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Conditionality Neg
Dispo doesnt solve - Smart teams run CPs like 50 states do plan and solve world
*** 2NC OV
The question of the debate is whether representing death in the simulation of debate represents a valuable or harmful practice- they cant access the case without justifying their conclusion that death simulations are important.As well to that on their no-link we clearly link the link for this debate is of how firstly competing death scenarios so then we do link to the Aff in some way shape or form .On the question of the Link turn if viewed this way this is a linear DA
We control the offense. Our impacts stem directly from being forced to debate death. Their impacts are missing the internal link between talking about death and fearing death.
Without the alts protest against militarization of the public sphere, continuously escalating spectacles of violence become desirable and necessary- all of their impact claims are produced to justify a constant state of domestic insecurity and the alt is the only way to solve any of them anyway. We are a pre-requisite to solve literally all of their offense, from fear of death good to political action good. Giroux 3/14
Henry A Giroux, Frequent author on pedagogy in the public sphere, Truthout, Youth in Revolt: The Plague of State-Sponsored Violence, March 14, 2012, http://truthout.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=7249:youth-in-revolt-the-plague-of-statesponsoredviolence As the social is devalued along with rationality, ethics and any vestige of democracy, spectacles of war, violence and brutality now merge into forms of collective pleasure that constitute an important and new symbiosis among visual pleasure, violence and suffering. The control society is now the ultimate form of entertainment as the pain of others, especially those considered disposable and powerless, has become the subject not of compassion, but of ridicule and amusement in America. High-octane violence and human suffering are now considered another form of entertainment designed to raise the collective pleasure quotient . Reveling in the suffering of others should no longer be reduced to a matter of individual pathology, but now registers a larger economy of pleasure across the broader culture and social landscape. My emphasis here is on the sadistic impulse and how it merges spectacles of violence and brutality with forms of collective pleasure. No society can make a claim to being a democracy as long as it defines itself through shared fears rather than shared responsibilities. Widespread violence now functions as part of an anti-immune system that turns the economy of genuine pleasure into a mode of sadism that creates the foundation for sapping democracy of any political substance and moral vitality. The prevalence of institutionalized violence in American society and other parts of the world suggests the need for a new conversation and politics that addresses what a just and fair world looks like. The predominance of violence in all aspects of social life suggests that young people and others marginalized by class, race and ethnicity have been abandoned as American society's claim on democracy gives way to the forces of militarism, market fundamentalism and state terrorism. The prevalence of violence throughout American society suggests the need for a politics that not only negates the established order, but imagines a new one, one informed by a radical vision in which the future does not imitate the present.(27) In this discourse, critique merges with a sense of realistic hope and individual struggles merge into larger social movements. The challenge that young people are posing to American society is being met with a statesponsored violence that is about more than police brutality; it is more importantly about the transformation of the United States from a social state to a warfare state, from a state that embraced the social contract to one that no longer has a language for community - a state in which the bonds of fear and commodification have replaced the bonds of civic responsibility and democratic vision. Until we address how the metaphysics of war and violence have taken hold on American society (and in other parts of the world) and the savage social costs it has enacted, the forms of social, political and economic violence that young people are protesting against as well as the violence waged in response to their protests will become impossible to recognize and act on .
Line by Line
A2No-Link
1. This is a link of inclusion. Other impacts dont justify death impacts. Its like saying an environment impact gives free reign to trivialize the Holocaust.
2. Their choice to initiate death impacts denies our choice to avoid them. Were forced to debate death to make impact comparisons and because debates that include death are strongly pressured to go to the body count.
Now onto answering their offense -Firstly on their Blaine evidence counteracting these forces should not be key to policy making using this logic the smallest policy options do they all go nuclear ??? No , that is the point of the Kritik we shouldnt be debating these far off policies with these non-sensical state moviated impacts . As well to that the whole thesis of this kritik is attack how trivilazation of death is of how we want to change thourgh are activism . K turns this answer because of are usage of the activism against the War machine
Secondly on the Neg links harder- no we dont Firstly if we nope we kick the CP and the Net Benefit ceed their Russian war between the United States will never occur and the rest will be done in the next speech . 2NC Impact
1. Death Cult. Death games cause an addiction to big impacts to win. For example, debaters star cards with more deaths and get excited by the spectacle. Practicing this attitude fosters a death culture that has enabled the worst violence in history.
2. Death Control. The focus on controlling death is bad for games. This relation of control neutralizes life by seeing peoples lives as fiat pets to be added up in an administrative numbers game. The more we obsess over death impacts, the less we can see our own acts that hurt others outside the debate game and outside death.
3. Death debating causes mass violence and genocide over 80 studies prove.
Solomon, Psych Brooklyn Clg, Greenberg, Psych U Ariz, & Pyszczynski, Psych U Colorado, 2K (Current Directions in Psychological Science 9.6, Sheldon, Jeff, and Tom, Fear of Death
and Social Behavior) Terror management theory posits that awareness of mortality engenders a potential for paralyzing terror, which is assuaged by cultural worldviews: humanly created, shared beliefs that provide individuals with the sense they are valuable members of an enduring, meaningful universe (selfesteem), and hence are qualified for safety and continuance beyond death. Thus, self-esteem serves the fundamental psychological function of buffering anxiety. In support of this view, studies have shown that bolstering selfesteem reduces anxiety and that reminders of mortality intensify striving for self-esteem; this research suggests that self-esteem is critical for psychological equanimity. Cultural worldviews serve the fundamental psychological function of providing the basis for death transcendence. To the extent this is true, reminders of mortality should stimulate bolstering of ones worldview. More than 80 studies have supported this idea, most commonly by demonstrating that making death momentarily salient increases liking for people who support ones worldview and hostility toward those with alternative worldviews. This work helps explain human beings dreadful history of intergroup prejudice and violence: The mere existence of people with different beliefs threatens our primary basis of psychological security; we therefore respond by derogation, assimilation efforts, or annihilation. Why has history been plagued by a succession of appalling ethnic cleansings? Archaeologists have found bas-reliefs from 1100 B.C. depicting Assyrian invaders practice of killing indigenous people by sticking them alive on stakes from groin to shoulder. These xenophobic propensities reached their zenith in the 20th century, when Hitlers Nazi regime perpetuated the most extensive effort at genocide in history, and have continued to resurface throughout the world in places such as Cambodia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, and the United States where in 1999 A.D. at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, two Nazi-influenced teenagers massacred schoolmates, seemingly provoked by threats not to material well-being, but to the abstract entity known as self-esteem.
B. Vote neg because the aff introduced death impacts into the debate. Austin Kutscher, President of the Foundation of Thanatology and Professor Columbia University, 80
Foreward)
Within the educational setting, interdisciplinary relationships are altering the perspectives of those who must make decisions on the
care of terminally ill patients, the members of their families, and other involved professional staff. The approaches to and expectations from therapeutic modalities are being broadened by new explorations into the ethics and values which should be automatically considered whenever human lives are being cared for. Philosophical enlightenment adds indispensable historical clarification to scientific interventions on behalf of the dying and the bereaved. Philosophy relates death to human existence and the quality of life the essential quality of human existence itself that engages the consciences of those who would offer us humanistic medicine. Compassion and knowledge are the springs from which flow trust and faith, without which man can live only a most deprived and barren existence. The task is to know how and when decisions can
be made, to proceed thoughtfully while making them, to distinguish between what can and cannot be done and what should and should not be done. In analyzing death, in interpreting its every significant nuance, Professor Carse advances the cause of all who delve into the meaning of life . Mere survival is not enough to provide nourishment for
the soul of man. The message to be read in Philosophy and in Thanatology is the same: Life is a treasure which mankind must cherish a treasure whose value increases exponentially when one being bestows solace on and acts to give love to humankind, collectively and individually.
C. This is a gateway argument about how we should be allowed to debate. If they win that we can use death impacts, then the rest of the 1NC applies. We will not make cross-applications from other flows to prove the link.
On their No Alt yes we have one misinterpation of the alternative is occurring we can have been debating of people suffering , poverty, and also we can talk about the farmers people would be
interested . Firstly there are people who care about them . On the Racism nope It doesnt trigger a turn to the Kritik firstly Rasiscm can be attributed to being the Root cause of Violence . But we are not advocating . Litterally Are Alt is Embrace non-death debates . That is literally all we ask for but no they choose to include a death impact- but nope then this is what comes . Group their Reubener evidence and the Milner and we turn the turn
Group the last two cards about Prior Questioning Firstly nope ? Where do we at all interact with this argument firstly we arent doing that at all , anyways with the warrants im seeing from their firstly on their Owen evidence not interaction at all with this , it talks about the IR epsitomology or ontology . Meanwhile this is a kritik of pedagogy in the debate there is not a question we ask before you actually vote aff. You vote neg to reject this inclusionary principle of the how the Alternative . As well to that warrants of how that might flow neg : Firstly that circle is describing securazatation secondly that could also show how the Affirmitive attempt to try to secure us from the inevitable Death any link work above should be cross-applied down here . Secondly to truly stop running in the circle then that defers neg
And, this begs the question of the framework debate- if we win that the aff is stuck to their pedagogical frame, then the permutation includes a violent pedagogy that should not be included in our vision of debate
1. Double-Bind. Either the perm severs its death impacts or doesnt solve. Severance makes the aff a moving target. We base our strategy on the 1ACs choices, so stick them to it.
2. Severance fails:
Because sorry as regret carries no acceptance of responsibility or accountability, the offence becomes an implicit part of the explanation, even a justification for an incredibly difficult decision. Reparation, forbearance, absolution are not appropriate in such circumstances. Moreover, M s Hewitt
which followed Hewitts apology makes explicit.
concludes her apology with a statement (but I dont think we were wrong to go in) whic h contradicts the demand made by the questioner, i.e. that the Prime Minister should apologize for taking the British nation to war in Iraq. However, though nearly all forms of media who report the Question Time encounter refer to Hewitts statement as an
apology, thus at least implicitly categorizing it as such, most of them do call into question in various ways its nature an d substance. The many viewers who responded to BBC News are even more critical and also, perhaps surprisingly, more discerning, despite the fact that the invitation was headlined: Ms Hewitt is the first senior member of the government to make a direct apology for the intelligence failings and the question worded as Was Patricia Hewitt right to apologise? Does the apology draw a line under the debate over WMD?, all of which accept as a presupposition that an apology has been made. The most frequent quest ion raised by both the press and viewers has to do with accountability, i.e. that a proper apology involves the acceptance of per sonal responsibility for the offence by the apologizer. Hence, Patricia Hewitts apology is faulty both because shes apologizing for something for which she bears no responsibility (What does Patricia Hewitt have to do with the security services?, as one viewer asks) and for the wrong offence, i.e. that it was the Prime Ministers misrepresentation of the intelligence reports, not the intelligence reports in themselves, which was wrong (I asked him [the Prime Minister] very specifically about the wa y in which he misrepresented the intelligence that he received to the country. Why can he not bring himself to say sorry for that? Michael Howard in the House of Commons, 13 October 2004). Both the press and large numbers of viewers, like Michael Howard, question the acceptability of Hewitts remarks on these grounds. Perhaps partly because Hewitts apology comes to exempli fy what is seen as the failure of a number of leading politicians to accept accountability, viewers, like the press, also question the ultimate significance of political apologies which appear to be unconnected with meaningful action, both in terms of rect ifying the damage caused by the offence (An apology wont bring back the lives of the servicemen lost, nor the civilians, nor rectify the damage, nor pay back the 5bn cost, nor call off the insurgents and terrorists, nor free Ken Bigley BBC News, World Edition 09/10/04) and as an indication of the (lack of) seriousness of the politicians sense of remorse (The only apology t hat I would accept is the apology of resignation BBC News, World Edition 09/10/04). Examining the controversy which followed Ms Hewitts Question Time statement has highlighted the complexity of political apol ogies in relationship to the interpersonal types usually explored in the apology literature or at least has demonstrated that different types of complexity are involved. First of all, it is clear that the use of one o f the two explicit Ifids (sorry and apologize) appear to be crucial according t o the judgements/evaluations of both the press and viewers in order to categorize what a politician says as an apology. The widespr ead categorization of Patricia Hewitts statement by the press as the first direct apology by a senior minister appears to relate to her use of these Ifids. Tony Blairs conference statement, on the other hand (I can apologize for the information that turned out to be wrong, but I cant, sincerely at least, apologize for removing Saddam) is ambiguous in its use of can as t o whether that speech act is actually being performed, and the clear emphasis is, in any case, on his refusal to apologize for the act cited in the latter half of the sentence. Indirection in a political apology is likely to be perceived negatively as evasion and shiftiness. Second, there are clearly disputes over who should apologize; hence, the reaction of much of the press and many viewers who write in online that Patricia Hewitt is not the appropriate person to apologize for something for which she had minimal or no responsibility. There is also the question of the offence itself, which in the Question Time challenge by the studio audience is related to the decision to go to war in Iraq, but in the apology becomes that the information provided by the intelligence services was wrong. And, perhaps most significant, to whom is the apology being made? Who are the victim/s? Unlike Mr Blairs apology for the injustice to those wrongly convicted for the IRA pub bombings, where the victims are named, there are no victims indicated in Ms Hewitts apology. The implication in the studio audience challenge is that it is the British people t o whom an apology for the decision to go to war in Iraq should be addressed, for having been misled, but the implications are probably even wider than that. (If there is an implicit meaning in the apology statement itself, it is that the Government it self has been victimized by having been provided with faulty intelligence, especially since Ms Hewitt clearly states that the act of going to war itself was not wrong.) In addition, Ms Hewitts statement is made in the immediate context in answer to a q uestion raised by a member of the studio audience, but the reaction of that audience certainly demonstrates that they regard the apology as directed at the entire audience rather than at the specific individual. Ms Hewitt knew that her statement was also being heard by the unseen wider audience who are watching the programme and must have anticipated that it would be taken up by the press, repeated and published for a wider public yet. Who the victim/s are and the nature of the offence are clearly disputed territory which the apology does little to clarify. Clearly, the political stakes for the Prime Minister are incredibly high, and whatever his current beliefs about Iraq or the demands of a substantial number of the British public for an apology for taking the country to war on the basis of faulty (or misrepresented) intelligence, Tony Blair is unlikely ever to issue a political apology which would satisfy the basic conditions of those demands according to viewer judgements (an Ifid token + an expression which indicates acceptance of responsibility and/or blame for wrongdoing) or to resign (absolution).1
We would agree with Luke (1997) that the apology has become a form of political speech with increasing significance and power (p. 344), and across the political spectrum on a global scale has, arguably, become one of the most prominent of public speech acts. Even though it may not as yet be the age of the apology, the
Conclusions
relative lack of interest in the political apology as a generic type of discourse by sociolinguistics and pragmatics is both surprising and unwarranted, since they demonstrate some revealing differences as well as significant areas of overlap with the type of interpersonal and individual apologies which have been the primary focus of the now considerable amount of apology research. For example, much of the existing literature on apologies, following Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987), adopts a face-needs perspective, seeing the apology as basically a negative politeness strategy which is aimed mainly at the redress of Face Threatening Acts (see Brown and Levinson, 1978, 1987; Goffman, 1971; Holmes, 1995, 1998). It is certainly the case that many types of political apologies do represent a potentially
serious loss of face for politicians, which may be why they are frequently so eager to apologize for things for which they cannot be held accountable. But to approach political apologies by means of face-oriented definitions is often not particularly helpful and highlights some of the important differences with the interpersonal data on which such definitions are most often based. Holmes (1998), for instance, defines apologies as follows: An apology is a speech act addressed to Bs face needs and intended to remedy an offense for which A takes responsibility, and thus to restore equilibrium between A and B (where A is the apologizer, and B is the person offended). (p. 204) Clearly, this is a definition which assumes that it is two individuals who are involved in the process of apologizing and that addressing the face-needs of the person offended is the primary motive for the speech act, with the re storing of equilibrium its main goal. Such definitions do not take us very far in understanding the significance and issues raised by po litical apologies. Given the magnitude of some of the offences we have considered, describing what the apology addresses as the face-needs of the person offended seems neither accurate nor enlightening. To claim that it is the face -needs of Samantha Roberts which are in some way damaged or that she is the person offended seems somehow to trivialize events which are of a very serious nature. Nor would these terms be very helpful in describing the motives held by the various persons and groups who call on the British Prime Minister to apologize for taking the country to war in Iraq or for allegedly misrepresenting the intelligence reports to members of Parliament. Moreover, the process of restoring equilibrium is again likely to be a much more complex process if it can be achieved at all than is the case when apologies are negotiated between individuals acting i n a private capacity. Indeed, its hard to imagine how Robinsons (2004) notion of a preferred response (one which offers absolution to the apologizer rather than merely accepting the apology) could possibly be applicable in the case of most political apologies. Even in the instance of fairly low level offences such as the British diplomat who described Nottingham as a more dangerous place than Saudi Arabia, city officials agreed to accept the apology rather than to offer absolution to the offender. H owever, Holmes emphasis on the apologizers accepting responsibility for the offence and Robinsons argument that Apologizing is an essential component of the maintenance of social harmony because it communicates awareness and acceptance of moral responsibility for offensive behavior (2004: 292) both foreground the essential sense of morality which generates the need for such apologies and which goes well beyond face-needs. What Samantha Roberts demands is an apology from the Minister for Defence which explicitly accepts his own moral responsibility for the actions which led to her husbands death. From both the press and view ers, Ms Hewitts political apology produces responses which are concerned essentially with morality, i.e. what is right or wrong, what the politician/s should or should not do; and these responses most often centre on the question of accepting personal responsibility. Eelen (2001: 249) argues in conjunction with new directions in politeness theory that morality is no longer regarded as a fixed higher-order set of rules that determine the individuals behaviour, but as something that people do to or with each other. This seems to us an arguable point but one which is overstated. Though what constitutes an acceptable political apology may not be based on a fixed higher-order set of rules, there does seem to exist a cultural consensus that is morally grounded and goes beyond the merely indivi dual response, i.e. it is right for a politician to offer an apology in which s/he explicitly accepts responsibility for his/her own acts and wrong to attempt to evade that responsibility. This is not to deny that the political apology is a contested concept or that it not only arises out of discourse struggle but generates further struggle and controversy. It is that very discourse struggle which is, indeed, part of their interest for linguists and which is reflected in the substantial amount of media coverage and public debate that political apologies often provoke. However, once again, we woul d argue that apologies, nearly always regarded in apology research as a quintessential politeness strategy, are more than an argumentative social tool with which the individual can accomplish things (Eelen, 2001: 249) and also that political apologi es are perceived as more than a politeness strategy. It is interesting that the British data on political apologies which we have examined contains no references at all to the question of (im)politeness, though that too frequently evokes impassioned public debate. Like Eelen, Mills (2003) also regards
apologies as a contested concept and stresses the importance of evaluation. Apologies are often composed of elements which cannot be recognised easily by either interactants or analysts as unequivocal apologies (p. 111). Hence, apologies cannot be considered to be a formal linguistic entity (p. 222) but rather a judgement made about someones linguistic performance (p. 112). This, again, is probably true in a general sense, and as we maintained earlier, apologies are unlikely ever to be defined precisely as a fixed set of semantic components. However, once again, though the evaluative component is highly significant, the responses (from both media and public) to the political apologies in our data are more t han merely individuals making disparate judgements about someones linguistic performance. They do instead, we would argue, reflect a set of cultural expectations as to what constitutes a val id apology as a formal speech act, and, as
listeners and viewers do have a sense of what constitutes an unequivocal apology that perpetuates the discourse struggle. In contrast to many apologies between individuals, which may take a wide variety of forms and often contain a high degree of implicitness, it seems to be crucial if political apologies are to be regarded as valid by those to whom they are addressed that they are not implicit or ambiguous, i.e. that they contain an explicit Ifid (sorry and/or apologize) and that there is an (explicit) acceptance of personal responsibility for a stated act which has been committed by the apologizer. The widely expressed cynicism with regard to political apologies which are made by major politicians long after the events concerned have occurred and for which they cannot be accountable reflects these cultural expectations, along with the clear sense that apologies are morally grounded.
such, contain also a quite considerable degree of predictability. Indeed, it is in large measure the fact that