Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
September 2009
INTRODUCTION
In the wake following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, U.S. businesses
and individuals must confront increasingly stringent regulatory controls on the export of
products, technical data, and services. In some cases, an actual “export” in the traditional
sense (i.e., a physical transfer of a product to a foreign territory) is not required to trigger
U.S. export control regulatory issues. More surprising to many, both within the U.S. and
abroad, is the fact that U.S. export control laws and regulations can extend well beyond
U.S. shores. In many cases, jurisdiction attaches to, and follows, U.S. origin products,
technical data, and services wherever they may be located or utilized around the globe.
As a consequence, any foreign person or entity that deals with U.S. origin products,
technical data, or services is potentially subject to these export control regimes, and
should be concerned with compliance. In today’s regulatory environment, it’s what you
U.S. government agencies charged with export regulation and enforcement – the
Departments of Commerce, State, Treasury, and Justice – have all stepped up their
investigation and enforcement efforts both domestically and abroad. While the core U.S.
grown since 9/11 as the U.S. Congress has significantly increased penalties for non-
compliance. It is, therefore, incumbent upon all individuals and entities, both domestic
or foreign, that deal with U.S. origin products, technical data, or services, to understand
their obligations under U.S. export control regulations and take all necessary measures to
ensure compliance.
The first step in complying with U.S. export control laws and regulations is to
determine which regulatory regime impacts your business. This paper summarizes the
primary U.S. export control regimes. For a variety of reasons, this paper then focuses on
regulations affecting the defense trade, including (1) the widespread misperception that
the defense trade is limited to major defense contractors building major defense systems,
as opposed to the reality that the defense trade now involves all levels of players dealing
with applicable U.S. export controls, and (3) the particularly far-reaching extraterritorial
The three primary export control regimes under U.S. law are (1) the Export
Administration Regulations (“EAR”) (15 CFR Parts 730-774);1 (2) the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) (22 CFR Parts 120-130);2 and (3) sanction and
1
The statutory basis for the EAR is the Export Administration Act, 50 USCA §2401, et seq. (“EAA”).
While the EAA itself has expired, its provisions and the resulting regulations continue pursuant to
Executive Order.
2
The statutory basis for the ITAR is the Arms Export Control Act, 22 USCA §2751, et seq. (“AECA”).
Executive Orders).3
of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), it applies to all products and
technologies created in the U.S. or by U.S. persons (wherever located), as well as foreign
products that move through the U.S. stream of commerce or incorporate more than a
minimal (“de minimus”) amount of U.S. parts, materials, or technologies. The EAR
covers all products and technologies that are purely commercial in nature, as well as
products and technologies that are “dual use” (i.e., items that have both a commercial and
a military application and that were not, at their genesis or at later stages, designed or
modified specifically for a military application – see further discussion of the ITAR
below).4 Stated otherwise, the EAR controls all products and technologies that are not
regulated by the ITAR. Despite the EAR’s broad sweep, many items governed by this
particular regulatory regime may be exported and reexported without a U.S. government
license issued by the BIS. Nevertheless, even items that are exported without a BIS
license are subject to certain end use and end user based controls.5 When a license from
the BIS is required under the EAR, it is typically due to national security or foreign
3
The statutory basis underpinning the OFAC regulations is complex. The primary statute is the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 USCA §1701, et seq. (“IEEPA”).
4
“Dual Use” items are defined under the EAR, in relevant part, as items that “can be used in both military
and other strategic uses (e.g. nuclear) [as well as] commercial applications.” 15 CFR §730.3.
5
For example, even the export and subsequent reexport of wholly benign products such as plumbing
fixtures are subject to the so-called “General Prohibitions” as embodied in Part 736 of the EAR.
In contrast, the ITAR is more narrowly focused on articles, technical data, and
services that have been developed, manufactured, or modified specifically for military or
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”). Almost all exports and reexports of
ITAR-designated articles (and related technical data and services) requires an export
license or some other form of approval issued by the DDTC, such as a pre-approved
agreement in which the U.S. party provides defense services or technical data to a foreign
party.6 The ITAR requires advance licenses and approvals in almost every export and
subsequent reexport scenario, even when dealing with the U.S.’s closest allies. Further, it
The OFAC Regulations are the most limited in scope. Administered by the U.S.
transactions, imports, and exports involving countries that are subject to comprehensive
trade sanctions or embargoes against designated countries (e.g., Iran, North Korea and
Cuba). They also provide comprehensive regulatory procedures for blocking assets of
traffickers. Individual U.S. persons, as well as entities formed under U.S. law and even
6
Such agreements, referred to in the ITAR as Technical Assistance Agreements or Manufacturing License
Agreements, can be used for a variety of purposes, including researching, developing, and manufacturing
defense articles both domestically and abroad.
7
A detailed discussion of embargo provisions currently embodied in the ITAR is beyond the scope of this
paper. It is important to understand, however, that the ITAR currently includes an absolute prohibition
against allowing any Chinese national within the U.S. or abroad to access U.S. origin defense articles or
related technical data or services.
Regulations wherever they are located. For instance, it is a violation of the OFAC
Contrary to popular belief, the ITAR governs much more than guns and bullets. It
governs the development, manufacture, export, and subsequent reexport of a wide range
of wholly benign (non-lethal) articles, as well as related technical data8 and services.9
ITAR compliance begins with an understanding that any article (and associated technical
data) of U.S. origin or entering U.S. commerce that has been specifically designed,
and is therefore subject to ITAR control. In some cases, this includes articles that have a
the-shelf (COTS) products such as laser diodes, crystal oscillators, sensors, electronics
cabinets, vibration shock mounts, and even headphones can become subject to control
under the ITAR if they undergo a simple modification for use in a military application or
metal screw, with threads designed for an ITAR-controlled article, can itself become
8
The ITAR defines “technical data,” in relevant part, as: “Information which is required for the design,
development, production, manufacture, assembly, operation, repair, testing, maintenance, or modification
of defense articles. This includes information in the form of blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans,
instructions, or documentation….” 22 CFR §120.10(a)(1).
9
The ITAR defines “defense service,” in relevant part, as: “(1) the furnishing of assistance (including
training) to foreign persons, whether in the United States or abroad, in the design, development,
engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation,
demilitarization, destruction, processing, or use of defense articles; [and] (2) the furnishing to foreign
persons of technical data controlled under this subchapter…, whether in the United States or abroad ….” 22
CFR §120.9(a)(1)-(2).
having a precise understanding of (1) the history of the article from its genesis and, (2)
what, if any, modifications or adaptations to the article have occurred over time
difficult to obtain this understanding, particularly when technology has evolved over time
available, records may be scarce or non-existent, and memories may fade. Even in real
time, the specific purpose for which an article is being designed, modified, or adapted is
not always clear, particularly when the design, modification, or adaptation is performed
under subcontract. It is, nevertheless, incumbent upon every party that designs and
manufactures products to understand whether or not the ITAR governs their activities on
a product-by-product basis.
services, are required to register with the DDTC (even if they never engage in an actual
export transaction). They must also obtain a license from the DDTC in connection with
nearly every export transaction. Even the act of sharing controlled technical data with a
foreign person (including foreign persons located within U.S. borders) requires a license
in most circumstances. Thus, any business that employs, contracts with, or makes sales
defense services must also be vigilant and understand the scope and jurisdictional reach
individuals and entities outside the United States, the extraterritorial reach of such
statutes is typically limited to U.S. citizens and foreign subsidiaries owned or controlled
by U.S. citizens. In contrast, the ITAR (as well as the EAR) has a far more
encompassing jurisdictional reach. Jurisdiction arises not only from the nationality of the
person or entity,10 but also by virtue of the fact that the article, technical data, or service
originated in the U.S. Because the controlled article, technical data or service retains its
U.S. origin “nationality,” the ITAR’s jurisdiction follows wherever in the world the
article, technical data or service may end up, and attaches to whomever may be in
possession. As such, a foreign person will be subject to the ITAR whenever he or she is
dealing with U.S. origin articles, technical data, or services as defined under the ITAR,
significant. For example, express provisions within the ITAR severely restrict the
10
The ITAR defines a “U.S. person” as “a person … who is a lawful permanent resident as defined by 8
USC 1101(a)(20) [the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act] or who is a protected individual as defined by
8 USC 1324(b)(a)(3). It also means any corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any
other entity, organization, or group that is incorporated to do business in the United States. … It does not
include any foreign person as defined in §120.16 of this part.” 22 CFR §120.15.
In contrast, the ITAR defines a “foreign person” as “any natural person who is not a lawful permanent
resident as defined by 8 USC 1101(a)(20) or who is not a protected individual as defined by 8 USC
1324(b)(a)(3). It also means any corporation, business association, partnership, society, trust, or any other
entity, organization, or group that is not incorporated or organized to do business in the United States, as
well as international organizations, foreign governments and any agency or subdivision of foreign
governments (e.g. diplomatic missions).” 22 CFR §120.16.
(Emphasis supplied).
U.S. origin, ITAR requirements apply equally whether the individual or entity in
possession constitutes a U.S. person or foreign person under the ITAR.11 If a foreign
person reexports or transfers that article, discloses related technical data, or provides a
related defense service, without first obtaining the approval of the DDTC, she is very
Nor does a foreign person escape the jurisdiction of the ITAR by incorporating a
defense article into a foreign made product, even if the foreign made product is
commercial or dual use in nature. The DDTC has adopted a transparency doctrine that
looks through the foreign made product to identify the ITAR controlled defense article or
any controlled U.S. technology or services that may have been incorporated into the
article. And unlike the EAR, there is no de minimus requirement. If a foreign made
using ITAR controlled defense services, however small or seemingly insignificant the
11
See, e.g., 22 CFR §120.14, which states: (“[i]f a provision in this subchapter does not refer exclusively to
a foreign person … or a U.S. person …, then it refers to both.”).
Even more controversial is the DDTC’s aggressive stance on the regulation of so-
called “brokers” of U.S. origin defense articles and related technical data. Pursuant to
Section 129.2(a) of the ITAR, a “broker” is defined as any person (U.S. or foreign):
Section 129.2(b) of the ITAR then broadly defines “brokering activities” as:
The ITAR requires brokers to register with the DDTC. In doing so, the ITAR
utilizes language that even further extends the provision’s extraterritorial reach to “any
foreign person located in the United States or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States.” See 22 CFR §129.3(a) (emphasis supplied). The DDTC indicated
recently that it interprets the clause “otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States” to apply to anyone dealing with U.S. origin defense articles or related technical
data or services. Whether this interpretation would withstand serious judicial scrutiny
12
Indeed, the ITAR mandates that bills of lading accompanying the export of U.S. origin defense articles
and related technical data expressly inform the foreign person that “[t]hese commodities are authorized by
the U.S. Government for export only to [country of ultimate destination] for use by [end-user]. They may
not be transferred, transshipped on a non-continuous voyage, or otherwise disposed of in any country,
either in their original form or after being incorporated into other end-items, without prior written
approval of the U.S. Department of State.” 22 CFR §123.9(b) (emphasis added).
CONCLUSION
The ITAR and the EAR present traps and pitfalls for the unwary, both within the
United States and abroad. The regulations are both complex and broad in scope, and can
U.S. export control regimes can prevent losses stemming from delays in obtaining
necessary licenses or authorizations, civil and criminal sanctions, and even the inability to
receive critical U.S. origin articles, technical data, and services. Compliance begins with
a firm understanding of the scope and application of U.S. export control laws and
regulations on particular business activities, both foreign and domestic. With the sharp
increase in U.S. export control enforcement since the events of 9/11, neither U.S. nor
this paper, please do not hesitate to contact either of the authors. We regularly assist