Marianne L.

Lalwani 1 Administrative Law

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-50908 January 31, 1984 MAR CONCEPC!ON "AUT!STA an# ENR!$UE %. "AUT!STA, Petitioners, vs. AL&RE%O L. JU!N!O, ROMEO &. E%U an# &!%EL '. RAMOS, Respondents.

&ERNAN%O, C.J.: The validity of an energy conservation easure, !etter of "nstruction No. #$%, issued on May &', '%(% ) the response to the protracted oil crisis that dates bac* to '%(+ ) is put in issue in this prohibition proceeding filed by petitioners, spouses Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enri,ue -. Bautista, for being allegedly violative of the due process and e,ual protection guarantees 1 of the Constitution. The use of private otor vehicles .ith / and E/ plates on .ee*)ends and holidays .as banned fro 01'23445 a. . 6aturday orning to 7344 a. . Monday orning, or '344 a. . of the holiday to 7344 a. . of the day after the holiday.0 ( Motor vehicles of the follo.ing classifications are e8e pted3 9a: 6 96ervice:; 9b: T 9Truc*:; 9e: -P! 9-iplo atic:; 9d: CC 9Consular Corps:; 9e: TC 9Tourist Cars:. 3 Pursuant thereto, respondent Alfredo !. <uinio, then Minister of Public =or*s, Transportation and Co unications and respondent Ro eo P. Edu, then Co issioner of !and Transportation Co ission issued on <une '', '%(%, Me orandu Circular No. &%, .hich i posed 0the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on o.ners of the above)specified vehicles0 found violating such !etter of "nstruction. 4 "t .as then alleged by petitioners that 0.hile the purpose for the issuance of the !>" #$% is laudable, to .it, energy conservation, the provision banning the use of / and E/ 1vehicles5 is unfair, discri inatory, 1a ounting to an5 arbitrary classification0 and thus in contravention of the e,ual protection clause. 5 Moreover, for the , such !etter of "nstruction is a denial of due process, ore specifically, 0of their right to use and en?oy their private property and of their freedo to travel and hold fa ily gatherings, reunions and outings on .ee*)ends and holidays,0 inviting attention to the fact that others not included in the ban en?oying 0unrestricted freedo .0 ) "t .ould follo., so they contend that Me orandu Circular No. &% i posing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license is li*e.ise unconstitutional, for being violative of the doctrine of 0undue delegation of legislative po.er.0 * "t is to be noted that such Me orandu Circular does not i pose the penalty of confiscation but erely that of i pounding, fine, and for the third offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for ninety days .hichever is longer. This Court gave due course to the petition re,uiring respondent to ans.er. There .as ad ission of the facts as substantially alleged e8cept, as previously noted, that the ban starts at '2344 a. . rather than '344 a. . of a 6aturday or of a holiday and as to the ention of a =illy@s Aaiser ?eep being registered in the na e of a certain Teresita Brbina, about .hich respondents had no *no.ledge. There .as a denial of the allegations that the classification of vehicles into heavy / and e8tra heavy 9E/: on the other hand and light and banta on the other hand .as violative of e,ual protection and the regulation as to the use of the for er cars on the dates specified a transgression of due process. The ans.er li*e.ise denied that there .as an undue delegation of legislative po.er, reference being ade to the !and Transportation and Traffic Code. 8 There .as also a procedural ob?ection raised, na ely, that .hat is sought a ounts at ost to an advisory opinion rather than an a?udication of a case or controversy. Petitioners filed a otion to be allo.ed to reply to the ans.er. "t .as granted. The reply, considering its e8haustive character serving as its e orandu , stressed ane. .hat it e phasiCed as the arbitrary, unreasonable, and oppressive aspects of the challenged !etter of "nstruction and Me orandu Circular No. &%. "t disputed .hat it characteriCed as an 0erroneous and arbitrary presu ption that heavy car o.ners unnecessarily use and therefore .aste gasoline .henever they drive their cars on .ee*)ends and holidays;0 9 it stig atiCed the ban as defeating its 0avo.ed purpose in the case of the affluent .ho o.n not only heavy li ousines but also any s all cars 1as5 they ay be co pelled to use at least t.o s all cars;0 10 referred to the high cost of ta8is or other public transports for those 0not able to afford e8pensive s all cars 1possibly5 only one heavy and possible old odel;0 11 cited the case of 0 any eight cylinder vehicles .hich because of their .eight have been registered as light but in fact consu e ore or as uch gasoline as the banned vehicles.0 1( Their conclusion is that 0the ban i posed, in result and effect is class legislation.0 13 The parties .ere re,uired to sub it e oranda. Respondents did so but not petitioners. They relied on their reply to the ans.er ) as noted, a rather co prehensive pleading. Dor reasons to be set forth, this Court holds that the petition cannot prosper. '. Dirst as to the procedural ob?ection. "n the e orandu for respondents, one of the issues raised .as .hether 0the po.er of ?udicial revie. ay be invo*ed considering the inade,uacy of the record and the highly abstract and acade ic ,uestions raised by the petitioners.0 14 "t is inaccurate to say that the record is inade,uate. "t does not ad it of doubt that the ban applies to petitioners .ho are 0the registered o.ners of an eight cylinder '%$% Buic*, and the vendees of a si8 cylinder =illy@s *aiser ?eep, .hich are both classified as heavy or /.0 15 To that e8tent, therefore, the enforce ent of the assailed !etter of "nstruction .ill a ount to a deprivation of .hat other.ise .ould be a valid e8ercise of a property right. Thus they fall s,uarely .ithin 0the unchallenged rule0 as

Marianne L. Lalwani 2 Administrative Law

to .ho ay raise a constitutional ,uestion, na ely, to ,uote the language of <ustice !aurel in the leading case of People v. Vera, 1) 0that the person .ho i pugns the validity of a statute ust have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or .ill sustain direct in?ury as a result of its enforce ent. 1* Moreover, that rule has been considerably rela8ed. 18 The ,uestion then is neither abstract nor acade ic as contended by respondents. 2. There is, ho.ever, this for idable obstacle that confronts petitioners. =hat they see* is for this Court to hold that a !etter of "nstruction, a regulatory easure precisely enacted to cope .ith the serious and grave proble of energy conservation, is void on its face. 6uch a tas* is rendered unusually difficult by .hat has been referred to by <ustice !aurel in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral Commission 19 as the 0presu ption of constitutionality0 and by the sa e ?urist in the case of People v. Vera (0 in slightly different .ords 0a presu ption that such an act falls .ithin constitutional li itations.0 There is need then for a factual foundation of invalidity. "n the language of Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. City Mayor or Manila3 0"t ad its of no doubt therefore that there being a presu ption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, .hich is not the case here. The principle has been no.here better e8pressed than in the leading case of O !orman & "o#ng v. Hart$ord %ire Ins#rance Co., .here the A erican 6upre e Court through <ustice Brandeis tersely and succinctly su ed up the atter thus3 @The statute here ,uestioned deals .ith a sub?ect clearly .ithin the scope of the police po.er. =e are as*ed to declare it void on the ground that the specific ethod of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of la.. As underlying ,uestions of fact ay condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presu ption of constitutionality ust prevail in the absence of so e factual foundation of record for overthro.ing the statute.@ 0 (1 &. "t is true, of course, that there ay be instances .here a police po.er easure ay, because of its arbitrary, oppressive or un?ust character, be held offensive to the due process clause and, therefore, ay, .hen challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding, be declared void on its face. This is not one of the . A recital of the .hereas clauses of the !etter of "nstruction a*es it clear. Thus3 01=hereas5, develop ents in the international petroleu supply situation continue to follo. a trend of li ited production and spiralling prices thereby precluding the possibility of i ediate relief in supplies .ithin the foreseeable future; 1=hereas5, the uncertainty of fuel supply availability underscores a co pelling need for the adoption of positive easures designed to insure the viability of the country@s econo y and sustain its develop ental gro.th; 1=hereas5, to cushion the effect of increasing oil prices and avoid fuel supply disruptions, it is i perative to adopt a progra directed to.ards the ?udicious use of our energy resources co ple ented .ith intensified conservation efforts and efficient utiliCation thereof; E E E.0 (( That is undeniable is that the action ta*en is an appropriate response to a proble that presses urgently for solution. "t ay not be the only alternative, but its reasonableness is i ediately apparent. Thus, to repeat, substantive due process, .hich is the epito e of reasonableness and fair play, is not ignored, uch less infringed. +. "n the interplay bet.een such a funda ental right and police po.er, especially so .here the assailed govern ental action deals .ith the use of one@s property, the latter is accorded uch lee.ay. That is settled la.. =hat is ore, it is good la.. -ue process, therefore, cannot be validly invo*ed. As stressed in the cited Er ita)Malate /otel decision3 0To hold other.ise .ould be to unduly restrict and narro. the scope of police po.er .hich has been properly characteriCed as the ost essential, insistent and the least li itable of po.ers, e8tending as it does @to all the great public needs.@ "t .ould be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allo.ed itself to be deprived of its co petence to pro ote public health, public orals, public safety and the general .elfare. Negatively put, police po.er is @that inherent and plenary po.er in the 6tate .hich enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the co fort, safety, and .elfare of society.@ 0 (3 7. The due process ,uestion having been disposed of, there is still the ob?ection based on the e,ual protection clause to be considered. A govern ental act ay not be offensive to the due process clause, but ay run counter to such a guarantee. 6uch is the case .hen there is no rational basis for the classification follo.ed. That is the point raised by petitioners. Dor the , there is no rational ?ustification for the ban being i posed on vehicles classified as heavy 9/: and e8tra)heavy 9E/:, for precisely those o.ned by the fall .ithin such category. Tested by the applicable standard that ust be satisfied to avoid the charge of a denial of e,ual protection, the ob?ection of petitioners is sho.n to be lac*ing in erit. 6uch a classification on its face cannot be characteriCed as an affront to reason. A legal nor according to &.M. '#ason & Co., Inc. vs. (and 'en#re Administration, (4 0.hether e bodied in a rule, principle, or standard, constitutes a defense against anarchy at one e8tre e and tyranny at the other. Thereby, people living together in a co unity .ith its yriad and co ple8 proble s can ini iCe the friction and reduce the conflicts, to assure, at the very least, a peaceful ordering of e8istence. The "deal situation is for the la.@s benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. >nly thus could chance and favor be e8cluded and the affairs of en governed by that serene and i partial unifor ity, .hich is of the very essence of the "dea of la.. The actual, given things as they are and li*ely to continue to be, cannot appro8i ate the "deal. Nor is the la. susceptible to the reproach that it does not ta*e into account the realties of the situation. E E E To assure that the general .elfare be pro oted, .hich is the end of la., a regulatory easure ay cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected ay under such circu stances invo*e the e,ual protection clause only if they can sho. that the govern ental act assailed, far fro being inspired by the attain ent of the co on .eal .as pro pted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discri ination that finds no support in reason. "t suffices then that the la.s operate e,ually and unifor ly on all persons under si ilar circu stances or that all persons ust be treated in the sa e anner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities i posed. Davoritis and undue preference cannot be allo.ed. Dor the principle is that e,ual protection and security shall be given to every person under circu stances, .hich if not "dentical are analogous. "f la. be loo*ed upon in ter s of burden or charges, those that fall .ithin a class should be treated in the sa e fashion, .hatever restrictions cast on so e in the group e,ually binding on the rest.0 (5 $. Nor does it ilitate against the validity of the !etter of "nstruction ?ust because the ban i posed does not go as far as it could have and therefore could be less efficacious in character. That .as the solution .hich for the President e8pressing a po.er validly lodged in hi , reco ended itself. There .as a situation that called for a corrective easure. /e decided that .hat .as issued by hi .ould do

Marianne L. Lalwani 3 Administrative Law

?ust that or, at the very least, help in easing the situation. That it did not cover other atters .hich could very .ell have been regulated does not call for a declaration of nullity. The President, to paraphrase (#t) v. Araneta, () 0is not re,uired by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or none.0 (* "t is ,uite obvious then that no e,ual protection ,uestion arises. (. "t ay not be a iss to refer to a '%#' A erican 6upre e Court decision, Minnesota v. Clover (ea$ Creamery Company. (8 Respondent along .ith several other business corporations adversely affected involved in the anufacture and utiliCation of plastic il* containers filed suit in a Minnesota district court see*ing to en?oin enforce ent of a Minnesota statute banning the retail sale of il* in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but per itting such sale in other nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, such as paperboard, il* cartons. After conducting e8tensive evidentiary hearings, the Minnesota court en?oined enforce ent of the statute, finding that it violated a ong others the e,ual protection clause of the Dourteenth A end ent to the Dederal Constitution. The Minnesota 6upre e Court affir ed. >n certiorari, the Bnited 6tates 6upre e Court reversed, .ith only <ustice 6tevens dissenting. The opinion by <ustice Brennan noted that 0proponents of the legislation argued that it .ould pro ote resource conservation, ease solid .aste disposal proble s, and conserve energy.0 (9 That sufficed for the Court to conclude 0that the ban on plastic nonreturnable il* containers bears a rational relation to the 6tate@s ob?ectives, and ust be sustained under the E,ual Protection Clause.0 30 "t does sho. that not.ithstanding the 0ne. e,ual protection approach0 .ith its e phasis on 0suspect classification0 and 0funda ental rights and interests standard,0 a concept so ably e8pounded by professor Funther, the 0rational relation test0 31 still retains its validity. Not that there could be any ob?ection to the classification here follo.ed as being in any .ay susceptible to such a pe?orative e8pression as 0suspect0 or that the assailed !etter of "nstruction does not ,ualify under 0the funda ental rights and interests0 standard #. There .as set forth in the petition .hat .ere referred to as 0other reasonable easures .hich the authorities concerned .ith energy conservation can ta*e i ediately, .hich are in fact acceptable and obviously called for and should have been done long ago, to .it3 '. re,uire and establish ta8i stands e,uipped .ith efficient telephone and co unication syste s; 2. strict i ple entation and observance of cargo truc* hours on ain arteries; &. strict observance of traffic rules; +. effective solution of traffic proble s and decongestion of traffic through rerouting and ,uic* repair of roads and efficient operation of double dec*er buses; 7. rationing of gasoline to avoid panic buying and give the private car o.ner the option and responsibility of deciding on the use of his allocation; $. allo. neon and electrically devised advertising signs only fro five o@cloc* p. . to nine o@cloc* p. . (. prohibit i ediately the i portation of heavy and lu8ury cars and seriously re)e8a ine the car anufacturing progra .0 3( Ad ittedly, such easures are conducive to energy conservation. The ,uestion before us ho.ever is li ited to .hether or not !etter of "nstruction #$% as i ple ented by Me orandu Circular No. &% is violative of certain constitutional rights. "t goes no further than that. The deter ination of the ode and anner through .hich the ob?ective of ini iCing the consu ption of oil products ay be attained is left to the discretion of the political branches. 33 Absent therefore the alleged infringe ent of constitutional rights, ore precisely the due process and e,ual protection guarantees, this Court cannot ad?udge !etter of "nstruction No. #$% as tainted by unconstitutionality. %. "t .as li*e.ise contended that Me orandu Circular No. &%, issued by the then respondent Minister of Public =or*s, Transportation and Co unications, and then respondent !and Transportation Co issioner, i posing the penalties 0of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of license is li*e.ise unconstitutional,0 petitioners invo*ing the principle of non)delegation of legislative po.er. 34 To that e8tent that a !etter of "nstruction ay be vie.ed as an e8ercise of the decree) a*ing po.er of the President, then such an argu ent is futile. "f, ho.ever, vie.ed as a co pliance .ith the duty to ta*e care that the la.s be faithfully e8ecuted, as a conse,uence of .hich subordinate e8ecutive officials ay in turn issue i ple enting rules and regulations, then the ob?ection .ould properly be considered as an #ltra vires allegation. There is this relevant e8cerpt fro 'eo*on v. Mem+er o$ t,e -oard o$ Administrators. 35 0'. The recognition of the po.er of ad inistrative officials to pro ulgate rules in the i ple entation of the statute, necessarily li ited to .hat is provided for in the legislative enact ent, ay be found in the early case of /nited 0tates v. -arrias decided in '%4#. Then ca e, in a '%'+ decision, /nited 0tates v. '#pasi Molina, a delineation of the scope of such co petence. Thus3 @>f course the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular depart ent ust be in har ony .ith the provisions of the la., and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the la. itself can not be e8tended. 6o long, ho.ever, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the la., they are valid.@ "n '%&$, in People v. 0antos, this Court e8pressed its disapproval of an ad inistrative order that .ould a ount to an e8cess of the regulatory po.er vested in an ad inistrative official. =e reaffir ed such a doctrine in a '%7' decision, .here .e again ade clear that .here an ad inistrative order betrays inconsistency or repugnancy to the provisions of the Act, @the andate of the Act ust prevail and ust be follo.ed.@ <ustice Barrera, spea*ing for the Court in Victorias Milling Company, Inc. v. 0ocial 0ec#rity Commission, citing Par*er as .ell as -avis did tersely su up the atter thus3 @A rule is binding on tile courts so long as the procedure fi8ed for its pro ulgation is follo.ed and its scope is .ithin the statutory granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agree ent .ith the policy stated therein or its innate .isdo E E E. >n the other hand, ad inistrative interpretation of the la. is at best erely advisory, for it is the courts that finally deter ine .hat the la. eans.@ "t cannot be other.ise as the Constitution li its the authority of the President, in .ho all e8ecutive po.er resides, to ta*e care that the la.s be faithfully e8ecuted. No lesser ad inistrative e8ecutive office or agency then can, contrary to the e8press language of the Constitution, assert for itself a ore e8tensive prerogative.0 3) "t .as alleged in the Ans.er of 6olicitor Feneral Estelito P. MendoCa that !etter of "nstruction #$% and Me orandu Circular No. &% .ere adopted pursuant to the !and Transportation and Traffic Code. 3* "t contains a specific provision as to penalties. 38 Thus3 0Dor violation of any provisions of this Act or regulations pro ulgated pursuant hereto, not hereinbefore specifically punished, a fine of not less than ten nor ore than fifty pesos shall be i posed.0 39 Me orandu Circular No. &% cannot be held to be #ltra vires as long as the fine i posed is not less than ten nor ore than fifty pesos. As to suspension of registration, 40 the Code, insofar as applicable, provides3 0=henever it shall appear fro the records of the Co ission that during any t.elve) onth period ore than three .arnings for violations of this Act have been given to the o.ner of a otor vehicle, or that the said o.ner has been convicted by a co petent court ore than once for violation of such la.s, the Co issioner ay, in his discretion, suspend the certificate of registration for a period not e8ceeding ninety days and, thereupon, shall re,uire the i ediate surrender of the nu ber plates E E E.0 41 "t follo.s that .hile the i position of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the !and Transportation and Traffic Code, the i pounding of a vehicle finds no statutory ?ustification. To apply that

Marianne L. Lalwani 4 Administrative Law

portion of Me orandu Circular No. &% .ould be #ltra vires. "t be i posed in accordance .ith the procedure re,uired by la.. 4( =/ERED>RE, the petition is dis issed. A1#ino, !#errero, 2e Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova and !#tierre), &r., &&., conc#r. Ma3asiar and Concepcion &., too3 no part. ust li*e.ise be ade clear that a penalty even if .arranted can only