ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to thank my Political science teacher for giving me such a relevant topic. I would also like to thank my seniors who gave me certain guidelines, the library faculty as well as the internet faculty. I would like to thank my friends who helped me with the resource materials as well as other essential requirements for the same. And in the end I would also like to thank my parents who were always there for me as an unseen hand for my support at every step of my project.

CONTENTS
Introduction Historical background structural changes in indias world view dynamics of the new foreign policy long term implications Conclusion Bibliography

AIM: To articulate the Indian foreign policy between th period 1992-2010 OBJECTIVES:o To trace the historical background of foreign policy o To determine the factors responsible for the changes that came in Indian foreign policy o To present a proposition for the long term implication of foreign policy SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS:The extent of this subject is to analyze the foreign policy of India within the given time period. the socio economic changes during this time period. This subject is conical to secondary study of materials, journals, books, and websites available in library. Lack of time is also an integral part of precincts. As within this stipulated time, it was not achievable to gather all data. SOURCE OF DATA:The source of this project is secondary in nature. They are from articles, journals, and websites.

INTRODUCTION
FOREIGN POLICY
A policy pursued by a nation in its dealings with other nations, designed to achieve national objectives. General objectives that guide the activities and relationships of one state in its interactions with other states. The development of foreign policy is influenced by domestic considerations, the policies or behaviour of other states, or plans to advance specific geopolitical designs. Leopold von RANKE emphasized the primacy of geography and external threats in shaping foreign policy, but later writers emphasized domestic factors. DIPLOMACY is the tool of foreign policy, and war, alliances, and international trade may all be manifestations of it. India foreign policies were formulated by our national leaders ever since India's independence. The principles of India's foreign policies are

Fostering cordial relations with other countries Solving conflicts by peaceful means Sovereignty and equality of all nations Independence of thought and action as per the principles of Non-align Movement or NAM Equality in conducting international relations

India - the founder member of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), raised its voice representing collective aspirations and interests of all the developing nations of the world. India Foreign Policy covers vital issues of development, peace and stability. India was the first country to raise the question of racial discrimination in South Africa in 1946 and also aims at eradicating colonialism. Indian foreign policy has been voicing the need for complete disarmament of nuclear weapons. India has taken several initiatives within the United Nations and outside, like Disarmament - an action plan for ushering in a nuclear weapons free and non-violent world. Indian foreign policy has opposed discriminatory treaties such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and has refused to give up its nuclear program until all nations of the world including nuclear weapon states accepts and respects the idea of total nuclear disarmament in a phased manner.

India foreign policy has been firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and has made significant contributions like participating in all peace-keeping operations like those in Korea, Egypt, and Congo in earlier years of its operation and then in Somalia, Angola, and Rwanda in recent years. India foreign policy focuses on active participation in the creation of a more balanced international economies. India has been an active member of the
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Group of 77, and later the core group of the G-15 nations. India foreign policy constantly addresses other important issues of international importance, such as environmentally sustainable development and the promotion and protection of human rights. The real architect of this policy was Prime Minister Nehru. Even though he was temperamentally a Western liberal, he was deeply skeptical of the United States. In part, his skepticism was the consequence of his highly Anglicized personal and professional background. At least two factors can be adduced to explain Nehrus adoption of non-alignment as the lodestar of Indias foreign policy. First, he was acutely concerned about the opportunity costs of defense spending. Any involvement with the two emerging blocs, he feared, would draw India into the titanic struggle and divert critical resources from economic development.i Second, he was intent on maintaining Indias hard-won independence. Moving into the ambit of either superpower could compromise such freedom of maneuver. Few events, barring the shock of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, has had as much of an impact on Indias foreign and security policies as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the concomitant end of the Cold War. The Soviet collapse and the transformation of the global order forced Indias policymakers to make drastic changes in Indias foreign policy at multiple levels. At a global level, nonalignment ceased to have much meaning. As a former Indian foreign and subsequently prime minister, Inder Kumar Gujral, quite succinctly stated, It is a mantra that we have to keep repeating, but who are you going to be nonaligned against? With the end of nonalignment for all practical purposes, Indias foreign policy was suddenly bereft of a grand strategic vision. At another level, the country was also confronted with an unprecedented fiscal crisis partly as a consequence of the first Gulf War of 1991. Three factors contributed to this crisis. First, anticipating a spike in oil prices because of Saddam Husseins invasion and occupation of Kuwait, India had purchased considerable amounts of petroleum on the spot market thereby draining its treasury of much-needed foreign exchange. Second, the government of India was forced to repatriate over a hundred thousand workers from the Persian Gulf at short notice. Third, it lost the very substantial remittances that the workers from the Gulf had contributed to the Indian exchequer. The confluence of these three factors placed the country in dire financial straits.ii Faced with his extraordinary crisis and also confronting the loss of the vast East European market as a consequence of the Soviet collapse, Indias policymakers, most notably the then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, chose to dramatically alter Indias domestic and international economic policies. These involved abandoning the countrys historic commitment to import-substituting industrialization, unbundling, though fitfully at best, its vast public sector and dismantling a labyrinthine set of regulations, licenses, permits and quotas which had largely stifled economic growth. Second, at a regional level, even though the US Department of Commerce under the stewardship of Secretary of Commerce, Ron Brown, had anointed India as one of the worlds big emergin g
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markets, American investment in and trade with India was so negligible that the nonproliferation issue overshadowed other interests. Third and finally, at a bureaucratic level in both countries the shadow of the past weighed heavily on all deliberations. Most Indian foreign policy bureaucrats looked were dubious about American goals and interests in South Asia and there was lingering distrust of India in both the State and Defense departments in the United States. These mutual misgivings hobbled the growth of the relationship even though some small progress had been made in the last days of Indira Gandhi and her son and successor Rajiv Gandhi. As a consequence of these three factors, improvements in relations were, at best fitful, and frequently hostage to minor, episodic differences. For example, the Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphaels careless remark about Kashmirs accession to India at a press briefing in Washington, DC became a major diplomatic contretemps India Foreign Policy is well aligned with its national interests and security. A well crafted India Foreign Policy has succeeded in establishing a network of mutually beneficial relations with all countries of the world, particularly in the improving relations with its neighbors. The history of Indian foreign policy is divided into three distinct historical sections. The first section deals with the period from 1947 to 1962, the second from 1962 to 1991 and the third from 1991 to the present. The choice of these three segments is far from arbitrary. The first period constituted the most idealistic phase of Indias foreign policy under the tutelage of Indias first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. The second began with Indias disastrous defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. This period saw a gradual shift away from the early idealism that had characterized the countrys foreign policy and the adoption of an increasingly self-help approach to foreign policy while retaining elements of the Nehruvian rhetoric. The third phase began with the end of the Cold War and the adoption of a more pragmatic foreign policy hewing closely to the principles of Realism.iii . Only in the aftermath of the border war did India embark on a self-help strategy designed to guarantee its security. Most nations and large ones at that do not easily alter their international orientation. States tend to be conservative about foreign policy. Fundamental changes in foreign policy take place only when there is a revolutionary change either at home or in the world. Much as the ascent of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s produced radical changes in Chinese foreign policy, Indias relations with the world have seen a fundamental transformation over the last decade and a half. A number of factors were at work in India. The old political and economic order at home had collapsed and externally the end of the Cold War removed all the old benchmarks that guided Indias foreign policy. Many of the core beliefs of the old system had to discarded and consensus generated on new ones. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the new wave of economic globalization left India scrambling to find new anchors for its conduct of external relations.Most Indians agree that its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had defined a unique foreign policy for India at the
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very dawn of its independence. Despite many critics of his world view, a broad national consensus had emerged around Nehrus ideas on independent foreign policy, non-alignment, and third world solidarity. Since the 1990s, though, the challenge for the Indian leaders has been to reinterpret Nehrus ideas to suit the new political context that had confronted it. The new Indian leaders could neither denounce Nehru nor formally reject Nehrus ideas, for that would have invited serious political trouble. Yet they had to continually improvise and refashion Indias foreign policy to suit the new requirements. This has not been easy. The tension between the imperative of the new and the resistance of the old ideas on how to conduct foreign policy is real and is unlikely to end in the near future. The fear of the new and fondness for the old continue to be reflected in all aspects of Indian diplomacy from engaging the United States to an optimal strategy towards the smallest of the neighbours. The new foreign policy of India is indeed work in progress. Yet it is not difficult to see that the direction of Indian diplomacy has changed substantially since the end of the cold war amidst internal and external impulses.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
When India became free the world scenario was quite changed. It was the time of cold war. World politics was divided in two blocs; the first one was led by USA under the capitalist ideology and another was by USSR under the communist ideology. India, under Nehru, did not wish to become a part of any bloc and adopted a new policy, which is known as non-alignment policy. Non-alignment has been regarded as the most important feature of Indias foreign policy. Non alignment aimed at maintaining national independence in foreign affairs by not joining any military alliance formed by the USA and USSR in the aftermath of the Second World War. Nonalignment was neither neutrality nor non-involvement nor isolationism. It was a dynamic concept which meant not commitment to any military bloc but taking an independent stand on international issues according to the merits of each case. The policy of non-alignment won many supporters among the developing countries as it provided an opportunity to them for protecting their sovereignty as also retaining their freedom of action during the tension ridden cold war period. Under this policy India had chosen an independent path for foreign policy and became a natural leader of newly independent AfroAsian countries in the surcharged atmosphere of cold war bloc politics between USA and USSR. In justifying this policy Nehru observed, India is too big a country. India is going to be and is bound to be a country that wants in world affairs...... while remaining quite apart from power blocs. We in better position to cast our weight at the right moment in favour of peace and meanwhile our relation can become as close as possible in the economic or other domain with such countries with which we can easily develop them. India has always opposed colonialism, imperialism and racism. Whenever any injustice happened, India raised her voice, for instance in favour of Indonesias nationality fighting against the Dutch colonialism in 1947, against South Africas illegal occupation of Namibia and the infamous apartheid policy in South Africa. India fully supported inclusion of communist China in the United Nations. India had a lot of experiences of British colonialism so India always opposes this evil naturally. On this behalf India supported to the freedom struggles of Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Malaya and other third world countries India has always viewed UN as a vehicle for peace and for peaceful change in world politics. Apart from this, India has always expected UN to actively involve countries to moderate their differences through talks or negotiations. Further, India has advocated active role for UN in development effort of Third World countries. India has pleaded for a common united front of the third world countries in the UN. It believes that the non-aligned group of nations, by virtue of its massive number, could play a constructive and meaningful role in the UN by stopping the superpowers from using this world body for their own designs. As early as 1950 India linked the reduction of armaments with the larger goal of development. The UN has in fact played a key role in preserving world peace by helping in the decolonization process, by providing humanitarian and developmental assistance and through peacekeeping. Decolonization refers to achievement of independence from colonial rule. After the Second World War many colonies achieved freedom in Asia and Africa.
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Indias role in UN is to make this organization more effective.Many scholars believe that these all determinants of Indias foreign policy are supporting the idealistic view of international politics, which ignores the hard realities of international relations. So they think that Indias foreign policy not succeeded to achieve the realistic goal. But it is one sided truth. Above all idealistic determinants of Indias foreign policy made her an important figure in world politics. Through the non-alignment policy India received benefits by both side of bipolar world and succeed at balancing the relations .Through this policy India span her politics in entire world and gathered the newly independent countries under the one umbrella. Non-alignment group of nations gave tough resistance to monopolistic economic policies of west. They strongly opposed to Bretton Woods system and provided a very strong platform to new international economic order. Due to opposing the colonialism, imperialism and racism India become natural leader of third world countries, for instance G77 other groups are headed by India.

STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN INDIAS WORLD VIEW

Underlying Indias current foreign policy strategy are a set of important transitions in Indias world view. Not all of these were articulated self-consciously or clearly by the Indian political leadership. A few of those changes stand out and are unlikely to be reversed. The first was the transition from the national consensus on building a socialist society to building a modern capitalist one. The socialist ideal, with its roots in the national movement, had so dominated the Indian political discourse by the early 1970s, that a Constitutional amendment was passed in 1976 to make the nation into a socialist republic. But 1991 saw the collapse of the Soviet Union, the veritable symbol of socialism, and the edifice of Indias state-socialism began to crumble. Adapting to the new challenges of globalization now became the principal national objective. The change in the national economic strategy in 1991 inevitably produced abundant new options on the foreign policy front. Implicit in this was the second transition, from the past emphasis on politics to a new stress on economics in the making of foreign policy. India began to realize in the 1990s how far behind it had fallen the rest of Asia, including China, in economic development. With the socialist strait jacket gone, and the pressures to compete with other emerging markets, Indian diplomacy now entered uncharted waters. In the past, foreign for aid was so symbolic of Indian diplomacy that sought to meet the governments external financing requirements as well as developmental needs. India was now seeking foreign direct investment, and access to markets in the developed world. The slow but successful economic reforms unleashed the potential of the nation, generated rapid economic growth and provided a basis to transform its relations with great powers, regional rivals Pakistan and China, and the neighbourhood as a whole. A third transition in Indian foreign policy is about the shift from being a leader of the Third World to the recognition of the potential that India could emerge as a great power in its own right. While independent India always had a sense of its own greatness, that never seemed realistic until the Indian economy began to grow rapidly in the 1990s. In the early decades of its independent existence, India viewed many of the international and regional security issues through the prism of the third world and anti-imperialism. The 1990s, however, brought home some painful truths. There was no real third world trade union, that India believed it was leading. After a radical phase in the 1970s, most developing nations had begun to adopt pragmatic economic policies and sought to integrate with the international market. Much of the developing world had made considerable economic advances, leaving the South Asia way behind. While the rhetoricon the third world remained popular, the policy orientation in Indias external relations increasingly focused on Indias own self interest. There was a growing perception, flowing from the Chinese example, that if India could sustain high growth rates it had a chance to gain a place at the international high table. The 1990s also saw India begin discarding the anti-Western political impulses that were so dominant in the world view that shaped Indian diplomacy right up to 1991. Rejecting the anti-Western mode of thinking was the fourth important transition of Indian foreign policy. As the worlds largest democracy, India
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was the most committed to Western political values outside the Euro-Atlantic world. Yet the Cold War sawIndia emerge as the most articulate opponent of the Western world view. A strong anti-Western bias crept into Indian foreign policy supported by the left as well as the right and underwritten by the security establishment. The disappearance of the Soviet Union and Chinas rise as a great power demanded that India to break the decades old anti-Western approaches to foreign policy. Finally, the fifth transition in Indian foreign policy in the 1990s was from idealism to realism. Idealism came naturally to the Indian elite thatwon independence from the British by arguing against colonialism on the basis of first principles ofEnlightenment. The new leaders of India had contempt for power politics. They believed it was a negative but lingering legacy from 19th century Europe that had no relevance to the new times of the mid 20th century. India tended to see its role in world politics as the harbinger of a new set of principles of peaceful coexistence and multilateralism which if applied properly would transform the world. Although Nehrudemonstrated realism on many fronts, especially in Indias immediate neighbourhood,the public articulation of Indias foreign policy had the stamp of idealism all over it. Since the 1990s, India could no longer sustain the presumed idealism of its foreign policy. Indiahad to come to terms with the painful reality that its relative standing in the world had substantially declined during the Cold War. Much like Deng Xiaoping who prescribed pragmatism for China, the Indian leaders began to emphasize practical ways to achieve power and prosperity for India.

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DYNAMICS OF THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY

One area which saw the cumulative impact of all these transitions in a powerfulmanner was Indias nuclear diplomacy. After years of promoting idealisticslogans such as universal disarmament, India by the late 1990s recognized the importance of becoming a declared nuclear weapon power. Despite the steady nuclearization of its security environment over the decades, India remained ambiguous about its attitudes to its national own nuclear weapons programme.Even as it tested a nuclear device in 1974, India refused to follow through with the nuclear weapons project. By the late 1990s, though, India found it necessary to make itself an unambiguous nuclear power. The economic growth of the decade gave it the self-confidence that it could ridethrough the inevitable international reaction to it. India was also right it betting that acountry of its size and economic potential could not be sanctioned and isolated for too long. Even moreimportant, India sensed that there might be diplomatic opportunities for getting the great powers acknowledge if not legitimize its nuclear weapons programme and removethe high technology sanctions against it. Within seven years after its second round of nuclear testing in 1998, India signed the historic nuclear deal with the Bush Administration in July 2005 under which the U.S. agreed to change its domestic non-proliferation law and revise the international guidelines on nuclear cooperation in favour of India. Another area of transformation was Indias relations with the great powers. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, allowed India to pursue, without the political inhibitions of the past, simultaneous expansion of relations with all the major powers. Injecting political and economic substance into the long emaciated relationship with the United States, now the lone super power, became the principal national strategic objective. At the same time, India was unwilling to let its old ties to the Soviet Union, now a weakened Russia wither away. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has remained an important source of arms and a strategic partner. Meanwhile Indias ties with Europe, China and Japan have all become far more weighty and diversified. The upgradation of the relations with China since the early 1990s has been one of the biggest achievements of Indias new foreign policy. The once wary relationship with China has now blossomed into a strategic partnership for peace and development. China is now all set to emerge as Indias single largest trading partner. India and Japan, which drifted apart from the Cold War, have steadily expanded the basis for political cooperation in recent years and have proclaimed a strategic partnership in 2005. Indias new foreign policy was not all about big power diplomacy. It involved a strong effort to find political reconciliation with two of its large neighboursPakistan and China. Since the end of the Cold War, India had sought to cope with Pakistan in the radically changed context that brought nuclear weapons into the bilateral equation and an increased ability of Pakistan to intervene in the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmirthrough cross-border terrorism. The diplomatic history of Indo-Pak relations in the 1990sis a rich, if frustrating, tapestry that included every possible developmentfrom a limited conventional war to a total military confrontation to many summits that struggled to define a new framework peace between the two neighbours. A new peace processunder way since 2004 has produced the first important steps towards a normalization of Indo-Pak relations, including a serious negotiation on the
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Kashmir dispute. At the same India is also involved in purposeful negotiations to end the longstanding boundary dispute with China. For the first time since its independence, India is now addressing itstwo of most important sources of insecurityunresolved territorial questions with Pakistan and China. Both involve de-emphasizing territorial nationalism, which in turn carry significant political risks at home. Yet, the Indian political leadership now believes resolving either or both of these problems would fundamentally alter Indias security condition. By the 1990s, India, which always saw itself as the pre-eminent power in South Asia, found its relations with the smaller neighbours had reached a dead end. Recognizing the need to transform its South Asian policy, India embarked on a series of policy innovations that demanded greater generosity and a willingness to walk more than half the distance in resolving its many accumulated problems with smaller neighbours. As it embarked upon the policy of economic globalization, India also saw the importance of promoting regional economic integration in the Subcontinent, which was a single market until the Partition of the region took place in 1947. While Indias weight in the region began to increase it also had to temper the past temptations to unilaterally intervene in the internal conflicts of its neighbours. Unlike in the past, when it soughtto keep major powers out of the Subcontinent, India is now working closely with the great powers in resolving the political crises in Nepal and Sri Lanka. Indias unilateralism in the region is increasingly being replaced by a multilateral approach. India has also supported the participation of China, Japan, and the U.S. as observers in the principal mechanism for regionalism, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Even as India seeks to define a new approach towards smaller neighbours, the regions abutting the Subcontinent beckoned India to reassert its claim for a say in theaffairs of the Indian Ocean and its littoral. The 1990s saw India making a determined effort to reconnect with its extended neighbourhood in South East Asia, Afghanistan and Central Asia, and the Middle East. Indias renewed engagement with the surrounding regions is within a new framework that emphasized economic relations and energy diplomacy rather than the traditional notion of third world solidarity through the non-aligned movement. The Cold War and Indias insular economic policies in the first four decades had undermined Indias standing to the East and West of its neighbourhood and prevented New Delhi from ensuring its much vaunted importance in the Indian Ocean littoral. But Indias new economic and foreign policies have given India a real opportunity to realize the vision of Lord Curzon, the British viceroy at the turn of the 20th century of Indian leadership in the region stretching from Aden to Malacca. After decades of neglecting economic and political regionalism, India is now an active participant in various regional organizations from the East Asia Summit to the African Union. During the 1990s Indian diplomacy had to develop a new strategy to deal with the Islamic world. Even as it renewed its engagement with Israel, that waskept at arms length for decades, India also sought to redefine its policies towards key Islamic countries. The reality of a large Islamic populationnearly 150 million todayhad always been an important factor in Indias foreign policy. In the past it merely meant supporting various Islamic causes. But today, the relationship with the Islamic world is being deepened on the basis of economic and commercial cooperation, energy securityand cooperation in combating religious
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extremism and terrorism. This gave an unprecedented depth and breadth to Indias ties to the Islamic world since the end of the Cold War. In the aftermath of the 2001-2002 crisis India and Pakistan with some American prodding embarked upon a peace process. The results from this process have been limited though it had resulted in some de-escalation of tensions on the Kashmir front.iv However, in August 2008, tensions once again came to the fore with Indian allegations about a Pakistani violation of the cease-fire agreement. Matters worsened considerably after India (and the United States) alleged that Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI-D) was behind the attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul in July 2008.v

While relations with Pakistan remain quite fraught, Indo-US relations now seem to be on a very secure footing. The Bush administrations willingness to exempt India from the expectations of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (which India had never acceded to in the first place) and pursue a civilian nuclear agreement provided a sound foundation for the relationship.vi After protracted bilateral (and internal) negotiations the Congress-led regime of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh withstood a parliamentary vote of no-confidence in July 2008.vii There is little question that this agreement can make a meaningful contribution toward alleviating Indias energy needs. However, once consummated, its larger significance will lie in ending Indias thirty-odd years of nuclear isolation from the global order. Since the United States had been one of the principal protagonists in creating and bolstering these global arrangements, the shift in American policy, which made an exception for India, was nothing short of revolutionary. Consequently, the American concession on this critical issue must be construed as recognition of Indias emerging potential as a great power in Asia and beyond.

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LONG TERM IMPLICATIONS

The innovations in Indias foreign policy strategy since the early 1990s has resulted in the happy situation of simultaneous expansion of relations with all the major powers,growing weight in Asia and the Indian Ocean regions, and the prospect of improved relations with important neighbours. Given its impending relative rise in the international system, India is bound to be confronted by a number of challenges. First the new focuson the importance of power is not without problems. Despite being marginalized in recent years, the imperatives of idealism and moralism have not completely disappeared from India's foreign policy. Since 1991, India has moved from its traditional emphasis on the power of the argument to a new stress on the argument of power. Given its noisydemocracy, India cannot build domestic political support to foreign policy initiatives purely on the argument of power. It would continue to need a set of values and norms to justify its actions on the world stage. As a consequence the tension between power and principle would remain an enduring one in Indias foreign policy strategy. Second, increased power potential will mean that India would have to take positions on major international issues and regional conflicts. In recent years, New Delhi has either avoided or merely substituted them with generalized slogans. Just as Beijing is being pressed to become a stake-holder in the international system, New Delhi too would come under greater pressure to stop being a free rider. In other words, Indiawould have to often find ways to limit the pursuit of national interest in order to contribute to collective interests of the international system. Third, as India emerges as an important element of future balance of power in the world, it would be pressed to make choices in favour of one or the other great powers at least on specific issues. The absence of great power confrontation in the last few years has allowed India the luxury of converting the slogan of non-alignment into an independent foreign policy. But amidst potential new rivalries among the U.S., China, Europe, Russia, and Japan, New Delhi would be compelled to make often wrenching political choices. While India making potential alliances with one or other major powers cannot be ruled out in the future, as a large country, India would remain loath to limit its freedom of action through formal alliances. Fourth, the demands on India to contribute to order and stability in its immediate and extended neighbourhood would dramatically increase in the coming decades. This would in turn draw India deeper into great power rivalries in various regions and the internal conflicts of smaller countries. Use of military force, either unilaterally or under multilateral mechanisms, could also become frequent. Meanwhile the India, likeChina, is increasingly turning towards other developing countries for stable supply of energy and mineral resources, giving growing amounts of economic assistance, providing arms and military training, and seeking long-term naval access arrangements. Arising India would, then, be no longer remain immune to the many tragedies of great power politics. Finally, India, like other great powers before it, is also in the danger of falling a victim to ultra-nationalism and an over-determination of national interest. Tempering nationalism and balancing ends and means are two challenges that come inseparably with a rising power potential on the world stage.
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CONCLUSION
The Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War forced India to redefine its foreign policy and search for a new place in the emerging international order. However, almost 20 years on, Indias foreign policy still appears During much of the Cold War, India chose to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy posture. The collapse of to lack a coherent strategic doctrine India today impinges on the world in unprecedented ways. At the same time it is increasingly dependent on the rest of the world for its own security and prosperity. This sets the stage for an ever larger and expanding role for India on the world stage.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
http://www.academia.edu/783270/Dynamics_of_Indias_foreign_policy http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTE XT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/asia-pacific/ari65-2012_india_foreign_policy http://thediplomat.com/the-pulse/2013/03/22/the-democratization-of-indias-foreign-policy/

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