Sunteți pe pagina 1din 23

Hypatia, Inc.

The Politics of Sex and Gender: Benhabib and Butler Debate Subjectivity Author(s): Fiona Webster Source: Hypatia, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Winter, 2000), pp. 1-22 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of Hypatia, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3810509 Accessed: 01/04/2010 08:11
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=hypatiainc. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Hypatia, Inc. and Blackwell Publishing are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Hypatia.

http://www.jstor.org

The Politicsof Sex andGender: Benhabib andButler DebateSubjectivity


FIONA WEBSTER

Thispaperresponds to thesenseof "crisis" or "trouble" thatdominates contemdebate about the sex and It that this poraryfeminist categories of gender. argues crisis has a theoretical and perception of from fundamental emerged confusionof issuesconcerning theimplications debate political of thesex/gender for political representation andagency.It explores thesensein whichthisconfusion is manifest in a debatebetweenSeylaBenhabib andJudithButler.

A sense of crisis prevails in some contemporaryAnglo-American feminist debates, a sense that the instability and indeterminacyof recent accounts of sex and gender are underminingthe very foundations on which feminism is built. There is, as Judith Butler remarks,"a certain sense of trouble, as if the indeterminacyof gender might eventually culminate in the failure of feminism"(1990, vii). As a movement which has, historically,sought to represent the needs and concerns of the genderedidentity category"women," feminism has appearedto rely upon a universal, stable, or "fixed"conception of that category in order to ground its theoretical and political claims. It has relied upon the idea that there is a subjectof feminism ("woman")whose needs and concerns can be defined as subjectsof political representation. In recent years,however,feminismhas been criticizedfor its assumptionof authorityover the experience of women and for its generalpresumptionthat, simply on the basis of a sharedgenderedidentity, women have immediateaccess to and knowledgeof the lives of other women. It is by no means clear that all women need or want the same things. The very legitimacyof the political concerns"is challenged by contemrepresentationof"women"and "women's accounts of sex and Such accounts contest the assumptionthat porary gender. reference can be made to any universalnotion of what it is to be a "woman" or of what constitutes "women'sconcerns."Also subject to challenge is the
Hypatia vol. 15, no. 1 (Winter 2000) by Fiona Webster

Hypatia

notion that individualsare at some point "free" fromtheir social construction as gendered.Women's"agency," and thereforetheir capacity to actively contest dominant genderparadigms, is conceived as itself socially constructed,itself a product of highly genderedrelations of power in society. Historically,theoristsseeking to drawa distinction between sex and gender have claimed that sex is a wholly naturalor biological category,independent of the culturalconstructionof gender.On this basisthey have claimed that our gender is in no way fixed or determinedby the natureof our sex. The rejection of this distinction by contemporaryfeminist theorists, accompaniedby a shift in conceptual frameworks, is perceived to have both positive and negative imfeminism. On the one hand, rejected in the new conceptual for plications or "fixed"category of sex that frameworkis the notion of a wholly "natural" somehow pre-existsand is a passive basisfor the culturalconstruction of gender. It is arguedthat sex is itself subjectto culturalconstruction. On the other hand, this new way of construing sex is perceived to be problematicfor feminism insofaras it appearsthat what we mean when we referto sex is unstable not only and indeterminate.That is to say,in the new conceptual framework, is gender construed as culturallyconstructed, and therefore as unstable, malleable, and negotiable, but so too is sex. This instabilityin the meaningor content of both sex and gender is thought to be problematicby those who believe that the feminist movement depends on a stable conception of either sex or gender. for or "crisis" In this paper, I will argue that this perception of "trouble" and feminismhas emergedfrom a fundamentalconfusion of theoretical political issues concerning the implications of the sex/gender debate for political representationand agency.This confusion is manifestin a debate between two feminist theorists,Seyla BenhabibandJudithButler, prominentcontemporary Contentions(Benhabib et al. 1995). in the collection of essaysFeminist There are two levels at which this debate between Benhabib and Butler servesto illustratethis confusion. At a generallevel, the debate between them have emergedin feminist theory about illustratespreciselyhow disagreements accountsof genderand the constructhe relationbetween some contemporary tion of a specificallyfeminist politics. At a more specific level, the debate between them providesthe basis for a direct critique of Butler'srejection of the sex/genderdistinction and her performativeaccount of those categories.Butinfluentialin account of sex and genderhas been particularly ler'sperformative Anglo-American feminist theory and is the subjectof considercontemporary able debate.1 In the firstsection of the paperI will arguethat, despite both rejecting the sex/gender distinction, Benhabib and Butler disagree over what is lost or gained in moving beyond this distinction. While Benhabib claims that Butler losesan account of agency,Butlerconsidersherself to gainone. While both agree that some account of agency is politically importantfor feminism, they

Fiona Webster

disagreeover preciselywhat sort of agency is requiredin orderfor specifically In the second section of the paper feminist political concerns to be addressed. her performativeaccount of I will addressthe issue of how Butlerunderstands to the criticisms raised to be by theorists such as Benhabib gender responsive the theoretical imperaI she understands work. will address how against her broader tives which groundher workto relate to the political concerns of feminism.
CONTENTIONS: BENHABIB VERSUSBUTLER FEMINIST OF BUTLER (I) BENHABIB'S CRITIQUE

Seyla Benhabib'scritiqueof Butlerhas two principaltargets.The firstis the to be critiqueof identity categoriesand identitypolitics which she understands at workin so-called postmoder theory.The second is Butler'saccount of gender as performance.Her critiqueof Butleroperatesas a specificexample of the way in which she understandsa postmoderncritique of identity categoriesto give way to a subversionof the foundations of a feminist politics. Benhabibclaims that the critiqueof identity categoriesraisedby postmodem theory gives rise to an "identity crisis"for feminism. She is by no means alone in making such a claim.2She arguesthat this identity crisis "mayeliminate not only the specificityof feminist theory but place in question the very emancipatoryideals of the women'smovement altogether"(Benhabib 1995a, 20). Her argumentis based on the claim that, in its strong form, postmoder theory promotes a dissolution of the subject which in turn dissolves the concepts of intentionality, accountability,self-reflexivityand autonomy (1995a, 20). Postmoder theory has debilitating implications for feminism precisely because the ideal of the autonomous,self-directingsubject is replacedwith a fractured,opaque self (1992, 16). Given that women'ssense of self is already fragile, that their history has been written by others and that they have not been able to fully control their lives, Benhabib claims that this fractured, opaque self of postmoder theory can only provide women with a more fragmented and fragilevision of themselves and their future (1992, 16). As such, it is a particularlydamagingaccount of subjectivity and one which does not further the emancipatoryobjectives of the feminist movement. The norms of autonomy,choice, and self-determinationin the legal, moral, and political arenas are vital, Benhabib claims, for women's struggles to be successfully voiced and acted upon (1992,16). Indeed,she claimsthat the projectof female without recourseto a regulativeprincipleon agenemancipationis unthinkable cy, autonomy,and selfhood (1995a, 21). It is importantto note, however, that there are reasonswe might want to question Benhabib'sargumentseven at this preliminarystage. Firstof all, we might want to claim that she has mischaracterized postmodernismand has

Hypatia

suggestedwrongly that its theoretical imperativesgive rise to a dissolution of a conception of the subject.Second, we might want to question her claim that a feminist politics requiresrecourseto particularregulativeor normativeprinciples in orderto supportits emancipatoryobjectives. I will come back to these questions later in this paper.At this stage, it is pertinent that we firstconsider her critique of Butler'stheory of performativity. This serves as an example of how she understandsthe "dissolutionof the subject"and subversionof the emancipatoryobjectives of feminism to be operative in postmodem accounts of subjectivity. Butler outlines her account of gender as performancein her book Gender Trouble(1990). In short, gender is performative,according to Butler, in the sense that it is not a stable or fixed point of agency, but rather is an identity categorycreated and constituted through"astylizedrepetition of acts"(1990, 140). Its meaning is constituted dramaticallyand contingently through sustained social performanceswhich take place in the context of the regulatory conventions and normsdominant in society (1990, 33). The ultimate effect of these repeatedperformancesis an appearanceof substance, an appearanceof gender as a natural expression of particularbodies. This repetition rigidifies and institutionalizesgender.At the same time, the very activity of this repetition of normssuggestsfor Butlerthe possibilitythat those normscan be subverted. Indeed, it is precisely in this variation in the way in which subjects actively repeat norms that Butler locates agency. as an example of the debilitating imUsing Butler'stheoryof performativity a for of radical feminism plications critique of identity categoriesand identity that Benhabib understands theory to be an instance of how a "postpolitics, modem" account of the subject disallows or dispenses with the ideals of autonomy, choice and self-determination.She claims that Butler'stheory of performative gender constitution cannot give us "a sufficiently thick and rich account of gender formation that would also explain the capacities of human agents for self-determination"(1995b, 110). Benhabib explicitly locates her critique of Butleras operative at two levels of analysis.At one level, she queswhich Butlerreliesupon in coming tions the sortsof social researchparadigms Benhabib arguesthat to an account of gender constitution as performativity. determinisButler'stheory of performativity"still presupposesa remarkably tic view of individuation and socialization processeswhich falls short of the currentlyavailable social-scientific reflections on the subject"(1995b, 110). She therefore understandsButler'stheory to go too far in its explanation of subject constitution, insofaras it tends towardattributingtoo much power to culture (/society/discourse)as a constitutive force, and too little power to individualsto resistwholesale culturaldetermination.The power of individuals to resist such determination is, she claims, evident in contemporarypsychosexual developmental accounts of subjects.In this sense, therefore,she is not only makinga general claim about such powerbeing necessary,in her view, to

Fiona Webster

any account of subjectivity,but she is claiming that social-scientificaccounts demonstratethe actual capacity of subjectsto assertsuch power. At another level, Benhabib questions the conception of agency implied by Butler'stheory of performativity(1995b, 111). Ultimately, she wants to contest Butler'sclaim that her theory of performativitycan, in fact, give an account of agency. She claims that Butler "wantsto extend the limits of reflexivity in thinking aboutthe self beyond the dichotomy of'sex' and 'gender"' (1995a, 21). Benhabib is bringing together two issues in making this claim. the other concerns "the dichotThe firstconcerns the notion of "reflexivity"; omy of sex and gender."The claim that Benhabibwants to make here is that a cathe capacityof subjectsor selves for self-reflection(that is, "reflexivity"), is brought pacity which she appearsto understandto be essential to "agency," into question by Butler'sproject to move beyond the sex/gender dichotomy. She understandsButler'sproject to be, at least in part, an attempt both to get that has supportedthe categoriesof sex and genbeyond the binaryframework der and to locate agencyin that reconfigured space.However,problemsemerge for Butler in providing an adequateaccount or explanation of agency. Butler does indeed attempt to make this conceptual shift "beyondthe binary frame"in her analysisof the categoriesof sex and gender.What exactly, however,is the natureof the relation Benhabibwants to drawbetween Butler's shift "beyondthe dichotomy of sex and gender"and her account of agency? Does Butler'stheory of performativity ultimatelydisallowan account of agenthe sameunderstanding of agency? Benhabib and Butler have do cy?Moreover, Benhabib's critique of Butler is leveled at precisely the point at which Butlercollapses the dichotomy of sex and gender-that is, the point at which Butler seeks to claim that sex is a product or effect of gender,not a basic or originarypoint on top of which are imposed various cultural significations.3 Butler'sperformativetheory of gender constitution relies upon an account of sex as "alwaysalreadygender."In other words,the categoryof sex does not pre-existgender,nor does it providean ontological foundationforvariousgendered significations.In Situating the Self, Benhabib expressesan explicit alleto Butler's claim that the giance category of sex is not simply an anatomical fact. Indeed, she agreeswith Butler,that "the construction and interpretation of anatomical difference is itself a social and historical process .. . Sex and gender are not related to each other as nature to culture"(1992, 192). Yet, despite her claim that the opposition of sex and gender must itself be questioned, she remainshighly critical of Butler'sreformulationof those categories in termsof the notion of performativity, and it is preciselyin this reformulation that Benhabib understandsagency to be lost. Butler'stheory of performativegender constitution cannot, Benhabib argues, "dojustice to the complexities of the ontogenetic originsof genderin the human person"(1995b, 108). While it gives us some account of how meaning is constructedand how significancecomes to be attached to our gendered

Hypatia

identities, it nevertheless fails, accordingto Benhabib,to give an explanation of the structuraland developmental processeswhich are in fact involved in individualsocialization (and hence in the construction of our genderedidentities).4 It also fails to give an account of the capacities individualspossessfor some degreeof self-determination.We can begin to see here the sense in which Benhabib and Butler are at odds with one another. On the one hand, Butler wants to claim that "thereis no ontologically intact reflexivityto the subject which is then placed within a culturalcontext" (1995b, 46). She is critical of accounts of the subject (such as Benhabib's)which characterizeit as "selfor "autonomous" on the basis that, in her view, reflective,""self-determining" they presumea subjectwhich has the capacityto deliberateor act outside of its cultural context. Benhabib, on the other hand, talks about there being "ontogenetic origins"(1995b, 108) of gender in the subjectand claims that these origins cannot be explained or accounted for by Butler.Nevertheless, against Butler'scharacterizationof her, she explicitly seeks to contest the claim that the subject deliberatesor acts outside of its culturalcontext. Indeed, her aim in Situatingthe Self is precisely to work against such a claim. Her argument is rather that subjectshave the capacity to challenge their "situatedness," to contribute to the constitution of their own identity and to their own place in the world (1992, 8), and it is precisely this capacity, capturedin part by the term "reflexivity," which she understandsto be lost or disavowed by Butler's of It is clear here that Benhabiband Butlercritiqueone theory performativity. another on the basis of largelycaricaturedaccounts of the claims each in fact seek to make. As such, the disagreementsbetween them can be understoodto be somewhathazierthan they initially appear.This mischaracterization of the views againstwhich both Benhabib and Butlerformulatetheir own theoretical and political positions is an importantissue and is one which I will come back to at a later point in the paper. Nevertheless, what is clear at this stage is that it is at this critical point, this disagreementover the originsor explanation of genderconstitution, that Butler and Benhabib understandeach other to diverge. Most significantly,it is at this point that BenhabibunderstandsButlerto underminethe possibilityof autonomy, choice, and self-determination. In providing an account of genderedidentity as performativeand so failing, accordingto Benhabib,to give an account of the capacity of subjectsfor self-reflectionand self-determination, she understandsButler'saccount of the construction of subjectivity to be ultimately (socially) deterministic. Moreover,she questions whether the dissolution of the concepts of agency,autonomy,and selfhood is in fact necessaryto of heterosexist and dualistpositions in the women's contesting the supremacy movement (1995a, 21). She thereforequestions the need for Butler to take as radicala position as she does in orderto achieve particulartheoretical ends. In the context of this paper,the most significant critical outcome of Benhabib'scritique of Butleron this issue is the way in which she relates it to the

Fiona Webster

very possibility of a feminist politics. For Benhabib, the possibility of a feminist politics dependsupon an account of subjectsas agents-that is, as capable of self-reflectionand some degree of self-determination.Since, for Benhabib, Butler'sproject precludessuch an account, she also understandsit to undermine the possibilityof a feminist politics. It is importantto note that in order to make this claim, Benhabib is clearly making three more basic, related, claims. Firstof all, on the basis of a very brief critical analysis,she is claiming that Butler'sperformativeaccount of the categoriesof sex and gender necessarilygives way to a problematicpolitical vision. Second, she is clearly making some important assumptionsabout the nature of a feminist politics and about the sorts of theoretical projects which feminists ought to pursue (or ought to envisage) in order to supportsuch a politics. Third, she is making some significant assumptionsabout what might in fact constitute "agency." For indeed, it is clear both that a notion of agency is employed by Butlerand that this notion is critical to Butler'sunderstandingof the transformative possibilities of her account of gender constitution. Benhabib and Butler are thereforeat odds with each other on a numberof significantpoints. In Butler's response to Benhabib, it will become even more clear to what extent these points of disagreementor divergence determine the ultimate force of their critiquesof one another.
RESPONSE TO BENHABIB (II) BUTLER'S

In considering the general form of Butler's response to Benhabib, it is apparent,first and foremost, that she takes an approachvery different from Benhabib'stowardthe "problem of politics"which emergeswithin debate over the possible alliance of feminismand postmoderism. Indeed, she would question Benhabib'scritical claim that feminism must articulatea "stable" subject in orderto grounda feminist politics. She claims that, rather,"a specific version of politics is shown in its contingency once these premisesareproblematically thematized"(1995b, 36). That is, the characterof the political arena is itself broughtinto question once the premisesupon which it is based(premises such as the very "stability" or "unity" of the subject) are shown to be problematic. For example, once an identity category (such as "women")is no longer understoodto representa unified, stable, identity ("woman"),then the legitimacy of identity-basedpolitics is itself broughtinto question. So, ratherthan question whether a stable subjectis necessaryin orderfor a feminist politics to be possible, Butlerquestions the very structureof the political domain which seems to necessitate a stable subject. Indeed, she claims that the contingency of that very domain is revealedas soon as the stabilityof the subjectis brought into question. Butler also differsfrom Benhabib in offeringa radicalcritique and renegotiation of traditional formulationsof the notion of agency.5Specifically,she

Hypatia

is critical of the "autonomous," "rational" subject of liberalism,broadlyconstrued.She is critical of such formulationspreciselybecause, in her view, they disavow both the "situated"and the "constituted"character of subjectivity. That is, they disavow both the fact that we alwaysact from and within a cultural schema and, most importantly,that we are constituted by and through those very acts. Indeed, ButlerrejectsSimone de Beauvoir's version of the sex/ on these on the distinction that is, grounds, groundsthat it precisely gender of from an account the subject as at some point "free" gender and presupposes as capable of deliberately"takingup"their gender.6She claims that the idea that there is a "doerbehind the deed," an idea she attributesto liberal formulations of agency, is installed by theorists only in orderto "assignblame and accountability"(1995b, 46). That is, it is a fictive structureset up for the purposes of morality (1995c, 135). For Butler, the "doer"is constituted in and through the "deed."Her theory of performativityis aimed precisely at capturing the sense in which significationand action are coincident. Yet, significantly, Butler wants to claim, contrary to Benhabib'scriticisms of her, that agency is not lost or disallowedhere. "Toclaim that the subject is constituted is not," she argues,"to claim that it is determined;on the contrary,the constituted characterof the subjectis the verypreconditionof its agency"(1995b, 46). Butler thereforecontests the claim that having an account of subjectsas constituted necessarilygives rise to an account of subjectsas determined. Inand resignificationand sofaras the subject is the site of endless transformation insofar as its constituted character is never fixed but always in process, Butler claims that resistance is alwayspossible. "Agency"is therefore located by Butler in the very instability of the subject. In responseto Benhabib,therefore,Butleris evidently highly critical of the in some way in orderfor claim that a subject must be "stable"or "grounded" she that such be to stabilitydisavowsthe conargues possible. Indeed, agency characterof the subject.Butlerarguesthat Benhastituted and transformative bib misconstruesher theory of performativity"bygrammaticallyreinstalling the subject'behind'the deed, and by reducing... the notion of performativity to theatricalperformance" (1995c, 135). It is clear here, then, that Butlerand Benhabibfundamentallydisagreeon how we might conceive of agency.Moreto some extent, each other'sconover,both theoristsareguilty of caricaturing, to claim that Butler'sperformaBenhabib wants of While ceptions agency. is constitution of tive theory gender ultimatelydeterministic,Butlercriticizes Benhabibfor offeringan account of agency which implies that subjectsare at some point capableof action which transcendsthe limitations of the situation or context fromwhich they act and, most significantly,throughwhich they are constituted.7At a laterpoint I will consider in moredetail this question of the differentconceptions of agency which informthe critiquesof Butlerand Benhabib.

Fiona Webster

A further andcriticaldisagreement whichdividesthe workof important andButler is reflected in theirdifferent to the political Benhabib approaches fora number Theirapproaches aredifferent of reasons. wehave domain. First, seen the sensein whichBenhabib andButler the "problem already approach of politics" fromdifferent to hold a particuangles.While Benhabib appears larconceptionof the character of the politicalarenaanddeduces fromthat character the necessary conditions forpoliticalaction,Butlerapsubjective to lookto the conditions whichmakeparticular pears politicalactionpossible andto critically consider fromthat perspective the character of the political arena. Thesedifferent of anglesinevitably giveriseto different understandings the normsandrequirements of the politicalarena.Butlerdisagrees with any of politicallife in projectwhich seeksto set out the normsor requirements advance of politicalaction.8 Thesenorms andrequirements, she claims,only come to be articulated in andthrough politicalaction(1995c, 129). Benhaof striving toward autonbib,on the otherhand,talksaboutthe importance the importance omyasan idealin politicallife (1995a,21). She alsosuggests of "utopian as a "practico-moral (1995a,30). Indeed, thinking" imperative" as we havealready criticism of the kindrequired seen,she claimsthat"social for women's is not even without struggles possible positingthe legal,moral andpoliticalnorms of autonomy, choiceandself-determination" (1992, 16). of the demands of justiceand Norms,Benhabib claims,facilitateexpression humanworthiness. modesof friendship, andhuUtopias"portray solidarity manhappiness" So while Butler claims that the of (1986,13). settingup norms andrequirements in advance of politicalactiondisavows the sensein which norms andrequirements areconstituted suchaction,Benonlyin andthrough habibclaimsthatwe needto set upsuchnorms andrequirements in order for to be and for the demands of life to be met. politicalstruggle possible political The curious Butler's contribution to point to note, however, concerning this issueis the sensein whichsheultimately confesses the imperative, in the to articulate the realityof politicallife, "toset norms,to affirm aspirations, of a morefullydemocratic andparticipatory possibilities politicallife"(1995c, shesuggests, forexample, the strategic andpoliticalimportance 129).Indeed, of retaining the category of "women," a category whichshe hasbrought into in order to makeparticular question, politicalclaims(1993, 222; 1995b,49). Wheneverthis is necessary, she argues, we mustsimplybe awarethat such arenot fixedordeterminate butalways sitesof contest(1993,221; categories wantsto claimthatin problematizing thatcategory 1995b,50). She therefore she doesnot wantto preventit frombeingusedin orderto serveparticular to openit up to the possibility of resignification andtransforends,butrather mation.Indeed,for Butler,the problematic character of the category ultisuchresignification andtransformation. matelyenables Howcanwe understand Butler's of identitycategories andhercricritique

10

Hypatia

tique of identity politics in relation to this ultimate appeal to the norms and requirementsof the political arena?Butlerprovidesvery little materialwhich directly addressesthe programmaticimplications of her critique of identity Indeed,partof the difficultywe have in assessingher workis workcategories.9 out vision for a feministpolitics might be, ing preciselywhat her programmatic the theoretical which Nevertheless, given imperatives guide her work.10 given the criticismswhich such theoristsas Benhabibraiseagainsther work,it seems imperativethat we question what possible direction a feminist politics would take on the basis of the variouscritiquesshe makes of identity categoriesand identity-basedpolitics. Does Butler,as Susan Hekman claims, ultimately give up the basis for a feminist politics (Hekman 1995a, 156)? To addressthis question, let us returnhere to some claims Butler does explicitly make concerning the strategieswe might employ as feminists addressing the concerns of"women" in the political arena. Despite being insistently critical of the descriptiveforce of the category"women,"Butlerendorsesstrategic use of that category to serve particularpolitical ends. She claims that "to understand'women' as a permanentsite of contest, or as a feminist site of antagonistic struggle, is to presumethat there can be no closure on the categoryand that, forpolitically significantreasons,there ought never to be. That the category can never be descriptive is the very condition of its political efficacy"(1993, 22 1). As in the case of her account of agency,we can see here the sense in which Butlerunderstandscategorical instability to give rise to political efficacy.That is, insofaras the category"women"is alwaysopen, alwaysa site of contest, the possibilities for transformationand resignification,both within that very category and in its deployment in the political arena, are never-ending." Butler'sclaims here are critically informedboth by her theory of performativity and by her analysis of Slavoj Zizek'sanalysis of political signifiersas "emptysigns which come to bear phantasmaticinvestment of variouskinds" (Butler 1993, 191). Butler claims that understandingthe category of "women" as a political signifierin this way affirmsthe sense in which that signifier unifies the categoryit seeks to representand, simultaneously,constitutes that powerof the political signifierthereforelies in verycategory.The performative it names" which that 150; 1995c, 134). The critical force of (1995a, "enacting the political signifierconsists in its failure,ultimately,to fully or comprehensively describeor representthat which it names. It is preciselythis open-ended character,this inability to ever fully establishor describethe identity to which it referswhich, Butler claims, constitutes the possibility of an "expansiverearticulation"(1993, 218) of that identity. So, in summary,the performative of its agency. characterof the signifieris the very condition characterof the in the Butler located is therefore by performative "Agency" of or It is an attribute not "power" subjects,throughwhich political signifier. over action or signification. Indeed, Butor control assert "authorship" they

Fiona Webster

11

ler is highly critical of an account of agency which implies that the subject is somehow the exclusive "origin"or "owner"of action or signification (1993, 227). The subject,for Butler,is constituted in and by a signifier(such as "woman"), where "'to be constituted' means 'to be compelled to cite or repeat or mime' the signifieritself" (1993, 220). Agency is located in this very action of at once being brought into being by and repeatingor miming the signifieritself.12 Possibilitiesfor "agency," and thereforefor change and transformation, such aclie in the very activity of repetition and identification. Furthermore, tivity is not, for Butler,entered into deliberatelyor voluntarilybut ratheris a processwhich subjectsare compelled to enter into insofaras they are constituted in and through relations of power in society. At this point it is pertinent that we step backfor a moment and considerthe accounts againstwhich Butleris formulatingher own position on agency.Butler caricatures accounts of agency insofaras she presumes traditional,"liberal," that they, necessarily,install a "doerbehind the deed."That is, they assumea subjectwhich is at some point capable of acting outside or beyond the limitations or constraintsof the discourseor culturewithin which they are situated (Butler 1995b, 42). Indeed, Butler accuses Beauvoir of ultimately assuming Likewise,she is preciselysuch a subject in her account of genderedidentity.13 critical of Benhabibfor,first,apparentlyinvesting subjectswith the capacityto deliberate or act outside of their culturalcontext and, second, criticizingher own account of performativitywith such a conception of the subject in mind (1995c, 135). Yet both Beauvoirand Benhabib are specificallyconcerned to "situate"the subject and thereby emphasizepreciselythe sense in which subjects act from within a specific social and historical context. How are we, therefore,to understandButler'scritiqueof their conceptions of agency,and in what sense are those conceptions distinct from her own? In assessing Butler'scritique it is clear that Beauvoir and Benhabib ultimately differ from Butler in three important ways. First, they differ in the relative strength of the agency or freedom which they attribute to subjects. Broadlyspeaking, while Beauvoir and Benhabib clearly equate agency with Butler locates agency in subjective capacities for choiceor self-determination, in the of a variation on resistance, "possibility repetition"of those varioussustained social performanceswhich constitute our identities (1990, 145). Second, they differ in their accounts of where, in what theoretical and political space, agency takes place. For Beauvoirand Benhabib, agency is clearly a capacityof the subject,while for Butler,it is an effectof the subject(Butler 1995c, 134). That is to say, it is not, for Butler,a quality or attributewhich subjects somehow possess and deliberatelyexercise, but rather is an effect of the very processes through which they are constituted as subjects. Third, Butler and Benhabibdisagreeover both the theoretical and political implicationsof their respective accounts of agency. While Butler understandsboth Beauvoir and Benhabib to be guilty of installing a "doerbehind the deed,"Benhabib is crit-

12

Hypatia

ical of Butler for apparentlydoing away with a "doer"altogether (Benhabib 1992, 16). Both Beauvoir and Benhabib insist on an account of agency in which there is a subject who acts, a "doer" who "does."Insofaras Butler criticizes such a formulationshe is attempting to emphasizethe sense in which there can be no separationof the "doer" from the "deed." The "doer," for Butis constituted in and Yet insofaras she wants to ler, always throughthe "deed." and "constituted" characterof the emphasizethis simultaneous"constituting" she is accusedof losing a valuableaccount of agency,an account which "doer," construes it as precisely about the sort of control the "doer"has over their "deeds." The characterizationsButler and Benhabib provide of each other's notions of agency inevitablycontributeto the differentassessmentseach makeof the political consequences of those notions. Indeed what the debate between them illustratesso well is how issuesin debate over the political consequences for feminism of particularnotions of agency have come to be confused and conflated. BenhabibunderstandsButler'stheory of performativityto have debilitating consequences for the emancipatoryobjectives of a feminist politics insofaras she perceives the subjective capacities of "choice"and "self-determination" to be missing from it. Yet, in response, it seems that Butler is less concerned with the question of whether or not "choice"or "self-determination" are possiblethan with the question of how such choice or self-determination comes about. She is therefore (to some extent) justifiablywaryof the very termsthroughwhich her workis assessed(Butler 1995c, 128). The debate is characterized capacities by Benhabib as one about "losing"or "disallowing" for self-determinationand self-reflection,while it is understoodby Butler to be about reformulatinghow agency comes about and under what terms it is effected or established.As she herself states, the task for feminism is actually to "locatestrategiesof subversiverepetition"and to participatein those practices of repetition that constitute identity (1990, 147). The task is thereforeto find ways of disruptingand destabilizingthe very processesthroughwhich we are constructed as subjects and, in so doing, open up possibilities for change and transformationin our identities. Despite the very different angles (and apparentcross-purposes)at which Benhabib and Butler enter debate with one another on this issue, it is abunimportancein their respecdantly clear that both invest considerablepolitical that of tive conceptions agency-for both, importance consists in the posand resignification of the subject and of cultural sibility for transformation and political relations (Benhabib 1995b, 108; Butler 1995b, 46). Ultimately, therefore,we areleft with the question of what sortof account of agencyis conand resignification.Clearly, sistent with the possibilityof such transformation to be inadequate(or consider each other's accounts and Butler both Benhabib to this with incoherent) possibility. respect three critical issuescharacterizethe debate between Benhabib In summary,

Fiona Webster

13

and Butler.First,there is a fundamentaldisagreementbetween them over how to understandthe origins and operationof agency.Second, despite agreement over the political importanceof agency,there is a division of opinion over the question of preciselyhow it does or ought to operate in the political domain. Third, there is specific disagreementover the implicationsfor a feminist politics of particularconceptions of agency. The primaryfocus of Benhabib'scritique of Butler is the notion of agency which emergesfrom Butler'sperformativeaccount of sex and gender and the inadequacyof that notion for the articulationand representationof what she perceives to be issues of specifically feminist political concern. However, I want to suggesthere that even if we disagreespecificallywith Benhabib over the question of preciselywhat such issues are, or how we might go about addressingthem, we arestill left with the question of whether Butler'sperformative account of those categories provides an adequate frameworkin which to addressand supporteither its own implicit political commitments or those issuesof political representationand agency as they aredebated in the broader context of the Anglo-American feminist theory in which she is situated.In the next section of this paperI will begin by considering in more detail precisely what sort of political commitments are implicit in Butler'swork and how she understands the issuesof political representationand agency to be addressed in the context of such commitments.
BUTLER THEPOLITICAL THEORIZES

Aside from Butler'sexplicit reference to the strategic importance of retaining the category "women"in order to meet particularpolitical ends, she does make some generalcomments in her workwhich suggestthat a particular vision for a "feministpolitics"does, at least implicitly, informher work. First of all, Butler suggeststhat feminism must engage in a critical analysis of its own groundsin orderto avoid losing its "democratizing potential"(1993, 29). Moreover,she clearly positions herself in BodiesThatMatterin the context of theorists committed to "radicaldemocratic theory."In support of this suggested commitment to "radicaldemocraticaims,"she appealsto "amore fully democraticand participatory political life" (1995c, 129). In this section I will addressthree questions. First,what does such a commitment, even if only implicitly, entail for Butlerand how is it to be understoodwithin the termsof her Second, how is the issue of political representation theory of performativity? addressedwithin this theory?Third, how might Butler,in response to critics such as Benhabib,reconcile her account of agencywith this apparentcommitment to radicaldemocraticaims? To addressthe firstquestion here, I will not endeavor to give a comprehensive account of the variousaims and objectives espousedby theoristscommitted to "radicaldemocratic politics." Rather, I will be concerned to draw out

14

Hypatia

preciselywhat it is that Butlerdrawsupon in her own account of such aimsand objectives and how she seeks to deploy some aspects of them within her own vision for a "feministpolitics."In drawingupon the workof Emesto Laclauand Chantal Mouffe (Laclauand Mouffe 1985), Butleridentifiesseveralaspectsof their theory for a radicaldemocraticpolitics which she understandsto be pertinent for understandingher own conception of the performativefunction of ForButler,as we have seen, the political signifier(such the political signifier.'4 as "women")is politically effective preciselybecause of its power to produce and constitute its political field and its simultaneousfailure to ever fully describe or representthat which it names. Like Butler,Laclauand Mouffe subscribeto the view that political signifiersareproductiveand constitutive of the political field. They also claim that all political signifiersare contingently related to one another.Insofaras such signifiersare alwaysin themselves incomplete (that is, insofaras they alwaysfail to fullydescribeor representthat which they name), they can and shouldbe perpetuallyrearticulatedin relation to one another.Laclauand Mouffeclaim that this processof rearticulationis productive of new subject positions and new political signifiersand, consequently, new linkages between these positions and signifiers,can become the rallying points for politicization (Butler 1993, 193). Laclauand Mouffe thereforeunderstand politics to be essentially "a practice of creation, reproductionand transformation" (1985, 153). They insist on understandingthe domain of the because the rules as "the space for a game which is never 'zero-sum,' political and the playersare never fully explicit" (1985, 193). Radical democratictheoretical and political potential consistspreciselyin this productiveand constitutive characterof the political domain. Critical to the aims and objectives of a radicaldemocraticpolitics is, therefore, an exposureand avowal of "the necessaryerrorof identity"(Butler 1993, 229). Butlerunderstandsthe democratizingpotential of identity categoriesto consist in mobilizing that necessary error and so exposing that which they exclude (the abject). Such exposure and mobilization is vital, according to Butler,to the very democratizingpotential of a feminist politics. It is precisely in this sense, then, that Butler understandsthe categoryof "women"to have "open and democratizingpotential" (1993, 221). For this reason, she is specifically critical of the claim that problematizingthe identity category"women" necessarilyleads to an "impossibilityof a feminist politics."15 Indeed, for Butler, the problematic characterof that category is itself constitutive of its democratizingpotential.'6 Leaving that category open, and so never understanding it to have a fixed or determinate set of references,will leave it open and reto challenge and thereforeopen to the sort of change, transformation, seek. significationwhich feminism might In summary, therefore, it is clear that Butler situatesherself in the context of political theoristswho see radicaldemocraticpotential in the incompletion of the political signifierand relations between political signifiers.Although

Fiona Webster

15

vision for a femiButler is not explicit in providing us with a programmatic nist politics, it is clear that the recognition and mobilization of "the necessaryerrorof identity"which is operative in Laclau'sand Mouffe'sradicaldemocratic theory is pertinent in the context of her own understandingof the possibility and democratic potential of a "feministpolitics." Indeed Mouffe, like Butler, appeals to the (postmodern) critique of identity categories precisely becauseof the sense in which that critiquedemonstratesthe multiplicity of subject positions which ultimately contribute to the constitution of a single agent (Mouffe 1988, 35). Mouffe claims that it is this multiplicity which should be the site of politics-for her, a full understandingof politics is impossible without a theory of the subject as preciselya decentered, destabilized agent (1988, 35).17 As I have claimed, two issues of specifically feminist political concern emerge in the context of Butler'stheory of performativityand, more specififunction cally, in the context of her theory,outlined above, of the performative of the political signifier.The first is the issue of political representation;the second is that of agency. I will turn firsthere to the question of how the issue of political representationis addressedin these contexts. We have seen here that the content of the identity categoryof "women"is never stable or fixed. Insofaras it is "a performative," or as it functions performatively,accordingto Butler,it constitutes itself as a categoryat the point at which it is "named." Its content is, in this sense, highly malleableand negotiable. Indeed it is this very malleability which, for Butler,determines its "deIt for a is, Butler, mocratizing" potential. categorywhich is open to a continual processof transformation and resignification.Yetwe may well ask what this malleability implies for the question of whether we can ever talk about there being some meaningfulor substantialaccount of the contentof that category. Forexample, is the term "women"simply an "emptysign"(Butler 1993, 191) which we invest with whatever meaning we choose at any given time?Insofar as that categoryof "women" does operateas such an empty sign, what does this mean for the effectively political representationby the feminist movement of "women"and "women'sconcerns"?18 How do such things come to be represented?Is our representationof them alwaysstrategicand temporary? Is this a problem? One consequence of the way in which Butlerconstruesthe gender identity as "anempty sign"is that that category,and those concerns category"woman" which we might identify as unique to that category,are wholly malleable and negotiable. According to Butler'saccount, there can be no meaningfulor substantial content specificto or determinateof that categoryor concerns except that which we invest in them. Furthermore,even at the point at which we "name"that categoryand so invest it with meaning or content, that meaning or content is shifting. That is to say, insofaras it can never "fullydescribeor representthat which it names"its meaning can never be fixed and it will mean

16

Hypatia

differentthings at differenttimes and in differentcontexts. Forthis reason,the and of "women's concerns"will alwaysbe, political representationof "women" for Butler,a slipperyaffair. The implications of this "slipperiness" for the feminist movement are, as I in the different suggested previous section, according to the different political contexts in which they are assessed.Forexample, insofaras it has historically been a movement which has specifically sought to represent"women" and "women'sconcerns," it is clear that for Butler such representationcan never be entirely legitimate. Indeed, Butlerspecificallyseeks to point out that "identityas a point of departurecan never hold as the solidifyinggroundof a feminist political movement" (1995b, 50). That movement can never legitimately prescribea fixed content or meaning to the categories of "women"or "women'sconcerns."In this sense-that is, insofaras feminism is understood as primarilya representative movement or lobby groupfor a particulargroupor particularconcerns-its political force does appearsubstantiallyweakened by Butler'stheory of performativity. However, in the context of her vision for a "radicallydemocratic politics," the open and transformativepotential of the category of "women"appearsto provide general supportfor such "radically democratic"aims. On the one hand, therefore,Butler'sperformativeaccount of gender can be understoodto weaken identity-basedpolitics. On the other hand, it could be understood to enrich our understandingof gender and so enrich our understandingof the processesthroughwhich "women" and "men" are constructed in particularways. The second issue of specificallyfeminist political concern that emerges in the context of Butler'stheory of the performativefunction of the political signifier is that of agency.As we have seen, Butler understandsthe political domain to be productive and constitutive of subjects.It is also clear that insofar as this production and constitution is an ongoing and transformative process, it is one that, accordingto Butler,gives rise to the possibility of agencyor reThe question which arisesat this point, therefore,is whether Butleris sistance. or rightly wronglyaccusedby critics such as Benhabib of ultimately disallowing agency and so "giving up the basis"for a feminist politics. What sort of by Butler and is this the sort of agency femiagency is actually "disallowed" nism actually requiresin orderto fulfill its "emancipatory" objectives?Is Butler'sconception of agency ultimately inadequatefor accounting for the sort of resistance which might be requiredin order for subjects to avoid wholesale social determinism?How is resistance possible?Is such resistance enough to enable the democratic and emancipatoryaims implicit in her political vision for feminism? Wendy Brown'swork offers some significant insights for the purposesof it illustratesvery well how feminist addressingthese questions. Furthermore, the issue of agency has come to be confusedbepolitical concern surrounding

Fiona Webster

17

cause of disagreementover preciselywhat sort of agency is necessaryin order to ground or supportparticularpolitical aims. Brown points out that a problem which is critical for feminists today lies in discerninghow we might forto contesting antidemocratic mulate a discourseof freedomthat is appropriate configurationsof power (1995, 7). In other words,she, like Butler,posits "democracy"as the ultimate goal of her political vision and askswhat sort of account of agency is necessaryfor the fulfillmentof that goal. As a consequence, she focuses specificallyon how formationsof power in contemporarysociety and how we might contributeto strategiesthat avoid might be "democratized" an account renderingsubjects"unresistingvehicles of its objectionable confunctions"(1995, 34). That is to say,she wants to avoid an account temporary of subjects as constituted and thereby determined by the relations of power in which they aresituatedand to think abouthow subjectsmight, in practice,resist such determination.Significantly,therefore,Brownseeksto think through just what is actually involved in contesting and subvertingthose relations of power in which we are situated while avowing the sense in which those relations are not something we can actually overcome or actively control. Brown'swork is significant in bringing into focus two critical issues that are directly relevant to our assessmentof Butler'sconception of agency.First, while clearly aligning herself with a conception of power as productive and constitutive of subjects, Brown affirmsthe necessity of defining strategies of resistance to such power.19 Second, she explicitly attemptsto articulatethe sort of power which is entailed by the actual practiceof freedom by subjects.20 Considering her work in relation to Butler'sconception of agency (and the claim that that conception gives rise to a problematicpolitical vision) yields some importantinsights. Firstand foremost, Brown claims that the mere existence of resistance (as a mode of agency or freedom) is not enough to successfully contest or arrogatepower. "[Resistance]by itself,"she argues,"does not contain a critique, a vision, or groundsfor organizedcollective effortsto enact.... Resistance-as-politicsdoes not raise the dilemmasof responsibility and justification entailed in 'affirming' political projects and norms"(1995, 49). In other words,resistanceby itself is not enough to makepossiblethe successful underminingof contemporaryconfigurationsof power, nor is it sufficient to raise the moral frameworknecessaryfor affirmativepolitical action. resistance does not necessarilygive rise to a particular(demoFurthermore, cratic or emancipatory)political direction (Brown 1995, 22). As I suggested,the issuesraisedby Brownhere raisesome importantpoints that aresignificantin our assessmentof the political implicationsfor feminism of the performativeframeworkthrough which Butler develops her account of agency,an account which, as we have seen, is definedprimarilyin termsof resistance. In summary, these points principallyconcern the need Brownidentifies for, first, defining strategiesof resistance to power;second, establishing

18

Hypatia

groundsfor collective agency; and third, raising the moral frameworknecessaryfor affirmativepolitical action. All of these points suggestthe need for a strongeraccount of agency than the notion of resistancewhich is providedby Butler.21 That is to say,they suggestthe need for a strongeraccount of what role subjectsmay actively play in their construction as gendered,on what grounds they might strengthen that role in the political arena through collective acaims and objectives that contest tion, and how they might set up appropriate their determination by the highly genderedrelations of power in which they are situated. I want to suggesthere, therefore,that while Butlercannot be accused of disallowing agency or of wholly undermining the basis for feminist political action, we are nevertheless justifiedin consideringher conception of of to explain or to provide an account of the actualpractice agency inadequate freedomby subjectsor groupsof subjects in the political arena. It will not have gone unnoticed that the problemsassociatedwith Butler's theory of agency bear similarities to those identified by many critics in the work of Michel Foucault.22 Likewise,Brown'sresponseto these problemscan also be perceived as an attempt to resolve some of the issues raisedby a Foucauldianmodel of powerin relation to political activism.Needless to say,while feminism is certainly not left in a state of crisis through an adherence to the theory of agency emergingfrom such a model, I have suggestedin this paper that too little attention is paid by theorists such as Butler to two issues:first, to identifying the relation between the individual and the processesthrough which they are constructed;and, second, to locating points of intervention in There is a reluctance to addressexplicitly the questions of those processes.23 how it is that individualsin practice resistdeterminationby dominant gender norms and how such norms might be actively contested in the context of a accounts such as feminist political movement. Until such issuesare addressed, which bearslittle for feminism a framework Butler'sriskproviding theoretical it relation to the practical political issues faces.

NOTES 1. See, for example, essays in Benhabib et al. (1995) and Hekman (1995a). 2. See, to name just a few examples, Alcoff (1988), Bartky(1995), Bordo (1992), Butler and Scott (1992), Hekman (1995b), Nicholson (1990), Riley (1988), and Schweickart (1995). 3. See Butler (1993, 28) for an example of this claim. 4. This claim is only brieflyarticulatedby Benhabib. It seems importantto note that it is ostensibly a curious one given that Butler'stheory of performativegender constitution seems to be precisely a theory about the structuraland developmental processes which are operative in the construction of identity (such as identification and repetition). Nevertheless, the point Benhabibdesiresto make, over and above her

Fiona Webster

19

general uneasiness with the social research paradigmswhich guide Butler'swork, is that Butler'stheory of performativitydoes not provide an adequateexplanation of the capacity of subjectsfor some degree of self-reflectionand self-determination. 5. I have referredhere to Butler'scritique of traditional, liberal formulationsof agency as "radical"in comparison to Benhabib'sown account of agency. Benhabib, however, is not uncritical of liberal accounts of agency. Indeed, insofar as Butler is construing the liberal account of agency as one in which subjects are somehow "disembedded,""disembodied," "abstractlyrational,"etc., Benhabib would concur with Butler in criticizingsuch an account. Nevertheless, the accounts of agencywhich they ultimately provide in response to their critiques of liberalismdiffer sharplyfrom one another. This difference in their responsesto the liberal account of agency is largely due to their different characterizationsof that account. 6. See Butler (1986). 7. Butler asks, in response to Benhabib'scriticism of her, "what notion of'agency' will that be which alwaysand alreadyknows its transcendentalground, and speaks only and alwaysfrom that ground?To be so groundedis nearly to be buried:it is to refuse alterity, to reject contestation, to decline that risk of self-transformation perpet(1995c, ually posed by democraticlife: to give wayto the very impulseof conservatism" 132). 8. Indeed, she notes that "anyeffort to give a universalor specific content to the categoryof women, presumingthat that guaranteeof solidarityis requiredin advance, will necessarilyproducefactionalization, and that identity as a point of departurecan never hold as the solidifying ground of a feminist political movement. Identity categories are never merely descriptive, but alwaysnormative, and as such, exclusionary" (Butler 1995b, 50). 9. Indeed, she explicitly claims in Bodies ThatMatterthat her text "isnot intended to be programmatic," but nevertheless hopes it will be "productive" in some way (Butler 1993, xii). 10. My task in this paperis, in part,to considerhow Butlermight programmatically theorize a specificallyfeminist politics. However, I have chosen not to addresshere in detail the more general sense in which she perceives some activities to have political outcomesor to amount to political acts. In Gendertrouble,for example, Butlerrefersto dragas a sort of political act insofaras it is subversiveof what we commonly understand to be gender-that is, as something that is attached to or a consequence of sex. To the extent that drag"imitatesgenders,"Butler argues,it reveals the sense in which those genders are themselves imitative and inscribedcontingently on the surfaceof bodies (1990, 136-37). She claims that dragthereforeeffectively mocks any appeal to a notion of "true" gender identity. The sort of parodyinvolved in drag is political, or constitutes a sort of politics, insofar as it brings into question dominant political norms our preconceptions about gender. concerning gender-it "bends" 11. Butler is not alone in seeing the political importanceof retaining the category of "women"while remaining insistently critical of the character of its possible construction and deployment. Drucilla Cornell argues,like Butler,that leaving the term open and never fixing its constitution "yieldsendless transformative possibility"(1995, 87). Like Butler,Cornell is critical of identity-basedpolitics. Corell relies instead on what she refersto as "anexplicitly political enactment of mimetic identification as the basis for solidarity"(1995, 71).

20

Hypatia

12.Butler marks the workings of anagency thatis concludes, "[this] resignification andthat(b) thoughimplicated in the veryrelations of (a) not the sameasvoluntarism, to thosedominant forms" reducible powerit seeksto rival,is not, as a consequence, (1993, 241). of thisclaim. 13. See Butler(1990, 8) fora further example earlier in thispaper to Butler's on the performacomments 14. See myreference tive powerof the politicalsignifier. 15. See Butler(1993, 188). of identity 16.Mouffe is alsocriticalof claimsthata critique necessarcategories of afeminist veinto Butler ilyleadsto animpossibility politics(1992,371). Ina similar in mind)she suggests ratherthat with morepractical politicalprinciples (although in order to reach"anadequate of the variety is necessary sucha critique understanding wherethe principles of libertyand equality shouldapply" of socialrelations (1992, 371). andcontradictory "wearein factalways alsowrites, 17.Mouffe subjects, multiple . . . constructed of a diversity of communities, inhabitants by a varietyof discourses of thosesubject-positions. andtemporarily sutured at the intersection andprecariously a political of the postmodercritique fordeveloping Thusthe importance philosophy thatwouldbe trulypluraland a new formof individuality aimedat making possible democratic" (1988,44). function to note herethatButler's 18. It is important theoryof the performative not simply forallpolitical hasimplications of the political signifiers, obviously signifier aboutitsimplications I amherethinking thatof "woman." However, quitespecifically I am on the "pofor this of feminism, forthe politicalconcerns reason, and, focusing and"women's of "women" concerns." liticalsignifiers" in the contextof femto power arises 19.The needto define ofresistance strategies criticisms notion of agency. of Foucault's inist critiques Indeed,one of the principal foror notionof agencyis thatit failsto account Foucault's raised against byfeminists an account or for women. Such or of explainstrategies empowerment emancipation of feminism. to aims and to be critical the is understood objectives explanation that we takefull for its sustenance 20. Indeedshe insiststhat freedom "requires and measure of power's rangeand appearances-thepowersthat situate,constrain in entailed will to well as the as 1995, (Brown power practicing freedom" subjects produce 25;myemphasis). and postmodern that "what 21. Indeed,Brownargues disperses postmodemity femandquestioning forposing arecultivated feminist spaces political politicsrequires women" of'the for the nature for inistpolitical (1995,49). She norms, discussing good' femiand the therefore of, first, assessing critically identifying suggests importance valuesthatmight the potential common nistpoliticalnorms and,second,considering "reBenhabib raisesa similar forwomenin the politicalarena.Significantly, emerge criticaltheoryis thatwhatis neededin feminist She argues forfeminism. quirement" betwofold: andreflective. Itstaskshould thatisbothemancipatory a theory to develop the conditionof women, research, critical,social-scientific first,to explain,through a utopianconditionfor andphilosophically, andsecond,to anticipate, normatively whichwe shouldstrive)(1992, 152). women(a conditiontoward Butlerherselfexdebt to Foucault, 22. Indeed,in evidenceof her theoretical Fouas a pointof departure thathertext "accepts ThatMatter plicitlystatesin Bodies

Fiona Webster

21

cault'snotion that regulatory powerproducesthe subjectsit controls, that power is not only imposed externally but works as the regulative and normative means by which subjects are formed"(1993, 22). 23. In this paperI have focused on the question of how we might resolve Butler's account of agency in relation to the development of a specificallyfeminist politics. I have concentrated on her performativeaccount of gender detailed in GenderTrouble and BodiesThatMatter.In more recent work,such as The Psychic Lifeof Power(1997b) and ExcitableSpeech(1997a), Butler has expanded her analysis of agency and the relation between agency and political action beyond the more feminist-oriented concernsof earlierwork.Her focus in both of these books is the question of how agencycan be thought of in opposition to the forces of subordination.That is to say, if we agree ratherthan constituting in relation to its own identity,how that the subjectis constituted might that subject assertpolitical agency?"Howcan it be," she asks,"thatthe subject, taken to be the condition for and instrumentof agency, is at the same time the effect of subordination,understood as the deprivation of agency?"(1997b, 10). Although Butler clearly makes it her task in The PsychicLifeof Powerto addressthe question of "how we might make such a conception of the subject work as a notion of political times"(1997b, 18), her responsein that book is focusedmore agency in post-liberatory on the aforementionedtheoretical paradoxthan on some of the practicalpolitical issues to which that paradox gives rise. The problem of agency is not addressedin a specifically feminist political context, and it is largely for this reason that I have not explored these worksin detail in the presentpaper,the primaryfocus of which is issues arisingfrom the debate between Benhabib and Butler.

REFERENCES The identity crisisin Alcoff, Linda. 1988. Culturalfeminismversuspost-structuralism: feminist theory. In Reconstructing the academy:Women'seducationand women's studies, ed. E. Minnich, J. O'Burr,and R. Rosenfield. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bartky,Sandra. 1995. Agency: What's the problem?In Provoking agents:Genderand andpractice, ed. J. KeganGardiner.Urbana:University of Illinois agencyin theory Press. Benhabib, Seyla. 1986. Critique,normand utopia:A studyof thefoundations of critical theory.New York:Columbia University Press. .1992. Situating theself: Gender,community andpostmoderismin contemporary ethics.Oxford:Blackwell. .1995a. Feminismand postmodernism: An uneasyalliance. In Feminist contentions: A philosophical ed. S. Benhabib, J. Butler, D. Cornell, and N. exchange, Fraser. New York:Routledge. .1995b. Subjectivity,historiography, and politics: Reflectionson the feminism/ contentions: A philosophical ed. S. postmodernismexchange. In Feminist exchange, New York:Routledge. Benhabib, J. Butler,D. Cornell, and N. Fraser. eds. 1995. FemiBenhabib, Seyla, Judith Butler,Drucilla Cornell, and Nancy Fraser, nist contentions: A philosophical New York:Routledge. exchange.

22

Hypatia

Studies18 (1): Bordo,Susan. 1992. Postmodernsubjects,postmoder bodies. Feminist 159-75. 3 (1): Brown, Wendy. 1991. Feminist hesitations, postmoder exposures.differences 63-84. 1995. Statesof injury: Powerandfreedom in latemodernity. Princeton:Princeton Press. University Butler,Judith. 1986. Sex and gender in The secondsex. YaleFrenchStudies72: 35-49. .1990. Gendertrouble: Feminism and thesubversion New York:Routof identity. ledge. . 1993. Bodiesthatmatter:On thediscursive limitsof sex. New York:Routledge. . 1995a. Burningacts: Injuriousspeech. In Deconstruction is/inAmerica:A new sense of thepolitical,ed. A. Haverkamp.New York:New YorkUniversity Press. . 1995b. Contingent foundations: Feminism and the question of "postmodA philosophical ernism."In Feminist contentions: ed. S. Benhabib,J. Butexchange, New York:Routledge. ler, D. Corell, and N. Fraser. . 1995c. For a carefulreading. In Feminist contentions: A philosophical exchange, ed. S. Benhabib, J. Butler,D. Cornell, and N. Fraser. New York:Routledge. . 1997a. Excitable New York:Routledge. speech:A politicsof theperformative. . 1997b. The psychiclife of power.Stanford:StanfordUniversity Press. Butler, Judith and Joan Scott, eds. 1992. Feministstheorizethe political.New York: Routledge. A philoCornell, Drucilla. 1995. What is ethical feminism? In Feministcontentions: ed. S. Benhabib,J. Butler,D. Corell, and N. Fraser. New York: exchange, sophical Routledge. Fraser, Nancy. 1995. False antithesis:A responseto Seyla Benhabiband Judith Butler. In Feministcontentions:A philosophical exchange,ed. S. Benhabib, J. Butler, D. New York:Routledge. Cornell, and N. Fraser. Hekman, Susan. 1995a. Review of Unbearable weight:Feminism,cultureand the body and Bodiesthatmatter.Hypatia10 (4): 151-57. . 1995b. Subjects and agents: The question for feminism. In Provoking agents: andpractice, ed. J. KeganGardiner.Urbana:University Genderandagencyin theory of Illinois Press. Toward a and socialist Laclau,Ernesto, and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. Hegemony strategy: radicaldemocratic politics.Trans.W. Moore and P. Cammack. London: Verso. Mouffe, Chantal. 1988. Radical democracy: Modem or postmodern? In Universal ed. A. Ross. Minneapolis: University of abandon:The politicsof postmodernism, Minnesota Press. the. 1992. Feminism,citizenship and radicaldemocraticpolitics. In Feminists orizethepolitical,ed. J. Butler and J. Scott. New York:Routledge. New York:Routledge. Nicholson, Linda, ed. 1990. Feminism/postmodernism. in history. the I that name?" Feminism and 1988. "Am Denise. of "women" category Riley, London: Macmillan. Schweickart, Patricia. 1995. What are we doing? What do we want? Who are we? agents:Genderand agency Comprehendingthe subject of feminism. In Provoking in theory andpractice,ed. J. Kegan Gardiner.Urbana:University of Illinois Press.

S-ar putea să vă placă și