Evidence Digest for Jan5..

TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE
2. People v Dominguez
Facts:
The accused Prudencio, is the then Mayor of the Municipality of Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental,
and was promoting the re election of former President Marcos. On Feb. 7, 1986, the day before the snap
election, Prudencio, together with his brother Roger went to visit their second cousin Judge Boligor,
known to have been promoting the candidacy of Corazon Aquino. Upon arriving at Judge Boligors
house, a certain Rodolfo Macalisag, brother in law of Mayor Dominguez, appear, talked to the Mayor
and hide under the shadows. The Mayor then and his brother proceeded to enter the house, however,
10 minutes later Rodolfo followed with an M-16 armalite automatic rifle and soon after bursts of gunfire
was heard. The Dominguez brothers came out of the house and sped away while Rodolfo came out of
the house and disappeared into the darkness. Judge Bologor and her husbands body were found inside
the house with multiple bullets wound in their vital parts.
The prosecutions case rested solely on the testimony of a certain Oscar Cagod who witnessed
the events from across the street. The defense, however, question the witness credibility because he
had been convicted when he was 12 yrs. Old, of murder, a crime involving moral turpitude thus,
accordingly his testimony deserved no credence.
Issue: Is the witness qualified to testify?
Held: Yes. Rule 13, Sec. 20 of the Rules of Court expressly states that conviction of a crime unless
otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualifying a witness from testifying. Thus, the
fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to disqualify or discredit a witness; the testimony
of such a witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the testimony of other
witness must be examined for its relevance and credibility.
5. U.S V. Concepcion
Facts:
On Dec. 2, 1913, several policemen went to the house of the defendant, Teresa Concepcion, where she
lives with his husband, Felix Ricablanca. Upon arriving at the defendants house, the policemen obtained
permission to enter and immediately searched the premises for opium. While the defendant is searching
the house, Felix ordered Teresa to take the can of opium from beneath the pillow and throw it away.
Upon doing so, policemen caught Teresa and took possession of the can. When ask of who is the owner
of the illegal item, Teresa admitted that it was her, however, Felix intervenes, and states that he owns
the house and is responsible for everything in it. The policemen believed that it was Felix, thus they
arrested him for the violation of the Opium Law. He was later bought to trial and was acquitted.
After 10 months, a complaint was filed against Teresa for the same act, base on the same event. The
prosecution presented as witness the testimony of the husband, during the previous (husbands) trial as
against Teresa. The lower court accepted such testimony over the defendants objection.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Is the husbands testimony admissible?
Held: No. A husband cannot be examined for or against her husband without his consent; nor a wife for
or against her husband without her consent; nor can either, during the marriage or afterwards, be,
without the consent of the other, examined as to any communication made by one to the other during
the marriage; but this exception does not apply to a civil action or proceeding by one against the other,
or to a criminal action or proceeding for a crime committed by one against the other."
It will be noted that said action prohibits a husband from giving testimony against his wife without her
consent, except in a civil action between husband and wife, and in a criminal action when the crime was
committed by one against the other. The present is not a civil action between husband and wife, neither
it is a criminal action where the crime was committed by one against the other. It would seem to clear,
therefore, that the testimony of the husband is not admissible if the wife objected. The testimony of the
husband should not have been admitted.
8. Guerrero v St. Claire Realty corp.
Facts: Isidro Guerrero verbally willed that the subject parcel of land be adjudicated in favor of his son,
Andres. By virtue of his verbal will, and upon his fathers death, Andres possessed said land and
cultivated it through his tenant, Dominador Ramirez. After Japanese Occupation, he entrusted that land
to his sister Cristina, with Dominador continuing his tenancy until Andres death. Andres heirs
subsequently discovered that the land was in the name of their cousin, Manuel Guerrero, by virtue of a
deed of sale allegedly executed by Cristina in his favor. Manuels heir subsequently sold the same land
to St. Clares Realty Company.
Andres heirs are now asking the court to annul the aforementioned sales and to award the ownership
of the land to them. As witness, Laura Cervantes testified as to her mother Cristinas illness as to loan
which Manuel granted Cristina, and as to the fact that the land was lent by Cristina to ANDRES. The
defendants counsel objected to Lauras testimony on the ground of the Dead Mans Statute.
Issue: Does the Dead Mans Statute apply?
Held: No. In this case, no claim or demand is being made against the estate of Manuel Guerrero. Also,
the Guerreros are not the executors or administrators of the deceased. The Guerreros are being sued in
their individual capacities as claimants of ownership of the subject lot which is not part of the estate.
The Dead Mans Statute cannot apply. The Rule expressly says, against an executor or administrator or
other representative of the deceased person. The phrase other representative refers to those who
like the administrator or executor are being sued in their representative and not personal capacity. The
use of the phrase, against the estate of such deceased person conveys the idea of an estate actually
owned by the deceased at the time the case was brought and that, therefore, it is only his rights that are
to be asserted and defended in the litigation by person representing him, not the personal right of such
relatives.


11. People v Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Atty. Sansaet was counsel for Paredes in a complaint undergoing preliminary investigation before the
tanodbayan for violation of RA no. 3019. The complaint was, however, dismissed on the ground of
double jeopardy based on their claim that Paredes was previously charged of the same offense which
was dismissed after arraignment. It turned out, however, that his claim of double jeopardy was based on
falsified documents so that both Paredes and Sansaet were charged of falsification. As his defense, Atty.
Sansaet claimed that it was Paredes who falsified the documents in his house and instigated and
induced him to file the motion using the falsified documents. Atty. Sansaet offered to become state
witness against Paredes.
Issue: Would the proposed testimony of Atty. Sansaet violate the attorney- client privilege?
Held:
No. The unbroken stream of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and
client having to do with the clients contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not
covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney
and client.
In the present cases, the testimonies sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the
communications made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he,
either with the active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of
falsifying, the documents. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to
Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been
committed in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present correspondents, later
committed. Having been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the
pale of the attorney-client privilege.
Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the Commission of that crime of falsification which
he and Paredes concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is a well settled that in order that a
communication between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in
furtherance of a lawful end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching.
In fact, it has also been pointed out to the court that the prosecution of the honorable relation of
attorney and client will not be permitted under the very guise of privilege, and every communication
made to an attorney by a client for a criminal which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney
under certain circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice.

13. Lim V CA
Facts:
In case for annulment of marriage filed by the husband on the ground that the wife was suffering from a
mental illness called schizophrenia, plaintiff sought to present the psychiatrist from the National Mental
Hospital to testify as an expert witness. Defendant objected on the ground that the testimony sought to
be presented is privileged since the psychiatrist examined the patient in a professional capacity. The trial
court allowed her to testify as an expert witness and she was asked hypothetical questions related to
her field of expertise. She neither revealed the illness she examined and treated defendant for nor
disclosed the results of her examination and the medicine she had prescribed.
Issue: Is the testimony barred by Sec 24(c), Rule 130 of the revised Rules on Evidence?
Held:
No. The rule on the physician-patient privilege is intended to facilitate and make safe full and
confidential disclosure by the patient to the physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms,
untrammeled by apprehension of their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the
witness stand, to the end that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and
efficaciously to treat his patient. It rests in public policy and is for the general interest of the community.
In order that the privilege may be successfully claimed, the following requisites must concur:
1. the privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery
or obstetrics;
3. such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional
capacity;
4. the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and
5. the information was confidential, and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient.

In the case, the defendant has failed to discharge the burden of proving the presence of all the
requisites. The reasons follow:

First, the psychiatrist was presented as an expert witness and she did not disclose anything obtained in
the course of her examination, interview or treatment by reason of the physician-patient relationship
existing between them.

Second, it is clear that the patient in this case was never interviewed alone. There is authority to the
effect that information elicited during consultation with a physician in the presence of third person
removes such information from the mantle of the privilege.

Third, except for the defendants sweeping claim, nothing specific or concrete was offered to show that
the information given by the psychiatrist would blacken defendants character. The psychiatrist never
disclosed any information regarding the defendants ailment.
Finally, while it may be true that defendant opposed the oral request for the issuance of a subpoena ad
testificandum to the witness, she did not interpose any objection to the testimony. Despite the trials
courts advice that her counsel may object to the testimony once it becomes apparent that the
testimony sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged communication rule.

14. BANCO FILIPINO v. MONETARY BOARD

Facts: Doctrine: The privilege under Section 21, Rule 130 is intended not for the protection of public officers but for
the protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this rule will not be
applicable. The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence
does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question.
Confidential communications are not necessarily absolute and privileged. The public officer who is asked to disclose
certain documents relevant to the case has the burden of proof to show that public interest will be adversely affected
thereby.

Facts:
This is an off- shoot of the case regarding the closure of Banco Filipino.
The subject of the petition is the Order of RTC Makati which granted the motion of Banco Filipino for the
production, inspection, and copying of certain papers and records which claims are needed for the
preparation of its comments, objections and exceptions to the Conservators report. These documents
sought to be produced include copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations on
the closure of Banco Filipino among others.

In issuing the order, the RTC considered the documents sought to be produced as not privileged because
they constitute or contain evidence material to the issues present. Respondents Monetary Board and
Central Bank take exception to the order and pray for the reversal and setting aside of the same. One of
the grounds they invoked is that the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are
confidential pursuant to sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act.

In its comment, Banco Filipino argued that the respondents cannot claim privilege in refusing to produce
the records sought because it is based only on the generalized interest of confidentiality. It cited US v.
Nixon, stating that when the ground for asserting the privilege as to the subpoenaed materials sought
for use in a criminal case is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality; it cannot prevail
over the fundamental demands of due process of law. BFs reason for asking the production of these
documents is to prove that the CB Governor closed BF without an MB resolution and without the
examiners reports on the financial standing of BF. MB on the other hand argued that US V Nixoatn finds
no application, because the present case is not a claim of privilege only on a generalized interest.
Rather, the MB deliberations are considered privileged under the rules of evidence (sec. 21, rule 130),
precisely because of the Central Bank Act which states that they are confidential.

Issue: WON the documents sought to be produced are considered privileged?

Held: No. The documents are no privileged. Any statute declaring in general terms that official records
are confidential should be liberally construed to have an implied exception for disclosure when needed
in a court of justice. The deliberations may indeed be confidential but not necessarily absolute and
privileged. There is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act which prohibits absolutely the courts
from conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter subjet
of a suit pending before it. The disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to
third parties.

The privileged under Sec. 21, Rule 130 is not intended not for the protection of public officers but for
the protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this
invoked the rule and thus will not be applicable. Where there is no public interest that would be
prejudiced, this communications made to him in official confidence does not apply when there is
nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure question. In the present case,
respondents have not established that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the papers and
documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was already closed as of January
1985, any disclosure of the letters, reports, transcripts at this time impose no danger or peril to our
economy. On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents.