Espionage (Civ5)

Edit Talk0 3,493pages on this wiki Back to game concepts Espionage is a gameplay mechanics included in the Civilization V: Gods & Kings expansion pack. Reflecting quite well real-world spy activities, this mechanics introduces a new level of covert actions in the game, which will have effects on technological advancement, diplomacy and even City-State relations.

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Spy recruitment and mechanics

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Espionage starts in a game once any civilization enters the Renaissance Era - when philosophers such as Machiavelli finally do away with the ideals honor and decency, and nations realize everything is permitted in war to achieve victory. Whenever the first civilization in the game enters the Renaissance, every player recruits their first Spy at the same time. After that, whenever any civilization enters a new Era, they get an additional Spy. Also, building the National Intelligence Agency provides an extra Spy for whoever built it. Spies are recruited automatically (within the previously described conditions) - they don't need to be produced in a city, they simply appear in their Secret Hideout. Spies can be moved into cities from their Secret Hideout. You can only target cities you've discovered on the map. The movement takes only 1 turn (regardless of the city location on the map). After that, they take 3 turns to establish a surveillance network (5 turns for 'Making introductions' in case the Spy has been assigned as a Diplomat), after which they start their activities in the selected city and continue until given different orders. As of the Fall 2013 patch, if you have the influence level of Familiar, your spies will take only 1 turn to establish surveillance. This bonus also applies to higher influence levels. Spies may die during their activities (Killed in Action). This happens when they try to steal a Technology and encounter an enemy Spy doing counter-intelligence, or when they organize an unsuccessful coup in a City-State. Killed spies are replaced after a few turns by new recruits. You may boost your Espionage and counter-espionage by building certain buildings or wonders the Constabulary and the Police Station diminish the success rate of enemy spies attempting to steal technology in the city where they're built by 25% each; the Great Firewall World Wonder

makes technology theft in your whole empire close to impossible, and the National Intelligence Agency National Wonder levels up all your existing spies and decreases the effectiveness of enemy spies, besides giving you an additional Spy.

Diplomats

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In Civilization V: Brave New World, any Spy can be requalified as a Diplomat when you station him into the Capital of another civilization. A Diplomat has different uses from a Spy, mainly related to the new World Congress feature, although he may still be able to monitor the other nation's activities just like a Spy. Note that a Diplomat can go back to being a Spy by moving him again (the dialogue opens each time you move the Spy). Note: Both spies and diplomats abhor military action. Whenever you attack and capture a city where a spy is active (or when the enemy does the same), they immediately leave the nation for the Secret Hideout, where you can later re-dispatch them. The Diplomat, on the other hand, will be immediately withdrawn if you declare war on the nation he is serving, or vice-versa.

Spy abilities and activities

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What the spy actually does depends on where he's assigned to. There are four possible spy activities: 1. Surveillance - If you station a spy to another civilization's city, he will establish a surveillance network in the city, besides giving you vision of the city territory within two tiles, and the ability to enter its city screen. Much more importantly, he automatically screens for the civilization leader's intentions and activities. He will then warn you about their plans (e.g. "X is secretly plotting against Y"), although depending on the spy's experience level, he might not find many details about those plans. You may then use the information to gain some advantage, for example by warning the target about the plot. Diplomats also confer these benefits. 2. Technology theft - While in another civilization's city, your spy will also engage in stealing their technology. If the target civilization has no technologies you don't know, you'll receive a message, "Agent X can't steal from civilization Y because we've completely eclipsed them in research". Pay attention to a target city's science potential, before assigning the spy there! This potential depends on the number of citizens, and the presence of any anti-spy building or counter-intelligence activity. The greater the science potential, the faster the spy can steal a technology. Once a spy has established a surveillance network in a city, he will automatically evaluate its potential. Depending on the technological level of the target civilization, on the science potential of the target city, and on the experience level of the spy himself, he will steal a technology within a certain number of turns. This technology is one that the target civilization already has, and you have yet to discover (but have unlocked). Be careful, though! In the turn when stealing the technology, the spy exposes himself to a certain degree. If he's inexperienced, and the enemy has good counter-intelligence

measures in the city, they may discover the theft and who's responsible for it, leading to diplomatic outrage. Also, if there is an enemy spy in the city, doing counter-intelligence, he may discover and kill your spy, preventing the theft. 3. Election rigging - Stationing a spy in a City-State will set him to rig the local elections which occur regularly every 12 turns. If he's successful, the new City-State government will be more friendly to your civilization, and less friendly to others, meaning you'll gain Influence with the City-State, while others will lose it. Enemy spies may also be acting in the same City-State, and then the spy with better experience will have better chance to rig elections. Other bonuses may improve chances at rigging elections. 4. Coup d'tat - While in a City-State, your spy may also stage a coup. This is only possible when the City-State already has an ally. It is a dangerous course of action, because you risk losing your spy if the coup is unsuccessful. However, if successful, the City-State immediately allies itself with you, while their previous ally's Influence is reduced to the level of Influence you previously had on the City-State. The success rate of the coup tends to depend on your spy's experience level, the presence of other spies in the City-State, and your current Influence level with them (the higher your Influence, the more chance of success, because your spy may use the existing sympatizers to bolster the coup attempt). Staging a coup may be the only way of gaining a City-State as an ally when their current ally has enormous Influence and you have no practical hope of eclipsing it. It is also the only way of getting out of war with the City-State if you're already at war with their current ally. 5. Counter-intelligence - Stationing a spy in one of your own cities will have him doing counter-intelligence work. Whenever there is an enemy spy acting there, your spy will have a chance to discover and kill him.

Leveling up your spies

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Every spy can gather experience while acting, and reach higher levels. He starts at level 1 Recruit. He then moves to level 2 - Agent, and finally, to level 3 - Special Agent. For each higher experience level, the spy becomes more effective - He takes less turns to steal technologies, has higher success rate of election rigging and coups, and better chance to discover enemy spies (and kill them). Leveling up occurs each time the spy successfully steals a technology (whether or not he's partially discovered), or each time he kills an enemy spy. Apparently, rigging elections and staging coups aren't that important. As of the Fall 2013 patch, Spy activity may benefit from your cultural influence with the target civilization. When you reach influence level of Popular, all your Spies there act as if they were effectively 1 level higher than their actual level; at Influential they act at +2 levels!

Strategy

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Espionage may become very helpful to your civilization, if used wisely. If your science output is lagging, station one of your Spies in the capital of the fastest technology-developing civilization, and start making up for your low science output by stealing techs! If, on the other hand, your research is going pretty strong, and few other civilizations can match you, station your Spies in key City-States to gain influence with them. This is very important when pursuing a Diplomatic victory, but it could also be useful in many other cases. Also, don't forget to spare a spy (or two) to be stationed in your Capital (or one of your other cities with high potential) to make sure no one steals your technologies. Diplomats confer additional options, allowing you to speed up your Tourism on other civilizations, or to trade votes with them for the World Congress. In the hands of skilled players, these may turn into crucial advantages! The English civilization is especially effective at spying, because they get an extra spy as soon as any civilization enters the Renaissance Era. When playing as England, you should make sure you are using this advantage and expand it.
http://civilization.wikia.com/wiki/Espionage_%28Civ5%29

Navy spy case barely caused diplomatic ripples between Canada and Russia

Sub.-Lt. Jeffrey Paul Delisle leaves provincial court after pleading guilty to charges related to communicating information to a foreign entity, before his preliminary hearing in Halifax on Wednesday, Oct. 10, 2012. (Andrew Vaughan / CANADIAN PRESS)

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The Canadian Press Published Tuesday, May 28, 2013 2:15PM EDT Last Updated Tuesday, May 28, 2013 4:09PM EDT OTTAWA -- The arrest of a Canadian naval officer spying for Russia did little to discourage Canada from welcoming that country's defence chief to a Newfoundland meeting of Arctic nations last year. The visit underscored the puzzling lengths to which the Harper government went to carry on a business-as-usual relationship with the one-time Cold War adversary in the wake of the Jeffrey Delisle case. Documents obtained by The Canadian Press under the Access to Information Act show that when the scandal involving Delisle broke in January 2012, Canada had not yet asked a group of Arctic nations to an April meeting of chiefs of defence.

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Canadian allies 'angry with us' in wake of navy spy scandal U.S. looking over Canada's shoulder in wake of navy spy scandal: Sources CSIS knew of navy spy's activity but held file back from RCMP Ex-naval officer who sold secrets to Russia won't appeal sentence

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Sub.-Lt. Jeffrey Paul Delisle is escorted from provincial court in Halifax on Tuesday, Jan. 17, 2012. (Andrew Vaughan / THE CANADIAN PRESS) And yet -- despite the damage caused by Delisle's espionage on behalf of the Russians -- Gen. Nikolai Makarov was invited to and attended the get-together, meant to enhance co-operation between Arctic countries. Most other planned military contacts between the two nations last year -- including participation in the anti-terrorism exercise Operation Vigilant Eagle -- also remained curiously normal. It happened at a time when the Harper government was struggling to explain to its allies how a junior officer could filch a vast swath of top secret information without so much as raising an eyebrow within the Canadian Forces. The one sign something was amiss came when Defence Minister Peter MacKay abruptly, but quietly, cancelled a planned visit to Moscow. That decision, however, occurred in the fall of 2011, weeks before the RCMP began investigating Delisle and subsequently arrested him. Defence officials recently pointed to the cancellation as a concrete display of displeasure in the spy case. It suggests MacKay was aware of a secret investigation of Delisle by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service before the Mounties took over. Earlier this week, The Canadian Press revealed that CSIS had the junior naval officer under surveillance for months before the RCMP was called in to build a criminal case. Delisle, 42, pleaded guilty and was sentenced earlier this year to 20 years in prison. The Harper government has not publicly acknowledged that Russia was behind the espionage, a stance that is deliberate and was agreed upon internally from the beginning, said several government sources. The government has maintained its silence even though court records lay out the Cold War foil's actions. Asked whether the Russian ambassador had ever been called in, or if a demarche -- a formal diplomatic note -- was delivered to the Kremlin, a spokesman for Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird refused to discuss any action that might have been taken to protest Delisle's activities. "We don't comment on matters of national security," Rick Roth said in a terse response.

He did not explain how national security would be affected by discussing the potential fallout of an already concluded case. Even after the RCMP began its investigation of Delisle, defence officials fretted about the snub MacKay delivered to Moscow by cancelling his trip. In a late-December 2011 memo, forwarded by then-deputy minister Robert Fonberg, they suggested a meeting with Russian ambassador Georgiy Mamedov to "personally convey your continued commitment to visit Russia to meet with your counterpart." They pressed him to "propose a concrete date" for a rescheduled trip and noted that senior officials, including Gen. Walt Natynczyk, the now-retired chief of defence staff, had been "systematically engaging Russia." A MacKay spokesman said the meeting with Mamedov never went ahead. Media reports following Delisle's Jan. 13, 2012, arrest claimed that up to four Russian diplomats were expelled from Canada over the spy case. But those reports were never publicly corroborated by the Harper government, and were flatly disputed by the Kremlin. At the time, political sources pointed to the official list of foreign government representatives in Canada and noted names stricken from the register, including that of former Russian defence attache Lt.-Col. Dmitry Fedorchatenko. The other missing names were Konstantin Kolpakov, Mikhail Nikiforov and Tatiana Steklova. Yet both Fedorchatenko and Kolpakov -- both well known within the Ottawa defence community -- left weeks before a criminal investigation was opened by the RCMP; it had been public knowledge for months that their terms were about to expire. "Some were routine rotations. It was time for them to end their tour," said a source familiar with the diplomatic movements. As for the number actually expelled, "It was small. It was a handful or less." The understated response is reminiscent of former prime minister Mackenzie King's minimalist handling of the Igor Gouzenko case -- the defection of a former Soviet Embassy clerk whose revelations of spying on the West helped touch off the Cold War. Back then, it was a fear of antagonizing the Soviet Union at the end of the Second World War that drove the response, an approach that intelligence expert Wesley Wark said makes no sense today. "Why a Conservative government in 2011 or 2012 would have a similar instinct baffles me, to be honest," said Wark, a visiting professor at the University of Ottawa's graduate school of public and international affairs.

"I simply don't understand their policy. There would be absolutely no harm and the Russians would have absolutely expected that the Canadians would have at least made a formal protest about Russians spying on Canada." In fact, Wark said, the "baseline is that you make a formal protest" and escalate the reaction from there depending upon how much noise one wishes to make. "In this case it seems they didn't want to do the formal protest. They didn't want to trouble the Russia relations," said Wark, who was an expert witness at Delisle's sentencing. The federal government might be concerned about fostering good relations with Russia on matters such as joint military ventures and competing territorial claims over the Arctic continental shelf, said Rob Huebert, an associate professor of political science at the University of Calgary who studies Canada's foreign and defence policies. "Are we trying to play nice just because of all these other vested interests that we have?" Advisers might be urging the prime minister to avoid public declarations of annoyance with Moscow in order to make gains on key policy files, Huebert said. "I think that that's probably what we're seeing within the Harper government." Still, the tepid response seems at odds with persistent efforts by the Conservatives to burnish their military and law-and-order credentials. Relations are so placid some members of the House of Commons defence committee were recently invited to a reception at the Russian ambassador's residence as if nothing had happened. "I said, these guys have just picked our pockets clean for the last three, four, five years and we're going to be going to a wine tasting?" said Liberal MP John McKay. "C'mon, does that make sense? The Russians must be saying to themselves, 'This is the nicest country in the world."' He feels nobody has a good answer as to why Canada has treated Moscow with kid gloves, and the issue deserves to be explored. McKay said that during the defence committee's recent visit to Washington he quietly broached the spy scandal with Canadian Ambassador Gary Doer, and it was brushed off as "something that is already behind us."
http://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/navy-spy-case-barely-caused-diplomatic-ripples-between-canada-andrussia-1.1300478

Espionage
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Jump to: navigation, search "Spy" and "Secret agent" redirect here. For other uses, see Spy (disambiguation) and Secret agent (disambiguation). For other uses, see Espionage (disambiguation). Espionage or spying involves a government or individual obtaining information considered secret or confidential without the permission of the holder of the information.[1] Espionage is inherently clandestine, as it is taken for granted that it is unwelcome and, in many cases illegal and punishable by law. It is a subset of intelligence gathering, which otherwise may be conducted from public sources and using perfectly legal and ethical means. It is crucial to distinguish espionage from intelligence gathering, as the latter does not necessarily involve espionage, but often collates open-source information. Espionage is often part of an institutional effort by a government or commercial concern. However, the term is generally associated with state spying on potential or actual enemies primarily for military purposes. Spying involving corporations is known as industrial espionage. One of the most effective ways to gather data and information about the enemy (or potential enemy) is by infiltrating the enemy's ranks. This is the job of the spy (espionage agent). Spies can bring back all sorts of information concerning the size and strength of an enemy army. They can also find dissidents within the enemy's forces and influence them to defect. In times of crisis, spies can also be used to steal technology and to sabotage the enemy in various ways. Counterintelligence operatives can feed false information to enemy spies, protecting important domestic secrets, and preventing attempts at subversion. Nearly every country has very strict laws concerning espionage, and the penalty for being caught is often severe. However, the benefits that can be gained through espionage are generally great enough that most governments and many large corporations make use of it to varying degrees. Further information on clandestine HUMINT (human intelligence) information collection techniques is available, including discussions of operational techniques, asset recruiting, and the tradecraft used to collect this information.

History
Events involving espionage are well documented throughout history. The ancient writings of Chinese and Indian military strategists such as Sun-Tzu and Chanakya contain information on deception and subversion. Chanakya's student Chandragupta Maurya, founder of the Maurya Empire in India, made use of assassinations, spies and secret agents, which are described in Chanakya's rastra. The ancient Egyptians had a thoroughly developed system for the acquisition of intelligence, and the Hebrews used spies as well, as in the story of Rahab. Spies were also prevalent in the Greek and Roman empires.[2] During the 13th and 14th centuries, the Mongols relied heavily on espionage in their conquests in Asia and Europe. Feudal Japan often used ninja

to gather intelligence. More recently, spies played a significant part in Elizabethan England (see Francis Walsingham). Many modern espionage methods were well established even then.[3] Aztecs used Pochtecas, people in charge of commerce, as spies and diplomats, and had diplomatic immunity. Along with the pochteca, before a battle or war, secret agents, quimitchin, were sent to spy amongst enemies usually wearing the local costume and speaking the local language, techniques similar to modern secret agents.[4] The Cold War involved intense espionage activity between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and China and their allies, particularly related to nuclear weapons secrets. Recently, espionage agencies have targeted the illegal drug trade and those considered terrorists. Since 2008 the United States has charged at least 57 defendants for attempting to spy for China.[5] Different intelligence services value certain intelligence collection techniques over others. The former Soviet Union, for example, preferred human sources over research in open sources, while the United States has tended to emphasize technological methods such as SIGINT and IMINT. Both Soviet political (KGB) and military intelligence (GRU[6]) officers were judged by the number of agents they recruited.

Targets of espionage
Espionage agents are usually[citation needed] trained experts in a specific targeted field so they can differentiate mundane information from targets of intrinsic value to their own organisational development. Correct identification of the target at its execution is the sole purpose[citation needed] of the espionage operation. Broad areas of espionage targeting expertise include:a spy

Natural resources: strategic production identification and assessment (food, energy, materials). Agents are usually found among bureaucrats who administer these resources in their own countries[citation needed] Popular sentiment towards domestic and foreign policies (popular, middle class, elites). Agents often recruited from field journalistic crews, exchange postgraduate students and sociology researchers Strategic economic strengths (production, research, manufacture, infrastructure). Agents recruited from science and technology academia, commercial enterprises, and more rarely from among military technologists Military capability intelligence (offensive, defensive, maneuver, naval, air, space). Agents are trained by special military espionage education facilities, and posted to an area of operation with covert identities to minimize prosecution Counterintelligence operations specifically targeting opponents' intelligence services themselves, such as breaching confidentiality of communications, and recruiting defectors or moles

Methods and terminology

The news media may speak of "spy satellites" and the like, espionage is not a synonym for all It is a specific form of human source intelligence (HUMINT). Codebreaking (cryptanalysis or COMINT), aircraft or satellite photography, (IMINT) and research in open publications (OSINT) are all intelligence gathering disciplines, but none of them are espionage. Many HUMINT activities, such as prisoner interrogation, reports from military reconnaissance patrols and from diplomats, etc., are not espionage. Unlike other forms of intelligence collection disciplines, espionage usually involves accessing the place where the desired information is stored or accessing the people who know the information and will divulge it through some kind of subterfuge. There are exceptions to physical meetings, such as the Oslo Report, or the insistence of Robert Hanssen in never meeting the people who bought his information. The US defines espionage towards itself as "The act of obtaining, delivering, transmitting, communicating, or receiving information about the national defense with an intent, or reason to believe, that the information may be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation". Black's Law Dictionary (1990) defines espionage as: "... gathering, transmitting, or losing ... information related to the national defense". Espionage is a violation of United States law, 18 U.S.C. 792798 and Article 106a of the Uniform Code of Military Justice".[7] The United States, like most nations, conducts espionage against other nations, under the control of the National Clandestine Service. Britain's espionage activities are controlled by the Secret Intelligence Service.

Organization

An intelligence officer's clothing, accessories, and behavior must be as unremarkable as possible their lives (and others') may depend on it.

A spy is a person employed to obtain such secrets. Within the United States Intelligence Community, "asset" is a more common usage. A case officer, who may have diplomatic status (i.e. official cover or non-official cover), supports and directs the human collector. Cutouts are couriers who do not know the agent or case officer but transfer messages. A safe house is a refuge for spies. In larger networks the organization can be complex with many methods to avoid detection, including clandestine cell systems. Often the players have never met. Case officers are stationed in foreign countries to recruit and to supervise intelligence agents, who in turn spy on targets in their countries where they are assigned. A spy need not be a citizen of the target countryhence does not automatically commit treason when operating within it. While the more common practice is to recruit a person already trusted with access to sensitive information, sometimes a person with a well-prepared synthetic identity, called a Legend in tradecraft, may attempt to infiltrate a target organization. These agents can be moles (who are recruited before they get access to secrets), defectors (who are recruited after they get access to secrets and leave their country) or defectors in place (who get access but do not leave). Spies may also be used to spread disinformation in the organization in which they are planted, such as giving false reports about their country's military movements, or about a competing company's ability to bring a product to market. Spies may be given other roles that also require infiltration, such as sabotage. Many governments routinely spy on their allies as well as their enemies, although they typically maintain a policy of not commenting on this. Governments also employ private companies to collect information on their behalf such as SCG International Risk and others. Many organizations, both national and non-national, conduct espionage operations. It should not be assumed that espionage is always directed at the most secret operations of a target country. National and terrorist organizations and other groups are also targets.[citation needed] Communications both are necessary to espionage and clandestine operations, and also a great vulnerability when the adversary has sophisticated SIGINT detection and interception capability. Agents must also transfer money securely.[citation needed]

Industrial espionage
Main article: Industrial espionage Reportedly Canada is losing $12 billion[8] and German companies are estimated to be losing about 50 billion ($87 billion) and 30,000 jobs[9] to industrial espionage every year.

Agents in espionage

In espionage jargon, an agent refers to the person who does the spying; a citizen of one country who is recruited by a second country to spy on or work against his own country or a third country. In popular usage, this term is often erroneously applied to a member of an intelligence service who recruits and handles agents; in espionage such a person is referred to as an intelligence officer, intelligence operative or case officer. There are several types of agent in use today.

Double agent, "is a person who engages in clandestine activity for two intelligence or security services (or more in joint operations), who provides information about one or about each to the other, and who wittingly withholds significant information from one on the instructions of the other or is unwittingly manipulated by one so that significant facts are withheld from the adversary. Peddlers, fabricators, and others who work for themselves rather than a service are not double agents because they are not agents. The fact that doubles have an agent relationship with both sides distinguishes them from penetrations, who normally are placed with the target service in a staff or officer capacity."[10] o Re-doubled agent, an agent who gets caught as a double agent and is forced to mislead the foreign intelligence service. Unwitting double agent, an agent who offers or is forced to recruit as a double or re-doubled agent and in the process is recruited by either a third party intelligence service or his own government without the knowledge of the intended target intelligence service or the agent. This can be useful in capturing important information from an agent that is attempting to seek allegiance with another country. The double agent usually has knowledge of both intelligence services and can identify operational techniques of both, thus making third party recruitment difficult or impossible. The knowledge of operational techniques can also affect the relationship between the Operations Officer (or case officer) and the agent if the case is transferred by an Operational Targeting Officer to a new Operations Officer, leaving the new officer vulnerable to attack. This type of transfer may occur when an officer has completed his term of service or when his cover is blown. Triple agent, an agent that is working for three intelligence services. Intelligence agent: Provides access to sensitive information through the use of special privileges. If used in corporate intelligence gathering, this may include gathering information of a corporate business venture or stock portfolio. In economic intelligence, "Economic Analysts may use their specialized skills to analyze and interpret economic trends and developments, assess and track foreign financial activities, and develop new econometric and modeling methodologies."[11] This may also include information of trade or tariff. Access agent: Provides access to other potential agents by providing profiling information that can help lead to recruitment into an intelligence service. Agent of influence: Someone who may provide political influence in an area of interest or may even provide publications needed to further an intelligence service agenda. I.e. The

use of the media to print a story to mislead a foreign service into action, exposing their operations while under surveillance. Agent provocateur: This type of agent instigates trouble, or may provide information to gather as many people as possible into one location for an arrest. Facilities agent: A facilities agent may provide access to buildings such as garages or offices used for staging operations, resupply, etc. Principal agent: This agent functions as a handler for an established network of agents usually Blue Chip. Confusion agent: May provide misleading information to an enemy intelligence service or attempt to discredit the operations of the target in an operation. Sleeper agent: A sleeper agent is a person who is recruited to an intelligence service to wake up and perform a specific set of tasks or functions while living under cover in an area of interest. This type of agent is not the same as a deep cover operative, who continually contacts a case officer to file intelligence reports. A sleeper agent is not in contact with anyone until activated. Illegal agent: This is a person who is living in another country under false credentials that does not report to a local station. A non official cover operative is a type of cover used by an intelligence operative and can be dubbed an "Illegal"[12] when working in another country without diplomatic protection.

Law
Espionage is a crime under the legal code of many nations. The risks of espionage vary. A spy breaking the host country's laws may be deported, imprisoned, or even executed. A spy breaking his/her own country's laws can be imprisoned for espionage or/and treason (which can only occur if he or she take up arms or aiding the enemy against his or her own country during wartime), or even executed, as the Rosenbergs were. For example, when Aldrich Ames handed a stack of dossiers of CIA agents in the Eastern Bloc to his KGB-officer "handler", the KGB "rolled up" several networks, and at least ten people were secretly shot. When Ames was arrested by the FBI, he faced life in prison; his contact, who had diplomatic immunity, was declared persona non grata and taken to the airport. Ames's wife was threatened with life imprisonment if her husband did not cooperate; he did, and she was given a five-year sentence. Hugh Francis Redmond, a CIA officer in China, spent nineteen years in a Chinese prison for espionageand died thereas he was operating without diplomatic cover and immunity.[13] In United States law, treason,[14] espionage,[15] and spying[16] are separate crimes. Treason and espionage have graduated punishment levels; death is a mandatory sentence for spying. The United States in World War I passed the Espionage Act of 1917. Over the years, many spies, such as the Soble spy ring, Robert Lee Johnson, the Rosenberg ring, Aldrich Hazen Ames,[17] Robert Philip Hanssen,[18] Jonathan Pollard, John Anthony Walker, James Hall III, and others have been prosecuted under this law.

Use against non-spies

However, espionage laws are also used to prosecute non-spies. In the United States, the Espionage Act of 1917 was used against socialist politician Eugene V. Debs (at that time the act had much stricter guidelines and banned speech against military recruiting amongst other things). The law was later used to suppress publication of periodicals, for example of Father Coughlin in WWII. In the early 21st century, the act was used to prosecute whistleblowers like Thomas Andrews Drake and John Kiriakou, as well as officials who communicated with journalists for innocuous reasons, like Stephen Jin-Woo Kim.[19][20] As of 2012, India and Pakistan were holding several hundred prisoners of each other's country for minor violations like trespass or visa overstay, often with accusations of espionage attached. Some of these include cases where Pakistan and India both deny citizenship to these people, leaving them stateless. The BBC reported in 2012 on one such case, that of Mohammed Idrees, who was held under Indian police control for approximately 13 years for overstaying his 15 day visa by 23 days after seeing his ill parents in 1999. Much of the 13 years was spent in prison waiting for a hearing, and more time was spent homeless or living with generous families. The Indian People's Union for Civil Liberties and Human Rights Law Network both decried his treatment. The BBC attributed some of the problems to tensions caused by the Kashmir conflict.[21]

Military conflicts
In military conflicts, espionage is considered permissible as many nations recognizes the inevitability of opposing sides seeking intelligence each about the dispositions of the other. To make the mission more easier and successful, soldiers or agents wear disguises to conceal their true identity from the enemy while penetrating enemy lines for intelligence gathering. However, if they are caught behind enemy lines in disguises, they are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status and subject to prosecution and punishmentincluding executionas many considered spies to be outside of the laws of war and thus treated as unlawful combatants. The Hague Convention of 1907 addresses the status of wartime spies, specifically within "Laws and Customs of War on Land" (Hague IV); October 18, 1907: CHAPTER II Spies."[22] Article 29 states that a person is considered a spy who, acts clandestinely or on false pretenses, infiltrates enemy lines with the intention of acquiring intelligence about the enemy and communicate it to the belligerent during times of war. Soldiers who penetrates enemy lines in proper uniforms for the purpose of acquiring intelligence are not considered spies but are lawful combatants entitled to be treated as prisoners of war upon capture by the enemy. Article 30 states that a spy captured behind enemy lines may only be punished following a trial. However, Article 31 provides that if a spy successfully rejoined his own military and is then captured by the enemy as a lawful combatant, he cannot be punished for his previous acts of espionage and must be treated as a prisoner of war. Note that this provision does not apply to citizens who committed treason against their own country or co-belligerents of that country and may be captured and prosecuted at any place or any time regardless whether he rejoined the military to which he belongs or not or during or after the war.[23][24] The ones that are excluded from being treated as spies while behind enemy lines are escaping prisoners of war and downed airman as international law distinguishes between a disguised spy

and a disguised escaper.[25] It is permissible for these groups to wear enemy uniforms or civilian clothes in order to facilitate their escape back to friendly lines so long as they do not attack enemy forces, collect military intelligence, or engage in similar military operations while so disguised.[26][27] Soldiers who are wearing enemy uniforms or civilian clothes simply for the sake of warmth along with other purposes rather than engaging in espionage or similar military operations while so attired is also excluded from being treated as unlawful combatants.[25] Saboteurs are treated as spies as they too wear disguises behind enemy lines for the purpose of waging destruction on enemy's vital targets in addition to intelligence gathering.[28][29] For example, during World War II, eight German agents entered the U.S. in June 1942 as part of Operation Pastorius, a sabotage mission against U.S. economic targets. Two weeks later, all were arrested in civilian clothes by the FBI thanks to two German agents betraying the mission to the U.S. Under the Hague Convention of 1907, these Germans were classified as spies and tried by a military tribunal in Washington D.C.[30] On August 3, 1942, all eight were found guilty and sentenced to death. Five days later, six were executed by electric chair at the District of Columbia jail. Two who had given evidence against the others had their sentences reduced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to prison terms. In 1948, they were released by President Harry S. Truman and deported to the American Zone of occupied Germany. The U.S. codification of enemy spies is Article 106 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This provides a mandatory death sentence if a person captured in the act is proven to be "lurking as a spy or acting as a spy in or about any place, vessel, or aircraft, within the control or jurisdiction" of the U.S. Armed Forces or industrial plants and other institutions employed by the U.S. in aiding the war effort.[31]

List of famous spies

This article is in a list format that may be better presented using prose. You can help by converting this article to prose, if appropriate. Editing help is available. (March 2010) See also: Intelligence agency, Special Operations Executive, and United States government security breaches

Howard Burnham (1915)

FBI file photo of the leader of the Duquesne Spy Ring (1941)

Espionage under Elizabeth I of England

Sir Francis Walsingham Christopher Marlowe

Espionage in the American Revolution

Thomas Knowlton, The First American Spy Nathan Hale John Andre James Armistead Benjamin Tallmadge, Washington's intelligence chief, organizer of the Culper Spy Ring in New York City

Espionage in the Napoleonic Wars

Charles-Louis Schulmeister William Wickham

Espionage in the American Civil War

One of the innovations in the American Civil War was the use of proprietary companies for intelligence collection by the Union. See Allan Pinkerton. The Confederate had the Confederate Secret Service.

Belle Boyd[32]

Espionage in the Aceh War

Dutch professor Snouck Hurgronje world leading authority on Islam was a proponent of espionage to quell Muslim resistance in Aceh in the Dutch East Indies. In his role as Colonial Advisor of Oriental affairs he gathered intelligence under the name "Haji Abdul Ghaffar". He used his knowledge of Islamic and Aceh culture to devise strategies that significantly helped crush the resistance of the Aceh inhabitants and impose Dutch colonial rule, ending the 40 year

Aceh War. Casualty estimates ranged between 50,000 and 100,000 inhabitants dead and about a million wounded.

Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje

Espionage in the Second Boer War

Fritz Joubert Duquesne Sidney Reilly

Espionage in The Russo-Japanese War

Sidney Reilly Ho Liang-Shung Akashi Motojiro

Espionage in World War I

See also: Espionage in Norway during World War I

Fritz Joubert Duquesne Jules C. Silber Mata Hari Howard Burnham T.E. Lawrence Sidney Reilly

Espionage in World War II

Informants were common in World War II. In November 1939, the German Hans Ferdinand Mayer sent what is called the Oslo Report to inform the British of German technology and projects in an effort to undermine the Nazi regime. The Rseau AGIR was a French network developed after the fall of France that reported the start of construction of V-weapon installations in Occupied France to the British. Counterespionage included the use of turned Double Cross agents to misinform Nazi Germany of impact points during the Blitz and internment of Japanese in the US against "Japan's wartime spy program". Additional WWII espionage examples include Soviet spying on the US Manhattan project, the German Duquesne Spy Ring convicted in the US, and the Soviet Red Orchestra spying on Nazi Germany. The US lacked a specific agency at the start of the war, but quickly formed the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Spying has sometimes been considered a gentlemanly pursuit, with recruiting focused on military officers, or at least on persons of the class from whom officers are recruited. However, the demand for male soldiers, an increase in women's rights, and the tactical advantages of female spies led the British Special Operations Executive (SOE) to set aside any lingering

Victorian Era prejudices and begin employing them in April 1942.[33] Their task was to transmit information from Nazi occupied France back to Allied Forces. The main strategic reason was that men in France faced a high risk of being interrogated by Nazi troops but women were less likely to arouse suspicion. In this way they made good couriers and proved equal to, if not more effective than, their male counterparts. Their participation in Organization and Radio Operation was also vital to the success of many operations, including the main network between Paris and London. See also: Honeypot

Espionage post World War II

Further information: Cold War espionage In the United States, there are seventeen[34] federal agencies that form the United States Intelligence Community. The Central Intelligence Agency operates a Clandestine Service (NCS)[35] to collect human intelligence and perform Covert operations.[36] The National Security Agency collects Signals Intelligence. Originally the CIA spearheaded the US-IC. Pursuant to the September 11 attacks the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was created to promulgate information-sharing.

Kim Philby Ray Mawby

Espionage technology and techniques

See also: Tradecraft and List of intelligence gathering disciplines

Agent handling Concealment device Covert agent Covert listening device Cut-out Cyber spying Dead drop False flag operations Honeypot Interrogation Numbers messaging Non-official cover Official cover One-way voice link Safe house Side channel attack Steganography Surveillance

Surveillance aircraft

Spy fiction
This section does not cite any references or sources. Please help improve this section by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (July 2011) Main article: Spy fiction An early example of espionage literature is Kim by the English novelist Rudyard Kipling, with a description of the training of an intelligence agent in the Great Game between the UK and Russia in 19th century Central Asia. An even earlier work was James Fenimore Cooper's classic novel, The Spy, written in 1821, about an American spy in New York during the Revolutionary War. During the many 20th century spy scandals, much information became publicly known about national spy agencies and dozens of real-life secret agents. These sensational stories piqued public interest in a profession largely off-limits to human interest news reporting, a natural consequence of the secrecy inherent to their work. To fill in the blanks, the popular conception of the secret agent has been formed largely by 20th and 21st century literature and cinema. Attractive and sociable real-life agents such as Valerie Plame find little employment in serious fiction, however. The fictional secret agent is more often a loner, sometimes amoralan existential hero operating outside the everyday constraints of society. Loner spy personalities may have been a stereotype of convenience for authors who already knew how to write loner private investigator characters that sold well from the 1920s to the present. Johnny Fedora achieved popularity as a fictional agent of early Cold War espionage, but James Bond is the most commercially successful of the many spy characters created by intelligence insiders during that struggle. His less fantastic rivals include Le Carre's George Smiley and Harry Palmer as played by Michael Caine. Most post-Viet Nam era characters were modeled after the American, C.C. Taylor, reportedly the last sanctioned "asset" of the U.S. government, whose use of informants made him most prolific at information gathering. Taylor, refusing the normal assignment as "embassy attache", worked alone and would travel as an American or Canadian tourist or businessman and is rumored to be responsible for over two dozen assassinations, many in East Germany or the former Soviet Union. According to documents available through the Freedom of Information Act, his operations were classified as "NOC" or Non-Official Cover, he was officially retired at the end of the Cold War, never revealing the names of his informants. Jumping on the spy bandwagon, other writers also started writing about spy fiction featuring female spies as protagonists, such as The Baroness, which has more graphic action and sex, as compared to other novels featuring male protagonists. It also made its way into the Video Gaming world thus the famous creation of Hideo Kojima, the Metal Gear Solid Series.

World War II: 19391945

Author(s) Title Publisher Babington-Smith, Air Spy: The Story of Photo Constance Intelligence in World War II Best-Kept Secret: Canadian Secret Bryden, John Lester Intelligence in the Second World War Hinsley, F. H. and Codebreakers: The Inside Story of Alan Stripp Bletchley Park Hinsley, F. H. Hohne, Heinz British Intelligence in the Second World War Yale Date 1957 1993 2001 Abridged version 1996 of multivolume official history. 1979 1978 1978 1991 FACE 2008 1982 1972 2001 1991 1995 ISBN 1-55750733-3 Notes

Canaris: Hitler's Master Spy The Wizard War: British Scientific Jones, R. V. Intelligence 19391945 Hitler's Spies: German Military Kahn, David Intelligence in World War II' Seizing the Enigma: The Race to Kahn, David Break the German U-Boat Codes, 19391943 The Hunt for Nazi Spies: Fighting Kitson, Simon Espionage in Vichy France The American Magic: Codes, Ciphers Lewin, Ronald and the Defeat of Japan The Double Cross System in the War Masterman, J. C. of 1935 to 1945 Roosevelt's Secret War: FDR and Persico, Joseph World War II Espionage Casey: The Lives and Secrets of Persico, Joseph William J. Casey-From the OSS to the CIA Counterfeit Hero: Fritz Duquesne, Ronnie, Art Adventurer and Spy Sayers, Michael & Sabotage! The Secret War Against Albert E. Kahn America Smith, Richard OSS: The Secret History of America's Harris First Central Intelligence Agency Stanley, Roy M. World War II Photo Intelligence The Ultimate Enemy: British Wark, Wesley Intelligence and Nazi Germany, 1933 1939 Wark, Wesley "Cryptographic Innocence: The

1942 2005 1981 1985 1987

West, Nigel

Origins of Signals Intelligence in Canada in the Second World War" in Journal of Contemporary History 22 Secret War: The Story of SOE, Britain's Wartime Sabotage Organization

Harper & Row Harper & Row Brown, Watson, Ltd.

1992 1974 1978 1960 1962

Winterbotham, F. The Ultra Secret W. Winterbotham, F. The Nazi Connection W. Cowburn, B. Wohlstetter, Roberta. No Cloak No Dagger

Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision

Cold War era: 19451991

Author(s) Ambrose, Stephen E. Andrew, Christopher and Vasili Mitrokhin Andrew, Christopher, and Oleg Gordievsky Aronoff, Myron J. Bissell, Richard Bogle, Lori, ed. Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin Colella, Jim Craig, R. Bruce Title Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Intelligence Establishment The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev The Spy Novels of John Le Carr: Balancing Ethics and Politics Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs' Cold War Espionage and Spying The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World Publisher Basic Books Date 1981- ISBN 01991, 465-003112005 7 1990 1999 1996 Notes

2001- essays ISBN 9780-14028487-4 ISBN 9780-70061311-3

The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Gardners Books 2000 Europe and the West My Life as an Italian Mafioso Spy Treasonable Doubt: The Harry Dexter Spy Case 2000

University 2004 Press of Kansas

Dorril, Stephen Dziak, John J. Gates, Robert M. Frost, Mike and Michel Gratton Haynes, John Earl, and Harvey Klehr Helms, Richard Koehler, John O. Persico, Joseph

MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service Chekisty: A History of the KGB From The Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story Of Five Presidents And How They Won The Cold War' Spyworld: Inside the Canadian and Doubleday American Intelligence Canada Establishments Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America A Look over My Shoulder: A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Secret Police' Casey: The Lives and Secrets of William J. Casey-From the OSS to the CIA

2000 1988 1997

1994 1999 2003 1999 1991

Murphy, David E., Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB Sergei A. Kondrashev, in the Cold War and George Bailey Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Prados, John Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II The CIA's Secret Operations: Rositzke, Harry. Espionage, Counterespionage, and Covert Action Srodes, James Sontag Sherry, and Christopher Drew Allen Dulles: Master of Spies Regnery

1997

1996

1988 2000 1998 2004

CIA head to 1961

Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story Harper of American Submarine Espinonage Encyclopedia of Cold War Greenwood Espionage, Spies and Secret Press/Questia Operations

Anderson, Nicholas NOC Enigma Books 2009 - Post Cold War era Ishmael Jones The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture Encounter Books 2008, rev. 2010 Michael Ross The Volunteer: The Incredible True Story of an Israeli Spy on the Trail of International Terrorists McClelland & Stewart 2007, rev. 2008

See also

Animals used in espionage Chinese intelligence operations in the United States Ninja Classified information Covert United States foreign regime change actions Dumpster diving History of Soviet espionage Intelligence assessment Labor spies List of cryptographers List of intelligence agencies Operation Snow White Security clearance Spymaster

References
1. 2. 3. 4. Jump up ^ "WHAT IS ESPIONAGE?". Jump up ^ "Espionage in Ancient Rome". HistoryNet. Jump up ^ "Henrywotton.org.uk". Henrywotton.org.uk. Retrieved 2012-07-07. Jump up ^ Soustelle, Jacques (2002). The Daily Life of the Aztecas. Phoenix Press. p. 209. Unknown parameter |isbnRT373T7T78YN8U9I[OPP= ignored (help) 5. Jump up ^ Arrillaga, Pauline. "China's spying seeks secret US info." AP, 7 May 2011. 6. Jump up ^ Suvorov, Victor (1987). Inside the Aquarium. Berkley. ISBN 0-425-09474X. 7. Jump up ^ US Department of Defense (2007-07-12). "Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms" (PDF). Retrieved 2007-10-01. 8. Jump up ^ "Defectors say China running 1,000 spies in Canada". CBC News. June 15, 2005. 9. Jump up ^ "Beijing's spies cost German firms billions, says espionage expert". The Sydney Morning Herald. July 25, 2009. 10. Jump up ^ "Double Agent". cia.gov. 11. Jump up ^ Cia.gov 12. Jump up ^ Illegal Mi5.gov -How spies operate. 13. Jump up ^ "CIA Status Improves Contractor's Case for Immunity". New America Media. 14. Jump up ^ treason 15. Jump up ^ espionage 16. Jump up ^ spying 17. Jump up ^ "Aldrich Ames Criminal Complaint". jya.com. Retrieved 2011 03 19. 18. Jump up ^ "USA v. Robert Philip Hanssen: Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint, Arrest Warrant and Search Warrant". fas.org. Retrieved 2011 03 19. 19. Jump up ^ Gerstein, Josh (11.3.7). "Despite openness pledge, President Obama pursues leakers". politico.com. Retrieved 2011 03 19. 20. Jump up ^ See the article on John Kiriakou

21. Jump up ^ Your World: The Nowhere Man, Rupa Jha, October 21, 2012, BBC (retrieved 2012-10-20) (Program link:The Nowhere Man) 22. Jump up ^ "Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land. The Hague, 18 October 1907.". International Committee of the Red Cross. 23. Jump up ^ Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa Ph.D, Sasho Ripiloski (January 19, 2011). Crime Wars: The Global Intersection of Crime, Political Violence, and International Law. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 125. 24. Jump up ^ The Journal of Intelligence History, Volume 6, Number 2. LIT Verlag Mnster. p. 41. 25. ^ Jump up to: a b Igor Primoratz (August 15, 2013). New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Nijhoff Classics in International Law). Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. p. 214. 26. Jump up ^ "United States of America, Practice Relating to Rule 62. Improper Use of Flags or Military Emblems, Insignia or Uniforms of the Adversary". International Committee of the Red Cross. 27. Jump up ^ 2006 Operational Law Handbook 28. Jump up ^ Leslie C. Green (February 1, 2000). The Contemporary Law Of Armed Conflict 2nd Edition. Juris Publishing. p. 142. ISBN 1-929446-03-9. 29. Jump up ^ George P. Fletcher (September 16, 2002). Romantics at War: Glory and Guilt in the Age of Terrorism. Princeton University Press. p. 106. 30. Jump up ^ Dr. J. H. W. Verziji (1978). International Law in Historical Perspective: The laws of war. Part IX-A. Brill Publishers. p. 143. ISBN 90-286-0148-1. 31. Jump up ^ Article 106Spies 32. Jump up ^ February 21, 2001 (2001-02-21). "Famous Spies in History, CNN". Archives.cnn.com. Retrieved 2012-07-07. 33. Jump up ^ "Special Operations Executive". Spartacus Educational. 34. Jump up ^ http://www.intelligence.gov/about-the-intelligence-community/ (nota bene: They say it's 17 agencies, in fact, taking military intelligence into consideration, it's 22 agencies) 35. Jump up ^ "Offices of CIA > Clandestine Service > Who We Are". cia.gov. Retrieved 2010-06-18. 36. Jump up ^ "Offices of CIA > Clandestine Service > Our Mission". cia.gov. Retrieved 2010-06-18.

Further reading

Jenkins, Peter Surveillance Tradecraft: The Professionals Guide to Surveillance Training ISBN 978-0-9535378-2-2 Felix, Christopher [pseudonym for James McCarger] "Intelligence Literature: Suggested Reading List". US CIA. Retrieved 9/2/2012. A Short Course in the Secret War, 4th Edition Madison Books November 19, 2001 West, Nigel MI6: British Secret Intelligence Service Operations 19091945 1983 Smith Jr., W. Thomas Encyclopedia of the Central Intelligence Agency 2003 Richelson, Jeffery T. The U.S. Intelligence Community 1999 fourth edition Richelson, Jeffery T. A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century 1977

Owen, David Hidden Secrets: A Complete History of Espionage and the Technology Used to Support It O'Toole, George Honorable Treachery: A History of U.S. Intelligence, Espionage, Covert Action from the American Revolution to the CIA 1991 Lerner, Brenda Wilmoth & K. Lee Lerner, eds. Terrorism: essential primary sources Thomas Gale 2006 ISBN 978-1-4144-0621-3 Lerner, K. Lee and Brenda Wilmoth Lerner, eds. Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence and Security 2003 1100 pages. Knightley, Philip The Second Oldest Profession: Spies and Spying in the Twentieth Century Norton 1986 Kahn, David The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet 1996 Revised edition. First published in 1967. Johnson, Robert Spying for Empire: The Great Game in Central and South Asia, 1757 1947 London: Greenhill 2006 Friedman, George America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between the United States and Its Enemies 2005 Doyle, David W., A Memoir of True Men and Traitors (2000) Tunney, Thomas Joseph and Paul Merrick Hollister Throttled!: The Detection of the German and Anarchist Bomb Plotters Boston: Small, Maynard & company 1919 | available on Wikisource: s:Throttled! Beesly, Patrick || Room 40 1982 Burnham, Frederick Russell Taking Chances 1944 May, Ernest (ed.) Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars 1984 Tuchman, Barbara W. The Zimmermann Telegram Ballantine Books 1966 Words: MATT BOLTON Photographs: MATT MUNRO The Tallinn Cables, A GLIMPSE INTO TALLINN'S SECRET HISTORY OF ESPIONAGE Lonely Planet Magazine, December 2011

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Espionage

c) Diplomatic Espionage

c) Diplomatic Espionage Diplomacy is closely linked to espionage or gathering of intelligence. Embassies are bases for both diplomats and spies, and some diplomats are essentially openly acknowledged spies. For instance, the job of military attachs includes learning as much as possible about the military of the nation to which they are assigned. They do not try to hide this role and, as such, are only invited to events allowed by their hosts, such

as military parades or air shows. There are also deep-cover spies operating in many embassies. These individuals are given fake positions at the embassy, but their main task is to illegally gather intelligence, usually by coordinating spy rings of locals or other spies. For the most part, spies operating out of embassies gather little intelligence themselves and their identities tend to be known by the opposition. If discovered, these diplomats can be expelled from an embassy, but for the most part counterintelligence agencies prefer to keep these agents in situ and under close monitoring. The information gathered by spies plays an increasingly important role in diplomacy. Arms-control treaties would be impossible without the power of reconnaissance satellites and agents to monitor compliance. Information gleaned from espionage is useful in almost all forms of diplomacy, everything from trade agreements to border disputes.
http://www.e-dipcourse.diplomacy.universityofqaran.com/c%29%20Diplomatic%20Espionage.html

Diplomats and Diplomatic Missions The collective term for a group of diplomats from a single country who reside in another country is a diplomatic mission. Ambassador is the most senior diplomatic rank; a diplomatic mission headed by an ambassador is known as an embassy, with the exception of permanent missions at the United Nations, the Organization of American States, or other multilateral organizations, which are also headed by ambassadors. The collective body of all diplomats of particular country is called that country's diplomatic services. The collective body of all diplomats assigned to a particular country is the diplomatic corps. a) Diplomatic Recognition Diplomatic recognition is an important factor in determining whether a nation is an independent state. Receiving recognition is often difficult, even for countries which are fully sovereign. For many decades after its becoming independent, even many of the closest allies of the Dutch Republic refused to grant it full recognition. Today there are a number of independent entities without widespread diplomatic recognition, most notably the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. Since the 1970s, most nations have stopped officially recognizing the ROC's existence on Taiwan, at the insistence of the People's Republic of China. Currently, the United States and other nations maintain informal relations through de facto embassies, with names such as the American Institute in Taiwan. Similarly, Taiwan's

de facto embassies abroad are known by names such as the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office. This was not always the case, with the US maintaining official diplomatic ties with the ROC, recognizing it as the sole and legitimate government of all of China until 1979, when these relations were broken off as a condition for establishing official relations with Communist China. The Palestinian National Authority has its own diplomatic service, however Palestinian representatives in most Western countries are not accorded diplomatic immunity, and their missions are referred to as Delegations General. Other unrecognized regions which claim independence include Abkhazia, Transnistria, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Lacking the economic and political importance of Taiwan, these nations tend to be much more diplomatically isolated. Though used as a factor in judging sovereignty, Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention states, the political existence of the state is independent of recognition by other states. Roots of modern diplomacy Early modern diplomacy's origins are often traced to the states of Northern Italy in the early Renaissance, with the first embassies being established in the thirteenth century. Milan played a leading role, especially under Francesco Sforza who established permanent embassies to the other city states of Northern Italy. Tuscany and Venice were also flourishing centers of diplomacy from the 1300s onwards. It was in the Italian Peninsula that many of the traditions of modern diplomacy began, such as the presentation of an ambassador's credentials to the head of state. From Italy the practice was spread to other European regions. Milan was the first to send a representative to the court of France in 1455. However, Milan refused to host French representatives fearing espionage and that the French representatives would intervene in its internal affairs. As foreign powers such as France and Spain became increasingly involved in Italian politics the need to accept emissaries was recognized. Soon the major European powers were exchanging representatives. Spain was the first to send a permanent representative; it appointed an ambassador to the Court of England in 1487. By the late 16th century, permanent missions became customary. The Holy Roman Emperor, however, did not regularly send permanent legates, as they could not represent the interests of all the German princes who were in theory all subordinate to the Emperor, but in practice each independent.

During that period the rules of modern diplomacy were further developed. The top rank of representatives was an ambassador. At that time an ambassador was a nobleman, the rank of the noble assigned varying with the prestige of the country he was delegated to. Strict standards developed for ambassadors, requiring they have large residences, host lavish parties, and play an important role in the court life of their host nation. In Rome, the most prized posting for a Catholic ambassador, the French and Spanish representatives would have a retinue of up to a hundred. Even in smaller posts, ambassadors were very expensive. Smaller states would send and receive envoys that were a rung below ambassador. Somewhere between the two was the position of minister plenipotentiary. Diplomacy was a complex affair, even more so than now. The ambassadors from each state were ranked by complex levels of precedence that were much disputed. States were normally ranked by the title of the sovereign; for Catholic nations the emissary from the Vatican was paramount, then those from the kingdoms then those from duchies and principalities. Representatives from republics were ranked the lowest (which often angered the leaders of the numerous German, Scandinavian and Italian republics). Determining precedence between two kingdoms depended on a number of factors that often fluctuated, leading to near-constant squabbling. Ambassadors, nobles with little foreign experience and no expectation of a career in diplomacy, needed to be supported by large embassy staff. These professionals would be sent on longer assignments and would be far more knowledgeable than the higher-ranking officials about the host country. Embassy staff would include a wide range of employees, including some dedicated to espionage. The need for skilled individuals to staff embassies was met by the graduates of universities, and this led to a great increase in the study of international law, modern languages, and history at universities throughout Europe. At the same time, permanent foreign ministries began to be established in almost all European states to coordinate embassies and their staffs. These ministries were still far from their modern form, and many of them had extraneous internal responsibilities. Britain had two departments with frequently overlapping powers until 1782. They were also far smaller than they are currently. France, which boasted the largest foreign affairs department, had only some 70 full-time employees in the 1780s. The elements of modern diplomacy slowly spread to Eastern Europe and Russia, arriving by the early eighteenth century.

The entire edifice would be greatly disrupted by the French Revolution and the subsequent years of warfare. The revolution would see commoners take over the diplomacy of the French state, and of those conquered by revolutionary armies. Ranks of precedence were abolished. Napoleon also refused to acknowledge diplomatic immunity, imprisoning several British diplomats accused of scheming against France. After the fall of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna of 1815 established an international system of diplomatic rank. Disputes on precedence among nations and therefore the appropriate diplomatic ranks used persisted for over a century until after World War II, when the rank of ambassador became the norm. In between that time, figures such as the German Chancellor Otto von Bismark were renowned for international diplomacy. The Modern Diplomacy The origins of modern diplomacy within the international spectrum of politics could often be traced back to the states of Northern Italy. This was during the early renaissance, where the first diplomatic embassies were established in the thirteenth century. The state of Milan played an incredible part in the establishment of permanent embassies within the city states of Northern Italy. Various diplomatic traditions were also conceived within Italy. The presentation of an Ambassadors credentials and acknowledgments are elements that were inaugurated in Italian early modern diplomacy. The practice of diplomacy and its various intricacies were also spread to various other autonomous European states. Milan created the first diplomatic international gesture in 1455, by sending a representative to the court of France. It was extremely controversial however, that they would not accept the same gesture from France, due to the fears of espionage and intervention in internal affairs. It had eventually become evident that as super powers such as France and Spain grew in size and strength, and there was an overarching necessity to accept any form of diplomatic effort within the international arena. Eventually Italy paved the way for all European power to exchange representatives. By the late 16th century, permanent emissaries were standard practice. Diplomatic Strategy Real world diplomatic negotiations are very different from intellectual debates in a university where an issue is decided on the merit of the arguments and negotiators make a deal by splitting the difference. Though diplomatic agreements can sometimes be reached among liberal democratic nations by appealing to higher principles, most real world diplomacy has traditionally been heavily influenced by hard power.

The interaction of strength and diplomacy can be illustrated by a comparison to labor negotiations. If a labor union is not willing to strike, then the union is not going anywhere because management has absolutely no incentive to agree to union demands. On the other hand, if management is not willing to take a strike, then the company will be walked all over by the labor union, and management will be forced to agree to any demand the union makes. The same concept applies to diplomatic negotiations. There are also incentives in diplomacy to act reasonably, especially if the support of other actors is needed. The gain from winning one negotiation can be much less than the increased hostility from other parts. This is also called soft power. Many situations in modern diplomacy are also rules based. When for instance two World Trade Organization countries have trade disputes, it is in the interest of both to limit the spill over damage to other areas by following some agreed-upon rules. d) The Diplomatic Resolution of Problems Nations sometimes resort to international arbitration and mediation when faced with a specific question or point of contention in need of resolution. For most of history, there were no official or formal procedures for such proceedings. They were generally accepted to abide by general principles and protocols related to international law and justice. Sometimes these took the form of formal arbitrations and mediations. In such cases a commission of diplomats might be convened to hear all sides of an issue, and to come some sort of ruling based on international law. In the modern era, much of this work is often carried out by the International Court of Justice at the Hague, or other formal commissions, agencies and tribunals, working under the United Nations. Below are some examples. Hay-Herbert Treaty Enacted after the United States and Britain submitted a dispute to international mediation about the US-Canadian border, etc. 1) Conference Conference resolutions were sought through the convening of international conferences. In such cases, there are fewer ground rules, and fewer formal applications of international law. However, participants are expected to guide themselves through principles of international fairness, logic, and protocol. 2) Negotiations The nations convene official negotiation processes to settle an issue or dispute between several nations which are parties to a dispute. These are similar to the conferences mentioned above, as there are technically no established rules or procedures. However, there are general principles and precedents which help define a course for such proceedings.

News World news US foreign policy

Embassy cables: Where does diplomacy end and spying begin?

Political staff in foreign missions understand where the line is drawn but have been known to stray over it, say experts
Beta

o o o

Julian Borger, diplomatic editor The Guardian, Sunday 28 November 2010 21.30 GMT

Sir Christopher Meyer with Hillary Clinton at the UK embassy in Washington in 1999 when he was the British ambassador. Photograph: Reuters/Corbis

The line between diplomat and spy is sometimes blurred, but former practitioners of both professions insist that the line does exist and that all concerned know when it has been crossed. Surreptitiously seeking to discover passwords, details of private and official email and mobile phone accounts of foreign officials lies deep within the field of espionage, diplomats interviewed by the Guardian agreed. As per the well-worn phrase, they are "incompatible with the status" of the job. "I would say that is not consistent with the work of a diplomat," said Sir Christopher Meyer, Britain's former ambassador to Washington. "Obviously your job is to find stuff out, but in general diplomats are above the surface operating in the light. Spies are lurking below the surface, operating in the dark." It is not an arbitrary distinction. The 1961 Vienna convention on diplomatic relations, which sought to impose some rules on the business, states that the official and private correspondence of a diplomat is "inviolable", protected against interference and prying from the host country. Those privileges apply to the United Nations HQ in New York. Similarly, while consulates, especially US consulates, routinely take fingerprints and photographs when issuing visas, diplomats said the covert collection of any kind of DNA lay well outside the realm of diplomacy if such material was not voluntarily offered. But there are still grey areas. Carrying out duties considered normal in a democracy, such as meeting members of the opposition, can be considered espionage by authoritarian, one-party host governments. In the last days of Franco's Spain, for example, Meyer sometimes met Basque contacts discreetly in the back rooms of cafes. But he argues the benchmark for judging the behaviour of diplomats of a democratic country should be the norms of an open society. In most foreign missions the senior diplomats are well aware of who the embassy "spooks" are. Both sides generally try to stay out of each other's way though they inevitably find themselves at the same cocktail parties with their ears cocked for interesting intelligence. "There is a degree of overlap. Diplomats, spies and journalists are all basically nosy people. They all want to find out things that are not generally known," said Charles Crawford, a former British ambassador to Sarajevo and Warsaw. "What distinguishes them in practice is the methods used. When it steps into impropriety and illegality you can just feel it." Approaching foreign nationals and asking them to work for your government is generally agreed to lie in the realm of espionage. In the case of a "walk-in", an approach from a foreigner offering his or her services, British diplomats are drilled in a procedure that entails handing off the person concerned to the embassy MI6 officers as soon as possible. "It is mainly a question of intent," said Harry Ferguson, a former MI6 officer. "Intelligence officers set out to get information that the other government is not willing to make available. Diplomats might pass such information if they came across it, but would not set out to find it." Robert Baer, a former CIA field officer in the Middle East, said that in the US diplomatic service the line may have been just as clear but more often crossed. "There is a reason that the CIA

station is usually next door to the political section in our embassies," Baer said. "You can always find diplomats who are happy to co-operate with the CIA. There are ambassadors who love that stuff. In the American system it sloshes over from side to side." Even in the British foreign service the supposedly neat division of labour is upset when spies ask their diplomatic colleagues for favours. In the mid-1990s, for example, MI6 asked British diplomats in Moscow to organise a birthday party to provide cover for contact with a Russian official. The incident led to the expulsion of some of the diplomats concerned and the foreign office subsequently drew up new procedures to stiffen the diplomat-spy boundary further. In that case the breach served as a reminder that the boundary existed. As for requests to dig up passwords and other electronic data of foreign officers, Crawford said: "That would be for practical purposes inconceivable in the British system."

News World news US foreign policy

NSA Signals Intelligence Industrial and Diplomatic Espionage

SPOTLIGHT, 23 September 2013 by WikiLeaks Press TRANSCEND Media Service In a recent keynote speech at the annual Blackhat Security conference aiming to address concerns over recently revealed NSA surveillance programs, NSA director General Alexander assured his audience that the NSAs main mission is protect the US and save lives. What were doing is for foreign intelligence purposes, he said, and that included counter-terrorism, counterproliferation, and cyber attacks. The General emphasized that he wanted to start a dialogue with the community, and reiterated a point made by the Blackhat hosts that there is a balance to be found between security and privacy. The Generals description of NSA surveillance activities focused on counter-terrorism, implicitly putting security and privacy at odds. What the General did not go into detail on was the more general NSA mandate of producing intelligence in support of US interests. Intelligence is

gathered in relation to far more than counter-terrorism activities documents revealed by Edward Snowden show that German and Brazilian diplomatic activities are included in the broad sweep of foreign intelligence. When NSA representatives came to the University of Wisconson-Madison for a recruiting session, PhD candidate Madiha Tahir questioned them about who the NSA considers appropriate to surveil, referencing in particular US allies such as Germany. The representatives specified, We do not generate the intelligence requirements, but also stated that Germany is not our enemy but would we have foreign national interest from an intelligence perspective on whats going on across the globe. While the NSA does not define US intelligence priorities (most often, requests for intelligence come from the CIA, FBI, and other federal agencies, as well as from the US diplomatic corps), it is uniquely equipped with technology, legal support, and strategic advantage. These features are due to US communications infrastructure access that allows for gathering intelligence not only on terrorist activities, but a broad spectrum of of intelligence on any number of issues for example, energy, oil, military procurement, and even how some UN votes will play out before they are held. Industrial and diplomatic espionage The Brazilian news outlet O Globo released several documents obtained from Edward Snowden, which included a slide on the PRISM program indicating an interest in a range of topics. The slide was entitled A week in the Life of PRISM Reporting, and it featured a list showing oil and military procurement as topics of interest on Venezuela, while energy, narcotics, internal security, and political affairs were listed as topics of interest relating to Mexico. Other documents showed that Brazil was an important intelligence target in Latin America, and that Brazilian telecommunications companies had cooperated in obtaining data. Following these revelations, the US Ambassador to Brazil, Thomas A. Shannon Jr., said that some of the information published in O Globo was inaccurate, and announced an investigation into the allegations stemming from the publication. A few weeks later, journalist Glenn Greenwald testified to the Brazilian Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and National Defense (CRE), revealing a letter written by Shannon (then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs) in 2009 to General Alexander, in which he thanked the NSA for deep insight into the plans and intentions of participants of the Fifth Summit of Americas. The letter continued by anticipating the Organization of American States General Assembly and expressing hopes that the NSA would obtain more important intelligence information for US diplomatic efforts. Another document provided by Edward Snowden appeared in the Brazilian magazine poca detailing how NSA signals intelligence capabilities were used to successfully undermine Brazils mediation attempts at the UN Security Council during negotiations over Iran sanctions. In effect, surveillance of UN Security Council partners helped the US determine the optimal moment to push for a vote on sanctions. The vote was advanced and succeeded in spite of a signed agreement having being reached by Iran, with the support of Brazil and Turkey.

A summary of the US Intelligence Community budget for fiscal year 2013 states that the top five mission objectives for the community are: combating terrorism, stopping the spread of nuclear and other unconventional weapons, warning U.S. leaders about critical events overseas, defending against foreign espionage, and conducting cyber-operations. While the report on how the US was able to monitor a UN vote on Iran sanctions seems to fit with the second mission objective, this sort of surveillance is clearly of a more diplomatic nature than a security concern. Communications between aides of Brazils President Dilma Rousseff, as well as those of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, were also of interest to the NSA, according to a recent TV Globo interview with Glenn Greenwald. Brazil Justice Minister Jose Eduardo Cardozo called the spying an attack on our countrys sovereignty. It is still unclear what proportion of the NSAs activities is dedicated to gathering intelligence for diplomacy and counterterrorism purposes. How the NSA authorizes gathering of so much information on diplomatic negotiations in the UN Security Council and in particular US allies is also not altogether clear.
http://www.transcend.org/tms/2013/09/nsa-signals-intelligence-industrial-and-diplomatic-espionage/

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Email Friend | Print Article | | July 9, 2010

'Illegal' Espionage
By Ishmael Jones The Russian "illegals" arrested recently were spies operating under commercial covers -- as private-sector businesspeople, not as government employees. Most intelligence officers use diplomatic cover, which provides diplomatic immunity, when posted overseas. A diplomat arrested during a spy operation will be declared "persona non grata" and simply returned to his home country. Diplomatic covers give our intelligence officers good access to foreign diplomats and government officials. It allows our officers to work officially with counterparts in friendly governments, and human sources who wish to volunteer information can be certain that they're actually dealing with an American when they're talking to an American diplomat. Illegals, on the other hand, can approach human sources who are not open to contact from U.S. diplomats. Terrorists and nuclear proliferators will not meet with an American diplomat

and do not appear at diplomatic venues, such as the cocktail party circuit. Rogue state government officials, Iranians and North Koreans, are under orders not to speak to American diplomats. One type of cover is not better than another -- just complementary to it. The military would never suggest that the infantry is better than the artillery because both are needed. Our weakness in human source intelligence collection is that the CIA's clandestine service relies almost exclusively on diplomatic cover. Our own "illegals" program is tiny, and the number of truly effective officers using non-diplomatic covers overseas is insignificant -- just a few of the more than a hundred thousand people in the American intelligence community. CIA management and Congress have spoken endlessly of the need to increase our use of nondiplomatic covers, and billions of dollars have been spent to do it, but it's never happened. More than 90% of CIA employees now live and work entirely within the United States. Valerie Plame, the CIA officer whose identity was "outed," was on the books as a spy serving under non-diplomatic cover, yet she spent only two months of a 21-year career in a commercially covered spy assignment overseas (according to her boss, a friend of mine). CIA "illegals" programs never get off the ground because they don't serve the needs of bureaucracy. The scholar C.N. Parkinson observed that bureaucracies seek to create subordinates. Illegals do not work in government offices and do not fit well with the hierarchies that define bureaucracies. Illegals cannot create subordinates, and the independent nature of their missions makes them poor subordinates. Embassies and buildings in Washington, D.C., however, make excellent breeding grounds for the growth of bureaucracy. I much preferred serving as an espionage officer under non-diplomatic cover. Despite the lack of diplomatic immunity, I was safer because terrorists and hostile governments simply didn't know who I was or where to find me. The American embassy system is like the Maginot Line: expensive, fixed in place, easily outmaneuvered. Human source intelligence programs were the only area of achievement in which the Soviet Union soundly thrashed America. Paradoxically, the Soviets did it by operating their intelligence services like American organizations, with flexibility, creativity, and accountability. We operated, and continue to operate, our human source programs, like typical Soviet organizations, with bureaucracy, waste, and infighting. We will dramatically improve our security if we simply run intelligence collection the way we run any other American organization.
Ishmael Jones is a former deep cover CIA officer and proponent of intelligence reform. He is the author of The Human Factor: Inside the CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Bureaucracy. His website address is www.ishmaeljones.com.

on "'Illegal' Espionage"
January 13, 2013 http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/07/illegal_espionage.html

Kedubes AS Jakarta, Salah Satu Stasiun Penyadap NSA

HL | 01 November 2013 | 05:42 Dibaca: 2062 Komentar: 39 15

Stasiun NSA di Asia Tenggara (Grafik: themalaymailonline.com) Jakarta, 1 November 2013. Para pejabat Indonesia mendadak terkejut dengan pemberitaan harian Australia, Sydney morning Herald tanggal 29 Oktober 2013 yang menuliskan secara rinci penyadapan dari National Security Agency (NSA) di 90 posnya di dunia termasuk di Jakarta. NSA adalah produsen utama dan manajer sinyal intelijen Amerika Serikat. Diperkirakan menjadi salah satu badan intelijen AS terbesar dilihat dari jumlah personil dan anggaran. NSA beroperasi di bawah kewenangan Departemen Pertahanan dan melaporkan hasilnya kepada Direktur Intelijen Nasional AS. Pemerintah Indonesia yang diwakili oleh Menlu Marty Natalegawa menyatakan akan meminta klarifikasi dari Dubes AS di Jakarta. Informasi tersebut berasal dari majalah Der Spiegel Jerman yang mendapat copy bocoran dari mantan kontraktor CIA/NSA, Edward Snowden yang kini bermukim di Rusia. Dalam setiap pemberitaan dokumen dari Snowden, dunia menjadi tegang, banyak yang kemudian menjadi khawatir, menjadi resah negaranya telah menjadi target penyadapan. Beberapa waktu lalu diberitakan sebuah

dokumen menyebutkan sebanyak 35 kepala negara sistem komunikasinya juga disadap. Tidak bisa dibayangkan perasaan sebuah negara yang tanpa disadari/diketahuinya telah ditelanjangi oleh NSA, disitulah kekuatan dan kehebatan sebuah organisasi intelijen yang dibiayai dan dilengkapi dengan teknologi canggih. Edward Snowden, whistleblower intelijen menyampaikan bahwa Amerika Serikat melakukan penyadapan telepon dan jaringan komunikasi pemantauan dari fasilitas pengawasan elektronik melalui Kedutaan dan Konsulat AS di Asia Timur dan SelatanTimur. Dislokasi pos penyadapan di ungkapkan oleh Der Spiegel berupa peta surveilans, dimana terdaftar 90 fasilitas NSA di seluruh dunia . Termasuk juga fasilitas monitoring komunikasi intelijen di kedutaan besar Amerika Serikat di Jakarta , Kuala Lumpur , Bangkok , Phnom Penh dan Yangon (Rangoon) . Menurut peta yang diterbitkan oleh majalah Der Spiegel Jerman pada hari Sabtu, yang dimodifikasi oleh banyak media, langkah CIA bersama NSA itu dikenal sebagai Special Collection Service yang melakukan sweeping operasi pengawasan serta operasi rahasia terhadap target intelijen khusus (terpilih). Dari 90 lokasi inatalasi penyadapan di seluruh dunia , terdiri dari 74 fasilitas berawak, 14 fasilitas yang dioperasikan dari jarak jauh dan 2 stasiun dukungan teknis. Kedubes AS di Bangkok adalah stasiun dukungan teknis dan pelaksanaannya berada di konsulat AS di provinsi Chiang Mai. Di Asia Timur , upaya pengumpulan intelijen AS difokuskan pada China , dengan fasilitas stasiun terletak di kedutaan besar AS di Beijing dan Konsulat AS di Shanghai serta di Chengdu provinsi Sichuan di Barat Daya China. Fasilitas pemantauan lainnya terletak pada kantor diplomatik AS di Taipei . Selain itu terdapat delapan fasilitas di Asia Selatan termasuk di kedutaan AS di New Delhi dan Islamabad. Untuk operasi di Timur Tengah dan Afrika Utara dikendalikan oleh tidak kurang 24 fasilitas stasiun, sedangkan sub-Sahara Afrika dikendalikan oleh sembilan stasiun lainnya . Untuk pos monitoring di benua Amerika, dokumen menyebutkan, terdapat 16 fasilitas pengumpulan khusus yang terletak di ibukota Amerika Latin dan kotakota termasuk Mexico City , Panama City , Caracas , Bogota , La Paz , Brazilia dan Havana. Karena AS tidak memiliki hubungan diplomatik dengan Kuba, AS menggunakan Kedutaan Besar Swiss di Havana seksi AS sebagai stasiun.

Salah satu pejabat Departemen Pertahanan Australia mengatakan kepada Fairfax, Pengungkapan operasi pengumpulan dengan metodologinya yang sangat sensitif tersebut akan merusak kemampuan intelijen Australia, disamping adanya resiko komplikasi serius dalam hubungan kita dengan tetangga kita, kata pejabat tersebut yang tidak mau disebut namanya. Peta stasiun pemantau yang dibuat pada tanggal 13 Agustus 2010 tersebut tidak menunjukkan adanya fasilitas pos/stasiun penyadap di Australia , Selandia Baru , Inggris, Jepang dan Singapura, disebutkan negara-negara tersebut sebagai sekutu terdekat AS . Dalam komunitas intelijen dibawah kepemimpinan AS, sandi 5-Eyes(lima mata) dari NSA adalah lima negara yang bekerja sama dalam pulbaket (pengumpulan bahan keterangan) klandestin terdiri dari AS, Inggris, Kanada, Australia dan New Zealand. Menurut dokumen yang dibocorkan oleh Edward Snowden , NSA mulai mencari akses langsung ke server milik perusahaan internet Amerika dalam skala luas sejak tahun 2007. James Clapper , State Director of National Intelligence telah mengonfirmasi tentang adanya program pengawasan skala besar tersebut. Dalam dokumen rahasia , program pengawasan NSA disebut dengan nama Prism.Prism memonitor melalui kabel serat optik. Presentasi internal NSA menunjukkan data streams melakukan perjalanan dari Eropa ke Asia , wilayah Pasifik atau Amerika Selatan. Sebuah panggilan telepon target, email atau chatting akan mengambil jalan termurah , bukan jalan fisik yang paling langsung , tulis dokumen tersebut (AP). Kemampuan penyadapan NSA jauh melebihi kemampuan internet di AS, dimana ulah Snowden telah membongkar beberapa kasus NSA juga memonitor negara sahabat, Jerman misalnya. Direktur NSA, Jenderal (bintang empat) Keith Alexander , secara teratur menerima delegasi dari Jerman di markasnya di Fort Meade. NSA merupakan pemimpin dan badan intelijen Jerman (BND) lebih sebagai asistennya. NSA banyak menerima informasi dari BND, tetapi banyak memberikan informasi intelijen, misalnya tentang ancaman serangan kelompok teroris (Sauerland) yang dapat digagalkan pada tahun 2007 di Jerman. Dilain sisi ternyata diketahui NSA juga menyadap sistem komunikasi Kanselir Jerman. Disini terlihat bahwa intelijen tetap mendudukan kepentingan nasional AS jauh diatas nilai kerjasama antar dua negara. Menurut Washington Post, pada satu hari, kemampuan operasi khusus cabang NSA telah mengumpulkan sebanyak 444,743 buku alamat email dari

Yahoo, 105,068 alamat email Hotmail dari , 82,857 acount dari Facebook , 33,697 dari Gmail dan 22,881 dari penyedia lain yang tidak ditentukan sebelumnya. Angka-angka tersebut adalah daftar internal rahasia NSA yang dibocorkan oleh Edward Snowden. Analisis Dari fakta-fakta tersebut, maka semakin terkuak rahasia yang selama ini hanya dimiliki oleh badan intelijen AS serta kelompok 5-Eyes dalam langkahnya melakukan penyadapan. Sebenarnya sejakmainland-nya berhasil diserang dan menara kembar WTC diruntuhkan oleh teroris Al-Qaeda pada 11 September 2001, terjadi pergeseran kebijakan pemerintah Amerika. Disebutkan, Kampanya melawan terorisme global merupakan tujuan utama kebijakan luar negeri dan pertahanan Amerika Serikat, dan tujuan-tujuan internasional lainnya akan berada di bawah tujuan besar ini (Stephen M.Walt). Maka sejak ini pemerintah AS menugasi badan intelijen untuk melakukan pengumpulan bahan keterangan dengan segala caranya agar dapat meniadakan ancaman teroris terhadap negaranya. AS sejak perang dunia pertama tidak pernah berperang di negaranya, peperangan terjadi jauh diluar negaranya. Oleh karena itu runtuhnya menara WTC telah membuat bangsa AS menjadi demikian benci dan takut terhadap teroris. Mereka faham ini adalah perseteruan ideologis yang sulit dikalahkan tanpa terkumpulnya informasi dan langkah militer. Dalam perkembangannya, untuk menghadapi ancaman terorisme yang merupakan cabang keilmuan dari disiplin intelijen, AS memainkan kartu intelijen. NSA diperkuat dan CIA menjadi ujung tombak upaya peniadaan ancaman (operasi lawan teror), dengan langkah preemtive strike. NSA yang pada awalnya mendapat tugas monitoring, menyadap ancaman teror kemudian berkembang menjadi badan penyadap bagi kepentingan AS dibidang lainnya, politik, ekonomi dan militer. Secara diam-diam NSA mendapat black budgetsebesar USD52,6 miliar untuk tahun fiskal 2013 (Edward Snowden). Disebutkan, Lembaga mata-mata AS telah dibangun menjadi sebuah organisasi intelijen raksasa sejak serangan 11 September 2001, tapi tetap dapat memberikan informasi penting lain tentang berbagai ancaman terhadap keamanan nasional. Disinilah kunci berkembangnya penyadapan dengan dibangunnya 90 stasiun NSA di dunia, termasuk di Jakarta. Dengan demikian dapat diperkirakan bahwa penyadapan sudah terjadi cukup lama, diperkirakan aktif sejak tahun 2007.

Bagaimana kita melihat dan menilai penyadapan terhadap Indonesia? Apabila diketahui Amerika Serikat menyadap baik pemerintah, pejabat, komunikasi perbankan, politik, dan memonitor semua saluran internet, maka jelas tidak ada rasa aman bagi bangsa Indonesia. Persoalannya, ini bukan hanya penyadapan belaka, tetapi hal tersebut merupakan masalah yang sangat sensitif, karena menyangkut masalah martabat dan keamanan bangsa. Dapat dikatakan ini adalah sebuah kejahatan besar dari sebuah negara. Sudah tepat apabila Menlu Marty mengundang Dubes AS di Jakarta dan apabila terbukti dapat membuat langkah yang berlaku di dunia diplomasi, mempersona non gratakan, sebagai penanggung jawab. Persoalannya apakah Indonesia mampu membuktikan? Informasi penyadapan saja di dapatkan dari harian Australia SMH. Sayangnya kita belum mampu mendapatkan informasi secara pasti kebocoran sebagai akibat dari penyadapan, mengingat teknologi NSA sudah demikian maju. Yang perlu dipertimbangkan, apabila kita akan membeli alat sadap/anti sadap dari Amerika Serikat dan kelompok lima mata lainnya (Inggris, Canada, Australia, dan NZ). Dapat dipastikan mereka akan mampu memonitor apabila kita gunakan.Yang akan jauh lebih rumit dan berbahaya, apabila terjadi adanya orang perorangan ataupun organisasi yang tanpa ijin kemudian ikut memiliki alat sadap tersendiri, ini akan jauh lebih berbahaya pastinya. Kesimpulan Dari informasi dokumen Snowden yang diberitakan media, kemungkinan besar sudah terjadi penyadapan dari stasiun NSA yang berada di kantor Kedutaan Besar Amerika Serikat di Gambir Jakarta. Dapat diperkirakan upaya penyadapan arus komunikasi baik saluran telpon maupun internet mereka lakukan pada awalnya untuk memonitor perkembangan sel terorisme yang memang sudah ada di Indonesia sejak pemboman Bali-1 tahun 2002. Kemudian penyadapan target berkembang kearah lainnya (politik, ekonomi dan militer). Selain memonitor perkembangan sel teroris di Indonesia, penyadapan yang seperti juga dilakukan terhadap Kanselir Jerman, Angela Merkel serta 34 kepala negara lainnya , kemungkinan besar alat komunikasi Presiden SBY, Wapres Boediono, serta beberapa pejabat penting lainnya bukan tidak mungkin juga termasuk yang disadap. Target yang sangat mungkin dimonitor dan disadap lainnya adalah arus handphone, telpon, internet, termasuk para pengguna Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, Face Book, Twitter dan media komunikasi lainnya.

Ancaman penyadapan jelas akan merugikan bangsa Indonesia. Jawabannya adalah adanya kesadaran sekuriti. Sulit mengatasi penyadapan dengan teknologi canggih tanpa peralatan canggih. Jelas sulit mengantisipasi langkah NSA sebagai badan intelijen dengan anggaran USD52,6 miliar. Para pejabat sebaiknya membatasi penggunaan telpon pribadi untuk membicarakan masalah khusus dan sifatnya rahasia negara, lebih baik apabila dilakukan personal meeting. Kita tidak perlu marah dan bertindak yang tidak baik. Yang perlu diingat, menghadapi serangan intelijen serupa, harus diatasi dengan kecerdasan dan kecerdikan. Yang harus sangat disadari, bahwa kini terbukti tidak ada alat komunikasi yang aman bila kita berbicara menggunakan tilpon atau HP, BB dan internet, nun dekat ataupun jauh disana ada yang menguping dan merekamnya. Tetapi untuk mengingatkan kesadaran sekuriti bagi pejabat jelas sulit. Kalau sudah memegang telpon, rasanya aman-aman saja, karena berbicaranya dengan berbisik-bisik. Waspada pak pejabat. Oleh : Marsda TNI (Pur) Prayitno Ramelan, www.ramalanintelijen.net