OSMTH

Original Princely Articles rebellions in Ltd western Europe, c.1170c.1280 1170c.
1280 Blackwell Oxford, Historical HISR 0950-3471 XXX Institute UK Research Publishing of Historical Research 2007c.
Kings and sons: princely rebellions and the structures of revolt in western Europe, c.1170 c.1280*
Bjrn Weiler
University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Abstract
Uprisings by royal sons against their fathers were a common phenomenon in the politics of medieval Europe, but one that, so far, has not been fully explored in the context of the thirteenth century. This was, however, a period during which numerous norms and mechanisms were developed that continued to dene the Latin West well into the early modern period. This article uses three case studies (England 1173; Germany 1234; and Castile 1282) to outline both shared features of medieval European politics at large, and characteristic differences between central regions of the medieval West.
In 1173, the eldest son of Henry II of England, Henry the Young King, aided by his brothers, and with the backing of King Louis VII of France and the count of Flanders, rebelled against his father. The uprising soon spread from across the Channel to Britain, where the earls of Chester and Leicester joined the revolt, as did the king of Scotland. Despite its initial success, and partly perhaps because it brought together such a disparate group of men, the rebellion collapsed. In September 1173, the earl of Leicester was beaten, and at Easter 1174 a royalist army defeated and captured the king of Scotland. By September, the Young King, too, submitted. 1 This article will take the Young Kings uprising as the starting point for a series of more wide-ranging questions. Henry IIs problems with his progeny were by no means unusual. In England, William the Conqueror had faced similar challenges from his eldest son,2 while, in the thirteenth century, Henry III was to be opposed repeatedly by his heir, the future Edward I.3 Nor was the 1173 revolt the end of Henry IIs parental troubles: in 1183, the Young King rose in arms again, and this time the revolt was cut short only by his death, while Henry died six years later, waging war on his son Richard.4 Neither was this a particularly English problem. The 1173 revolt was, in fact, representative of a phenomenon in evidence across the
* Earlier versions of this article were read to the London Medieval Society; the Franco-British History Seminar and the doctoral seminar Eglise et societ du vie au XIIIe sicle at the Universit de Paris IVSorbonne; and the Centre for Medieval Studies at the Universitetet i Bergen. The author would like to thank Theo Riches, Frdrique Lachaud, Dominique Barthlmy, Sverre Bagge and Leidulf Melve for their kind invitations and generous hospitality; the respective audiences, for their welcome comments, criticisms and suggestions; and Sarah Lambert, John Gillingham, Patrick Geary and the anonymous reader for Historical Research for forcing him to think more about the denition and typology of revolt. W. L. Warren, Henry II (1973), pp. 108 34; D. Carpenter, The Struggle for Mastery: Britain 1066 1284 (Oxford, 2003), pp. 223 7. 2 W. M. Aird, Frustrated masculinity: the relationship between William the Conqueror and his eldest son, in Masculinity in Medieval Europe, ed. D. M. Hadley (Harlow, 1999), pp. 39 70, at pp. 39 55. 3 M. Prestwich, Edward I (1988), pp. 24, 32 3, 35 7; J. R. Maddicott, Simon de Montfort (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 185 6, 193 7. 4 Warren, pp. 591 3, 617 26.
Institute of Historical Research 2007. Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009) Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
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Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280
medieval West: that of an uprising led not by disgruntled lords, but by a rulers chosen heir.5 Young Henrys revolt should also be distinguished from other kinds of dynastic dispute: this was not a conict over the rules of succession, nor was it concerned with controlling the government of an under-age king. That this kind of revolt was universal does not, of course, mean that it was either ubiquitous or that it occurred regularly: there were rulers like Frederick Barbarossa who were quite capable of ruling jointly with their sons, and of doing so harmoniously.6 Equally, the kings of France were blessed not only with a line of unbroken dynastic descent, but also with the absence of lial rebellion.7 Even so, a sufcient number of these incidents survive for them to be recognized as a familiar element in the political history of the Latin West. It is thus all the more surprising that, while excellent work has been done on the role of royal sons, or on the legitimization and procedure of deposing kings in an early medieval context, these revolts have not been explored in any detail for the period under consideration here the long thirteenth century. 8 This is regrettable, as such revolts allow us to highlight not only developing concepts of royal power in a period of dramatic political, social and intellectual change, but also some of the underlying structures and mechanisms of medieval politics and political culture. It was, after all, in moments of crisis like that of 1173 that concepts and ideologies of royal power were discussed and dened, not only by the political actors themselves, but also by their contemporaries, and that the means and mechanisms of conducting or resolving disputes were tested and formed. Conict and debate, in turn, forced actors to formulate more clearly the principles on which the rightful exercise of their ofce was to be based, and those on which the governance of the realm was meant to be built. They offer snapshots of norms, tools and processes that otherwise all too frequently remain hidden from view. To offer a comprehensive study of this phenomenon would exceed the limitations of an article like this. Instead, the following will focus on three case studies the revolts of Henry the Young King in 1173, Henry ( VII) in Germany in 1234, 9 and Infante Sancho in Castile in 1282. These examples have been chosen because they provide similar types of evidence, but within quite different regnal traditions, and covering a chronological span that enables us to see the degree to which ideas and concepts changed in the thirteenth century. While, in 1173, Henry the Young Kings
5 Other examples include Emperor Otto I and his son Liudolf in the 10th century (Adalberti continuatione Regionis, in Quellen zur Geschichte der schsischen Kaiserzeit, ed. and trans. A. Bauer and R. Rau (2nd rev. edn., Darmstadt, 1977), pp. 204 13); or, in the 11th century, Roger of Apulia and Jordanus (Geoffrey de Malaterra, De Rebus Gestis Rogerii Calabriae et Siciliae Comitis et Roberti Guiscardi Ducis Fratris Eius, ed. E. Pontieri ( Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, new ser., Bologna, 1928), pp. 78 9; T. Broekmann, Rigor Iustitiae. Herrschaft, Recht und Terror im normannisch-stauschen Sden (1050 1250) ( Darmstadt, 2005), pp. 59 67)); and Wladyslav of Poland and his progeny (Gesta Principum Polonorum: the Deeds of the Princes of the Poles, ed. and trans. P. W. Knoll and F. Schaer (Budapest, 2003), pp. 122 9). See also the short survey provided by K. H. Krger, Herrschaftsnachfolge als Vater-Sohn-Konikt, Frhmittelalterliche Studien, xxxvi (2002), 225 40, which, however, focuses on examples from the Carolingian imperium and its eastern successor kingdom up to 1235. 6 U. Schmidt, Knigswahl und Thronfolge im 12. Jahrhundert (Cologne, Weimar and Vienna, 1987), pp. 195 224; F. Opll, Friedrich Barbarossa (Darmstadt, 1990), pp. 166 70; P. Csendes, Heinrich VI (Darmstadt, 1993), pp. 35 73. 7 A. W. Lewis, Royal Succession in Capetian France: Studies on Familial Order and the State (Cambridge, Mass., 1981). 8 With the exception of Krger, passim, who, however, focuses on how these conicts were perceived by contemporary chroniclers in relation to the story of David and Absalom. The following, by contrast, will focus on how the rebels themselves sought to justify their actions. 9 His regnal number is conventionally put in brackets to distinguish him from Emperor Henry VII (r. 1308 13).
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line of argument thus formed part of a tradition that can also be found, for instance, in Germany in the early twelfth century,10 and one that bears a striking resemblance to ideals and values voiced as far back as the ninth,11 by 1282 a new and more formalized type of thinking about power had emerged.12 That this transformation was not a linear development is something we need to keep in mind, but focusing on a series of snapshots, as here, enables us to see clearly just how much changed over the century under consideration. These differences become particularly apparent because we have at our disposal comparable types of evidence: in the case of Henry the Young King and Henry (VII) letters of justication, in which they or those close to them outlined their grievances, the ideals and norms they deemed to have been violated, and which they vowed to restore or uphold. In Sanchos case, matters are a little more complex. While we do not have letters of justication, this is compensated for by a series of charters issued by the prince and his allies in an attempt to justify his actions, and by the chronicle evidence (much of it written under Sanchos guidance). We should not, of course, take these sources to be representative of all the contemporary views on kingship, political norms or even the events themselves. They do, however, represent an attempt by political agents to legitimize their actions in response to the norms and values of their expected audiences, and thus enable us to say something about wider contemporary debates on the ethical and moral underpinnings of royal lordship in particular, and the exercise of political power in general. Moreover, while these texts reect shared traditions, mechanisms and customs, they are also sufciently different to allow us to trace what was specic about each kingdom. One aim of this article is therefore to show how custom and expectations were appropriated and modied to t and respond to the conventions, needs and challenges of quite different regnal communities. While this approach was born out of engagement with a peculiar tradition, especially prevalent among (but by no means exclusive to) historians of medieval England, of juxtaposing England against some diffuse and ill-dened yet homogenous norm assumed to be in evidence on the
I. S. Robinson, Henry IV of Germany, 1056 1106 (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 286 8, 324 36. Annales Fuldenses, in Quellen zur Karolingischen Reichsgeschichte, ed. and trans. R. Rau (3 vols., Darmstadt, 1969), iii. 22 3; Annales Bertiniani, in Quellen zur Karolingischen Reichsgeschichte, ii. 12 27; Thegan, Vita Ludevici Imperatoris, in Quellen zur Karolingischen Reichsgeschichte, i. 237 40; Astronomus, Die Taten Kaiser Ludwigs, ed. and trans. E. Tremp (Monumenta Germaniae Historica Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum separatim editi, 77 vols., Hanover, 1871) (hereafter M.G.H. S.R.G.), lxiv. 456 9, 472 81 (although the reference to witchcraft in the latter also clearly distinguishes it from the 12th-century case). In lieu of a very rich secondary literature, see J. L. Nelson, The last years of Louis the Pious, in Charlemagnes Heir: New Perspectives on the Reign of Louis the Pious, ed. P. Godman and R. Collins (Oxford, 1990), 147 60; E. J. Goldberg, Struggle for Empire: Kingship and Conict under Louis the German, 817 76 (Ithaca and London, 2006), pp. 57 85; S. MacLean, Kingship and Politics in the Late 9th Century: Charles the Fat and the End of the Carolingian Empire (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 144 60. The author is grateful to Simon MacLean for his advice on these cases. 12 Most notably in the form of more abstract expositions of royal power, indebted to the rediscovery of Aristotle in the early decades of the 13th century. These will not be covered in this article, but it is worth remembering, rst, that what changed was often not the concept of royal power (still indebted to St. Augustines reworking of classical thought), but the language in which it was expressed; and, second, that it is extremely difcult to trace the reception of political thought by contemporary rulers. On the former, see G. J. McAleer, Giles of Rome on political authority, Jour. Hist. Ideas, lx (1999), 21 36; T. J. Renna, Augustinian kingship and Thomas Aquinas, in Proceedings of the P.M.R. Conference, V, ed. J. C. Schnaubelt, J. J. Hagen, and J. Reino ( Villanova, 1983), pp. 151 7; and on the latter, S. J. Williams, Giving advice and taking it: the perception by rulers of the pseudo-Aristotelian Secretum secretorum as a speculum principis, in Consilium. Teorie e pratiche del consigliare nella cultura medievale, ed. C. Casagrande, C. Crisciani and S. Vecchio (Firenze, 2004), pp. 139 80.
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Continent, and against which its inherent exceptionalism can be demonstrated, 13 what follows will be relevant beyond these somewhat insular concerns. By approaching questions of political culture and political norms from a broadly comparative perspective, we will be able to gain a better understanding of the relationship between a common, shared heritage of structures, norms and procedures, and the increasing diversity so characteristic of high and late medieval Europe. This article is therefore not a study of the rebellions of Henry (III), Henry ( VII) and Sancho IV, but of what their uprisings tell us about the diversity and commonalities, the theory and practice of political power in thirteenth-century Europe. Henry (III)s reasons to rebel survive in their most comprehensive form in a letter sent at some point in 1173 (the exact date remains uncertain) to Pope Alexander III. 14 The author is unknown but probably originated from within the royal household. The letter started out with an admission of guilt: fully aware that one should honour and obey ones father, the young king deemed it necessary to outline the reasons for the conict, and ask for Alexanders guidance. Henry explained that he had been made king reluctantly and against his will (he had been crowned in 1170), 15 but that his father had prevented him from fullling his royal duties. He had to listen daily to the clamour of the oppressed, and witness many acts of violence and cruelty, but was denied the power and authority to give the poor a hearing or to reprimand those who perpetrated tyrannous acts. Furthermore, to his shame and ignominy (quasi in contemptum nostrum et ignominiam), those holding grievances were forced to bring them not before him, but before judges of lower status, and to do so in his presence. Finally, Henry repeatedly had his advisers and councillors exchanged against his will, and ofcials of frequently unknown morals forced upon him by his father. He was thus denied the ability to do justice and to protect those who could not protect themselves: to perform, that is, the most noble and basic functions of his ofce. We should note the emphasis on shame and dishonour. Honour entailed meanings of right, legal claims and ofce, as well as status, dignity and reputation. 16 Young Henry was denied what was rightfully his the exercise of his functions as king but also suffered dishonour, as his dignity was violated, and his standing diminished. In practical terms, both were of consequence. Honour in the sense of prestige publicly manifested the status and authority of political actors. The higher their standing, the greater their ability to inuence their peers and superiors, to reward and aid their
13 A point more eloquently made by T. Reuter, Modern mentalities and medieval polities, in T. Reuter, Medieval Polities and Modern Mentalities, ed. J. L. Nelson (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 3 18. 14 Le Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. M. Bouqet and others (24 vols., Paris, 1718 1904) (hereafter R.H.G.F.), xvi. 643 8. 15 A. Heslin, The coronation of the Young King in 1170, Studies in Church History, ii (1965), 165 78; Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis, ed. W. Stubbs (2 vols., 1867 8) (hereafter Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi ), i. 4 5. For the topos of reluctant kingship, invoked by Henry, see B. Weiler, The rex renitens and the medieval ideal of kingship, c.950 c.1250, Viator, xxxi (2000), 1 42, which, however, does not make reference to this case. 16 See the denitions offered by H. Krieg, Herrscherdarstellung in der Stauferzeit (Ostldern, 2003), pp. 140 9; G. Althoff, Gloria et nomen perpetuum. Wodurch wurde man im Mittelalter berhmt?, in Person und Gemeinschaft im Mittelalter: Festschrift Karl Schmid, ed. G. Althoff, O. G. Oexle and J. Wollasch (Sigmaringen, 1988), pp. 297 313 (repr. in G. Althoff, Inszenierte Herrschaft. Geschichtsschreibung und politisches Handeln im Mittelalter (Darmstadt, 2003), pp. 1 24). In a German and British context recent work by Knut Grich has been particularly important ( K. Grich, Die Ehre Friedrich Barbarossas: Kommunikation, Konikt und politisches Handeln im 12. Jahrhundert (Darmstadt, 2001); K. Grich, Verletzte Ehre. Knig Richard Lwenherz als Gefangener Kaiser Heinrichs VI., in Historisches Jahrbuch, cxxiii (2003), 65 91).
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dependants. This was one of the reasons why the Young King emphasized that it had been in his presence that lesser judges were ordered to treat cases which had been brought before him: the king was publicly denied the authority to act, with his subjects and followers there to witness his humiliation. Add to this that he was not even able to decide on the composition of his own household, 17 and the full extent of the Young Kings political impotence was revealed. His treatment was that of a minor, and that he was eighteen years old by the time of his revolt well beyond the stage by which medieval sons commonly reached maturity could only have added to his ignominy: he was treated like a child, rather than the crowned and consecrated king he was.18 This forced and extended infancy mattered, and it hardly comes as a surprise that Henrys revolt opened with his knighting, that is, with a ceremonial declaration that he had come of age.19 This was not, however, the only issue at stake. Most of the letter was concerned with the many infringements of ecclesiastical liberties perpetrated by the Young Kings father.20 Most importantly, Henry had failed to punish the killers of Thomas Becket, and instead rewarded those who had opposed the archbishop with beneces and dignities. He was, in short, a recalcitrant oppressor of the church, loath to meet the conditions under which he had been allowed back into the community of the faithful. These accusations were well timed: little more than a year had passed since Henry II had been reconciled to the church, while Thomas Beckets canonization had occurred even more recently, in February 1173. The letter certainly played on the doubts of its audience (Alexander, as Anne Duggan has pointed out, hesitated for some time before accepting as sincere the old kings contrition).21 To emphasize Henrys desire to be a good son of the church, a mandate was included for Alexander to conrm, that listed the ecclesiastical liberties which his father had violated, and which the Young King vowed to uphold.22 Several of these a guarantee that criminous clerics would not be tried by secular courts, the freedom to impose ecclesiastical censure without royal licence or to appeal freely to the pope had been central to Henry IIs conict with Becket.23 The Young King was portrayed as the defender of the very values for which Thomas Becket had died. In fact, the letter ended with a solemn invocation of the
17 See also R. V. Turner, The households of the sons of Henry II, in La Cour Plantagent (1154 1204), ed. M. Aurell (Poitiers, 2000), pp. 49 62. 18 The age of maturity could, of course, vary, but was normally between 14 and 18. Perhaps the best survey is that provided by D. Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III (1990), pp. 123 4, 241 3. The confusing complexity of ages of majority is illustrated by Les Etablissements de Saint Louis, ed. P. Viollet (4 vols., Paris, 1881 6), ii. 28, 125, 280 1; iii. 43, 91, 136, 161, 165 8, 197, 206, 226, 271. The author is grateful to Dominique Barthlmy and Frdrique Lachaud for this last reference. 19 History of William Marshal, ed. A. J. Holden and trans. S. Gregory (3 vols., Anglo-Norman Text Soc., 2002), i, ll. 2068 107. See also Z. Daleswki, The knighting of Polish dukes in the early middle ages: ideological and political signicance, Acta Poloniae Historica, lxxx (1999), 15 43; B. Weiler, Knighting, homage, and the meaning of ritual: the kings of England and their neighbours in the 13th century, Viator, xxxvii (2006), 275 300, at pp. 278 84. 20 Illustrated by a mandate allegedly sent by the old king to the monks of Winchester: I command you to hold a free election, but I do not want you to accept anyone but my clerk Richard, archdeacon of Poitiers (R.H.G.F., xvi. 645). 21 A. J. Duggan, Diplomacy, status, and conscience: Henry IIs penance for Beckets murder, in Forschungen zur Reichs-, Papst- und Landesgeschichte. Peter Herde zum 65. Geburtstag von Freunden, Schlern und Kollegen dargebracht, ed. K. Borchardt and E. Bnz (2 vols., Stuttgart, 1998), i. 265 90. The author is grateful to Sarah Hamilton for this reference. 22 R.H.G.F., xvi. 645 7. 23 F. Barlow, Thomas Becket (1986), 167 97.
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duties the Young King owed his kingdoms neomartyr, Thomas Becket, whose glory and name continued to suffer, while those who had shed his blood prospered. 24 This, in turn, contextualizes the earlier part of this missive: Henrys dishonour and shame reected more fundamental concerns about Henry IIs governance. That the Young King had been refused the means and authority to do justice, that his court was lled with men of frequently doubtful morals and that he was thus rendered unable to help those most in need of his protection, was but one side of a coin the reverse of which held the old kings continuing violation of ecclesiastical liberties, his reluctance to punish the killers of Thomas Becket and his refusal to make true the promises he had given in 1172. Henry II, in short, not only acted like a tyrant by promoting unsuitable people, making promises which he then failed to keep and refusing to perform his duties as king, but also, and perhaps more importantly, by preventing others from performing theirs. There was a distinctly English note to this missive. Almost every post-Conquest ruler justied his claim to the throne by promising to restore an ideal status quo ante, normally dened as how things had been under his predecessor but one. Young Henrys promises reect almost verbatim the declarations made by Henry I, 25 Stephen of Blois26 and Henry II on their accession to the throne,27 all of whom had vowed to restore and respect the liberty of the church and to end the abuses and bad customs of their immediate predecessors. This may reect the volatile nature of English dynastic politics in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, with each king facing rival claimants to the throne, and with church matters as one means of gaining legitimacy: Henry I had done so by recalling St. Anselm from exile, Stephen by holding reforming councils and seeking endorsement from Pope Innocent II, and Henry II by promising that he would end the violence of Stephens reign. In fact, when, also in 1173, the old king complained to the pope about the actions of his sons, he referred to the curias special responsibility for England, which he likened to that of a lord for his vassal.28 All this may also echo the justication of William the Conquerors bid for the English throne, which he had claimed not only by hereditary right, but also as a means of reforming the Anglo-Saxon church, and of restoring the laws and liberties as they had been under Edward the Confessor.29 That those who claimed the throne promised to reform the governance of the realm and to restore it to some pristine and long-passed glory was not, of course, something peculiar to England. Nonetheless, in the Holy Roman Empire, for
R.H.G.F., xvi. 648. Eadmeri Historia Novorum in Anglia, ed. M. Rule (1884), pp. 11920; Die Gesetze der Angelsachsen, ed. F. Liebermann (3 vols., Halle, 1903 16), i. 521 3. 26 Select Charters and other Illustrations of English Constitutional History from the Earliest Times to the Reign of Edward I, ed. W. Stubbs (Oxford, 1913) (hereafter Select Charters), pp. 142 4; William of Malmesbury, Historia Novella, ed. E. King and trans. K. R. Potter (Oxford, 1998), pp. 14 15; Gesta Stephani, ed. and trans. K. R. Potter (Oxford, 1976), pp. 22 5. See also B. Weiler, Kingship, usurpation and propaganda in 12th-century Europe: the case of Stephen, Anglo-Norman Stud., xxiii (2000), 299 326, at pp. 313 15. 27 Select Charters, pp. 157 8. 28 Receuil des actes de Henri II, roi dAngleterre et duc de Normandie concernant les provinces franaises et les affaires de France, ed. L. Delisle and E. Berger (3 vols., Paris, 1916 27) (hereafter Receuil des actes), i, no. 460. The author is grateful to Nicholas Vincent for this reference, and for pointing out doubts about the authenticity of this letter, which may have reected the views of the letters author (Peter of Blois) rather than those of the king (N. Vincent, The court, forthcoming in Henry II: New Perspectives, ed. C. Harper-Bill). 29 George Garnett is shortly to explore this in greater detail. In the meantime see his Coronation and propaganda: some implications of the Norman claim to the throne of England in 1066, Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., 5th ser., xxxvi (1986), 91116.
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instance, no equivalent to Henry Is or Stephens coronation charter survives. Neither Conrad III (113852), who had initially been elected anti-king to his predecessor Lothar in 1126, nor Frederick Barbarossa (1152 90), whose own election conveniently ignored the fact that his predecessor already had a son old enough to take the crown, issued charters in which they specically denied the legitimacy of their predecessor or rival.30 The closest we have to a (in rather loose terms) programmatic statement is Barbarossas announcement to the pope in 1152 that he had been elected king, that he promised to be a faithful son to the church and that he would send envoys to negotiate about his coronation as emperor. 31 We do have isolated references in narrative sources: in 1198, for instance, one chronicler claimed that Philip of Swabia had promised the archbishop of Strasbourg that he would restore the lands alienated by his father and brother in exchange for the prelates supporting Philips bid for the throne.32 It is in chronicles, too, that we nd a clear juxtaposition between good kings and their less apt predecessors: Otto of Freising established such a contrast between Lothar III, who, he implied, had cheated the Staufen of the throne in 1125, and his successor, Conrad III.33 At the same time, he stayed clear of portraying Lothars predecessors Henry IV and Henry V as model kings: unsurprisingly, considering their status as archetypal tyrants and oppressors of the church. All this was something qualitatively different from the king and his chancery dening good lordship as not doing what his predecessor had done. It was not until 1281, during the troubled reign of Rudolf of Habsburg (127391), that imperial decrees were revoked that had been issued since Frederick IIs deposition by the pope at Lyon in 1245, thereby invalidating the grants of Rudolfs immediate predecessors. Even then, the last Staufen emperor, as excommunicate and inveterate enemy of the church, became an ideal by implication at best.34 None of this thus quite matches up to the English experience: there was no formal charter addressed to the community of the kings subjects, offering a catalogue of the liberties which the new monarch vowed to uphold, or of specic grievances he sought to abolish. Closest to the English case is that of thirteenth-century Hungary: in 1222, for instance, when King Andrew II issued the Golden Bull, he claimed merely to reissue
30 J. P. Niederkorn, Friedrich von Rothenburg und die Knigswahl von 1152, in Von Schwaben bis Jerusalem: Facetten stauscher Geschichte, ed. S. Lorenz and U. Schmidt (Sigmaringen, 1995), pp. 51 60; G. Althoff, Friedrich von Rothenburg. berlegungen zu einem bergegangenen Knigssohn, in Festschrift fr Eduard Hlawitschka zum 65. Geburtstag, ed. K. Schnith and R. Pauler (Kallmnz, 1993), pp. 307 16; Opll, pp. 33 5; Schmidt, pp. 117 29. 31 Diplomata Friderici I, ed. H. Appelt and others (5 vols., M.G.H. Diplomata, Hanover, 1975 90), i, no. 5. 32 Annales Marbacenses qui dicuntur (Cronica Hohenburgensis cum continuatione et additamentis Neoburgensibus), ed. H. Bloch (M.G.H. S.R.G., Hanover and Leipzig, 1907) (hereafter Annales Marbacenses), p. 71. Generally see S. Haider, Die Wahlversprechungen der rmisch-deutschen Knige bis zum Ende des zwlften Jahrhunderts ( Vienna, 1968). 33 Otto of Freising and Rahewin, Ottonis Episcopi Frisingensis et Rahewini Gesta Frederici; seu rectius Cronica, ed. F.-J. Schmale, trans. A. Schmidt (Darmstadt, 1965), pp. 284 5; Otto of Freising, Chronica sive Historia de duabus civitatibus, ed. A. Hofmeister, rev. W. Lammers, trans. A. Schmidt ( Darmstadt, 1960), pp. 528 9. See also, for a parallel development, G. A. Loud, William the Bad or William the Unlucky? Kingship in Sicily 1154 66, Haskins Society Jour., viii (1996), 99 114. 34 Constitutiones et Acta Publica Imperatorum et Regum, iii: 1273 98, ed. J. Schwalm (M.G.H. Leges IV, Hanover, 1904 6), no. 284. See also R. Pauler, Dum esset catholicus Zur Frage der Gltigkeit von Regierungserklrungen exkommunizierter oder abgesetzter Kaiser, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung fr Rechtsgeschichte. Germanistische Abteilung, cxii (1995), 345 65. For the contemporary context, see B. Weiler, Image and reality in Richard of Cornwalls German career, Eng. Hist. Rev., cxiii (1998), 1111 42, at pp. 1138 41.
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the good old laws of King Stephen (r. 9971038), which had been diminished . . . by the authority of certain kings, some of whom in personal anger took vengeance, others of whom paid heed to the false counsel of wicked and self-serving men. 35 As in the case of England, general privileges safeguarding the liberties of a rulers noble subjects were proclaimed as restoring an ideal status quo ante, and as redressing the evils committed by intervening kings. Moreover, again as in England, this tradition persisted: in 1267, Bela IV reissued Andrews charter, still proclaiming it to represent the liberties of St. Stephen (but without reference to bad kings), 36 as did the regents of Hungary in 1298, who also claimed that the laws issued by Andrew II had been entirely neglected through the laxity of the lord king.37 However, we should note subtle yet important differences: with the exception of the 1298 reissue, the ideal status quo ante was dened as having existed in the distant past (in the formative period of Hungarys conversion to Christianity), 38 and not in the reign of the new kings predecessor but one. Similarly, in Sicily, Poland or Norway, often with dynastic rivalries no less violent than those in England, the reform of the realm was certainly promised, but it was never dened so specically in relation to a particular ruler, or with as comprehensive a list of particular grievances. The Young King thus adapted common norms (all medieval kings promised to protect the church, for instance, to offer justice and so on) to the specic traditions and conditions of a particular kingdom (they did not normally dene good governance as not doing what their predecessor did). This process of adaptation, could, however, take a variety of forms, as our next example will show. In September 1234, Henry (VII), king of the Romans and emperor-elect, rebelled against his father, Emperor Frederick II.39 Henrys elevation to the German throne in 1220 had been the price that Pope Honorius III demanded for Frederick II to be crowned emperor.40 Although it was not unusual for emperors to secure the election of their eldest son as king during their lifetime, Henrys elevation did not occur after his father had fully secured his grip on the realm, but at the outset of his reign, and it had been agreed upon with the express purpose of limiting Fredericks hold on the Holy Roman Empire. There was no precedent which could have dened how exactly their relationship was to work once Henry came of age. By 1232, relations had deteriorated so far that Frederick ordered the German princes to oversee Henry ( VII)s governance, authorizing them to revoke their fealty should the king fail to abide by
The Laws of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary, ed. and trans. J. Bak, G. Bnis and J. R. Sweeney (2 vols., Bakerseld, Calif., 1989) (hereafter Laws of Medieval Hungary), i. 34. For the background, see P. Engel, The Realm of St. Stephen: a History of Medieval Hungary, 8951526, ed. A. Ayton, trans. T. Plosfalvi (2001), pp. 83 122. For a more detailed, though at times idiosyncratic, account, see Z. J. Kosztolnyik, Hungary in the 13th Century (New York, 1996), pp. 77 92. 36 Laws of Medieval Hungary, i. 42; Kosztolynik, pp. 239 54. 37 Laws of Medieval Hungary, i. 48; Kosztolynik, pp. 37489. This should be read in conjunction with L. Veszprmy, Chronicles in charters: historical narratives (narrationes) in charters as substitutes for chronicles in Hungary, in The Medieval Chronicle III, ed. E. Kooper (Amsterdam and New York, 2004), pp. 184 99. 38 See also L. Veszprmy, The invented 11th century of Hungary, in The Neighbours of Poland in the 11th Century, ed. P. Urbanczyk ( Warsaw, 2002), pp. 137 54. 39 W. Strner, Friedrich II. (2 vols., Darmstadt, 1994 2000), ii. 296 309; C. Hillen, Curia Regis: Untersuchungen zur Hofstruktur Heinrichs (VII.) 1220 35 nach den Zeugen seiner Urkunden (Frankfurt am Main, 1999), pp. 214 36; Broekmann, pp. 260 368. 40 Strner, i. 223 7.
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Fredericks commands.41 Moreover, Henry was forced to write to Gregory IX to ask the pope to excommunicate him should he again disobey his father. 42 Henrys frustration nally erupted in the autumn of 1234, when he held an assembly at which he decided to take up arms against Frederick.43 Almost immediately, he dispatched envoys to Italy to form an alliance with the Lombard League of cities hostile to Fredericks reassertion of imperial power in the north of the peninsula, 44 and he was even said to have planned a marriage alliance with the Capetian kings of France.45 A few months later, in early 1235, Frederick II entered Germany.46 Henrys revolt quickly collapsed, and the king was deprived not only of his royal status, but also that of heir apparent in 1237 his brother Conrad was elected king,47 and Henry died, still a prisoner, in 1242.48 The Young Kings revolt and that of Henry VII share several features both, ultimately, centred on the division of authority between father and son, and both focused on the role which the heir apparent was to play during his fathers lifetime but there were also fundamental differences. On an elementary level, while the Young King had not yet come of age in 1173, Henry ( VII) had reached maturity in 1227, almost a decade before his uprising. This, as we shall see, accounted at least in part for the somewhat different tone of his grievances against Frederick II. Furthermore, while both the Young King and his German namesake failed in their revolts, their subsequent fortunes could hardly have been more different. Finally, while the Young King, initially at least, could count on the backing of a number of the English barons, as well as that of the kings of France and Scotland, and the count of Flanders, Henrys support was rather more restricted. Like the Young King he had sought to forge ties with other rulers and his fathers enemies. Unlike the Young King, however, he had limited backing from within his own kingdom: the bishop of Worms and possibly the duke of Austria apart, few secular or ecclesiastical princes of note sided with him. In fact, his revolt was largely limited to the Staufen heartlands in Swabia and Alsace, and even there his support crumbled with Fredericks arrival. 49 At the same time, while the course, outcome and subsequent handling of the revolts
41 Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum, ii: 1198 1272, ed. L. Weiland (M.G.H. Leges IV, Hanover, 1896) (hereafter Constitutiones 1198 1272), no. 170. 42 Constitutiones 1198 1272, no. 316. 43 Annales Neresheimenses (M.G.H. Scriptores Rerum Germanicarum in folio, 38 vols., Hanover and Berlin, 1826 ) (hereafter M.G.H. Scriptores), x. 23; Annales Placentini Gibellini (M.G.H. Scriptores, xvii), p. 470. 44 Acta Imperii Inedita saeculi XIII et XIV: Urkunden und Briefe zur Geschichte des Kaiserreichs und des Knigreichs Sizilien, ed. E. Winkelmann (2 vols., Innsbruck, 1880 5; repr. 1964), nos. 470, 642; Acta Imperii Selecta: Urkunden deutscher Knige und Kaiser. Mit einem Anhange von Reichssachen, ed. J. F. Bhmer (Innsbruck, 1870), no. 334. 45 Annales Marbacenses, p. 97. 46 Continuatio Eberbachensis (M.G.H. Scriptores, xxii), p. 348. 47 Chronica Regia Coloniensis Continuatio IV, in Chronica Regia Coloniensis (Annales Maximi Colonienses), ed. G. Waitz (M.G.H. S.R.G., Hanover, 1880) (hereafter Chronica Regia Coloniensis), p. 271; Constitutiones 1198 1272, no. 329. 48 Continuatio Lambacenses (M.G.H. Scriptores, ix), p. 558; Annales Neresheimenses (M.G.H. Scriptores, x), p. 23; Annales Moguntini (M.G.H. Scriptores, xvii), p. 2; Annales Sancti Trudberti (M.G.H. Scriptores, xvii), p. 293; Annales Sancti Georgii in Silva Nigra (M.G.H. Scriptores, xvii), p. 297; Annales Ottenburani Minores (M.G.H. Scriptores, xvii), p. 317. 49 Historia Diplomatica Friderici Secundi, ed. A. Huillard-Breholles (7 vols. in 12, Paris, 1852 61) (hereafter Historia Diplomatica), iv. 5313; Hillen, pp. 21436; K. Borchardt, Der sogenannte Aufstand Heinrichs ( VII.) in Franken 1234/35, in Forschungen zur bayerischen und frnkischen Geschichte: Festschrift Peter Herde, ed. K. Borchardt and E. Bnz (Wrzburg, 1998), pp. 53 119.
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were quite different, there were striking similarities in the arguments that the two kings used to justify their actions. In September 1234, Henry (VII) wrote to the bishop of Hildesheim to explain the reasons for his revolt.50 Henry knew that some of his actions left him open to censure, most notably the destruction of princely castles, and the hostages he had taken from the duke of Bavaria and the margrave of Baden. By the thirteenth century, destroying castles or demanding noble hostages had become the stock in trade of tyrants and bad lords, and when Frederick II listed his grievances against Henry ( VII) in early 1235, these were the very instances he gave of his sons tyranny and oppression. 51 Henry sought to pre-empt such criticism, and presented his actions as manifesting his loyalty towards empire and emperor. The castles, for instance, had been razed only after he had received numerous complaints about their being used to plunder and oppress his subjects, after public consultation during an imperial diet, and after the princes (who had attended in unprecedented numbers) had passed judgement demanding their destruction. The duke of Bavarias son, in turn, had been taken hostage as a means of maintaining the peace. Henry therefore acted not of his own volition or for personal gain, but in order to do justice to his subjects, and at their behest. Indeed, he was proven right by the fact that unrest erupted as soon as he followed his fathers wishes and set free the dukes son. Henry stressed that he aimed not at overthrowing the emperor, but at pacifying the empire. He had exhausted all other means of settling his differences with Frederick: his father even refused to receive his envoys. All Henry wanted the bishop of Hildesheim to do was to plead with Frederick II not to diminish further honorem nostrum, quem de gratia Dei omnipotentis et sua habere dinoscimur (our honour, which we deem to hold by his grace and that of God). The bishop and his peers were called upon as arbitrators and intercessors, not as prospective allies and fellow rebels, and in order to resolve this dispute, not to legitimize it. We should note the reference to royal honour: like the Young King, Henry ( VII) used a concept of honour that referred to his legal rights as anointed king of the Romans, as well as to his prestige and reputation. If Frederick refused to listen to the kings envoys, passed judicial sentences without a proper hearing (as he had done in 1232) and restricted and undermined Henrys ability to govern, then he certainly violated the kings rights, but he equally shamed and dishonoured him. However, while the Young King had presented violations of his status as indicative of more fundamental shortcomings in Henry IIs governance, Henry (VII) never accused his father of tyranny or undue favouritism in general he oppressed his son, not the princes. Instead, he placed his actions within an established framework of imperial rule. Their conict touched on fundamental principles of imperial governance: maintaining peace and justice, and the concept of joint rule of emperor and princes. Or, as Henry ( VII) had put it to the bishop: imperium maxime consistat in vobis (the empire very much rests on you). 52 Henry (VII)s complaints were rmly rooted in the specic context of late Staufen Germany,53 but both his emphasis on the collective nature of royal government and on rebellion as a last resort, a means of gaining a fair hearing that had otherwise been denied, reected broader European developments. As Susan Reynolds has reminded
Constitutiones 1198 1272, no. 322. Constitutiones 1198 1272, no. 193. 52 Constitutiones 1198 1272, no. 322. 53 That situation ultimately went back to the 11th century, and requires a more detailed study. In the meantime, see J. Schlick, Knig, Frsten und Reich (1056 1159): Herrschaftsverstndnis im Wandel (Stuttgart, 2001).
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us,54 the collectivization of royal lordship, in the sense that the governance of the realm was a joint undertaking of the monarch acting in co-operation and consultation with his leading nobles and prelates, was not a new concept, but one which, in the course of the thirteenth century, had become more formalized and was invoked with increasing frequency and in relation to an ever wider range of issues. What exactly that consultation meant differed widely, of course, between various kingdoms. It was also a principle that applied not only to kings and princes, but to princes and their vassals.55 When Frederick visited Germany in 1235, this collective nature of governance permeated both his celebration of imperial lordship and his efforts at reforming the government of Germany. The deposition of his son as king, for instance, the creation of the new duchy of Brunswick and the imminent war against the duke of Austria, as well as the general reform of the legal and juridical structure of royal lordship, were celebrated as emanating from the princes, with Frederick little more than their willing executioner.56 This was not, of course, an accurate reection of reality. In fact, what distinguished the German case in 1235 from, for example, England in 1215, Hungary in 1222 or Aragon and Castile in the twelve-sixties, was that, rather than limiting or restraining royal power, Frederick II used the collective nature of imperial rule as a means of strengthening his hold on the princes. The emperors German sojourn was dominated by an emphasis on the duties that this communal governance imposed upon the great men of the realm: if princes failed to perform their functions, they forfeited the special status through which they had gained these rights and privileges. This was certainly the line taken by Frederick in dealing with his son, and it was soon applied to others: the process against Duke Frederick of Austria, for example, which began in the summer of 1235, centring on the dukes violation of his duties towards empire and emperor, drew on and elaborated the principles rst invoked against Henry.57 Although this was also a highly unusual reading, and one that did not outlast Fredericks second excommunication (1239), Henry (VII)s revolt, despite all that was specically German and Staufen about it, still highlights developments in evidence across the thirteenth-century West. Similarly, Henry (VII)s argument that his uprising was merely an attempt to gain a fair hearing from his father, a last resort used after all other avenues had been exhausted, should sound familiar. Again, it was not a concept peculiar to the thirteenth century, but one that was then invoked with increasing regularity and frequency. In England, for instance, this had been the line of justication taken by
S. Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe 900 1300 (Oxford, 1984), pp. 262 302. In 1231, for instance, Henry ( VII) had issued a charter which decreed that princes could act only in consultation with their knights and vassals. More importantly, Frederick II later conrmed this charter (Constitutiones 1198 1272, no. 305). One should perhaps also note the similarities with England, where, as John Maddicott has suggested, one of the reasons Simon de Montfort fell out with his fellow rebels after 1258 was the question of the extent to which the standards demanded of the king (and used to justify Henry IIIs disempowerment) should be applied to dealings between the magnates and their dependants (Maddicott, pp. 228 38). 56 E. Boshof, Reich und Reichsfrsten in Herrschaftsverstndnis und Politik Kaiser Friedrichs II. nach 1230, in Heinrich Raspe: Landgraf von Thringen und rmischer Knig (1227 47), ed. M. Werner (Frankfurt am Main, 2003), pp. 3 27, at pp. 10 11; B. Weiler, Reasserting power: Frederick II in Germany (1235 6), in Representations of Power in Medieval Germany, 800 1500, ed. B. Weiler and S. MacLean (Turnhout, 2006), pp. 241 72. 57 Weiler, Reasserting power, pp. 268 71; F. Hausmann, Kaiser Friedrich II. und sterreich, in Probleme um Friedrich II., ed. J. Fleckenstein (Sigmaringen, 1974), pp. 225 308, at pp. 242 56; H. Dopsch, K. Brunner and M. Weltin, sterreichische Geschichte 1122 1278: Die Lnder und das Reich. Der Ostalpenraum im Hochmittelalter (Vienna, 1999), pp. 189 94.
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the barons rebelling against King John in 1215, and it continued to be invoked by the earl marshal when rebelling against Henry III in 1233 4, and even by the barons who rose up against the king in 12635.58 It was, however, an argument notably absent from the Young Kings letter in 1173, and it does not appear to have played much of a role in the proceedings against Alfonso of Castile in 1282. This may in part reect the relative strength of Frederick II in 1235. Unlike Henry II in 1173, or Alfonso X in 1282, the emperor was at the height of his standing and power. This would explain Henry (VII)s inability to nd allies, and it contextualizes his selfrepresentation as an aggrieved vassal seeking redress from his lord: there was not much else that he could have done. We should, nally, return to the importance of honour. Both Henry and his father used a discourse of legitimization centring on the honor imperatoris et imperii, the honour of emperor and empire. Henry had rebelled because Frederick repeatedly infringed his honor, and once Frederick visited Germany in 1235, the honor imperii permeated his visit. It appeared in documents as diverse as the enfeoffment of Otto the Child with the duchy of Brunswick it was the emperors duty to defend and increase the name and honour of the empire (imperii nomen et honor)59 and the Reichslandfrieden, or imperial land peace of Mainz by maintaining peace greater glory accrued to Frederick, and greater benet to his subjects.60 It was also apparent in the campaign against the duke of Austria in 1235 6 who had to be punished as he violated the honour of the empire by insulting that of his subjects. 61 It may be tempting to view this continuing emphasis on honour as indicative of the archaism of governmental structures in Germany, where abstract values such as honour, which manifested themselves through their public symbolism, compensated, by their wider practical and political implications, for the absence of the administrative structures associated, for instance, with Aragon or the Italian city states. These concepts were, however, equally popular, for example, in thirteenth-century England, by any standards a realm with more elaborate administrative and bureaucratic structures than those available in Germany. Rather, the importance of honor highlights basic structural features in the way medieval politics was conducted: honour and the way it was expressed and claimed indicated publicly, to a rulers or princes peers and subjects, his status, standing and political clout. Other means of securing and exercising power military might, nancial resources and so on were to some extent dependent on status for their effectiveness, or they reected it, but they could not compensate for its lack. The revolt led, in 1282, by the future Sancho IV of Castile against his father, Alfonso X, el Sabio, differed from our previous examples in a number of ways. 62 First, Sancho seems to have been fully involved in the governance of the realm well before
58 Rogeri de Wendover Chronica sive Flores Historiarum, ed. H. O. Coxe (5 vols., 1841 4), iii. 373 8, iv. 282 8; Les gestes de Chiprois, ed. G. Reynard (Paris, 1887) (hereafter Gestes de Chiprois), pp. 172 7. 59 Constitutiones 1198 1272, no. 197. 60 Constitutiones 1198 1272, no. 196. 61 Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Babenberger in sterreich. Vierter Band. Zweiter Halbband. Ergnzende Quellen 1195 1287, ed. O. Freiherr von Mitis, H. Dienst, C. Lackner and H. Hageneder ( Vienna and Munich, 1997) ( hereafter Urkundenbuch Babenberger), nos. 1193, 1198. 62 M. G. Jimenz, Alfonso X el Sabio (1252 84) (Palencia, 1993), pp. 134 45; J. F. OCallaghan, The Learned King: the Reign of Alfonso X of Castile (Philadelphia, Pa., 1993), pp. 252 69; a step by step outline of events has been provided by A. BallesterosBeretta, Alfonso X el Sabio (Barcelona and Madrid, 1963), pp. 953 98.
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his revolt: he had been present at meetings with King Pedro of Aragon in 1281, for instance, and had taken part in negotiations with the king of France. Second, he succeeded: although Sancho refused to take the title of king, he began to exercise effective royal control during his fathers lifetime. Finally, he pursued a strategy of legitimization which, while drawing on familiar elements, also reected more rened legal thinking on secular authority, and which, in its ideology and in the principles it invoked, points to the royal depositions of the fourteenth century; that is, Alfonso X was not a bad lord who had to be deposed (as had been argued about Henry II) or corrected (as Henry (VII) had claimed of Frederick II), but one who was no longer capable of ruling. Alfonsos nal years had been plagued by setbacks. His election as king of the Romans in 1256/7 had failed to gain him more than a disputed title; the Mudejar rebellion of the twelve-sixties had seriously undermined his prestige as a defender of Christianity in Spain; and the subsequent revolt of Alfonsos leading subjects had limited both the nancial resources and the manpower at the kings disposal. Moreover, even the death of his rival for the imperial throne, Richard of Cornwall, in 1272, had failed to ease Alfonsos path to it, and he was forced to surrender his claim altogether.63 These setbacks were further aggravated by conicts within the royal family. In 1277, Alfonso had ordered the execution of his brother, Infante Fadrique, and of Simn Ruiz de los Cameros, a member of one of the leading noble families of Castile, who were to be among Sanchos earliest supporters. 64 Fadriques hanging in itself a deeply shameful death had been justied partly by alleged plans to displace Alfonso as king, partly by the Infantes homosexuality. 65 To make matters worse, in 1278 Queen Violante ed her husbands court and took refuge with her brother, the king of Aragon, while Alfonsos daughter-in-law ed to France. 66 In addition, Alfonso faced a Muslim invasion from north Africa, and the increasing reluctance of his subjects to fund his expensive and ineffective defence of the realm. In early February 1281, furthermore, an armed conict with the king of France had narrowly been avoided. The point of no return, as far as Infante Sancho was concerned, was reached in 1281, when Alfonso presented the cortes of Seville with a plan to create a separate kingdom in Jaen for one of his grandsons. 67 Sancho replied with an impassioned plea for his sole succession to the Castilian throne, and for an
63 B. Roberg, Die Abdankung Alfons X. von Kastilien als deutscher Knig, Historisches Jahrbuch, lxxxiv (1964), 334 51; OCallaghan, The Learned King, pp. 198 233. 64 Crnica de Alfonso X. Segn el Ms. II/2777 de la Biblioteca del Palacio Real (Madrid), ed. and trans. M. G. Jimnez (Murcia, 1998) (hereafter Crnica de Alfonso X ), pp. 227 9; Chrnica de Alfonso X: Chronicle of Alfonso X, trans. S. Thacker and J. Escobar (Lexington, Ky., 2002) (hereafter Chronicle of Alfonso X ), p. 248. 65 OCallaghan, The Learned King, pp. 241 3; R. P. Kinkade, Alfonso X, Cantiga 235, and the events of 1269 78, Speculum, lxvii (1992), 284 323; Jofr de Loaysa, Crnica de los Reyes de Castilla Fernando III, Alfonso X, Sancho IV y Fernando IV (1248 1305), ed. and trans. A. G. Martnez (2nd edn., Murcia, 1982) (hereafter Jofr de Loaysa, Crnica), p. 108; Crnica de Alfonso X, p. 194; Chronicle of Alfonso X, p. 220. 66 OCallaghan, The Learned King, pp. 2768; Crnica de Alfonso X, pp. 198200; Chronicle of Alfonso X, pp. 225 6; The Chronicle of San Juan de la PeNa: a 14th-Century Ofcial History of the Crown of Aragon, trans. L. H. Nelson (Philadelphia, Pa., 1991) (hereafter Chronicle of San Juan de la PeNa), p. 70. Forcing a royal consort into exile was a token of moral and therefore ultimately political depravity. A good survey is provided by W. Kowalski, Die deutschen Kniginnen und Kaiserinnen von Konrad III. bis zum Ende des Interregnums (Weimar, 1913), pp. 28 34; see also the allegations against Henry (VII), who was rumoured to have sought to divorce his wife to marry the duke of Austrias daughter instead (Annales Wormatienses, in Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Worms, ed. H. Boos (3 vols., Berlin, 1886 93), ii. 146), or against the duke, who was accused of having sought to imprison his mother (Urkundenbuch Babenberger, nos. 1190, 1198). 67 J. F. OCallaghan, The Cortes of Castile-Len, 1188 1350 (Philadelphia, Pa., 1989), pp. 25 6.
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inheritance which could and should not be diminished.68 Shortly thereafter he went on a diplomatic mission to Granada, and was joined by his brothers Pedro and Juan, as well as the leaders of various military orders.69 Sanchos rebellion had begun. Sancho, however, faced the problem that, in the sons of his predeceased elder brother, Fernando de Cerda, there existed rival claimants to the throne, a dilemma that was to plague Castilian politics well into the fourteenth century. Consequently, it is unsurprising that Sancho justied his bid not with reference to a right of inheritance (all too easily questioned by those supporting his nephews), but to Alfonsos alleged tyranny. The rebels strove to establish a clear contrast between the ideals of good royal lordship and the tyrannous reality of Alfonsos rule. Sancho and his brothers toured the realm, settling small-scale conicts and promising to restore ancient customs and liberties. Initially, therefore, the rebellion consisted less of armed combat than a series of meetings between the rebels and the regnal assemblies of the constituent parts and provinces of the Castilian monarchy, with each having its privileges conrmed, and Sancho granting additional revenues and liberties. 70 Sancho also performed a series of highly symbolic acts: he recalled nobles from exile, arranged for his mother to return and demonstratively gave an honourable burial to the remains of Infante Fadrique.71 Several charters and chronicle entries survive outlining the reasons for Sanchos revolt.72 They centre on the tyranny of Alfonso X, who had destroyed the livelihood of his people through repeated devaluations, and by overtaxing them; who had tyrannically oppressed the liberty of the church and ignored the privileges and rights of his nobles; who had killed members even of his own family without due legal process; and who was unable to defend the realm against its enemies. To this we can add further accusations, referred to by Alfonso X in his response to Infante Sancho: most importantly, that the king was mad and a leper, and no longer capable of acting like a king.73 Much of this drew on an established repertoire of describing a tyrannical ruler, but combined it with a more comprehensive picture of Alfonso X not as someone unwilling, but as someone incapable of ruling. It was certainly the approach nally taken by the cortes of Valladolid in April 1282, where the assembled magnates and prelates decided that Sancho should assume control of the exercise of justice, the collection of taxes and the management of royal castles, but that Alfonso X should remain king.74 Why did Sancho stop short of claiming the throne? Political realities certainly played their part: there was an important difference between acting on behalf of a king for the greater good of the realm and usurping the throne. Furthermore, Joseph OCallaghan has drawn attention to the wider international context: Alfonsos
68 Crnica de Alfonso X, pp. 21820; Chronicle of Alfonso X, pp. 2412; OCallaghan, The Learned King, p. 257. 69 Crnica de Alfonso X, pp. 220 30; Chronicle of Alfonso X, pp. 244 9. 70 Crnica de Alfonso X, pp. 220 30; Chronicle of Alfonso X, pp. 246 9; OCallaghan, Cortes of Castile-Len, pp. 85 90. 71 Crnica de Alfonso X, p. 223; Chronicle of Alfonso X, pp. 245 6. 72 Jofr de Loaysa, Crnica, p. 114; Prvlegos Reales de la Catedral de Toledo, ii, ed. J. A. Garca Lujn (Toledo, 1982), no. 85; the most detailed account, although considerably later, is that in the Crnica de Alfonso X, pp. 230 41; Chronicle of Alfonso X, pp. 242 57. 73 Diplomatario Andaluz de Alfonso X, ed. M. G. Jimnez (Seville, 1991) (hereafter Diplomatario Andaluz), no. 503. 74 Jofr de Loaysa, Crnica, p. 114; OCallaghan, The Learned King, pp. 266 9.
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in-laws, the kings of Aragon, England and France, might have tolerated the settlement of Valladolid, but would perhaps have viewed an act of deposition either as unacceptable or as a welcome opportunity to intervene in the affairs of Castile. 75 It could also echo a very different way of dealing with bad kings. Peter Linehan has pointed to the similarities between the proceedings against Alfonso X and the deposition of King Sancho II of Portugal during the Council of Lyons in 1245. 76 For unlike the other, more famous casualty of 1245 Emperor Frederick II Sancho II was not deposed, but merely deprived of his authority as king. Pope Innocent IV had called upon Sanchos brother Alfonso, count of Boulogne, to rule on the kings behalf, and with the ofcial title of curator regni, keeper of the kingdom.77 Sancho II had been declared unable to rule because he took wicked counsel, persecuted the church and attacked ecclesiastical and lay properties. As he was unwilling to listen to the grievances of his subjects, they had turned to the pope, who saw no other way of acting but to entrust Alfonso with the administration of justice, the control of royal castles and the raising of royal revenue. Both the accusations made against Sancho II and the settlement nally proposed by the pope thus foreshadow what happened in Castile in 1282. There is another possible parallel: England in 1264 5, with the rebel barons led by Simon de Montfort in charge of the kingdom. After all, King Henry III had not been deposed, but had effectively been deprived of the ability to govern. The key difference was, of course, that Henry III was never formally declared incapable of ruling. Nonetheless, like Sancho IV, de Montfort and the barons took considerable care to manifest their loyalty to the king: charters continued to be issued in his name, and even at the battle of Evesham in 1265, which ended de Montforts regime, the rebel army was led by the king (although under guard and without arms). 78 Similarly, some of the reasons given by de Montfort and his partisans seem to foreshadow the Castilian example: the kings refusal to take the advice and counsel of his subjects, his unwillingness to reform the governance of the realm, his violation of established rights and freedoms, and perhaps most importantly his repeated breaking of promises. 79 It is difcult to prove that Sancho and his allies were familiar with the English case: although de Montforts revolt was commented on by writers as far aeld as Cyprus
OCallaghan, The Learned King, p. 262. The Blackwell History of Medieval Spain (Oxford, forthcoming). The author is grateful to Dr. Linehan for allowing him to read the draft version of his section on Sanchos revolt. 77 E. Peters, The Shadow King: Rex Inutilis in Medieval Law and Literature, 7511327 (New Haven and London, 1970), pp. 135 69; E. Peters, Rex inutilis: Sancho II of Portugal and 13th-century deposition theory, Studia Gratiana, xiv (1967), 253 306 (repr. in his Limits of Thought and Power in Medieval Europe (Aldershot, 2001)). 78 Chronica de Mailros, ed. J. Stevenson (Bannatyne Club, Edinburgh, 1835), p. 201; Arnold FitzThedmar, De Antiquis Legibus Liber, ed. T. Stapleton (Camden Soc., 1846), pp. 53 4; for an important discussion taking a somewhat different stance, see C. Valente, The Theory and Practice of Revolt in Medieval England (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 68 107. 79 Gestes de Chiprois, pp. 172 7. See also P. W. Edbury, The de Montforts in the Latin East, ThirteenthCentury England VIII: Proceedings of the Durham Conference 1999, ed. R. Britnell, R. Frame and M. Prestwich (Woodbridge, 2001), pp. 23 32. Equally, we should note the difculties which had faced Jaime of Aragon during the 1260s (The Book of Deeds of James I of Aragon: a Translation of the Medieval Catalan Llibre dels Fets, trans. D. Smith and H. Buffery (Aldershot, 2003), pp. 288 301; J. N. Hillgarth, The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250 1516 (2 vols., Oxford, 1976 8), i. 277; D. J. Kagay, Structures of baronial dissent and revolt under James I (1213 76), Mediaevistik, i (1988), 61 85; J. L. Villacaas, Jaume I el Conquistador (Madrid, 2003), pp. 678 90). See also the difculties facing Alfonso X in the 1260s (OCallaghan, The Learned King, pp. 21433; P. K. Rodgers, Alfonso X writes to his son: the Crnica de Alfonso X , Exemplaria Hispanica, i (1991 2), 58 79).
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and Norway,80 none of the Castilian chronicles dealing with the twelve-sixties makes reference to it. At the same time, there were close contacts between the English and Castilian royal courts Henry IIIs heir was married to Alfonso Xs sister, and at least one meeting at the papal court, convened to decide whether Alfonso or Richard of Cornwall should be crowned emperor, had to be postponed because Richard had been captured by the barons.81 How far this inuenced the actions of Sancho and his allies is perhaps impossible to determine, but it should certainly alert us to the fact that this was not a peculiarly Iberian phenomenon. The arguments used in 1282 reect a more general development it was increasingly acceptable to depose a ruler, or at least to curtail his authority, if he failed to perform his duties. This in itself was not necessarily something new Gregory VII had used a similar line with Emperor Henry IV and King Solomon of Hungary in the eleventh century,82 as had William of Malmesbury in the twelfth, when describing Robert Curthose or King Stephen (not forgetting Einhards ninth-century depiction of the last Merovingian king).83 However, the degree to which the community of the realm could act in curtailing and limiting a monarchs power, and even in deposing him if he persistently failed to perform his functions, marks an important qualitative shift from earlier periods, as does the subtle distinction between deposition and a denial of the authority to rule.84 To some extent, the line of reasoning developed in Castile echoed similar arguments employed, for instance, in 1298, when a number of German princes sought to justify their rebellion against King Adolf of Nassau. 85 It certainly played a part in the deposition of Edward II in England 86 or in the dealings between King John of Bohemia and his Czech subjects in the early fourteenth century.87 Older traditions did, of course, continue to be invoked, as is illustrated by the case of Edward II or of King Wenzel in Germany in 1399, 88 but the degree to which the justication of revolt had changed in 1282 from that advanced in 1173 makes this an appropriate point at which to move from specic case studies to a series of more general questions.
Gestes des Chiprois, ch. 330 8, 172 7; Saga of Magnus, in The Saga of Hacon, and a Fragment of the Saga of Magnus with Appendices, trans. G. W. Dasent (Icelandic Sagas, iv, 1894), p. 377. 81 Epistolae Saeculi XIII e Regestis Ponticium Romanorum Selectae, ed. C. Rodenberg (M.G.H. Epistolae, 3 vols., Berlin 1883 94), iii, no. 631. For Anglo-Castilian relations in the reign of Alfonso X generally, see A. Goodman, Alfonso X and the English crown, in Alfonso X el Sabio, Vida, Obra Y Epoca, ed. J. C. de Miguel Rodriguez, A. Muoz Fernandez and C. Segura Graio (Madrid, 1989), pp. 39 54. 82 Das Register Gregors VII., ed. E. Caspar (M.G.H. Epistolae Selectae, 2 vols., Berlin, 1920 3), ii, no. 63. 83 Weiler, Kingship, usurpation and propaganda, pp. 31113; Einhardi Vita Karoli, in Quellen zur karolingischen Reichsgeschichte, i. 166 9. 84 E. H. Kantorowicz, The Kings Two Bodies: a Study in Medieval Political Theology (Princeton, N.J., 1957), pp. 143 64; H. G. Walther, Das Problem des untauglichen Herrschers in der Theorie und Praxis des europischen Sptmittelalters, Zeitschrift fr Historische Forschung, xxiii (1996), 1 28. 85 A. Gerlich, Adolf von Nassau (1292 8). Aufstieg und Sturz eines Knigs, Herrscheramt und Kurfrstenfronde, Nassauische Annalen. Jahrbuch des Vereins fr Nassauische Altertumskunde und Geschichtsforschung, cv (1994), 17 78. 86 Peters, Shadow King, pp. 232 42. 87 See the essays in Johann der Blinde: Graf von Luxemburg, Knig von Bhmen 1296 1346, ed. M. Pauly (Luxembourg, 1997); Die Knigsaaler Geschichts-Quellen mit den Zustzen und Fortsetzungen des Domherrn Franz von Prag, ed. J. Loserth (Vienna, 1875), pp. 391 7. 88 Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Knig Wenzel. Dritte Abteilung: 1397 1400, ed. J. Weizscker (2nd edn., Gttingen, 1956), nos. 204 5; Die Weltchronik des Mnches Albert, 1273/77 1454/56, ed. R. Sprandel (M.G.H. S.R.G., new ser., Munich, 1994), p. 306. F. Graus, Das Scheitern von Knigen: Karl VI., Richard II., Wenzel IV., in Das sptmittelalterliche Knigtum im europischen Vergleich, ed. R. Schneider (Sigmaringen, 1987), pp. 17 40.
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Our rebels had no reason to doubt that they would one day be kings the Young King and Henry (VII) had already been crowned, and Sancho had begun to exercise authority jointly with his father. Moreover, they had all publicly been acknowledged as heirs designate: the two Henrys had been crowned, and in 1278 Sancho had been recognized as his fathers heir. This was not, however, the whole story. Some contemporary observers pointed out, for instance, that the Young Kings uprising was linked to the demands made by his brothers Richard and Geoffrey who also had to be provided for, and the fact that his youngest brother John was to be enfeoffed with lands in Anjou.89 There was thus the very real possibility that at least part of Henry IIs domains might be taken out of the Young Kings control. Sancho, similarly, started his revolt not long after plans had been announced to diminish the lands he would inherit by creating a separate kingdom of Jaen, and there was the risk of a rival bid for the throne by the children of his predeceased elder brother, Fernando. Henry (VII), too, faced potential rivals. In fact, some chroniclers claimed that his revolt had been triggered by envy of his half-brother Conrad, the king of Jerusalem. 90 Each rebel faced either limitations on his authority and resources, or the prospect of rival claimants. These rebellions were thus, to some extent, conicts over securing the material foundations of political power. Ultimately, the loss of substantial revenues in mainland Europe would seriously have restricted the Young Kings ability to rule, or perhaps even to ght off the ambitions of his brothers (as the examples of William Rufus, Robert Curthose or Stephen of Blois would have taught him). In the empire, the successful exercise of imperial authority depended to an ever larger degree on the resources of the kingdom of Sicily, which was held not as part of the empire, but as a separate ef from the papacy (and which would thus not necessarily have been part of Henry ( VII)s inheritance). Greater issues were at stake than the feelings of stroppy adolescents. Moreover, these were not conicts just within the royal family, but involved the great men of the realm, as well as the kingdoms neighbours. The Young Kings uprising provided a means for all those threatened by or disillusioned with the actions of Henry II to channel their protest and voice their demands. The initial success of the revolt was thus not so much an expression of support for the aims of the Young King as the result of the pent up frustration among many of the old kings leading subjects, notably over his expansion of royal prerogatives at the expense of his noble and ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief and the handling of patronage and noble inheritances. Similarly, support for Sancho had been born out of old grievances Alfonsos killing of nobles, for example but also immediate concerns, including disillusionment with the kings expensive yet fruitless imperial adventure and his inability to see off a resurgent kingdom of Granada. It was but one in a series of clashes between king and nobles. There was a reason, after all, why the relatives of Simon de Cameros, who had been executed with Fadrique, were among the earliest and most important of Sanchos supporters.91 Henry ( VII)s revolt provides a suitable counterpoint: grievances about the state of the realm were directed not at the emperor but at the king, and this (in addition to the fact that Frederick was at the height of his power and inuence) best explains the young kings lack of a following.
Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi, i. 41. Thomae Tusci Gesta Imperatorum et Ponticum (M.G.H. Scriptores, xxii), p. 512; Annales Placentini Gibellini (M.G.H. Scriptores, xviii), p. 470; Annales Bergomates (M.G.H. Scriptores, xxxi), p. 333; D. Henniges, Vita Sanctae Elisabeth, Landgraviae Thuringiae auctore anonymo nunc primum in lucem edita, Archivum Franciscanum Historicum, ii (1909), 240 68, at p. 264. 91 Crnica de Alfonso X, p. 228; Chronicle of Alfonso X, pp. 248 9.
90 89
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Sanchos and the Young Kings rebellions also highlight an important structural element of many baronial revolts: the need for legitimization by winning support from within the royal family. This had been one of the driving factors in the English succession struggles of 113554 and 11981202, but is equally evident, for example, in the history of twelfth-century Norway or thirteenth-century Serbia: there was little more dangerous for an act of noble resistance than the lack of a morally and politically legitimizing gurehead. We should, at the same time, avoid, rst, assuming that every act of noble resistance needed royal backing, and, second, imposing a reductionist reading on that relationship when it did occur. Sufcient examples survive of barons taking up arms without the support of royal sons, and of sons rebelling while the nobles and prelates either stood by or sided with the king. This is not to say, however, that princes did not portray their actions as having the backing of their subjects, or nobles their revolts as acts of loyalty. Rebellious magnates required legitimacy not just to cloak ulterior motives: equally important was the need to avoid being perceived as driven by such concerns, not just in the eyes of ones opponents, but also of potential allies. Being associated with the king-in-waiting was also a matter of political inuence and protection: those allied with a kings son or eldest brother were unlikely to experience the kind of harsh and unrelenting treatment increasingly meted out to rebels.92 That this calculation did not always work is evident in the German case, where Henrys partisans were ruthlessly pursued by the emperor. This, however, serves to underline the exceptional nature of Henry (VII)s fate: a kings rebellious progeny were not normally deprived of their authority to rule or incarcerated for the remainder of their earthly life.93 Similarly, while in Castile being associated with Fadrique had not saved either Alfonsos brother or his allies, it was the killing of a member of the royal family and his supporters that was to be cited as token of Alfonsos tyranny. It thus underlined the degree to which the king had breached the rules and conventions of political morality. Having a kings heir or close relative with whom to throw in ones lot provided legitimacy, but also security and protection against wrathful and victorious fathers. This also reects a constant in political rebellions during this period: revolts frequently, although not always, proclaimed themselves to be acts of loyalty towards the king, of resistance not towards the monarch, but those shielding him from the men who should rightfully ll his court and household. There were, of course, exceptions, but even in England and the kingdoms of Jerusalem or Cyprus, where, in the thirteenth century, the most elaborate legal and ideological framework for legitimizing resistance towards royal power had been developed, its rejection was couched in terms that stressed that the rebels were, in fact, those genuinely loyal to the king. This need for royal legitimization is also evident in the degree to which baronial rebels, unable to call upon the services of a rebellious prince, portrayed their actions as tokens of sincere loyalty: they might have to foist it upon the king, but theirs was nonetheless true fealty. Hence the insistence in England in 1264 5, for example, that Simon de Montfort derived his authority from the king he held captive, or the degree to which, also in England, Richard Marshal and his allies sought to
92 A shift also noted, in Germany, by G. Althoff, Die Macht der Ritual: Symbolik und Herrschaft im Mittelalter (Darmstadt, 2003), pp. 145 60, 181 6; and, in a wider European context, by Broekmann, pp. 156 9, 354 8. 93 See also Broekmann, pp. 360 9, who argues that contemporary chroniclers felt it necessary to invent crimes committed by the king to justify the harshness of Fredericks response.
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paint a clear contrast between the rebels, who were the kings true friends and faithful men, and those who had perniciously usurped access to the royal person. 94 Comparable concerns played their part in the case of young kings: after all, few of them ever managed to wrest the throne from their fathers. Apart from Sancho IV, this author only knows of one other case in which a thirteenth-century prince managed to do so Stefan Dragutin of Serbia, who, in 1276, succeeded Stefan Uro 4 I.95 Just as magnates required princes to provide them with legitimacy and protection, so princes needed the support of their subjects. While to later observers, writing after the emperors death, Fredericks treatment of Henry ( VII) may thus have become a token of his tyranny and injustice,96 the harshness of his response was at least in part made possible by the kings inability to win the backing of his magnates. We should, however, also notice that the majority of princes did not, or at least did not claim to, seek to replace their fathers: Henry the Young King was the clear exception. Even Sancho IV had only radicalized his stance after Alfonso had called upon the ruler of Granada for support against the rebels, and threatened to disinherit his son. Nor did lial resistance necessarily take the form of all-out war: the future Edward I of England, for example, voiced his protest through the company he kept and the degree to which he allowed his agents to voice views critical of his father.97 Military failure could bring with it political gains, as exemplied by the Young King and his brothers, who, after 1174, were granted at least some of the authority they had until then be denied. Resistance was a means of winning concessions, and war only ensued when fathers continued to refuse the demands of their progeny (as had been the case with the Young King and Henry ( VII)), when military action remained the only tool by which an even greater evil could be averted (as with Sancho IV, but also, some contemporaries claimed, Henry ( VII)), or when the dynastys ability to maintain its grip on the throne was threatened (as, in 1105 6, with Emperor Henry IV and his son Henry V). Even in those rare instances when a lial rebellion did succeed, the old king was rarely deposed: Alfonso X had been deprived of the authority, but not the title of kingship, while in 1105, Henry V did not seize the empire from his father Henry IV, but the old emperor resigned it to his son. 98 All this had, to some extent, to do with the moral stigma attached to rebellious sons,99 a stigma, moreover, that applied to the rebels and their fathers in equal measure. Princes moulded their actions at least in part to avoid accusations of being
94 For England, see M. Strickland, Against the Lords anointed: aspects of warfare and baronial rebellion in England and Normandy, 1075 1265, in Law and Government in Medieval England and Normandy: Essays in Honour of Sir James Holt, ed. G. Garnett and J. G. H. Hudson (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 56 79; B. Weiler, Kingship, Rebellion and Political Culture: England and Germany, c.1215 c.1250 (Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 76102. For Germany, see J. Rogge, Attentate und Schlachten. Beobachtungen zum Verhltnis von Knigtum und Gewalt im deutschen Reich whrend des 13. und 14. Jahrhunderts, in Knigliche Gewalt Gewalt gegen Knige: Macht und Mord im sptmittelalterlichen Europa, ed. J. Rogge and M. Kintzinger (Berlin, 2004), pp. 750. For France, see J. Le Goff, Saint Louis (Paris, 1996), pp. 88 112. 95 Serbisches Mittelalter. Altserbische Herrscherbiographie, ii: Danilo II und seine Schler, die Knigsbiographien, trans. S. Hafner (Slavische Geschichtsschreiber, ix, Graz, Vienna and Cologne, 1976), pp. 63 6. The author is grateful to Slavica Rankovic for this reference. 96 Die Kaiserchronik eines Regensburger Geistlichen, ed. E. Schrder (M.G.H. Deutsche Chroniken, Hanover, 1892), Erste (Bairische) Forstetzung, 405, ll. 616 18. 97 Maddicott, pp. 183 5, 193 7, 199 201. 98 S. Weinfurter, Canossa: Die Entzauberung der Welt (Munich, 2006), pp. 191 205; V. Huth, Reichsinsignien und Herrschaftsentzug. Eine vergleichende Skizze zu Heinrich IV. und Heinrich ( VII.) im Spiegel der Vorgnge von 1105/6 und 1235, Frhmittelalterliche Studien, xxvi (1992), 287 330. 99 See Krger, passim.
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usurpers, desirous of the throne, mere tyrants in the making. They thus claimed to act in order to restore an ideal status quo ante, at the behest of their subjects and in order properly to exercise the duties of kingship. Hence Henry ( VII)s stress on the public diets which had legitimized his actions, and Sanchos touring of the realm, convening and attending regnal assemblies, conrming liberties and issuing privileges. Their actions required a public display of support, either active (by taking up arms in support of the rebel prince) or passive (by accepting the validity and legitimate authority of his acts and actions). As far as the fathers were concerned, having their own sons take up arms against them was politically and symbolically damaging. Contemporaries were all too familiar with the example of Absalom and David, with the sons rebellion punishment for the fathers sins.100 This also explains why the fathers in question were cautious in drawing these parallels. We should thus note the different ways in which Henry II and Frederick II employed the Biblical precedent. The English king, while never likening himself to David or his sons expressly to Absalom, nonetheless portrayed his sons rebellion as an act of divine punishment. 101 But then his response to the revolt had been an act of ostentatious penance at the tomb of Thomas Becket, including his walking barefoot and receiving a public whipping (in another parallel to David who had ed barefoot from his son). 102 Not only did this representation of Henrys uprising tie in with the general note of the old kings actions, and their emphasis on contrition, repentance and an acknowledgement of past sinfulness, but it was also made all the easier by the fact that, soon after the fathers act of public penance, the king of Scotland and other leading rebels had been defeated and captured. It was easier to accept rebellion as an act of punishment once the revolt had been overcome and penance rewarded. Similarly, Frederick II, the sole example of a father explicitly likening his son to Davids depraved progeny, did so only after it had become clear that Henry ( VII) could be overcome with ease, and after the kings limited backing had become evident.103 This, in turn, brings us back to the relationship between rebels and princes: the latter, too, required the protection and legitimacy that only broad support could provide. These uprisings were thus not merely instances of barons exploiting factions at court, or princes tensions between their fathers and their subjects. Rather, they reveal the degree of mutual dependence, based in equal measure on political realities and moral norms, that tied rulers and ruled together. All this raises questions of denition and typology. How can we distinguish rebellions within the royal family from the normal conict between generations, and how from baronial rebellions by the kings subjects? There will be no clear answer, and we face problems similar to those encountered by Samuel Cohn in his recent study of popular revolts,104 aggravated by the fact that we are dealing with three examples as opposed to Professor Cohns well over a thousand. This in itself may, however, already hold part of the answer: these revolts were rare, and seem to have petered out by the early decades of the fourteenth century. This partly reected biological accident (princes being too young to provide credible leadership) and partly
In lieu of a very rich literature, see P. Buc, Lambigut du livre: prince, pouvoir, et peuple dans le commentaries de la Bible au moyen age (Paris, 1994), p. 356. In a wider German context, see Krger, passim. 101 Receuil des actes, no. 460. 102 On David walking barefoot, see 2 Samuel XV: 30. 103 Historia Diplomatica, iv. 528. 104 S. K. Cohn, Jr., Lust for Liberty: the Politics of Social Revolt in Medieval Europe, 1200 1400. Italy, France, and Flanders (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), pp. 76 107.
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broader historical developments (the inability of the fourteenth-century German kings to secure the succession of their own sons, for instance), but also fundamental structural changes (other outlets for protest such as assemblies, institutionalized access to the royal person and so on that were set aside only when a ruler violated norms of political behaviour in a manner that made these channels too dangerous or ineffective to use). One of the reasons Edward I in England, for example, decided to side with his father against the barons in 1263 5 was perhaps that what had begun as an attempt to curtail the inuence of one faction at court threatened to shift power away from the monarch, and to do so to a degree that Edward, as future king, would have found as hard to stomach as his father and his fathers peers. It is also worth speculating that the shift in dealing with kings perceived as ineffectual and tyrannical, evident in the case of Alfonso X, may explain why the association between rebellious princes and aggrieved barons ceased to be as regular a phenomenon in the fourteenth and fteenth century: the reasoning employed in deposing kings set too dangerous a precedent for those eager to succeed to the throne themselves. While princely and baronial rebellions overlapped in many areas, and while they certainly invoked similar mechanisms and strategies of legitimization, they were also quite distinct. In this respect, at least, it is possible to argue that the chief difference between an ordinary rising by barons and the kind discussed here was that princes, as heirs to the throne, could provide an immediate focus of loyalty towards the crown that other rebels lacked. Values and norms thus provided as crucial a tool in the conduct of revolt as the use of arms, the nding of allies and the rules of negotiation. We have, of course, encountered sometimes very different concepts of royal power, conditioned either by the audience of a letter or by the specic circumstances of a revolt. Nonetheless, there were some shared themes: a duty to guarantee the liberty of the church (most pronounced in 1173, but equally present in 1282); a responsibility to deliver justice and aid those who could not protect themselves (a concern shared in almost equal measure by the Young King, Henry (VII) and Sancho IV); and the need to take the advice and counsel of ones leading subjects (which had been at the heart of Henry (VII)s letter, but which was also referred to by Sancho IV). There was also a common emphasis on the degree to which a ruler was bound by shared legal norms: even in 1173, this had formed part of the background to the Young Kings revolt, but it also mattered in Henry (VII)s uprising and was most fully pronounced in that of Sancho IV. The weighting of these values, the order in which they appeared and the detail with which they were elaborated changed, of course, over time, and according to specic circumstances. There were regnal traditions, too: it is striking, for instance, to notice the degree to which the maintenance of public order, the settlement of feuds and the pacication of the empire remained the key legitimizing topoi in Germany for most of the middle ages, invoked in equal measure in 1198, in 1235, by the antikings installed after Fredericks deposition in 1245, by both Alfonso X and Richard of Cornwall after 1257, by Rudolf of Habsburg and Ottokar of Bohemia in 1273 4 and 12768, and by the opponents of King Adolph of Nassau in 1298. 105 These topoi
105 K. Hampe, Ungedruckte Briefe zur Geschichte Knig Richards von Cornwall aus der Sammlung Richards von Po, Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft fr ltere deutsche Geschichtsforschung, xxx (1905), 673 90; Constitutiones 1273 98, nos. 16, 474, 618, 620, 621. These should be read in conjunction with the pertinent comments, although mostly relating to the 11th and 12th centuries, by T. Reuter, The insecurity of travel in the early and high middle ages: criminals, victims and their medieval and modern observers, in his Medieval Polities, pp. 38 71.
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had largely disappeared from English political discourse during the twelve-thirties, and played little role, for example, in the Wars of Baronial Reform of 1258 65. Similarly, pacifying the realm was certainly alluded to by Sancho in 1282 as something that needed to be done, but it was a requirement that originated in the kings alliance with the enemies of the realm and his tyranny, rather than in the need to make peace among the kings subjects. These carefully crafted arguments were not, however, always what mattered to contemporary observers. In fact, chroniclers and annalists were prepared to state what political actors would or could not declare, and they were quite capable of ignoring or setting aside elaborate constructs of legitimization. This does not mean that they somehow painted a more realistic picture of the true intentions of political actors in fact, many chroniclers knew even less than modern historians do about the concerns and actions of these men, the tools, processes, pressures and demands that conditioned their responses merely that the ideas and values by which they judged the legitimacy of political actions were sometimes quite different from those espoused by the lead actors themselves. In England, for instance, the Young Kings complaints about his fathers governance barely registered, and his rebellion was instead blamed on a desire for lands and property, riches and honours.106 This is the more remarkable as, judging from the surviving evidence, this was not something of which Henry II had accused his sons.107 In Germany, similarly, neither Henry ( VII)s nor Frederick IIs emphasis on honour or the role of the princes was noted by contemporary observers.108 Castile presents somewhat of an exception: partly perhaps because, unlike the Young King or Henry (VII), Sancho IV succeeded, his fathers reasons failed to make it into the historiographical record, and most chroniclers simply recorded complaints about the kings tyranny, and his inability to act in the true manner of a king.109 Equally, however, they avoided making reference to the kings illness, or accusations of leprosy and insanity. To them, it was not the legal niceties of Alfonsos disempowerment that mattered, but the charges of tyranny. This should serve as a reminder that we cannot limit investigations of medieval political thought to theoretical treatises or even to the kind of documents discussed here, but that we also need to consider the response to and the reception of these political events and ideals by their contemporary audience. That we occasionally encounter quite different discourses of political legitimacy is thus additional evidence that may explain why few
106 Gesta Regis Henrici, pp. 41 6; Radul de Diceto Decani Lundoniensis Opera Historica, ed. W. Stubbs (2 vols., 1876) (hereafter Radul de Diceto Opera Historica), i. 371; William of Newburgh, Historia Rerum Anglicarum , in Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I , ed. R. Howlett (2 vols., 1884 5) ( hereafter Historia Rerum Anglicarum), i. 196 7. There were only a few exceptions: Jordan Fantosme, for instance, while lamenting the misery that the conict brought upon the realm, lambasted the old king for his refusal to treat Young Henry with due honour ( Jordan Fantosmes Chronicle, ed. and trans. R. C. Johnston (Oxford, 1981), pp. 1 5). The author is grateful to Nicholas Vincent for this reference. We should also note a curious text, produced by Thomas Agnellus, the archdeacon of Wells, a decade later, shortly after Young Henrys death (Magistri Thomae Agnelli Wellensis Archidiaconi Sermo de Morte et Sepultura Henrici Regis Junioris, in Radulphi de Coggeshall Chronicon Anglicanum, ed. J. Stevenson (1875), pp. 265 6). 107 Receuil des actes, no. 460. Curiously, the only one to echo the kings line was Gerald of Wales (De Principis Instructione Liber, ed. G. F. Warner (1891), pp. 163, 181). 108 Weiler, Kingship, Rebellion, pp. 53 75. 109 Jofr de Loaysa, Crnica, p. 114; Crnica de Alfonso X, pp. 223 9; Chronicle of Alfonso X, pp. 244 7. Certainly it was not recorded that Alfonso, shortly before his death, disinherited Sancho (Diplomatario Andaluz, no. 518). On the contrary, the chronicle of Alfonso X stressed Alfonsos love for Sancho, and his forgiveness (Crnica de Alfonso X, pp. 240 2; Chronicle of Alfonso X, p. 258).
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of these revolts succeeded, and offers a further insight into the workings and conduct of politics in the long thirteenth century. Finally, we have seen how, despite the theoretical sophistication of the political arguments used, despite the increasing emphasis on the more elaborate legal framework of politics, and despite an ever greater stress on due legal process, other, seemingly more archaic values and mechanisms continued to play an integral role in justifying and determining the conduct of rebellion. It is worth remembering that Alfonso X, when complaining about Sanchos actions, repeatedly invoked the insult done to his honour; similarly, when King Pedro III of Aragon had granted refuge to Alfonsos queen, Violante, in 1278, he did so because of the insult done to her honour.110 This aspect becomes more apparent after even a cursory look at the means by which rebellions were handled, reconciliation was expressed or victory demonstrated. Henry IIs response to the Young Kings rebellion, for example, drew as much on symbolism and ritual as it did on the use of military, scal and juridical means of government. In fact, the kings pilgrimage to Canterbury, his public ogging and his show of contrition, probably did more to restore his authority than all the writs of his chancery and exchequer combined;111 Frederick II, in responding to his sons revolt, drew on a largely symbolic display of power, an elaborate and ceremonial restoration of imperial might, that, too, culminated in a pilgrimage (to the shrine of St. Elisabeth of Marburg);112 nally, Sancho IV used symbolic actions to demonstrate his ability to rule and the purity of his motives he refused to take the crown, and gave Fadrique a proper burial.113 Similarly, once he succeeded to the throne, he used an increasingly elaborate emphasis on the sacrality of royal power, largely absent from Castilian politics since the early twelfth century, the display of royal splendour and royal ritual to underline the legitimacy of his kingship and succession. 114 These public and symbolic manifestations of principle mattered, and they continued to matter irrespective of the wider intellectual and legal changes outlined above. 115 There are other variations between our three examples: the legitimizing role of the church, for instance, manifested itself differently in England (with a direct appeal to the pope, in the tradition of Young Henrys predecessors), Germany (where Henry could hardly appeal for support from the pope whom he had asked to excommunicate him should he disobey his father) and Castile (where the legitimizing function seems to have been performed by the military orders). The same applied to values and norms (such as honour, which meant different things in different contexts) or mechanisms
110 Chronicle of San Juan de la PeNa, p. 70; Gesta Comitum Barcinonensium, ed. L. Barrau Dihigo and J. Mass Torrents (Barcelona, 1925), p. 65. 111 T. K. Keefe, Shrine time: King Henry IIs visits to Thomas Beckets tomb, Haskins Society Jour., xi (2003), 115 22; Historia Rerum Anglicarum, ii. 187 90; Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi, p. 72; Radul de Diceto Opera Historica, i. 382 4; The Historical Works of Gervase of Canterbury, ed. W. Stubbs (2 vols., 1879 80), i. 248 9; Historia Rerum Anglicarum, ii. 187 90. 112 Henniges, pp. 264 5; Sermo de Translatione Beate Elyzabeth, in Die Wundergeschichten des Caesarius von Heisterbach, ed. A. Hilka (3 vols., Bonn, 1933 7), iii. 386 7; Chronica Regia Coloniensis, p. 268; Strner, ii. 323 6. 113 Crnica de Alfonso X, pp. 223, 2413; Chronicle of Alfonso X, pp. 244, 258; Jofr de Loaysa, Crnica, p. 122. 114 P. Linehan, History and Historians of Medieval Spain (Oxford, 1993), pp. 444 51, 469 76; P. Linehan, The politics of piety: aspects of the Castilian monarchy from Alfonso X to Alfonso XI, Revista Canadiense Estudios Hispnicos, ix (1985), 385 404; T. F. Ruiz, Unsacred monarchy: the kings of Castile in the late middle ages, in Rites of Power: Symbolism, Ritual and Politics since the Middle Ages, ed. S. Wilentz (Philadelphia, Pa., 1985), pp. 109 44. 115 This is contrary to a strong trend in current writing on medieval political ritual (see Weiler, Knighting, homage, pp. 290 5).
40
(the role of public assemblies, with the structure, proceedings and participants of an imperial diet being something quite different from an English parliament or Castilian cortes). Nonetheless, these variations should not deceive us as to the existence of a shared core of tools and processes, ideals and customs. We are not dealing with departures from an elusive medieval norm, not with English or Castilian exceptionalism or a German Sonderweg, but with variations on a common theme. It is, moreover, only through a process of comparison that we have been able to see what was specically English, Staufen or Castilian about our three rebellions. These uprisings were thus more than mere marginalia in the political history of thirteenth-century Europe. Instead, they reveal fundamental principles of political organization, behaviour and ethics: the complex relationship between honour and similarly transcendental values, and the realities of power; the public nature of politics; the mutual obligations, both ethical and pragmatic, that forged and dissolved political alliances; the need for legitimization in reference to a widely shared set of values and ideals that imposed limitations on the kind of actions in which political actors could engage; and the continuing importance of gesture and symbolism. Uprisings by royal sons open a window onto the structures, beliefs and mechanisms of political organization that otherwise are all too often hidden from view, and thus onto a reality and issues far larger than dealings between kings and princes alone.

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Original Princely Articles rebellions in Ltd western Europe, c.1170c.1280 1170c.

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Princely rebellions in western Europe, c.1170c.1280

Institute of Historical Research 2007.

Historical Research, vol. 82, no. 215 (February 2009)