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Draft of an article forthcoming in Critical Sociology

Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights: Change and Continuity under Dilma

Par Engstrom Human Rights Consortium, University of London, UK

Abstract This article evaluates the degree of policy change and continuity at the intersection of human rights and foreign policy in the early period of the Dilma Rousseff administration in Brazil. The smooth character of succession of power in Brazil that Dilmas election represented suggests significant policy continuity with her immediate predecessor Luis Incio Lula da Silva. In the area of human rights, however, there have been some early indications of policy shifts. Four particularly salient dimensions of both change and continuity in the areas of human rights and foreign policy are examined: (i) Brazils role as an advocate for global governance reforms; (ii) its efforts to foster South-South relations; (iii) the character of Brazils power projection; and (iv) its regional leadership role. The article also evaluates the emergence of Brazil as a pivotal player in global governance and assesses the implications for the engagement with international human rights by Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil will have

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2004305

to manage increasing expectations that the country should play a more active and forceful role in shaping the development of the international human rights regime.

Keywords Brazil, Dilma, foreign policy, human rights, Lula, rising power

Introduction

That Brazil is rising is increasingly taken for granted both in the academic literature and in policy-circles. Brazils gradual emergence as a pivotal player in global governance together with its current buoyant economic performance indicate for many a fundamental global economic and political shift toward the Global South and a new multi-polar global order. During the Lula administrations (2003-2010), Brazilian foreign policy became increasingly active. Indeed, the increasing assertiveness of Lulas Brazil was seen by many as a progressive force on the international arena. In order to distinguish itself from his predecessors perceived acceptance of the liberalizing agenda of the 1990s, Lula pursued a highly visible foreign policy agenda. Yet, in the area of international human rights, Lulas foreign policy remained uneven and raised fundamental questions regarding the future role of Brazil in the international human rights regime. This was due to a combination of internal and external factors,

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2004305

including: a fragile domestic social order with continuing human rights violations; a foreign policy process that tends to privilege narrow conceptions of national interest; and continuing uncertainty over the role of emerging states in the international human rights regime. These uncertainties notwithstanding, the rise of Brazil in international relations has generated increasing expectations, both domestically and in international fora, that Brazil should play a more prominent role in the international human rights regime (Human Rights Watch, 2009). The transition of power in Brazil through the election of Dilma Rousseff on 31 October 2010 raised further questions regarding the degree of change or continuity with Lulismo. The smooth character of succession of power in Brazil that Dilmas election represented suggests significant policy continuity with Lula. We may therefore need to look hard for any indications of change. In the area of human rights, however, many commentators have been seized on early indications of change. This article evaluates the degree of policy change and continuity in the early period of the Dilma administration at the intersection of human rights and foreign policy.i It is divided into three parts. The first part seeks to very briefly locate human rights in the broader tradition and trends of Brazilian foreign policy and maps Brazils increasing engagement with the international human rights regime since the transition to democracy in 1985. The second and main part assesses the extent to which human rights influence Brazils formulation and pursuit of foreign policy objectives. It situates human rights in the broader context of Brazils foreign policy process during the Lula administrations (2003-2010) and examines the early

period of the Dilma administration. The concluding part seeks to evaluate the importance of human rights concerns for Brazilian foreign policy. It also provides some tentative reflections on present and future trends in Brazilian foreign policy with regards to human rights. 2

Brazil and International Human Rights Since 1985

Since the early days of the international human rights regime Brazils relationship with human rights has been characterized by a significant gap between diplomatic support in international fora and a problematic human rights record at home. Brazil was an active participant in the creation of the United Nations and early supporter of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Following the military coup in 1964 however, Brazil became the target of international human rights pressures as, for example, Amnesty International adopted Brazilian prisoners of conscience and brought cases of the political use of torture to the attention of the outside world (Macaulay, 2010). Yet parallel to extensive human rights abuses being committed in their own country Brazilian diplomats continued to engage with the international human rights regime, contributing to the drafting of the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights respectively. Brazils military government relied on diplomacy to prevent close examination of its own human rights record in the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, in order to avoid

condemnatory reports such as the ones targeting the Pinochet regime in Chile in particular, and the Argentine military juntas to a lesser extent.3 In contrast to other Southern Cone countries where human rights significantly shaped processes of political transition to democratic government, during Brazils protracted transitional period issues related to transitional justice played a relative minor role in the return to civilian rule (Pinheiro, 1998; Barahona de Brito, 2001). In part this can be explained by the closed and negotiated character of Brazils transition to democracy. But the broadly undisputed 1979 Amnesty Law also ensured that questions of accountability for violations committed under the military regime remained marginalised during the democratic transition.4 Yet, since the transition to democracy successive Brazilian governments have gradually accepted the legitimacy of international concern for the human rights record of individual countries. Over the course of the last three decades of democratization, Brazil has shifted its relationship with the international human rights regime from a defensive and sovereigntist position to a broadly multilateral one. This can most clearly be seen in the significant increase in the number of Brazilian ratifications of international human rights treaties, signalling an increasing Brazilian engagement with the international human rights regime both regionally and globally. Following the transition to democracy successive Brazilian governments have ratified all the core international human rights treaties, putting in place a domestic infrastructure of human rights. In the process, Brazil gradually shifted from

an obstructionist to a more cooperative relationship with international human rights monitoring bodies. Moreover, government responses to continuing human rights violations have evolved as well, from being defensive and reactive to a more pro-active and institutionalised policy-making (Panizza and Barahona de Brito 1998: 21). In large part these shifts are driven by broader foreign policy concerns of attaining international legitimacy and recognition as a reliably democratic state and a global good citizen. But political leadership by committed government policymakers played an important role as well. More significantly though, Brazils human rights community started towards the end of the 1990s to pressure the government with demands for more active human rights policies to ensure compliance with the countrys international commitments. As Brazilian foreign policy has democratized with increasing civil society input and as Brazil has emerged as a pivotal player in global governance, the engagement with international human rights by Brazilian foreign policy has increased. This shift has created the necessary policy conditions for a more active Brazilian role in the international human rights regime on the one hand, and a more prominent role for human rights in Brazilian foreign policy more generally, on the other.

Brazilian Foreign Policy and Human Rights: From Lula to Dilma

The installation of the first Lula government in January 2003 was met with significant anticipation by human rights activists in Brazil and beyond. Given the Workers Partys record

of opposition to the military regime and its support for human rights at the local and municipal levels throughout the 1990s these expectations were to some extent justified. Moreover, in order to distinguish itself from the Cardoso governments perceived acceptance of the liberalizing agenda of the 1990s, Lula pursued an increasingly assertive foreign policy agenda. Indeed, the Lula presidencies were seen by many as a progressive force on the international arena in particular. Following Dilmas election on 31 October 2010, four particularly salient dimensions of both change and continuity in the areas of human rights and foreign policy need to be highlighted: (i) Brazils role as an advocate for global governance reforms; (ii) its efforts to foster South-South relations; (iii) the character of Brazils power projection; and (iv) its regional leadership role.

Brazil and Global Governance Reforms

Under Lula Brazil sought to increase its weight and influence in international institutions through strongly advocating for reform of global governance institutions and the revision of global norms. This was most clearly seen in intensified efforts to gain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but also in Brazils successful efforts in joining the core group of states negotiating the Doha round trade talks of the World Trade Organization. Brazil has not been strongly revisionist in the positions taken, but it has been opposed to the status quo as reflected in the policies pursued with regards to issues such as nuclear

proliferation (regarding the sanctions regime imposed on Iran) and climate change (regarding the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities that stresses the need for developed countries to shoulder the greater burden of the costs of adapting to climate change). The foreign policy discourse of the Lula administration stressed the need for a more multi-polar world, and it continued the Brazilian foreign policy tradition of emphasising multilateralism. It also reflected the more instrumental character of the Brazilian Foreign Ministrys attitude towards multilateralism, which tends to frame Brazils own interests in terms of arguments for greater justice and representativeness in global governance institutions (Hurrell, 2008: 53). These claims resonate widely in Brazils ongoing campaign to reform the UNSC, which draws on the widespread sense of the unrepresentative nature of international institutions in order to boost Brazils own claim for a permanent seat on the UNSC.5 As highlighted in the negotiations around the new head of the International Monetary Fund, the Dilma government is likely to continue to press Brazilian demands for global institutional reforms. Although more assertive in tone, foreign policy under Lula built upon a deep-rooted nationalist tradition in Brazil of viewing international institutions suspiciously and the international order as entrenching the privileges of the developed world. The divisions within Brazilian political elites as to the way to achieve a more prominent role in the international arena are long-standing. There is a certain ambivalence among political elites about whether Brazil is part of the West and should seek convergence with the global

liberal order, or whether the country is a member of the Third World and should therefore identify with the struggle for development and ally with the developing world in order to push for a greater role in international affairs. Although Brazil has long shared Western ideas about international law and society, since the 1960s the more nationalist and developmentalist side of Brazils foreign policy identity has prevailed. The foreign policy of the Cardoso administration drew more actively on the other side of Brazilian national identity emphasising Brazils convergence with the liberal norms of the 1990s. Under Lula the emphasis was on economic and political sovereignty and on seeking alliances within the Global South against the West.6 Although Dilma may adopt a less assertive rhetoric she is likely to follow Lula in viewing the liberal norms of the 1990s concerning democracy, human rights, and free markets as not reflecting a universal consensus but instead narrow national interests.7 The consequences for Brazils human rights foreign policy are significant. Brazilian diplomatic discourse on human rights is likely to continue to stress internationalism and multilateralism and support for global liberal values. And the contrast with Brazils continuing pluralist and Third World discourse on matters related to international trade negotiations, international finance, and the environment is likely to remain unaltered. Hence, there has been very little evidence of any mainstreaming of human rights in Brazilian foreign policy on the international arena. Brazil under Dilma is likely to remain a comparatively inactive participant in terms of diplomatically supporting the international

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human rights regime, launching human rights initiatives in multilateral fora8, and funding and staffing international agencies with rights mandates.9

Brazil and South-South Relations

The Lula administration prioritised the expansion of relations with other major developing countries, especially China, India, and South Africa. Efforts to intensify South-South dialogues were reflected in the increasing formalization of the IBSA forum (India, Brazil, and South Africa) and the gradual institutionalization of the BRIC group (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), but were also seen in the more activist Brazilian diplomacy towards Africa, and to a lesser extent the Middle East. Partly these diplomatic efforts need to be understood in the context of Brazils attempts to mobilise support for its bid for a permanent seat on the UNSC, although stronger ties with the Third World also have deep roots in Brazilian national identity. Yet, the ambition to build South-South strategic alliances and to gain support for a UNSC seat has led Brazil to compromise on its commitment to human rights. Although Brazil has traditionally refused to criticise other countries human rights record, for the Lula administration pragmatic strategic interests trumped more principled concerns for human rights. Brazil consistently supported China, gave a quick endorsement of Irans disputed presidential elections in 2009, and invited Irans president for an official visit. Supporters of

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this pragmatic approach stress the importance of engaging rather than isolating Iran, for example, and Brazilian diplomats may have calculated that they have very little influence to change the domestic behaviour of states such as China and Iran in any case. But Lulas trip to Israel in March 2010, which was billed as a peace initiative, and to Iran in May 2010 indeed demonstrated the difficulties for Brazil to engage with international conflicts and promote humanitarian values. Here there are some potentially significant indications of a shift by the Dilma administration. In a much publicised interview with the Washington Post a few days before taking office on 1 January 2011, Dilma sought to distance herself from Lula by criticising Brazils abstention on the vote on Iran at the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) in 2010. The Dilma administration followed up on this by changing Brazils historical voting pattern at the HRC by supporting an initiative, proposed by the United States, to appoint a rapporteur to monitor the human rights situation in Iran.10 The vote reflects, in addition to a shift in Brazils relationship with Iran, an increasing government willingness to criticise individual countries for their human rights record. It is therefore noteworthy that the Brazilian Ambassador in Geneva justified the vote on the grounds of impartiality:

Brazil believes that all countries, no exception, have challenges to face in this field. President Rousseff made it quite plain that she will closely monitor the human rights situation globally, beginning with Brazil. [...] [I]t is a motive of particular concern for

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us the non observance of a moratorium on the death penalty, not only in Iran but in all those countries that still practice such an execution as punishment . (MercoPress, 2011)

Beyond the diplomatic rhetoric, the signalling seemed to have generated domestic political dividends. It represented for many a departure from Lula and a step for Dilma out of the shadow of Lula, which was achieved at a relatively modest cost. For example, Senator Cristovam Buarque, from the Democratic Labour party (PDT) and Lulas former education minister, concurred with the vote:

There are differences between Dilma and Lula. The vote was correct, it does not condemn Iran; rather it accepts an investigation. The bottom line is that Brazil believes there are certain universal policies that define human rights. (MercoPress, 2011)

Yet, to what extent does Dilmas divergence from her predecessors policy on Iran signal a substantive departure? It is true that in foreign policy terms Iran had become a highprofile issue for Lula himself. In May 2010 Turkey, Brazil and Iran had announced a nuclear fuel swap deal that was aimed at pre-empting further UN sanctions. The deal was also heralded as an example of the increasing clout of emerging countries in a new multi-polar

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world, even in an area of global governance such as international peace and security dominated by Western powers. The Brazilian government, and the then foreign minister Celso Amorim in particular, therefore openly expressed their frustration with a US government that quickly moved to discredit the nuclear deal. But also domestically the deal attracted significant criticisms, despite the Lula governments assurances that it was in Brazils self-interest to cultivate closer ties with a country that has emerged as one of Brazils largest trading partners in the Middle East. Dilmas policy shift on Iran has exposed one of the main fault lines in Brazilian diplomacy on human rights that pit principled rhetorical condemnation against pragmatic and cordial dialogue.11 As an example of the latter, former foreign minister Celso Amorim has strongly criticized the Iran vote at the Human Rights Council on the grounds that it undermined any opportunities to pursue a dialogue with the Iranian leadership. In an interview, Amorim also defended the Brazilian diplomatic tradition of impartiality, and preference for mediation over condemnation (MercoPress, 2011). Amorims intervention indicates that Dilmas position on Iran does indeed reflect an independence of mind and a willingness to depart from some of Lulas preferred foreign policies. Yet, the Iran vote does not by itself reflect a fundamental shift in Brazilian diplomacy on human rights towards a more assertive and condemnatory rhetoric as cautioned against by Amorim.

The Character of Brazils Power Projection

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The Lula administration maintained Brazils preference for soft power over hard power strategies. This was reflected in Brazilian positions taken in debates over coercive sanctions (Iran) and in Brazils continuing reluctance to accept the legitimacy of military interventions for humanitarian purposes. Brazil's traditional allergy to the use of force, deeply held doubts about the utility of force, and preference for mediation and diplomacy is likely to endure under Dilma. For example, Brazilian reluctance to support coercive enforcement measures was seen in its response to the conflict in Libya. In March 2011 Brazil, as a temporary member of the UN Security Council, joined with China, India, Russia and Germany to abstain from the vote authorising all necessary measures against Libya. Following the onset of NATO bombing of Libya, Brazils opposition to the bombing hardened in the aftermath of the visit of US President Barack Obama to Brazil in March 2011 with the Foreign Ministry, the Itamaraty, issuing statements condemning the loss of civilian lives, and calling for a ceasefire and the initiation of a dialogue. Brazils opposition to the NATO bombing campaign in Libya reflects the countrys traditional aversion to the use of force and its preferences for mediation and diplomacy. However, the expectations on Brazil, particularly by the USA and the EU, to shoulder increasing responsibilities for the management of international security concerns may continue to grow. Brazils continuing leadership role in the UN mission in Haiti reflects an

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increasing willingness to engage in more robust UNSC-mandated missions and a shift in its position on the legitimacy of coercive peace enforcement. And, often overlooked given the focus on UNSC Resolution 1973 that authorised the use of force in the case of Libya is the fact that Brazil voted in favour of a previous UNSC Resolution (1970) in February 2011 that imposed sanctions on Libya and that referred the situation to the International Criminal Court. This is in contrast to previous reluctance to support coercive sanctions in the case of Iran for example. Any Brazilian policy shifts in these matters need to be understood in the context of the ongoing campaign to secure a permanent seat on the UNSC. It is also important to note that Brazilian aversion to the use of force even for humanitarian purposes needs to be differentiated from its position on other (softer) human rights enforcement measures, such as diplomatic dialogue and local capacity-building.

Brazil as an Ambivalent Regional Leader

Brazils multilateralism has traditionally tended to be projected beyond the region of Latin America. But under Lula there was some recalibration of foreign policy priorities, as the administration sought to intensify relations with the South American sub-region in particular. This was seen in efforts to broaden Mercosur (to include Venezuela) as well as deepen it (beyond purely economic relations and towards political cooperation, including on human rights matters). The regionalization of Brazilian foreign policy was also reflected in the

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creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). Brazil under Lula showed itself to be prepared to be politically more assertive in the wider Latin American region by becoming involved in politically contested issues, such as Brazils leadership role in the UN peace-keeping mission in Haiti, and (tentative) expression of willingness to mediate in the Colombian conflict. However, these attempts have been fraught with problems, as regional countries do not necessarily sign off on Brazilian regional leadership. 12 With regards to human rights policy more specifically the limits of Brazils regional leadership are also apparent. Even if it were willing to promote human rights as part of its regional foreign policy (Brazilian relations with Cuba indicates otherwise), Brazils capacity to shape political outcomes in the region is limited, as seen, for example, in the political negotiations following the July 2009 coup in Honduras and its ongoing political and human rights aftermath. 13 Brazil is also a regional outlier in the Southern Cone in that political democratization coincided in the first decade that followed the transition to democracy in 1985, with a deterioration of the domestic human rights record, at least on measures related to citizen security (Macaulay, 2010). 14 Hence, despite the return of electoral democracy and Brazils increasing engagement with international human rights, processes of democratization in Brazil have moved at a different speed, and occasionally in different directions, than human rights change. Moreover, although Brazils ratification record is notable compared to many other regional states (the USA for example) 15, it is in many ways a regional laggard. In terms of

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recognition of regional human rights norms and mechanisms, Brazil was one of the last Organisation of American States (OAS) member states in Latin America to recognize the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Brazilian perception of having a self-contained legal system combined with a reluctance to accept international scrutiny of the countrys domestic human rights record on sovereignty grounds has made Brazil a relative latecomer to the international human rights regime (at least judged on regional terms). 16 This is particularly evident in Brazils relationship with the Inter-American human rights system (IAHRS). Brazils engagement with the regional human rights regime has been reluctant. For example, comparatively few cases were submitted to the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) during the military regime. Following the democratic transition, Brazil has had comparatively few dealings with the IAHRS, and by the mid-1990s only a handful of the several hundred cases pending before the IACHR concerned Brazil (Cavallaro, 2002: 483). 17 As seen in Figure 1, this pattern of recourse to the IAHRS continued throughout the 2000s.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

Moreover, up until the mid-1990s at least, Brazilian authorities put pressure on the IACHR not to recognize cases from Brazilian petitioners. During the Cardoso government however, the Brazilian state moved from an obstructionist to a more cooperative relationship

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with the IAHRS reaching a number of friendly settlement agreements with the IACHR. Also, Brazil supported the candidacies of Antnio Canado Trindade to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (serving as judge on the Court from 1995 to 2006) and of Hlio Bicudo, a deputy of the Workers Party and former prosecutor in So Paulo, who was elected member of the IACHR in 1997 (and served 1998-2001). 18 Yet, in terms of concrete engagement with the IAHRS on specific cases, Brazilian state institutions have tended either to ignore judgements by the regional system or choose not to implement substantial measures. 19 Moreover, the federal governments increasingly responsive human rights policy has not been matched by a parallel recognition at sub-national level. Brazil has an extremely fragmented and heterogeneous polity which limits the central states capacity to implement effective strategies (Panizza and Barahona de Brito, 1998: 21). The character of Brazilian federalism means that accountability for human rights violations remains dispersed with the notorious Brazilian military police being controlled at sub-national level which has further limited the capacity of the IAHRS to put pressure on Brazilian federal authorities to provide effective remedies for violations. In part, the relative neglect of the regional human rights system is explained by the fact that Brazilian governments engagement with international human rights has tended to be projected outside the region and towards the UN, which has led to Brazil not having a clearly defined presence within the IAHRS. 20 The absence of Brazilian regional leadership is particularly noteworthy in the area of transitional justice. In some ways Lula built on Cardosos approach by extending

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compensation policy to victims of past state violence and by offering some support for the creation of a National Truth Commission. Yet, despite widespread protests from victims groups, the Lula government extended the Secrecy Law to allow military files considered sensitive to be kept from public view for 60 years. 21 Lula also resisted efforts to circumvent the 1979 Amnesty Law and legal attempts to prosecute military and police personnel for human rights violations committed under the military regime. Significantly, the Lula government was openly divided over the Amnesty Law with parts of the Ministry of Justice in favour of prosecution while Defence Minister Nelson Jobim referred to justice efforts by victims groups as revenge (Barahona de Brito, 2010). In the early period of Dilmas presidency there have been some indications of change, but also of continuity, in the area of transitional justice. On the one hand, for its supporters it is currently an exceptionally opportune moment for the creation of a Truth Commission with a president who herself is a victim of human rights violations under the military regime. The new Special Secretary for Human Rights, Maria do Rosrio Nunes, has publicly confirmed the presidents support of a Truth Commission, despite certain voices working against the initiative:

Dilma Rousseff, because of her history and her commitment, is absolutely allied with human rights [and for her the Truth Commission is a project close to her heart, which she] clearly supports. [] The president belongs to a generation that fought for

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democracy and she is working [so that Brazil] clears its debt with the past and recognizes history no matter how painful it may be. (ANSA, 2011)

In a political triumph for Dilma the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies approved in September 2011 the legislative proposal to create a Truth Commission with a mandate to investigate the whereabouts of forcibly disappeared people; to clarify the responsibilities and structures behind torture, forced disappearances and arbitrary executions; and that incorporates an explicit recognition of victims right to the truth. 22 Moreover, notwithstanding the policy preference for truth over justice as demonstrated by the Dilma government, it may simply not be possible to put a full stop to increasingly concerted legal efforts to hold individual military and police personnel to account for their involvement in human rights violations under the military regime. Indeed, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights recently ruled in the Gomes Lund et al. (Guerrilha do Araguaia) case that Brazils Amnesty Law violated the countrys international obligations under the American Convention on Human Rights to investigate and prosecute human rights crimes committed by the military regime. 23 The Dilma government has thus far been able to resist growing pressures to implement this ruling, but, as Alexandra Barahona de Brito points out, other countries in the region have learned from experience that both domestic and international pressures to implement such rulings have a corrosive effect on impunity for past human rights violations (Barahona de Brito, 2010). For example, Viviana

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Krsticevic, the executive director of CEJIL, one of the organisations that brought the Gomes Lund case to the Inter-American human rights system, makes an explicit link between the Brazilian governments lack of progress on transitional justice and its potential for regional leadership:

Latin America has advanced significantly in the resolution of crimes against humanity committed by dictatorial governments. Brazil, however, is still in debt with family members [of victims] and society when it comes to the establishment of truth and justice in relation to this topic. [The ruling by the Inter-American Court in the case of Gomes Lund] represents a unique opportunity for Brazil to show that it is capable of leadership both internationally as well as nationally with regards to human rights and democracy. For this reason, Brazil must overturn [dejar sin efecto] the aspects of the amnesty law that prevent justice to be done when confronted by crimes against humanity. (CEJIL, 2010)

There are clearly strong political incentives for the Dilma government to resist such pressures, particularly out of concern of not jeopardizing the relatively friction-free relationship that the Workers Party has developed with the military during its time in government. 24 Yet, such appeasement of the security forces will also indicate the limits of

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civilian control over the military establishment as well as the limits of human rights accountability in Brazil more broadly (Barahona de Brito, 2010).

Conclusion: Rising Brazil- What Role for Human Rights?

Brazil is important for the future development of the international human rights regime. The distinctiveness of the country, both in terms of its domestic human rights record and in terms of its relationship with international human rights, means that Brazil is likely to impact on debates on the meaning and nature of democratic rule and human rights in the decades to come. Together with India and South Africa (and China), Brazil is not likely to develop understandings of human rights governance in line with Western ideals. 25 Brazil has traditionally emphasised the importance of universalist multilateral institutions, including with regards to the international human rights regime. But Brazil has also continued to stress the importance of the protections from external interference as enshrined in the principle national sovereignty and voiced opposition to the idea and practice of humanitarian intervention. It has also resisted the inherent selectivity of Western criticisms of certain countries human rights records (with, for example, Iran singled out as a human rights and security pariah, whereas Saudi Arabia is afforded the status of a key Western ally). What then are the prospects for a more assertive and consistent set of human rights policies by the Dilma government? True, Dilma has generated significant domestic support as

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a result of the policy shift on Iran, and to a certain extent with her support for a truth commission with a mandate to investigate human rights abuses committed by the Brazilian military regime. Yet, the extent and significance of these policy changes, albeit important, should not be overstated. In relation to the global democratization agenda, Brazil will continue to stress the importance of democratizing global governance. As a consequence, Brazil will continue to favour dialogue over confrontation. Hence, although there is a case to be made for labelling Brazil Western, democratic, and even liberal, Brazils foreign policy objectives will continue to diverge from what is commonly associated with these labels by dominant strands of academic theorizing. This has significant implications for the international human rights regime, as one cannot assume that emerging powers will simply be absorbed within the current global liberal order. There are of course significant domestic challenges in terms of Brazils own deeply problematic human rights record. Yet, it is important to acknowledge the very significant developments in Brazilian human rights policies over the course of the last few decades. And, domestic experiences of human rights challenges can provide important opportunities to pursue informed and effective policies abroad (e.g. the struggle against poverty as can be seen in Lulas initiative on combating hunger, 26 and Brazils constructive role in the followup to the Durban conference on racial discrimination). And, of course dominant countries have had their own internal human rights challenges (US and racial segregation, UK and

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colonial rule, and France in Algeria), while simultaneously supporting the development of the international human rights regime, even before the more contemporary rights violating policies and practices by powerful states in the war on terror. It is also important to note some of the structural features that will continue to shape Brazilian policies when it comes to international human rights both during the Dilma administration(s), as well as beyond. In particular, there are two key dimensions to the future direction of Brazilian human rights policies, both connected to increasing expectations and normative pressures facing Brazilian policy-makers. First, on the domestic side, the increasing pluralisation of Brazilian society has also had its impact on foreign policy making. The formal embedding of Brazil in the international human rights regime has created important political and legal opportunities for human rights activism. There has been an increasing professionalization of Brazils human rights organization over the course of the last decade. This is partly the result of increased interest by major international donors such as the Ford Foundation. There has also been increased interaction between local NGOs and transnational networks as evidenced in the creation of Justia Global in 1999 by human rights professionals who previously worked at HRW and CEJIL. As a consequence, Brazilian human rights NGOs, and even social movements, have increasingly plugged into international human rights networks. Also, domestic human rights groups, such as Conectas, have increasingly sought to influence Brazilian foreign policy in human rights matters. Conectas, for example, played an active role in NGO lobbying efforts

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shaping the creation of the UN Human Rights Council. It has also worked with key countries to produce international norms (e.g. in relation to framing of norms around issues concerning discrimination based on sexual orientation). Conectas has also been active in lobbying the Congressional Committee on human rights and foreign policy. In short, Brazilian foreign policy is no longer merely what the Itamaraty says it is (Cason and Power, 2009). This has also led to an increasing politicisation of the foreign policy process, a trend that has intensified in recent years with the Workers Party increasingly putting its stamp on Brazilian foreign policy priorities under Lula. Second, internationally Brazil will have to manage increasing expectations that the country should play a more active and forceful role in shaping the development of the international human rights regime. Attempts in recent years on the part of the most powerful states in the international system to shift the normative balance between human rights and security in the name of the war on terrorism have showed, according to some, the inherent power-based logic underpinning the global human rights regime (Dunne, 2007). For others, however, the resilience and normative strength of the human rights system is demonstrated by the ways in which the human rights discourse has re-asserted itself at various levels (Foot, 2007). Beyond the more immediate human rights concerns, however, the international human rights regime is facing a more uncertain future as highlighted in the debates surrounding the meaning and wider implications of the rise of non-Western states, shifting global power balances, and what some predict could be the beginning of the end of the period of US

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hegemony. In many ways the rise of Brazil is seen as distinct from authoritarian China, and other middle-powers such as Iran (and for some, to use a more regionally relevant example, Venezuela). Yet, one cannot simply assume Brazil to converge to global liberal norms and values, including human rights (although such expectations in Brazils quest for international status and prestige may assert some influence on foreign policy behaviour). Confronted with increasing expectations and demands to assume greater international responsibilities, Brazilian foreign policy-makers need to balance and assess often conflicting policy objectives. Dilmas government will therefore face some of the long-standing tensions in strategy and national identity of whether Brazils future lies as the leader of the South, as the mediator between North and South, or as a rising power drawing on universal standards of legitimacy for its own instrumental purposes (Hurrell, 2008: 57).

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-Figure 1. Number of Petitions Submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, by Country

Source: Authors own based on data from Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Annual Reports, 1999-2009.

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Notes

This discussion of Brazilian human rights policies cannot aim to be exhaustive of course. A

number of key human rights concerns are dealt with in other articles in this special issue. See, particularly, Macaulay (forthcoming).

This article draws, with permission, on materials previously published as Engstrom (2011).

The author is grateful for the constructive comments of two anonymous reviewers on an earlier version of this article.

For an account of Brazils role in limiting the scope of the mandate of the United Nations

Human Rights Commission with regards to the question of disappeared persons during this period see Kramer and Weissbrodt (1981).

The unofficial truth report sponsored by the Archdiocese of So Paulo with support from

the World Council of Churches, provided an important account, however, of the systematic human rights violations committed by the military regime, including use of torture, disappearances, and extra-judicial executions (Archdiocese of So Paulo, 1985). For external opposition to the Brazilian military regime, see Green (2010).

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Brazil has been a non-permanent member of the Security Council during the following

years: 19461947; 19511952; 19541955; 19631964; 19671968; 19881989; 19931994; 19981999; 20042005; and 2010 2011.

Lulas foreign policy managed overall to tread a delicate balance between strengthening

diplomatic and economic ties with the developing world and securing access to the exclusive gatherings of the developed world such as the G8.

These fissures are long standing as highlighted by Pinheiro (2000: 32): The military, the

right, and traditional sectors of Brazilian diplomacy refused transparency and dialogue with NGOs because this was regarded as interference in domestic affairs by subversive elements intent on mobilising a campaign against the values of the dictatorship. On the other hand, sectors of the left (including elements within Brazilian diplomacy) considered that most human rights initiatives as tools implemented by the industrialised nations (it didnt matter that those nations were democratic) against the interests of the Third World.

One important exception to this tendency is Brazils leading role over the last decade in

support of a United Nations resolution on sexual orientation and gender identity. Together with South Africa, Brazil led the UN Human Rights Council, against significant opposition

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(mainly from member states from the non-Latin American Global South), in the adoption of the resolution in June 2011.

It is noteworthy that arguably the most prominent Brazilian on the global humanitarian

scene, the late Sergio Vieira de Mello, received practically no official or diplomatic support from his country of birth (Power, 2008). And, the absence of any voluntary Brazilian financial support of the UN office that Vieira de Mello was heading at the time of his death, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, is all the more glaring in light of modest, yet diplomatically significant, funding given by countries such as Argentina, Chile, and Mexico.

10

The decision follows a highly publicised move in July 2010 when Lula offered asylum to

an Iranian woman, Sakineh Mohammadi Ashtiani, who had been sentenced to death by stoning for alleged adultery in Iran.

11

The idea of cordiality plays a defining role in Brazils national self-image. In terms of its

conduct and normative preferences in international affairs, this idea is reflected in Brazils traditional preference for negotiation and mediation over direct confrontation in the pursuit of national interests.

31

12

Although the intensity of Argentina-Brazil rivalry has dramatically diminished following

Argentinas relative economic decline in recent decades, Argentina does not support Brazils campaign for a permanent seat on the UNSC. Beyond South America, Mexicos foreign policy reorientation towards the US since the 1990s has not been favourably received by the Itamaraty. And, Chavez Venezuela has its own ideas about regional integration that do not necessarily align with those of Brazil.

13

There are multiple reasons for Brazils active involvement in Honduras following the coup

including its concern over the repression of demonstrators and political supports of the deposed president, Manuel Zelaya, who took refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa. Yet, the overriding concern of Brazil, together with the majority of Latin American states, was the violation of the regional norm for the respect of democratically elected government enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the Organization of American States.

14

For the current citizen security situation, and the responses of Brazilian authorities to

rising public fear of crime, see Fiona Macaulays contribution to this special issue.

15

The USAs human rights ratification record stands in marked contrast to most other

democratic countries in that it has not ratified a range of widely supported international human rights treaties including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

32

Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. At a regional level, the USA distinguishes itself, together with Canada and most of the Englishspeaking Caribbean countries for example, by not having ratified the American Convention on Human Rights.

16

For example, in a general comparison with other Latin American states, Brazil has been

slow to accept the competence, where available, of UN human rights mechanisms to receive and consider inter-state and individual complaints. It took Brazil, for instance, until 2006 to accept Article 22 under the Torture Convention and until 2009 to ratify the first optional protocol under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, both of which give the respective monitoring committees the competence to review individual complaints.

17

As an illustration, in terms of the number of petitions received by the IACHR in 2008, 151

cases involved Argentina, while 76 involved Chile and 64 cases were submitted against Brazil. Clearly this pattern of recourse to the IAHRS by individual petitioners and groups in these countries cannot primarily be explained in terms of sheer numbers of human rights violations in the respective countries. Rather, this evidence suggests that the reasons for the differentiated relationship with the IAHRS are found in patterns of human rights mobilization by civil society actors primarily, but also in terms of engagement with international human

33

rights institutions by domestic judiciaries and state officials. See further: Engstrom and Hurrell (2010).

18

Very few Brazilians have been elected to the IACHR: Carlos A. Dunshee de Abranches,

1964-1983; Gilda Maciel Correa Russomano, 1984-1991; and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 20042011. Canado Trindade is the only Brazilian who has served as Judge on the Inter-American Court.

19

This is seen, for example, in the piecemeal reactions to the provisional measures adopted

by the IACtHR in relation to the case of Urso Branco prison. IACtHR, Provisional measures in Urso Branco (Brazil), 25 November 2009.

20

Moreover, the reaction of the Dilma government to the April 2011 decision of the Inter-

American Commission on Human Rights to grant interim measures to suspend the construction of the Belo Monte dam in the Amazon basin reflects Brazils reluctance to submit to the authority of the regional human rights system. In response to the Commissions decision Dilma reportedly ordered the suspension of Brazils annual contribution of approximately US$ 800,000 to the Inter-American system.

34

21

As president Dilma initially supported a legislative proposal to revise the Secrecy Law

through the adoption of a freedom of information law. Yet after strong criticisms from opposition politicians Dilma toned down her support for the proposal, which has led to the proposal being stalled in the Senate.

22

At the time of writing (October 2011), the legislative proposal has moved to the Brazilian

Senate for approval.

23

The case refers to the arrest, torture, extra-judicial killings, and disappearances by the

Brazilian military of members of a guerrilla group that was active in the early 1970s in the Araguaia River region.

24

See further the article by Juliana Bertazzo in this special issue.

25

However, Brazils understanding of the concept of human rights does not significantly

diverge from that of the West, at least when compared to other emerging powers in the international system, such as China and perhaps even India. Moreover, it must be noted that there is much divergence even within the West in this regard. Consider, for example, Northern European conceptions of social welfare, and of the appropriate balance between individual freedoms and collective responsibilities, with Anglo-American conceptions.

35

26

Lula sought to build foreign policy on domestic policy achievements. This could most

clearly be seen in Lulas social commitment at home (Zero Hunger programme) being projected abroad through policy initiatives such as Action against Hunger and Poverty. This initiative was launched by Brazil at the United Nations in 2004 and seeks to use innovative financing mechanisms to raise funds for hunger and poverty alleviation programmes globally.

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Pinheiro PS (2000) Brazil and the International Human Rights System. Centre for Brazilian Studies Oxford University Working Paper 15.

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For correspondence: Par Engstrom, Human Rights Consortium, School of Advanced Study, University of London, Malet Street, London, WC1E 7HU. United Kingdom. Email: par.engstrom@sas.ac.uk