Channel Talk Articles

Fire and gas

By Kimberly A. Dejmek and Richard Skone 01 June 2003

Standard's use spreading, but confusion still surrounds FGS.

Consistency is the hallmark of any great organization or process. When it comes to fire and gas systems (FGSs), consistency is not a desired goal; it is a must. ut since the promulgation of !S" S#$.%& in &''(, there has )een confusion surrounding the treatment of fire and gas systems. Some )elie*e that the standard e+cludes co*erage in fire and gas systems, ,hile others prepare FGS specifications that re-uire compliance ,ith ".S!/!S" S#$.%.%&0&''(. 1his has led to inconsistency in the approach )et,een and ,ithin operating companies. 1he re-uest for compliance ,ith )oth S#$ and .ational Fire 2rotection "ssociation (.F2") standards creates additional implementation issues. Simultaneously meeting the re-uirements of )oth standards limits the a*aila)le e-uipment, configurations, and architectures. !n many cases, the user has already specified the e-uipment and its configuration, making it impossi)le to meet standards.

Working together

Relationship between the systems

All a misunderstanding

3Fire and gas systems are e+cluded3 is often heard in discussions of the !S" standard on safety instrumented systems. 1his can )e true, or not, depending upon the specific application in -uestion. 1he e+clusion that is often mis-uoted is from paragraph &.4.&$, ,hich reads5 3Systems ,here operator action is the sole means re-uired to return the process to a safe state are not co*ered )y this standard (e.g., alarm systems, fire and gas monitoring systems, etc.).3 1he key concept in this paragraph is that the e+clusion applies to 3systems ,here operator action is the sole means re-uired to return the process to a safe state.3 1his e+clusion does not, therefore, address FGSs that automatically initiate process actions, )ut those that only monitor and generate alarms. "nother area of confusion surrounding the applica)ility of S#$ to FGSs is ,hether the application of fire0mitigation materials should )e a part of the safety instrumented function (S!F). 1his is not an issue that can )e generally resol*ed, )ut instead re-uires case0)y0case consideration. 6ust as you can re*ie, process0related S!Fs to identify the actions re-uired to achie*e functional safety, you can similarly apply this identification of 3safety critical actions3 to an FGS. !f the successful initiation of fire mitigation achie*es the risk reduction allocated to the FGS, then these actions, along ,ith the identified process actions, are safety critical. 1he !S"/!nternational 7lectrotechnical Committee (!7C) standards for safety instrumented systems (S!Ss) and the .F2" standards addressing FGSs de*eloped in isolation, ,ith the systems treated as separate and independent. 8o,e*er, the edges )et,een these t,o types of systems are )lurring, creating o*erlap )et,een the system re-uirements. 9any S!Ss ha*e inputs from fire and gas detectors and generate outputs to process and fire0fighting e-uipment.

Plenty of options

The three options for the boundaries when complying with the

requirement for S84 compliance

Complications set in
!mplementing a system compliant ,ith .F2" :4 re-uires e-uipment that has )een tested and appro*ed under the rules of the standard. 7ach component used in a system must ,ork ,ith all other components to ,hich it ,ill connect. ;edicated FGS component suppliers ha*e performed the necessary testing and recei*ed the necessary certification. 8o,e*er, ,hen there is a re-uest for additional compliance ,ith S#$, and more specifically, ,ith a safety integrity le*el (S!<), selecting FGS e-uipment )ecomes more complicated. =ne key issue is the limited selection of logic0sol*ing de*ices certified under .F2" :4 that are capa)le of meeting the higher S!< performance criteria. 1he traditional fire panel has a failure rate of >.:70%( per hour, ,hich results in a pro)a)ility of failure on demand (2F;) of 4.>70%4 at annual testing. 1his 2F; is consistent ,ith a S!< & le*el of performance. ?ou ,ill need -uarterly testing to achie*e S!< 4 performance, and e*en monthly testing is insufficient to achie*e S!< @. "dditionally, certification of traditional fire panels has not occurred under !7C(&>%#, making their use in todayAs en*ironment e*en less likely. 2rogramma)le logic sol*ers certified under !7C(&>%# and .F2" :4 are a*aila)le, )ut the current selection is e+tremely limited. "nother area of conflict is the S#$ (and !7C) re-uirement for periodic functional testing and some of the currently a*aila)le fire suppression and mitigation e-uipment. S#$ states, 3periodic functional tests shall )e conducted . . . including the sensor(s), the logic sol*er, and the final element(s).3 1here are a num)er of fire0fighting systems that are not compati)le ,ith regular testing, including foam, car)on dio+ide, F94%%, 8alon, dry chemical agents, and e*en some ,ater applications. " num)er of the agents are in canisters e-uipped ,ith a *al*e that opens ,hen a demand hits the fire0mitigation system. ?ou cannot test the *al*e, ho,e*er, ,ithout releasing the contents of the container. !f the contents release, you ,ould need to replace them. ?ou cannot test other systems )ecause, although reusa)le, e+posure to the fire0fighting agents ,ould damage the process or computing e-uipment in the area. 1he codes addressing the design of such e-uipment are prescripti*e in nature, and hence lea*e little room for modification. .F2"04%%&0&( re-uires a *isual inspection of the canisters on a fi*e0year schedule and states in paragraph $0&.& that 3discharge tests are not re-uired.3 !n order for the treatment of fire and gas systems to )e compati)le ,ith that of S!Ss, there ,ill need to )e an update of the codes dictating the design of fire suppression and mitigation e-uipment. !mplementing an FGS that is compliant ,ith S#$ and .F2":4 can )e -uite difficult, and yet most specifications re-uest )oth standards. 9any are concerned that there is a disparity )et,een the e+pectations of the o,ner/operator and the systems actually pro*ided. 1he FGS specifications often identify S#$ as a design standard, )ut fail to pro*ide sufficient definition of the S!F to support proper design and e*aluation. 1here are three options for the )oundaries ,hen follo,ing the re-uirement for S#$ compliance. =ption & B,hich only includes the logic sol*erBrepresents ,hat suppliers are likely to pro*ide. 1he pro*ision of an FGS logic sol*er that complies ,ith the target S!< does not ensure that the S!F ,ill meet the target. =ption 4 includes FGS detection, the FGS, and S!S logic sol*ers and process output actions. !t is possi)le to pro*ide a system ,ith these )oundaries that meets the re-uirements of the standards and complies ,ith a target S!<; ho,e*er, FGS *endors rarely ha*e the kno,ledge and skills re-uired to

design and e*aluate such a system. =ption @, ,hich includes all the elements of the FGS, detection, logic sol*ers, process outputs, and FGS outputs, is generally not possi)le to pro*ide gi*en the ina)ility to test the releasing system, as pre*iously discussed. 1he ,orst situation, and that ,hich is the most likely to e+ist, is the o,ner/operators )elie*e that they are re-uesting and recei*ing option @, and the suppliers are pro*iding option &.

Standing alone

SIS and !S standards de"eloped in isolation

Matter of interpretation
Consider the e+ample of an FGS specification that re-uests a S!< 4 system to detect fire in a compressor0control )uilding using thermal rate0of0rise detectors and, *ia a standard fire panel, lights a stro)e to the S!S logic sol*er that shuts do,n the motor0dri*en compressor. ;epending upon the supplierAs interpretation of the re-uest, the supplier could pro*ide a num)er of different system configurations at the door. =ption &5 1his option only contains the fire panel. "s pre*iously stated, the traditional fire panel has a failure rate of >.:70%( per hour, re-uiring -uarterly testing to achie*e S!< 4 performance. =ption 45 1his option includes thermal detection, the fire panel, the S!S logic sol*er, and compressor motor shutdo,n. 1he fault tree illustrates the logic model of the )ase0case system. Csing pu)lished failure0rate data for the system components and annual testing, the system only achie*es S!< &Dle*el performance. Euarterly testing impro*es the performance of the system to S!< 4 ,ith a 2F; of #.>$70 %@, or a safety a*aila)ility of ''.&>F.

=ption @5 1his option addresses the entire system, including the gaseous clean0agent (.F2" 4%%&) release. !n order to suppress a fire successfully, officials calculated the release of at least t,o clean0agent )ottles. !f it is not possi)le to test the entire system, as pre*iously discussed, then you can utilize a fi*e0 year replacement schedule. !t ,as impossi)le for the )ase case of Gust t,o )ottles to meet S!< 4. When testing monthly, the system safety a*aila)ility ,as appro+imately >%F. !f one maintains the fi*e0year replacement philosophy and considers monthly testing of the system, then a )ank of se*en )ottles ,ould )e re-uired to pro*ide S!< 4 performance (2F; H #.&(70%@). !f a one0year replacement philosophy ,ere instituted, then a )ank of four )ottles ,ould )e re-uired to achie*e S!< 4 performance (2F; H $.:(70 %@). 1he follo,ing data, o)tained from =I7;"0'4 and !777>%%, ,as used in the analysis5 clean0agent release, #70%( per hour; fire and gas panel, >.:70%( per hour; control relay, &.((70%: per hour; 9CC relay, >.%70%# per hour; thermal detector, &.%&70%( per hour. 1he relationship )et,een the FGS and the S!S standards is some,hat am)iguous, )ut if they come from the same perspecti*e as process S!Fs you can de*elop a logical, repeata)le approach. Where the FGS initiates actions critical to safety and pro*ides re-uired risk reduction, the S#$ 3e+clusion3 is inapplica)le and you should apply all the S!S re-uirements. 1herefore, it is important that those in*ol*ed ,ith an FGS are educated in the scope, terminology, and re-uirements of the S!S standards to ensure that those pro*iding e-uipment meet the e+pectations of those purchasing it. "s understanding impro*es and the FGS specifications are ,ritten and interpreted to reflect the true re-uirements of the o,ner/operator, the areas of the .F2" code conflicting ,ith the a)ility to pro*ide an FGS that also ser*es as a portion of S!S ,ill )e apparent. !t ,ill then )e possi)le for the standards and the e-uipment to e*ol*e in a ,ay that supports the common o)Gecti*es to pro*ide an FGS that ade-uately protects the pu)lic, personnel, and facilities. ST

Behind the byline

#imberly $% &e'mek, 2.7., C.F.S.7. is a senior engineer at aker 7ngineering and Iisk Consultants in Stafford, 1e+as. Richard Skone is a systems )usiness de*elopment manager at ;etector 7lectronics in 8ouston.

Fixed-point infrared gas monitors

0 May !00"

#hat e$ery engineer should %no&

;etecting com)usti)le gas leaks sa*es li*es and property, )ut )ecause the economic *alue of gas monitoring e-uipment is hard to -uantify, engineers need to do more ,ith less. Compliance officers re-uire relia)ility and adherence to safety mandates. !nfrared gas detectors are an ans,er in many situations. Com)ustion re-uires three elements5 o+ygen (air), fuel (com)usti)le gas or *apor), and a source of ignition. For com)ustion to occur, fuel needs to mi+ in proper proportion ,ith o+ygen. Com)usti)le gas0 air mi+tures can )urn or e+plode o*er a range of concentrations. "n ignition source ,ill cause an e+plosion or flame front propagation o*er a specific minimum concentration for each gas. 1his minimum concentration is the lo,er e+plosi*e limit (<7<) or lo,er flamma)le limit (<F<). Com)usti)le gases also ha*e an upper e+plosi*e limit (C7<). When the concentration of com)usti)le gas goes a)o*e that limit, there is not enough o+ygen to support an e+plosion or flame. 1he <7< and the C7< are different for each com)usti)le gas. For most com)usti)le hydrocar)ons, this minimum

concentration is )et,een %.>F and &>F )y *olume in air. For e+ample, the <7< for methane is >F gas )y *olume, and the C7< is &>F )y *olume. 2entaneAs <7< is &.>F )y *olume, and the C7< is :.#F )y *olume, so its e+plosi*e range is e*en narro,er.

'etecting combustible gases

When you use infrared to detect com)usti)le gases (selecti*e a)sorption of infrared), you ,ill find one of its primary )enefits can also )e one of its pro)lems. " catalytic sensor can detect all com)usti)le gases; ho,e*er, most infrared de*ices can only detect the gas they ,ere designed to detect. !n most cases this is methane and a fe, other gases that happen to share the a)sorption ,a*elength )and. 1he only ,ays to sol*e this pro)lem are to use multiple detectors in a de*ice or to use multiple de*icesB each intended to detect a particular gas. !n addition, manufacturers choose a filter that ,orks )est ,ith methane, )ut they often canAt see other com)usti)le gases, such as the aromatic compounds )enzene and toluene. 8ere is another pro)lem ,ith single0gas infrared sensors5 once you set them to see one gas, they can significantly misinterpret other com)usti)le gases. Cnlike catalytic sensors, the response of infrared sensors is far from linear; the soft,are must interpret the cur*e )ased on the gas it is e+pecting. !f it sees another gas, the a)sorption cur*e of that other gas can )e (and usually is) *ery different, leading to readings that can )e more than @%%F off from ,hat they should )e. For fi+ed0point detectors, you can engineer the ideal path length into the product. For instance, ,ith methane detectors designed to detect &%%F <7<, the ideal path length ,ould )e )et,een $ and : inches. 8o,e*er, for open path products, the larger path lengths used often mean the product is flooded ,ell )efore reaching &%%F <7<. With a path of > feet, an infrared detector might not )e a)le to detect more than &%F <7< of methane )efore flooding, assuming a constant methane/air concentration e*ery,here )et,een the light source and the light recei*er. 1he en*ironment can compound this pro)lem during hot, humid conditions ,hen ,ater *apor a)sor)s much of the light.

=pen path detectors can see sources of infrared other than the one the manufacturer chooses. Solar radiation, hydrocar)on flames, e*en flash)ul)s produce )road0spectrum infrared radiation, ,hich could trick the detector, unless designers pro*ide countermeasures in the design. When choosing an infrared gas monitor, deal directly ,ith a manufacturer rather than ,ith a company rela)eling another companyAs product. !nfrared sensors are comple+, and if there e*er is a pro)lem, it may )e easier to sol*e directly ,ith the manufacturer. e sure the production and repair are in your country. 1rying to ship a defecti*e product across an international )order can )e e+pensi*e. Choose a sensor appro*ed )y Factory 9utual (F9) "ppro*als and )y Canadian Standards "ssociation (CS"). Choosing manufacturers ,ho ha*e )oth certifications ,ill assure the detectors are professionally made. "nd you ,ill kno, independent sources ha*e *erified their performance and o,nerAs manual claims. CS" and F9 "ppro*als audit the manufacturers they appro*e at least once a year.

Behind the byline

!erald (% $nderson is chair of the "S19 <eak 1esting Committee, a mem)er of the C.S. 1echnical "d*isory Group on .;1, and chief e+ecuti*e officer of ;elphian Corp.