UNIVERSITY OF PETROLEUM AND ENERGY STUDIES COLLEGE OF LEGAL STUDIES DEHRADUN INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

CASE ANALYSIS

SUBMITTED TO: Prof Ashish Verma [COLS]

SUBMITTED BY: Abhishek Chhabra BA LLB (VII Sem) 500011974(5)

State Of Rajasthan vs Babu Ram1

The word "person" has not been defined in the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. One of the basic principles of interpretation of Statutes is to construe the words according to their plain, literal and grammatical meaning. The word "person" has not been defined in the Act. Section 2(xxix) of the Act says that the words and expressions used herein and not defined but defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. The Code, however, does not define the word "person". Section 2(y) of the Code says that the words and expressions used therein and not defined but defined in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Code. Section 11 of the Indian Penal Code says that the word "person" includes any Company or Association or body of persons whether incorporated or not. Similar definition of the word "person" has been given in Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act. Therefore, these definitions render no assistance for resolving the controversy in hand.. One of the basic principles of interpretation of Statutes is to construe them according to plain, literal and grammatical meaning of the words. If that is contrary to, or inconsistent with, any express intention or declared purpose of the Statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended or abridged, so far as to avoid such an inconvenience, but no further. The onus of showing that the words do not mean what they say lies heavily on the party who alleges it. He must advance something which clearly shows that the grammatical construction would be repugnant to the intention of the Act or lead to some manifest absurdity.. In the well known treatise - Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, the learned author has enunciated the same principle that the words of the Statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the Statute to suggest the contrary. . A bag, briefcase or any such article or container, etc. can, under no circumstances, be treated as body of a human being. They are given a
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AIR 2007 SC 2018

separate name and are identifiable as such. They cannot even remotely be treated to be part of the body of a human being. Depending upon the physical capacity of a person, he may carry any number of items like a bag, a briefcase, a suitcase, a tin box, a thaila, a jhola, a gathri, a holdall, a carton, etc. of varying size, dimension or weight. Therefore, it is not possible to include these articles within the ambit of the word "person" occurring in Section 50 of the Act The scope and ambit of Section 50 of the Act was examined in considerable detail by a Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh (1999 (6) SCC 172)and para 12 of the reports is being reproduced below : "12. On its plain reading, Section 50 would come into play only in the case of a search of a person as distinguished from search of any premises etc. However, if the empowered officer, without any prior information as contemplated by Section 42 of the Act makes a search or causes arrest of a person during the normal course of investigation into an offence or suspected offence and on completion of that search, a contraband under the NDPS Act is also recovered, the requirements of Section 50 of the Act are not attracted." The Bench recorded its conclusion in para 57 of the reports and sub-paras (1), (2), (3) and (6) are being reproduced below : "57. On the basis of the reasoning and discussion above, the following conclusions arise: (1) That when an empowered officer or a duly authorized officer acting on prior information is about to search a person, it is imperative for him to inform the person concerned of his right under Sub-section (1) of Section 50 of being taken to the nearest gazetted officer or the nearest Magistrate for making the search. However, such information may not necessarily be in writing. (2) That failure to inform the person concerned about the existence of his right to be searched before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate would cause prejudice to an accused. (3) That a search made by an empowered officer, on prior information, without informing the person of his right that if he so requires, he shall be taken before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate for search and in case he so opts, failure to conduct his search before a gazetted officer or a Magistrate may not vitiate the trial but would render the recovery of the illicit article suspect and vitiate the conviction and sentence of an accused, where

the conviction has been recorded only on the basis of the possession of the illicit article, recovered from his person, during a search conducted in violation of the provisions of Section 50 of the Act. (6) That in the context in which the protection has been incorporated in Section 50 for the benefit of the person intended to be searched, we do not express any opinion whether the provisions of Section 50 are mandatory or directory, but hold that failure to inform the person concerned of his right as emanating from Sub-section (1) of Section 50, may render the recovery of the contraband suspect and the conviction and sentence of an accused bad and unsustainable in law."

Olga Tellis and ors Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and ors2 'Pavement dwellers case'

Facts: In 1981, the State of Maharashta and the Bombay Municipal Council decided to evict all pavement and slum dwellers from the city of Bombay. The residents claimed such action would violate the right to life, since a home in the city allowed them to attain a livelihood and demanded that adequate resettlement be provided if the evictions proceeded. Issue Whether Right to life include right to livelihood ? Court held :- The Court declined to provide the remedies requested by the applicants but found that the right to a hearing had been violated at the time of the planned eviction. The Court held that the right to life, in Article 21 of the Constitution, encompassed means of livelihood since, if there is an obligation upon the State to secure to citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to lie. However, the right to a livelihood was not absolute and deprivation of the right to livelihood could occur if there was a just and fair procedure undertaken according to law. The government's action must be reasonable and any person affected must be afforded an opportunity of being heard as to why that action should not be taken. In the present case, the Court found that the residents had been rendered the opportunity of being heard by virtue of the Supreme Court proceedings. While the residents were clearly not intending to trespass, they found it was reasonable for the government to evict those living on public pavements, footpaths and public roads. The evictions were to be delayed until one month after the monsoon season (31 October 1985). The Court
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MANU/SC/0039/1985

declined to hold that evicted dwellers had a right to an alternative site but instead made orders that: (i) sites should be provided to residents presented with census cards in 1976; (ii) slums in existence for 20 years or more were not to be removed unless land was required for public purposes and, in that case, alternative sites must be provided; (iii) high priority should be given to resettlement My analysis : If there is an obligation upon the State to secure to the citizens an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right to life. The State may not, by affirmative action, be compellable to provide adequate means of livelihood or work to the citizens. But, any person, who is deprived of his right to livelihood except according to just and fair procedure established by law, can challenge the deprivation as offending the right conferred under the Article 21.

In Mrs. Neera Mathur v Life Insurance Corporation of India3

The Supreme Court recognized the right to privacy of female employee. Mrs. Neera had been appointed by the LIC without them knowing that she was pregnant. She applied for maternity leave and when she returned thereafter she was terminated. The reason given was that she had withheld information regarding her pregnancy when she had filled their questionnaire. The Supreme Court on perusing the questionnaire was shocked to find that it required women candidates to provide information about the dates of their menstrual cycles and past pregnancies. It considered them to be an invasion of privacy of a person and violative of Article 21 which guarantees right to life and privacy. It, therefore, directed the LIC to reinstate Mrs. Neera and to delete those columns from its future questionnaires. In this case the petitioner drew the attention of the Court to the Equal Remuneration Act (25 of 1976) Section 4. The Supreme Court upheld her contention and stated that the employer was bound to pay the same remuneration to both male and female workers irrespective of the place where they were working unless it is shown that the women were not fit to do the work of the male stenographers.

1991 SCALE (2)1139

In State of Maharashtra v. Manubhai Pragaji Vashi4

The Court has considerably widened the scope of the right to free legal aid. The right to free legal aid and speedy trial are guaranteed fundamental rights under Art. 21. Art 39A provides "equal justice" and "free legal aid". It means justice according to law. In a democratic policy, governed by rule of law, it should be the main concern of the State to have a proper legal system. The crucial words are to "provide free legal aid" by suitable legislation or by schemes" or "in any other way" so that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. These words in Article 39A are of very wide import. In order to enable the State to afford free legal aid and guarantee speedy trial vast number of persons trained in law are needed." Legal aid is regarded in many forms and at various stages, for obtaining guidance, for resolving disputes in courts, tribunals or other authorities. It has manifold facets. The need for a continuing and well organized legal education is absolutely necessary in view of the new trends in the world order, to meet the ever-growing challenges. The Legal education should be able to meet the ever growing demands of the society. This demand is of such a great dimension that sizeable number of dedicated persons should be properly trained in different branches of law every year. Since a sole Government law college cannot cater to the needs of legal education in a city like Bombay it should permit private colleges with necessary facilities to be established. For this, it should afford grants-in-aid to them so that they should function effectively and in a meaningful manner. For this huge funds are needed. Compiled by Kavya Salim .

They should not be left free to hike the fees to any extent to meet their expenses. In absence of this the standard of legal education and the free legal scheme would become a farce. This should not be allowed to happen. The Court therefore directed the State to afford grant-in-aid to them in order to ensure that they should function effectively and turn out sufficient number of law graduates in all branches every year
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1995 SCALE (4)797

which will in turn enable the State to provide free legal aid and ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen on account of any disability. Article 21 read with Art. 39A casts a duty on the State to afford grants-in-aid to recognized private law colleges in the State of Maharashtra, similar to the faculties, viz. Art, Science, Commerce, etc. The words used in Art. 39A are of very wide importance. The need for a continuing and well organized legal education is absolutely essential for the purpose. The State of Maharashtra had denied grants-in-aid of the private recognized Law Colleges on the ground of paucity of funds. The Court held that this could not the reasonable ground for denial of grant-in-aid to such colleges.