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Disclosure strategies regarding ethically questionable business practices

Ipek Aktar
Graduate Program of Economics, Finance, and Management (GPEFM), Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain
Abstract
Purpose The authors objective is to reveal the consumer responses to information disclosure strategies regarding controversial ethical issues. Design/methodology/approach The author is interested in how voluntary disclosure of questionable business practices by chocolate manufacturers regarding child labor exploitation at cocoa plantations inuences consumer behavior. A total of 120 students participated in an experimental study in which the author manipulated awareness of ethical issues in the chocolate industry and corporate disclosure strategy. The author measured willingness to pay (WTP) and consumer perceptions about the rms commitment to corporate social responsibility. Findings The study found that voluntary disclosure of unethical business practices by a rm was not damaging in terms of consumer perceptions. When public awareness was limited, disclosing participation in unethical behavior did not inuence WTP for the rms products. When public awareness was high, disclosing this negative information is even more benecial than no disclosure and generates similar responses to including only positive elements in the rms communication, provided that the rm commits to eliminate its unethical practices. Research limitations/implications Voluntary negative social disclosure will not hurt a rms performance in terms of sales, given the disclosure is transparent and this suggests a credible commitment to improve its practices regarding the issue. Originality/value The author investigates the optimal strategy for a rm to disclose ethical infractions. She demonstrates that being open about them does not necessarily damage a rms reputation and suggests under which conditions this is the case. Keywords Willingness to pay, Ethical consumerism, Negative corporate social disclosure, Transparency, Food and agricultural ethical issues, Public awareness, Consumerism, Disclosure, Social responsibility Paper type Research paper

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British Food Journal Vol. 115 No. 1, 2013 pp. 162-189 q Emerald Group Publishing Limited 0007-070X DOI 10.1108/00070701311289939

1. Introduction Any company confronted with ethical issues faces a dilemma regarding the choice of being open about them or remaining quiet. The question of how transparent and truthful corporate communication should be becomes more difcult if they have been involved in unethical business practices. After all, the purpose of corporate social communication is to manage public response. While extensive research has examined the effect of a companys positive social practices on stakeholders, less attention has been paid to the impact of corporate disclosures of ethical infractions. In this paper we investigate whether a rm necessarily incurs economic damage from the disclosure of
For their invaluable contributions, the author owes her special thanks to Marc Le Menestrel, Michael Bashshur and Gert Cornelissen who enthusiastically have always supported her studies.

ethical infractions. We suggest a number of conditions under which this is not the case. These ndings could guide a rms decision to resolve such dilemmas and encourage them to be more open about their questionable practices. For instance, should a chocolate company admit that there are issues of child slavery at cocoa plantations and, if it does so, is it harmful to admit the company is not able to guarantee slave-free chocolate? These questions are relevant in the context of corporate social responsibility (CSR) communication, which increasingly takes a more prominent place in managerial thinking (Bhattacharya et al., 2008; Bronn and Vrioni, 2001; Gelb and Strawser, 2001; Greeneld, 2004; Hartman et al., 2007; Kolk, 2003; Maignan and Ralston, 2002; McWilliams et al., 2006; Morsing and Schultz, 2006; Pearce and Doh, 2005; Vogue, 2005). As issues of environmental protection, sustainability, climate change, working conditions, and labor rights in developing nations continue to gain more attention around the globe, many corporations have included and emphasized a CSR component in their mission statement (Astous and Legendre, 2009; CAFOD, 1998; Elliott and Freeman, 2005; Marymount University Center for Ethical Concerns, 1999). In parallel with the increasing investments in CSR communication, the idea that companies have a responsibility to have a positive impact on the social community in which they operate has become a common expectation of stakeholders (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2004; Lichtenstein et al., 2004). Likewise, previous research has shown that consumers respond favorably to corporations perceived to engage in socially responsible activities, expressed in increased consumer expenditures on goods and services identied as being ethical (Billock, 2004; Co-operative Bank, 2006; Dawkins, 2004; National Statistics, 2006). However, the transition to ethical practices and communication is not without its problems (Du and Bhattacharya, 2010; Lindgreen et al., 2009; Lindgreen and Swaen, 2010; Maon et al., 2009). Most companies hesitate to engage in a more active public discourse about the ethical challenges they face. Understandably, they prefer to disclose favorable statements. On the other hand, recent research has suggested that companies could benet by voluntarily disclosing negative information regarding specic CSR issues in terms of consumer purchase preferences in a comparative context in which consumer are given simultaneously more than one (Aktar and Le Menestrel, 2010). The current study focuses on how consumers willingness to pay (WTP) might be affected by the disclosure of negative CSR information and whether public awareness regarding a particular ethical issue moderates the effect of negative information disclosure on the consumers WTP. Companies facing a potentially controversial CSR issue can respond in a number of ways. First, they can opt to avoid mentioning or disclosing information connected to the matter at hand (no disclosure). Second, they can acknowledge the existence of the issue and specify that they are not involved in any of those unethical activities arising from the issue (positive disclosure). Third, they may acknowledge the issue, admit their role in it and commit to eradicate the problematic practices (negative disclosure). Within the context of cocoa production in West Africa and the surrounding ethical issues of child labor and slavery, we study the impact of voluntary negative disclosure in terms of the consumers willingness to pay (WTP) for the product. Furthermore, we reveal whether public awareness of CSR

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issues moderates the relationship between voluntary negative social disclosure and WTP. 2. Literature review 2.1. Ethical consumption and WTP With steadily growing frequency, individuals identify themselves as ethical consumers and choose to support companies that care about ethical aspects in their production and trading processes (Harrison et al., 2005; Strong, 1996). The literature denes ethical consumption as: . the purchase of products that are produced and sold maintaining ethical standards and promoting issues such as environmental protection, human rights, and animal rights; . the boycott of companies that are involved in unethical practices; . post-consumption behaviors such as recycling; and . controlling excessive consumption (Auger et al., 2003; Cherrier, 2007; Doane, 2001; Harrison et al., 2005; Jackson, 2006; Newholm and Shaw, 2007). Revealing philanthropic and altruistic motives as the main drivers behind ethical consumption, the literature also shows that consumers may also choose to consume ethically to position themselves in an elite, distinct social class (Shaw and Newholm, 2002). The decision-making matrix for ethical consumption not only involves ethical considerations, but also extends to consumer buying factors as price, product quality, taste, brand familiarity, convenience, cultural values and family values (Harrison et al., 2005). Hence, in ethical consumption, the ethical aspect associated with the manufacturing of the product is only one of the characteristics considered by the consumer. Contingent upon specic factors, some consumers report that they also would be willing to pay a price premium for ethical products (Blend and Van Ravenswaay, 1999; Loureiro and Lotade, 2005; Maietta, 2003; Trudel and Cotte, 2008). A survey reveals that about 46 percent of Europeans are willing to pay more for ethical products (MORI, 2000). However, research still is inconclusive as to the amount of premium consumers, in general, would be willing to pay for products identied as ethical. Price premium that consumers would be willing to pay for ethical products, reported in previous studies, range from 2 percent to 28 percent for different products (DePelsmacker et al., 2005; Devinney et al., 2006; Elliott and Freeman, 2005; Loureiro and Lotade, 2005). The lack of consensus indicates that various factors including specic ethical issues involved, industry market, cultural contexts, and the price category of the targeted product all moderate the impact on consumer WTP. Additionally, some research suggests that ethical products might appear more attractive if they are more expensive. For some, such product may be used as status symbol to display their nancial well being (Griskevicius et al., 2010). Given the increase in ethical consumerism and price premium for ethical products, we hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, consumer WTP will be higher for products of companies associated with positive corporate social disclosure relative to companies, which has no social disclosure.

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On the other hand, consumers might decide to punish irresponsible business practices by decreasing their WTP or avoiding purchasing the products of rms involved in unethical practices (Trudel and Cotte, 2008). A number of studies demonstrate a negativity bias referring to the fact that consumers punishment tends to be stronger than their rewarding behavior in terms of WTP (Dean, 2004; Henard, 2002; Trudel and Cotte, 2008). Consumers seem more receptive to information regarding irresponsible practices as negative information is considered more informative, diagnostic, unique, unexpected, and, hence, more memorable (Henard, 2002). One study showed that 67 percent of European and US consumers claim to have boycotted a food, drink or personal care product on ethical grounds (Datamonitor, 2005). Another indicated the publicized cases of fraud on food packaging such as incorrect claims regarding product origin, organic farming, or the product being free of genetically modied ingredients would signicantly decrease WTP (Ravilious, 2006). Despite of the evidence on consumer punishment to unethical practices, we hypothesize that voluntary disclosure of unethical practices by companies will not decrease consumer WTP if such a disclosure explicitly states its commitment to eliminate them and be transparent regarding the process. We believe that consumers will not perceive such a disclosure same as having simply irresponsible actions as acknowledgement of such issue and commitment to solve them signals companys sincere objective to be ethical. Results of a recent study, which analyzes the impact of voluntary negative social disclosure on consumer preference to buy, in the presence of a contrast effect, support our hypothesis (Aktar and Le Menestrel, 2010). Contrast effect occurs when an objects evaluation moves away from a point of reference as opposed to assimilation that occurs when it moves towards a desired point of reference (Meyers-Levy and Sternthal, 1993; Sherif and Hovland, 1961). Applied to our context contrast effect suggests that, consumer evaluation of a rm who voluntarily discloses negative information would be positively affected when the consumer can compare that message with another message containing no social disclosure, because no disclosure is assumed to withhold information and not be transparent. Consumer evaluations of negative social disclosure will be negatively affected when the consumer compares it with a message containing disclosure of only ethically responsible activities (Levin et al., 1996; Nam and Sternthal, 2008). Yet, Aktar and Le Menestrel (2010) reveal consumers do not punish companies that acknowledge their ethical infractions and act to solve them when evaluated in contrast to a company that states its is free of any ethical violation. Their ndings further suggest that consumers whose awareness is raised by a third party message on the relevant ethical issue may even reward companies who are committed to solve their unethical practices. Other research streams have attempted to create a prole of the socially responsible consumers. These studies fail to reach to a consensus, however, regarding the typical characteristics that ethical consumers share (DePelsmacker et al., 2005). Demographics remain the most widely used basis of classication, yet their signicance remains debatable as the literature provides contradictory ndings on the predictive power of gender, age, income and employment (Carrigan and Attalla, 2001; Cowe and Williams, 2000; Dickson, 2000; Maignan and Ferrell, 2001; MORI, 2000; Roberts, 1996a; Sikula and Costa, 1994; Tsalikis and Ortiz-Buonana, 1990; Witkowski and Reddy, 2010). Two studies report that education is the only demographic variable that predicts

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consumers WTP for ethical products (Devinney et al., 2006; McGoldrick and Freestone, 2008). In addition to demographic variables, other research in this direction nds that individuals personal pro-social values, perceived consumer effectiveness, liberalism, idealism, social engagement behaviors, alienation and culture signicantly impact ethical consumption behavior (DePelsmacker et al., 2005; Dickson, 2000; Pepper et al., 2009; Robert, 1996a and 1996b; Witkowski and Reddy, 2010). 2.2 Corporate transparency and consumer awareness In addition to the studies on ethical consumption, another line of research related with our study is the corporate transparency literature (see, e.g. Hebb, 2006; Hess, 2007, 2008). As disclosing negative information likely is counterintuitive for companies, CSR reports include primarily positive information (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Cho and Patten, 2007; Deegan and Rankin, 1996; Gozali et al., 2002). However, corporate transparency should refer to information disclosure not only on positive activities but also to information about a companys ethical infractions. In this context recent studies have explored the impact of corporate environmental transparency on consumer behavior. Two main streams of research concerning this issue can be identied. The rst argues that greater informational transparency would not improve market performance, as consumers would use the information to put pressure on the companies to act and correct the infractions they may be involved in (see, e.g. Bansal and Kistruck, 2006; Hendry, 2006). On the other hand, several studies reveal greater informational transparency would improve favorable consumer behaviors as such transparency is considered a requirement for corporate social accountability, which, in turn, leads to consumer trust (Reynolds and Yuthas, 2008; Tapscott and Ticoll, 2003). Supporting this second line of argument, a recent empirical study by Vaccaro and Echeverri (2010) concludes that informational transparency impacts consumer behavior positively as perceived company transparency predicts consumer pro-environmental behavior. These ndings support our hypothesis that consumers will not punish voluntary negative social disclosure given the company is committed to eliminate unethical practices, as consumers will value positively companys transparency regarding its ethical issues. Another important issue, which emerges in the corporate transparency literature, concerns awareness. Joergens (2006) states that consumers cannot be sure whether they consume ethically because they lack information both regarding the product and the result of their choices. Therefore, increasing consumer awareness becomes a prerequisite for increasing ethical consumption (Barnett et al., 2005; Lee and Shin, 2010; Wigley, 2008). However, Vaccaro and Echeverri (2010) reveal that consumer awareness on environmental issues, even though it improves a consumers pro-environmental behavior, is negatively related with the perceived transparency of companies. Hence, in addition to the studies discussing the positive impact of awareness on a consumers pro-environmental behaviors (Christman and Taylor, 2002; Clark et al., 2003), Vaccaro and Echeverri (2010) suggest raising awareness on environmental issue is a difcult task, which requires a medium-term to long-term investment, careful analysis of consumers expected level of information and which should be supported by the national educational system (Roberts, 1996b). The most common ways to increase consumer awareness are print and visual media of which the latter has been found to

be more effective in persuading the audience and changing their attitudes (McLuhan, 1994, Nasser and McEven, 1976; OConnell et al., 2004). In addition, the literature highlights the potential of information disclosure through information and communication technologies such as Internet-based interactive communication channels (e.g. blogs, social networks and company webpage) in achieving more effective communication (Vaccaro and Madsen, 2010). Given the proven role of awareness to increase ethical consumerism, we hypothesize that consumers, whose awareness on the relevant social issue is raised by a media report, will reward companies that acknowledge their ethical infractions and eliminate them in terms of their WTP. 2.3 Child labor exploitation at cocoa plantations Among the most extensively documented ongoing ethical controversies is the use of child labor and slavery in the companies associated with cocoa production. Conrmed reports indicate there may be 280,000 children being forced to work in severe conditions, 200,000 of them in the Ivory Coast alone (International Labour Organization: International Programme on Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC), 2005). While some children in Third World countries voluntarily work, many are forced into labor at the risk of suffering physical punishment and psychological abuse (Dunaway, 2003, p. 135; Drachman and Shank, 2003, pp. 152-159). In the cocoa plantations, most of the child laborers are purchased from slave trafckers in a one-time bulk fee arrangement and are rarely, if ever, paid directly for their work. Provided only with basic amenities of food and shelter, plantation laborers usually work for twelve or more hours with little time for sufcient rest. While some are able to leave by the time they reach their mid-teen years, most child laborers have little or no option of ending their indentured service for fear of being abandoned and deported out of the country to uncertain conditions for survival (Kielland and Tovo, 2006, pp. 154-156). Human rights and labor groups from around the globe have consistently called upon cocoa harvesting units and plantation owners to revise their labor practices and to employ adults at reasonable wages (Bass, 2004, pp. ii, 4; Off, 2007, p. 211). Abandoning the use of child labor would also mean stimulating employment as well as ending the exploitative practices of slave trafcking (Elliott and Freeman, 2005). Despite a multitude of reports about the child labor problem at cocoa plantations, most of the chocolate manufacturing conglomerates have ignored petitions calling for the placement of a slave-free mark on product wrappers. Spokespeople for the manufacturers often have adopted the strategic tactic of not disclosing any information or disclosing they had nothing to do with purchasing cocoa harvested and processed by means of forced labor. The Chocolate Manufacturers Association lobbied successfully to stop a proposed bill in the US Congress that would have forced the companies to put a slave-free label on their products, claiming that such legislation would trigger a consumer boycott of all products from the Ivory Coast (Chatterjee, 2001, pp. 21-23). One of the bills sponsors, US Representative Eliot L. Engel from New York, said legislation was needed as a corrective because while the chocolate manufacturers had the power to guarantee an end to exploitative labor practices, yet

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they refused to do so because the practices, in effect, had strengthened their nancial and market positions in an intensely competitive industry (Chatterjee, 2001, pp. 21-23). In 2008, reports emerged that Cargill, a major conglomerate manufacturer of cocoa products that have a strong brand presence in the US, had been complicit in child labor (Parenti, 2008). Cargill responded by enacting a loan program for Ivory Coast farmers and workers but there were reports that those individuals who could not satisfy their outstanding debts were either jailed or conscripted to cultivate cocoa on their farmland or forced to work at the companys farms along with their families. The company denied the allegations in calling it a serious misinterpretation, the companys spokespersons suggested that farm owners had signed special contracts as per stated within Cargills CSR documents which had explicitly denounced the use of slavery in production (Parenti, 2008). More recently, for many chocolate manufacturers, the ethical dimensions of environmental issues of going green and sustainability appear to have eclipsed the focus on child slave labor in terms of CSR initiatives (Ethics World, 2009). Cadburys CSR goals cite a fair trade brand-mark partnership, which permits the company to purchase more cocoa directly from farmers to their economic benet (Ethics World, 2009). Meanwhile, Nestle did not mention the slavery issue in a recent CSR report preferring to concentrateonissuesinvolvingwaterconservationandobesity.Similarly,theCSRreports of other chocolate manufacturers only mentioned slavery in limited text citations, indicating their preference to keep the issue off the public radar (Ethics World, 2009). 3. Hypotheses Earlier research indicated that companies could benet from voluntarily disclosing negative information regarding their CSR issues in terms of consumer buying preference, if consumers could compare that information with statements from non-disclosing rms (Aktar and Le Menestrel, 2010). As a result, the company is ideally positioned for proactive responses in avoiding future ethical infractions and keeping consumers apprised of the ethical issues involved in their industry. The current study investigates consumer responses to a single CSR message. We evaluate the impact of negative social disclosure when the consumer does not have immediate access to other messages they can use as references. Specically, we observe how disclosures regarding ethical practices inuence consumer WTP. If a company that voluntarily discloses negative CSR information is truly committed to eliminate the social problem and is transparent regarding how it will do so, either with the intent of resolving the problem and/or of minimizing the potential risk of negative publicity that could arise from no or wrong disclosure, the following hypotheses are proposed: H1. Consumers WTP will be higher for the companies with a positive CSR message relative to companies that dont mention anything regarding the CSR issue. H2. Consumers WTP will be equal for companies that voluntarily disclose negative CSR information relative to companies with positive CSR disclosure. H3. Public awareness of the relevant CSR issue moderates the effect of disclosure strategy on consumers WTP. When awareness is high, we expect consumer responses to negative disclosure to be relatively less negative.

4. Methodology 4.1 Participants and design A total of 120 undergraduate students anonymously participated in the study in exchange for money. Twenty participants were assigned to each experimental condition. The sample comprised of 75 female (62.5 percent) and 45 (37.5 percent) male students randomly selected from the student population at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona, whose overall average monthly spending was 843.87 e (SD 200.81) with an average age of 20.79 (SD 2.06). The experimental design included two between-subjects factor (see Table I). We manipulated public awareness (watching a video clip on child labor in the chocolate industry versus no video) and communication strategy (no disclosure, positive disclosure, and negative disclosure). The video that half of the participants viewed was an 18-minute version of a daily television/radio news program as broadcasted at http:// democracynow.org (Democracy Now, 2008). The edited version used for the experiment involved actual clips from the organisations original video. Regarding communication strategy, equal proportions of our partipicants were randomly given one of the following three statements, supposedly published by a rm in the chocolate industry: (1) A no disclosure statement in which there is no mention of child labor and slavery issues involved at cocoa production; (2) Positive disclosure statement in which the issues of child labor and slavery are acknowledged but the company states explicity that its products are free and clear of such or (3) A negative discosure statement in which issues of child labor and slavery are acknowledged and the company cannot guarantee that its products are free from those concerns, but it outlines plans to assure that its products are free of all forms of exploitative labor. 4.2 Procedure At the beginning of the session, all participants, regardless of experimental condition, were asked to estimate the typical price of a 125 gram chocolate bar of their preference (i.e. milk or dark). This measure served as a baseline to control for individuals price estimates for a regular bar of chocolate. Participants subsequently answered questions regarding their chocolate consumption habits. Then, participants assigned to the video conditions (4, 5 and 6) watched the video. All participants, whether they watched the video or not, then were asked to read one of the relevant three CSR messages about a ctional chocolate manufacturer company (X) (see Appendix 1 for complete instructions, Figure A1).

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No disclosure No video Video Condition 1 Condition 4

Positive disclosure Condition 2 Condition 5

Negative disclosure Condition 3 Condition 6 Table I. Experimental design

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Following the reading of the CSR message, participants were asked to assign the price they would be willing to pay for six chocolate products from this particular chocolate company. Subsequently, participants completed measures described below (see Appendix 1 for complete instructions, Figure A1). 4.3 Measures . WTP. We asked each participant how much they would be willing to pay for a 125 gram chocolate bar of their preferred taste (i.e. milk or dark), produced by the ctional chocolate company. . Perceived consumer effectiveness (PCE) scale. The PCE scale consisted of four items, measured on a seven-point Likert-Scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) (adapted from Straughan and Roberts, 1999). The scale (Cronbachs alpha 0.78) measured individual perceptions of how much impact consumers can have, through their purchase decisions, to resolve the problem of child labor exploitation. . Control variables. To control for potential mood effects of our awareness manipulation, we included a ve items scale to measure mood (Pham, 1998). Additionally, we measured participants prior awareness of (seven items) and attitude regarding child labor practices at cocoa production by three items that both we created on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). We controlled for participants trust propensity by using three items from Rotters (1971) general trust scale. We also collected information about age, gender, and income level (see Appendix 2 (Table AI) for all scale reliabilities). 5. Results Outlier analysis of WTP responses suggested that the data of one participant should be excluded, for being more than three standard deviations away from the mean. Excluding this participant did not change any of the results. Then we analyzed which of our control variables responded to our experimental manipulations. We ran a multivariate ANOVA, with public awareness and disclosure type as independent variables. Awareness did not have a main effect on perceived consumer effectiveness. We found a signicant effect of disclosure type on attitude towards child labor exploitation (F(2,113) 3.17, p 0:046) and perceived consumer effectiveness (F(2,113) 4.91, p , 0:01). Participants in no-disclosure condition (M 5:65, SD 1:48) had a less negative attitude towards child labor than those in the positive disclosure group (M 6.27, SD 0.90) and negative disclosure conditions (M 6:14, SD 1:02). Attitudes of participants who read negative and positive disclosure did not differ. Regarding perceived consumer effectiveness, any kind of voluntary social disclosure, negative (M 5:46, SD 0:75) and positive (M 5:34, SD 0:88), led to higher perceived consumer effectiveness relative to no disclosure (M 4:89, SD 0:95). The public awareness manipulation had a signicant effect on mood (F(1,113) 51.13, p , 0:01) and a marginally signicant effect on attitude toward child labor exploitation (F(1,113) 3.53, p 0:06). Those who watched the video (M 3:90, SD 0:99) reported a worse mood than those who did not (M 5:12, SD 0:85). In addition, those who watched the video had a less tolerant attitude towards child labor (M 6:22, SD 1:08) relative to those who did not watch

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the video (M 5.82, SD 1.25). The observed interaction of disclosure type and awareness did not affect control variables. Correlation analysis revealed that participants prior awareness, trust propensity and mood were not signicantly correlated with WTP, whereas attitude towards exploitation (r 0:21, p , 0:03), perceived consumer effectiveness (r 0:243, p , 0:01) and estimated typical price of a chocolate bar (r 0:558, p , 0:01) were. Then, we evaluated which of those variables explained WTP by an ANOVA analysis. We found that participants prior awareness, trust propensity and attitude towards child labor exploitation were not signicant predictors of WTP, whereas perceived consumer effectiveness (F(1,107) 16.59, p , 0:01) and estimated typical price of a chocolate bar (F(1,107) 81.25, p , 0:01) and mood (F(1,107) 4.28, p 0:04) were. Those variables that were signicantly related with WTP and affected by our manipulations were included in the analysis as covariates. An ANCOVA was generated to determine the effect of disclosure type and awareness of the ethical issue on WTP, controlling for estimated typical price, mood, perceived consumer effectiveness and attitude toward exploitation (see Appendix 3 (Table AII) for parameter estimates). The overall ANCOVA was signicant (F(9, 109) 15.75, p , 0:01, partial h2 0:565, power 1.00). The covariates estimated typical price (F(1, 109) 83.81, p , 0:01), mood (F(1, 109) 4.32, p 0:04) and perceived consumer effectiveness (F(1, 109) 16.78, p , 0:01) had a signicant effect while attitude toward exploitation (F(1, 108) , 1) did not. WTP was higher for participants who had a higher estimated price of a regular 125 gr. chocolate bar and for those who reported a higher level of PCE. Lower mood scores were related to higher levels of WTP. We found a main effect of disclosure type (F(2, 109) 9.06, p , 0:01), but not of public awareness (F(1, 109) , 1). This main effect was qualied by a signicant interaction between disclosure type and public awareness (F(2, 109) 4.44, p , 0:02, see Figure 1). Based on these results, we conrm our H3, which states that awareness moderates the effect of disclosure of negative information on WTP. To probe the interaction, we tested pair wise contrasts of the estimated cell means.

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Figure 1. Estimated marginal means of WTP by disclosure and awareness

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Regarding participants whose awareness was not raised (i.e. those in the no video condition), there was no effect of disclosure type on WTP, rejecting our H1 and accepting our H2 (see Appendix 4 (Table AIII) for parameter estimates). Participants WTP in the no disclosure (M 2:31, SD 0:65), positive disclosure (M 2:41, SD 0:84) and negative disclosure conditions (M 2:41, SD 0:94) did not differ signicantly (F(2,52) , 1). Regarding participants who did watch the video, however, WTP was higher if they had read a CSR statement including negative disclosure (M 2:72, SD 0:95) and positive disclosure (M 2:50, SD 1:25) than in the case of reading a statement in which the rm did not disclose any information (M 1:59, SD 0:61, F(2,53) 10.39, p , 0:01). For viewers of the video, there was no difference regardless of whether the disclosure statement was positive or negative (see Appendix 5 (Table AIV) for parameter estimates). For those participants who read a CSR message in which there was no disclosure regarding child labor, the WTP of those who were made aware (M 1:54, SD 0:61) of the existence of child labor was lower than for those who were not (M 1:94, SD 0:65, F(1,34) 4.76, p , 0:04) (see Appendix 6 (Table AV) for parameter estimates). For those participants who read a CSR message in which the rm states it is free of any involvement with child labor exploitation (i.e. positive disclosure), WTP did not differ signicantly (F(1,33) 1.11, p 0:30) for participants who watched the video (M 2:76, SD 1:25) relative to participants who did not (M 2:38, SD 0:84) (see Appendix 7 (Table AVI) for parameter estimates). Likewise, for those participants who read a CSR message in which the rm did disclose but could not guarantee that its products were free of child labor exploitation (i.e. negative disclosure), awareness does not have an effect (F(1,34) , 1) on WTP (video viewers M 2:69, SD 0:95 vs not video viewers M 2:64, SD 0:94) (see Appendix 8 (Table AVII) for parameter estimates). Discussion We tested how communication affects consumers responses for rms, which are active in an industry struggling with an ethical issue. The results of our study suggest that if public awareness regarding the certain ethical issue is limited, neither positive nor negative voluntary disclosure of social issues has a substantial effect on consumers WTP. Therefore, if a managers sole objective is to improve consumers WTP, it does not matter whether the rm discloses her practices regarding these ethical issues. In particular, it is very important that negative disclosure does not a cause a decrease in WTP. This is an interesting nding, considering the fact that consumers WTP should not be the sole objective of corporate communication. Transparency and making information freely available should be additional motivators to disclose ethical infractions as part of social responsibility. These results conrm that rms should not hesitate to disclose publicly their ethical dilemmas or predicaments, given they are truly committed to eliminating them when the public awareness is low (Aktar and Le Menestrel, 2010). Additionally, both positive and negative disclosure results in higher levels of PCE, which is one of the main determinants of ethical consumer behavior (Roberts, 1996b). Although these effects do not directly translate into a larger WTP,

they are likely to improve consumer loyalty, brand image and other desirable long-term effects. When awareness is high, results indicate that both positive and negative voluntary social disclosure, lead to higher WTP than no disclosure. In this case, disclosing rms are better off, as consumers seem willing to punish those companies that do not disclose any information. Hence companies should disclose their ethical infractions when there is public awareness on the relevant social issue. Another important result is the predictive power of PCE on WTP. This emphasizes the relevance of a consumer empowerment component in campaigning on social issues. If consumers believe that each euro they spend makes a difference, they are more likely to incorporate considerations of an ethical dimension into their consumption decisions. The ndings contribute to the growing body of literature on ethical consumerism by demonstrating that transparency on ethical infractions might benet rm performance in a specic context (i.e. high awareness, no contrast), where consumers would be wiling to pay more for the products of transparent companies with a genuinely accountable commitment to eliminate their problems regardless of the prospect of disclosing negative information (i.e. they can or cannot ensure their products and operations included unethical practices). This complements previous ndings that for a communication strategy regarding unethical practices to be successful, it should include a commitment to eliminate ethical infractions, when they are identied (Aktar and Le Menestrel, 2010). Awareness strengthens consumer perceptions and attention to ethical consumption according to their response in the marketplace to the different ways in which information is disclosed. The ndings partially support existing consumer behavior literature that suggests that awareness will increase ethical consumerism. More specically, with regard to labor exploitation at the cocoa plantations, the ndings suggest at least tangentially that a broad, deep awareness of the ethical issues involved would not lead necessarily to a total consumer boycott of goods as professional industry lobbyists might otherwise have warned. Apparently, companies hesitate to take the risk of disclosing negative information, preferring instead to underestimate the consumers capacity for appreciating meaningfully and positively a company that voluntarily discloses its involvement in a controversial ethical problem. In addition, consumers might give companies the redemptive benet of the doubt in terms of corrective action. Unfortunately, the existing literature and periodic media reports suggest that, at least, many multinational chocolate companies prefer strategies that ultimately distract the public rather than directly address the problem. And, as in an earlier study (Aktar and Le Menestrel, 2010) regarding the impact of competing CSR messages from two companies with different disclosure strategies, our ndings suggest also without a contrast effect, companies shouldnt hesitate to be transparent regarding their social problems. 7. Limitations The current study was limited to self-reported WTP, Therefore, the translation of the results into an accurate account of how actual buying behavior would be affected remains a further research question. In addition, only one aspect of the decision-making process in consumer buying behavior was examined rather than the much broader approach that includes many relevant factors targeting a consumers

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preference for product. One also must acknowledge that ethical consumption involves more costs than offered in the experimental conditions of the study, especially those relating to the search for information about corporate social responsibility and ethical products. Finally, the results are based on experiments conducted on undergraduate students. We constructed our design so that both control and treatment groups are drawn from the same population and we looked at treatment effects. Although chocolate is a common good consumed by students and we would expect a similar attitude toward it from different social groups, replication of this analysis with different consumer groups would be needed to show the robustness of our ndings. 8. Future research Future studies might reveal the step-by-step process of how disclosure type and awareness translate into consumers WTP. Also, our study incorporated just a single media platform for increasing awareness. Future studies, taking in account the nature and credibility of the information source, might, for example, look at the effect of negative disclosure when the company in question is the primary source for the awareness-building campaign and when it is compared to external trusted sources of information. Additionally, communication channel can also be manipulated. Consumers often do not seek CSR information but they are exposed to it through channels such as editorial coverage on television and in the press, stakeholder word-of-mouth or corporate communication channels, including high prole cause-oriented marketing campaigns, advertising or point of purchase communications. Such communication channels might affect the responses to a negative disclosure in a different way than a corporate website. The current study also could be replicated with other social problems about which the publics prior awareness of the social issue is already high and the focus would be on which manner and type of disclosure strategy would trigger the most signicant changes in consumer WTP. Another possibility is to examine the effect of negative informations long-term effects on perceived sincerity, trust, attitude towards companies and consumer loyalty. Finally, as discussed in the previous section, the robustness if our ndings could be tested in a further study where consumers make their choices in a naturally occurring setting. 9. Conclusion What should corporate managers do when faced with an ethical problem? Given the intensity of market conditions in many industries, when companies face an ethical issue, the obvious default action appears to cover it up, even if the company is doing efforts to resolve the issue through less visible channels. Instinctively, many managers fear risking negative reactions from the media and, in turn, consumers and the general public. However, this protocol of managerial attitude and response compromises the promotion of sustainable business and ethical consumerism as it underestimates the importance of those ethical problems, decreases the efcacy of a proposed solution and falsely soothes companies pretending that they do not have a problem. Contrary to the conventional belief that consumers would not buy a product because of any negative information, managers and stakeholders such as consumers must be able to see beyond the negative information itself especially where consumers are increasingly becoming familiar with the inevitable dynamics of living in a global marketplace. Once consumers

become aware of negative information associated with a companys connection to a controversial ethical problem or issue, it becomes economically, managerially, and socially unfeasible to pretend that a problem does not exist. For managers and executives, the strategy represents unforeseen costs that could have been avoided had the company taken the opportunity to acknowledge the problem and make consumers aware of any corrective actions. When there is awareness, consumers likely will reward the companies that publicly disclose, regardless of the positive or negative nature of the information being shared. In other words, voluntary negative social disclosure likely will not damage a companys position, given it acts denitively to resolve the issue and is transparent in the process. The response of other stakeholders is as critical, including other companies in the industry identied as ethically responsible, nonprot agencies, government, and others directly and indirectly connected to the company and industry in question. In the longer term, consumers also will be lulled out of their traditional comfort zones and will be challenged to think more comprehensively about the individual and collective impact of consumer behavior and the growing importance of ethical consumerism in many industries, most notably food and agriculture in which public debates seem to be multiplying in exponential form.
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Appendix 1

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Figure A1. Instructions

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Figure A1.

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Figure A1.

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Figure A1.

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Figure A1.

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Scales Attitude towards child labor exploitation Mood Perceived consumer effectiveness Prior Information on the CSR issue Trust Propensity

Cronbachs alpha 0.649 0.916 0.782 0.828 0.729

Number of items 3 5 4 7 3

Table AI. Scale reliabilities

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Parameter Intercept typicalprice mood Consumer effectiveness Attitude exploitation [disclosure 1.00] [disclosure 2.00] [disclosure 3.00] [video 0.00] [video 1.00] [disclosure 1.00] * [video 0.00] [disclosure 1.00] * [video 1.00] [disclosure 2.00] * [video .00] [disclosure 2.00] * [video 1.00] [disclosure 3.00] * [video .00] [disclosure 3.00] * [video 1.00]

B 2 0.269 0.928 2 0.143 0.313 2 0.002 0.148 0.193 0b 2 0.617 0b 0.758 0b 0.896 0b 0b 0b

Std. error 0.628 0.101 0.069 0.076 0.056 0.234 0.233 0.238 0.318 0.320
b

t 2 0.428 9.155 2 2.078 4.096 2 0.038 0.632 0.829 2 2.590

Sig. 0.669 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.970 0.529 0.409 0.011

95% condence interval Lower Upper bound bound 2 1.514 0.727 2 0.279 0.161 2 0.114 2 0.316 2 0.268 2 1.089 0.129 0.262 0.976 1.129 2 0.007 0.464 0.109 0.613 0.654 2 0.145 1.388 1.530

Partial eta squared 0.002 0.435 0.038 0.133 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.058 0.050 0.067

2.386 0.019

2.801 0.006

Table AII. Parameter estimates of ANCOVA Analysis of WTP as the dependent variable with all participants

Notes: a. Computed using alpha 0.05; The parameter is set to zero because it is redundant; Disclosure: 1 positive disclosure/2 negative disclosure/3 no disclosure (reference group); Video: 0 having watched the video/1 not watched the video (reference group); When awareness is not raised by a video, relative to no disclosure (reference group), positive disclosure (disclosure 1) and negative disclosure (disclosure 2) respectively results in 0.148 e and 0.193 e higher WTP, which are both not signicant; In order to comment on the effect of disclosure on WTP when participants see the video, we will conduct further analysis as the interaction variable is signicant

Appendix 4
95% condence interval Lower Upper bound bound 2 1.133 0.737 2 0.146 0.207 2 0.456 2 0.292 2 0.293 1.772 1.123 0.118 0.535 2 0.131 0.498 0.488

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B 0.320 0.930 2 0.014 0.371 2 0.293 0.103 0.097 0a Std. error 0.724 0.096 0.066 0.082 0.081 0.197 0.195 t Sig. Partial eta squared 0.004 0.638 0.001 0.280 0.198 0.005 0.005 Table AIII. Parameter estimates of ANCOVA analysis of WTP as the dependent variable with participants who did not watch the video

Parameter Intercept typicalprice Attitude exploitation Consumer effectiveness Mood [disclosure 1.00] [disclosure 2.00] [disclosure 3.00]

0.441 0.661 9.675 0.000 2 0.215 0.830 4.541 2 3.615 0.524 0.501 0.000 0.001 0.602 0.619

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Notes: aThis parameter is set to zero because it is redundant; b. R squared 75.1 percent

Appendix 5

Parameter Intercept typicalprice Attitude_ exploitation consumer_ effectiveness Mood [disclosure 1.00] [disclosure 2.00] [disclosure 3.00]

B 2 1.137 0.945 0.017 0.251 2 0.034 0.912 1.128 0a

Std. error 0.940 0.171 0.088 0.131 0.107 0.256 0.264

Sig.

95% condence interval Lower Upper bound bound 2 3.022 0.601 2 0.160 2 0.011 2 0.248 0.399 0.599 0.748 1.288 0.194 0.513 0.180 1.426 1.657

Partial eta squared 0.027 0.365 0.001 0.065 0.002 0.194 0.257

2 1.209 0.232 5.523 0.000 0.191 0.849 1.925 2 0.318 3.567 4.278 0.060 0.752 0.001 0.000

Notes: aThis parameter is set to zero because it is redundant; b. R-squared: 47.2 percent; when participants watch the video, relative to no disclosure, positive disclosure results in 0.912 e higher WTP and negative disclosure with 1.128 e higher WTP

Table AIV. Parameter estimates of ANCOVA analysis of WTP as the dependent variable with participants who watched the video

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Parameter

B 0.363 0.870 2 0.088 0.164 2 0.022 2 0.393 0a

Std. error 0.595 0.125 0.049 0.076 0.072 0.180

95 % condence interval Lower Upper Sig. bound bound 2 0.845 0.616 2 0.188 0.010 2 0.168 2 0.758 1.571 1.124 0.012 0.319 0.124 2 0.027

Partial eta squared 0.011 0.587 0.085 0.121 0.003 0.123

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Table AV. Parameter estimates of ANCOVA analysis of WTP as the dependent variable with participants who read the no disclosure statement

Intercept typicalprice Attitude exploitation Consumer effectiveness Mood [video 0.00] [video 1.00]

0.610 0.546 6.958 0.000 2 1.782 0.084 2.159 0.038 2 0.306 0.761 2 2.183 0.036

Notes: aThis parameter is set to zero because it is redundant; b R-squared: 60.3 percent

Appendix 7

Parameter Intercept typicalprice Attitude exploitation Consumer effectiveness Mood [video 0.00] [video 1.00]

B 2 1.540 0.956 0.232 0.194 2 0.051 0.384 0a

Std. error 1.532 0.181 0.168 0.170 0.181 0.364

Sig.

95% condence interval Lower Upper bound bound 2 4.658 0.588 2 0.110 2 0.152 2 0.420 2 0.358 1.577 1.323 0.573 0.540 0.318 1.125

Partial eta squared 0.030 0.459 0.054 0.038 0.002 0.032

2 1.005 0.322 5.287 0.000 1.378 0.178 1.140 0.262 2 0.283 0.779 1.052 0.300

Table AVI. Parameter estimates of ANCOVA analysis of WTP as the dependent variable with participants who read the positive disclosure statement

Notes: aThis parameter is set to zero because it is redundant; b. R-squared: 49.1 percent

Appendix 8

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B 2 1.164 0.799 0.171 0.529 2 0.333 0.048 0a Std. error 1.285 0.195 0.107 0.143 0.107 0.275 t Sig. 95% condence interval Lower Upper bound bound 2 3.774 0.402 2 0.046 0.239 2 0.551 2 0.511 1.447 1.196 0.387 0.818 2 0.116 0.608 Partial eta squared 0.024 0.330 0.070 0.288 0.222 0.001

Parameter Intercept typicalprice Attitude exploitation Consumer effectiveness Mood [video 0.00] [video 1.00]

2 0.906 0.371 4.093 0.000 1.605 0.118 3.706 0.001 2 3.118 0.004 0.175 0.862

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Table AVII. Parameter estimates of ANCOVA analysis of WTP as the dependent variable with participants who read the negative disclosure statement

Notes: aThis parameter is set to zero because it is redundant; b. R-squared: 60.1 percent

About the author Ipek Aktar recently obtained her PhD in Management at Universitat Pompeu Fabra focusing on corporate social responsibility. She is interested in doing research on business ethics and credibility of ethical companies. Ipek Aktar can be contacted at: ipek.aktar@upf.edu

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