this reason, it needs to be excluded (reasoning from negative consequences). On the contrary, in a waterraising scenario, the choice of blasting the man needs to be assessed relative to the choice of letting many people die. In this case, the positive consequence of saving many peoples life (intentional effect of the action) needs to be balanced against the negative consequence of killing a man (unintentional but foreseen and necessary consequence of the action) (Foot 1967, 5). In everyday reasoning, other types of choices are more frequent than the one of blasting people to exit a cave. More frequently, ordinary moral dilemma concern choices of actions whose classification is blurred (Ariely 2009, 196), or whose assessment is difficult because of lack of sufficient information. Is cheating insurance companies by filing higher insurance claims a fraud? Is cheating on tax return stealing? In these cases, the assessment concern an action whose classification is commonly considered as controversial (a smart act or a little deceit to an abstract entity such as the state), and for this reason it is regarded as a means that can do directly little or no harm on other people, but whose positive direct and intended consequences are extremely positive (money gained or saved). If stealing and committing frauds is less common, much more frequent is making a decision based on what is the better product. How to assess goods for whose assessment we lack the sufficient information or knowledge? Depending on our criteria of evaluation, we consider a good product a cheap one, or a high-quality one. However, how to determine the value of a good whose manufacturing process is unknown or difficult to understand and assess? In such cases, the qualitatively better becomes the more expensive (Ariely 2009, 180-184). The blurred classification is also crucial when the assessment of an action is focused on the positive consequences of its side-effects. Is saving money avoiding waste or buying an unneeded product for less? All these issues of classification and definition show how the decisionmaking process is guided and determined by the way we define the components of an action. The other side of the coin is that our decisions can be guided and conditioned by the way the possible options and actions are framed. 5. Heuristic value judgments The schemes mentioned above represent the complex pattern of reasoning that leads from a desire to an evaluation, from an evaluation to a goal, and from a commitment to a goal to a reason to act, i.e. a reason to commit to perform a certain action. What is crucial in this process is the evaluation. The agent needs to assess a state of affairs as desirable or not through more or less complex types of definitions, and then, once he is committed to a goal, he needs to assess the possible actions he can perform to bring it about, and whether it is better to act or not to act. The definition of a good action is the ground for this latter type of classification, which presupposes the assessment of the possible consequences. These evaluative steps are often complex, subject to potential controversies and, therefore, time and effort consuming. Moreover, they often require additional information in order to establish whether the entity, the action or the state of affairs can or cannot fall within the evaluative judgment. This model is ideal, as it depicts how the reasoning can be explained based on the rational steps needed to provide reasons for a decision. And ideal rationality is often quite different from reality. We do not always have time and patience enough to go through all the steps of reasoning to decide on every issue. We rely on patterns of reasoning that are more effective, i.e. that allow us to come to a fast conclusion (Chen & Chaiken 1999). This difference between ideal reasonableness and effectiveness in decision making can be

understood by taking into account the distinction between systematic (or central) and heuristic (or peripheral) reasoning, and between systematic and heuristic patterns of classification. 5.1. Heuristic classifications Aristotle pointed out that the desirable is not only what is sought for its own sake, but also what appears to be good, i.e. what is perceived as such. Moreover, as mentioned above, there are various ways of classifying something as desirable or not. Sometimes we simply use more defeasible types of classification (Walton &Macagno 2010). Instead of analyzing whether a state of affairs is desirable per se or is productive of something desirable in itself, we can simply rely on what is usually, or often productive of happiness. This latter type of definition by examples, or inductive definition, is clearly more defeasible, as the examples are not exhaustive, and the case may not fit the example (Macagno & Walton 2014: 100). For instance, if goodness is defined using the examples of its possible productive causes, such as money, beauty, etc., such qualities and possessions are good only inasmuch as they are often productive of happiness. A classification of a state of affairs as good based on such definitional criteria risks leading to considering a relative good as an absolute one. Moreover, providing instances of a category leads to other potentially weak forms of reasoning. An example such as a prototypical case can be used to guide classifications of entities that do not correspond to the prototype, but are similar to it. In this case, the central and highly abstract reasoning by classification is replaced by a faster one, more accessible, based on what is or appears similar to an easily accessible model. The heuristic definitions of good can account for the distinction between what is good and what appears to be so. It can also explain why the reasoning based on them is faster and easier. Heuristic, or peripheral reasoning, can be described as a fast type of reasoning based on easily accessible information, namely mental contents that immediately come to mind (Kahneman 2003, 699; 706), and aimed at providing the most immediate conclusion, without considering possible alternatives or its defeasibility. Such accessible contents, constituted by prototypes, stereotypes (namely generalizations accessible because of their emotional valence) or changes affecting ones emotions, spare the individual the effort of acquiring and evaluating information, and are used to trigger a heuristic judgment (Kahneman 2003, 716). Instead of acquiring and processing information and drawing a conclusion based on the abstraction of the properties characterizing the classification, the agent can simply reason relying on the similarity of an object with a prototype, which result in similar judgment on the entity to be assessed (Kahneman 2003; Clore & Gasper 2000, 26; Petty et al. 2004, 86). Instead of evaluating a state of affairs (or an action) based on its desirability relative to the agents goals (or the possible negative foreseeable consequences), which would result in great effort, a person may resort to a much less complex judgment, grounded on a heuristic attribute that comes more readily to mind (Kahneman 2003, 699, 707). Heuristics is of fundamental importance when we have not the information and the knowledge needed for the correct evaluation of a product or a state of affairs, or we do not want to spend effort and time on the task of acquiring the needed information. How can we choose between two different drugs, if we do not have any medical knowledge? How can we judge whether an unknown product is precious or not (Ariely 2009, Ch. 2)? In such cases, we rely on what is most accessible (Kahneman 2003, 699), i.e. the possible sign of effectiveness and preciousness, the price. Similarly, in a situation in which we do not have much time for deciding (a special deal ending soon

for the purchase of a product), we make our decision establishing the goodness of the good not based on the analysis of our present and future actual needs (saving defined as avoidance of waste), but on the much more accessible equations higher price = higher quality and discount = saving. In conditions of lack of adequate information we act on the basis of any possible accessible information that can guide our judgment, such as possible signs or similarities, even if not directly related to the judgment (Tversky & Kahneman 1982, 14). 5.2. Heuristic classifications and systematic evaluations The distinction between heuristic and systematic classifications can shed light on the mechanisms involved in some apparent irrational judgments, which underscore the high defeasibility of the fast routes used in decision-making. A clear example is given in the following case (Ariely 2009, 19-20):
<The first errand you need to run is> to buy a new pen, and the second is to buy a suit for work. At an office supply store, you find a nice pen for $25. You are set to buy it, when you remember that the same pen is on sale for $18 at another store 15 minutes away. What would you do? Do you decide to take the 15-minute trip to save the $7? Most people faced with this dilemma say that they would take the trip to save the $7. [] You find a luxurious gray pinstripe suit for $455 and decide to buy it, but then another customer whispers in your ear that the exact same suit is on sale for only $448 at another store, just 15 minutes away. Do you make this second 15-minute trip? In this case, most people say that they would not.

The two situations involve the same saving (7$) and the same effort (a 15 minute trip). However, the evaluation of the same state of affairs is radically different in the two distinct situations. In both cases, the criterion used for the evaluation is not the ratio cost/benefit, i.e. saving money vs. wasting time. Instead, a much more accessible criterion is used, i.e. the ratio between cost and time effectiveness. If the difference in cost is higher, the saving will be bigger. We can represent the evaluation criteria in fig. 2 below:

Better as being cheaper/closer

Better=Cheaper B is much better than A

Better as a costs/benefits ratio

Better = Less time A is better than B

Shop A: 28% More expensive Closer Shop B: 39% cheaper Farther

Purchase pen X (15$) in shop A Purchase pen X (10$) in shop B

Choice: B

Good: Avoiding waste Shop A: 7$ More expensive Closer Shop B: 7$ cheaper Farther Purchase suit X (455$) / pen X (25$) in shop A Purchase jacket X (448$) / book X (18$) in shop B

Better=Cheaper B is only a bit better than A

Good: Time efficient

A=B

Better = Less time A is better than B

Shop A: 1,5% More expensive Closer Shop B: 1,6% cheaper Farther

Purchase suit X (455$) in shop A Purchase suit X (448$) in shop B

Choice: A

Figure 2: Heuristic and systematic evaluative classifications

This figure shows how the heuristic and the systematic types of reasoning can lead to different evaluations. The heuristic criterion of evaluation is more accessible than the systematic one. A cost/benefit ratio would require calculating the absolute difference between the products, and see whether the saving is worth the time wasted relative to the agents goals. On the contrary, a relative difference does not need to be calculated, as it appears immediately as bigger or smaller, and provides an absolute criterion (bigger relative saving equals greater good) independent of any other consideration. For this reason, big saving (defined as a saving relative to the comparison) is always extremely good, while a small one is a much a lesser good. This criterion of evaluation is highly defeasible, as it is based on a criterion of classification that can be defeated by several stronger definitional criteria of what is good. 5.3. Triggering heuristic classifications The heuristic dimension of our reasoning opens up the possibility of triggering the fast and easy way to assessing a complex situation by providing only the most accessible information. These strategies are often grounded on emotional appeals, i.e. descriptions that, by depicting a state of affairs similar to the audiences potential experiences and constituting the cognitive component of an emotion (Elster 1999, 56; Pugmire 2005, 16; Keltner & Lerner 2010, 324), can trigger an emotional response. Emotions can be considered as instrument for activating heuristic reasoning, as our thinking is driven by emotional urge. As Clore and Gasper (2000: 30) put it,
Once an emotion is experienced, the system no longer operates as a scientist, carefully weighing the pros and cons of the belief implied by the emotion. Instead, the emotional person acts like a prosecutor or a defense lawyer seeking by any means to find evidence for the belief. Presumably, the experiential aspect of the emotion is itself responsible for

this process of interrupting the flow, providing information, and, through associated beliefs, guiding attention.

Emotions provide us with extremely accessible information (Frijda & Mesquita 2000, 67) and lead us to make a decision not grounded on a sufficient assessment of the information available (Keltner & Lerner 2010, 331). This mechanism of emotions and heuristic reasoning can be used for guiding and manipulating judgments and choices. A complex state of affairs such as a war can be presented and depicted only through highly accessible and emotional descriptions, productive of a stereotypically extremely good consequence. Thus, a war can become a fight for freedom, or a battle for saving childrens lives. The choice of how we depict a situation becomes an instrument for guiding and influencing our choices, depending on whether the description is aimed at representing or distorting the actual state of affairs. This fundamental relationship between classification and choice leads us to taking into account the reasoning mechanisms underlying such apparently irrational inferences, and the ways to drive them. 6. Framing choices The strategy of describing or distorting a situation by pointing out some aspects that can guide or trigger an evaluative conclusion is commonly addressed under the label of framing. Framing can be considered as a goal-directed description aimed at making specific features of a complex state of affairs more accessible (Entman 1993, 52):
Framing essentially involves selection and salience. To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described.

A piece of information is made accessible and meaningful, i.e. salient (Entman 1993, 53), to the audience, so that the interlocutors rely mostly or only on it in assessing the state of affairs (see Lakoff 2010; Heink and Jaz 2014). Some of its characteristics that can support the desired evaluation are amplified or stressed, while others eliciting unwanted judgments are omitted. For instance, the same event of cutting down a tree can be differently framed according to the purpose of the speaker (Schiappa 2003, 152):
1. A cylindrical organic object is being rotated from a vertical to a horizontal position. 2. A tree is being murdered. 3. A mean old man is cutting down that nice shady tree.

The state of affair is the same in every description, but different judgments are encouraged by choosing not to specify the action and the entities involved in it (case 1), introducing inexistent properties by means of metaphors (case 2), or irrelevant and doubtful qualities leading to a value-judgment (case 3). Framing provides an appearance of reality, and like all appearances, it can mirror it or conceal and distort it, by excluding essential information and providing other details irrelevant for making a grounded decision (Petty et al. 2005: 108). The process of framing is directly related with the aforementioned criteria for evaluating reality, i.e. classifying a state of affairs as desirable or not. However, the passage between underscoring certain properties and triggering the correspondent judgment is not immediate. As mentioned above, this step is based on reasoning from classification, i.e. systematic or heuristic argument

proceeding from definitions or classification criteria. Depending on how a choice is framed, i.e. how it is described, the heuristic value judgment can be affected and guided. A famous example of the effect of framing on decision-making is the following description of the possible options for dealing with a deathly disease. The first set of options is described according to its positive consequences, while the second one, identical to the first one, according to the negative outcomes (Kahneman 2003, 702
Assume that the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved. Which one of the two programs would you favor? [] If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die. If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die.

When confronted with the first paradigm of options, the majority of respondents chose Program A, while in the second scenario they chose Program B, even though it was exactly identical to Program B. The difference lies in the criteria of classification (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein 1988, 157-158). In the first case, what is better is decided according to the option that leads to the positive consequences, and certainty of saving people is a better consequence than the risk of saving no one. In the second one, the framing changed the criteria. What is better is established based on the negative consequences, and what leads to a certain negative consequence is worse than an option leaving the possibility of avoiding deaths at all. Framing does not involve only the representation of a situation or an action. It is also possible to guide the evaluation process by simply modifying the possible alternative means to achieve a goal, i.e. the paradigm. By solely altering the number or the type of options, without changing their description, the agents decision can be driven towards a particular option. The principle underlying framing paradigms is that people have difficulties settling on a single selection when there are too many choice options (Kimmel 2013, 112). Choosing what is better among goods that can be assessed by taking into account several criteria is a complex operation, and for this reason this effort is often avoided by not choosing at all (Kimmel 2013, 110-113). Judging which city is better for a weekend among the European capitals, or what jam is better among a selection of 24 choices is much more difficult than choosing between two options that can be compared using the same criterion (for instance, price). A solution for facilitating the choice is to construct a paradigm of options that provides the agent with highly accessible criteria of classification. The agent is confronted with a set of options that already suggests a value judgment, so that he is guided in his decision by a heuristic classification. A famous example is the one illustrated in the advertisement below (fig. 3), in which the agent is confronted with a paradigm of three options, of which the second one is apparently unreasonable (it offers for the same price of the third option a service less) (Ariely 2009, 1):

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Figure 3: Framing paradigms of choice

Clearly, the agent chose either option 1 or option 3, with a large majority (84%) opting for the last one. The second option, apparently useless, was inserted in order to frame the paradigm and trigger a heuristic classification. As a matter of fact, without such an option, the majority of the agents (68%) chose the first option, which was cheaper. The apparently useless option provided a criterion for evaluating the possible actions based on a unique criterion, the services provided, without taking into account the other different criterion, price. Instead of evaluating the options comparing two distinct values (or attributes), the agent is led to make a decision by using only one of them, which is much easier. In this sense, the modification of the paradigm of choices affects the paradigm of evaluation: instead of taking into account a ratio between two incomparable values (Keeney 1988), the agent establishes what is better based only on the most accessible criterion, the one providing a hierarchy already. We can represent this modification of the classification in figure 4 below (adapted from Ariely 2009, 9):

A
Attribute 1 Attribute 1

A -A B

Attribute 2

Attribute 2

Figure 4: Framing the paradigms of evaluation

The second option provides a hierarchy between option 3 and option 2 based only on one value, number of services. The comparison between the first and the third option is avoided, as more complex and involving an analysis of the agents needs and goals. Conclusion The decision-making process can be described as a combination of reasoning and free will, in which the agent rationally selects what is desirable for him and the best means to achieve it, but then needs to assent to such a goal and such an action to bring the goal about. Argumentation theory can contribute to the debate on actions and decisions by describing the mechanisms involved in the choice, both of the goal and the means therefor. By formalizing the steps of reasoning using argumentation schemes, it is possible to understand the crucial role played by the reasoning from classification. An agent needs first to determine whether a certain state of affairs is desirable or not, in order to commit himself to bring it about. He then needs to assess the possible means to achieve such a goal, and choose the best one. In this complex process, reasoning from classification plays a fundamental role. Both the aforementioned reasoning steps presuppose a classification of a state of affairs or an action as desirable (or rather good), or more desirable (or better). These classifications can be based on a systematic type of classification, grounded on abstract definitional criteria of desirable, resulting in a complex analysis of the available information and a comparison between different principles of classification. Or such evaluations can be made by relying on heuristic processes, proceeding from more accessible definitional criteria for establishing what is good. In this latter case, the agent can reach an easy and fast conclusion, which is, however, more defeasible. The heuristic classifications depend on how a state of affairs is represented, i.e. which dimensions and aspects are made more available to the agent. These classificatory processes can be also guided by framing strategies, i.e. the representation of a complex state of affairs through a deliberate selection of specific aspects of it, aimed at triggering an immediate evaluation. Also the paradigms of the possible choices or courses of actions can be framed. In this case, the number of options can be limited and their evaluation guided or manipulated by reducing criteria of evaluative classification to the one made more accessible to the agent. The strategies of framing affect the evaluative classification by simplifying the classification of a goal or an action as desirable or more desirable, reducing the classification criteria to only one or few ones. The complexity of comparing values and hierarchies of values is avoided, but the risk of jumping to a hasty conclusion and becoming subject to easy manipulations becomes extremely high. References Abaelardus, Petrus. 1885. Opera Omnia (accurante J.P. Migne). Patrologia Latina 178. Paris: Garnier-Migne. Aqvist, Lennart. 1974. A new approach to the logical theory of actions and causality. In Logical Theory and Semantics, ed. Soren Stenlund, 73-91. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Ariely, Dan. 2009. Predictably irrational. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. Aristotle 1995. Rhetorica. Translated by William Rhys Roberts. In The works of Aristotle vol. II, ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Aristotle. 1995. Nicomachean Ethics. In The complete works of Aristotle, vol. II, ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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