According to our legislation we have the inner institution of possession, that is defined more from the point of de facto

view and is known as the possession as a state of being. We actually speak about detentio that actually expresses the idea of holding or the natural possession. I should mention that the idea of this institution was rather taken from the German civil code, then from the Russian one. If studding these codes we can notice the fact that the Russian do not provide the institution of possession as a natural fact, we see that there persists only the idea of possession as a legal fact, and some protections for the persone that detains the good. In the Russian civil code we do not have a developed institution that statetes the main ideas of this qwestion, thats why we should come back to the basis. In doctrine there persists two theories that provides us the general knowledge about possession as a natural fact and how it appears. The first one is developed by the great german scientist Savini, and is called the subjective theory that is based on the ancient roman juridical practice, and their private roman law statements. So he figures out that for detaining the object the possessor should have the corpus possessionis the actual ruling over the object and the animus domini - the intention of owning the good from the own name. The accent in this theory is made on the animus part that according to the author is the thing that determines the real possessor because of its subjective atitude above the object itself. No clear picture emerges of the meaning of animus from the classical texts, although it was not seriously doubted that some form of mental element was required in possession. Possibly it meant the intention to hold the property as one's own. If so, that could explain why certain holders were regarded as having or not having possession in Roman

law. Or animus might have signified the consciousness of being in physical control of the thing. One could not acquire possession if one lacked or was incapable of the required awareness. For example, an insane person or one who was asleep could not acquire possession. The requirement of animus meant that you did not necessarily possess everything that was in your physical control; there had to be an awareness of what it was that you controlled: A person possessing a building as a whole is not deemed to possess the individual things in the building. The same applies to a ship and to a cupboard. (D.41.2.30.pr.) Of course, if a person was aware of the things contained (or likely to be) in the building, ship or cupboard, then he would have possession. Could one acquire possession by animus alone? In principle, it would seem not but textual authority on the issue is unclear. It was possible in late law at least to transfer possession by mere agreement in some circumstances. But it is arguable that the words used in such cases constituted both the corpus and the animus. Corpus -As a basic rule, a person could not possess without taking effective physical control of the property. It followed that possession could only be acquired over corporeal things. It was impossible, therefore, to possess a servitude, e.g. a right of way. Whether effective physical control was taken of a thing depended on the circumstances. For example, the possession of land could be acquired if the boundaries were indicated to the intending possessor no actual physical holding (or contact) was required. Or possession could be acquired of a thing if it was placed, at the intending possessor's request, where he could see it. Juristic literature is typically bereft of guiding principles on the issue of corpus and is suspected in part of interpolation.

These theory based upon the theses of animus as a main part of a natural possession was further very criticized by another german scientist Ihering that formed the so called Objective theory. The nature of corpus and animus has been the subject of considerable debate. Savigny, an outstanding Romanist of the early nineteenth century, thought that animus was the major element of possession. Relying on texts attributed mainly to Paul, he regarded animus as the intention to hold the property as one's own. His compatriot, Ihering, thought that animus was simply the consciousness of being in control of the property. He regarded Savigny's views as postulating too subjective a theory of possession, and thought that Paul was not a reliable authority on this piirlieular issue. For Ihering, it was corpus that was the essence of possession. He thought that a man in possession appears to the world as if he were the owner. Savigny took essentially a narrow view of possession only those possess who hold the property as though they were the owner. Ihering, however, regarded possession as a broader concept anyone possesses who in ill control of property and aware of that fact. Of course, virtually everyone who has physical control will be aware of it, but not in every case. For example, if a child's ball is kicked into your garden without your knowledge, you have physical control of it but not possession; or when someone parks I heir car on your property unknown to you . From the beginning of his work Ihering brings us some delimitations and things that we should notice in order to understand better. He classifies the whole idea of possession in to two parts that ar stated as the natural possession or the actual de facto possession and the possession as a juridical fact. Further he classifies the natural possession in also two parts that are called the absolute and relative. The absolute is characterized that, the good itself is under a possession of a person but, dose not have a owner or better to say when the good

has a natural possessor but does not under a juridical possession. The relative one is characterized throught the fact that the possessor or the detainer is another person that the owner. This type he also classifies in two parts the individual and the representative. The individual one is described as being the case when the detainer possesses the good in his own will and for hiss appropriate goals. As an example we can give the rent contract. I think in our legislation this is defined as the indirect possession. The other part that is called the representative defines the situations when the good is detained from the name and in the interest of another person. As an example we can give the comadat contract. I should state that our legislation is the adept of the Objective theory, that is actualy inspired from the German legislation but with some differences. For example the article 854 of the civil code of Germany states that the possession is obtained by the natural possession reign over the good. This norm is made in strict derivation from Iherings theory. He exprese this in the following form X= a+c Y= a+c-n Where X is possession from the juridical point of view, Y is the possession from the natural point of view, a is the animus of the natural possessor, c is corpus and n is actually a basic component that is present only in the objective theory and is characterized through a positive right that disobey the cases of possession, character of possession and the resulting of its possession. The formula according to Savini theory should look like this X=a+d+c

Y=a+c d stands for the thing that transforms the animus of natural possession into animus of juridical possession. Also I should mention another formula I => V=> a I stands for the interest, V stands for will and a remains the basic idea of animus. So I want to say that according to the theory animus is a progression of interest and will and returning to the initial idea we can say that n is that thing that takes apart those elements that form the proper animus returning it to the state of interest or will. Thats why in our legal framework we have the stipulation of will manifestation, that gives the possession to be expressed like Y=I+c. I think according to this statement the German civil code lacks the idea of interest/will from their legal rule. We by the way have it, thats why we should be proud.