Pioneer texturing vs NLRC Facts: PR is the petitioners reviser/trimmer.

She based her assigned work on a paper note posted by the petitioners, which contains the corresponding prive for work. De jesus worked on PO 3853 by trimming the cloth ribs. She thereafter submitted tickets to her supervisor. She then received a memorandum requiring her to explain why no disciplinaty action should be taken against her for dishonesty and tampering of official records and documents with the intention of cheating as PO 3853 allegedly required no trimming. PR said that she made a mistake but was not dishonest. Petitioners then dismissed the PR. PR filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA heard the case and ordered her reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and full backwages. Petitioners appealed to NLRC which affirmed the decision of the LA. Petitioner contended that the order of reinstatement is not self executory and that there must be a writ of execution to be issued. PR averred, that the petitioners should have reinstated her immediately after the decision of the LA since the law mandates that the reinstatement is immediately executor. Issue: w/n an order of reinstatement needs a writ of execution. Held: Art. 223. Appeal. . . . In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal . The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein. xxx xxx xxx Art. 224. Execution of decisions, orders, or awards. (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter, or med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu propio or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce final decisions, orders or awards of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or regional director, the Commission, the Labor Arbiter or med-arbiter, or voluntary arbitrators. In any case, it shall be the duty of the responsible officer to separately furnish immediately the counsels of record and the parties with copies of said decisions, orders or awards. Failure to comply with the duty prescribed herein shall subject such responsible officer to appropriate administrative sanctions. Article 224 states that the need for a writ of execution applies only within five (5) years from the date a decision, an order or award becomes final and executory . It can not relate to an award or order of reinstatement still to be appealed or pending appeal which Article 223 contemplates. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement . The legislative intent is quite obvious, i.e., to make an award of reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would certainly betray and run counter to the very object and intent of

Article 223, i.e., the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons.. Furthermore, the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be 32 resolved in favor of labor. In ruling that an order or award for reinstatement does not require a writ of execution the Court is simply adhering and giving meaning to this rule. Henceforth, we rule that an award or order for reinstatement is self-executory. After receipt of the decision or resolution ordering the employee's reinstatement, the employer has the right to choose whether to re-admit the employee to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the employee in the payroll. In either instance, the employer has to inform the employee of his choice. The notification is based on practical considerations for without notice, the employee has no way of knowing if he has to report for work or not. This interpretation is more in consonance with the constitutional protection to labor (Section 3, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The right of a person to his labor is deemed to be property within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law.

Yupangco vs Mendoza Yupangco Cotton Mills, Inc. vs. CA (2002) Facts: Petitioner contended that a sheriff of the NLRC erroneously and unlawfully levied certain properties which it claims as its own. It filed a 3rd party claim withthe Labor Arbiter and recovery of property and damageswith the RTC. The RTC dismissed the case. In the CA, thecourt dismissed the petition on the ground of forumshopping and that the proper remedy was appeal in due course, not certiorari or mandamus. Petitioner filed MFR and argued that the filing of a complaint for accionreinvindicatoria with the RTC was proper because it is aremedy specifically granted to an owner (whoseproperties were subjected to a writ of execution toenforce a decision rendered in a labor dispute in which itwas not a party). The MFR was denied. Hence, petitionerfiled this appeal. Issue: Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the case Held:YES A third party whose property has been levied upon by asheriff to enforce a decision against a judgment debtor isafforded with several alternative remedies to protect itsinterests. The third party may avail himself of alternativeremedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude thethird party from availing himself of the other alternativeremedies in the event he failed in the remedy firstavailed of.Thus, a third party may avail himself of the followingalternative remedies:a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of theLabor Arbiter, andb) If the third party claim is denied, the third partymay appeal the denial to the NLRC.Even if a third party claim was denied, a third partymay still file a proper action with a competent courtto recover

ownership of the property illegally seizedby the sheriff.The filing of a third party claim with the Labor Arbiterand the NLRC did not preclude the petitioner from filing asubsequent action for recovery of property and damageswith the Regional Trial Court. And, the institution of suchcomplaint will not make petitioner guilty of forumshopping. Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago v. Philippine Airlines (PAL) G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009 Facts: Philippine Airlines filed a case against its employees herein petitioners for allegedly caughtin the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel and law enforcers raided thePAL Technical Centers Toolroom Section.After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioner for transgressing companys Code of Discipline prompting them to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal which the Labor Arbiter (LA) in its decisionruled on their favor ordering PAL to immediately comply with the reinstatement aspect of the decision.Prior to the judgment, SEC placed PAL under Interim Rehabilitation Receiver who subsequentlyreplaced by Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver. On appeal, NLRC reversed said decision anddismissed petitioners complaint for lack of merit Subsequently, LA issued a Writ of Execution respecting the reinstatement aspect of hisdecision. Respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction with the NLRC. The NLRC affirmed thevalidity of the Writ and the Notice issued by LA but suspended and referred the action to theRehabilitation Receiver for appropriate action.On appeal, the appellate court partially granted the petition and effectively reinstated the NLRC resolution insofar as it suspended the proceedings. By manifestation, respondent informed theCourt that SEC issued an Order granting its request to exit from rehabilitation proceedings Held: It is settled that upon appointment by the SEC of a rehabilitation receiver, all actions for claims before any court, tribunal or board against the corporation shall ipso jure be suspended.[31] As stated early on, during the pendency of petitioners complaint before the Labor Arbiter, the SEC placed respondent under an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver. After the Labor Arbiter rendered his decision, the SEC replaced the Interim Rehabilitation Receiver with a Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver.

Case law recognizes that unless there is a restraining order, the implementation of the order of reinstatement is ministerial and mandatory.[32] This injunction or suspension of claims by legislative fiat[33] partakes of the nature of a restraining order that constitutes a legal justification for respondents non-compliance with the reinstatement order. Respondents failure to exercise the alternative options of actual reinstatement and payroll reinstatement was thus justified. Such being the case, respondents obligation to pay the salaries pending appeal, as the normal effect of the non-exercise of the options, did not attach.

While reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does not contemplate the period when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a judicially monitored state of being resuscitated in order to survive.

The parallelism between a judicial order of corporation rehabilitation as a justification for the non-exercise of its options, on the one hand, and a claim of actual and imminent substantial losses as ground for retrenchment, on the other hand, stops at the red line on the financial statements. Beyond the analogous condition of financial gloom, as discussed by Justice Leonardo Quisumbing in his Separate Opinion, are more salient distinctions. Unlike the ground of substantial losses contemplated in a retrenchment case, the state of corporate rehabilitation was judicially pre-determined by a competent court and not formulated for the first time in this case by respondent.

More importantly, there are legal effects arising from a judicial order placing a corporation under rehabilitation. Respondent was, during the period material to the case, effectively deprived of the alternative choices under Article 223 of the Labor Code, not only by virtue of the statutory injunction but also in view of the interim relinquishment of management control to give way to the full exercise of the powers of the rehabilitation receiver. Had there been no need to rehabilitate, respondent may have opted for actual physical reinstatement pending appeal to optimize the utilization of resources. Then again, though the management may think this wise, the rehabilitation receiver may decide otherwise, not to mention the subsistence of the injunction on claims.