CHAPTER 3

Quieting of Title (n)

Article 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in
fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought
to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from
being cast upon title to real property or any interest
therein.
Quieting of title a common-law remedy for the removal of any
cloud upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real
property
The purpose of quieting of title is to secure an adjudication that
a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of
the complaint is invalid, so that the complaint and those
claiming under him may be forever afterward from any danger
of hostile claim. (Arturo Tolentino)
An action to quiet title to property in the possession of the
plaintiff is imprescriptible. (Foja v. Court of Appeals)
An action to quiet title is really in in personam because it is
enforceable only against the defeated party, or privies.
(Santiago v. J.M. Tuason and Co.) But since concerning real
property xa, quasi in rem xa.
A suit to quiet title brought against one co-owner is not res
judicata with respect to the other co-owners who were not
made parties thereto. (Santiago v. J.M. Tuason and Co.) Pero
kung ang gi tira kay ang title sa ilang predecessor-in-interest,
ang decision is binding also to the other co-owners.
To authorize an action to prevent a cloud being cast on title, it
must be made clear that there is a fixed determination on the
part of the defendant to create a cloud, and it is not sufficient
that the danger is merely speculative. (Clark v. Davenport;
Sanders v. Yonkers)
If the plaintiff is not in possession of the property, the action to
quiet title may prescribe. (Sapto, et al. v. Fabiana) (In the
sense that, the action is not for quieting of title anymore but
one to recover real property. See Gallar v. Hussain)
Article 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title
to, or interest in the real property which is the subject
matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said
property.
Article 478. There may also be an action to quiet title or
remove a cloud therefrom when the contract, instrument
or other obligation has been extinguished or has
terminated, or has been barred by extinctive prescription.
Article 479. The plaintiff must return to the defendant all
benefits he may have received from the latter, or
reimburse him for expenses that may have redounded to
the plaintiff's benefit.
Article 480. The principles of the general law on the
quieting of title are hereby adopted insofar as they are not
in conflict with this Code.
Article 481. The procedure for the quieting of title or the
removal of a cloud therefrom shall be governed by such
rules of court as the Supreme Court shall promulgate.


CHAPTER 4
Ruinous Buildings and Trees in Danger of Falling
Article 482. If a building, wall, column, or any other
construction is in danger of falling, the owner shall be
obliged to demolish it or to execute the necessary work in
order to prevent it from falling.
If the proprietor does not comply with this obligation, the
administrative authorities may order the demolition of the
structure at the expense of the owner, or take measures to
insure public safety. (389a)
Article 483. Whenever a large tree threatens to fall in such
a way as to cause damage to the land or tenement of
another or to travelers over a public or private road, the
owner of the tree shall be obliged to fell and remove it;
and should he not do so, it shall be done at his expense
by order of the administrative authorities. (390a)


TITLE III
CO-OWNERSHIP
Article 484. There is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons.
In default of contracts, or of special provisions, co-
ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this
Title. (392)
A co-ownership is not a juridical person, nor is it granted any
form of juridical personality. Thus, it cannot sue in court. Co-
owners may, of course, litigate in their individual capacities.
(Smith v. Lopez)
Possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not
be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as
beneficial to all of them. (Salvador v. CA)
There is no co-ownership when the different portions owned by
different people are already concretely determined and
identifiable, even if not yet technically described. (De la Cruz v.
Cruz)
A co-owner can only alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-
owned property. Thus, a co-owner does not lose his part
ownership of a co-owned property when his share is
mortgaged by another co-owner without the formers
knowledge and consent. (Nufable v. Nufable)
A co-owner may, independently of the other co-owners, validly
lease his undivided interest to a third party. (Sanchez v. CA)
How Co-ownership arises:
1. By law
2. By contract
3. By chance
4. By occupation or occupancy
5. By succession or will
Property acquired by a man while living with a common-law
wife during the subsistence of his marriage is conjugal
property, even when the property was titled in the name of the
common-law wife. (Adriano v. CA)
If the actual contribution of a party is not proved, there will be
no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares. (Tumlos
v. Spouses Fernandez)
Tenancy in common (co-ownership) distinguished from joint
tenancy (joint ownership):
1. Tenancy in common involves a physical whole but
there is an ideal share division; each co-owner being
the owner of his own ideal share. Joint tenancy also
involves a physical whole but there is no ideal
division; each and all of them own the whole thing.
2. In tenancy in common, each co-owner may dispose of
his ideal share or undivided share without the others
consent; in joint tenancy, each co-owner may not
dispose of his share without the consent of all the rest
because he really has no ideal share.
3. In tenancy in common, if a co-owner dies, his share
goes to his own heirs; while if a joint tenant dies, his
share goes by accretion to the other joint tenants by
virtue of their survivorship or jus accrecendi.
4. If a co-owner is a minor, this does not benefit the
others for the purpose of prescription, and
prescription therefore runs against them; while if one
joint tenant is under a legal disability, this benefits the
other against whom prescription will not run.
Characteristics of co-ownership:
1. There must be more than one subject or owner.
2. There is one physical whole divided into ideal shares.
3. Each ideal share is definite in amount, but is not
physically segregated from the rest.
4. Regarding the physical whole, each co-owner must
respect each other in the common use, enjoyment, or
preservation of the physical whole.
5. Regarding the ideal share, each co-owner holds
almost absolute control over the same.
6. It is not a juridical person, i.e., it has no juridical
personality.
7. A co-owner is in a sense a trustee for the other co-
owners.
Co-ownership distinguished from an ordinary partnership:
1. Co-ownership has no legal personality; while ordinary
partnership has legal or juridical personality.
2. Co-ownership is created by contract or by other
things; while ordinary partnership is created by
contract only.
3. The purpose of co-ownership is the collective
enjoyment; while the purpose of ordinary partnership
is profit.
4. Agreement for the co-ownership to exist for 10 years
valid; while there is no term limit set by the law for
ordinary partnership.
5. In co-ownership, as a rule, there is no mutual
representation; while in ordinary partnership, there is
mutual representation.
6. Co-ownership is not dissolved by death or incapacity
of a co-owner; while ordinary partnership is dissolved
by the death or incapacity of the partner.
7. A co-owner can dispose of his share without consent
of the others; while a partner cannot substitute
another in his place without the consent of the other.
8. In co-ownership, profits must always depend on
proportionate shares; while in ordinary partnership,
profits may be stipulated upon.
Co-ownership distinguished from conjugal partnership:
1. Co-ownership may arise by an ordinary contract;
while conjugal partnership arises only because of a
marriage contract.
2. In co-ownership, sex of the co-owners is immaterial;
while in conjugal partnership, one must be a male and
the other a female.
3. Co-owners may be two or more, conjugal owners are
always only two.
4. In co-ownership, profits are proportional respective
interests; in conjugal partnership, profits are generally
50-50 unless a contrary stipulation is in a marriage
settlement.
5. Death of a co-owner does not dissolve the co-
ownership; while death of either the husband or wife
dissolves the conjugal partnerhip.
6. Generally, all co-owners administer; while in conjugal
partnership, the husband is generally the
administrator.
7. Co-ownership is discouraged by law; while conjugal
partnership is encouraged by law to provide for better
family solidarity.
Article 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as
well as in the charges, shall be proportional to their
respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to the
contrary shall be void.
The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-
ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is
proved. (393a)
If a co-owner has paid the taxes to prevent forfeiture of the
common property for tax delinquency, he could compel
contribution from his co-owners. But if he has not yet paid, he
cannot compel them to pay the overdue and unpaid taxes to
him himself, for after all, the taxes are due, not to him, but to
the government. (Jalandoni et al. v. Guanzon et al.)
Article 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common, provided he does so in accordance with the
purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not
to injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent the
other co-owners from using it according to their rights.
The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by
agreement, express or implied. (394a)
Article 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action
in ejectment. (n) (It is understood that the action is being
instituted for the benefit of all co-owners. Hence, if the co-
owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for
himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper.)
Actions covered by the term ejectment:
1. Forcible entry
2. Unlawful detainer
3. Accion publiciana
4. Accion reivindicatoria
5. Quieting of title
6. Replevin
As a general rule, the main issue in an ejectment suit is
possession de facto, not possession de jure. In the event the
issue of ownership is raised in the pleadings, such issue shall
be taken up only for the limited purpose of determining who
between the contending parties has the better right of
possession. (Lao v. CA) (The lower court cannot declare who
among the parties is the true and lawful owner of the subject
property because adjudication of ownership is not sanctioned
in the summary action for ejectment. [Corpuz v. CA])
A decision in a suit to quiet title brought against one co-owner
by a third party is not res judicata with respect to the other co-
owners because co-owners as such are not privies inter se in
relation to the property owned in common. (Santiago, et. al. v.
Tuason) However, a statement in said suit stating that the
document relied upon by the co-owners predecessor-in-
interest did not give title to said predecessor, is binding on said
co-owners, for regarding this aspect, they may be considered
as privies or successors-in-interest. If their predecessor-father
was not the owner of the land, they, the children cannot be
considered as co-heir or co-owners. (Santiago, et. al. v.
Tuason)
A co-owner of an undivided parcel of land is an owner of the
whole, and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion
but he is at the same time the owner of a portion which is truly
abstract. (De Guia v. CA)
Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only
against a third person but also against another co-owner who
takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of
the property. (De Guia v. CA)
Article 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the
other co-owners to contribute to the expenses of
preservation of the thing or right owned in common and to
the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself from
this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided
interest as may be equivalent to his share of the expenses
and taxes. No such waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial
to the co-ownership. (395a)
If the renouncing is in favour of the creditor, said creditor must
give his consent.
If the renouncing is in favour of the other co-owners, a novation
would result necessitating the consent of said other co-
owners and of the creditor.
Reimbursement can be had from the estate of a deceased co-
owner, provided no renunciation has been made. (Hibberd v.
Estate of McElroy)
Renunciation cannot be implied by mere refusal to pay the
proportionate share.
Article 489. Repairs for preservation may be made at the
will of one of the co-owners, but he must, if practicable,
first notify his co-owners of the necessity for such repairs.
Expenses to improve or embellish the thing shall be
decided upon by a majority as determined in article 492.
(n) (Financial majority)
Practicable means that something can be done; practical
means useful.
If no notification is made though it was practicable, the rest of
the co-owners are still liable. But the liability of the other co-
owners may be lesser because if notification was made, the
expenses for the repairs may have been cheaper.
Article 490. Whenever the different stories of a house
belong to different owners, if the titles of ownership do not
specify the terms under which they should contribute to
the necessary expenses and there exists no agreement on
the subject, the following rules shall be observed:
(1) The main and party walls, the roof and the other things
used in common, shall be preserved at the expense of all
the owners in proportion to the value of the story
belonging to each;
(2) Each owner shall bear the cost of maintaining the floor
of his story; the floor of the entrance, front door, common
yard and sanitary works common to all, shall be
maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata;
(3) The stairs from the entrance to the first story shall be
maintained at the expense of all the owners pro rata, with
the exception of the owner of the ground floor; the stairs
from the first to the second story shall be preserved at the
expense of all, except the owner of the ground floor and
the owner of the first story; and so on successively. (396)
Article 491. None of the co-owners shall, without the
consent of the others, make alterations in the thing owned
in common, even though benefits for all would result
therefrom. However, if the withholding of the consent by
one or more of the co-owners is clearly prejudicial to the
common interest, the courts may afford adequate relief.
(397a)
Alteration a change (a) which is more or less permanent, (b)
which changes the use of the thing, and (c) which prejudices
the condition of the thing or its enjoyment by the others; an act
of ownership; may be material or metaphysical; and gives rise
to a real right over the property owned in common
A sale, donation or mortage, etc. of a part of the property with
definite boundaries is not void; however, it is subject to the
result of the subsequent partition. (Lopez v. Cuaycong)
A lease of real property is an alteration if the lease is recorded,
or is for more than one year whether recorded or not.
A co-owner can lease his ideal share in the property owned in
common without the approval, concurrence, or consent of the
other co-owners. (Castro, et. al. v.Atienza)
A consent may be given impliedly but only for the purpose of
making the alteration legal. (Manresa)
To make the other co-owners liable for the expenses of the
alteration, an express consent is needed. (Javier v. Javier)
Replacement is not considered an alteration. (Enriquez v.
Watson and Co.)
Article 492. For the administration and better enjoyment of
the thing owned in common, the resolutions of the
majority of the co-owners shall be binding.
There shall be no majority unless the resolution is
approved by the co-owners who represent the controlling
interest in the object of the co-ownership.
Should there be no majority, or should the resolution of
the majority be seriously prejudicial to those interested in
the property owned in common, the court, at the instance
of an interested party, shall order such measures as it may
deem proper, including the appointment of an
administrator.
Whenever a part of the thing belongs exclusively to one of
the co-owners, and the remainder is owned in common,
the preceding provision shall apply only to the part owned
in common. (398)
Although the majority (financial) can approve resolutions for
administration and better enjoyment, still before a decision is
made, there should first be a notice to the minority so that they
can be heard. (Manresa)
The majority would be justified in proceeding only when the
urgency of the case and the difficulty of meeting with the
minority render impracticable the giving of notice. (Singson v.
Veloso)
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
(399)(The term personal right is not the technical personal
right as distinguished from real right.)(This article deals not
with the right to the whole property but only with the right to the
ideal or metaphysical share of each co-owner.)
If there has been no express partition as yet, but the co-owner
who sells points out to his buyers the boundaries of the part he
was selling, and the co-owners make no objection, there is in
effect already a partial partition, and the sale of the definite
portion can no longer be assailed. (Pamplona v. Moreto)
Redemption of share of co-owner cannot be effected if there
has already been a partition of the property formerly owned in
common. And this is so even if the share had been sold while
the co-ownership was still existing. (Caro v. CA)
If a co-owner sells the entire common property, the sale is valid
only insofar as his share is concerned, unless the other co-
owners consented to the sale. (Punzalan v. Boon Liat)
When a co-owner sells his share to a stranger, it is the
stranger who should participate in the partition, and not the
original co-owner, since the vendor has ceased to have an
interest in the co-ownership. (Lopez v. Ilustre)
Article 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his
share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided
for a certain period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall
be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period
which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by
law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. (400a)
When a co-owner may not successfully demand partition:
1. If by agreement, partition is prohibited.
2. When partition is prohibited by a donor or testator
from whom the property came.
3. When partition is prohibited by law.
4. When a physical partition would render the property
unserviceable, but in this case, the property may be
allotted to one of the co-owners, who shall indemnify
the others, or it will be sold, and the proceeds
distributed.
5. When the legal nature of the common property does
not allow partition.
If the agreement to keep the thing undivided exceeds 10 years,
the stipulation is valid only insofar as the first 10 years are
concerned.
Although a testator may provide for an indivision of 20 years,
the heirs may nevertheless partition the property should any of
the ground for the dissolution of a partnership exist.
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
common property implying that an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches.
Rules on Prescription in favour of a co-owner against the other
co-owners:
1. Generally, prescription does not run in favour of a co-
owner against his co-owners. (Last paragraph of Art.
494)
2. However, if a co-owner properly repudiates the co-
ownership, prescription starts to run against the other
co-owners from the time of repudiation.
3. Mere actual possession, receiving of rents or profits,
payment of land taxes, and the construction of fences
and buildings by one co-owner will not give rise to the
inference that the possession is adverse against the
other co-owners. (Laguna v. Levantino)
4. In a constructive trust, prescription does not run.
(Cordova v. Cordova; Juan v. Zuniga; Jacinto v.
Jacinto) But see J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Magdangal
and Alzona v. Capunitan where it was held that a
constructive or implied trust can prescribe, as
distinguished from an express trust which cannot
prescribe. (According to Paras, the latter rule seems
to be the better rule.)
Article 495. Notwithstanding the provisions of the
preceding article, the co-owners cannot demand a
physical division of the thing owned in common, when to
do so would render it unserviceable for the use for which
it is intended. But the co-ownership may be terminated in
accordance with article 498. (401a)
Article 496. Partition may be made by agreement between
the parties or by judicial proceedings. Partition shall be
governed by the Rules of Court insofar as they are
consistent with this Code. (402)
A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate
should set forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his
title; and an adequate description of the real estate. He must
join as defendants all the other persons interested in the
property. (Sec. 1, Rule 69, Rules of Court)
Insufficiency of description in the complaint may be cured even
during the trial, not afterwards. (Del Val. V. Del Val)
Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners
may take part in the division of the thing owned in
common and object to its being effected without their
concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition
already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case
it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition
presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of
the debtor or assignor to maintain its validity. (403)(All
creditors whether preferred or ordinary are included within the
scope creditors as used in this article, but they must have
become creditors during the existence of the co-ownership,
and not before or after.)
Since Art. 497 grants the creditors the right to participate in the
partition, it is understood that notice must be given them,
although the law does not expressly so provide. (De Santos v.
BPI)
Article 498. Whenever the thing is essentially indivisible
and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one
of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold
and its proceeds distributed. (404)(Legal or Juridical
Dissolution)
Although Art. 498 seemingly refers only to a case when the
property is essentially indivisible, still there is nothing wrong
with applying the same to an object that is essentially divisible.
(Lara v. Lara)
Article 499. The partition of a thing owned in common
shall not prejudice third persons, who shall retain the
rights of mortgage, servitude or any other real rights
belonging to them before the division was made. Personal
rights pertaining to third persons against the co-
ownership shall also remain in force, notwithstanding the
partition. (405)
All those who did not in any way participate or intervene in the
partition are considered third persons. (Manresa)
Article 500. Upon partition, there shall be a mutual
accounting for benefits received and reimbursements for
expenses made. Likewise, each co-owner shall pay for
damages caused by reason of his negligence or fraud. (n)
Effects of partition:
1. Mutual accounting for benefits
2. Mutual reimbursement for expenses
3. Indemnity for damages in case of negligence or fraud
4. Reciprocal warranty for defects of title (or eviction)
and quality (or hidden defects)
5. Each former co-owner is deemed to have had
exclusive possession of the part allotted to him for the
entire period during which the co-possession lasted
6. Partition confers upon each, the exclusive title over
his respective share
Article 501. Every co-owner shall, after partition, be liable
for defects of title and quality of the portion assigned to
each of the other co-owners. (n)
How co-ownership is extinguished:
1. Juridical partition
2. Extrajudicial partition
3. When by prescription, one co-owner has acquired the
whole property by adverse possession as against all
the others, and repudiating unequivocally the co-
ownership of the other
4. When a stranger acquires by prescription the thing
owned in common
5. Merger in one co-owner
6. Loss or destruction
7. Expropriation

TITLE V
POSSESSION
CHAPTER 1
Possession and the Kinds Thereof
Article 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. (430a)
Viewpoints of possession:
1. Right to possession this is a right or incident of
ownership
2. Right of possession this is an independent right of
itself, independent of ownership
Degrees of possession:
1. Mere holding or having, without any right whatsoever.
2. Possession with a juridical title, but not that of an
owner. (lease, pledge or deposit)
3. Possession with just title, but not that of an owner
(real possessory right). (Example: A person who buys
in good faith from a seller who is really not the owner
of the thing sold.)
4. Possession with a title of dominium, that is, with a just
title from the owner.
Requisites or Elements of Possession:
1. There must be a holding or control of a thing or a
right. (the corpus) (May be actual or constructive)
2. There must be a deliberate intention to possess. (the
animus) (This is a state of mind.)
3. The possession must be by virtue of ones own right.
(Hence, an agent who holds is not truly in possession;
it is the principal who possesses thru the agent.)
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it
can be said that he is in possession. (Ramos v. Director of
Lands)
It is essential in constructive possession that the property be
not in the adverse possession of another. (Sarmiento v.
Lesaca)
Classes of possession:
1. In ones own name or in that of another.
2. In the concept of owner and in the concept of holder.
3. In good faith or in bad faith.
A judgement of ownership does not necessarily include
possession as a necessary incident. (Jabon v. Alo)
Possession is not a definite proof of ownership, nor is non-
possession inconsistent therewith. (Heirs of Bofill v. CA)
Article 524. Possession may be exercised in one's own
name or in that of another. (413a)
Possession in anothers name:
1. Voluntary as when an agent possesses for the
principal
2. Necessary as when a mother possesses for a chil
still in the maternal womb
3. Unauthorized
The landlord himself may bring an action against an intruder
who ousts the tenant. (Simpao v. Dizon)
Article 525. The possession of things or rights may be had
in one of two concepts: either in the concept of owner, or
in that of the holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy it,
the ownership pertaining to another person. (432)
A possessor in the concept of an owner is one who, whether in
good or in bad faith, claims to be, and acts as if he is the
owner. (Adverse possession)
Article 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is
not aware that there exists in his title or mode of
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in
any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be
the basis of good faith. (433a)
If circumstances exist that require a prudent man to
investigate, he will be in bad faith if he does not investigate.
(Lee v. Strong; RFC v. Javillonar; Manacop v. Cansino)
Before one purchases real property, he must make inquiries
regarding the rights if any of those in possession thereof.
(Republic v. CA)
While one who buys from the registered owner does not need
to look behind the certificate of title, one who buys from one
who is not the registered owner is expected to examine not
only the certificate of title but all factual circumstances
necessary for him to determine if there are any flaws in the title
of the transferor, or in his capacity to transfer the land. The
failure of the purchaser to make the necessary investigation
constitutes lack of good faith. (Revilla v. Galindez)
Bad faith is different from the negative idea of negligence in
that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill-will. (Equitable
Banking Corp. v. NLRC)
Just because a person is in bad faith does not necessarily
mean that his successors-in-interest are also in bad faith.
Article 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him
who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor rests the
burden of proof. (434)
A possessor in good faith is not responsible for the subsequent
loss of the property thru a fortuitous event. (Cea v. Villanueva)
Article 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not
lose this character except in the case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not
unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully. (435a)
Existence of bad faith may begin either from the receipt of
judicial summons, (Tacas v. Tobon) or even before such time
as when a letter is received from the true owner asking the
possessor to stop planting on the land because somebody else
owns it. (Ortiz v. Fuentebella)
Article 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be
enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired,
until the contrary is proved. (436)
Article 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible
of being appropriated may be the object of possession.
(437)
Res nullius abandoned or ownerless property


CHAPTER 2
Acquisition of Possession
Article 531. Possession is acquired by the material
occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the
fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the
proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring
such right. (438a)
In the absence of stipulation of the parties that the ownership
of a thing sold shall not pass to the purchaser until he has fully
paid the stipulated price, the execution of the sale thru a public
instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing. (by
the proper acts or legal formalities)
If an entire parcel is possessed under claim of ownership,
there is constructive possession of the entire parcel, unless a
portion thereof is adversely possessed by another. (Ramos v.
Director of Lands)
Article 532. Possession may be acquired by the same
person who is to enjoy it, by his legal representative, by
his agent, or by any person without any power whatever:
but in the last case, the possession shall not be
considered as acquired until the person in whose name
the act of possession was executed has ratified the same,
without prejudice to the juridical consequences of
negotiorum gestio in a proper case. (439a)
Negotiorum gestio does not arise:
1. When the property or business is not neglected or
abandoned;
2. If in fact the manager has been tacitly authorized by
the owner.
Article 533. The possession of hereditary property is
deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and
from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the
inheritance is accepted.
One who validly renounces an inheritance is deemed
never to have possessed the same. (440)
Article 1138[1] says In the computation of time necessary for
prescription, the present possessor may complete the period
necessary for prescription by tacking his possession to that of
his grantor or predecessor-in-interest.
An heir has the right to dispose of the decedents property
even if the same is under administration based on Art. 533.
(Acebedo v. Abesamis) (Kasi nga under Art. 533, siya na agad
ang deemed na naka possess sa property of the decedent
even if there is that time frame na it would be under an
administrator.)
Article 534. On who succeeds by hereditary title shall not
suffer the consequences of the wrongful possession of
the decedent, if it is not shown that he was aware of the
flaws affecting it; but the effects of possession in good
faith shall not benefit him except from the date of death of
the decedent. (442)
Because extraordinary prescription requires 30 years, and
ordinary prescription requires 10 years, it follows that 3 years
possession in bad faith should be equivalent to 1 year
possession in good faith.
Article 535. Minors and incapacitated persons may acquire
the possession of things; but they need the assistance of
their legal representatives in order to exercise the rights
which from the possession arise in their favor. (443)
Minors and other incapacitated persons may acquire property
or rights by prescription, either personally or thru their parents,
guardians, or legal representatives. (Art. 1107)
Article 536. In no case may possession be acquired
through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he
has an action or a right to deprive another of the holding
of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if
the holder should refuse to deliver the thing. (441a)
The act of entering into the premises and exchanging the
lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of
force over the property. (Manalac v. Olegario)
Article 537. Acts merely tolerated, and those executed
clandestinely and without the knowledge of the possessor
of a thing, or by violence, do not affect possession. (444)
Mere inaction or mere failure to bring an action is not the
tolerance referred to in the law.
Article 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at
the same time in two different personalities except in the
cases of co-possession. Should a question arise
regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor
shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one
longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are
the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these
conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial
deposit pending determination of its possession or
ownership through proper proceedings. (445)
If there are two possessors who began possessing at the same
time and could present a title, the one with the older title should
be preferred. (Manresa)
Article 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to the
person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to
the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the
Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to
the person who in good faith was first in the possession; and in
the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith.

Where the purchaser had knowledge, prior to or at the time of
the levy, of such previous lien or encumbrance, his knowledge
is equivalent to registration, and taints his purchase with bad
faith. (Hernadez v. Katigbak)

Article 1544 can be applied only if the 2 buyers had bought the
same property from the same person (or at least from another
in representation of the same seller. It does not apply if there
are two different sellers, one of whom, when he made the
conveyance, had long before disposed of his rights as owner of
the same. (Carpio v. Exenea [CA]) Ex: A sold his land to B.
Later, A sold the same land to C. B in turn sold the same to D,
who took possession of the land. D is the owner.

As between the first buyer, who later knew about the second
sale of the same property sold to him, and the second buyer
who had no knowledge of the prior sale, the latter is
considered as the owner due to the knowledge of the former of
the second sale. (Dissenting opinions in the case of Carbonell
v. CA the present rule)(pero sa Sales na subject, lahi pud;
ang Carbonell daw ang tama)nalibog na ko!

Between an unrecorded sale of prior date of real property by
virtue of a public instrument and a recorded mortgage thereof
at a later date, the former is preferred for the reason that if the
original owner had parted with his ownership of the thing sold,
he no longer had the ownership and free disposal of that thing
so as to be able to mortgage it. (Reyes v. De Leon) According
to Paras this ruling is not accurate. Haynaku!!
CHAPTER 3
Effects of Possession
Article 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in
his possession; and should he be disturbed therein he
shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the
means established by the laws and the Rules of Court.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible
entry may within ten days from the filing of the complaint
present a motion to secure from the competent court, in
the action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession.
The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days
from the filing thereof. (446a)
The phrase every possessor in Art. 539 indicates that all
kinds of possession, from that of the owner to that of a mere
holder, except that which constitutes a crime, should be
respected and protected by the means established by law and
the rules of procedure. (Phil. Trust Co. v. CA)
The owner should go to court, and not eject the unlawful
possessor by force. (Bago v. Garcia)
A tenant illegally forced out by the owner-landlord may institute
an action for forcible entry even if he had not been paying rent
regularly. (Mun. of Moncada v. Cajuigan)
Article 540. Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in
the concept of owner can serve as a title for acquiring
dominion. (447)
Possession in the concept of holder:
1. Lessees
2. Trustees
3. Antichretic creditors
4. Agents
5. Attorneys
6. Depositaries
7. Co-owners
While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual
possession, tax declarations and receipts are strong evidence
of ownership. (Gesmundo v. CA)
Article 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in
his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a
just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it.
(448a)
Actual possession of the property under claim of ownership
raises the disputable presumption of ownership; the true owner
must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property.
(Chan v. CA)
Kinds of titles:
1. True and valid title
2. Colorable title
3. Putative title
A person who is not in fact in possession cannot acquire a
prescriptive right to the land by the mere assertion of a right
therein. (Gamboa v. Gamboa)
Article 542. The possession of real property presumes that
of the movables therein, so long as it is not shown or
proved that they should be excluded. (449)
Article 543. Each one of the participants of a thing
possessed in common shall be deemed to have
exclusively possessed the part which may be allotted to
him upon the division thereof, for the entire period during
which the co-possession lasted. Interruption in the
possession of the whole or a part of a thing possessed in
common shall be to the prejudice of all the possessors.
However, in case of civil interruption, the Rules of Court
shall apply. (450a)
Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the
possessor. (Art. 1123)
Article 544. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the
fruits received before the possession is legally
interrupted.
Natural and industrial fruits are considered received from
the time they are gathered or severed.
Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily and belong to the
possessor in good faith in that proportion. (451)
Article 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there
should be any natural or industrial fruits, the possessor
shall have a right to a part of the expenses of cultivation,
and to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion to the
time of the possession.
The charges shall be divided on the same basis by the two
possessors.
The owner of the thing may, should he so desire, give the
possessor in good faith the right to finish the cultivation
and gathering of the growing fruits, as an indemnity for
his part of the expenses of cultivation and the net
proceeds; the possessor in good faith who for any reason
whatever should refuse to accept this concession, shall
lose the right to be indemnified in any other manner.
(452a) Note that this applies only to a possessor in good faith.
This applies also to crops which are not yet manifest.
Article 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to
every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed
therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor
in good faith with the same right of retention, the person
who has defeated him in the possession having the option
of refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the
increase in value which the thing may have acquired by
reason thereof. (453a)
Necessary expenses those without which the thing would
physically deteriorate or be lose; hence, those made for the
preservation of the thing (pwede maka recover ang tanang
possessor, whether bad faith or good faith)
If the owner sues the possessor for the recovery of the
property, the possessor in good faith must file a counterclaim
for the refund of necessary and useful expenses, otherwise the
judgement in the case for possession will be a bar to a
subsequent suit brought solely for the recovery of such
expenses. The purpose is clearly to avoid multiplicity of suits.
(Beltran v. Valbuena)
Useful expenses those that add value to the property, or
increase the objects productivity, or useful for the satisfaction
of spiritual and religious yearnings, or give rise to all kinds of
fruits
Useful expenses do not include the value of farming animals
which the possessor retains and which do not remain on the
land, nor the expenditures through which the possessor
receives the fruits. (Valenzuela v. Lopez)
Article 547. If the useful improvements can be removed
without damage to the principal thing, the possessor in
good faith may remove them, unless the person who
recovers the possession exercises the option under
paragraph 2 of the preceding article. (n)
Article 548. Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure
shall not be refunded to the possessor in good faith; but
he may remove the ornaments with which he has
embellished the principal thing if it suffers no injury
thereby, and if his successor in the possession does not
prefer to refund the amount expended. (454)
Expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure those which add
value to the thing only for certain determinate persons in view
of their particular whims; they are neither essential for
preservation nor useful to everybody in general
Article 549. The possessor in bad faith shall reimburse the
fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor
could have received, and shall have a right only to the
expenses mentioned in paragraph 1 of article 546 and in
article 443.
The expenses incurred in improvements for pure luxury or
mere pleasure shall not be refunded to the possessor in
bad faith, but he may remove the objects for which such
expenses have been incurred, provided that the thing
suffers no injury thereby, and that the lawful possessor
does not prefer to retain them by paying the value they
may have at the time he enters into possession. (445a)
It is submitted that the refund should not exceed the amount
spent, otherwise he is placed in a better position than the
possessor in good faith.
Article 550. The costs of litigation over the property shall
be borne by every possessor. (n)
Article 551. Improvements caused by nature or time shall
always inure to the benefit of the person who has
succeeded in recovering possession. (456)
Article 552. A possessor in good faith shall not be liable
for the deterioration or loss of the thing possessed, except
in cases in which it is proved that he has acted with
fraudulent intent or negligence, after the judicial
summons.
A possessor in bad faith shall be liable for deterioration or
loss in every case, even if caused by a fortuitous event.
(457a)
Article 553. One who recovers possession shall not be
obliged to pay for improvements which have ceased to
exist at the time he takes possession of the thing. (458)
Article 554. A present possessor who shows his
possession at some previous time, is presumed to have
held possession also during the intermediate period, in
the absence of proof to the contrary. (459)
Article 555. A possessor may lose his possession:
(1) By the abandonment of the thing;
(2) By an assignment made to another either by
onerous or gratuitous title;
(3) By the destruction or total loss of the thing, or
because it goes out of commerce;
(4) By the possession of another, subject to the
provisions of article 537, if the new possession
has lasted longer than one year. But the real right
of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten
years. (460a)
Abandonment the voluntary renunciation of a thing
Requisites of abandonment:
1. The abandoner must have been a possessor in the
concept of owner
2. The abandoner must have the capacity to renounce
or to alienate
3. There must be a physical relinquishment of the thing
or object
4. There must be no more spes recuperandi
(expectation to recover) and no more animus
revertendi (intent to return or get back)
A property owner cannot be held to have abandoned the same
until at least he has some knowledge of the loss of its
possession or the thing. (U.S. v. Rey)
There is no real intention to abandon property when as in the
case of a shipwreck or a fire, things are thrown into the sea or
upon the highway. (U.S. v. Rey)
Abandonment which converts the thing into res nullius does
not apply to land. Much less does abandonment apply to
registered land.
Article 556. The possession of movables is not deemed
lost so long as they remain under the control of the
possessor, even though for the time being he may not
know their whereabouts. (461)
Article 557. The possession of immovables and of real
rights is not deemed lost, or transferred for purposes of
prescription to the prejudice of third persons, except in
accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law and
the Land Registration laws. (462a)
Article 558. Acts relating to possession, executed or
agreed to by one who possesses a thing belonging to
another as a mere holder to enjoy or keep it, in any
character, do not bind or prejudice the owner, unless he
gave said holder express authority to do such acts, or
ratifies them subsequently. (463)
Article 559. The possession of movable property acquired
in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who
has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived
thereof, may recover it from the person in possession of
the same.
If the possessor of a movable lost or which the owner has
been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a
public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor. (464a)
Article 560. Wild animals are possessed only while they
are under one's control; domesticated or tamed animals
are considered domestic or tame if they retain the habit of
returning to the premises of the possessor. (465)
Article 561. One who recovers, according to law,
possession unjustly lost, shall be deemed for all purposes
which may redound to his benefit, to have enjoyed it
without interruption. (466) Kung nawala ang thing for some
period then na recover, it is deemed na wala na interrupt ang
possession. Murag wala nawala (na stolen) ang thing. (This
article applies to both possessors in good faith and in bad faith,
but only if beneficial to them)