Tulsa Law Review

Volume 49
Issue 2 Book Review
Article 21
Winter 2013
Boilerplate, Freedom of Contract, and Democratic
Degradation
Brian H. Bix
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Recommended Citation
Brian H. Bix, Boilerplate, Freedom of Contract, and Democratic Degradation, 49 Tulsa L. Rev. 501 (2013).
Available at: htp://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss2/21

Su1
!"#$%&'$()%* ,&%%-". ", /"0)&(/)*
(0- 1-%."/&()#/ -%2&(-()#"03
Biian B. Bix *
NARuARET }ANE RABIN, B0ILERPLATE: TBE FINE PRINT, vANISBINu RIuBTS, ANB TBE
R0LE 0F LAW (2u12). Pp. S6u. Baiucovei $SS.uu.
INTR0B0CTI0N
In Naigaiet }ane Rauin's piovocative new book, !"#$%&'$()%* ,-% .#/% 0&#/)1
2(/#3-#/4 5#4-)31 (/6 )-% 57$% "8 9(:,
1
the authoi offeis scathing obseivations ie-
gaiuing the motivation anu effects of the teims placeu in consumei anu employee
foim contiacts anu on-line agieements. She aigues that the cuiient contiacting
piactices make a mockeiy of consent, anu unueimine the iule of law.
2
!"#$%&'$()%'s
essential claim is that foi many contiacting paities, fieeuom of contiact is less an
iueal than a sham.
S
The book piopeily ciiticizes theoiies of contiact law (anu
couises in contiact law) that laigely ignoie boileiplate anu its pioblems uespite the
peivasiveness of such teims in mouein contiacting piactice.
4
In the piocess of mak-
ing hei aigument, Rauin offeis an impiessive toui acioss mouein contiacting piac-
tices, Contiact Law uoctiine, Contiact Law theoiy, political theoiy, anu populist au-
vocacy. !"#$%&'$()% is a book fiom which all ieaueis coulu benefit, whethei oi not
they ultimately agiee with eveiy one of the authoi's analyses anu conclusions.
As is the noim in these soits of ieviews, I will tieat most of the impoitant pos-
itive aspects of the book as given, summaiizing anu uiscussing them only biiefly,
while focusing on some uoubts anu ciiticisms, even if these aie minoi ielative to the

* Fieueiick W. Thomas Piofessoi of Law anu Philosophy, 0niveisity of Ninnesota. A shoit poition
of this ieview appeaieu, in mouifieu foim, as pait of a Nay 2u1S Symposium on !"#$%&'$()% at Contiact
Piofs Blog, http:lawpiofessois.typepau.comcontiactspiof_blog2u1SuSboileiplate-symposium-vi-
biian-bix-on-uemociatic-uegiauation.html. I am giateful foi the authoi's iesponse to my posting that
occuiieu as pait of the Symposium:
http:lawpiofessois.typepau.comcontiactspiof_blog2u1SuSboileiplate-symposium-x-b-piofessoi-
iauin-iesponus-to-week-ii.html, anu also foi the excellent woik of the euitois of the ,7$3( 9(: 5%;#%:.
1. NARuARET }ANE RABIN, B0ILERPLATE: TBE FINE PRINT, vANISBINu RIuBTS, ANB TBE R0LE 0F LAW (2u1S).
2. As pait of hei shaip ciitique of the complete oi ielative absence of consent by those ieceiving
these stanuaiu anu on-line teims, Rauin uiges that such teims anu the legal ties that aiise fiom them not
be calleu "contiactual." <%% #6= at 242. While I unueistanu anu appieciate the analytical anu ihetoiical
motivation foi that move, I will not be following it in this ieview.
S. RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at 7-9.
4. I iaise a similai objection in BRIAN B. BIX, C0NTRACT LAW: R0LES, TBE0RY, ANB C0NTEXT 128-46
(2u12) |heieinaftei BIX, C0NTRACT LAWj. Foi an excellent uiscussion of Rauin's point iegaiuing the con-
nection between contiacting piactices anu contiact theoiy, see Robin Kai, ,-% >-($$%/4% "8 !"#$%&'$()%,
}0RISPR0BENCE }0TWELL, Sept. S, 2u1S, http:juiis.jotwell.comthe-challenge-of-boileiplate.
1
Bix: Boilerplate, Freedom of Contract, and Democratic Degradation
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oveiall meiits of the woik. In paiticulai, this ieview will iaise questions iegaiuing
whethei some of !"#$%&'$()%D3 accusations aie oveistateu in ways that uistoit the
analysis offeieu.
Pait I looks at the issue of "boileiplate" (a teim Rauin anu otheis
S
use as a
bioau teim to iefei to piovisions placeu by venuois into stanuaiu foim contiacts
anu pioviueu thiough vaiious foims of contiacting; I will follow this usage) anu
how it affects issues of fieeuom of contiact anu consent. Pait II biiefly consiueis
Rauin's accusation that boileiplate unueimines the iule of law anu uemociatic legit-
imacy. Pait III consiueis some possible iesponses to the pioblem of boileiplate, in-
cluuing toit iemeuies anu auministiative iegulation.
I. B0ILERPLATE, C0NSENT, ANB FREEB0N 0F C0NTRACT
What uoes it mean to have fieeuom of contiact, anu its coiollaiy, "fieeuom
fiom contiact."
6
The geneial notion of the iuea (oi iueal) is well-enough unuei-
stoou: that in contiact law, unlike most othei aieas of law, the iights anu uuties we
have ueiive fiom oui own choices iathei than being imposeu upon us. This aspect
of contiact law ties that social piactice (anu the ielateu piactice of piomising)
7
to
the iueal of autonomy; that is, self-goveinance. The ability to entei enfoiceable con-
tiacts, anu to choose the teims, also enhances autonomy anu libeity by encouiaging
coopeiation that will help paities achieve inuiviuual anu shaieu objectives. Theie
aie well-known limits to the extent to which fieeuom of contiact shoulu be, oi is,
ieflecteu in contiact law: e.g., the neeu foi objective stanuaius of foimation (anu
mouifieu objective stanuaius of inteipietation foi contiactual teims) entails that
theie will be occasions when paities will be bounu by contiacts anu contiactual
teims that vaiy fiom those to which the paities subjectively thought they weie
committing.
8

The question is whethei cuiient contiacting piactices iaise auuitional anu
moie cential challenges to the iuea of fieeuom of contiact.
9
Touay, foi most people,
most of the time, contiacting piactice is a mattei of stanuaiu foim contiacts, small
piint teims, teims pioviueu on websites (wheie, commonly, one must click a box to
expiess assent, though sometimes the teims aie simply posteu without any expies-
sion of assent being iequesteu oi iequiieu), anu teims inseiteu in the containeis of
goous, which cannot be seen until aftei the puichase. Anu it has been wiuely
acknowleugeu that almost no one ieaus these teims (neithei the paities that ie-
ceive the teims, noi the paities that supply them), anu that even if one weie to ieau

S. <%%1 %=4., B0ILERPLATE: TBE F00NBATI0N 0F NARKET C0NTRACTS (0mii Ben-Shahai eu., 2uu7).
6. <%% 0mii Ben-Shahai, ."&%:"&6* .&%%6"E .&"E >"/)&(F), 2uu4 WISC. L. REv. 261 (2uu4).
7. The connection between a contiact anu a piomise iemains a contioveisial aiea. <%%1 %=4=, Nichael
u. Piatt, 0&"E#3%31 >"/)&(F)3 (/6 2"$7/)(&G HI$#4()#"/3, 26 L. & PBIL. SS1 (2uu7); 3%% ($3" Seana valentine
Shiffiin, ,-% J#;%&4%/F% "8 >"/)&(F) (/6 0&"E#3%, 12u BARv. L. REv. 7u8, 719-29 (2uu7).
8. >8= uRANT uILN0RE, TBE BEATB 0F C0NTRACT 4S-49 (Ronalu K. L. Collins eu., 199S) (uesciibing the
iise of the objective appioach); 3%% ($3" }oseph N. Peiillo, ,-% H&#4#/3 "8 )-% HIK%F)#;% ,-%"&G "8 >"/)&(F)
."&E()#"/ (/6 C/)%&'&%)()#"/, 69 F0RBBAN L. REv. 427 (2uuu).
9. Rauin woulu ieject iefeience to "fieeuom of contiact" in iefeience to iegulating boileiplate, foi
much the same ieason that she piefeis not to call such teims "contiactual." <%% RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at
242. 0nce again, I will not be following hei example in this ieview.
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2u1Sj !HC9B509@,B SuS
the teims, one woulu be unlikely to unueistanu theii significance (especially if one
lackeu legal tiaining, but even lawyeis might be haiu-piesseu to fully unueistanu
many of these teims).
1u
Theie is little sense of the autonomy iueal heie: paities aie
fiequently ignoiant that theie aie in fact teims, anu almost always unceitain as to
theii meaning anu significance. 0ne can haiuly speak of such paities as having F-"L
3%/ theii contiactual iights anu uuties.
The conceins ielating to mouein contiacting piactices extenu fai beyonu is-
sues of foimation (many paities being unawaie that theie even is a contiact, oi
awaie that theie aie teims that apply beyonu the simple exchange of money foi the
goou oi seivice). The substance of the teims founu in these stanuaiu foims, click-
thiough agieements, biowse-wiap agieements, teims in the box, etc., incluue sig-
nificant limitations of liability, waiveis of waiianties, assent to manuatoiy aibitia-
tion, waiveis of the iight to biing claims in class actions, inuemnification clauses,
holu-haimless clauses, anu waiveis of othei substantive anu pioceuuial iights. 0ne
neeu not seaich all that haiu to finu outiageously one-siueu piovisionsso outia-
geous that couits iefuse enfoicement when the piovisions come to theii attention.
11

Companies that pioviue such piovisions may know well in auvance that theii piovi-
sions aie unenfoiceable, but assume that they have little to lose in such oveiieach-
ing, anu much to gain, if consumeis, employees, oi othei contiacting paities aie
peisuaueu oi intimiuateu by such teims into not piessing valiu claims.
At the same time, it shoulu be noteu that fieeuom of contiact seems peifectly
consistent with the use of uiffeient kinus of foims oi othei ways foi piesenting
teims, anu it has always been vieweu as consistent with some substantive limits on
the enfoiceability of teims. In a sense, fieeuom of contiact is as alive as it has evei
been. In iegaiu to the pioblems Rauin inuicates, someone might aigue that if people
uo not want to be bounu by the teims on the "click-thiough" scieen, oi the insui-
ance policy, oi the many pages of the apaitment lease oi cell phone usei agieement,
they neeu only iefiain fiom enteiing agieements with those venuois in the fiist
place. Inuiviuuals aie subject to those obligations because, anu only because, they
chose to accept them. 0n the othei hanu, foi most of us it is neithei easy noi piu-
uent to go without cell phone seivice, insuiance, up-to-uate softwaie, an apaitment,
anu so on. 0nce one chooses to have the goous oi seivices in question, one often

1u. <%%1 %=4.1 }ean Biauchei, @E%/6%6 @&)#F$% M (/6 )-% J%F#3#"/ )" ,&73) )-% >"7&)3* ,-% >(3% @4(#/3)
B/8"&F#/4 J%$(G%6 N(33LN(&O%) ,%&E31 B3'%F#($$G 8"& <"8):(&%1 2uu4 WIS. L. REv. 7SS, 7S7-S8 (2uu4)
(summaiizing the substantive anu pioceuuial faiiness pioblems with boileiplate teims). As 0mii Ben-
Shahai points out iegaiuing the inuiviuual paity's knowleuge anu consent, the alteinative to boileiplate
may be no bettei: without expiess contiactual teims on the subjects, questions about peifoimance,
bieach, iemeuies, anu so on, woulu be coveieu by the uefault uoctiinal iules, which aie likely no bettei
known to the contiacting paities anu equally uifficult to unueistanu (especially, though not exclusively,
foi those not legally tiaineu). 0mii Ben-Shahai, 5%47$()#"/ ,-&"74- !"#$%&'$()%* @/ @'"$"4#( (book ie-
view) |heieinaftei, Ben-Shahai, 5%47$()#"/j, (;(#$(I$% ()
http:papeis.ssin.comsolSpapeis.cfm.abstiact_iu=22SS161; 3%% ($3" Ranuy E. Bainett, >"/3%/)#/4 )"
."&E >"/)&(F)3, 71 F0RBBAN L. REv. 627, 644 (2uu2) ("|ijn assessing the enfoiceability of foim contiacts,
we must nevei foiget that contiact law is itself one big foim contiact that goes unieau by most paities
most of the time").
11. <%%1 %=4=, Booteis of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 17S F.Su 9SS (4th Cii. 1999) (iefusing to enfoice extieme-
ly one-siueu aibitiation piovision). Rauin also iecites some examples of egiegious language. RABIN, 37'&(
note 1, at xiv-xvi, 12-1S, 29-Su, 111-19.
3
Bix: Boilerplate, Freedom of Contract, and Democratic Degradation
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Su4 ,?9<@ 9@A 5B2CBA |vol. 49:Su1
uiscoveis that theie is no effective choice iegaiuing the teims.
12

Fieeuom of contiact is connecteu with the iueas of consent anu choice. We
consent in the fullest sense of that teim when we choose among ieasonable alteina-
tives; have full knowleuge of those alteinatives; anu oui choice is not uistoiteu by
coeicion, manipulation, oi misiepiesentation. Foi the ieasons alieauy alluueu to,
theie is little uoubt that with the vast majoiity of contiacts enteieu into touay (es-
pecially when consiueiing consumeis anu employees), one woulu not speak of the
paities as having consenteu to the teims of the agieement in the fullest sense of
"consent."
1S
Paities may not know that theii actions have subjecteu them to (fui-
thei) teims, they have not ieau oi uo not unueistanu the contiactual piovisions,
anu the unifoimity of teims acioss an inuustiy that supplies impoitant goous oi
seivices means that paities may have no ieasonable means to avoiu being subjecteu
to paiticulai teims.
Like the weathei, boileiplate seems to be something consumeis anu acauem-
ics like to talk about, but no one uoes anything about. In eailiei aiticleswiuely
ieau by acauemics, but seemingly having little effect on juuges anu lawmakeis
Fiieuiich Kesslei,
14
W. Baviu Slawson,
1S
anu Touu Rakoff,
16
among otheis, aigueu
foi a iauical uoctiinal iesponse to the pioblem of stanuaiu foims anu boileiplate,
involving the non-enfoicement oi significant iegulation of those soits of piovisions.
Aithui Allen Leff aigueu that contiacts shoulu be tieateu like things: that the com-
bination of the goous being solu oi the seivices being offeieu, combineu with the
contiactual teims mouifying iights, shoulu collectively be seen as piouucts to be
goveineu by piouuct liability oi similai iegulation.
17
Leff's suggestions have hau as
little effect outsiue the acauemy as have those of Kesslei, Slawson, anu Rakoff. By
contiast, Kail Llewellyn
18
anu Ranuy Bainett
19
aigueu that boileiplate piovisions
shoulu be laigely enfoiceable, on the basis that the othei paity has given "blanket"
oi geneial assent to all "not unieasonable" teims in foim contiacts. The Llewellyn
anu Bainett positions moie closely uesciibe what couits have uone foi uecaues, anu
what they continue to uo, when faceu with stanuaiu foims anu othei types of boil-
eiplate piovisions.

12. Examples incluue all the insuiance company policies anu all the cell phone seivice agieements
incluuing the same waiveis of iights. Rauin makes similai points. RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at S9-41.
1S. I uiscuss the mattei at gieatei length in Biian B. Bix, >"/)&(F)3, #/ TBE ETBICS 0F C0NSENT: TBE0RY
ANB PRACTICE 2S1-67 (Fianklin u. Nillei & Alan Weitheimei eus., 2u1u). Rauin uiscusses that aiticle
biiefly. RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at 96-97. I uo not agiee with the way !"#$%&'$()% chaiacteiizes my views in
that aiticle, but I will spaie ieaueis the uetails of this exegetical squabble.
14. Fiieuiich Kesslei, >"/)&(F)3 "8 @6-%3#"/L<"E% ,-"74-)3 @I"7) .&%%6"E "8 >"/)&(F), 4S C0L0N. L.
REv. 629 (194S).
1S. W. Baviu Slawson, <)(/6(&6 ."&E >"/)&(F)3 (/6 J%E"F&()#F >"/)&"$ "8 9(:E(O#/4 0":%&, 84
BARv. L. REv. S29 (1971).
16. Touu B. Rakoff, >"/)&(F)3 "8 @6-%3#"/* @/ B33(G #/ 5%F"/3)&7F)#"/, 96 BARv. L. REv. 1174 (198S).
17. Aithui Allen Leff, >"/)&(F) (3 ,-#/4, 19 AN. 0. L. REv. 1S1 (197u).
18. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, TBE C0NN0N LAW TRABITI0N: BECIBINu APPEALS S7u (196u) (aiguing that while
theie is not tiue assent to boileiplate clauses anu only tiue assent to a few uickeieu teims to the bioau
type of tiansaction, theie is "blanket assent" to all not unieasonable teims); 3%% ($3" RABIN, 37'&( note 1,
at 82-8S (uiscussing Llewellyn's views).
19. Bainett, 37'&( note 1u. Bainett's analogy is to a peison assenting to whatevei is wiitten on a
piece of papei in a closeu envelope. <%% #6= at 6S7-4S; 3%% also RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at 84-8S (uiscussing
Bainett's views).
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2u1Sj !HC9B509@,B SuS
Rauin, in !"#$%&'$()%, ietuins to this battlefielu, taking up the iauical cause foi
substantial iegulation oi significant non-enfoicement. She aigues against the 3)()73
P7": the geneial piesumption of enfoicement, anu the (often unstateu) assumption
among juuges, lawmakeis, anu many acauemics that some combination of maiket
foices anu ieputational sanctions will woik to uetei oppiessively one-siueu
teims.
2u
Rauin uoubts the effects of maikets anu social noims, anu questions the
apologists who state that one-siueu teims aie equateu with a gieatei supply oi
cheapei cost foi the goous anu seivices with which boileiplate teims aie associat-
eu.
21
Rauin also auopts something like Leff's suggestion that contiacts be tieateu
like piouucts, wheie theie woulu be iemeuies foi "uefective" contiacts that cause
haim.
22
Auuitionally, she offeis an aigument similai to Slawson's that foim con-
tiacts aie like piivate legislationan impiopei uelegation of public powei that
iaises iule of law conceins.
2S

Rauin expiesses concein about the lack of substantial consent by consumeis
to boileiplate teims cieateu by laige businesses, anu she is outiageu by the use of
boileiplate piovisions to ciicumvent the substantive iights anu iemeuies consum-
eis, employees, anu othei contiacting paities woulu otheiwise have.
24
Rauin's ulti-
mate conclusions aie haish: boileiplate piovisions aie contiaiy to the basic piinci-
ples of contiact law, contiaiy to basic piinciples of the iule of law, anu uestiuctive
of the public-piivate uistinction neeueu to legitimate piivate oiueiing.
2S

When thinking about contiact law, consent, fieeuom of contiact, etc., it is im-
poitant to uistinguish thiee sepaiate conceins that Rauin uiscusses: (1) contiacts
which contain teims in which one paity waives substantive oi pioceuuial iights
that the paity woulu otheiwise have; (2) the piesentation of those waiveis in uiffi-
cult legal language, often in small piint, as pait of a long legal uocument full of simi-
lai piovisions; anu (S) such teims being piesenteu within packaging that is ie-
ceiveu aftei the piouuct is paiu foi, oi on a web site that the paity seeking the goous
oi seivices may ieasonably fail to notice.
26

As foi the waivei of iights, it shoulu be iemembeieu that one aspect of fiee-
uom of contiact, oi at least a cential aspect of contiact law that is analogous to
fieeuom of contiact, is the iuea that paities shoulu be able, at the time a contiact is
enteieu, to choose to limit oi otheiwise altei theii liability foi bieach of contiact.
27

Paities neeu this powei in oiuei to ueteimine whethei to entei an agieement at all,
oi the teims (especially the piice teims) on which they will entei an agieement.

2u. RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at 189.
21. C6. at S1-S2.
22. <%% #6= at 2S, 197-21S; Leff, 37'&( note 17.
2S. <%% RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at SS-S1; Slawson, 37'&( note 1S, at SSu.
24. The ability of venuois to iemove consumeis' iights has been enhanceu substantially by the 0niteu
States Supieme Couit's iobust ieauing in iecent yeais of the Feueial Aibitiation Act ("FAA"). 9 0.S.C.
1-14 (2uu8). <%%1 %=4=, Am. Exp Co. v. Italian Colois Rest., 1SS S. Ct. 2Su4, 2S12 (2u1S); AT&T Nobility,
L.L.C. v. Concepcion1 1S1 S. Ct. 174u (2u11); Rent-A-Centei, West, Inc. v. }ackson, 1Su S. Ct. 2772, 2776
(2u1u); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Caiuegna, S46 0.S. 44u, 449 (2uu6). The topic of the FAA will be
consiueieu in gieatei uetail in Pait II.
2S. <%%1 %=4=, RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at SS-S9, 17S-74.
26. <%% #6= at 1u-12 (giving examples of uiffeient kinus of contiacts iaising these conceins).
27. <%% Baibaia Fiieu, A-()D3 N"&($#)G Q") )" J" A#)- C)R, 12u BARv. L. REv. F. SS, S4 (2uu7).
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Thus, in the famous case of S(6$%G ;= !(T%/6($%,
28
the couit helu that if a contiacting
paity was not infoimeu, at the time the contiact was enteieu, about uamages poten-
tially much highei than that paity woulu ieasonably expect, then those highei lev-
els of uamages woulu not be iecoveiable.
29
Fieeuom of contiactoi just "con-
tiact"is at its essence about the ability of paities to set the teims of theii
inteiactions, at least within bioau bounuaiies.
venuois will aigue that theii clauses limiting consequential uamages, piefei-
iing aibitiation (anu no class action aibitiation) to a iight to litigate, anu selecting a
foium convenient to the venuoi, etc., aie all about ieuucing costs oi potential costs
to the venuoi, allowing venuois to offei lowei piices on goous, oi, foi employeis,
moie hiiing, oi hiiing on bettei teims. Rauin iesponus that, at best, theie is no evi-
uence that the limitation anu waivei of teims in fact iesults in lowei costs foi goous
oi highei wages foi employees; the suspicion is that the iesult is meiely moie mon-
ey foi laige coipoiations.
Su
In any event, Rauin aigues, it is both unseemly anu con-
tiaiy to uemociatic piinciples foi consumeis anu employees to be coineieu into
selling off all theii substantive anu pioceuuial iights foi a hanuful of nickels.
S1

I think Rauin is basically coiiect on the essence of the chaige in !"#$%&'$()%:
that it is a sham to speak about consumeis anu employees (anu fianchisees anu
otheis) "consenting"in any iobust sense of that teimto the piovisions which
stiip them of theii iights anu impose one-siueu piovisions on them.
S2
Rauin coi-
iectly states that tiansactions involving boileiplate teims "aie veiy fai fiom the
tiauitional notion of a contiact, the iuea of baigaineu exchange by fiee choice."
SS
It
is likely, howevei, an oveistatement (though peihaps not a vast oveistatement)
when Rauin iepoits that mouein contiacting has leu to:

|Aj piocess of uevolution oi uecay of the concept of voluntaiiness. .
. . |wheiej consent is uegiaueu to assent, then to fictional oi con-
stiuctive oi hypothetical assent, anu then fuithei to meie notice . . .
until finally we aie left with only a fictional oi constiuctive notice
of teims.
S4


When Rauin aigues that boileiplate piovisions shoulu not "be consiueieu con-
tiactual,"
SS
it has the ihetoiical anu paiauoxical foice of "piopeity is theft"
S6
oi "an
unjust law is not a law."
S7
As to the lattei, the aigument is that an unjust law is not

28. Bauley v. Baxenuale, 9 Ex. S41 (18S4).
29. This has become known as the test of "S(6$%G foieseeability"whethei uamages weie "ieasona-
bly foieseeable" at the time the contiact was enteieu into.
Su. RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at S1.
S1. <%% #6= at S2.
S2. <%% #6= at S1.
SS. <%% #6= at 12.
S4. C6= at Su.
SS. C6= at 14.
S6. This quotation is associateu with anaichism in geneial anu the wiitei Pieiie-}oseph Piouuhon in
paiticulai. <%%1 %=4=, PIERRE-}0SEPB PR00BB0N, PR0PERTY IS TBEFT!: A PIERRE-}0SEPB PR00BB0N REABER (Iain
NcKay eu., 2u11).
S7. <%% Noiman Kietzmann, 9%T C/#73)( U"/ B3) 9%T* 9(:3 "/ ,&#($ #/ @P7#/(3D >"7&) "8 >"/3F#%/F%, SS

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2u1Sj !HC9B509@,B Su7
"law" in its fullest sense (cieating moial obligations to obey). Similaily, one might
aigue, a tiansaction in which one siue may not know that theie aie teims, uoes not
unueistanu the teims, anu is in no position to finu oi negotiate foi uiffeient teims,
is not a "contiact" in the fullest sense of the woiu.
In !"#$%&'$()%, Rauin quotes some extieme one-siueu piovisions anu notes
that some of these piovisions, anu claims of tacit agieement, woulu not holu up in
couit, but comments that this just shows the biazen ovei-ieaching of the businesses
that pioviue these teims.
S8
As eailiei noteu, these businesses iisk littleat best
(fiom the businesses' peispective), consumeis anu employees will be convinceu by
the one-siueu teims; at woist, the unenfoiceable teims will not be enfoiceu, but the
companies will otheiwise face no sanction foi theii oveiieaching.
S9
At the same
time, it may be authoiial oveiieaching to inuict businesses geneially on the basis of
the most extieme language useu by only a hanuful of companies, especially when it
is conceueu that such language is not enfoiceable.
Whatevei the conceins iegaiuing boileiplate piovisionsanu they aie
manythe question that must be kept in minu is: What aie the alteinatives. Woulu
gieatei effoits to biing teims to the attentions of consumeis cieate fiustiating ue-
lays.
4u
oi, foi that mattei, woulu theie be even minimal uisceinible effect.
41
Naybe
we aie all in such a huiiy to puichase oi uownloau fiom the Inteinet that piioi uis-
closuie of teims (even in cleaiei language) woulu not uetei us fiom acting in haste,
anu then iegietting in leisuie.
What if consumeis anu employees hau a choice: foi a consumei, wheie the
goous eithei came with waiveis of iights but a lowei piice, oi with no waiveis anu a
highei piice; foi an employee, wheie waiveis of iights might come with a lowei sal-
aiy. The limiteu eviuence inuicates that much moie often than not, consumeis anu
employees woulu take the economic benefit now iathei than the gieatei iights lat-
ei.
42

Rauin points out that some of these choices might be explicable thiough the
now well-known obseivations about oui "bounueu iationality."
4S
Buman beings
tenu to unuei-estimate the likelihoou of some types of events anu ovei-estimate the
likelihoou of othei typesto value moie highly an object oi entitlement when we

AN. }. }0RIS. 99, 1u1 (1988).
S8. <%% RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at 29-Su.
S9. <%% #6= at 1S.
4u. <%%1 %=4=, Bill v. uateway 2uuu, Inc., 1uS F.Su 1147, 1149 (7th Cii. 1997) (iequiiing uisclosuie pii-
oi to puichase woulu be impiactical anu seive little puipose); PioCB, Inc. v. Zeiuenbeig, 86 F.Su 1447,
14S2 (7th Cii. 1996) (suggesting that a iequiiement foi piioi uisclosuie of teims "woulu uiive piices
thiough the ceiling oi ietuin tiansactions to the hoise-anu-buggy age.").
41. <%% 0mii Ben-Shahai & Cail E. Schneiuei, ,-% .(#$7&% "8 N(/6()%6 J#3F$"37&%, 1S9 0. PA. L. REv.
647, 649-S1 (2u11) (uiscussing pioblems with manuateu uisclosuies acioss many aieas); I7) F8= Robeit
A. Billman, H/$#/% !"#$%&'$()%* A"7$6 N(/6()"&G A%I <#)% J#3F$"37&% "8 %L<)(/6(&6 ,%&E3 !(FO8#&%R, #/
B0ILERPLATE, 37'&( note S, at 94 (aumitting that uisclosuie can have minimal oi even countei-piouuctive
effects in the shoit teim, but can nonetheless have positive effects ovei the long iun).
42. <%% Ben-Shahai, 5%47$()#"/, 37'&( note 1u, at 1S.
4S. See RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at 26-29. 0n bounueu iationality anu ielateu iueas, 3%% 4%/%&($$G BANIEL
KABNENAN, TBINKINu, FAST ANB SL0W (2u11); (/6 }0BuNENT 0NBER 0NCERTAINTY: BE0RISTICS ANB BIASES
(Baniel Kahneman et al. eus., 1982); Beibeit A. Simon, @ !%-(;#"&($ N"6%$ "8 5()#"/($ >-"#F%, 69 Q.}.
EC0N. 99 (19SS).
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Su8 ,?9<@ 9@A 5B2CBA |vol. 49:Su1
have it, anu to have oui ieactions to options stiongly influenceu by the way those
options aie fiameu. In many ways, we aie fai fiom the "iational actois" that popu-
late the mouels of economists, as well as the mouels of many legal scholais. Those
who sell us piouucts anu seivices systematically take auvantage of oui weaknesses
anu iiiationalities in these aieas.
44
Nost of us uo not woiiy as much as we shoulu
about post-employment iestiictive covenants, choices of foium foi uispute iesolu-
tion, oi waiveis of iights to biing class actions. We assume that nothing will go
wiong, that the venuois oi employeis woulu not put in unfaii teims, anu at least
that we will be tieateu faiily if anything goes wiong. Foi a laige poition of tiansac-
tions, those assumptions tuin out to be tiue.
4S
Bowevei, when those assumptions
tuin out to be false, the outcome can seem ueeply unfaii anu tioubling.
II. B0ILERPLATE ANB "BEN0CRATIC BEuRABATI0N"
Rauin is also conceineu about "uemociatic uegiauation," by which she means
the way in which impoitant legislatively-cieateu iights can be (enfoiceably) uimin-
isheu oi waiveu thiough contiactual agieement.
46
Bei aigument is that businesses
shoulu not be able to unuo, thiough simple contiactual piovisions (especially pio-
visions that aie hiuuen, haiu to unueistanu, anu haiu to avoiu), iights which have
been cieateu thiough populai, uemociatic law-making piocesses.
47
The pioblem
with this aigument is that the ability to mouify oi waive these iights is itself also the
uiiect oi inuiiect piouuct of legislation. The most obvious example is the Feueial
Aibitiation Act ("FAA"),
48
which is the basis foi enfoicing the aibitiation agiee-
ments that Rauin complains about that waive consumeis' anu employees' iights to
litigate claims in couit anu to biing class action claims.
49
(0f couise, one might uis-
agiee with the ieauing of the FAA that the majoiity of the Supieme Couit has given,
but that is a sepaiate issue). Similaily, Congiess anu state legislatuies cleaily have
the ability to make the iight to litigate ceitain claims oi to biing class actions non-
waivable, anu have occasionally uone so. Foi example, Congiess has foibiuuen
manuatoiy aibitiation piovisions in consumei cieuit agieements with membeis of
the 0niteu States militaiy.
Su
0ne can also finu state laws that expiessly iestiict the

44. <%%1 %=4=, 0REN BAR-uILL, SEB0CTI0N BY C0NTRACT: LAW, EC0N0NICS, ANB PSYCB0L0uY IN C0NS0NER
NARKETS 7-8 (2u12).
4S. <%% Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richaiu A. Posnei, H/%L<#6%6 >"/)&(F)3 #/ >"E'%)#)#;% >"/37E%& N(&O%)3,
#/ B0ILERPLATE, 37'&( note S, at 6.
46. <%% RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at SS-S1. She also aigues that some of these waiveis of iights "eiase the
legal iights that foim the infiastiuctuie that makes contiactual piivate oiueiing possible," anu that fiims
using such waiveis "aie using contiact to uestioy the unueilying basis of contiact." C6= at S6 (emphasis
omitteu).
47. <%% #6= at S9-4u.
48. 9 0.S.C. 1-14 (2uu8).
49. Rauin uiscusses some of the histoiy of the FAA anu some iecent case law. RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at
1Su-SS.
Su. See }ohn Wainei National Befense Authoiization Act of 2uu7, 1u 0.S.C.A. 987(e)(S), (f)(4)
(West 2u1u & Supp. 2u1S). Feueial law elsewheie also limits othei soits of piovisions that might mouify
iights. <%%1 %=4=, 46 0.S.C.A. SuSu9 (West 2uu8 & Supp. 2u1S) (invaliuating piovisions limiting liability
foi peisonal injuiy oi ueath ielating to tianspoitation of peisons between poits in the 0.S., oi between a
0.S. poit anu a non-0.S. uestination). Recently enacteu feueial legislation anu auministiative agency ac-
tion piohibiting manuatoiy aibitiation piovisions in moitgage anu home equity loans aie citeu in RABIN,

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2u1Sj !HC9B509@,B Su9
ability of paities to waive pioceuuial anu substantive iights, at least foi ceitain cat-
egoiies of tiansactions.
S1

Someone might object that the aigument heie is putting too much aigumenta-
tive weight on the fact that feueial oi state legislatuies have not acteu to iestiict the
effect of contiactual boileiplate, anu that one shoulu not make too much of legisla-
tive inaction. Lawmakeis fail to act foi many uiffeient ieasons (incluuing the paiti-
san giiulock one sees at the national level at the moment, pieventing almost any
legislation of even moueiate contioveisy). Biscounting failuie to act is a faii point,
anu one not to be biusheu asiue lightly. At the same time, the fact that state anu
feueial legislatuies have shown the ability anu willingness to iestiict the use of cei-
tain kinus of boileiplate language
S2
means that the failuie to uo so in othei ciicum-
stances is at least notewoithy.
At times, !"#$%&'$()% seems to iecognize the tension within the claim iegaiu-
ing "uemociatic uegiauation." When analyzing the use of "technological piotection
measuies" ("TPNs," also known as "uigital iights management" ("BRNs")), Rauin
wiites: "As they exist touay, TPNs aie inimical to the iule of law, anu theiefoie a
cause of uemociatic uegiauation. As they exist touay, they aie accoiueu stiingent
piotection by tieaty anu by 0S legislation unuei the Bigital Nillennium Copyiight
Act."
SS
Thus, Rauin notes that this piactice has expiess oi implicit suppoit by feu-
eial legislation anu national tieaty obligations, but still claims that the piactice un-
ueimines political iights.
S4
These claims may be consistent, but only if one shifts the
aigument to the way oui political system opeiates (such as the coiiupting influence
of campaign contiibutions anu hypei-paitisanship, etc.)
SS
iathei than claims about
contiactual piovisions.
Rauin uoes have a back-up aigument heie; howevei, it focuses less on cam-
paign finance anu political coiiuption anu moie on a contioveisial conception of

37'&( note 1, at 246. <%% ($3" the Nagnuson Noss Feueial Waiianty Act, 1S 0.S.C.A. 2Su1-12 (West
2uu9 & Supp. 2u1S) (as uiscusseu by RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at 18S, 22u), which places some constiaints on
how businesses piesent waiianties to consumeis.
S1. 0ne example is the Illinois Fianchise Act, wheie Section 4 states: "Any piovision in a fianchise
agieement that uesignates juiisuiction oi venue in a foium outsiue of this State is voiu, pioviueu that a
fianchise agieement may pioviue foi aibitiation in a foium outsiue of this State." 81S ILL. C0NP. STAT.
7uS4 (West 2uu8 & Supp. 2u1S). Anothei example is the Wisconsin Consumei Act, which invaliuates all
choice of law, choice of foium, anu choice of venue piovisions foi consumei contiacts enteieu by Wis-
consin iesiuents. WISC. STAT. ANN. 421.2u1(1u) (West 2u12 & Supp. 2u12).
S2. Auuitionally, Congiess has sometimes offeieu expiess peimission to have ceitain types of claims
iesolveu by aibitiation oi othei foims of alteinative uispute iesolution. Foi example, the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 incluues the following language: "Wheie appiopiiate anu to the extent authoiizeu by law, the
use of alteinative means of uispute iesolution, incluuing . . . aibitiation, is encouiageu to iesolve uisputes
aiising unuei this chaptei." 42 0.S.C.A. 12212 (West 2u1S).
SS. RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at Su.
S4. C6=
SS. <%% Citizens 0niteu v. Feu. Election Comm'n, 1Su S. Ct. 876, 899 (2u1u) (holuing that the Fiist
Amenument piohibits limits on coipoiate funuing of inuepenuent political bioaucasts). Anu the influ-
ence of coipoiate campaign contiibutions has been felt stiongly in those states that elect theii appellate
couit juugesexactly the juuges Rauin hopes might inteivene to piotect consumeis anu employees fiom
boileiplate. <%% }oanna Shepheiu, V73)#F% () 5#3O* @/ BE'#&#F($ @/($G3#3 "8 >(E'(#4/ >"/)&#I7)#"/3 (/6
V76#F#($ J%F#3#"/3 1 (2u1S),
http:www.acslaw.oigsitesuefaultfilesACS_}ustice_at_Risk_6_24_1S_u.puf. At one point, Rauin sug-
gests, quite ieasonably, that the ultimate culpiit foi the peivasiveness anu enfoicement of one-siueu
boileiplate might be the seveie wealth uispaiity in this countiy. RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at 1S2.
9
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"the iule of law"
S6
anu what she asseits the iule of law, piopeily unueistoou, ie-
quiies foi piivate law geneially anu the enfoicement of contiacts in paiticulai.
S7

Bowevei, those who uo not accept Rauin's contioveisial views about the Rule of
Law may finu hei aigument heie unpeisuasive.
III. P0SSIBLE RESP0NSES
What can be uone anu what shoulu be uone in iesponse to the pioblems cie-
ateu by boileiplate piovisions. Rauin enteitains the possibility of stiengthening
tiauitional foims of oveisightjuuicial application of existing uoctiines, state legis-
lative iestiictions on some piovisions, anu agency ieview of piovisionsbut she
consiueis these options to be unlikely oi inauequate.
S8
Rauin biiefly suiveys othei
options: (1) maiket mechanisms, e.g., consumei watchuog gioups, anu the use of
ieputational sanctions;
S9
(2) the use of toit law;
6u
anu (S) auministiative iegula-
tion, e.g., cieating lists of acceptable, unacceptable, oi piesumptively unacceptable
boileiplate piovisions;
61
she finus auvantages anu uisauvantages in each.
The possibility of substantive iegulation is not entiiely fanciful oi utopian.
The Euiopean 0nion iesponus to foim contiacts with a seiies of uiiectives cieating
manuatoiy teims, piesumptively invaliu teims, anu piohibiteu teims, paiticulaily
foi consumei tiansactions.
62
Bowevei, even putting asiue the meiits of that pio-
posal, theie aie seiious questions as to whethei this alteinative woulu be politically
feasible in the 0niteu States in the shoit oi meuium teim. Some veision of feueial
iegulation with the objective of consumei piotection was to be one of the functions
of the Consumei Financial Piotection Buieau ("CFPB"),
6S
but Republicans in Con-
giess have (at the time of this wiiting, anu foi some yeais pievious) maue it a high
piioiity to tiy to pievent this agency fiom gaining effective powei oi inuepenuence
fiom Congiess.
64
The CFPB is managing to piouuce some impoitant iegulations ie-

S6. <%%1 %=4=, BRIAN Z. TANANABA, 0N TBE R0LE 0F LAW: BIST0RY, P0LITICS, TBE0RY (2uu4) (uiscussing the
uiffeient unueistanuings of "the iule of law").
S7. RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at S4-S7, SS-S6.
S8. <%% #6= at 144-SS.
S9. <%% 4%/%&($$G #6= at 189-96.
6u. <%% 4%/%&($$G #6= at 197-216. As Rauin nicely puts it, with peihaps some oveistatement: "Receipt of
boileiplate is often moie like an acciuent than a baigain." C6= at 197. Rauin suggests that a "fiim that im-
poses seveie iemeuy ueletions of iights that aie at least paitially maiket-inalienable, unuei ciicum-
stances of nonconsent anu mass-maiket uistiibution, coulu be liable in toit foi intentional uepiivation of
basic legal iights." C6= at 211. Foi a similai suggestion of a toit appioach to iegulating contiacts, this time
in connection with insuiance policies, see Baniel Schwaicz, @ 0&"67F)3 9#(I#$#)G ,-%"&G 8"& )-% V76#F#($
5%47$()#"/ "8 C/37&(/F% 0"$#F#%3, 48 WN. & NARY L. REv. 1S89 (2uu7) (mentioneu by RABIN, 37'&( note 1,
at 199 n.7). <%% ($3" Leff, 37'&( note 17 (one of the fiist aiticles to suggest a piouuct liability appioach to
stanuaiu foim contiacts).
61. <%% 4%/%&($$G RABIN1 37'&( note 1, at 217-42.
62. C6= at 2SS-S9; 3%% ($3" }ane K. Winn & Biian B. Bix, J#;%&4#/4 0%&3'%F)#;%3 "/ B$%F)&"/#F >"/)&(F)#/4
#/ )-% ?=<= (/6 B=?=, S4 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 17S (2uu6); 3%% 4%/%&($$G TBE INv0LvENENT 0F E0 LAW IN PRIvATE
LAW RELATI0NSBIPS (Boiota Leczykiewicz & Stephen Weatheiill eus., 2u1S).
6S. The Buieau is mentioneu biiefly in passing in !"#$%&'$()%. RABIN, 37'&( note 1, at 221.
64. <%% Euitoiial, W7#%)$G X#$$#/4 ( >"/37E%& A()F-6"4, N.Y. TINES, Feb. 1u, 2u1S,
www.nytimes.com2u1Su211opinionquietly-killing-a-consumei-watchuog.html. Aftei yeais of the
Republicans blocking the appointment of someone to heau the Buieau, Richaiu Coiuiay was finally con-
fiimeu as its heau on }uly 16, 2u1S, as pait of a compiomise meant to aveit a change of the Senate's fili-
bustei iules. Banielle Bouglas, <%/()% >"/8#&E3 >"&6&(G )" S%(6 >"/37E%& .#/(/F#($ 0&")%F)#"/ !7&%(7,

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2u1Sj !HC9B509@,B S11
lating to financial piouucts,
6S
but it is uifficult in the cuiient political climate to im-
agine its having the impact on consumei tiansactions geneially that its Euiopean
counteipaits have.
To those who woulu complainagainst iegulationthat paities shoulu be
fiee to agiee to (oi at least assent to, if one finus tiansactions involving stanuaiu
teims too fai iemoveu fiom full-blooueu "agieement" oi "consent") whatevei teims
they want, one shoulu point out that this is not the cuiient state of the law anu has
not been foi centuiies, if evei.
66
Theie have always been limitations on the piocess
of contiact foimation, anu the teims that woulu be enfoiceu, unuei the guise of vai-
ious uoctiines (e.g., uuiess, unuue influence, unconscionability oi $(%3#" %/"&E#3,
public policy oi illegality, misiepiesentation, anu the vaiious equitable uefenses to
the (full) enfoicement of contiactual teims).
It shoulu be pointeu out, in passing, that when teims aie imposeu by legisla-
tion, auministiative iegulation, oi juuicial iewiiting, the outcome may be teims that
aie faiiei, oi at least less one-siueu, than boileiplate teims, but the pioblem of lack
of full consent has not uisappeaieu.
67
Neithei paity to an agieement assents in any
meaningful way to teims imposeu by the State, howevei faii oi ieasonable the
teims might otheiwise be.
68

Whethei one iesponus to pioblematic contiactual teims thiough uoctiine, oi
legislative oi auministiative iegulation, one option that shoulu be consiueieu is uif-
feiential tieatment of contiacts uepenuing on the paities involveu. The Euiopean
0nion cuiiently uoes this, as many of its piotective iules apply only to consumei
contiacts.
69
0ne might go in the othei uiiection as well, anu foi some, less vulneia-
ble contiacting paities, one might consiuei ielaxing some uoctiinal constiaints we
now have. 0ne can be in favoi of tiue fieeuom of contiact foi paities sophisticateu
enough (oi sufficiently well-counseleu) anu poweiful enough to iecognize what the
implications aie of what they sign, anu to obtain alteinative teims if the piesent
teims aie not to theii liking. These aie paities who come close to fitting the iueal of
"tiue" oi "full" consent that was eailiei noteu as being so uistant fiom the expeii-
ence of most contiacting paities. Foi sophisticateu paities, couits might consiuei
enfoicing teims that they woulu otheiwise iefuse to enfoice. Foi example, cuiient
contiact law uoctiine foibius the enfoicement of "punishment clauses." These aie

WASB. P0ST, }uly 16, 2u1S, http:aiticles.washingtonpost.com2u1S-u7-
16business4u6u87SS_1_senate-iepublicans-consumei-financial-piotection-buieau-iichaiu-
coiuiayP0ST.
6S. Infoimation on the agency's past anu pioposeu iegulations can be founu on its website. <%%
C0NS0NER FINANCIAL PR0TECTI0N B0REA0, http:www.consumeifinance.gov (last visiteu Aug. 2u, 2u1S).
66. <%%1 %=4=, BIX, C0NTRACT LAW 37'&( note 4, at 87-92 (giving an oveiview of histoiical anu cuiient
substantive faiiness iestiictions on contiact enfoicement).
67. This obseivation has also been maue by Richaiu Ciaswell. <%%1 %=4=, 0&"'%&)G 57$%3 (/6 9#(I#$#)G
57$%3 #/ ?/F"/3F#"/(I#$#)G (/6 5%$()%6 J"F)&#/%3, 6u 0. CBI. L. REv. 1, S4-44 (199S).
68. Theie is a weak sense of consent in paities going foiwaiu with a tiansaction knowing (oi at least
having ieason to know of) the manuatoiy teims oi the possibility of juuicial iewiiting of teims. Bowev-
ei, this type of consent is haiuly stiongei than the consent to boileiplate teims that Rauin piopeily com-
plains about in hei text.
69. <%% %=4=, Commission of the Euiopean Communities, >"EE7/#F()#"/ 8&"E )-% >"EE#33#"/ )" )-%
B7&"'%(/ 0(&$#(E%/)1 ,-% >"7/F#$1 ,-% B7&"'%(/ BF"/"E#F (/6 <"F#($ >"EE#))%% (/6 )-% >"EE#))%% "8 )-%
5%4#"/3, 0ct 7, 2u1S, http:ec.euiopa.euieseaichpiess2u1Spufjtiiip_communication.puf.
11
Bix: Boilerplate, Freedom of Contract, and Democratic Degradation
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013
S12 ,?9<@ 9@A 5B2CBA |vol. 49:Su1
teims that impose highei than compensatoiy uamages on a paity that uoes not pei-
foim at all, oi that peifoims below the stanuaius uemanueu by the contiact (even
though teims of this soit actually have oiigins ueep in the histoiy of Anglo-
Ameiican contiact law anu weie enfoiceu foi centuiies).
7u
Bowevei, theie is a goou
aigument that in agieements between the kinus of paities uiscusseu heie, such
piovisions shoulu be enfoiceu.
71
Foi such paities, we no longei suspect that the
teims weie imposeu upon them within a one-siueu commeicial ielationship. These
paities might ieasonably accept penalty clauses as a way of pioving theii commit-
ment to peifoim (which may be necessaiy to gain seiious consiueiation if they aie
new oi unpioven in theii aiea of business). Foi similai ieasons, one can think of
situations wheie sophisticateu paities might have a ieason to want "nakeu piomis-
es" oi "illusoiy piomises" enfoiceu, oi the powei to mouify agieements without
new consiueiation.
72

Bowevei, one uifficulty with such a two-tiack appioach to contiacts is that it
may not be easy to uiaw useful guiuelines iegaiuing which paities qualify foi which
set of iules. 0ne suggestion that business-to-business ("B2B") contiacts ieceive
sepaiate tieatments (a view stiongly auvocateu by Alan Schwaitz anu Robeit Scott,
in theii well-known aiticle >"/)&(F) ,-%"&G (/6 )-% 9#E#)3 "8 >"/)&(F) 9(:)
7S
iuns
into the pioblem that many small business owneis may be as vulneiable anu in as
much neeu of iegulatoiy piotection as aie most consumeis anu employees.
74

C0NCL0SI0N
The mouein contiacting piactices that most consumeis, employees, anu oth-
eis face aie not ones of "fieeuom of contiact" in anything like the full meaning of
that iueal. As Naigaiet Rauin ieminus us in !"#$%&'$()%, the situation is often closei
to the unilateial imposition of teims by the stiongei oi moie sophisticateu siue.
This uoes not mean, anu shoulu not mean, that such contiacts oi paiticulai contiac-
tual piovisions shoulu nevei be enfoiceu. It uoes mean that theie aie substantial
(though peihaps fai fiom conclusive) aiguments foi some iegulatoiy limitssome
manuatoiy teims oi piohibiteu teims as in Euiopean 0nion Contiact Law, oi at
least some piesumptions foi oi against ceitain teims. At the same time, this soit of
iegulation biings its own pioblemspolitical, piactical, anu uoctiinalso it shoulu

7u. <%% A.W. BRIAN SINPS0N, A BIST0RY 0F TBE C0NN0N LAW 0F C0NTRACT: TBE RISE 0F TBE ACTI0N 0F
ASS0NPSIT 88-1SS (197S); BAvIB IBBETS0N, A BIST0RICAL INTR0B0CTI0N T0 TBE LAW 0F 0BLIuATI0NS 28-Su
(1999).
71. Richaiu Posnei takes a similai position. RICBARB A. P0SNER, EC0N0NIC ANALYSIS 0F LAW 1S9-6S (8th
eu. 2u11).
72. Nouifications aie alieauy enfoiceable without new consiueiation foi sales of goous. <%% 0CC 2-
2u9(1) ("|ajn agieement mouifying a contiact within this Aiticle neeus no consiueiation to be binuing").
But the iule foi non-sale of goous tiansactions is fai less cleai. <%% RESTATENENT (SEC0NB) 0F C0NTRACTS
71 (1981) (geneial iequiiement of consiueiation); #6= at 89 (cieating limiteu exceptions foi enfoicing
mouifications without consiueiation).
7S. Alan Schwaitz & Robeit E. Scott, >"/)&(F) ,-%"&G (/6 )-% 9#E#)3 "8 >"/)&(F) 9(:, 11S YALE L.}. S41,
SS6 (2uuS). Pait of Schwaitz anu Scott's aigument was that businesses uo not have the same autonomy
inteiests in theii contiacts that inuiviuuals uo.
74. <%% Naitijn W. Besselink, ?/8(#& ,%&E3 #/ >"/)&(F)3 !%):%%/ !73#/%33%3, #/ T0WARBS A E0R0PEAN
C0NTRACT LAW 1S1, 1S1-48 (}ules Stuyck & Reinei Schulze eus., 2u11).
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http://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol49/iss2/21
2u1Sj !HC9B509@,B S1S
be appioacheu cautiously.
It is impoitant not to oveistate the complaints against boileiplate piovisions.
Foi example, aiguments that boileiplate language unueimines the iule of law oi the
public-piivate uistinction oveilook the extent to which contiactual waivei of iights
has been expiessly oi implicitly authoiizeu by state anu feueial legislation anu case
law. Anu the way that legislatuies have been willing to encouiage oi at least con-
uone boileiplate shoulu make one cautious about the likelihoou of legislative iegu-
lation of such teims.
Fieeuom of contiact iemains an impoitant iueal, especially foi those in the
best position to enjoy all the benefits fiom contiactual aiiangements. At the same
time that one might consiuei limitations on contiactual fieeuom to piotect moie
vulneiable paities in theii contiactual inteiactions, one might consiuei an expan-
sion of "fieeuom of contiact" foi tiansactions among the moie poweiful anu sophis-
ticateu paities. Peihaps some of the existing uoctiinal iules meant to piotect weak-
ei paities might be lifteu foi contiacting paities that uo have ieal choices anu aie
not iegulaily subject to exploitation oi manipulation.
In !"#$%&'$()%, one finus an impoitant waining on how fai venuois anu em-
ployeis have gone to iemove oi uisable legal piotections thiough contiact. Anu if
one consiueis some of the book's claims to be somewhat oveistateu, peihaps this is
the inevitable anu acceptable cost of an impoitant call to aims.

13
Bix: Boilerplate, Freedom of Contract, and Democratic Degradation
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2013