1

From Airport Scanners to License Plate Readers, DHS Has Your Backside
Jeremiah Riley

September 11, 2001 is a day that many still remember. I was an LDS missionary living
in McCook, Nebraska when the towers fell. In a lot of ways, Nebraska is far removed from New
York City, but the tragedy still felt close to home. I assume it felt that way for all Americans. It
certainly did for the Bush administration. In the wake of the attack, President Bush promised
that the government would come together to improve air safetyand take new measures to
prevent hijacking. Moreover, he promised that the government will come together to
strengthen [its] intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act and to find
them before they strike.
1

To a large extent, Bush kept that promise. The government responded to the 9-11 events
with remarkable speed and force. Its response included a new, massive cabinet-level department
charged with securing our boarders and preventing future terrorist attacks.
2
In a way, the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stands as a monument to the tragedys fallen, and it is
evidence of our countrys persistent fear of a repeat attack. The threat of another large-scale
terrorist attack is so real that almost overnight DHS became the third largest department in the
Federal Government.
3
The Department employs over 200,000 individuals and operates through a
budget that exceeds $40 billion annually.
4
DHS provides our vast countryand its busy modes
of travelincreased security. There have been no large-scale terrorist attacks within our

1
President Bush Addresses the Nation, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html
2
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Our Mission (Feb. 24, 2014, 12:35 PM),
http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission
3
Is DHE Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats, 112th Cong. 1-3
(2012) (Committee on Homeland Security).
4
Id.
2
boarders over the past 12.5 years. That is commendable and, to an extent, it is remarkable.
However, our increased security comes with a price beyond the multi-billion dollar budget. The
additional price for usthe average, innocent, and semi-free among usis privacy.
DHS extends its protective tentacles into our lives regularlyin ways both seen and
unseen.
5
But perhaps the most obvious way that the DHS interacts with Americans is through
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and its many ever-probing, light-blue, latex
hands. With bureaucratic enthusiasm, TSA personnel herd thousands of travelersfamilies,
workers, lovers, and friendsthrough Americas airports. Like interest, TSA never sleeps. In
airports around the country, TSA agents are always present. In fact, TSAs operations are so
extensive that it screens every commercial airline passenger in the U.S.
6

Like the DHS, TSA (an agency within the DHS) was a response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Less than two months after 9-11, President Bush signed the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA) into law, which created TSA. A year after the ATSA
became law, TSA assumed all passenger and baggage screening at domestic airports.
7
TSA
screens over two million travelers daily at various airports throughout the United States.
8
TSAs
screening process is thoroughsimilar to a jail booking, really. The main difference between
the two is that not even low threat inmates can bring their MacBook Airsand quart-sized bags
of liquidsinto the local big house. But when someone gets booked into jail, there is a good
chance that he/she did something wrong. When TSA books a traveler into his/her flight, there

5
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Who Joined DHS (Feb. 25, 2014, 3:04 PM),
http://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs
6
Transportation Security Administration, About TSA (Feb. 26, 2014, 12:03 PM),
http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa
7
Brittany R. Stancombe, Fed Up with Being Felt Up: The Complicated Relationship Between the
Fourth Amendment and TSA's "Body Scanners" and "Pat-Downs", 42 Cumberland L. Rev. 181,
183 (2012).
8
Id. at 184
3
is a good chance that person did nothing wrong. In fact, TSA has caught very few terrorists
attempting to board passenger flights in the U.S.
9

1. DHS and AIT Scanners
But the threat of a repeat attack is real. It is real enough that most Americans support
TSAs various screening methods, including body and belonging searches. However, TSAs
body searches expose more than many travelers think. For instance, TSAs Advanced Imaging
Technology (AIT) captures a naked image of each traveler who walks through it.
10
TSA views
the AIT scanners as a valuable tool in their fight against terrorism.
11
Although AIT scanners
supposedly blur the outline of naked travelers, some judges and scholars view them as a major
encroachment on privacy rights.
12

Before the current AIT scanners, TSA used another intrusive system. It is called
backscatter x-ray technology. Like AIT scanners, backscatter is superman-like. It can see
through travelers clothing with ease. In fact, the images that backscatter produces are so
detailed that they look like a low-budget adult magazine. It is that bad.
I vividly recall the first time that I saw backscatter technology in use. It was a year
before the first traveler stood sheepishly under its all-glaring eye. I saw the technology at the
Force Protection Equipment Demonstration (FPED) outside of Washington, DC. FPED is an
industry show where defense contractors showcase the most advanced defense technology

9
Stephen Dinan, TSA Profiling at Airports Has yet to Nab a Terrorist, The Wash. Times, Nov.
14, 2013 at , http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/14/tsa-profiling-at-airports-has-
yet-to-nab-a-terrori/?page=all.
10
U.S. Senate Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs Comm., TSA Airport Screening (2010).
11
Transportation Security Administration, Advanced Imaging Technology (Mar. 8, 2014, 1:08
PM), http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/advanced-imaging-technology-ait
12
Yofi Tirosh & Michael Birnhack, Naked in Front of the Machine: Does Airport Scanning
Violate Privacy, 74:6 Ohio St. L. J. 1263, 1265 (2012).

4
available. However, at FPED, the consumers are high-ranking military officers from the U.S.
and various allied countries throughout the world. At FPED it is common to see a group of
multi-star generals evaluating star technologies. And the backscatter inspection system was no
different.
With a group of military elite looking on, the backscatter demonstrator explained the
advanced abilities of the machine. He assured the generals that nothingabsolutely nothing
could escape the backscatters discriminate gaze. And then he proved it. The demonstrator
walked into the machine. The crowd could see it. The mans stark naked body flashed onto a
life-sized screen mounted off to the side of the remarkable technology. After a few moments, the
demonstrator walked out of the machine and shamelessly explained how the technology could
change the way that TSA processed travelers. After the demonstration, I walked away
wondering what Hobbes would have thought. Maybe the federal government had become the
great Leviathan. To ensure that we are safe from terrorists, the government has begun treating us
all as if we were one.
Backscatter x-ray and AIT scanners are key components to TSAs threat detection and
mitigation. But the scanners see through citizens clothing. And as such the technology literally
butts up to the Constitution in notable ways. For instance, the Fourth Amendment guarantees
that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
13
The Amendment at least implies that the
government shouldnt use advanced technology to see through the clothing of millions of

13
U.S. CONT. amend. IV.
5
innocent citizens.
ACLU argues that, passengers expect privacy underneath their clothing and should not
be required to display highly personal details of their bodiessuch as evidence of mastectomies,
colostomy appliances, penile implants, catheter tubes, and the size of their breasts or genitalsas
a prerequisite to boarding a plane.
14
Although the ACLU and others make compelling
arguments against TSAs screening practices, courts have declined to extend the Fourth
Amendment to airport screenings.
In her article, Fed Up With Being Felt Up, Brittany Stancomb calls attention to cases
that highlight the judicial stance on TSAs security methods.
15
In New York v. Burger, officers
searched a private scrap yard without a warrant.
16
In that case, the officers were searching for
stolen vehicles and auto parts.
17
The officers conducted their search pursuant to a New York
state statute, which regulated the purchase and sale of vehicles.
18
The Court held that business
owners who operate in highly regulated industries should have a reduced expectation of privacy,
and moreover, the officers in Burger acting pursuant to a statute did not require a warrant to
conduct the search.
19

New York v. Burger limited the Fourth Amendment in an unfortunate way. However,
Burger is not alone. The Courts decision in Burger largely turned on two prior cases, which
were Colonnade Catering v. U.S. and U.S. v. Biswell. The cases combined create what is known

14
Stancombe, supra. at 202.
15
Id. at 203.
16
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
17
Burger, 482 U.S. at 693-94
18
Id.
19
Id. at 712.
6
as the Colannade-Biswell doctrinea major Fourth Amendment limiter.
20
In Colonnade the
Court reviewed the constitutionality of a federal statute, which authorized warrantless searches
of liquor license holders.
21
In that case, an IRS agent was a patron on the Colonnade premises
when he witnessed a possible violation of excise tax law.
22
The IRS agent requested that the
owner of the premises unlock a storage room so he could inspect it.
23
When the owner declined,
the agent broke the lock and forced his way in without a warrant.
24
The Court held that although
the agent acted beyond his statutory authority, the statute itself, which granted IRS agents the
authority to conduct warrantless searchesunder certain circumstanceswas constitutional.
25

Although Colonnade inhibited the Fourth Amendments reach, U.S. v. Biswell is the true
Fourth Amendment limiter. Indeed Biswell, is the heavier half of the Colonnade-Biswell
doctrine. In Biswell the Court considered the constitutionality of the Gun Control Act of 1968,
which authorized warrantless searches on the premises of licensed firearms dealers.
26
In Biswell
the respondent was a licensed dealer who was going about his business when a city police officer
and a U.S. treasury agent visited him and demanded that he open his locks and his books for their
perusal.
27
The respondent complied with the officials demands; however, the officials found
him in violation of the law.
28
The Biswell Court held that because the search was administrative,
the officials did not need a warrant; therefore, their search did not violate the Fourth

20
John S. Morgan, The Junking of the Fourth Amendment: Illinois V. Krull and New York V.
Burger, 63 Tulane L. Rev.355 335, 342 (1988).

21
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75, 90 S. Ct. 774, 776, 25 L. Ed. 2d
60 (1970).
22
Id. at 73.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 82.
26
Morgan, supra. at 344.
27
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 312, 92 S. Ct. 1593, 1594, 32 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1972).
28
Id.
7
Amendment.
29

The holdings in Colonnade and Biswell support the federal governments practice of
conducting warrantless inspections in closely regulated industries.
30
The Colonnade-Biswell
doctrine stands for the principle that the federal government is given great deference to search
without a warrant so long as the administrative searches are limited in their time, place, and
scope.
31
And for better or worsemostly worsecourts view airport passenger screenings as
administrative searches that do not require a warrant.
32

Although courts hold that TSA does not require a warrant to conduct its passenger
screenings, the practice is still very controversial. In part because individuals do not know what
TSA does with its passenger images after the screening is complete. And that concern is well
founded.
According to a letter from TSA to Congressman Thompson, Chairman of the House
Committee on Homeland Security, TSA requires that all airport passenger scanners are capable
of storing and transmitting images for testing, training, and evaluation purposes.
33
Moreover,
Marc Rotenberg, executive director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), says
that TSAs body scanners are, designed and deployed in a way that allows the images to be
routinely stored and recorded.
34
In fact, a TSA procurement notice for body scanners says that
the scanners must allow exporting of image data in real time and allow for high-speed

29
Id. at 317.
30
Morgan, supra. at 342.
31
Stancombe, supra. at 203.
32
See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that airport screenings
are reasonable administrative searches because they are part of a broad regulatory scheme
intended to protect passengers from terrorist threats).
33
Declan McCullagh, Feds Admit Storing Checkpoint Body Scan Images, 2010 CNET, Aug. 4,
2010 at (2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20012583-281.html.
34
Id.
8
transfer of image data over TSAs network.
35
Like many things in DHSand the current
Executive for that matterTSAs practices are veiled in secrecy. Travelers rightfully wonder
where the images go. Many are left to assume that images of their naked bodies leave the airport
before their flights actually do.
Because courts do not recognize the Fourth Amendment in the passenger-screening
context, TSA is free to search as it pleasesand that it does. As such travelers have few options.
Citizens can choose between TSAs thorough pat-downs or TSAs electronic strip-search. No
other choiceexcept the bus. But on the Grey Hound, your privacy violator probably isnt kind
enough to wear latex gloves.
2. DHS and License Plate Readers
Although TSA is the touch point of the DHS in the lives of most Americans, the DHS
oversees much more than passenger screenings at U.S. airports. Its operations are extremely
broad and, as such, its privacy issues are too. DHS componentsfrom TSA and Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)monitor a lot of
things and they capture, store, and share a lot of images. There is an emerging DHS practice that
concerns privacy advocates as much as TSAs use of body scanners. Like airport screening, the
practice involves images of citizens backsides. However, the backsides at controversy here
are the backs of cars, not people.
When DHS captures an image of the back of a vehicle, it does so to capture the vehicles
license plate. License plates function as vehicle owners nametags and by capturing license
plates, DHS can determine individuals locationsboth citizens and non-citizens. DHS utilizes
a technology called License Plate Readers (LPRs) to capture the license plate images. The

35
Id.
9
technology is so advanced that it captures license plate images of moving vehicles, sometimes at
great distances.
36

ACLU calls attention to governments increasing use of LPRs saying, The information
captured by the readersis being collected and sometimes pooled into regional sharing systems.
As a result, enormous databases of innocent motorists location information are growing rapidly.
This information is often retained for years or even indefinitely.
37
Moreover, according to the
ACLU, the use of LPRs has few, if any, restrictions to protect individuals privacy rights.
38

Still more disconcerting is DHS interest in establishing a national license plate tracking
system that would provide the government with a treasure trove of information that reveals
where innocent and guilty Americans are at all times.
39
The proposed license plate database
would be massive and could easily contain over 1 billion records.
40
DHS could share these
records with myriad agencies and potentially open the doors for the government to scrutinize the
movements of ordinary citizens.
41

According to Jennifer Lynch, an attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),
DHS proposal would ultimately [create] a national database of location information.
42
And
the networked LPRs would be powerful enough to track somebody as theyre going through

36
ACLU, You Are Bing Tracked, How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record
Americans Movements (Mar. 14, 2014, 6:23 PM), https://www.aclu.org/alpr
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Ellen Nakashima & Josh Hicks, Homeland Security Is Seeking a National License Plate
Tracking System, The Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 2014 at 9:33 AM,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/homeland-security-is-seeking-a-
national-license-plate-tracking-system/2014/02/18/56474ae8-9816-11e3-9616-
d367fa6ea99b_story.html.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
10
their life.
43
DHS LPRs and database would be huge. In fact, the proposed database would be
the first of its kindin both size and scope.
44
Needless to say that the proposed program raises
significant privacy concerns.
45

Just days after releasing a solicitation for bids to begin developing its massive LPR
database, the DHS abruptly canceled its plans.
46
Why the cancelation? According to Jeh
Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, DHS canceled the solicitation because it was posted
without the awareness of ICE leadership.
47
Johnsons reason for the cancelation should
concern privacy advocates. Within hours of DHS solicitation, civil liberties groups around the
country began calling attention to the privacy issues of DHS proposal. In fact, DHS canceled
the solicitation the day after The Washington Post reported on Homeland Securitys plans.
48

One could suspect that Johnson canceled the program in response to the negative press and
public uproar. I think thats likely. But Johnson said nothing about the programs future.
Although DHS managing a national database of license plates is alarming (to say the
least), private companies are quietly amassing billions of license plate reads and storing the data
with little oversight. Seeking to put the brakes on this shadow industry, Utah State Senator,

43
Id.
44
Jennifer Lynch, Update: National License Plate Recognition Database: What It Is and Why
It's a Bad Idea, Electronic Frontier Found., Feb. 19, 2014 at 9:52 AM,
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/national-license-plate-recognition-database-what-it-and-
why-its-bad-idea.
45
Id.
46
DHS Cancels Plan to Collect License Plate Data, Fox NewsPol., Feb. 19, 2014 at ,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/02/19/dhs-plan-for-national-license-plate-tracking-
system-raises-privacy-concerns/.
47
Id.
48
Id.
11
Daniel McCay sponsored a state bill that would restrict the private collection of LPR data.
49

Although the Utah legislation would be a boon to personal privacy, two major LPR firms saw the
issue differently and filed a lawsuit.
50
Their suit is seeking a permanent injunction against the
application or enforcement of the Act.
51
Moreover, the LPR firms claim that the Act violates
the First Amendment because taking photographs is Constitutionally protected, and the Act
would prohibit the firms from taking photographs of license plates in the public.
52

There are countervailing Constitutional currents relating to the use of LPRs. On one
hand companies seek to enjoin the government from prohibiting their use of LPRs for First
Amendment reasons, and on the other hand privacy advocates argue that in light of the Fourth
Amendment, the government should limit its use of the technology.
53

Parties disagree as to whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the governments use of
LPRs. Although the Fourth Amendment deals with privacy, it does not explicitly outline a right
of privacy; the Amendment simply implies that the right exists.
54
Much of the law concerning
individuals privacy rights comes from the Court applying the Fourth Amendment in case law.
55

A great deal of privacy law comes from Katz v. United States. In that famous case the Supreme
Court articulated a two-part, objective and subjective, privacy rights test.
56


49
Cyrus Farivar, Private Firms Argue First Amendment Right to Collect License Plate Data, Ars
Technica, Feb. 14, 2013 at 11:00 AM, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/02/private-firms-
argue-first-amendment-right-to-collect-license-plate-data/.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Tyson E. Hubbard, Automatic License Plate Recognition: An Exciting New Law Enforcement
Tool with Potentially Scary Consequences, Syracuse Sci. & Tech. L. Rep. 1, 9,
http://jost.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/automatic-license-plate-recognition_an-exciting-new-law-
enforcement-tool-with-potentially-scary-consequences.pdf.
54
Id. at 13.
55
Id.
56
Id.
12
In Katz the FBI attached an electronic bug to a telephone booth, which the defendant
routinely used for illegal gambling.
57
The FBI recorded the defendants conversations, and the
government later used the recordings as evidence to convict the defendant of transmitting
wagering information by telephone among other things.
58
The defendant challenged his
conviction, and ultimately the Supreme Court held that because the defendant entered the booth
and closed the door, he assumed his conversations were private and would not be broadcast to
the world.
59
In conclusion the Court held that the governments activities in electronically
listening to and recording the petitioners words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably
relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a search and seizure within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
60

The Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine resulting primarily from Katz focuses on three
issues: (1) whether an individual had a subjective expectation of privacy (prong one of Katz test);
(2) whether society deems the individuals privacy expectation as reasonable (prong two of Katz
test); and (3) the relative intrusiveness of the supposed privacy violation.
61
Although the privacy
doctrine affirms individuals privacy rights in private places, it does little for Fourth Amendment
rights in the public. Under the traditional view of the Katz framework, DHS warrantless use of
surveillance technologylike LPRsfits within the Constitutional doctrine of the Fourth
Amendment because individuals do not have an objectively reasonable expectation to privacy
when driving their cars in public.
62


57
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354, 88 S. Ct. 507, 512, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967).
58
Id. at 349.
59
Id. at 353.
60
Id. at 353.
61
Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 281 U. of Ill. J. of Law,
Tech. & Pol'y 282, 282-283 (2011) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
62
Id.
13
Although the practice of DHS recording the license plates of vehicles is not particularly
intrusive, individuals likely expect that their movementsin aggregateare private. And if so,
DHS proposed national system of LPRs would be counter to the Fourth Amendments privacy
rights. Let me explain. Average peopleyou, me, most of us in societysubscribe to the
large school of fish safety doctrine; that is, we expect that many of our actions in public or
private go unnoticed because there are so many of us. When you are in public, you would
rightfully assume that someone is watching each thing you are doing, but you would not expect
someone to watch everything you are doing. So when an individual goes about his/her day, that
person expects that no one is keeping track of everything; therefore, that individual has a
reasonable expectation that the aggregate of his/her actions is private.
DHS national LPR network could also violate the objective prong of the Katz test
because society would probably accept that an individuals public actionsif aggregated
togethershould be private. Most people are fine with the government seeing snippets of their
public actions. But few people are fine with the government compiling their actions into a large,
detailed mosaic because that view into their lives would undoubtedly be intrusive.
Constitutional or questionable, many agree that both the LPR technology and DHS
proposed applications are intrusive. Speaking of the intrusive nature of LPR technology itself,
UT State Senator Todd Weiler, the author of Utahs LPR bill, said: this [LPR] technologycan
cut through fog, it can see in the dark, its very invasiveit doesnt matter if youre going 80
mph. Its not just a photograph, its the direction of travel, time, and GPS locationI think its
an invasion of privacy. This technology is very intrusive
63
And if LPRs are an invasion of

63
Cyrus Farivar, Private Firms Argue First Amendment Right to Collect License Plate Data, Ars
Technica, Feb. 14, 2013 at 11:00 AM, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/02/private-firms-
argue-first-amendment-right-to-collect-license-plate-data/.
14
privacy, they are an invasion everywhere. Due to the widespread use of LPRs, the
governmentfederal, state and localknows where you are, whether in a large city or in a small
town.
64

Like many emerging technologies, LPR technology is developing faster than the
associated privacy regulations.
65
The existing LPR privacy laws are a patchwork of state and
local regulations.
66
In light of the limited legal oversight, many government agenciesfrom
small counties to DHSare free to use LPR technology as they choose. And agencies are not
regulating themselves in the publics best interest. As an example, ACLU compiled data on LPR
usage within 293 agencies; only a fraction had internal policies governing LPR use.
67

Before considering a nationwide network of LPRs, lawmakers should make note of the
way LPRs compromise privacy in other countries. For instance, Australias active use of LPR
technology rightfully concerns many of its citizens.
68
Australian critics condemn the LPR
networks as a Pandoras box for abuse of power, mistakes and illegal disclosure because the
network allows the government to compile an extraordinary amount of data about [individuals].
This includes your name, address, contact details, driving history and license status.
69
David
Jancik, a privacy advocate and critic of Australias LPR networks observed that Innocent people
are increasingly being treated with suspicion due to the tiny chance that some offence [sic] may

64
Allie Bohm, "Limited Only By the Imagination": The Need for Legal Limits on License Plate
Reader Use, Free Future, Protecting Civ. Liberties in the Digital AgeYou Are Bing Tracked, July
19, 2013 at 10:13 AM, https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-
security/limited-only-imagination-need-legal-limits-license.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Paul Joseph Watson, Homeland Security to Activate 'National License Plate Recognition
Database', INFOWARS.com, Feb. 13, 2014, http://www.infowars.com/homeland-security-to-
activate-national-license-plate-recognition-database/.
69
Id.
15
be committed.
70
Undoubtedly a lot of people in the U.S. feel the same way about DHS strong,
emerging interest in the lives of innocent Americans.
Privacy stands at the basis of liberty. Many believeand far too many acceptthat
privacy is dying. As Howard Rheinglod said, You cant assume any place you go is private
becausesurveillance [is] becoming so affordable and so invisible. I agree that very few
places are truly private. However, each public stopalthough not private itselfis a
brushstroke in the portrait that composes an individuals private life. When citizens open their
doors and step out into the world, they do not leave the Fourth Amendment behind.
DHS proposed national LPR network compromises our Constitutional privacy rights.
DHS plan should fail under the Katz privacy testassuming the test is applied broadlyin part
because individuals have an expectation that the aggregate of their public actions are private.
Moreover, the privacy expectation would be objectively reasonable. As such, the federal
government should not pursue a national LPR network. Furthermore, state and local
governments should ensure that their LPR networks do not compile information on innocent
people going about their innocent lives.
In principle, our Founders would abhor the federal governments pervasive surveillance.
In practice, our watchful, all-knowing, all-powerful government is just steps away from using
advanced technology to monitor most of our public actions. This means that DHS will have the
ability to monitor an innocent individuals drive from his home to the airport. And after he
arrives at the airport, DHS will use another advanced technology to electronically remove his
clothing. Its just an administrative inconveniencewhile his naked body flickers on a screen.

70
Id.