CASE 1

G.R. No. L-56077 February 28, 1985

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES MAXINO

FACTS: This case is about the validity of the registration of 885 hectares of public forestal land aka Lot 1 located in Mulanay, Quezon.

On March 21, 1961 In Land Registration Case No. 81-G of the CFI at Quezon ordered the registration of said land, Lot 1, in the names of the spouses Maxino. The decision became final and executory. On June 20, 1969, the Republic of the Philippines filed an amended petition to annul the decision, decree and title on the ground that they are void because the land in question was still a part of the unclassified public forest. Moreover, the possessory information title relied upon by the Maxino spouses covered only 29 hectares of land and not 885 hectares.

Judge Agana denied the petition and was served upon the assistant provincial fiscal and on the special counsel, Jaime Dispo of the Bureau of Forestry. A copy of the order was transmitted by the fiscal to the Solicitor General's Office only on

September 2, 1971 or nearly one year from the issuance of the order. The Solicitor General appealed from that order, and was given due course.

In its decision dated October 24, 1980 the Appellate Court dismissed the petition because the 1970 order had allegedly long become final and unappealable. The Solicitor General appealed to this Court.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the appeal of the State from the trial court's 1970 order of denial was seasonably made.

2. Whether Spouses Maxino have a right of ownership over the disputed land

HELD: 1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the reglementary thirty-day period for appeal should be reckoned from the time the Solicitor General's Office was apprised of the 1970 order of denial and not from the time the special counsel or the fiscal was served with that order. These representatives of the Solicitor General had no power to decide whether an appeal should be made. They should have referred the matter to the Solicitor General.

The Solicitor General's Office should be served with the final order disposing of the petition and should not be bound by the service on his surrogates, the special counsel and the fiscal.

In this case, where it is contended that the registration is void allegedly because public forestal land was registered and the State sought to declare the decision void, the Government should not be estopped by the mistakes or errors of its agents.

2. No. It is incontestable that Lot 1, the 885-hectare area registered by the Maxinos, is within the public forest, not alienable and disposable nor susceptible of private appropriation. Its inclusion in the public forest was certified by Director of Forestry on July 6, 1940. The certification was reiterated by the Director of Forestry on May 20, 1948. The basis of the claim of the Maxinos is a Spanish title, a gratuitous composition title or adjustment title issued on July 30, 1888 to Prudencio Tesalona pursuant to the Royal Decree of December 26, 1884 for 29 hectares of pasture land (pasto de animales) allegedly bounded by the Yamay and Campalacio Creeks. The composition title erred in stating the boundaries. The unreliability or dubiousness of the composition title is evident from the sale executed by the heirs of Prudencio Tesalona in favor of Tarciana Morales-Maxino. That curious document is not a sale at all. It is a "quit-claim".

It is axiomatic that public forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during the Spanish regime or under the Torrens system, nullifies the title. Possession of public forestal lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.

Spanish titles are not indefeasible. The instant case bears similarities to Ramirez and Bayot de Ramirez vs. Director of Lands, 60 Phil. 114, where an adjustment

title issued in 1896 was held to be void because it was fraudulent and it covered public forestal land not subject to registration.

Incidentally, it may be mentioned that Presidential Decree No. 892 effective February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land registration proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the application for registration of Lot 1, Psu-175880 is dismissed.

CASE 2

G.R. No. L-61539 February 14, 1986

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners, vs. LOPE GUZMAN RIVAS, PACIFICO V. VIJANDRE, FERNANDO A. PASCUA, and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

This is a land registration case involving what the Republic of the Philippines claims to be grazing land, a part of the forest reserve.

On March 14, 1873 Domingo Bunagan was purportedly granted a possessory information title for a tract of land, called Nottab, and on November 3, 1885 obtained a "composicion gratuita" for a parcel of land in Enrile, Cagayan or a gratuitous adjustment title as distinguished from an onerous adjustment title, which the Solicitor General found as not authentic.

In the present case, the parties involved assert their own claims over the disputed parcel of land. The evidence presented by the parties was conflicting. According to Cavaco's evidence, the whole land was sold to Luis Guzman Rivas and later to Cavaco, whereas, according to Vijandre's evidence, only a portion was sold to Luis

and the remainder was sold to Lope Guzman Rivas who in turn sold portions to Vijandre and Fernando A. Pascua.

The Solicitor General's view is that the whole Nottab land, whatever its area, is forestal and grazing land, and consequently, was inalienable land and, therefore, all supposed sales regarding that land were void.

On the other hand, according to Vijandre's evidence in this case, on July 26, 1915, Manuela Bunagan, the sole heir of Domingo, sold to Pablo Guzman for Pl,000 the remainder of the land in Nottab, Enrile, Cagayan. Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre filed in May, 1968 an application for the registration of two parcels of land located at Sitio Nottab, the same Nottab land previously applied for by Cavaco.

The learned trial court declared the disputed land public land and dismissed the applications of Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and the claims of Pascua and Cavaco.

The Appellate Court reversed said decision and granted the application of Lope and Vijandre, except with respect to Lot No. 13. The Directors of Lands and Forest Development appealed to this Court.

ISSUE Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in not declaring that the disputed land is part of a forest reservation

HELD:

The appellate court was wrong. The Supreme Court held that the disputed land is inalienable public grazing land, being a part of the forest reserve. It is part of Timberland Project No. 15-A of Enrile, Cagayan. It is included in the Bureau of Forestry Map L. C. 2263, comprising the Timberland of the Cagayan Land Classification, containing an area of 8,249 hectares, situated in Enrile, Solana and Amulong, Cagayan. It is non-registerable. It cannot be appropriated by private persons. It is not disposable public agricultural land.

Said land is a part of the forest reserve under Presidential Proclamation No. 159 dated February 13, 1967. It is intended for "wood production watershed soil protection and other forest uses". The reservation was made prior to the instant 1968 application for registration.

We have stated that the supposed possessory information title issued in 1873 to the original claimant, Domingo Bunagan, describes the land as a grazing land

Manuela Bunagan, the supposed heir to Domingo Bunagan, sold in 1915 the 2,000 hectares in question to Pablo Guzman at fifty centavos a hectare. Similarly, Ignacio A. Pascua bought from Lope Guzman Rivas the 800 hectares in 1962 as "a parcel of pasture land".

Grazing lands and timber lands are not alienable under section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Section 10 distinguishes strictly agricultural lands (disposable) from grazing lands (inalienable).

Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the object of private ownership

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Appellate Court is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of Lope Guzman Rivas and Pacifico V. Vijandre and the counter-application of lawyer Fernando A. Pascua are dismissed.

CASE 3

G.R. No. 84464

June 21, 1991

SPOUSES JAIME AND TEODORA VILLANUEVA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CATALINA I. SANCHEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Private respondent Catalina Sanchez, claiming to be the widow of Roberto Sanchez, averred that her husband was the owner of a 275 sq. meter parcel of land located at Rosario, Cavite, which was registered without her knowledge in the name of the herein petitioners on the strength of an alleged deed of sale executed in their favor by her late husband on February 7, 1968. Involving the report of a handwriting expert from the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, who found that the signature on the document was written by another person, she prayed that the deed of sale be annulled, that the registration of the lot in the name of the petitioners be cancelled, and that the lot be reconveyed to her.

In their answer, the petitioners questioned the personality of the private respondent to file the complaint, contending that the late Roberto Sanchez was never married. On the merits, they claimed that Roberto Sanchez had deeded over the lot to them in 1968 for the sum of P500.00 in partial settlement of a judgment they had obtained against him.

On the petitioner's motion, the trial court required the examination of the deed of sale by the NBI to determine if it was a forgery. Trial proceeded in due time, with the presentation by the parties of their testimonial and documentary evidence. On June 25, 1986, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners.

The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which held that the trial court did err, as contended by the appellant, in holding that the deed of sale was not spurious; that the action to annul it had already prescribed; that Catalina Sanchez was not the widow of Roberto Sanchez; and that she had no capacity to institute the complaint.

ISSUE:

Before us now, the petitioners fault the respondent court for : a) upholding the testimony of the expert witnesses against the findings of fact of the trial court; b) annulling the deed of sale; c) declaring that the action to annul the deed of sale had not yet prescribed; d) not declaring the private respondent guilty of estoppel; and e) not sustaining the decision of the trial court.

HELD: We see no reason to disturb the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It is consonant with the evidence of record and the applicable law and jurisprudence.

The Court notes at the outset that Catalina Sanchez has proved her status as the widow of Roberto Sanchez through a marriage certificate. A Torrens certificate is the best evidence of ownership of registered land, not of the civil status of the owner.

As the surviving spouse of Roberto Sanchez, the private respondent could validly file the complaint for the recovery of her late husband's property, without prejudice to the succession rights of his other heirs.

Coming now to the questioned signature, both the PC Examiner and NBI Examiner expressed the informed view that the signature on the deed of sale was not written by Roberto Sanchez.

The explanation given by the petitioners for their delay in registering the deed of sale is not convincing. That delay lasted for all of thirteen years. The petitioners suggest they are simple peasants and did not appreciate the need for the immediate transfer of the property in their name. They also say that they forgot. The evidence shows, however, that they understood the need for registering their property for purposes of using it as collateral in case they wanted to borrow money. It would appear that they thought of simulating the sale registering the subject lot when their own lands were insufficient to secure a P100,000.00 loan their daughter wanted to borrow.

The supposed vendee's signature having been proved to be a forgery, the deed of sale is totally void or inexistent as "absolutely simulated or fictitious" under Article 1409 of the Civil Code. According to Article 1410, "the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe."

Finally, petitioners invoke Article 1431 of the Civil Code and contend that the respondent court erred in not declaring the private respondent and her late husband estopped from questioning the deed of sale until after fourteen years from its execution. The inference that Roberto Sanchez and the private respondent knew about the instrument from that date has not been proved by the evidence of record. Moreover, we fail to see the applicability of Article 1431, which provides that "through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." Neither the private respondent nor her late husband has made any admission or representation to the petitioners regarding the subject land that they are supposed to have relied upon.

Our own finding is that the petitioners have not proved the validity and authenticity of the deed of sale or even the circumstances that supposedly led to its execution by the late Roberto Sanchez. On the contrary, we are convinced from the testimonies of the handwriting experts that his signature had been forged on the questioned document and that he had not conveyed the subject land to the petitioners. The deed of sale being a forgery, it was totally void or inexistent and so could be challenged at any time, the action for its nullification being imprescriptible. The private respondent, as the widow of Roberto Sanchez, has the capacity to sue for the recovery of the land in question and is not estopped from doing so.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

CASE 4 G.R. No. 114299 September 24, 1999

TRADERS ROYAL BANK, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all surnamed CAPAY and RAMON A. GONZALES, respondents.

G.R. No. 118862

September 24, 1999

PATRIA, RUBY ANN, MARGARITA, ROSARIO, CYNTHIA, LINDA JOY, all surnamed CAPAY, and RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioners, vs. SPS. HONORATO D. SANTOS and MARIA CRISTINA S. SANTOS, SPS. CECILIO L. PE and JOSEFINA L. PE, FLORA LARON WESCOMBE, SPS. TELESFORO P. ALFELOR II and LIZA R. ALFELOR, SPS. DEAN RODERICK FERNANDO and LAARNI MAGDAMO FERNANDO, REMEDIOS OCA, DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and TRADERS ROYAL BANK, respondents.

Facts: A parcel of land owned by the spouses Capay was mortgage to and subsequently extrajudicially foreclosed by Traders Royal Bank (TRB). To prevent property sale in public auction, the Capays filed a petition for preliminary injunction alleging the mortgage was void because they did not receive the proceeds of the loan. A

notice of lis pendens (suit pending) was filed before the Register of Deeds with the notice recorded in the Day Book. Meanwhile, a foreclosure sale proceeded with the TRB as the sole and winning bidder. The Capays title was cancelled and a new one was entered in TRBs name without the notice of lis pendens carried over the title. The Capays filed recovery of the property and damages. Court rendered a decision declaring the mortgage was void for want of consideration and thus cancelled TRBs title and issued a new cert. of title for the Capays.

Pending its appeal before the court, TRB sold the land to Santiago who subsequently subdivided and sold to buyers who were issued title to the land. Court ruled that the subsequent buyers cannot be considered purchasers for value and in good faith since they purchase the land after it became a subject in a pending suit before the court. Although the lis pendens notice was not carried over the titles, its recording in the Day Book constitutes registering of the land and notice to all persons with adverse claim over the property. TRB was held to be in bad faith upon selling the property while knowing it is pending for litigation. The Capays were issued the cert. of title of the land in dispute while TRB is to pay damages to Capays.

Issue: Who has the better right over the land in dispute? Whether or not TRB is liable for damages

Ruling: The court ruled that a Torrens title is presumed to be valid which purpose is to avoid conflicts of title to real properties. When the subsequent buyers bought the property there was no lis pendens annotated on the title. Every person dealing with a registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the title and is not obliged to interpret what is beyond the face of the registered title. Hence the court ruled that the subsequent buyers obtained the property from a clean title in good faith and for value. On one hand, the Capays are guilty of latches. After they filed the notice for lis pendens, the same was not annotated in the TRB title. They did not take any action for 15 years to find out the status of the title upon knowing the foreclosure of the property. In consideration to the declaration of the mortgage as null and void for want of consideration, the foreclosure proceeding has no legal effect. However, in as much as the Capays remain to be the real owner of the property it has already been passed to purchasers in good faith and for value. Therefore, the property cannot be taken away to their prejudice. Thus, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time they sold it to Santiago.

CASE 5

G.R. No. 149679

May 30, 2003

HEIRS OF CLEMENTE ERMAC, namely: IRENEA E. SENO, LIBRADA E. MALINAO, INES E. MIOZA, SOLEDAD E. CENIZA, RODULFO ERMAC and AMELITA E. BASUBAS, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF VICENTE ERMAC, namely: BENJAMIN, VIRGINIA, PRECIOSA, DANILO, as HEIRS OF URBANO ADOLFO; BERNARDINO, CLIMACO, CESAR, ELSA, FLORAME and FE, all surnamed ERMAC, as HEIRS OF CLIMACO ERMAC, ESTELITA ERMAC, ESTANESLAO DIONSON, VICENTE DIONSON, EUFEMIA LIGARAY, EMIGDIO BUSTILLO and LIZA PARAJELE, LUISA DEL CASTILLO,* respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Ownership should not be confused with a certificate of title. Registering land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.

The Case

The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The factual antecedents of the case are summarized by the CA as follows:

"In their Complaint, [respondents] claim that they are the owners of the various parcels of real property that form part of Lot No. 666, (plan II-5121 Amd.2) situated in Mandaue City, Cebu, which lot allegedly belonged originally to Claudio Ermac. Upon the latters death, the said Lot No. 666 was inherited and partitioned by his children, namely, Esteban, Pedro and Balbina. Siblings Pedro and Balbina requested their brother Esteban to have their title over the property registered. Esteban, however, was unable to do so, and the task of registration fell to his son, Clemente. Clemente applied for registration of the title, but did so in his own name, and did not include his fathers brother and sister, nor his cousins. Despite having registered the lot in his name, Clemente did not disturb or claim ownership over those portions occupied by his uncle, aunt and cousins even up to the time of his death. Among the occupants of Lot No. 666 are the [respondents] in this case. [Respondents]-heirs of Vicente Ermac claim ownership over the portions of Lot No. 666 now occupied by them by right of succession as direct descendants of the original owner, Claudio Ermac. [Respondents] Luisa Del Castillo and Estaneslao Dionson allegedly derived their title by purchase from the children of Claudio Ermac. [Respondent] Vicente Dionson, on the other hand, bought his land from the heirs of Pedro Ermac, while [Respondents] Emigdio Bustillo and Liza Parajele derived their ownership from the Heirs of Balbina Ermac-Dabon. [respondents] ownership and possession had been peaceful and undisturbed, until recently when the [petitioners]-heirs of Clemente Ermac filed an action for ejectment against them. The filing of the said ejectment caused a cloud of doubt upon the [respondents] ownership over their respective parcels of land, prompting them to file this action for quieting of title.

"[Petitioners], on the other hand, denied the material allegations of the [respondents], and claimed that the [respondents] have no cause of action against them. It is essentially claimed that it was Clemente Ermac and not his grandfather Claudio Ermac who is the original claimant of dominion over Lot No. 666. During his lifetime, Clemente Ermac was in actual, peaceful, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of an owner of the entire Lot No. 666. With the help of his children, he cultivated the said lot, and planted corn, peanuts, cassava and fruit products. Clemente also effected the registration of the subject lot in his name. Upon Clementes death, [petitioners] inherited Lot No. 666, and they constructed their residential houses thereon. [Petitioners] claim that [respondents] recent occupation of some portions of Lot No. 666 was only tolerated by Clemente Ermac and the [petitioners]. [Petitioners] in fact had never surrendered ownership or possession of the property to the [respondents]. [Petitoners] also set up the defense of prescription and laches.

xxx

xxx

xxx

"After trial, the lower [court] rendered its [D]ecision, finding that the original owner of the lot in question was Claudio Ermac, and therefore, the property was inherited upon his death by his children Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. All the heirs of Claudio Ermac, therefore, should share in the ownership over Lot No. 666, by right of succession. The ruling [was] supported by the admissions of Irene[a] Seno, witness for the [petitioners] and daughter of Clemente Ermac, establishing facts which show that [petitioners] and their predecessor Clemente did not own the entire property, but that the other heirs of Claudio Ermac are entitled to twothirds (2/3) of the lot. Since the entire lot is now registered in the name of Clemente Ermac, the shares belonging to the other heirs of Claudio Ermac, some of which have already been purchased by some of the [respondents], are being held in trust by the [petitioners] in favor of their actual occupants."6

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA held that the factual finding of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)7 should not be disturbed on appeal. The latter found that Lot No. 666 was originally owned by Claudio Ermac and, after his death, was inherited by his children -- Esteban, Balbina and Pedro. It ruled that respondents were able to prove consistently and corroboratively that they -- as well as their predecessors-in-interests -- had been in open, continuous and undisturbed possession and occupation thereof in the concept of owners.

According to the appellate court, "[t]he fact that [petitioners] have in their possession certificates of title which apparently bear out that it [was] Clemente Ermac alone who claimed the entire property described therein [has] no discrediting effect upon plaintiffs claim, it appearing that such titles were acquired in derogation of the existing valid and adverse interests of the plaintiffs whose title by succession were effectively disregarded."8

Hence, this Petition.9

The Issues

In their Memorandum,10 petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:

"I. The validity of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated February 5, 1996 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, directing the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, to cease and desist from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 2401[;]

"II. Whether or not O.C.T. No. RO-752 issued in the names of [Spouses] Clemente Ermac [and] Anunciacion Suyco is indefeasible and incontrovertible under the Torrens System[;]

"III. Whether or not the alleged tax declarations and tax receipts are sufficient to defeat the title over the property in the names of petitioners predecessors-ininterest [Spouses] Clemente Ermac and Anunciacion Suyco[;]

"[IV]. Whether or not laches ha[s] set in on the claims by the respondents on portions of Lot No. 666[.]"11

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is unmeritorious.

First Issue:

Preliminary Injunction

Petitioners assail the validity of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the RTC to restrain the ejectment proceedings they had filed earlier.

This question is not only late, but also moot. If petitioners truly believed that the issuance of the Writ was tainted with grave abuse of discretion, they should have challenged it by a special civil action for certiorari within the reglementary period. Any ruling by the Court at this point would be moot and academic, as the resolution of the issue would not involve the merits of the case, which this appeal -- as it is now -- touches upon.

Second Issue:

Indefeasibility and Incontrovertibility of Title

Petitioners posit that pursuant to Section 32 of PD 1529 (the Property Registration Decree), the certificate of title issued in favor of their predecessor-ininterest, Clemente Ermac, became incontrovertible after the lapse of one year from its issuance. Hence, it can no longer be challengedence, it can no longer be challenged.

We clarify. While it is true that Section 3212 of PD 1529 provides that the decree of registration becomes incontrovertible after a year, it does not altogether deprive an aggrieved party of a remedy13 in law.14 The acceptability of the Torrens System would be impaired, if it is utilized to perpetuate fraud against the real owners.15

Furthermore, ownership is not the same as a certificate of title. Registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.16 A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein.17 Its issuance in favor of a particular person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be co-owned with persons not named in the certificate, or that it may be held in trust for another person by the registered owner.18

Third Issue:

Ownership of the Disputed Lot

Petitioners claim that the CA erred in relying on the hearsay and unsubstantiated testimony of respondents, as well as on tax declarations and realty tax receipts, in order to support its ruling that the land was owned by Claudio Ermac.

We are not persuaded. The credence given to the testimony of the witnesses for respondents is a factual issue already passed upon and resolved by the trial and the appellate courts. It is a hornbook doctrine that only questions of law are entertained in appeals by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The trial courts findings of fact, which the CA affirmed, are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.19

Moreover, while tax declarations and realty tax receipts do not conclusively prove ownership, they may constitute strong evidence of ownership when accompanied by possession for a period sufficient for prescription.20 Considering that respondents have been in possession of the property for a long period of time,

there is legal basis for their use of tax declarations and realty tax receipts as additional evidence to support their claim of ownership.

Fourth Issue:

Prescription and Laches

Petitioners assert that the ownership claimed by respondents is barred by prescription and laches, because it took the latter 57 years to bring the present action. We disagree.

When a party uses fraud or concealment to obtain a certificate of title to property, a constructive trust is created in favor of the defrauded party.21 Since Claudio Ermac has already been established in the present case as the original owner of the land, the registration in the name of Clemente Ermac meant that the latter held the land in trust for all the heirs of the former. Since respondents were in actual possession of the property, the action to enforce the trust, and recover the property, and thereby quiet title thereto, does not prescribe.22

Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable considerations.23 It cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud and injustice.24 Its application should not prevent the rightful owners of a property to recover what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

CASE 6

G.R. No. L-29442 November 11, 1987

FORTUNATO BOLLOZOS, ANDREA BOLLOZOS VDA. DE RAPANOT PABLO B. CALAM, EPIFANIA B. BEVERA, SERGIO B. CALAM, GUALBERTO B. CALAM, IGNACIO B. CALAM, JOSE B. CALAM, JR. and CAROLINA B. CALAM, plaintiffs-appellees, vs. YU TIENG SU, alias SISO YU, defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

The original protagonists in this controversy have long since passed away into "the tongueless silence of the dreamless dust" and are now but mute witnesses to this litigation. We can now go only by the musty records that will take us back to more than half a century ago, before the period of the Commonwealth.

This case was formally commenced on January 20, 1968, with the filing of a complaint for the recovery of a 1.2 hectare parcel of land and accounting for its use from defendant Yu, the herein appellant. The plaintiffs claimed that the said land had been delivered to him only for administration so he could apply the produce thereof to the indebtedness of Paulino Bollozos, their predecessor-in-

interest. It was alleged that Yu had refused to return the land despite demand and to make the required accounting although the debt had long been paid. 1

In his answer, the defendant averred that he had acquired ownership of the land in question by virtue of two documents executed in his favor by Paulino Bollozos, to wit, a deed of sale with right of repurchase dated September 1, 1934, and a deed of absolute sale dated September 21, 1936. He therefore had no obligation to return it. Additionally, Yu claimed that the suit was barred by prescription, the complaint having been filed only after all of 26 years. 2

Issues having been joined, the parties later entered into a stipulation of facts before the trial court, reading in full as follows:

1. That both parties hereby agree on the Identity of the parcel of land in litigation as described in paragraph II of the amended complaint, which parcel of land is covered by OCT No. 5033 in the name of Paulino Bollozos;

2. That plaintiffs Fortunato Bollozos and Andrea Bollozos are the only surviving children of the late Paulino Bollozos while the rest of the above-named plaintiffs are the grandchildren of said Paulino Bollozos,

3. That sometime on September 1, 1934, the late Paulino Bollozos executed a document entitled "Escritura de Compra y Venta Con Pacto de Retro," the original of which is hereto attached as Annex A to form part hereof and another document was executed by the late Paulino Bollozos entitled "A Definite and Absolute Purchase and Sale" dated September 21, 1936, the original copy of which is hereto attached to form an integral part of this complete stipulation of facts

4. That the parties agree to submit the entitled case for decision on the basis of the following issue or issues:

(a) Whether a valid conveyance of ownership was made of the parcel of land in litigation on September 1, 1934 as appearing in Annex A, entitled "Escritura de Compra y Venta Con Pacto de Retro," or on September 21, 1936 as appearing in Annex B, entitled "A Definite and Absolute Purchase and Sale" of the parcel of land in litigation, and for the Honorable Court to determine the legality or nullity of the above-mentioned documents. 3

On the basis of this agreement and of the memoranda filed subsequently by the parties, the lower court, * without receiving further evidence, rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. 4 It held, first, that the deed of sale with pacto de retro executed on September 1, 1934, was in reality an equitable mortgage and did not transfer ownership of the land to the defendant; and second, that the subsequent sale executed in 1936 was null and void ab initio because by that time the transfer of agricultural lands to aliens was already prohibited by the Commonwealth Constitution, which became effective on November 15, 1935. Yu was a Chinese national.

The above rulings are the subject of this appeal, ** which we find meritorious. We shall reverse.

It is important to note at the outset that there is nothing in the record to show that the disputed property had merely been entrusted to Yu for administration in connection with Paulino Bollozos' indebtedness to him, as claimed by the plaintiff. Neither is there any evidence of such indebtedness. This allegation, which was the

very basis of the complaint, was not among those admitted in the stipulation of facts and indeed had been categorically denied in the answer. It thus remained a bare averment without any actual or presumptive support.

It should also be noted that, by contrast, the defendant, to substantiate his answer, produced the two above-cited documents Annexes "A" and "B", which clearly indicate the intention of the parties regarding the ownership and disposition of the land in question. These documents are the best and, as it happens, the only evidence adduced of such intention.

Annex "A" reads as follows:

ESCRITURA DE COMPRA Y VENTA CON PACTO DE RETRO

Nosotros, PAULINO BOLLOZOS, de 71 aos de edad y FAUSTINA LILOC, de 58 aos de edad, marido y mujer respectivamente, filipinos y vecinos y residentes del barrio de Bonbon, Municipio de Catarman Provincia de Misamis Oriental, Islas Filipinas, por la presente hacemos constar que consideracion a la suma de SEISCIENTOS TREINTA Y SEIS PESOS (P636.00) en moneda filipina que nos ha pagado y hemos recibido a nuestra entera satisfaccion del SR. YU TIENG SU, de 34 aos de edad, chino, casado de la SRA SIA PUTE, de 29 aos de edad, china y residente de este Municipio de Catarman Provincia de Misamis Oriental, Islas Filipinas, VENDEMOS, CEDEMOS ENTREGAMOS y TRASPASAMOS al referido SR. YU TIENG SU sus herederos y causahabientes una parcela de terreno con todas sus mejoras existentes situada en el distrito de Quilambon, barrio de Bonbon, Municipio de Catarman Provincia de Misamis Oriental, Islas Filipinas bajo el

numero del Lote Cadastral de este Municipio Catarman Misamis Oriental, Caso No. 9m y cuya descripcion tecnica es como sigue:

(Technical Description)

Hacemos constar tambien que queda pacto y convenido con el referrido SR. YU TIENG SU, que si nosotros devolvieramos o mandamos devolver dentro del termino de SIETE (7) ANOS contados desde esta fecha la suma de SEISCIENTOS TREINTA Y SEIS PESOS (P636.00) en moneda filipina, y le abonaremos ademas los gastos que ocasione el presente contrato, nos otorgaran el comprador o sus representantes escritura de retroventa pero si transcurre dicho plazo sin haberse utilizado el derecho de redencion, adquirira la presente el character de absolutamente consumada, y entretanto solo podra el comprador disponer la finca con las limitaciones prescritas en la Ley Hipotecaria

En testimiento de rado lo cual firmamos la presente en este Municipio de Catarman Provincia de Misamis Oriental hoy 1, o-de Septiembre, 1934, A.D.

(Sgd.) PAULINO BOLLOZOS Y

(Sgd.) FAUSTINA LILOC,

Firmadas en presencia de

(Sgd.) JOSE LIM PATUNGAN y

(Sgd.) EUFROSINO LIMBACO

The second instrument, Annex "B", declared the following:

DEFINITE AND ABSOLUTE PURCHASE AND SALE

That I, PAULINO BOLLOZOS, 72 years of age, Filipino married to Faustina Liloc, 60 years of age, and resident of the barrio of Bonbon, Municipality of Catarman, Province of Oriental Misamis, P.I. do hereby declare and say:

1st. That I am the lawful owner of one parcel of land together with all existing improvements thereon, located in the sitio of Kilambon, barrio of Bonbon, Municipality of Catarman, Province of Oriental Misamis, P.I., particularly described as follows:

(Technical Description)

2nd. That the said parcel of land together with all existing improvements thereon is registered in my name in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Oriental Misamis, as evidenced by the ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE number FIVE THOUSAND THIRTY THREE (5033).

3rd. That the said parcel of land, together with all existing improvements thereon was sold by me to Mr. YU TIENG SU, married to Sia Pute on September 1, 1934 for

the sum of SIX HUNDRED THIRTY SIX (P636.00) under the instrument of purchase with right or repurchase (Compra venta con pacto de retro) and said document is ratified before Notary Public Mr. Eufrosino Limbaco, of Mambajao, Misamis Oriental, on the 1st day of September 1934, Not. Reg. No. 149-Page No. 97-Book No. 8-Series of 1934.

4th. That by these presents I do hereby declare and say that I will forever renounce and repudiate my rights and privileges to repurchase the said parcel of land together with all its existing improvements thereon and for and in consideration of an additional sum TWO HUNDRED NINETY-FIVE PESOS (P295.00), Philippine Currency to me in hand paid and the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged by Mr. YU TIENG SU, 36 years of age, Chinese, married to Sia Pute, 31 years of age, Chinese and resident of this Municipality of Catarman Misamis Oriental, P.I., by these presents I do hereby sell, transfer and forever convey a deliver unto said Mr. YU TIENG SU, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns that parcel of land together with all its existing improvements thereon, particularly described above (Lot No. 473). Original Certificate of Title number Five Thousand Thirty-three.

5th. Lastly, I do hereby declare and say that I will forever warrant and defend unto said Mr. YU TIENG SU, his heirs, executors, administrator and assigns all lawful claims of all persons whomsoever of his right of ownership of the said parcel of land together with its existing improvements thereon described above.

IN WITNESSETH WHEREOF, I have hereunto signed my name in this Municipality of Catarman Province of Misamis Oriental, P. I., on this 21 st day of September 1936.

(Sgd.) PAULINO BOLLOZOS

Signed in the presence of:

(Sgd.) JOSE LIM PATUNGAN and

(Sgd.) JOSE L. RIVERA

It is clear from the first document that Paulino Bollozos actually sold the land in question to Yu for the sum of P636.00, subject only to the former's right to repurchase it within a period of seven years. There is nothing in this instrument suggesting a different arrangement such as that alleged by the plaintiffs-appellees in their complaint, nor have they submitted any evidence in proof of such arrangement.

The intention clearly embodied in Annex "A" was affirmed in the second transaction between the same parties as reduced to writing in Annex "B", denominated as "A" Definite and Absolute Purchase and Sale." Concluded two years later, it specifically referred to the first sale made in 1934 by virtue of which, as Paulino Bollozos declared, the land in question and its improvements were "sold by me to Mr. Yu Tieng Su" for the agreed consideration of P636.00. He further stated in Annex "B" that "by these presents I do hereby declare and say that I will forever renounce and repudiate my right and privilege to repurchase" the said property as reserved by him in the first instrument. For such renunciation, Bollozos acknowledged receipt of an additional sum of P295.00, thus increasing the total purchase price of the land to P931.00.

The Court holds that the first transaction was a valid sale with right of repurchase and effectively transferred ownership of the land in dispute to the defendantappellant. All the elements of a valid contract were present, and in any case the plaintiffs-appellees themselves have stipulated on its authenticity. As it was concluded in 1934, the prohibition against the acquisition of agricultural lands by aliens was not yet applicable, having become effective only from November 15, 1935, under the Commonwealth Constitution. Moreover, the title acquired by Yu was recognized in the said Constitution as a vested right that could no longer be disturbed under the new provisions of that charter reserving ownership of such lands to Filipino citizens. 5

The plaintiffs-appellees err in suggesting that the first transaction, being conditional, did not effectively transfer the ownership of the land to the vendee. It did, certainly, subject only to the right of the vendor to redeem it within the period specified. As we said in an earlier case:

In the deed of pacto de retro sale executed by Ignacio Reyes in favor of Lim Kiam on May 30, 1932, covering Lot 9203, the period of repurchase was not fixed. The Court of Appeals correctly held that in accordance with Article 1508 of the old Civil Code the right could be exercised within four years from the date of execution of the conveyance - in this case up to May 30, 1936. The fact, however, that on this date the Constitution was already in force did not affect the right acquired by Lim Kiam. We have held in a number of cases decided under the provisions of the old Civil Code that the nature of a sale with the right of repurchase is such that the ownership over the thing sold is transferred to the vendee upon execution of the contract, subject only to the resolutory condition that the vendor exercise his right, of repurchase within the period agreed upon. Manalansan v. Manalang, L-13646, July 26, 1960; Almiranez v. Devera, L-19496 February 27, 1965; Rosario v. Rosario, L-13018, December 29, 1960. 6

A sale with pacto de retro transfers the legal title to the vendee and this, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, carries with it the right of possession. In the case of Santos v. heirs of Crisostomo and Tiongson (41 Phil. 342), this court, in discussing the nature of sale with pacto de retro said: ... It is our opinion, however, that the insertion of a stipulation for repurchase by the vendor in a contract of sale does not necessarily create any right inconsistent with the right of ownership in the purchaser. Such a stipulation is in the nature of an option, and the possible exercise of it rests upon contingency. ... 7

To be sure, Paulino Bollozos could have repurchased the property within seven years pursuant to the first contract. However, he did not choose to do so and in fact "renounced and repudiated" this right two years later in the second contract. It is noted that this contract also purported to convey the same property to Yu but this was merely an affirmation or reiteration of the parties' intention in the first transaction. It was not really necessary to repeat the sale because the first contract had already been perfected and consummated. Indeed, the sale could not have been made for the first time then for it would have been illegal under the provisions of the new Constitution that had come into force in 1935. Actually, the real purpose of the second contract was to manifest Paulino Bollozo's waiver of his right to repurchase, for which he received the additional sum of P295.00.

The plaintiffs-appellees make much of the admitted fact that the disputed property is still in the name of Paulino Bollozos as so too are the tax declarations. This circumstance, it is argued, proves that ownership of the land was retained by Bollozos and later transferred to his heirs, besides being an indication as well that the first contract was really only an equitable mortgage and not a deed of sale. The contention is that as long as the land had not yet been registered in the name of the defendant-appellant, title hereto remained with Bollozos.

This is not correct. The first deed of sale took effect on September 1, 1934, and legally transferred ownership of the land subject thereof from the vendor to Yu on the said date. Failure to register the sale did not vitiate it or render it unenforceable. As we have held in several cases, an unrecorded deed of sale is binding between the parties and their privies because actual notice is equivalent to registration. The real purpose of registration being to give notice to third persons, deed of sale that has not been registered does not lose its efficacy insofar as the parties thereto and their heirs are concerned. 8

It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Thus:

Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large. 9

And with particular reference to problems such as the one at bar, we have ruled that:

Title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of the constitutional prohibition, dates back to the time of their purchase, not later. Any other ruling would be illegal and unjust, and would operate to dispossess alien owners who had acquired their lands in good faith before the prohibition was established, but either failed wholly to register them or registered them only after the Constitution was adopted. 10

As for the finding of the trial court that the deed of sale with the right of repurchase was an equitable mortgage, we hold it has no basis in fact and law. All that is invoked in its support is that the land continued to be registered, and all

the tax declarations thereon were made, in the name of Paulino Bollozos. That may well be, but that circumstance would not change the nature of the contract concluded in 1934. At best, it may demonstrate neglect on the part of the vendee, who had a right to transfer the registration in his name, but that would not signify that Paulino Bollozos retained or recovered ownership of the land he had already sold.

The defendant-appellant cites Article 1602 of the Civil Code and argues that none of the indications mentioned therein of an equitable mortgage are present in this case. While we are inclined to agree, it should be noted that the said article is not applicable because it was not embodied in the old Civil Code which was in force in 1934. This is an innvocation in the present Code. In any event, it is worth stressing that one of the indicia mentioned in the said article is that the vendor not remains in possession of the property in question, which is riot the situation here. The complaint, in fact, asks for recovery of possession of the land from defendant Yu.

In sum, we hold that the trial court erred in disregarding the sale with right of repurchase concluded on September 1, 1934, and in considering it an equitable mortgage. The second contract executed on September 21, 1936, could not have validly conveyed the land in question to defendant Yu, who was an alien, as this was already prohibited by the Commonwealth Constitution. Nevertheless, it was effective in affirming the earlier contract of September 1, 1934, and, more importantly, in making it absolute with the renunciation by the vendor of his right to repurchase the property. Accordingly, Yu should be recognized as the lawful owner of the land in dispute, acquired by him by virtue of a legitimate contract of sale with pacto de retro which became absolute when the vendor waived his right of repurchase.

The fact that the defendant in this case was an alien cannot be taken against him for he was not disqualified from acquiring the land in question when the sale was concluded in 1934. It should not deter us from ruling in his favor now.

This Court dispenses equal justice to the citizen and the alien and judges them on the merits of their cause and not the color of their skin. Having admitted him into our territory, the State is committed to the recognition of all the rights of the stranger in our midst save only where they unduly clash with the higher interests of our own nation. There is no such collision here. On the contrary, we see here an opportunity to prove, as we do now, that respect for the foreign guest is ingrained in the law of the land and in the nature of our people.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED. The complaint and the counterclaim in Civil Case No. 66-C are DISMISSED, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellees. It is so ordered.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.

CASE 7

G.R. No. 130174

July 14, 2000

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND TABANGAO REALTY, INC., represented by Rodolfo Perez, respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal1 via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals2 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 07, Batangas City decreeing the registration under the Property Registration Decree, P. D. No. 1529, of three (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City in favor of respondent corporation.3

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

"On January 8, 1991, Tabangao Realty, Inc. filed an application for Original Registration of Title over three parcels of land, more particularly described as follows:

"Lot 9895 Plan Ap-4A-001136, containing an area of 4,596 square meters, situated in the Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas;

"Lot 10155 Plan Ap-4A-001221, containing an area of 4, 031 square meters, situated in the Barrio of Libjo, City of Batangas;

"Lot 10171 Plan Ap-4A-001157, containing an area of 8,224 square meters, situated in the Barrio of Tabangao, City of Batangas.

"Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. alleged in its application that it acquired the above-mentioned lots by purchase from its previous owners as evidenced by the corresponding Deeds of Sale; that it is the owner of all adjoining lots; that it had been in actual possession of the lots since the time it acquired the same from the previous owners up to the present; and that its possession and occupation as owners including that of its predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful, continuous, adverse to the whole world and in the concept of an owner.

"The applicant further alleged that the plant of the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Company is partly erected on the subject lots which improvements are owned by it (applicant). It also claims that the subject lots are not subject of any lien or encumbrance; that no adverse interests exist with respect to the subject lots; and that there are no military or forest reservation or any pending litigation affecting said subject lots.

"Should the property registration decree invoked not be allowed, the applicant in the alternative applied for the benefits under CA No. 141 as amended and thus

alleged that together with its predecessors-in-interest it had been in open, continuous, public, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject lots for more than 30 years. It also declared that the lots are not tenanted nor subject of an agricultural leasehold relationship.

"Applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. attached to its application its Articles of Incorporation, the tracing cloth plan of the lots, blue print copies of said plan, technical descriptions of the lots, Deeds of Sale, Assessment Certificate, Tax Declarations for the three lots and Tax Clearances.

"On August 12, 1991, the application was ordered archived by the Regional Trial Court for the applicants failure to comply with the requirements called for in the Report dated February 22, 1994 by the Office of the Land Registration Authority. On June 2, 1994, the applicant filed a motion to revive the application and to set the case for initial hearing. The motion was granted by the Regional Trial Court on June 7, 1994 and initial hearing was set on September 1994.

"At the hearing, only the Assistant City Prosecutor appeared to oppose the application on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Counsel for the applicant thereupon presented all the necessary evidence to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements. Thereafter, upon motion of the application, the Regional Trial Court issued an order of special default against the whole world with the exception of the government. The court also issued an order designating and authorizing Mr. Rodolfo G. Serrano, Legal Researcher of Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, to receive evidence.

"At the reception of evidence, the applicant presented Romeo Geron, the Consultant and Project Controller of applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. Geron testified that he is a resident of Tabangao and was a member of the Task Force

responsible for negotiating with the numerous landowners and the subsequent acquisition by sale of the properties of Tabangao Realty, Inc. in Tabangao and Libjo, Batangas. He testified that the applicant-corporation was duly organized and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is authorized to acquire land by purchase and develop, subdivide, sell, mortgage, exchange, lease and hold for investment or otherwise, real estate of all kinds.

"He also testified that Lot 9895 was acquired by the applicant-corporation on March 31, 1980 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed in its favor by the previous owners; the spouses Santiago and Cristina Dimaano (Exh. "L"); that Lot 10155 was acquired by applicant-corporation by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on April 25, 1980 in its favor by the former owner Mr. Perpetuo Almario married to Felisa Magpantay who owned the lot since 1945 (Exh. "L-1"); and that Lot 10171 was purchased by applicant-corporation on March 31, 1980 from Anita Clear de Jesus who had been the owner of said lot since 1945 (Exh. "L-2").

"The witness presented the tax declarations for the three parcels of land and tax receipts showing full payment of all taxes due. (Exh. "P, P-1, P-2" and "Q") He testified that there is no pending litigation involving the subject properties or any adverse claims filed against the applicants; that they are free from any liens or encumbrances; that there are no tenants or agricultural leasehold contracts involving the subject properties; and that there are no mineral deposits in said lots.

"Geron also testified that the properties are presently under Lease Contract with Shell Gas Philippines for 25 years from 1981 up to 2006 as evidenced by a Lease Contract executed on May 18, 1991 (Exh. "M").

"The applicants also presented Crecencio Marasigan. He is an employee at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Batangas since June 1971. He testified that he has been a resident of Barangay Malitan, Batangas City even before 1937 up to the present and that he knew the applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and the areas surrounding the lots subject of the application. He mentioned that he was the Chairman of the Task Force that was responsible for the negotiations that were done with the previous owners of the subject lots, and was therefore personally aware of the specific dealing regarding the lots subject of the application. He said that he knew the previous owners since he started residing in Batangas; and that their possessions had been open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse and in the concept of owners.

"Marasigan corroborated the testimony of Romeo Geron with regard to the ownership, possession and the status of the lots subject of the application.

"In opposition, the City Prosecutor of Batangas offered the testimonies of Rodolfo Fernandez of the Bureau of Lands and Loida Maglinao of the Bureau of Forest Development.

"Rodolfo Fernandez testified that the three parcels of land subject of the application are not covered by any kind of public land application or patent; that they are not within the reservation area nor within the forest zone; that they are not reserved for any government purposes; and that the entire areas are within the Alienable and Disposable Zone as Classified under Project No. 13, Map No. 718 and certified on March 26, 1928. Fernandez presented the Investigation Report made by the Bureau of Lands dated April 24, 1991 (Exh. "1" to "1-b").

"Loida Maglinao testified that the subject properties are within the alienable and disposable area of the public domain and no forestry interest is adversely interposed by the Bureau of Forest Development.

"On the basis of all the evidence presented, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision on March 31, 1995 granting the application for registration. It held:

"From the credible testimony and documentary evidence adduced establishing applicant-corporation that the latter and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse possessions of the parcels of land applied for up to the present, for the requisite period of time, under bona fide claim of ownership, and considering, that no evidence has been presented by the government in support of its Opposition, and even presented the favorable testimonies of Mr. Rodolfo Fernandez, of the Bureau of Lands and Miss Loida Y. Maglinao, of the Bureau of Forest Development, both CENRO, Batangas City Branch, Batangas City, supported by their respective official Reports, the Court is convinced that the applicant-corporation Tabangao Realty Incorporated had sufficiently established its rights to the grant of title over the three (3) parcels of land subject of this case."

In due time, petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals.4

On July 30, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming the appealed decision.5

Hence, this appeal.6

The issue raised is whether respondent Tabangao Realty, Inc. has registerable title over three (3) parcels of land situated in Tabangao, Batangas City applied for.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. is entitled to registration of title over the three (3) parcels of land applied for. The ruling is erroneous.

An applicant seeking to establish ownership over land must conclusively show that he is the owner thereof in fee simple,7 for the standing presumption is that all lands belong to the public domain of the State, unless acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, except lands possessed by an occupant and his predecessors since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.8

The land in question is admittedly public. The applicant has no title at all.1wphi1 Its claim of acquisition of ownership is solely based on possession. In fact, the parcels of land applied for were declared public land by decision of the Cadastral Court.9 Such being the case, the application for voluntary registration under P. D. No. 152910 is barred by the prior judgment of the Cadastral Court. The land having been subjected to compulsory registration under the Cadastral Act and declared public land can no longer be the subject of registration by voluntary application under Presidential Decree No. 1529. The second application is barred by res-judicata.11 As previously held, "[W]here the applicant possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot acquire one under the Torrens System of registration."12

Nonetheless, applicant anchors its application for registration of title on the provisions of P. D. No. 1529 or in the alternative Com. Act No. 141, Section 48 (b), as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, which allows "those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application" to apply for judicial confirmation and registration of title.13

However, the evidence is inconclusive that applicant and its predecessors in interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land in question, en concepto de dueo, or a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application,14 or since June 12, 1945,15 or earlier,16 or since time immemorial.17

Analyzing the evidence submitted, we note that the applicant failed to prove the fact of possession by itself and its predecessors in interest for at least thirty (30) years before the filing of the application.

Witness Romeo Geron, a consultant of applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. testified that in the year 1945, he knew that the land designated as Lot 9895, with an area of 4,596 square meters was owned by Santiago Dimaano, who sold the lot to applicant corporation on March 31, 1980 and that the parcel of land designated as Lot 10155 with an area of 4,031 square meters was owned by Perpetuo Almario way back in 1945, and that he possessed the lot up to the time he sold the same to applicant corporation on April 25, 1980 because he was in charge of negotiation with the numerous landowners for acquisition of their property by Tabangao Realty, Inc.18 However, in 1945, witness Geron was only seven (7) years old, and obviously could not competently testify on the ownership and possession of the subject land.

Applicant failed to prove specific acts showing the nature of its possession and that of its predecessors in interest.19 "The applicant must present specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of possession."20 "Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property."21

The bare assertion of witnesses that the applicant of land had been in the open, adverse and continuous possession of the property for over thirty (30) years is hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature.22 In other words, facts constituting possession must be duly established by competent evidence.

Consequently, the lower court gravely erred in granting the application.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals, DENIES the application for registration of title filed by applicant Tabangao Realty, Inc. and declares the subject parcels of land to be public land belonging to the public domain.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.