JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 15, 254-262 (1979)

Objective Self-Awareness, Standards of Evaluation,

and Moral Behavior
ROBIN R. VALLACHER AND MAURICE SOLODKY
Illinois Institute of Technology
Received June 6, 1978
In a performance setting, subjects were given an opportunity to cheat without
fear of detection on puzzle problems. Subjects were led to believe that successful
performance was due to ability in some conditions, but to luck in other conditions.
In fact, most of the problems were insolvable, so that success was impossible
without cheating. Self-awareness was induced in half the subjects by having them
sit in front of a mirror and listen to a tape recording of their own voice as they
worked on the puzzle problems; the remaining subjects were not exposed to a
mirror and listened to a tape of someone elses voice as they worked on the
problems. It was predicted that cheating frequency would be higher under ability
attribution conditions than under luck attribution conditions, and that this effect of
performance attribution would be greater among self-aware subjects than among
non-self-aware subjects. Results confirmed these hypotheses. Discussion cen-
tered on the differential use of morality and competence standards for behavior
when in a state of self-awareness.
According to objective self-awareness theory (Duval & Wicklund,
1972; Wicklund, 1975, in press), the phenomenological state of self-
awareness has important behavioral consequences that distinguish it from
states in which attention is directed outward, away from the self. These
consequences are said to derive in large part from the self-aware persons
greater sensitivity to the consistency of his or her behavior with salient
standards of evaluation. Such a person is more likely to evaluate his or her
behavior in relation to such standards and therefore to experience nega-
tive affect when this evaluation is unfavorable. The desire to reduce this
negative affective state leads to behavior that is more consistent with the
standard to which it is compared.
Requests for reprints should be addressed to Robin R. Vallacher, Department of Psychol-
ogy, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, IL 60616. The helpful comments of Ed
Diener, Daniel M. Wegner, and Robert A. Wicklund on an earlier draft of this report are
appreciated. A summary of this research was presented at the meeting of the American
Psychological Association, Toronto, August 1978.
2.54
0022-103 l/79/030254-09!$02.00/0
Copyright @ 1979 by Academic Press. Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
SELF-AWARENESS AND STANDARDS 255
Beyond the suggestion that the source of evaluative standards may be
either internal (e.g., a reported ideal self) or external (e.g., a percep-
tion of consensual or normative behavior), objective self-awareness
theory does not provide a specification of potential self-standards. Judg-
ing by the bulk of empirical research in this area, however, it appears that
standards typically pertain to morality and prosocial behavior (e.g.,
Carver, 1974, 1975; Diener & Wallbom, 1976; Gibbons, Wicklund,
Karylowski, Rosenfield, & Chase, Note 1; Gotay, Note 2; Scheier,
Fenigstein, & Buss, 1974; Wegner & Schaefer, 1978). Morality, of course,
is a central concern in social life, and thus it is not surprising that
self-evaluation often involves an assessment of ones behavior in relation
to such standards. It is possible, however, to define another broad class of
standards-those associated with competence. Self-evaluation is also
based to an important extent on an evaluation of ones behavior in relation
to standards of intelligence, creativity, or achievement. Despite the
ubiquity of such standards in everyday life, few studies have examined
competence-related standards within the theoretical framework of self-
awareness (e.g., Diener & Sruli, in press; Liebling & Shaver, 1973;
McDonald, in press; Wicklund & Duval, 1971). Moreover, no research to
date has compared the respective contributions of morality-based and
competence-based standards under conditions of self-awareness. Inatten-
tion to the relationship between morality and competence standards is
surprising, since one can envision circumstances in which maintaining a
self-definition of competence would have implications for behavior con-
trary to those following from a concern for maintaining a self-definition of
morality. In the present study, we created conditions conducive to such a
conflict and examined the relative prepotence of morality and competence
standards on behavior.
Although the conditions under which one standard is likely to be more
salient than another in the self-aware state have received little theoretical
or empirical attention (see Diener & Srull, in press; Wicklund, in press), it
is possible to generate such predictions on a priori grounds. Simply put, in
a situation where there are conflicting standards, the prepotent standard
will be the one that has the clearest implications for self-evaluation. In the
case of morality and competence, a conflict would exist if the demonstra-
tion of competence (e.g., success on a task) were impossible without
immoral behavior (e.g., cheating), or, conversely, if moral behavior (the
inhibition of cheating) precluded the demonstration of competence (suc-
cess). Whether or not a self-aware person will cheat in such a situation
should depend on whether moral behavior or the demonstration of compe-
tence has clearer implications for self-evaluation.
One important variable in this regard would seem to be the persons
attribution for success and failure (Weiner, 1974). If performance out-
comes are attributed to luck or external factors, success does not neces-
256
VALLACHER AND SOLODKY
sarily imply a positive self-evaluation with respect to competence, nor
does failure necessarily imply a negative self-evaluation. The inhibition of
cheating, however, would still promote positive self-evaluation with re-
spect to a morality standard. Thus, when performance outcomes are
attributed to luck or external factors, the morality standard is likely to be
prepotent over the competence standard in driving behavior among self-
aware persons. If, however, ability is perceived to be the cause of ones
performance outcomes, success and failure would have rather clear impli-
cations for self-evaluation with respect to competence. To the extent that
the competence standard is rendered salient in this way, cheating repre-
sents a means by which a positive self-evaluation may be obtained. In this
case, then, the influence of the competence standard should be greater,
and the influence of the morality standard correspondingly less.
The contention that cheating tendencies may be augmented by self-
awareness diverges somewhat from a previous exploration of the relation-
ship between self-awareness and cheating behavior (Diener & Wallbom,
1976). In that study, self-aware subjects were less likely to cheat in
solving anagrams than were non-self-aware subjects. However, perfor-
mance attribution was not manipulated for these subjects; conceivably,
then, subjects may have felt their performance was at least partially
dependent upon luck. If so, the morality standard may have been prepo-
tent over the competence standard, in accordance with the present analy-
sis. Moreover, even if subjects in the Diener and Wallbom study did
attribute their performance to ability, the behavioral measure of
cheating-working past an alloted time on the anagrams-had less clear
implications for competence demonstration than it did for morality. That
is, cheating did not guarantee success in solving the anagrams; the deci-
sion to cheat or not to cheat represented a choice between behaving
morally and the possible demonstration of competence. Thus, subjects
were not presented with a clear conflict between morality and competence
standards.
In the present research, the conflict between morality and competence
standards of evaluation was explicitly manipulated under conditions con-
ducive to self-awareness and non-self-awareness. Half the subjects were
led to believe that success in a performance setting was due to ability; the
other subjects, that success was due to luck. In fact, most of the problems
were insolvable. However, subjects were given an opportunity to cheat,
and thereby demonstrate success, without fear of detection. Subjects
focus of attention-self-awareness versus non-self-awareness-was also
manipulated and crossed factorially with the attribution manipulation. It
was expected that cheating would be more frequent when performance
was attributable to ability than when it was attributable to luck, and that
this difference would be greater in the self-awareness condition than in the
non-self-awareness condition.
SELF-AWARENESS AND STANDARDS
257
Overview and Subjects
METHOD
Subjects individually attempted to solve a series of geometric puzzles in a study allegedly
concerned with performance under conditions of distraction. The distracting stimuli consti-
tuted a manipulation of self-awareness: Half the subjects sat in front of a mirror and listened
to a recording of their voice while working on the puzzles (self-awareness): the other
subjects were not faced with a mirror and listened to a recording of someone elses voice
(non-self-awareness). In addition, subjects were led to believe that success was attributable
either to ability or to luck. The test puzzles were actually insolvable, but subjects were
provided an opportunity to cheat without fear of detection. The design, in short, was a 2
(self-awareness) x 2 (performance attribution) between-subjects factorial, with cheating as
the dependent variable. Subjects task impressions were also assessed.
Thirty-nine male and thirteen female undergraduates participated in the experiment in
exchange for credits in their psychology courses. However, data from four of the subjects
(three males and one female) were eliminated prior to the analyses, as language problems on
their part prevented them from understanding the instructions. Twelve subjects were ran-
domly assigned to each of the four conditions.
Procedure
The experimenter (one of two males) explained that the purpose of the experiment was to
examine performance on a series of puzzles under different test-taking conditions. The
puzzles, identical to those employed by Srull and Karabenick (1973, consisted of line
drawings of geometric forms (e.g., a rectangle embedded in a triangle). The subject was to
trace over the lines of each puzzle without lifting the pencil from the paper and without
retracing any line. There were I5 puzzles, with I min allowed for each one. The subject was
encouraged to attempt as many solutions to each puzzle as he or she desired during each l-
min period. I f the subject solved the puzzle, he or she was to place an X in the upper right
corner of the tracing paper. I f the puzzle was not solved, the subject was to place the paper
in a box to the side and go on to the next puzzle.
Manipulation of performance artriburion. Following the task explanation, the experi-
menter verbally provided information that was intended to induce a belief that performance
on the puzzles was attributable either to ability or to luck (cf. Strull & Karabenick, 1975).
Those subjects randomly assigned to the ability attribution condition were told that the task
involved a number of basic skills: Perceptual ability, visual-motor coordination, concept
formation ability, quick reaction time, and abstract reasoning ability. The importance of
these skills in everyday functioning was stressed, and it was pointed out that not everyone
does well on the task. The luck attribution subjects were told that performance on items such
as these was once believed to be indicative of intellectual functioning, but that this belief had
since proven to be false. The experimenter explained that ones degree of success on the
task was not related to any single ability, and that there was an element of chance or luck in
solving each puzzle. It was pointed out that not everyone does well on the task.
After answering any questions regarding the task and/or attribution information, the
experimenter worked two sample problems for the subject. On the second of these, he
retraced a line and asked, Whats wrong with this ? I f the subject did not volunteer the
answer, the experimenter pointed out that he had retraced a line and that that was not
allowed. He then worked the puzzle correctly and said, these two lines look exactly the
same, but only this one was done correctly, without retracing a line. In effect, then, the
experimenter was demonstrating the nondetectability of cheating on the task. The subject
then worked six practice puzzles (all of them solvable) in the presence of the experimenter.
Upon completion of these, the experimenter reinforced the performance attribution by
258
VALLACHER AND SOLODKY
saying,
you can see how solving these problems requires ability (some luck). He waited
for the subject to concur with this assessment before proceeding.
Munipufation ofsdawareness. Before beginning the test puzzles, the subject was re-
minded that the purpose of the experiment was to examine performance under various
conditions. It was pointed out that in most testing situations there are a variety of sights and
sounds that can serve to distract ones attention. The experimenter said that it was un-
known, however, whether such distraction affects performance on tasks requiring ability
(some luck). The subject was informed that in order to approximate some of these condi-
tions, a cassette tape recording of a voice would be played while he or she worked on the
puzzles. The voice was recorded on a I-min continuous tape loop. Thus, in addition to
providing an approximation of natural testing situations, the tape recording served as a
I-min marker, indicating when to go on to the next puzzle. This purpose also was made
explicit for the subject.
Subjects in the self-awareness condition created a tape loop of their own voice, and this
served as the marker-distractor tape loop during their puzzle performance. Each subject
recorded the statements Stop! Your time is up! Go on to the next puzzle! and also
indicated his/her hair and eye color, year and major in school, and first name. The subject
filled the remainder of the I-min loop by reciting letters of the alphabet. Subjects in the
non-self-awareness condition did not create a tape loop of their voice; instead, they listened
to an equivalent tape loop, but one that was created by another male undergraduate. An
additional manipulation of self-awareness was employed as well. In the self-awareness
condition, a mirror (25 cm x 35 cm) was affixed to the wall, approximately 1 m in front ofthe
subject and at his/her eye level. In the non-self-awareness condition, a poster having roughly
the same dimensions as the mirror was used in place of the mirror. Subjects were told that
just as the tape loop represented a potential auditory distraction, the mirror (poster) repre-
sented a potential visual distraction.
Dependent measures. After creating and/or being informed about the tape loop, the
subject attempted to solve the 15 test puzzles in privacy. Although the practice puzzles were
solvable, only 3 of the 15 test puzzles (the first, third, and fourth) were solvable, the
remaining 12 being insolvable. Thus. an indication of an X by a subject on an insolvable
puzzle provided a direct, unobtrusive measure of cheating. Upon completion of the 15-min
test period, subjects completed a questionnaire which asked them to indicate their impres-
sions of the task along four dimensions-interesting, enjoyable, difficult, and challenging-
and to indicate their overall liking for the task. Each task evaluation item was answered
along an 1 l-point scale (1 = very,
II = not at all), as was the liking item (1 = very
much, I1 = not at all). Subjects also were asked to rate the amount of skill, effort, and
luck required to solve the puzzles; again, I l-point scales (1 = very much, 11 = not at
all) were provided for these judgments. These ratings were reverse scored prior to analyses
so that high values reflected favorable task evaluations on the impression items and high
estimates of causal significance on the attribution items. After completing the questionnaire,
subjects were probed for suspicion, debriefed, sworn to secrecy, and dismissed.
RESULTS
Preliminary Analyses
Since two experimenters were employed and assigned randomly to
subjects, a separate analysis of variance was performed to examine the
effects of this factor on each of the dependent measures. The results of
these analyses demonstrated that experimenter had no significant effects
on cheating behavior or on any of the questionnaire item responses 0, >
SELF-AWARENESS AND STANDARDS 259
.20 in all cases). Accordingly, the data were collapsed across this factor
in subsequent analyses.
Separate 2 x 2 (self-awareness x performance attribution) analyses of
variance were performed on subjects assessment of the contributions of
skill, luck, and effort to their success on the task. In support of the
effectiveness of the attribution manipulation, ability attribution subjects
felt that skill played a greater role in their success (M = 7.71) than did luck
attribution subjects (M = 5.53), F(1,44) = 11.94, p < .OOl, whereas luck
played a slightly lesser role (M = 5.54 vs 6.67), F(1,44) = 2.07, p < .15.
No other significant effects were revealed by the analyses. A manipula-
tion check on self-awareness was not employed because, as argued by
Wicklund (1975), any attempt to question an individual regarding self-
focused attention would typically bring about such a state. It should be
noted, however, that the self-focusing effect of mirrors has recently been
validated by Carver and Scheier (1978).
Cheating Behavior
The number of subjects who cheated (i.e., indicated an X for at least
one insolvable puzzle) and did not cheat under each combination of
experimental variables is shown in Table 1. It was predicted that cheating
would be a function of performance attribution, and that this effect would
be more pronounced under self-awareness than under non-self-
awareness. Since none of the 12 subjects in the self-awareness-luck condi-
tion cheated on any of the puzzles, analyses of variance assumptions were
violated. Accordingly, x2 analyses were performed on the relative fre-
quencies of cheaters and non-cheaters in each self-awareness condition
separately as a function of performance attribution.
For the self-awareness condition, results indicated that, as predicted,
cheating was more frequent among ability subjects than among luck
subjects, x2( 1) = 26.3, p < .Ol; virtually all of the former but none of the
latter subjects cheated on at least one puzzle. For the non-self-awareness
condition, however, cheating frequency did not differ between ability and
luck conditions, x2(1) = .17, ns. An additional analysis revealed that the
proportion of subjects for whom cheating versus not cheating was a
TABLE 1
FREQUENCY OF CHEATERS AND NQNCHEATERS AS A FUNCTION OF
SELF-AWARENESS AND PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTION
Self-awareness Non-self-awareness
Performance attribution Cheaters Noncheaters Cheaters Noncheaters
Ability 11 1 6 6
Luck 0 12 5 I
260
VALLACHER AND SOLODKY
function of performance attribution in the self-awareness condition (23 of
24) was significantly greater than the corresponding proportion in the
non-self-awareness condition (13 of 24), z = 3.33, p < .OOl. The
hypothesis therefore is supported: Compared to non-self-awareness,
self-awareness inhibited cheating under luck attribution, but enhanced
cheating under ability attribution.
Questionnaire Responses
With the exception of task difficulty, responses to the task impression
items were highly intercorrelated; using the Fisher r to Z transformation,
average r (48) = .54, p < .Ol. Hence, responses to interesting, enjoyable,
challenging, and overall liking were averaged for each subject and consid-
ered an index of task satisfaction. Analysis of variance of this index
revealed that subjects expressed greater satisfaction under ability attribu-
tion conditions (M = 8.94) than under luck attribution conditions (M =
7.90), F(l&) = 4.19, p < .05, but no other effects. This suggests that,
although the apparent relevance of performance to ability increased intrin-
sic interest in the task, this increase was not restricted to the self-awareness
condition. Moreover, correlational analyses demonstrated that, collapsing
across self-awareness and performance attribution, cheating was indepen-
dent of subjects task impressions (p > .lO for each item). Thus, intrinsic
interest per se did not provide a sufficient inducement to cheat. Nor was
cheating a function of differences in perceived task difficulty; analyses of
responses to the item concerning this factor yielded no significant effects.
DISCUSSION
The results of this study demonstrate that the state of self-awareness
sensitizes the individual to the implications of his or her behavior for
self-evaluation. Thus, when performance was perceived as relevant to an
evaluation of ones competence, self-aware subjects cheated so as to
demonstrate competence. However, when performance was unrelated to
competence, self-awareness inhibited cheating behavior; presumably, the
decision to cheat or not to cheat was considered in light of its implica-
tions for moral self-evaluation.
The recognition that self-evaluation is sometimes based on competence
and sometimes on morality standards helps to clarify an apparent con-
tradiction in the self-awareness literature. On the one hand, there is
evidence that the self-aware individual attributes responsibility to self for
both good and bad outcomes (Duval & Wicklund, 1973). On the other
hand, there is evidence that self-awareness promotes self-defensive at-
tribution tendencies; success is attributed to self, but failure-especially
unexpected failure-is attributed externally (Federoff & Harvey, 1976).
In the present view, this apparent conflict reflects the differential implica-
tions for self-evaluation of personal versus external attribution in the two
SELF-AWARENESS AND STANDARDS 261
studies. In the Duval and Wicklund (1973) study, personal versus external
attribution revolved around issues of moral responsibility rather than of
competence. Since the acceptance of personal responsibility for outcomes
associated with ones behavior promotes a definition of self as morally
responsible, self-aware subjects in the Duval and Wicklund study demon-
strated this attributional tendency. In the Federoff and Harvey (1976)
study, however, the salient issue was competence-success versus failure
in providing therapy to a phobic patient. Thus, to maintain a positive
self-evaluation in relation to competence, subjects took credit for success
and deflected blame for failure. In short, it may be unnecessary to invoke
different mechanisms to account for the divergent effects of self-
awareness on outcome attribution; instead, this divergence may simply
reflect the relevance of different self-evaluative standards (i.e., morality
vs competence).
As indicated earlier, the source of standards may be either internal
or external, a distinction that, conceptually at least, is rather ortho-
gonal to the morality-competence partition. Thus, many of the dilemmas
of everyday life may be understood in terms of the conflicting demands of
internal and external standards, with regard to both morality and compe-
tence. Abiding by ones private convictions versus adhering to the dic-
tates of ones reference group, for example, would seem to represent a
conflict between internal and external standards in the morality sphere.
With regard to competence, Diener and Srull (in press) distinguished
between personal and social expectancies for performance and demon-
strated that among self-aware subjects social expectancies were more
salient. The morality-competence distinction, of course, is not the only
possible partition of evaluative standards. Wicklund (in press) has indi-
cated a number of common end points-goals, standards, and
concerns-that can become salient in the self-aware state and has dis-
cussed the issue of conflict among such end points. It remains for research
to identify empirically the various classes of evaluative standards, the
relations among such classes, and the conditions that evoke their respec-
tive salience. Such efforts, in combination with the findings of the present
study, would contribute a great deal to an understanding of self-awareness.
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REFERENCE NOTES
1. Gibbons, F. X., Wicklund, R. A., Karylowski, J., Rosenfield, D., & Chase, T. C.
Altruistic responses to se&focused attention. Unpublished manuscript, University of
Texas, Austin, 1977.
2. Gotay, C. C. Helping behavior as a function of objective self-awareness and salience of
the norm of helping. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Maryland, 1977.