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Executive Summary2 I. INTRODUCTION..5 A. B. C. D. E. Note about Methodology..5 Background6 Major IDP Populations.7 General Findings.12 Trends.13
II. Numbers Summary17 Annexes...22 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Displacement in the Southern Region.24 Displacement in the Western Region..29 Displacement in the Central Region...35 Displacement in the Eastern Region...38 Displacement in the Southeastern Region..43 Displacement in the Northern and Northeastern Regions47 Displacement in the Central Highlands..51
Executive Summary
This report was prepared by UNHCR, under the auspices of the National IDP Task Force and in close cooperation with the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR), which endorsed the report on 10 November 2008. The data is valid as of August 2008. The profiling was undertaken pursuant to a recommendation of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons following his visit to Afghanistan in August 2007. The purpose of the profiling was: (1) to know how many people were internally displaced (2) to know where they were displaced; (3) to know why they were displaced ; (4) to better understand their assistance and protection needs; (5) to better understand displacement trends, so as to assist the government to develop a comprehensive and integrated national IDP strategy; (6) to assist the humanitarian community to respond more effectively to IDP assistance and protection needs. In preparing the profile, no attempt was made to do any census or re-registriation of IDPs. Instead, the report pulls together the different surveys that have been done in different regions of the country, particularly by UNHCR offices in the field, by provincial Departments of Refugees and Repatriation (DoRRs) of the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR), and by UNAMA. Often, numbers are estimates rather than firm figures. What the profiling makes clear is that Afghanistan is highly complex with different displacements having occurred at different times, in different parts of the country and for different reasons. Thus, finding durable solutions will be neither easy nor quick. The profiling identified 235,833 IDPs nationwide. The bulk of this population is comprised of a protracted caseload of 166,153 individuals displaced as a result of conflict in the period prior to and after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, or as a result of drought of the 1990s which impacted severely on Kuchi (nomads) in the north, the west and the south. These IDPs are largely living in camp-like settlements in the south (119,958), the west (29,690) and the southeast (12,341). In addition, there are 52,422 returnees from Pakistan since 2005 (21,102 in the period 2005-2007 and 31,320 in 2008) who became IDPs upon their return to Afghanistan, because they are unable to return to their places of origin for security reasons, landlessness, or lack of basic services or work opportunities. These have largely settled in spontaneous camps in the Eastern Region. The statistics also include new conflictaffected families (9,901 individuals) -- people displaced since 2002 as a result of conflict (between tribal or ethnic groups, often exacerbated by disputes over land and
property or access to scarce resources such as pasture or water), insecurity and human rights violations. What the above statistics do not capture are two additional groups. First, those called battle-affected individuals/families who have been impacted by fighting between the international forces/Afghan National Army and anti-government elements. These number in the thousands displaced in 2007 and 2008, but definitive numbers are difficult to determine because most are short-term IDPs who return to their homes after the fighting ends, and because insecurity in the "war zones" makes access and verification almost impossible. The other major group are the persons forced into displacement by the severity of the continuing drought, coupled with the high cost of food. As displacement in this case is a traditional coping mechanism, whereby families leave their villages, or send the men to the cities or the neighbouring countries to work, it is hard to differentiate between displacement and economic migration. Certain trends emerge as we look to the future and the type of contingency planning that is required to address likely IDP scenarios: an increase in battle-affected displacement if the fighting continues and the security situation deteriorates further; an increase in displacement if the drought continues and the economic situation does not improve; an increase in secondary displacement by returnees if their return is not sustainable in their places of origin; an increase in IDP populations as a result of conflict over land and resources unless the issue of land and property is adequately addressed Lastly, the profile suggests the need to focus on local integration as a durable solution for the protracted caseload unable to return to their places of origin.
I. INTRODUCTION internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to free or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 19881
A. Note about Methodology This report was prepared by UNHCR, under the auspices of the National IDP Task Force and in close cooperation with the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR), which co-Chairs the National IDP Task Force together with UNHCR. All UNHCRs Sub-Offices and Field Offices in Afghanistan, the two Regional IDP Task Forces (one in Hirat for the West and one in Kandahar for the South), as well as all participants of the National and Regional Task Forces (which include other UN agencies, international and national NGOs, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, and interested government/donor agencies) were asked to contribute to and/or to review the document. The document was then formally adopted by the National IDP Task Force at its meeting on 10 November 2008. (The numbers are, however, valid as of end August 2008.) As noted below, the preparation of the report was a direct response to a recommendation of the Representative of the Secretary General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons following his visit to Afghanistan in August 2007. In preparing this National Profile of Internal Displacement across Afghanistan, it was not possible and no attempt was made to do any census or registration of all IDPs in the country. The last major data collection on IDPs took place in 2004, when a very detailed profiling of the IDPs camp population in the camps/settlements of the Southern Region was conducted by UNHCR. For several years thereafter, the size of the population of the camps/settlements in the South was calculated by subtracting those who UNHCR assisted to return from the total recorded in 2004. Since then, there have been a number of surveys in different regions of the country. These, however, have been performed by different actors, at different times, using different methodologies. For example, in the Western Region, in one day on 19 February 2008 the Department of Refugees and Repatriation (DoRR) Herat, with assistance from the Deputy Governor and under instruction of the Minister of MoRR (who was then visiting the Western region), mobilized some 300 government and other staff from the departments of Education (DoE), Rural Development (DRRD), Disaster Preparedness (DDP) and Refugees and Rehabilitation (DoRR) and from the Afghan Red Cresent Society (ARCS) and did an
The UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, drafted between 1992 and 1998 when they were endorsed as a framework by the Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), does not specifically mention displacement as a result of natural disaster. Subsequently, in the context of the tsunamis, hurricainse and equakes which hit parts of Asia and the Americas in 2004/5, the IASC supported the development of Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disaster (June 2006) which in effect extend the Guiding Principles to victims of natural disasters.
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unannounced simultaneous blitz survey in the three IDP settlements in Hirat Maslakh, Shaodayee and Minarets. The purpose was to see how many families and individuals were living in the three camps. Subsequently, quite a detailed profiling was done of Minarets, one of the three camps, with the involvement of both DoRR and UNHCR. In the South, in May-June 2008, DoRR did a re-registration of the IDPs in Zhare Dasht, Maywand and Punjway to confirm which of the families who had been profiled in 2004 were still in the settlements, but only registering new births, not families who had not been registered earlier. Simultaneously, UNHCRs sub-Office was conducting a detailed profiling of a small sample of the settlement population to find out what their intentions were regarding return and what their needs were in displacement. Because of security concerns, no similar re-counting or profiling was done in Mukhtar IDP settlement in Hilmand. In the Northern Region, UNHCRs Sub-Office has very detailed information on all IDPs from the protracted case load. This is not the case in the Southeast Region because of insecurity or in the Central Region, because so many IDPs are invisible within informal urban settlements. One notable inconsistency in the statistics we have is that for some of the caseload, we know not only how many families there are but how many individuals. Elsewhere, we have only the number of families. In the latter case, to determine the total population, we multiple the number of families by six, assuming each family is comprised of six people, though we know many of the families are considerably larger. Therefore, many of our numbers are estimates rather than firm figures. This should not, however, matter enormously as the purpose of the profiling is to find durable solutions for those in displacement and, in that case, estimates of the size of a group are often sufficient.
B. Background In 2002, when the Taliban-regime fell from power, there were approximately 1.2 million internally displaced Afghans throughout the country. The majority of these IDPs were to return spontaneously to their places of origin over the course of several years. Some 98,654 families (489,525 individuals) were assisted by UNHCR from 2002 to October 2007 on the basis of a Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Government of Afghanistan, UNAMA and UNHCR which gave UNHCR a lead support role in relation to IDPs2. In 2005, a National Policy was endorsed by the Consultative Group (CG) on Returnees, Refugees and IDPs, which placed an increased emphasis on the promotion of durable solutions through voluntary return and local settlement in accordance with the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and affirmed the lead role of the Afghan Government. The 2005 Strategy further offered a clear delineation of responsibilities: UNHCR would continue to play an active role in relation to Protection IDPs notably in assisting the Government of Afghanistan to address obstacles to return and to provide assistance for their return to their places of origin, whereas government authorities would take an increased ownership in identifying solutions for IDPs victims of natural disasters (floods, drought).
2 The Letter of Understanding was signed on 6 June 6 2002 and stipulated that the main responsibility of UNHCR at the national and sub-national level will be to assist the MoRR in ensuring the assistance and protection needs of all people of concern to the Programme Group (returning refugees, IDPs, and communities receiving returnees) are adequately met and that solutions to problems of displacement in Afghanistan are identified and pursued.
Over the next several years, UNHCR continued to assist those IDPs prepared to return to their places of origin. However, by 2008, it was clear that the return had become a trickle. For a variety of reasons including continued insecurity in large areas of the country, inter-tribal and personal conflict, landlessness, drought, and lack of job opportunities or basic services in rural areas the solution for the majority of the protracted caseload of displaced persons would not be the Governments preferred solution, i.e., that they go home. In August 2007, the Representative of the Secretary General on the Human Rights of Displaced Persons, Walter Klin, conducted a working visit to Afghanistan and made a number of observations regarding the displacement in Afghanistan. He noted, inter alia, that internal displacement in Afghanistan is a highly complex phenomenon; its causes include not only armed conflict and natural disaster such as drought and flood, but also inter-communal tensions and human rights violations; it has occurred across different periods of time and has been of varying duration; some people have been displaced because of a combination of factors, and some have been displaced multiple times; and, because of both the complexity of causes and the limitations of access to parts of the country affected by armed conflict, no one is entirely sure of the magnitude of the displacement. Consequently, one of Walter Klins recommendations was that a national assessment and profiling of the displacement situation be undertaken. On the basis of this, UNHCR could assist the Government to develop a comprehensive and integrated national strategy which addresses the needs of IDPs relating to assistance, protection and durable solutions, with particular attention to the needs of vulnerable groups. As well, such a profiling could assist the humanitarian community to respond more effectively to IDP needs. One must, of course, be pragmatic and realistic: where IDPs are displaced in areas over which the government has little or no control, or where it is not possible for government or humanitarian actors to intervene, expectations will need to be tempered by those on-the ground security realities. C. Major IDP Populations In 2008, the internally displaced in Afghanistan can be divided into five major categories: (1) A protracted caseload of about 166,000 people internally displaced as a result of conflict in the period prior to and after the fall of the Taliban in 2001, or because of the intimidation and attacks of the local commanders in the north after the fall of the Taliban, or as a result of drought which impacted severely on Kuchi (nomads) in the north, the west and the south. These IDPs are largely living in camp-like settlements in the south, the west and the southeast. One particular group merits special mention here the Kuchi of the Registan desert who had lived there with their flocks for centuries. They comprise at least 60% of the IDPs in Maywand and Punjway in the south, currently estimated at 21,500 individuals. Now, with 90% of their livestock lost, the water tables drastically low, and no end to the drought, return is not sustainable, though many continue to ask for assistance to go back. The humanitarian and protection concerns of the protracted caseload are wide-ranging and varied and can include: the danger of being evicted from the places in which they are living (no security of tenure); threats to their safety (as some of the areas in which they live are only marginally under government control); lack of livelihood opportunities,
including lack of affordable public transportation to labor markets; no access or inadequate access to basic services (especially, education, health, social welfare); at times lack of enough food and water to cover nutritional needs, especially for children, lactating women and the elderly; lack of civil documentation and no access to free legal services. (2) New conflict-affected IDPs. There are new IDPs that have fled their homes as a result of conflict, insecurity and human rights violations since 2002, especially the past few years. People here fall into two categories: (a) Battle-affected First are those called battle-affected who are the individuals and families impacted by fighting, largely in the southern, but also in the southeastern, central and eastern regions, between the international coalition forces [i.e., the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and/or US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)] and the Afghan National Army (ANA) on the one hand, and anti-government elements (AGEs) or the Taliban on the other. Many thousands of battle-affected were displaced in 2007 and additional thousands in 2008. For example, local officials in the three conflict-affected provinces of Kandahar, Hilmand and Uruzgan estimated that 80,000 people were displaced due to the conflict in 2007.3 With regard to the June 2008 military operation in the Arghandab district of the Kandahar, local officials reported 6,973 families who were displaced from their homes to the outskirts of Kandahar City, where assistance (food and NFIs) was provided to them. UNAMA reports that for the first 6 months of 2008, 12,646 families of battle-affected populations in the Southern Region received assistance from UN agencies. On a smaller scale, we have similar situations in other regions. For example, in the North, during the first half of July 2008, conflict between AGEs and representatives of the Naghara Khana village in Qaisar district (Faryab province) caused around 150 families to leave their village for nearby villages. Through the intervention of government, by providing greater security in their village of origin and food assistance, these families returned home during the second half of July. But many of our numbers are largely estimates and the picture is incomplete. We are unable to feel confident about the figures we have for those impacted by the fighting because our limited access to the war zones makes verification impossible. We believe that many of the battle-affected people originally from Punjway, Zhare Dasht, Maywand etc. remain quite close to their homes (Arghandab is only a few kilometers from Kandahar City) and that most though not all -- return after the fighting ends. However, if the IDPs flee to major city centres, as many have, or if their houses and property have been destroyed or their land confiscated, they are likely to remain in displacement for longer periods of time. As well, there are those who have been threatened or targeted as collaborators by the insurgents and feel too insecure to return.
Afghanistan: Conflict-affected displacement major humanitarian challenge - Afghan Red Crescent, IRIN, November 2007.
The humanitarian and protection concerns of the battle-displaced would include: the need for water, food, shelter and possibly NFIs (including bedding, clothing, cooking utensils) as many families flee with few or no possessions; compensation for destroyed property, crops, irrigation systems and livelihoods so they can restart their lives when the fighting ends; emergency health care and emergency schooling; possibly tracing of children separated from parents; protection from attacks by AGEs (who might consider them collaborators) or by government forces (who might suspect them of being Taliban sympathizers). (b) Victims of Inter- or Intra-Tribal Conflict There are also others who have been forced to leave their homes as a result of conflict between different tribal or ethnic groups or even conflicts within a single tribe. One example is the current and long-standing conflict between the Hazara farmers in the Central Highlands and the Kuchi largely Pashtun pastoralists, who have traditionally taken their flocks to Wardak, Ghazni, Ghor and Bamyan provinces in the summer. The fighting in June 2008, like the fighting last year, led to deaths and injuries, the destruction of property, and the displacement of perhaps as many as 7,000 families, some to Kabul but also within the Central Highlands. Now that the fighting has ended and a peace Commission has been established, the Kuchi have withdrawn and the IDPs have returned to their villages. However, there is no assurance that the Commission will negotiate a solution that is acceptable to both parties and the violence may recur again next year. There are similar conflicts in other parts of the country. Part of the protracted caseload, but illustrative of the type of conflict that still manifests itself, the Gujar IDPs in the northeast (270 families) are displaced because Tajik commanders are occupying their land and property. Immediately after the fall of the Taliban, Gujar were displaced mainly to Nangarhar, Baghlan and Kunduz provinces as a punishment for their support for the Taliban. Since 2006, 254 returnee families of the Nasir tribe have been living in Paktika province in the southeast, forced to leave their homes in Zabul province because of a fight over land ownership with the Shamalzai tribe. And there are many disputes between sub-groups of the Pashtun, frequently, as with the cases mentioned above, involving bitter disputes over land, property or access to resources. Fortunately, however, thus far these have not led to large scale displacements. The humanitarian and protection needs of such victims of conflict will initially be for water, food and shelter, as well as possibly for clothing, bedding and other NFIs, for emergency medical care and health needs, emergency education, tracing of lost children or other family members. It will, subsequently, be for assistance to return home (i.e., with transportation costs), to rebuild their homes, damaged irrigation systems, destroyed livelihoods (possibly need for seeds and tools and to replace livestock); possibly for programs of dialogue and reconciliation; possibly for free legal assistance. (3) Returnees and deportees from neighboring countries in secondary displacement. We have a very large number of Afghan refugees more than 180,000 individuals between 1 January and 15 July) who have returned to Afghanistan from Pakistan or Iran this year. While the 2008 return may not reach the 2007 figure of over 365,000 returns, it is a substantial number
for Afghanistan to absorb. Some of these returnees left voluntarily because the cost of living and food, particularly in urban areas, shot up this year, or because they knew their Proof of Registration (the basis on which they could stay in Pakistan) would expire in 2009. Many others were pressured if not forced to return by the closure of camps (notably, Jalozai in Pakistan) or the clearance of No-Go-Areas (in Iran). Many of the returnees have lived abroad in urban environments for over 20 years, and could not conceive of going to rural Afghanistan, where they could expect neither job opportunities nor services, and where they may have no land. The return of some has also been delayed or prevented by the presence of landmines.4 Thus, while the majority of the returnees from Pakistan went back to their areas of origin, a not inconsiderable portion more than 5,200 families (approximately 31,200 individuals) of approx. 23% have not done so. Most are in the Eastern Region, where they have created four temporary settlements in Nangarhar (one of them has been formally recognized as township for land allocation to returnees) and one in Laghman, assisted by the international community and by the Government with water, food, health services, non-food items and temporary shelter. The population in two of these settlements continues to increase daily. In addition, there are also some 200 Pashtu speaking Baluch families who returned from Jalozai camp to Sholgara district (Balkh) in late May, but are unable to settle in their area of origin though they bought land there because of a dispute with the surrounding Khalili (Pashtun sub tribe) Shia community. They are, consequently, living in a precarious camp-like situation in a buzkashi field in Sholgara district. The Provincial Governor has sent a governmental delegation in mid June to verify the land ownership and to mediate on the land dispute should it not belong to the government. Serious efforts are on-going to find a durable solution for these returnees, so that they do not become IDPs in secondary displacement, but for the present, they need to be considered part of the humanitarian displacement caseload. In 2005, there were large numbers of Afghans living in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan who were forced to return to Afghanistan (30,792 families 171,665 individuals5), some after the onset of the winter in November, because the Pakistani authorities closed the camps in FATA. A substantial number of these were Kuchi who had left Afghanistan just after the Russian invasion in 1979, who no longer had animals, had no land to return to, and who consequently ended up in secondary displacement, settling in 11 open-air settlements in Khost.6 This year, 163 families (851 individuals) who were Amayesh II registered Afghans in Iran returned from the No-Go-Area of Qazvin to drought affected villages in Shebirghan, provincial
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According to the Afghanistan: Landmine Monitor Report 2007, the Afghanistan Landmine Impact Survey (ALIS), completed in 2005, found 2,368 communities and more than four million people affected by mines, and identified some 715 square kilometers of hazardous areas, concentrated in 12 of Afghanistans 32 provinces. Despite the release of more than 100 square kilometers of land since then, the estimate of contamination has increased, as a result of new survey and information generated by the return of refugees to previously unoccupied land. Updated estimates at the end of May 2007 put total contamination at 778 square kilometers. Moreover, while casualities are down in 2008 to 44 people/month injured or killed by mines, as against 100/month a year earlier (over 70,000 Afghans were killed or disabled by According to UNHCRs database of returnees from FATA in 2005. Interviews with Kuchi leaders in Gardez (April 2008) and in Kabul (July 2008).
landmines in the last two decades of the 20th century), there are also reports now of Taliban remining areas in Hilmand Province.
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capital of Jawzjan, and in Sare Pul provinces in the north of Afghanistan. One of the villages is completely destroyed and has been deserted for the last 20 years, forcing returnees to seek temporary settlement in other villages. None of the returnees have houses and are now being accommodated by relatives or other members of their communities. One of the three villages they returned to faces a severe water shortage because of the drought. While most of the returnees have expressed their intention to stay in Shebirghan, it is likely that many will be obliged to send male members abroad to secure income. And, if the return proves unsustainable, this population will be at risk of displacement in the future. Their main problems are destruction of the houses, landlessness, drought-related problems and lack of job opportunities. In this regard, one need also to note the large-scale deportation of illegal migrants from Iran this year, primarily single males, more than 180,000 by late July. While these would be considered economic migrants and not IDPs, many of the single males will gravitate to the cities in search of employment and become part of the urban squatters living in informal settlements. The humanitarian and protection needs of these displaced persons will first and foremost be for land where they can settle that is safe and where they will not fear eviction (security of tenure) and for livelihood (job opportunities so they can earn a living to take care of their families). They will also need access to all basic services (water, health, education, public transportation). (4) Displacement as a result of Food Insecurity This past year, Afghanistan has also seen considerable displacement as a result of food insecurity. The causal factors are clear: a very harsh winter (2007-2008), followed by a drought, particularly in the north and the west of the country, with severe crop loss, and with hunger and poverty exacerbated by the unexpected rise in the price of food globally. The Joint Emergency Appeal launched by the humanitarian community in Afghanistan in July 2008 to address the high food price and drought crisis notes that the heaviest impact of the food insecurity has been on the Balkh, Samangan, Sari-Pul and Jawzjan (in the North); Badghis, Nimroz and Ghor (in the West); Logar (East); Wardak (Central) and Khost (Southeast), where, in each case, more than a quarter of the population has been significantly affected. In Balkh province, where a locus infestation threatened the crops in April, large scale displacement occurred in May. Shortages of food and drinking water resulted in some 2,000 families from the Alborz community of Chimtal district leaving their villages a movement that quickly swelled to over 6,000 families to set up camp beside the river near to Chishma-e-Shefa but still in Chimtal district not far from Mazar-e-Sharif. The joint strategy of the Government and the humanitarian community, to forestall the emergence of IDP camps in the province and to counter those trying to politically exploit the situation, was to deliver food, water and food for work programs back in their villages, not where the people had pitched tents; and this seems to have successfully stemmed a large exodus from northern villages. In the middle of May 2008, around 200 Arab families from Shiram area joined 100 families in Sangtoda area of Sare Pul province who were displaced also last year due to the food and water insecurity in their villages of origin. While their needs are great, this type of displacement has been qualified as seasonal displacement. At the same time in May, some 200 Pashtun/Balooch people in Sozma Qala District of Sare Pul province started to make a camp due to food insecurity, but they were encouraged by the provincial government to return to their villages where assistance (food and NFIs) would be provided. All this caseload returned as requested.
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However, we are beginning to see considerable displacement now taking place in the West as a result of both the worsening security and drought, with IDPs moving towards Hirat. These movements will need to be carefully monitored. The humanitarian and protection needs are first and foremost water and food if possible to prevent displacement. Once people are displaced, shelter is immediately added to their needs. And, if they use up the seeds they should have saved for the next years planting, they will need new seed as well. Plus, of course, access to basic services in displacement especially health and education. (5) Internally displaced in Urban Areas
Finally, there are an indeterminate number of internally displaced people living often precariously with family or friends, or sometimes in squatter settlements that have sprung up around most of the major cities. These are often difficult to identify as they have blended into the large indistinct mass of urban poor, generally surviving by doing day labor and other menial tasks. We do know that there are substantial numbers of IDPs living in Kabul, which is a magnet attracting people from across the country, though we have only identified some of them. One should note that the population of Kabul has increased from 1.5 million in 2001 to 4.5 million in 2007, and other cities such as Kandahar, Hirat and Khost have also seen IDP influxes. As the Representative on Internally Displaced Persons noted in his August 2007 report, the extent of urban displacement is difficult to pinpoint because many IDPs have partially integrated, more than 50% of urban Kabul consists of irregular settlements,7 and who an IDP is depends in part on self-identification, particularly where such persons are living individually as opposed to collective groups. In a certain sense, if these people had originally left their homes as a result of insecurity, persecution or man-made disasters and many did -- they have found their own solution to displacement i.e., they have locally integrated, without assistance, albeit often at a very low level of subsistence. Others, who have migrated from the rural to the urban areas, attracted by the prospects of more economic opportunity and services, would be considered economic migrants and not IDPs, though the distinction is often a difficult one to make. While not part of the IDP profiling, they certainly are part of the humanitarian problematique and difficult to disentangle from the displacement picture. The humanitarian and protection concerns regarding displaced persons in urban situations are wide-ranging and will vary on whether they are squatting on land that is not theirs or living with host families. As with the protracted caseload, there is a concern that these people not be evicted; that their shelters are adequate, and they have adequate fuel, clothing and bedding, especially where winter is harsh; that they have access to clean water and to latrines, to reduce the risk of epidemic diseases; that their children are vaccinated for measles and polio; that they have adequate food; access to basic health and educational services. D. General Findings What the profiling of the populations internally displaced makes clear is that we have highly complex phenomena with different displacements having occurred at different times, in
Anuj Chopra , Afghanistan Faced with Severe Housing Shortage, World Politics Review, 18 October 2007.
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different parts of the country and for different reasons -- and finding durable solutions will be neither easy nor quick. One enormous obstacle to addressing displacement is land and property claims/disputes and, relatedly, the fact that many of the IDPs are landless, and that the value of land, especially in and around urban centres, has skyrocketed in the past few years. Another, is a mindset or worldview held by many Afghan leaders both in national and local government (and partially reflected in Afghan law) -- that if you were not born in a province, district, town or village, then you really dont belong there, even though the Afghan Constitution (article 39) recognizes that Afghans have a right travel or settle in any part of the country (except in regions forbidden by law). Hence, for example, Presidential Decree 104 On Land Distribution for Settlement to Eligible Returnees and IDPs makes entitlement to receive a plot of land in a specific province dependent upon the individual/family originating from that province.8 And hence the view of many Governors that IDPs can stay temporarily in their province if they cannot return to their places of origin because of security considerations, but that local integration should not be considered a permanent solution. Ethnicity is clearly a factor in many situations, with local authorities afraid that by letting people from other ethnic groups settle, they may be changing the demographic and hence the political -- balance of the area. Another enormous obstacle to finding durable solutions for those in displacement is the lack of job or livelihood opportunities, and basic services (notably, water and sanitation, education and health) in large areas of the country. While this is a challenge faced by all Afghans, it is particularly daunting for people who have been uprooted and lived in exile for long periods of time. It is therefore, vital that development and poverty reduction programs take special account of IDPs and returnees when they are drafted. Of course the issue of security remains a paramount concern, and if hostilities continue to escalate, displacement may not only dramatically increase, it may take on new dimensions. Particularly linked to insecurity is the fact that large areas of the country not only in the south, but also in the west, the southeast, the east and even areas of the north, are now becoming no-go areas where humanitarian access is effectively denied. Not only is access denied by AGEs or the Taliban, it may also be blocked by local commanders and warlords, whose private militias and not the police or the Afghan National Army hold sway in the area. E. Trends As one looks to the future and to the type of contingency planning that should be done to address the likely IDP scenarios over the coming year, several trends are evident. First, as documented in UNDSS and UNAMA reports, we are likely to see more displacement as a result of fighting between international and Afghan government forces on the one hand and insurgents (Taliban and other AGEs) on the other, not only in the Southern Region, but also in the West (in Bakwa, Gulistan and Pur Chaman districts of Farah and possibly in Nimroz where the level of violence has recently increased), in Badghis (especially Murghab district) in the North, and in all the provinces in the East bordering the tribal areas with Pakistan, but especially Nuristan, Kunar and Khost. There will probably also be displacement as a consequence of the
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The one exception to this general rule is that someone might get land in a neighboring province if there is none available in their province of origin and the neighboring province has the absorptive capacity.
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Talibans growing strength in certain areas of the central region: the past month, we saw the first displacement from Parwan to Kabul city as a result of an increased Taliban presence, and a vicious attack in which the Taliban targeted and killed four international aid workers from the International Rescue Committee, in broad daylight, in Logar, on the main road to Kabul. There have also been a heightened number of incidents in Kapisa.. Humanitarian access to much of the country has deteriorated dramatically and many, notably the ICRC,9 believe that access has never been worse, including in the 1992-1993 period when you could at least negotiate with Commanders who had an understanding of what a humanitarian response meant. Now, the nature of the insurgency is very different. As the Special Rapporteur on Education to the Human Rights Council said in the statement he issued (on 15 August) following the killing of the IRC workers who had been supporting education in Afghanistan: Their [the Talibans] attacks on schools, teachers and others working on education are systematic, not random. They are part of a deliberate attack on human rights, on equality for women and on any attempt by their fellow citizens to control their own destiny. Not surprisingly, as the conflict has intensified, we have seen more and more civilian casualties. According to UNAMAs figures, during 2007, there were more than 1,500 non-combatants killed as a result of fighting between Anti-Government Elements (AGEs) and government forces in 2007. In the first four months of 2008 UNAMA Human Rights Team documented over 500 civilian deaths as a direct result of insurgency and counter-insurgency operations, which represents an increase of almost 80 per cent compared with the same period last year. This undoubtedly affects peoples perceptions about their safety. Thus, the assumption that we have made, that most battle-affected IDPs do not move too far from their homes and rapidly return home once the fighting has ended is likely to be seriously challenged. Already, we are seeing groups of battle-displaced from Hilmand in the South and from other provinces in the Central region going to live in and around Kabul City, either with friends and family or in squatter settlements. Secondly, the displacement as a result of the drought in both the West and the North -- needs to be carefully monitored. While, thus far, it appears that this displacement has been kept in check by the Government policy, largely supported by the international humanitarian community, of providing food and water in the affected villages to those who are most vulnerable, if this aid does not reach people fast enough, or if the aid pipeline is interrupted for any reason, we are likely to see people leaving their homes and drawn to where they believe they will more readily get assistance. IDP camps, which we have largely been able to avoid thus far, may be something we will need to contend with in the future, meaning that shelter as well as water and food will need to be provided and a Camp Management Cluster may need to be created. What we already see, in both the North and the West, is the phenomenon of families sending their male members fathers and sons either to the larger cities in Afghanistan or to Pakistan or Iran. While this economic migration is a traditional coping mechanism, the numbers climb when the challenges to survival increase. However, the higher cost of living in Pakistan (that has actually contributed to raising the numbers of refugees voluntarily returning to Afghanistan) and Irans announcement, that it is going to cut its food and other commodity subsidies and replace them with cash transfers to the very poor in Iran, will impact significantly on Afghan workers there, who will not be eligible for the cash transfers. Essentially, it means that the remittances that the
9
See, e.g., IRIN, Humanitarian Needs Growing as Conflict Spreads ICRC, 8 April 2008, where ICRC is quoted as expressing deep concern about the intensification and spreading of armed conflict in Afghanistan.
14
Afghan workers abroad are able to send home to their families will be substantially lower. This may greatly increase the vulnerability of the many households in Afghanistan who are heavily dependent on these remittances. As regards the major population return of refugees from Pakistan back to Afghanistan following the closure the last two years of two major camps in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), Jalozai and Kachagari, in 2007, returns from Pakistan topped 357,000. While the number in 2008 will probably be somewhat lower, returns as of mid August, has already reached the figure of 210,000 and there has been little slowing of the rate of approximately 1,000 per day crossing the border. With approximately 23% of the returnees not returning home but settling into temporary settlements (and a current returnee caseload of over 30,000 from this year and 20,000 who returned between 2005 and 2007), we are likely to face serious overcrowding and shelter problems which will need to be addressed before the winter. It is also important to follow the extent to which returns which are on-going, largely with respect to the repatriation from Pakistan, but also the deportations from Iran (over 180,000 by beginning of August 2008), largely of single males who go back to their families are sustainable. The absorptive capacity of Afghanistans rural areas has probably not only been reached but surpassed in many areas. The consequences of this are likely to be an outflow from the villages to the urban centers. And while these people would be considered as economic migrants rather than IDPs, they are certain to inter-mingle with and impact on the IDP humanitarian caseload. As well, we are likely to see increasing conflict over land and resources (especially water) that may lead both to violence and to displacement unless more comprehensive measures are taken to improve land use management. The fighting between Kuchi and Hazara over pasturelands in the Central Highlands is perhaps the most prominent example, but certainly not the only one. Thus, as work begins to focus on finding durable solutions for the protracted caseload, the IDP Task Force and other coordination mechanisms for dealing with displacement will need to continually and carefully monitor new and potential displacements.
15
16
III.
Southern* Protracted caseload Total: Western** Protracted caseload New Drought-affected Total Central Protracted caseload New conflictaffected*** Total Eastern New conflict-affected 2008 Returnees 2005-07 Returnees Total Southeastern* Protracted caseload+ New conflict-affected* Battle-affected Total North and Northeastern++ Protracted caseload Total Central Highlands+++ TOTAL 365 365 0 43,197 1,843 1,843 0 235,833 1,943 254 127 2,324 12,341 1,524 759 14,624 577 5,220 3,517 9,314 3,462 31,320 21,102 55,884 427 2,321 4,915 7,236 5,925 1,083 7,008 29,690 6,598 36,288 22,841 22,841 119,958 119,958
918
1,345
* without battle-affected IDPs ** without battle-affected IDPs and without deportees from Iran *** does not include the Hazara IDPs in Kabul as a result of the June-July 2008 fighting in the Central Highlands + does not include data on the Mullah Khel IDPs because of a lack clarity about those figures ++ does not include drought-affected and other small groups for which we do not have accurate information +++ does not include recent conflict IDPs as they have all returned
home
17
The chart above estimates, conservatively, that there are approximately 235,000 internally displaced persons in Afghanistan, of which of which about 132,000 are the protracted case load. However, the total does not include most of those who are battle-affected or many of those who are drought-affected. Nor do the numbers reflect whatever invisible IDPs there are in the large urban concentrations who have not self-identified as displaced persons, or who have not been identified through other means, or any of those deported from Iran, some of whom inevitably end up in displacement. In the latter two cases, both of these are considered more as economic migrants than as IDPs. The humanitarian caseload that displacement poses in Afghanistan may, therefore, be substantially larger than the above numbers suggest. If one looks at number of IDPs by reason for the displacement across the country, one gets the following chart. They, of course, do not capture either the recent battle-affected or droughtaffected caseload.
Reason for Displacement Protracted Caseload New Drought-affected* New conflict-affected Returnees in displacement Battle-affected* Total
These numbers are clearly unreflective of the real caseload, which amounts to many thousands of people.
Reasons for displacement 180,000 166,153
Individuals
120,000
60,000
52,422
18
Internally Displace Persons (IDPs) Caseload by District of Displacement - end Aug 2008
FAM = Families M = Males F = Females IND = Individuals TOTAL M 51 57 26 39 61 436 179 31 61 940 11,988 16,830 3,977 14,438 13,946 61,179 6,294 777 387 7,458 1,766 4,042 2,234 294 245 196 10,982 2,316 1,579 2,142 92 2,130 483 28,501 IDPs Caseload F IND 49 100 54 111 25 50 38 77 59 120 419 855 172 350 29 60 59 120 903 1,843 11,518 23,506 16,170 33,000 3,821 7,798 13,871 28,309 13,399 27,345 58,779 119,958 6,047 12,341 747 1,524 372 759 7,166 14,624 1,696 3,462 3,884 7,926 2,146 4,380 282 576 235 480 188 384 10,552 21,534 2,226 4,542 1,517 3,096 2,058 4,200 88 180 2,046 4,176 465 948 27,383 55,884
Region North North North North North North North North North North Total South South South South South South Total Southeast Southeast Southeast Southeast Total East East East East East East East East East East East East East East Total
Location of Displacement Province District Balkh Nar-e-Shahi Balkh Balkh Faryab Almar Faryab Maimana Kunduz Kunduz Kunduz Kunduz (Bagh-e-Sherkat Sett.) Takhar Baharak Takhar Iskamish Takhar Kalafgan Hilmand Kandahar Kandahar Kandahar Kandahar Khost Paktika Paktya Kunar Kunar Laghman Laghman Nangarhar Nangarhar Nangarhar Nangarhar Nangarhar Nangarhar Nangarhar Nangarhar Nangarhar Lashkargah (Mukhtar Sett.) Kandahar (Kuchi sett.) Maywand (Qala-i- Shamir) Panjwai (Mushan&Kuluqan) Zhari Dasht Khost (Matun), Terzai & Bak Terwi Gardez Asad Abad Sirkany, Khas Kunar, Shigal, Marwara & Asad Abad Mihterlam Qarghai Surkh Rod Surkh Rod Khohgyani / Surkh Rod Kuzkunar/Behsud Jalalabad Surkh Rod (Upper & Middle SM Samarkhel Surkh Rod (Lower SM) Unknown (Jamaly)
FAM 20 17 10 17 24 171 70 12 24 365 4,705 5,500 1,745 5,418 5,473 22,841 1,943 254 127 2,324 577 1,321 730 96 80 64 3,589 757 516 700 30 696 158 9,314
19
West West West West West Total Central Central Central Central Total Totals
Hirat (Maslakh) Hirat (Shaydaee) Hirat (Minarat) Unknown Kabul Paghman Ghazni
7% 4% 1% 3% 15% 2% 0% 1% 3% 100%
Breakdown of IDPs by Region of Displacement - as of end Aug 2008 150,000 Number of Individuals Individulas 100,000 119,958
Females, 115,558, 49%
IDPs Sex
55,884 50,000 14,624 1,843 0 North South Southeast East West Central 36,288 7,236
20
Afghanistan IDPs - Caseload by Region & District - No. of Individuals in Displacement - 10 Aug 08
TURKMENISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN CHINA
Kunduz
Baharak
Kalfagan
Ishkamish
North 1,843
Almar Maymana
East 55,884
Hirat Paghman Kabul Mihtarlam Kuz Kunar Qarghayi Jalalabad Surkh Rod Khogayani
Asadabad
Hi gh la nd
Ce nt ra l
West 36,288
Central 7,236
No Window
INDIA
Ghazni
Gardiz Khost(Matun)
PAKISTAN
So
ut 14 heas ,62 t 4
South 119,958
Waza Khwa
Zhari Kandahar
Panjwayi
Note: This map does not reflect the full extend of IDPs displaced as result of recent battle or drought
Page 21
Data Date & Source: UNHCR sub/filed offices Jan - 10 Aug 2008
Annexes
22
23
ANNEX 1. DISPLACEMENT IN THE SOUTHERN REGION The Southern Region has the largest protracted caseload of IDPs in the country an estimated 22,841 families and 119,958 individuals. In the four main camps (i.e., excluding the Kuchi living in and around Kandahar), approx. 66% are Pashtun and about 31% are Baluch (largely Kuchi or semi-Kuchi). The numbers are as follows:
District/Province Zhari, Kandahar Maywand, Kandahar Punjway, Kandahar Kandahar City, Kandahar Lashkar Gar, Hilmand Total
Settlement Zhari Dasht Qala Shamir Koloqan & Moshan Kuchi settlements Mukhtar
a. Zhari Dasht IDP Camp, Kandahar: located some 14 kilometers outside of Kandahar city in Zhari district, houses 5,473 families (27,345 individuals) who are registered as IDPs with the DoRR. This is the number that confirmed by a re-registration conducted by DoRR in May 2008, adjusted to take into account the 171 families who had decided to return to their places of origin in July 2008. Many of these people were initially displaced at the end of 2001, from areas in the north and the west, to the Chaman waiting area a no-mans land between Afghanistan and Pakistan -- and then relocated in Zhari Dasht in 2002, 2003 and 2004. Currently, the camp has IDPs displaced from the west (Hirat, Farah and Badghis), the north (Balkh, Saripol, Faryab and Jawzjan), the northeast (Takhar), the southeast (Paktika) and the South (Kandahar, Uruzgan , Zabul). Of these, 97% are Pashtuns, 2% Baluch, and 1% other. b. Qala Shamir Camp, Maywand: has a population of approximately 1,745 families, as of DoRR re-registration in June/July 2008 (approx. 7,798 individuals), which includes approximately 550 families who moved there in 2007 from Marghar in Punjway when that area became too dangerous. The population is about 73% Baluch, 26% Pashtun and 1% other. Many of the inhabitants, including those from Marghar, are Kuchi or semiKuchi, uprooted between 1999 and 2003 because of drought in the Reg desert and the consequent death of their livestock. In 2001 (??) the situation of some of the Kuchi in Registan, particularly those living in remote areas, reached a critical point and some were airlifted and others evacuated by heavy trucks provided the Talaiban authorities. They were then settled in Maywand or Punjway districts of Kandahar. In 2002, as a result of intervention by UNHCR, their settlements were recognized as IDP camps. While many of the Kuchi elders say that they would like to return to Registan, such a return is not currently sustainable, given the continuation of the drought. c. Punjway (Koloqan and Moshan) IDP Camps: 5,415 families, as of DoRR reregistration in June/July 2008 (approx. 28,309 individuals), of whom 35% are Pashtun, 64% Baluch, and 1% other. Most of the population originates from the Reg and
24
Punjaway districts of Kandahar province and were displaced between 1999 and 2003 by the drought and the death of their livestock. Many are Kuchi or semi-Kuchi. d. Kuchi camped outside Kandahar City: According to a survey conducted by the Government (DRRD, Kuchi Directorate and Economy Department of Kandahar) and WFP (via its International Partner IP HAPA) in August 2007, there are some 5,500 Kuchi families (about 33,000 individuals) living in 51 settlements on the outskirts of Kandahar city and the surrounding villages. These people had been nomadic and had moved with their animals (sheep, goats, camels and donkeys), migrating in the summer to the districts of Sahjoy (Zabul Province) and Muqur (Gazni Province) and in the winter to Registan and other districts in Kandahar province. Some families are reported to come from Badghis Province. After seven years of drought and the loss of their animals, these Kuchi are more or less settled and earn their living as day laborers in Kandahar City, and with some elderly men and women reduced to begging in the streets. The needs assessment conducted in 2008 underscored their need for food, drinking water and better shelter, and for educational and health facilities to which they have very limited access. e. Mukhtar Camp, Hilmand: in Lashkar Gar district, 4,705 families (23,506 individuals). There has not been any recent re-registration of the population in Mukhtar. Data from 2006 indicates that 91% of the population is Pashtun, 6% Tajik, 2% Baluch and 1% Hazara. They were displaced between 2001 and 2003, with the fall of the Taliban, from the west (Badghis, Hirat, Ghor), the north (Faryab, Jawzjan, Saripul), the East (Kapisa, Laghman), the southeast (Ghazni), the south (Hilmand, Uruzgan, Kandahar) and some from the center (Kabul, Logar). Many fled because of security issues, threats, the occupation of their land by armed groups, and the breakdown of law and order while other fled because of the drought, the loss of their livestock, and food shortages. In the Southern Region, we also have the largest number of battle-affected IDPs though, as noted above, most of these do not travel far from their homes and return home when the battle moves elsewhere. We have the data compiled by UNAMA, which reports that, in 2007, over 40,000 families (i.e., upwards of 240,000 individuals ) were assisted in the Southern provinces of Kandahar, Hilmand and Uruzgan with food aid and non-food assistance by UN agencies, largely at the request of, and on the basis of numbers reported by, Government offices and verified (to the extent possible) by implementing partners of the UN. For 2008, reporting for the first 6 months found that a total of 12,646 families (or over 75,000 individuals) were assisted by UN agencies in the Southern region. These numbers do not take into account the battle-affected families assisted directly by PRTs or the international forces, which often provide food and nonfood items as well as pay compensation to people for damaged property or loss of life. Nor does this factor in those displaced families which are assisted by the International Committee of the Red Cross often the first assistance people fleeing fighting are able to receive. The UNAMA data is as follows: Date Assistance requested for this displaced by battle No. of families affected 15,003 6,847
10,136 families from Panjway and Zhari took shelter in Kandahar and 4,876 displaced in various villages Families in Lashkar Gar, Hilmand, displaced from Sangin, Musa Qaka, Garmser, Nahri Serat and other districts Displaced to Tirin Kot, Uruzgan
720
25
23 May 2007
2 October 2007
4 November
4 November 2007 4 November 2007 4 November 2007 20 November 2007 Total Number reported in 2007 January/February 2008 March/April 2008 March/April 2008 March/April 2008 May/June 2008 May/June 2008 Total assisted in first 6 months of 2008
Assistance requested for families displaced from Musa Qala, Hilmand Request to assist 3,200 families displaced from Sangeen and Kajaki districts of Hilmand Displaced from Nawzad district living in Gereshk and Lashkar Gar, Hilmand Request for assistance for 2,050 families displaced in April-May by fighting in Sangeen, living in Lashkar Gar and Grishk districts. Governor of Khandahar requested food for 500 families of Sangeen district, Hilmand 300 of which fled to Arghandab, 100 to Ghorak and 100 to Kandahar City Families displaced to Chora, Uruzgan DRRD requests assistance for 1,744b battle affected families from Garmser, Hilmand but only 722 verified DRRD requested assistance for families displaced from Dihrawoud, 220 of whom had moved to Trinkot and the rests in various villages DRRD reported on families displaced from Nahr-isaraj district to Bazar Grishk and outher surrounding areas of Lashkar Gar, Hilmand ANDMA requests assistance for 421 families displaced from Kajaki, Hilmand to Arghandab, Kandahar ANDMA reports families displaced from Sangeen district, Hilmand living in Arghandab, Kandahar ANDMA reported families displaced from Musa Qala, Hilmand, living in Arghandab, Kandahar ANDMA reported 223 families displaced from Dihrawud, Uruzgan, living in Arghandab, Kandahar Request for assistance for additional families from Garmser, Hilmand
500
554
421
Families of Sangeen and Sarwan Qala assisted in Khandahar Families of Musa Qala district, Hilmand assisted Families of Derhrawood district assisted in Derhrawood, Uruzgan Families of Dehrawood district assisted in Terinkot, Uruzgan Families in Arghandab district, Hilmand, assisted in Arghandab Families of Garmser district, Hilmand, assisted
26
Battle displaced Families in the Southern Region who received assistance in 2007/2008
45,000 40,043 40,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
12,646 8,473
10,000
5,000 0 0
3,367 0
2,876
3,500
Total 08
27
Afghanistan IDPs - Southern Region Protracted Caseload No. of Individuals in Displacement - 14 Aug 08
Baghran