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FISCAL DESENTRALIZATION
AND INDONESIA REGIONAL INCOME DISPARITY
(1994-2004)
Iman Widhiyanto1
Abstract
1
Staff of Directorate Cash Management Directorate General of Treasury Ministry of Finance Republic
Indonesia
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Jurnal Keuangan Publik Vol. 5, No. 1, Oktober 2008
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Fiscal Desentralization And Indonesia Regional Income Disparity
(1994-2004)
Income per capita disparity, measured can be revealed and it will be useful
by coefficient variations of Gross Regio- input to determine further policy.
nal Domestic Product (GRDP) per ca- This paper only relies on the
pita, has remained relatively the same data from 1994 to 2004, because the
throughout the centralization era as well previous and ex post data are not
as throughout the decentralization era. properly available. Even so many
The GRDP per capita growth variables influence the regional econo-
varies from 1994 to 2004. The GRDP mic development and regional income
per capita growth rate in the rich regions where the fiscal decentralization is one
in some periods was lower than that in of those variables, the main focus of
the poorer regions. It is postulated in discussion is only for the role of fiscal
convergence theorem that when the decentralization both in regional
countries are similar with respect to economic development and regional
structural parameters for preferences and income disparity.
technology, then poor countries tend to The discussion in this paper will
grow faster than rich countries3. The explore only up to the provincial levels,
speed of convergence is believed not because the data for district levels is not
constant since the GRDP growth varies properly available. Therefore the
between various periods. In addition to economic development and income
that Indonesia also faced economic crisis disparity within regional are not
during 1997 to 1998, which increases addressed in this paper.
the difficulty to measure the speed of Basically, this paper is desk study
convergence in this observation. which analyzes data from primary sources
The main purpose of this paper (Statistic Indonesia and Ministry of
is to analyze the role of fiscal decentra- Finance) elaborates with other countries
lization on regional development and experiences. The analysis will be divided
regional income disparity especially in in two periods, before and after decen-
Indonesia case after the changing tralization by using Indonesia Provincial/
governmental system from centralization GRDP panel data from 1994 to 2004.
to decentralization. There will be compared the regional
Several questions that will be economic development and regional
addressed in this paper are: (1) Does income disparity before and after
fiscal decentralization aggravate regional decentralization, where the growth of
income disparity; (2) Does fiscal decen- GRDP per capita is as proxy of regional
tralization matter for regional economic economic development whether GRDP
development; (3) What are the positive per capita is as proxy of income.
and negative impacts of fiscal decentra- In order to analyze the regional
lization for Indonesia’s economic deve- economic development, the standard
lopment. methodologies of beta and sigma
By answering several questions convergence will be employed. Further-
above, the role of fiscal decentralization more, for measuring regional income
in Indonesia toward economic develop- disparity the Theil index approach will
ment and regional disparity hopefully be used.
3
Barro, Robbert J. (1991)
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Jurnal Keuangan Publik Vol. 5, No. 1, Oktober 2008
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Fiscal Desentralization And Indonesia Regional Income Disparity
(1994-2004)
lization program approach was intro- roles, even they decentralized the
duced in Indonesia in the early 2000s, responsibilities.
Cambodia and Vietnam preferred a There are some types of decen-
gradual process of decentralization tralization including political, adminis-
Beside its advantages, decentra- trative, fiscal and market decentralization.
lization also has many drawbacks. In order to achieve the usefulness of
Efficiency may not occur during decen- decentralization, better understanding of
tralization time. Central governments various concepts is needed. Sometimes
can loss control over scare financial there is overlapping in defining of these
resources. Others argue that decentrali- terms, but the definitions are not as
zation may end up with increasing cost important as the comprehensive approach.
and reduce efficiency in service delivery, Political, administrative, fiscal and
increasing inequity and macroeconomic market decentralization may appear in
instability. Weak administrative or different forms and combinations across
technical capacity at local government countries, within countries and even
levels may result in inefficiency and within sectors. In this paper, the only
ineffectively services delivery in some one that will be relaxed is fiscal decen-
areas of the country. These drawbacks tralization.
emerge in a situation where citizen
preferences are unlikely to be repre- The View of Fiscal Decentralization
sented and there is almost no institutio- Traditionally, the theory and
nal capacity at the sub-national levels. In practice of fiscal decentralization is to
the absence of citizen participation local understand how fiscal decentralization
elites and traditional authority structures affects the traditional economic objec-
may emerge. tives of economic efficiency, income
White and Smoke (2005) propose redistribution and macroeconomic stability.
that national leadership is essential to Fiscal decentralization is often defined
anticipate the drawbacks of decentrali- as the delegation of fiscal authority from
zation. The national leader should able the central government to the local/
to response across regions consistently regional governments. Fiscal decentrali-
and systematically due to the potential zation may provide greater economic
disadvantages of decentralization. efficiency in the allocation of resources
In several countries, the balance in the public sector. Because of different
combination between centralization and preferences in public services across
decentralization is essential to reach the regions, the uniform provision of public
effectiveness and the efficiency govern- services provided by central government
ment functions. Therefore it is possible will be less efficient. As result, regional
not only to run pure centralization or governments are better able to match
decentralization system. Some government different preferences across jurisdictions.
functions could not be financed and Therefore, there is a competition among
managed in decentralization fashion. regional governments in delivering
Central governments often control and public services and pursuing economic
regulate important policy and supervise growth.
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Jurnal Keuangan Publik Vol. 5, No. 1, Oktober 2008
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Fiscal Desentralization And Indonesia Regional Income Disparity
(1994-2004)
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Jurnal Keuangan Publik Vol. 5, No. 1, Oktober 2008
sional because there are many aspects of may be seen as the result of economic
a country’s fiscal affairs that can be more development for particular region.
or less decentralized. Since regional An essential question comes up
governments have more power to decide whether fiscal decentralization causes or
their expenditures, it can be the case that results of economic development. Is it
another country is more decentralized, more complex outcome that accompa-
even though higher central government nies economic growth? The assertion is
revenue was transferred to its regional whenever income rise and economic
government. Another case, lower degree of grows in the mature level then the gains
decentralization was caused by uncoun- from fiscal decentralization occur.
table regional officials though greater Decentralization more likely comes with
central government revenue was share to the achievement of higher stage of
regional government. economic development and that
The degree of decentralization threshold level of economic develop-
also can be measured on government ment at which fiscal decentralization
revenues and expenditures, as Davoodi become attractive appears to be quite
and Zou (1998) did for across countries high5. From this perspective, an econo-
data. They measured the degree of mic development comes first then fiscal
decentralization in their study of the decentralization follows. On the other
relationship between fiscal decentra- hand, fiscal decentralization appears to
lization and economic growth. have a potentially useful role to play in
Economists employ several economic development. But the
methods to measure the dimensions of translation of this potential into a real
regional disparities. Some of the contribution to economic growth depends
methods are Coefficient of Variation on a number of crucial conditions regarding
(CV), Gini coefficient, The Lorenz Curve, the responsiveness of local institutions to
Theil index and Atkinson index. All of local welfare which, in turn, depends
those models are common in the analysis importantly on the poorer structure of
of interpersonal income disparity but they fiscal institutions6.
have not been used in the studies related
Davoodi and Zou (1998) po-
to regional disparities.
inted out that fiscal decentralization is
seen as part of a reform package to
Fiscal Decentralization and Economic improve efficiency in the public sector,
Growth to increase competition among sub-
Oates (1993) argued that there is national government in delivering public
much current interest in the potential service and to stimulate economic
contribution of fiscal decentralization to growth. In their research, Davoodi and
economic development. Delegating Zou concluded that there is no relation-
higher responsibilities to local govern- ship between fiscal decentralization and
ments is seemed as to break the grip of growth in developed countries. On the
miss management and central planning other hand in developing countries there
as effort to set self sustaining regional
economic growth. The increasing qua- 5
Bahl and Linn (1992)
lity and quantity of public sector service 6
Oates (1993) p. 241
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Fiscal Desentralization And Indonesia Regional Income Disparity
(1994-2004)
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Jurnal Keuangan Publik Vol. 5, No. 1, Oktober 2008
approximation to the existence of beta taxes, and revenues from major natural
convergence7. resources such as oil and gas remain at
The estimating for absolute beta the central level. Indeed, local govern-
convergence could be performed by ments are often left with low-yielding
formula below; income. Thus, intergovernmental transfers
(ln yit − ln yi,t −1 )/ nt = α + β ln yi,t −1 + ε it (2.1) are needed to achieve vertical balance.
Second, intergovernmental transfer is
beneficial to address horizontal fiscal
Where:
imbalance. In developing and transition
y it refers to GRDP per capita in the last countries, it is common to have large
year of period t for regions i disparities between the rich and the poor
yi ,t −1 is the value of GRDP per capita in regions. This may happen due to
variations in the capacity of local
the initial year of period t governments to generate their own
nt is the number of years in that period resources. Such variations depend on the
ε it is the error term performance of potential income, the
natural resources and the local eco-
nomic activities. Hence, this will lead to
Intergovernmental Transfer
horizontal imbalance. System of grant
equalization might be justified to address
Intergovernmental transfer can
such problem. Third, intergovernmental
take two general forms. They can be
transfer is needed in order to address
conditional grants and unconditional
inter-jurisdiction spill over or exter-
grants. Conditional grants place any
nalities. Some public services in a parti-
various kinds of restrictions on their use
cular region sometimes create externalities
by recipients. While unconditional
to other regions. Pollution control and
grants are the lump sum transfers to be
higher education are some example for
used in any way the recipient wants. The
such externalities. Therefore, central
conditional grants are employed where
government should provide incentives or
the provision of local services generate
financial resources for local government
benefits for local residents to other
to address this particular problem.
jurisdictions. In contrast, the uncondi-
Actually, there are still many
tional grants are typically the appropriate
advantages from intergovernmental
vehicle for fiscal equalization purpose.
transfers, such as to control the overall
The aim of these grants is to channel
levels of local government expenditure,
funds from wealthy jurisdictions to
to encourage revenue mobilization, to
poorer ones.
stimulate local economic development,
There are three main objectives
to encourage responsibility and trans-
of intergovernmental transfer. First,
parency in local decision making, and to
intergovernmental transfer is used to
provide emergency situation.
address vertical fiscal imbalance. Pro-
blem of vertical imbalances may always
persist, since broad and substantial
7
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991)
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Fiscal Desentralization And Indonesia Regional Income Disparity
(1994-2004)
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Jurnal Keuangan Publik Vol. 5, No. 1, Oktober 2008
In term of direct impact, they expect completely supported by, and depending
higher growth associated with higher on, the central government. In 1968 only
fiscal decentralization. They also saw around 7 percent of national public sector
that there are potentially the indirect revenue was redistributed to the regions.
effects of fiscal decentralization towards This condition continued for the next 20
economic growth. Those indirect impacts years. In 1990s the central government
include through consumer efficiency, still dominated approximately 90 percent
producer efficiency, the geographical of national revenue, transferring to the
distribution of resources, macroecono- regional government with only about 10
mic stability, corruption and capture by percent of total expenditures (M. Tadjoe-
elites. These indirect effects will link din at. al. 2003). Thereby, Indonesia was
higher economic growth in one side, but categorized with worse financial system
there are others that work in the opposite in the world as indicated by deeply
direction. imbalanced intergovernmental fiscal
Resosudarmo, Budy P, Vidyata- relation.
ma, Yogi (2006) examined the regional The government’s aim to centra-
income disparities in Indonesia. They lizing revenue collection and transferring
focused on the growth rate of poorer a part of collected funds to the regions,
regions in terms of per capita income or in principle, was to equalize development
output. Their concept defines a throughout the regions without taking
convergence as phenomenon in which into account regional prosperity, resources,
poorer regions have higher growth rate geography, interest and production
than richer regions. The main analysis in capacity. The main distribution goal was
this concept aims to prove whether or to create regional uniformity as reflected
not the coefficient of initial condition on in per head population, equal budget
growth is negative. So, sometime in the allocation, equal number of social
future, all regions will have the same facilities such as health (hospitals) and
growth rate. They concluded that; first, education (schools), and for delivering
disparity in provincial income per capita other public services.
in Indonesia is relatively severe; second, The economic crisis in 1997-
there is a conditional growth convergence, 1998 and intense pressures for indepen-
meaning that the GDP per capita of dence from rich natural resources regions,
poorer provinces grows faster than that eventually, made government in the
of richer provinces given the data 1993 difficult situation. There is no choice
to 2002; third, physical investment (both except to accommodate region interests
private and public investment), trade by changing the governmental system
openness and the role of oil and gas are from centralization to decentralization.
significant determinants of growth. Legally government, approved by house
of representative, issued the Law 22/1999
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION IN and Law 25/1999 as jurisdiction ‘umbrella’
INDONESIA for such changing governmental system.
Before 2001, at the New Order The Law 25/1999 concerns with
regime, Indonesia conducted highly fiscal fiscal balance between central and
centralization with regional revenue regional governments, which would be
30
Fiscal Desentralization And Indonesia Regional Income Disparity
(1994-2004)
accompanied with new responsibilities into the regional budget and not
delegated to regional governments under registered in regional government’s
the Law for administrative decentra- account. The third form is funds that
lization (Law 22/1999). The Law 25/ allocated by the lines ministries to
1999 is become basis for new inter- finance development activities in the
governmental transfer arrangements as region.
equality reflection revenue sharing. The As a result, by running the new
equalization fund (Dana Perimbangan) system the total revenue received by
consists of three components according regional government consists of three
to this law. The first is Revenue Sharing items. Those are regional own revenues,
at certain portion of taxes on land and fiscal equalization funds and other legal
buildings, the transfer of land and official revenues. Regional own revenues
buildings, and the net-tax revenue from is composed of regional taxes, levies
the exploitation of forest, mining, fisheries, (retributions), and revenue from profit
oil and gas. The second component is regional own enterprises and other legal
the General Purpose Grant (DAU), a regional own revenues. Equalization
block grant which is aimed to equalize funds consist of tax sharing, non tax
the fiscal capacities of regional natural resources sharing, general purpose
governments to finance their purchase fund and specific purpose funds. While
expenditures. It is stated in the law that other legal official revenues were
the amount of DAU per fiscal year is at composed by revenues from intergovern-
least 25 percent of the central govern- mental transfers such as grant, emergen-
ment domestic revenue, and this amount cy fund such as funds used to cope with
should be distributed among local disasters, and saving from previous year.
governments through formula that was
designed with considering the regional
needs and potential capacity. The third
component is the Specific Purpose Grant
(Dana Alokasi Khusus-DAK). Basically
DAK is also block grant that distributed
to finance special needs that either
cannot be included by the formula used
in DAU allocation or categorized as
national priorities and commitments.
Grants from central government
to regional governments can be catego-
rized into three forms. First form is grant
from the central government to be spent
by the regional governments that
integrated into the regional budget and
registered into regional government’s
account. The second form is grant from
central government to be spent by
regional governments, but not integrated
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Jurnal Keuangan Publik Vol. 5, No. 1, Oktober 2008
By looking at the table above, it the other side, the grant from central
seems that Fiscal Equalizations increase government was more than half of total
drastically from 13% to 78%. Actually in regional revenues. Usually the purpose
1994-2000 the specific purpose grant of that grant had been targeted by
and the general purpose grant were not central government. Thereby, it was
counted since these types of grant not often happen that the goal of the grant
available yet. Indeed 13% only reflecting did not match with the local needed.
the sharing funds. The magnitude of After fiscal decentralization has
sharing fund before and after fiscal been held, the grant magnitude was
decentralization can be seen at table 2 relatively low, because it was included
in next sub chapter. On the other hand, in general and specific purposes grant.
other legal official revenues share to The General purpose fund was
total revenue is quite big before calculated with specific formula that
decentralization. The grant and or takes into account demography, local
intergovernmental transfer contributed government officer number and price
69% from total other legal official index. The use of general purpose fund
revenues. While the emergency fund was fully decentralized to local
was only transferred whenever there is government. Part of this fund used to pay
such a disaster or catastrophe. The local officer salary. Specific purpose
saving from previous year also was very fund was granted as investment stimu-
small instead of negative. This saving late. This fund was proposed by local
minus is due to the expenditures above government to central government.
the revenues. Detail about general and specific
The important one from the purpose fund will be described in the
table 1 above is that before fiscal next sub chapter.
decentralization, special and general The share of own revenues
purpose funds were not available. On before fiscal decentralization is higher
32
Fiscal Desentralization And Indonesia Regional Income Disparity
(1994-2004)
than after, since averagely the total system, the decentralization process in
regional revenues after fiscal decentra- Indonesia is still difficult to be evaluated
lization is bigger caused by enhance- whether it is successful or not. From the
ment of the magnitude of fiscal sharing central government point view, the
and of fiscal equalization. While decentralization has been running well,
regional own revenues relatively stable. even there is a doubt about the future
It was found in the data that the regions because so many things have to be done
which have abundant natural resources in order to keep the decentralization in
have lower share own revenues. the right order, including to revise the
Contrary, the share of own revenues for law 22/1999 and 25/1999. However, the
poor regions is higher. Anyway the level local governments less satisfied than the
of regional own revenues is increasing central one. They think that central
year by year. For instance, the share of government does not fully support
own revenues for East Kalimantan which decentralization process. There is indica-
has abundant of natural resources tion if the decentralization process is
especially from oil is only 5%, while considered to fail the recentralization
Jakarta which have no oil has 40% own system will be used again9.
revenue share. The economic impacts of
In order to reduce the fiscal decentralization are considered as the
transfer dependency from central most crucial thing, since Indonesia still
government, regional governments try to on the recovery after economic and
increase their own resources. Local financial crisis on 1998. Most Indone-
government is allowed to dig up their sian had high expectation on the suc-
potential own resources that available in cessfulness of decentralization to arise
its region. There are also possibilities to economic condition. As describe in
increase the tax rates and levies based previous chapter, the contribution of
on its region characteristics. Thereby the decentralization on economic refor-
tax rates among regions are different. To mation is one of the reasons of changing
be considered that the regulation about governmental system. Reducing disparity
regional taxes and levies should be between Java Provinces and outside Java
approved by local legislative. That is the Provinces or western part and eastern
ability of citizens to pay the tax also part of Indonesia also has been desired
taken into account. On the other side, during decentralization process. Having
the central government’s rule about more authority on economic policy
taxation also should get deliberation. decision making to the local government
Instead of increasing tax rates and levies, is also expected as successfulness of the
the higher portion of revenue sharing to decentralization process.
be allocated for original regions is better Recently the legal process of
for future fiscal decentralization. decentralization in Indonesia is based on
the law 32/2204 and the law 33/2004.
Intergovernmental Transfer and The previous one concerns with regional
Equalization governance which revised the law
Up to now after six years imple- 22/1999. The later concerns with the
menting decentralization governmental
9
Brojonegoro (2005)
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Jurnal Keuangan Publik Vol. 5, No. 1, Oktober 2008
central and local government fiscals horizontal fiscal gap among regional
balance which revised the law 25/1999. governments. In the Indonesia’s budget
The law 33/2004 mandates that revenue term we call it equalization funds (Dana
sources for sub-national levels are from Perimbangan). This equalization funds
own-source revenues (taxes and user deploys in the form of revenue sharing,
charges), intergovernmental transfers, specific purpose grant and general
borrowing mechanism and other legiti- purpose grant.
mate revenues. From the figure 1 below, it is
The highlight of sub-national clear that intergovernmental transfer
revenue sources stated in this law is increased almost two and half times after
intergovernmental transfer. The aim of running fiscal decentralization, where
intergovernmental transfer is to reduce the total amount of government transfer
vertical fiscal gap between central and reflects the summation of A2 and A3 in
regional government and to reduce the table 1.
35,000.00
30,000.00
25,000.00
billion rupiah
20,000.00
15,000.00
10,000.00
5,000.00
0.00
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
years
34
Fiscal Desentralization And Indonesia Regional Income Disparity
(1994-2004)
Specific Purpose Grant (Dana Alokasi criteria. The general criteria should
Khusus/DAK) consider the financial capacity of the
DAK is allocated to specific regions, while special criteria emphasi-
regions and certain program. DAK is zes on the characteristic of the regions.
intended to promote the attainment of Technical criteria are more specific and
minimum standard and to compensate established by the line ministries. Condi-
the benefit/cost spill over related to tional term attached in DAK lead to the
priority capital investment. Hence, it is limited scope of sub-national govern-
confined mainly to finance physical ments’ entitlement, particularly in the
capital investment and limited-period usage of funds. However, the bottom up
financing of operational and mainte- principle applies during the process of
nance needs. DAK allocation. In this process local
The criteria for DAK are based governments may propose programs and
on the general, special, and technical
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Jurnal Keuangan Publik Vol. 5, No. 1, Oktober 2008
activities which are in line with the determining the type of fiscal decentra-
national priorities. lization is the extent to which local
government are given autonomy to
General Purpose Grant (Dana Alokasi determine the allocation of their expen-
Umum/DAU) ditures. Another one is the ability to raise
The DAU intends to address their revenues.
both problems of vertical and horizontal The composition of regional
imbalance. Thus it is expected to budget expenditures in Indonesia in-
equalize fiscal capacities across regions cludes; Officer Expenditure (salary etc);
to finance public services. In article 27 Good and Services; Transport and
law 33/2004 states that the total amount Accommodation; Other Expenditures;
for DAU as at least 26 percent of net Investment Expenditures and Unpre-
domestic revenues. Previously the dictable expenditures. All of those
magnitude of DAU is 25 percent. expenditures do not accommodate
However, there are no clear reasons for central government officer expenditures
one percent increase. Brodjonegoro who work in particular region.
(2005) points out that there is no proof Increasing revenues due to fiscal
whether local governments need more decentralization automatically will in-
transfer or on the contrary might have crease local government expenditures in
surplus. Thus, one might assume that almost the same portion. Even the
political compromises lay behind this structural of expenditures is relatively the
stipulation. same before and after fiscal decentra-
In principle, the main content of lization.
amendment of DAU in the law 33/2004 Generally, the expenditures are
concerns the formula for fiscal gap and divided into two activities, namely
the basic amount of allocation. The routine expenditures and investment
formula for fiscal gap is using the expenditures. Routine expenditures are
difference of expenditure needs and used to maintain that government
fiscal capacity. The main change in the activities still exist. Those activities are
formula for fiscal gap between the old such as payment for salaries, good and
and the current system are the indicator services that support routine activities,
for fiscal need. Those indicators such as maintenance, transport, accommodation,
population, area, geographical condi- and other expenditures. While invest-
tion, and income level which consider ment expenditures are used for invest-
poverty. New indicators had been added ment activities such as procurement for
in measuring the needs are the Human new building, highway, bridge, road,
Development Index and GRDP per dike, irrigation, and so on.
capita index. The share of investment expen-
ditures to total expenditures before and
Local Government Expenditure after decentralization is relatively stable.
Fiscal decentralization involves It is around 30 to 40% from total
shifting some responsibilities of expen- expenditures. The rest of expenditures
ditures and revenues to lower levels of are used to routine activities payment.
governments. One important factor in The investment expenditures increase in
36
Fiscal Desentralization And Indonesia Regional Income Disparity
(1994-2004)
the level year by year. It will be better if natural resources depleted over time
the share of investment expenditures is while to keep the sustainability of GRDP
getting higher and higher since benefit growth non oil and gas sector should get
from investment expenditures not only have a higher priority.
could encourage economic sectors There are 27 provinces in
highly but also encourage other sectors. Indonesia before 1999. Since a province,
The main difference in the local Timor Leste, separated from Indonesia in
government expenditures before and 1999, therefore this province was
after fiscal decentralization is not in the excluded from calculation. There are
share of expenditure itself, but the most also four new provinces since 2000 that
important things is the freedom of local should be taken into consideration
government to allocate those funds namely Bangka Belitung, Banten,
according to their preferences and Gorontalo and North Maluku. Bangka
necessities. Before fiscal decentra- Belitung was part of South Sumatra,
lization, it was often that central Banten was part of West Java, Gorontalo
government fully controlled what was part of North Sulawesi and North
regional wants. Central government Maluku was part of Maluku before. So
decided what regional should do with that totally now there are 30 provinces
those transferred funds. Therefore, there will be relaxed in this paper.
is gap between regional needs and Column 3 in table A1 in the
central wants. Contrary, after fiscal appendix shows the annual GRDP
decentralization was run, local govern- Growth from 1994 to 2000 per province
ments have fully authority to manage including oil and gas. Papua has highest
their funds. By doing so, budget will average growth before decentralization
allocate in appropriate expenditures (from 1994 to 2000) with 10.05%, while
conform to local needs. Maluku have the lowest growth level
with -5.07%. The lowest economic
Indonesia’s Provincial GRDP growth in Maluku provinces was caused
Indonesia is one of the rich by horizontal conflict there for several
natural resources countries, but those years. This horizontal conflict created
natural resources not spread equally instability and directly lessens economic
among regions. So that the regions that activity. Papua province had had the
have abundant natural resources have highest economic growth because of the
advantages to have higher GRDP mining boom in Papua Island during
compare to the regions that do not have those periods. Nationally, before fiscal
natural resources. Among those regions decentralization, the highest growth is in
are Aceh where has huge natural gas 1994 where Indonesia economic growth
and oil, Riau has oil, South Sumatra has is 8.7%. The growth was going down in
oil, East Kalimantan oil and mining and the following year, and have a negative
Papua has mining. Based on this sign in 1998, in which the lowest growth
condition, it is better if we distinguish is -6.45%. The reason is because as all
the GRDP growth among regions into of us knew that at that time Indonesia
two groups, the GRDP growth with and was hit by economic crisis. The
without oil and gas. It is because the exchange rate of rupiah falls almost eight
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Jurnal Keuangan Publik Vol. 5, No. 1, Oktober 2008
times than before crisis toward US have average negative growth, Aceh and
dollar. Up till now, Indonesia is still in Maluku. Aceh Province has positive
economic recovery. Economic growth growth now. During the period 1994 to
gradually increase, even the economic 2000 nationally the average growth is
growth was still below than before 4.03%. Actually, the Indonesia’s highest
economic crisis hit Indonesia. growth rate is 9.39% in 1994, but it
Column 4 table A1 shows the could not remain longer, since in the
annual GRDP growth including gas and following years those growth getting
oil after fiscal decentralization from lesser and lesser. Even the experience of
2001 to 2004. Averagely all of regions negative growth occurred in 1998 at -
have positive sign economic growth. The 4.01%. The economic growth start to
higher growth rate is 7.11% in Southeast increase after 1998, but the level still
Sulawesi, while the lowest one is North lower compare to that before economic
Sulawesi with 2.51%. The Indonesia crisis.
economic growth increases gradually By running fiscal decentraliza-
after economic crisis. Between economic tion package there is acceleration in
crisis and before fiscal decentralization economic growth which can be seen in
the average growth rate is still below the column 6 table A1 in appendix. Not
0.5%, but after decentralization started one of provinces has negative growth
in 2001 the growth rate was jump to rate, instead of nationally the growth rate
3.71% and then the following years getting greater and greater. But the
economic growth remain increase to growth achievement is still below then
4.19%, 4.52% and 5.75% respectively. before economic crisis especially in
As stated above, not every 1994. The highest economic growth was
province in Indonesia has abundant achieved by East Kalimantan with
natural resources of gas, oil and several 3.64%.
kinds of mining. Inevitably those It is better if we do not only
resources depleted over years and will take into consideration the economic
vanish in the certain time. Therefore it is growth by take a look at the growth
useful to distinguish the level of level, but also take consideration the
economic growth by excluding gas and amount of populations in every region.
oil from the data. What we will address is known as GRDP
Column 5 table A1 in appendix per capita. By analyzing the data of per
shows the annual GRDP growth per capita growth, it is more reliable and
province excluding gas and oil. From reflecting the actual condition of
1994 to 2000 before decentralization, particular region. Column 3 table A2 in
the highest growth rate is still belongs to appendix shows the growth of annual
Papua Province, and the lowest one also per capita growth including gas and oil
the same for Maluku Province. The before fiscal decentralization. Aceh and
growth rate trend is almost the same Riau province have experience average
compare with when still including gas negative growth rate during this period
and oil as part of GRDP. The different in the level of -3.29% and -0.57%
thing here is if oil and gas was included respectively.
there are only two provinces that still
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Jurnal Keuangan Publik Vol. 5, No. 1, Oktober 2008
0.1600
0.1400
0.1200
0.1000
Index
0.0800
0.0600
0.0400
0.0200
0.0000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Years
From figure 2 above, we can see of gas and oil will create higher gap in
that the level of income disparity slightly GRDP term among regions.
decreases during the period under
observation when including gas and oil. Dynamics of Regional Income
From 1994 to 1997 it increased slightly Variations (Sigma Convergence)
but went down in 1998. After fiscal Figure 3 shows the dynamics of
decentralization from 2001 to 2004 overall variation regional income per capita
income disparity went down, and if we during 1994-2000. The coefficient of
have a look at that figure, the trend of variation is determined by dividing
regional income disparity will decrease standard deviation of GRDP per capita
for the next following years. Contrary, by over the means of GRDP per capita all
excluding gas and oil, the GRDP disparity regions. The variance in regional income
increased from 1994 to 1997 then went per capita has been relatively stable both
down in 1998. From 1998 to 2001 the including and excluding oil and gas, but
GRDP disparity relatively stable, slightly its level is higher if we include gas and
increase in 2002, went down in 2003 oil in the calculation. We see that hypo-
and again increase in 2004. It could be thesis of sigma convergence does not
said that gas and oil have significant role valid on this period of observation since
in the GRDP disparity among regions in the value of coefficient variations does
Indonesia. It is clear since regions which not decrease over time.
have oil and gas resources have potential to
collect higher revenues. Having higher
revenues make the particular regions
have chance to spend more their expen-
ditures, in which directly or indirectly foster
the GRDP. Consequently the availability
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(1994-2004)
1
coefficient of
0.8
variation
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
years
It was proven that by employing the same level, but fluctuate during
either Theil Index or coefficient of observation. This result will support the
variations, it comes up with the same conclusion that there is no sigma con-
result. In the beginning and in the end vergence before and after decentra-
of period observation both Theil index lization.
and coefficient variation show almost
0.8
coefficient of
0.6
variation
0.4
0.2
0
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Years
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Where:
yi1994 : GRDP per capita in province i in 1994 (base year before decentralization)
y i 2000 : GRDP per capita in province i in 2000 (final year before decentralization)
yi 2001 : GRDP per capita in province i in 2001 (base year after decentralization)
y i 2004 : GRDP per capita in province i in 2004 (final year after decentralization)
nt : The number of years ( equal 7 before decentralization and equal 4 after then)
α,β : Parameters to be estimated
εi : The error term
If the coefficient of β is negative then The regression result is stated in the table
there is economic convergence and on below,
the way around if coefficient of β is
positive then there is no economic
convergence.
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N 26 30 60 26 30 60
R-square 0.415 0.122 0.175 0.513 0.169 0.239
Figures in parentheses represent values of t- statistic
Asterisks indicate that variable whose coefficients are significant at the 0.01(**) and
0.05 (*) level.
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government expenditures, the higher the case, the Theil Index behaves as dependent
economic growth will be. It can be variable. While in the explanatory variables,
explained by looking at the coefficient of two variables are added. Those variables
FD in the period 2001-2004 compare to are;
that in 1994-2000 whether take into • Theil Index is influenced by the total
consideration oil and gas or not. While if population and GRDP per year in
we use pooled model (1994-2004 data) province. This Theil Index
the coefficient of FD is slightly higher measurement is explained in sub
compare to that in the period 1994- chapter IV.1.
2000. • Local Government Expenditures
The estimated coefficient of HDI (TE) is measured by the ratio of the
is negative. This variable may serve as a aggregate realization of expenditures
poor control variable. Since the HDI gap for each municipal within province
is high among richer and poorer regions. and also province expenditures itself
For instance the highest HDI is 76.1 in to GRDP per capita during particular
Jakarta while the lowest one is 54.2 in year.
West Nusa Tenggara. The other control • Regional Own Revenues (OR) is
variable is PD. The coefficient of PD is measured by the share of regional
small positive. It also faces the high gap own revenues for each municipal
PD among regions. In Jakarta the PD is within province and also province
almost 13.000 population per square itself to total expenditures in a
kilometers while in Papua only 6 popu- particular year.
lation per square kilometers. This un- Using OLS estimation, the regression
wellbalance PD may cause such result is described as in the table 5
unexpected regression result. below.
The relationship between fiscal By analyzing the table, the
decentralization and regional income primary finding is that the coefficient of
disparity can be found by employing the FD is negative for all data. This finding
model below; provides evidence that FD has negative
impact on disparity which is consistent
Theilindex i = α + β FD + γX i + ε i with the new theory of fiscal decentra-
lization. More precisely that the coeffi-
Where: cient of FD is negatively higher in the
Theil index : Theil Index period of 2001-2004 both including and
FD : Fiscal Decentralization excluding oil and gas compare to that
X : A vector control variable the period 1994-2000 and pooled data
ε : The error term 1994-2004. It is undermined the notion
i : Province that the higher the share of FD to total
α, β, and γ : Coefficients to be local government expenditures, the
estimated smaller the income per capita disparity
among regions.
The model used is almost similar with Other variables’ estimated co-
the previous model. The difference is in efficient can be explained as follow. The
the dependent variable, where in this coefficient of HDI is unstable and
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statistically not significant in the 0.05 statistically significant in the 0.05 level
level for period 1994-2000 and 2001- and has negative relationship to Theil
2004. While the coefficient of PD is Index.
N 26 30 60 26 30 60
R-square 0.87 0.90 0.39 0.85 0.85 0.43
Figures in parentheses are the absolute values of t- statistic
Asterisks indicate that variable whose coefficients are significant at the 0.01(**) and
0.05 (*) level.
The other variables is OR and TE. The the higher the income per capita dispa-
coefficient of OR is negative in the rity among regions.
period of 1994-2000 and 2001-2004,
while it is positive if we employ pooled CONCLUSION
data 1994-2004. It means that the higher
the ratio of own regional revenues to its There are two opposite theories
regional expenditures, the smaller the regarding the relationship between fiscal
income per capita disparity among decentralization, economic develop-
regions. It also can be explained that the ment, and regional income disparity.
coefficient of OR is higher in period The conventional theory says that fiscal
2001-2004 than that in 1994-2000, since decentralization will decrease economic
fully implementing higher portion of FD growth especially in developing and
in 2001 lures local government to transition countries. Fiscal decentrali-
explore more their own revenue sources. zation also could increase regional
The coefficient of TE is positive for all income disparity among regions in the
period used data and significant in the country. In contrast, new theories argue
0.01 level. It underlines the opinion that that fiscal decentralization would not
the higher the ratio of total local only increase efficiency and economic
government expenditure to total GRDP development but also reduce income
disparity among regions within a country.
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Appendix
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