InternationalAssociationofConstitutionalLaw AssociationInternationaledeDroitConstitutionnel

TABLERONDEDELAIDC
CampusdeHaydarpaa,Universitde Marmara,Istanbul Les28et29avril2011

ROUNDTABLEOFTHEIACL
HaydarpaaCampus,MarmaraUniversity, Istanbul 2829April2011

LERENOUVELLEMENTDELA CONSTITUTION
Lepouvoirconstituantdanslacontinuit dunordrejuridiqueconstitutionnel Programme Jeudi,le28avril2011 09h3010.45 Discoursdouverture RecteurdelUniversitdeMarmara,M.le Prof.Dr.ZaferGl PrsidentdelAIDC,M.leProf.Martin Scheinin PrsidenthonorairedelAIDC,M.leProf. DidierMaus Rapportsintroductifs Leconstitutionnalismeetlemouvement constitutionnelenTurquie Prof.JeanMarcou(Institutdestudes politiquesdeGrenoble) Ledilemmeentrelesrvisions permanentesetlaqutepermanentepour lerenouvellement Prof.I.Kabolu(UniversitdeMarmara)

RENEWALOFACONSTITUTION
Constituentpowerwithintheframework oftheconstitutionallegalorders continuity Programme Thursday28April2011 09h3010h45 OpeningStatements PresidentoftheUniversityofMarmara, Prof.Dr.ZaferGl PresidentoftheIACL,Prof.Dr.Martin Scheinin PresidentemeritusoftheIACL,Prof.Dr. DidierMaus Introductoryreports Constitutionalismandtheconstitutional reformmovementinTurkey Prof.Dr.JeanMarcou(IEP,Grenoble) Thetensionbetweenpermanent constitutionalchangeandthepermanent questforrenewal Prof..Kabolu(UniversityofMarmara)

PremireSance,matine,11h15 12h30 Pouvoirsconstituantsoriginaireetdriv: thorieetpratique Prsidente:Prof.VickiJackson(Georgetown) (duredechaqueintervention:20minutes)

SessionI,Morning Constituent/ConstitutedPower:Theoryand Application Chair:Prof.Dr.VickiJackson(Georgetown) (presentationsof20minuteseach)

PartialChange,EntireChangeandRenewalof Constitutions Renouvellementpartielle,rvisiontotaleet Prof.Dr.ThomasFleiner(FribourgUniversity) nouvelleconstitution Prof.ThomasFleiner(UniversitdeFribourg) MethodsofConstitutionalAmendment Prof.Dr.Ergunzbudun(BilkentUniversity, Lesprocduresdervisionconstitutionnelle Prof.Ergunzbudun(UniversitdeBilkent/ Ankara) Ankara) ConstitutionalReviewofConstitutional Amendments Lescontrlesdelaconstitutionnalit Prof.Dr.LechGarlicki(ECHR) damendementsconstitutionnels Prof.LechGarlicki(LaCEDH) Deuximesance,13h4516h00 Lespropositionsconcrtespourunenouvelle constitutionenTurquie Prsidente:Mme.leprof.IoannaKuuradi (UniversitdeMaltepe/stanbul) (duredechaqueintervention:10 minutes) Dispositionsinaltrables Prof.RainerArnold(Universitde Regensburg) Souverainetetsupranationalit,Prof. TurgutTarhanl,lUniversitBilgi (stanbul) Droitsetliberts Prof.MeltemCanikliolu,lUniversit DokuzEyll(zmir) Indpendancedelajustice Prof.Sibelnceolu,lUniversitBilgi (Istanbul) Pouvoirlgislatif 2 SessionII,13h4516h00 ConcreteProposalsforaNewTurkish Constitution Chair:ProfessorIoannaKuuradi(Universityof Maltepe/stanbul) (Lengthofpresentations:10minutes) Eternityclauses ProfessorRainerArnold,Universityof Regensburg Sovergnityandsupranationalism ProfessorTurgutTarhanl,Bilgi University,Istanbul RightsandFreedoms Prof.MeltemCanikliolu,DokuzEyll University,Izmir JudicialIndependence Prof.Sibelnceolu,BilgiUniversity, Istanbul Legislativeauthority As.Prof.MuratYank,Universityof

M.MuratYank,Maitredeconfrences lUniversitdIstanbul Pouvoirexcutif(choixdurgime politique) M.Sultanzeltrk,Maitrede confrenceslUniversitYeditepe (stanbul) Laicit Mme.SelinEsen,Maitrede confrencesauxSciencesPo.dAnkara Citoyennet Prof.Nazavuolu ProfesseurauxSciencesPo.dIstanbul Relationsentrelecentreetla priphrie(dcentralisation) M.AlilkAzrak,professeurmrite desSciencespo.dIstanbul Procdurederenouvellement EricSales,Maitredeconfrencesaux UniversitsdeMontpellierIetde Galatasaray

Istanbul Executiveauthority Ass.Prof.Sultanzeltrk,Yeditepe University,Istanbul Secularism Ass.Prof.SelinEsen,AnkaraUniversity Citizenship Prof.Nazavuolu,Universityof Istanbul CenterPeripheryRelations (decentralization) Prof.AlilkAzrak,Universityof Istanbul Amendmentprocedures Ass.Prof.EricSales,Universityof MontpellierIandUniversityof Galatasaray

Troisimesance,16h3017h45 Llaboration de la constitution dans le processusdeladmocratisation Prsidente: Mme le prof. ElenaSimina Tanasescu,UniversitdeBucarest (duredintervention:20minutes) LaTunisie Mr.LeProfesseurYadeBenAchour, PrsidentdelaHauteInstancesuprieure pourlaralisationdesobjectifsdela Rvolution,delarformepolitiqueetdela transitiondmocratique LEgypte Mr. le Conseiller Dr. Taimour Mustafa Kamel,PrsidentduParquetadministratif 3 Thirdsession,16h3017h45 Draftingaconstitutioninthetransitionto democracy Chair:ProfessorElenaSiminaTanasescu, UniversityofBucharest (Lengthofpresentations:20minutes) Tunisia ProfessorYadeBenAchour,Presidentof theSupremeAuthorityfortheFulfilmentof theObjectivesoftheRevolution,ofthe PoliticalReformandDemocraticTransition Egypt Dr.TaimourMostafaKamel,Presidentof theadministrativeprosecutorsservice

Vendredi,le29avril2011 Quatrimesance,9h3011h15 LeconstitutionnalismeauXXIeSicle: quellestendances? Prsident:M.leprof.MichelRosenfeld, CardozoSchoolofLaw,prsidentmritede lAIDC (Duredelintervention:20minutes) Transconstitutionnalismeetdroit constitutionnelcompar Prof.ChristinaMurray,UniversitdeCape Town Mutationsconstitutionnellessousleffetdela mondialisation Prof.RaulPangalangan,Universitdes Philippines Mutationsconstitutionnellessousleffetde leuropanisation Prof.AnneLevade(UniversitdeParis XII) Sancedeclture,11h4513h30 Dbatgnraletconclusion Prsidence: Mmeleprof.CherylSaunders,Universitde Melbourne,PrsidentemritedelIACL Prof.brahimKabolu(Marmara) Prof.EivindSmith(UniversitdOslo) RunionduCEdelAIDC,15h0017h30 LAPROBLEMATIQUE Lobjectifducolloqueestderepenserle pouvoirdtabliruneConstitution.Unetelle rflexionseraconcentresurllaboration dunenouvelleConstitutiondanslacontinuit dunordrejuridiqueconstitutionnelen excluantlefaitdtablirunenouvelle Constitutionlasuitedesruptures profondes. 4

Friday29April2011 SessionIII,9h3011h15 Constitutionalisminthe21stCentury:Which Trends? Chair:ProfessorMichelRosenfeld,Cardozo SchoolofLaw,emerituspresidentoftheIACL (Lengthofpresentations:20minutes) MultilevelConstitutionalismandComparative ConstitutionalLaw Prof.ChristinaMurray,UniversityofCape Town ConstitutionalChangesasaResultof Globalization Prof.RaulPangalangan,Universityofthe Philippines ConstitutionalChangesasaResultof Europeanization Prof.AnneLevade(UniversityofParisXII) ClosingSession,11h4513h30 GeneralDiscussionandEvaluation Chairs: ProfessorCherylSaunders,Universityof Melbourne,emerituspresidentoftheIACL Prof.brahimKabolu(Marmara) Prof.EivindSmith(UniversityofOslo) MeetingoftheExecutiveCommitteeofthe IACL,15h0017h00 PROBLEMATIC Theaimofthemeetingistoreconsiderthe powertomakeaconstitution.This considerationwillexcludecasesinwhich newconstitutionsareadoptedafterdeep ruptures,andwillfocusonthepreparation ofanewconstitutionwithinthe frameworkofanestablishedconstitutional order;changewithincontinuity.

Danscetteventualit,lexercice constituantdpenddesquilibresde forcestablispendantlescirconstances extraordinaireslasuitedesruptures radicalespoliticoconstitutionnelles.Pour cequiconcernelacteconstitutionneldans lacontinuitdunordrejuridique constitutionnel,ilyabiensubstitution dunordrejuridiqueconstitutionnelun autrepuisquelaConstitutionancienneest remplaceparuneConstitutionnouvelle. Cestlalogiquedelarvisiontotaledans laquellelaConstitutiondisparatpourtre remplaceparuneautre. Parquelleprocdureunetelletransition constitutionnelledevraitelletre assure?Certes,laConstitutionen vigueurpeutellecontenirlavoie procduraledurenouvellementdela Constitution.Toutefois,ilnesagitquede larvisionpartielledanslaplupartdes Constitutionscontemporaines.Quantla rvisiontotale,cellecireste exceptionnelle. Daprsladoctrinededroit constitutionnelclassique,lepouvoir originaireestinconditionn(puisquil instaureuneConstitutionnouvelle,un ordrejuridiquenouveau),alorsquele pouvoirconstituantdrivestconditionn parlepouvoirconstituantoriginaire. Autrementdit,lepremierrelvedela politiqueetnondroit,alorsquelepouvoir constituantdrivrelvedudroit,carilya alorsdesrglesjuridiquesrespecter. Mais,danslesdeuxcasdefigure,onpeut sedemandersilepremierestvraiment absoluetillimitcontrairementausecond quiestconsidrcommeconditionnpar lesrglesposesparlepremieretavecun contrlejuridictionnelventuelde lapplicationexactedecesrgles. LeslimitesmatriellesduneConstitution correspondent,dupointdevuedela forme,lespritdunervisionpartielle. 5

Whenaconstitutionismadeinan exceptionalperiodoftime,constituent actioncomesintobeingbasedonbalances ofpower,whichareformedafterradical politicalconstitutionalruptures.Inthe caseofconstitutionmakingbasedonthe permanenceofcurrentconstitutionallegal order,thenewconstitutionwilltakethe placeofitspredecessor;anexisting constitutionisreplacedbyanewone.In thiscasethereisanentirechangelogic thatrequiresthepreviousconstitutionto ceasetobeeffectiveinordertothenew onetosupersedeit. Whatkindofprocedureormethodshould beadoptedfortheamendmentofa constitution?Currentconstitutions frequentlystipulateanamendment procedure.Howevermostmodern constitutionsonlyregulatehowtomake partialchangeswithintheconstitution,but donotspecifyhowtochangeitentirely. Constitutionalclausesaboutentire changeareexceptional. Accordingtotheclassicalconstitutional lawdoctrine,theconstituentpowerto frameaconstitutionisnotlimited,sinceit foundsanewconstitutionalandlegal order.However,constitutedpowerto amendanexistingoneisstipulatedbythe constituentpowertoframeaconstitution. Inotherwords,thefirsttypeof constituentpowerisrelatedtopolitical, nottolegalspace.Ontheotherhand, constituentpowertoamendanexisting constitutionisrelatedtothelegalsphere, becausetherearelegalnormsthatithave tobeobserved. Nonetheless,onemayquestionwhether thefirsttypeofconstituentpowerisreally absoluteandlimitless;andalsowhether theconstituentpowertoamendan existingconstitutionbindsitselfbythe rulesofthefirsttypeofconstituentpower andifapplicationoftheserulesissubject tojudicialreview.

Danscecas,ilparatopportundeposerla questionsuivante:estcequelepouvoir constituantalacomptence dhypothquerlavolontdes gnrationsfutures? Unetellequestiondevientdavantage lgitimepouruneConstitutionlabore lasuiteduneruptureradicale.La ConstitutiondelaRpubliquedeTurquie quidatedu7novembre1982enestassez significative.Elleatrviseet remaniepardesmodificationsde1987 nosjours.MalgrlarestaurationdelEtat dedroitparvoiedesmodifications successives,laqutedunenouvelle Constitutionquiremonteaudbutdes annes1990esttoujoursdactualit. LaCourconstitutionnelleammecensur lamodificationde2008.LaCour constitutionnelle,enappliquantlarticle protecteurdesdispositionsinaltrables,a annullesajoutsfaitsauxarticles modifiables.Ainsi,laCouratellelargile blocdesdispositionsinaltrablespartir duneliaisontablieentrelesdeux catgoriesdedispositions constitutionnelles... Untelarrtarelancledbatsurla procduresuivrepourrenouvelerla Constitutiondufaitquunervisiontotale napastprvuedanslaConstitutionde 1982.Certes,lavoieprocduralenestpas excluepoursupprimerladisposition protectrice.Cependant,unetelleinitiative nestpasconcevablesansavoirle consensussurlavenirdurgimepolitique. Cecidit,lepouvoirconstituantdevrait treconudanslarticulationdela techniquejuridique(procdurede rvision)dufaitquelatransitiondoittre effectuepartirdesdonnesdusystme existantet,duprocessuspolitique( compromis,dialogue,dlibration,...)afin dassurerleconsensussurladmocratie dontlesdroitsdelhommeconstituent linfrastructure. 6

Informalcontemplation,substantive limitsoftheconstitutioncorrespondsto understandingofpartialconstitutional change.Insuchacase,oneshouldaskthe followingquestion:doesconstituent powertoframeaconstitutionhave authoritytobindthewillofsubsequent generationsonconstitutionalchanges? Suchaquestionbecomesmorelegitimate underthecircumstanceswhicha constitutionwasmadeafteraradical rupture.Inthisregard,theConstitutionof theRepublicofTurkeywhichcameinto forceonNovember7,1982isasignificant example.ThisConstitutionwasamended severaltimesandhasbeenreshapedsince 1987.Eventhoughtheruleoflawhas beenrestoredthroughconsecutive alterationsintheConstitution,thequest foranentirelynewconstitutionwhich gainedmomentumatthebeginningofthe 1990sremainsacurrentpreoccupation. Forinstance,whenreviewingthe proposedconstitutionalamendmentsof 2008,theTurkishConstitutionalCourt appliedtheeternityclauseinthe Constitutiontofindtotheconstitutional amendmentstobeunconstitutional. Thereby,theCourtextendedthe unchangeableprovisionsblockto substantiveconstitutionalrevision.The Courtusedasimilarreasoning,whenit declaredtheproposedconstitutional changesof2010tobepartially unconstitutional. TheserulingsoftheConstitutionalCourt haverekindleddebatesabouthowto amendtheconstitution,sincethe1982 Constitutionissilentabouthowtochange itinitsentirety.Certainly,abolishingthe eternityclausemaybeconsideredasa proceduralsolution.However,suchan attemptmaynotbeimagined,unless thereisaconsensusaboutthefutureof thepoliticalregime.

Eneffet,lesavantsprojetsetlesrapports destinslaqutedunenouvelle constitutionquionttprparset rdigspartirdesinitiativesciviles refltentbienlavolontdescitoyenspour unenouvellenormefondamentale. Toutefois,celanapasencoreexercun effetsuffisantpourdbloquerlavolont politique.Deplus,malgrlarichessede travauxencequiconcernelaspect matrieldunenouvelleConstitution,la naturedupouvoirconstituantnapas encoretsuffisammentexplore. LarencontredIstanbulpourraitdonc permettreauxconstitutionnalistesde discuterdupouvoirconstituantdansla continuitdunordrejuridiquepartir duneexpriencevcue,maissansdoute danslecontextedudroitconstitutionnel compar.Enbref,lenrichissement dlmentsderflexionsurlepouvoir constituantdunepartet,lclairagedela voieconstitutionnelledelaTurquie dautrepart,constituentlalogiquedela TableRondedelAssociation InternationaledeDroitConstitutionnel. brahim.Kabolu(membreduComit excutifdelAIDC20042010) Professeurdedroitconstitutionnel lUniversitdeMarmara PrsidentdelAssociationdeRechercheset dEtudesenDroitConstitutionnel(Turquie)

Toputinanotherway,lepouvoir constituentshouldbeformedtogether withlegaltechniques(amendment procedures)sinceconstitutional transformationwillbefulfilledinthe frameofthecurrentsystem,andpolitical procedure(dialogue,deliberation)to obtainaconsensusondemocracywhichis predicatedonhumanrights. Constitutionaldraftsdrawnupbyand reportspreparedbythenongovernmental organizationsreflectthecitizenswillfora newconstitution.Nonetheless,these effortshavenotproducedaneffectto stimulateapoliticalwill.Besides,even thoughthereareseveralstudiesregarding theproposedcontentofanew constitution,theformofconstituent powerhasnotyetbeenthoroughly considered. TheRoundTableMeetinginIstanbulwill servetostartadialoguebetween constitutionallawscholarsabout Constituentpowerwithintheframework ofthecurrentlegalorderscontinuityina comparativeperspective.Inbrief,thegoal oftheRoundTableMeetingofthe InternationalAssociationofConstitutional Lawistoenrichtheintellectualdiversity aboutConstituentpowerwhilecastinga lightonTurkeysfutureconstitutional path. Ibrahim.Kabolu(ExecutiveCommittee Member/IACL:20042010) ProfessorofConstitutionalLaw,Marmara University PresidentoftheAssociationofResearch andStudyonConstitutionalLaw(Turkey)