Chinua Achebe and the Moral Obligation to be Intelligent

By
Damola Awoyokun
A writer should not be an accomplice to lies. Even when thorns infect the land, a
writer must embody and defend the perennial destiny of high values and principles. It
is not the business of a writer to side with the powerless against the powerful; the
powerless can be thoughtless and wrong. (The Nai party was once a powerless
group!. A writer should not prefer falsehoods to reality "ust because they serve
patriotic ends. In times of great upheavals in a multi#ethnic society, a writer should
get out and warn the society that the more perfect the answer, the more terrifying its
conse$uences. %ride in one&s ethnic identity is good, patriotism is fantastic but when
they are not properly moderated by other higher considerations, they can prove more
destructive than nuclear weapons.
I was in 'bafemi Awolowo (niversity, Ife when another round of the war of self#
determination and secession bro)e out between *oda)e)e and Ife. As the war
escalated, a single bullet wasn&t enough to )ill the +enemy,, he had to be butchered
into little pieces and the severed heads displayed at each other&s mar)et s$uares to
huge approval and celebration. -uch was the power of the mutual hatred unleashed
from their pride in their respective ethnic identities that these two communities were
not rebu)ed by the fact that were both .oruba, both Nigerians, or that the massacres
were being conducted around the famed cradle of .oruba civiliation.
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%atriotism when deployed must always be simultaneously governed by something
higher and lower than itself li)e the arms of a democratic government. These provide
chec)s and balances so that patriotism doesn&t become a false conception of greatness
at the e/pense of other tribes or nations. It is for this reason that we proceed to discuss
Achebe&s patriotic autobiography, There Was a Country: A Personal History of
Biafra in the light of something higher than it0 12,333 pages of Confidential, Secret,
Top Secret US State Department Central Files on i!eria"Biafra #$%&" #$%$ and
something lower0 The 'ducation of a British Protected Child by 4hinua Achebe
himself.
(A Country is written for modern day Igbos to )now from where the in"ustice of
their e/istence originated. Achebe&s logic is neat and simplistic0 Africa began to
suffer 533 years ago when Europe discovered it (that is, there was no suffering or
intertribal wars before then in Africa6! Nigeria began to suffer when 7ord 7ugard
amalgamated it. And Igbos began to suffer because of the event surrounding the
8iafran secession. To Achebe, there should have been more countries in the behemoth
7ord 7ugard cobbled together called Nigeria. 9hat Achebe does not ta)e into
account is the role rabid tribalism plays in doing violence to social cohesion which
ma)es every region counterproductively see)s a perfect answer in demanding its own
nation state. There are over 153 tribes in Nigeria and there cannot be over 153
countries in Nigeria. There are officially :;5 distinctive tribes in India and only one
country. All over the world there are tens of thousands of tribes and there are only 13:
countries. 9hat the tribes that constitute Nigeria need to learn for the unity of the
country is the democratiation of their tribal loyalties. And that inevitably leads to
gradual detribaliation of consciousness which ma)es it possible to treat a person as
2
an individual and not basically a member of another tribe. That is the first error of
Achebe.
Instead of writing the boo) as a writer who is Igbo, Achebe wrote the boo) as an Igbo
writer hence wor)ing himself into a <ugwang bind. In chess once you are in this
bind, every step you ma)e wea)ens your position further and further. All the places
that should alarm the moral consciousness of any writer, Achebe is either indifferent
to or dismisses them outright because the victims are not his people. =owever, in
every encounter that shows Igbos being )illed or resented by Nigerians, or by the
.oruba in particular, Achebe intensifies the spotlight, deploying stratospheric
rhetoric, amassing $uotes from foreign authors with further elaborations in endnotes
to show he is not partial. Achebe calls upon powerfully coercive emotive words and
phrasings to dignify what is clearly repugnant to reason. >urthermore, not only does
he ta)e pride in ignoring the findings of common sense, he allocates primetime
attention to facts#free rants "ust because they say his people are the most superior tribe
in Nigeria. The boo), to say the least, is a masterpiece of propaganda and sycophancy.
And yet it is not a writer&s business to be an accomplice to lies.
>irst let&s ta)e Achebe&s 4hristopher ')igbo. Throughout the boo), Achebe presents
')igbo in loving moments complete with tender details0 ')igbo attending to
Achebe&s wife during labour, ')igbo ordering opulent room service dishes for
Achebe wife in a swan) hotel while Achebe was out of the country, ')igbo being a
dearly beloved uncle to Achebe&s children, ')igbo opening a publishing house in the
middle of the war. 'ut of the blue he writes that he hears on ?adio Nigeria the death
of *a"or 4hristopher ')igbo. *a"or@ The reader is completely shoc)ed and feels
revulsion for the side that )illed him and sympathy for the side that lost him. (nli)e
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other accounts li)e 'bi Nwa)anma&s definitive biography of ')igbo, Achebe s)ips
details of ')igbo running arms and ammunition from 8irmingham to 8iafra and also
from place to place in 8iafra; he suppresses the fact that ')igbo )new of the Aanuary
2B:: coup beforehand through Emmanuel Ifea"una; he omits the fact that ')igbo was
an active#duty guerrilla fighter )illing the other side before he himself got )illed. 7i)e
many other episodes recounted in the boo), Achebe photoshops the true picture so
that readers would allocate early enough which side should merit their sympathy,
which side should be for slated for revulsion. %ities, cheap sympathy, sloppy
sentimentalism, one#sided victimhood are what are on sale throughout the boo).
Achebe of course is preparing the reader for his agenda at the end of the boo).
To Achebe, the final straw that led to secession was the alleged C3,333 Igbos )illed in
the North. =e carefully structures the narrative to locate the reason for this systematic
)illingDpogromDethnic#cleansing in the so#called usual resentment of Igbos and not
from the fallout of the first coup in the history of Nigeria. Achebe dismisses the
targeted assassinations as not an Igbo coup. The two reasons Achebe gives are
because there was a .oruba officer among the coup plotters and that the alleged
leader of the coup, *a"or 4hu)wuma Eaduna Neogwu was Igbo in name only. +Not
only was he born in Eaduna, the capital of the *uslim North, he was widely )nown
as someone who saw himself as a Northerner, spo)e fluent =ausa and little Igbo, and
wore the Northern traditional dress when not in uniform(pg FB!., ?eally@ >irst, it was
not mysterious that Ai)iwe left the country in 'ctober 2B:5 on an endless medical
cruise to 8ritain and the 4aribbean. Gr. Idemudia Idehen his personal doctor,
abandoned him when he got tired of the endless medical trip. Not even the
4ommonwealth %rime *inisters& 4onference never held outside 7ondon but hosted in
7agos for the first time in early Aanuary was incentive enough for Ai)iwe to return
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and yet he was the president of the nation. In a revelation contained in the American
secret documents, it was Ai)iwe&s presidential bodyguards from >ederal Huards that
*a"or Emmanuel Ifea"una, the coup&s mastermind, used to capture the %rime
*inister, Abuba)ar 8alewa. 'nce Ifea"una and *a"or Gonatus ')afor, the
4ommanding officer of the >ederal Huards tipped off Ai)iwe about the planned
bloodshed, ')afor, Hodfrey Eedigbo and others Huards became freer to meet in
Ifea"una&s house in Apapa to ta)e the plan to the ne/t level. The recruitment for the
ringleaders was done between August and 'ctober 2B:5. Immediately Ai)iwe left,
planning and training for the e/ecution began.
-econd, the eastern leadership was spared when others were brutally wasted. Third,
the head of state *a"or#Heneral Aguyi#Ironsi, an Igbo, didn&t try and e/ecute the coup
plotters as was the practice if it were a pure military affair. ('"u)wu told -uanne
4ron"e, the 8ritish#-outh African author that he as)ed Aguyi#Ironsi to ta)e over and
told him how to unite the army behind him. That was the reason he made him the
governor of Eastern ?egion.! >our, when Awolowo, 8ola Ige, Anthony Enahoro,
7ateef Aa)ande, etc were imprisoned for sedition, they served their terms in 4alabar
away from their regions as was the normal practice. 9hen 9ole -oyin)a was
imprisoned for activities at the beginning of the civil war, he was sent to faraway
Eaduna and Aos prisons but the ring leaders of coup plotters were moved from 7agos
bac) to the Eastern ?egion, among their people on the advice of '"u)wu. >ive, during
the Aburi negotiations, why was full reprieve for the coup plotters put on the table@
-i/, a freed Neogwu by April 2B:F before the secession declaration "oined in
training recruits in Aba)ali)i for the inevitable war with Nigeria. =e later died on the
Nsu))a front fighting for 8iafra. .et that was Achebe&s =ausa#spea)ing, )aftan#
wearing Eaduna man, who is Igbo in name only. It was an Igbo coup. (The same
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repac)aging was attempted for the invasion and occupation of the *idwest. It was
called liberation of the *idwest from =ausa#>ulani domination when it was simply
another Igbo coup for Igbo ends planned in Enugu albeit headed by a .oruba, 4olonel
Iictor 8an"o!
The Aanuary coup didn&t foment a much more viscera response in 9estern ?egion
since their assassinated political leader was part of the corrupt, troublesome, election#
rigging class. To 9esterners, the coup was good riddance to bad rubbish. =owever to
the Northerners who were feudal in their social organiation and =obbesian in their
consciousness, it was different matter. -ir Ahmadu 8ello, the slain -ardauna of
-o)oto was their all in all; he was the heir to the powerful -o)oto 4aliphate and
descendant of (sman dan >odio. *ore than Ai)iwe and Awolowo, -ardauna was the
most powerful politician in Nigeria (pg ;:!. *urdering him was murdering the pride
of a people. Achebe chooses to ignore this perspective and more importantly was the
fact that Igbos in the North were widely taunting their hosts on the loss of their
leaders with ?e/ 7awson&s song +Ewu Ne 8a A)wa, (Hoats are crying! and others
celebrating +Igbo power,, the +Aanuary Iictory., %osters, stic)ers, postcards, cartoons
displaying the murdered -ardauna begging Neogwu at the gates of heaven or 8alewa
burning outright in pits of hell, or Neogwu standing -t Heorge#li)e on -ardauna the
defeated dragon began to show up across Northern towns and cities. These
provocations were so pervasive that they warranted the promulgation of Gecree ;; of
2B:: banning them. The Igbos didn&t stop. Ai)iwe is more honest than Achebe. In
his pamphlet, The )ri!ins of the Ci*il War, he writes0 +Jsome Ibo elements who
were domiciled in Northern Nigeria taunted Northerners by defaming their leaders
through means of records or songs or pictures. They also published pamphlets and
postcards which displayed a peculiar representation of certain Northerners, living or
6
dead, in a manner li)ely to provo)e disaffection., It was these images and songs that
eventually led to the so#called pogromsDethnic#cleansingDgenocide not the coup. The
coup was in Aanuary, the pogroms started late in *ay, and the provocations were in
between.
=owever Igbos in the East did not sit idly by. They started the massacre of innocent
Northerners in their midst. Achebe chose to ignore this account since it doesn&t serve
his agenda so we return to Ai)iwe0 +8etween August and -eptember 2B::, either by
chance or by design, hundreds of =ausa, >ulani, Nupe and Igalla#spea)ing peoples of
Northern Nigeria origin residing in the Eastern Nigeria were abducted and massacred
in Aba, Aba)ali)i, Enugu, 'nitsha and %ort =arcourt., It is important to note that
these Northerners never published nor circulated irreverent or taunting pictures of
Eastern leaders unli)e the Igbos of the North, they were "ust massacred for being
Northerners. The government of Eastern ?egion did not stop these massacres.
Neither did the Igbo intellectuals. '"u)wu, the military administrator even made a
radio broadcast saying that he can no longer guarantee the security of non#Eastern
Nigerians in the East, Easterners who did not return to Igboland would be loo)ed on
as traitors. This was when %rofessor -am Alu)o who was the head of Economics
department at (niversity of Nigeria, Nsu))a and a personal friend of '"u)wu fled
bac) to the 9est. Ai)iwe continues in his boo)0 +Eyewitnesses gave on#the#spot
accounts of corpses floating in the Imo ?iver and ?iver Niger. K>arawayL?adio
4otonou broadcast this macabre news, which was suppressed by Enugu ?adio. Then
?adio Eaduna relayed it and this spar)ed off the massacres of -eptember M 'ctober
2B:: Kin the NorthL,.
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Achebe, li)e Enugu ?adio, suppressed this information and goes on to pivot the
Npogrom& on the fact that Igbos were resented because they were the most superior,
most successful tribe in the country. =e claims they were +the dominant tribe(pg
1CC!, +led the nation in virtually every sector M politics, education, commerce, and the
arts(pg ::!,, which included having two vice chancellors in .oruba land; they the
Igbos are the fol)loric +leopard, the wise and peaceful )ing of the animals (pg2FF!,,
they +spearheaded,(pg BF! the struggle to free Nigeria from colonial rule0 +This
group, the Igbo, that gave the coloniing 8ritish so many headaches and then literarily
drove them out of Nigeria was now an open target, scapegoats for the failings and
grievances of colonial and post#independent Nigeria(pg :F!., An Igboman, Achebe
writes, has +an un$uestioned advantage over his compatriotsJ(nli)e the
=ausaD>ulani he was unhindered by a wary religion, and unli)e the .oruba he was
unhampered by traditional hierarchiesJAlthough the .oruba had a huge historical
head start, the Igbo wiped out their handicap in one fantastic burst of energy in the
twenty years between2BC3 to2B53 (pg F;!., 8eside the fact that this has a language
consistent with white supremacist literature, Achebe, to demonstrate he is not partial
or a chauvinist, based himself on a 2F page report by %aul Anber in +ournal of
,odern African Studies titled Modernization and Political Disintegration: Nigeria
and the Ibos.
I loo)ed up the 2B:F "ournal. 4uriously this Nscholar& was designated as +a member of
staff of one the Nigerian (niversities., 9hy would a scholar hide his place of wor) in
a "ournal@ I chec)ed the essays and boo) reviews in all the 2B: issues of +ournal of
,odern African Studies from Iolume 2 issue 2 of Aanuary 2B:C to the last issue
Iolume ;B November 1322, there was nowhere a piece was published and the
designation of the scholar vague or hidden. Also this %aul Anber never published any
8
piece before and after this article in this or any other "ournal. I wanted to start
chec)ing the academic staff list of the five universities in Nigeria then until I realied
again that it says +he is a staff of Nigerian university;, I would have to chec) the
names of "anitors and cleaners, and other non#academic staff too. The truth is %aul
Anber is a fa)e name under which someone else or a group of people possibly Igbo is
mas$uerading. And heDthey never used this name again for any other piece or boo)s.
-o that this ruse would not be found out was the reason heDthey hid hisDtheir
university. And this piece li)e The Protocols of the 'lders of -ion has been the
cornerstone of boo)s and widely $uoted by other "ournals over a period ;5 years. It is
the cornerstone of the chapter A istory O! "thnic #ension And $esentment which
Achebe used to s)ew the motive for Igbo people&s maltreatment from the fallout of
Aanuary 2B:: coup and the inflammatory provocations they published to resentment
for being allegedly the most successful and dominant tribe in Nigeria.
=ad Achebe not been overdosing on rabid Igbo nationalism, he would have had his
chest#beating ethnic bombasts inflected by a deeper and more sobering analysis of the
Nigerian situation in the ne/t essay in the Aournal0 #he Ine%itability o! Instability
written by a real and e/isting %rofessor Aames '&4onnell, an Irish priest and professor
of government in a real and e/isting institution0 Ahmadu 8ello (niversity, <aria. '&
4onnell argues that the lac) of constitutionalism and disregard for rule of law fuel
psychology of insecurities in all ethnic groups. =e fingers as an inevitable cause of
our national instability, Nigerians& +failure to find an identity and loyalty beyond their
primordial communities that lead them constantly to choose their fellow wor)ers,
political and administrative, from the same community, ignoring considerations of
merit.,
9
The symbolism of Igbos heading the (niversity of Ibadan and (niversity of 7agos
both in .oruba land was a positive image to assist Tiv, =ausa, I"aw, (rhobo, .oruba,
Ibibio, Igbo, Efi), etc students shed their over#loyalty to their respective primordial
communities and to fashion a higher sense of identity that is national in character and
federal in outloo). To Achebe, the symbolism was an e/ample of the dominance and
superiority of Igbos. +It would appear that the Hod of Africa has created the Ibo
nation to lead the children of Africa from the bondage of ages,, %aul Anber $uotes
Ai)iwe saying in his West African Pilot, +=istory has enabled them not only to
con$uer others but also to adapt themselves to the role of preserverJ The Ibo nation
cannot shir) its responsibility., Anber says in hisDtheir essay0 +The Ibo reaction to the
8ritish was not typically one of complete re"ection and resistance, though Ibos were
militantly anti#colonial. -ince modernisation is in many respects basically a process of
imitation, the Ibos modelled themselves after their masters, seeing, as -imon
'ttenberg put it, that NThe tas) was not merely to control the 8ritish influence but to
capture it.& To some degree, it may be said that this is precisely what they proceeded
to do. >aced with internal problems of land hunger, impoverished soil, and population
pressure, the Ibos migrated in large numbers to urban areas both in their own region
and in the North and 9estJ,
The spirit of inclusive humanism, the *artin 7uther Eing Ideal, the *andela
E/ample, the conscience of a writer should necessitate that if a child in -o)oto goes to
bed hungry someone in (muahia should get angry. If a pregnant woman in Eotangora
needs "ustice someone in %atani should be able to stand up and fight for her. If an 'su
group is being maltreated in Igboland, someone in <aria should stand up and defend
them. 8ut to Achebe, there should be no mercy for the wea) in so far as he or she
belongs to the other side. Ta)e for instance the butchering of the lone shell#shoc)ed
10
+*ali#4had mercenary, wandering around +daed and aimless, in the bush Achebe
witnessed. To show the fight#to#finish courage of his people in face of overwhelming
force, he describes how *a"or Aonathan (chendu&s Abagana Ambush succeeded in
destroying 4olonel *urtala *ohammed&s convoy of B: vehicles, four armoured
vehicle )illing 533 Nigerians in one and a half hours. +There were widespread reports
of atrocities perpetrated by angry Igbo villagers who captured wandering soldiers. I
was an eyewitness to one such angry bloody freny of retaliation after a particularly
tall and lan)y soldier M clearly a mercenary from 4had or *ali wandered into an
ambush of young men with machetes. =is lifeless body was found mutilated on the
roadside in a matter of seconds (pg 2FC!.,
Achebe does not tell us if he tried to prevent this cold#blooded butchering even
though there was an episode where he intervened to save the life and chastity of a
8iafran woman arguing with some wandering Nigerian soldiers who wanted to
re$uisition her goat for food (pg 132!. If Achebe couldn&t intervene in the butchering,
what did he thin) of the )illing then or now that he is writing the boo) with the
benefit of hindsight@ -houldn&t the man have been handed over as a prisoner of war@
9as his )illing not a violation of Heneva conventions which he so much accused the
Nigerian side of disrespecting (pg 121!@ Gid villagers behaving this way not rebus sic
stantibus blur the lines between soldiers and civilians hence ma)ing themselves fair
game in war@ Also notice how Achebe starts the narration with an active first person
voice0 +I was an eye witness toJ, and how he $uic)ly switches to a passive third
person voice in the ne/t sentence0 +=is body was foundJ, Achebe $uic)ly goes
A9'7 +in a matter of seconds, leaving a moral vacuum for the Igbo writer to
emerge and the conscientious writer to go under.
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9hen atrocities were committed against 8iafrans, Achebe deploys strong active voice
(sub"ect O verb!, isolates the aggressive phrases of military bravado with italics or
$uotation mar)s. 8ut when 8iafra is caught committing the atrocity, he employs
passive sentence structures, modal verbs of li)elihood, euphemisms and he never
isolates pledges of murder in italics or $uotation mar)s. Ta)e the +Ewale Incident (pg
12P!, that eventually became an international embarrassment for 8iafra. 8ased on an
unsubstantiated source, he writes, +8iafran military intelligence allegedly obtained
information that foreign oilmenJwere allegedly providing sensitive military
information to federal forces M about 8iafran troop positions, strategic military
manoeuvres, and training., -o 8iafra decided to invade. +At the end of the
Ne/ercise&,, Achebe writes, +eleven wor)ers had been )illed,
Also compare these two accounts0 the bac)ground is the 8iafran invasion of *idwest.
Gespite '"u)wu&s assurance to them before the secession that he would absolutely
respect their choice of belonging to neither side, he invaded them, occupied their land,
foisted his government on them, too) charge of their resources, looted the 4entral
8an) of Nigeria in 8enin, set up military chec) points in several places to regulate the
flow of goods and human beings, imposed dawn#to#dus) curfews, flooded the
airwaves with 8iafran propaganda, imprisoned and e/ecuted dissidents on a daily
basis according to Nowa 'moigui&s The .n*asion of ,id/est and -amuel
'gbemudia&s 0ears of Challen!e. In fact, +The =ausa community in the 7agos street
area of 8enin and other parts of the state were targeted for particularly savage
treatment, in part a reprisal for the pogroms of 2B::, but also out of security concerns
that they would naturally harbour sympathies for the regime in 7agos,, 'moigui
writes. The *idwesterners regarded 8iafrans as liars and traitors. And the Nigerian
army came to their rescue.
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Achebe writes0 +The retreating 8iafran forces, according to several accounts,
allegedly beat up a number of *id#9esterners who they believed had served as
saboteurs. Nigerian radio reports claimed that the 8iafrans shot a number of innocent
civilians as they fled the advancing federal forces. As disturbing as these allegations
are, I have found no credible corroboration of them (pg 2CC!., .es, he can&t find it;
they were not his people. Also note his euphemisms0 +allegedly beat up,J +shot a
number of innocent civilians,(shot not )illed!. =e writes0 +a number of innocents, to
disguise the fact that massacres too) place. =e also writes0 +saboteurs.,
*idwesterners collaborated with federal forces to liberate their lands from 8iafran
traitors and occupiers, Achebe calls them +saboteurs., Now note in the ne/t paragraph
how he describes what happened to his people when the >ederal army in hot
pursuance of the 8iafran soldiers reached the Igbo side of the *idwest. It is noisily
headlined0 The Asaba *assacre(pg 2CC!.
+Armed with direct orders to reta)e the occupied areas at all costs, this division
rounded up and shot as many defenceless Igbo men as they could find. -ome reports
place the death toll at five hundred, others as high as one thousand. The Asaba
*assacre, as it would be )nown, was only one of many such post#pogrom atrocities
committed by Nigerian soldiers during the war. It became a particular abomination for
Asaba residents, as many of those )illed were titled Igbo chiefs and common fol)
ali)e, and their bodies were disposed of with rec)less abandon in mass graves,
without regard to the wishes of the families of the victims or the town&s ancient
traditions., Then he goes on to $uote lengthily from boo)s and what the %ope&s
emissary said about it in a >rench newspaper, what Howon said, what was said at
'puta panel etc etc. =e found time to research. They were his people unli)e the
sufferings, the Eshan, 8enin, I"aw, Ise)iri, (rhrobo people underwent at the hands of
13
the 8iafrans which he couldn&t find +credible corroboration of., Achebe is incapable
of being interested in the sufferings of others.
In the chapter #he Calabar Massacre& Achebe not only totally avoids the well#
documented atrocities including massacres 8iafran forces committed against the
Efi)s, Ibibios, I)werre, when they occupied their lands, he goes on to tell lies against
the >ederal forces. Achebe writes0 +8y the time the Nigerians were done they had
Nshot at least 2,333 and perhaps 1,333 IbosKsicL, most of them civilians.& There were
other atrocities throughout the region. NIn '"i ?iver,& The Times of London reported
on August 1, 2B:P, Nthe Nigerian forces opened fire and murdered fourteen nurses and
the patients in the wards.&, Achebe continues still referring to the same Times article0
+In (yo and ')igwe more innocent lives were lost to the brutality and bloodlust of
the Nigerian soldiers(pg2CF!., =ow the fact chec)ing services of his publishers
allowed him to get away with these is baffling. I loo)ed up the 2B:P piece of course.
It is a syndicated story written by 7loyd Harrison of the e/ 0or1 Times to balance
the piece by their own Aohn .oung which appeared three days before. In the 2ondon
Times piece Achebe $uotes, there is no mention of (yo or ')igwe or '"i ?iver at all.
This is what is in the piece M the "ournalist was $uoting 8rother Aloysius, an Irish
missionary in (turu 253)m away from Aba)ali)i0 +8ut when theyK>ederal forcesL
too) Aba)ali)i, they put the 22 white fathers there on house arrest. In the hospital
outside Enugu, they shot all the fourteen 8iafran nurses who stayed behind, then went
down the wards )illing the patients as well. It was the same thing in %ort =arcourt.,
This missionary had believed the ruthlessly efficient 8iafran propaganda service.
8ecause of the atrocities Nigeria soldiers committed earlier in the 'go"a MNsu))a
front and the revenge )illings in Asaba, the world had been alerted and it was hurting
14
Nigeria&s arms procurement from 8ritain. -o Howon agreed to an international
observer team made of representatives from (N general secretary and 'A( to
monitor the activities of the three Nigerian divisions against the claims ?adio 8iafra
was sending to the world and its people. In their first report released on B
th
'ctober
2B:P, there was no evidence of the )illings even though it was brought to their
attention. Even 7loyd Harrison and other members of the international press corps in
8iafra couldn&t find evidence of that particular )illings in the hospital. Also note
Achebe&s statement0 +8y the time the Nigerians were done they had Nshot at least
2,333 and perhaps 1,333 IbosKsicL, most of them civilians.&, =ow can an intelligent
mind write +they had shot at least 2,333, which is an uncertainty, and then following
it up with another uncertainty0 +perhaps 1,333 Ibos, and then say with certainty +most
of them are civilians,@ =ow can you say for sure that most of them are civilians when
you are not even sure whether they are 2333 or 1333@ It defies sense and logic to
build a certainty on two concurrent uncertainties and then offer it as the truth. 8ut
that is the meaning of propaganda. 9illiam 8erndhardt of *ar)press and ?obert
Holdstein of =ollwood were on contract from '"u)wu to handle 8iafra&s mar)eting
and propaganda. Nathaniel 9hittemore&s seminal thesis, Ho/ Biafra Came to Be:
3enocide, star*ation and American .ma!ination of the i!erian Ci*il War revealed
how they did it and how it wor)ed.
Achebe proceeds to celebrate +the great ingenuity, of scientists from 8iafran
?esearch and %roduction (nit who developed +a great number of roc)ets, bombs, and
telecommunication gadgets, and devised an ingenious indigenous strategy to refine
petroleum., Then he drops the most disingenuously incongruous "aw#dropping
statement in the boo)0 +I would li)e to ma)e it crystal clear that I abhor violence, and
a discussion of the weapons of war does not imply that I am a war enthusiast or
15
condone violence (pg 25:!., That is Achebe who pages before lamented the lac) of
weapons for his people; that is Achebe who travelled the world soliciting material
relief including arms for 8iafra; that is Achebe who watched the butchering of a lone
mercenary without flinching; that is Achebe who told ?a"at Neogy on pg 2350
+%ortugal has not given us any arms. 9e buy arms on the blac) mar)et. 9hat we
cannot get elsewhere, we try and ma)e.,
8ut there is a reason why he drops this dishonest statement here; he is preparing us for
what is coming ne/t. 9e all )now what happened in The 3odfather when Gon
*ichael 4orleone renounced -atan and all his evil wor)s0 Achebe begins to praise the
indigenously manufactured bomb, +'gbunigwe, (meaning mass )iller, a translation
unli)e others Achebe doesn&t include in the boo) for obvious reasons0 one of which is
a people he is trying to attract the world&s pity to as victims must not be caught )illing
en mass!. Achebe continues0 +'gbunigwe bombs struc) great terror in the hearts of
many a Nigerian soldier, and were used to great effect by the 8iafran army throughout
the conflict. The novelist Iincent 4hu)wueme)a I)e captures the hysteria and dread
evo)ed by it in a passage in his important boo) Sunset at Da/n: A o*el a4out
Biafra0 9hen the history of this war comes to be written, the ogbunigweKsicL and the
shore batteries will receive special mention as 8iafra&s greatest saviours. 9e&ve been
able to wipe out more Nigerians with those devices than with any imported weapons,
If the other side dare uses +wipe out,, Achebe would have flagged it as an evidence of
the plan to +annihilate the Igbos, but here, he let it pass without comment. It is from
his side. And 'gbunigwe was not a product of Igbo ingenuity; it was a
+bespectacled, American mercenary from *IT uncovered by the Irish "ournalist
Gonal *usgrave that was secretly training 8iafrans on how to use fertiliers to ma)e
16
bombs (cf 2C August 2B:P cable from American embassy in Gublin to the one in the
7agos!.
In the boo), Achebe narrates the many diplomatic missions M official and unofficial M
he embar)ed on for the secession. A particularly telling one was to the %resident of
-enegal, 7eopold -enghor(pg2:1!. =e and '"u)wu were attracted to -enghor because
of his Negritude philosophical movement. KThis story of course is not true. -am
Agbam who Achebe claimed he travelled with was e/ecuted alongside with Iictor
8an"o, Emmanuel Ifea"una and %hilip Alale in Enugu on -aturday 1C
rd
-eptember
2B:F. 9hat Achebe went to warn -enghor about didn&t become an issue until Aune
2B:P when 8iafra was losing and '"u)wu had to move the capital further south to the
heartland of (muahia then to 'rlu. And there was a monstrously centripetal migration
of Igbos towards the new capital which resulted in the humanitarian catastrophe. And
the (li airport Achebe claimed they flew from hadn&t being constructed before his
travel companion -am was e/ecuted on 1C
rd
-eptember 2B:F. It was constructed and
opened for use in August 2B:P because Enugu and %ort =arcourt which were 8iafra&s
only airports had fallen into the hands of the >ederal forces. -o let&s ta)e Achebe&s
story as story and move onL. Achebe tells us after days of bureaucratic obstacles, he
directly delivered to -enghor, '"u)wu&s personal letter that +informs him of the real
catastrophe building up in 8iafra., -enghor, Achebe writes, +glanced through the
letter $uic)ly, and then turned to me and said he would deal with it overnightJas
soon as possible (pg 2:1!.,
Throughout the boo) Achebe never says what -enghor response was. That alone
should alert the reader that the response wasn&t flattering to the 8iafran cause since
Achebe usually suppresses unfavourable views and information. In the >oreword
17
-enghor wrote during the war for ?aph (wechue&s boo) 5eflections on i!erian
Ci*il War: Call for 5ealism, we see the reason why Achebe chooses to omit
-enghor&s stand. -enghor delivers a classic rebu)e to Achebe, '"u)wu and the very
idea of 8iafra. >irst, -enghor effusively praises (wechue0 +here at last, is a man of
courage and sense,, who didn&t forgo +his ibotism, but because in him this is
transcended by a national will, he thus ac$uires the force to "udge both facts and men
with serene ob"ectivity., =e said reading the manuscript and encountering arguments
+for the unity of Nigeria,, ?aph (wechue +won him over at once., Note that with
'"u)wu&s letter which Achebe brought, -enghor +glanced through, +$uic)ly, and
promised to do something overnight. Then he started discussing philosophy and
literature with Achebe. '"u)wu&s letter never +won him over at once., .et the letter
warned of the urgency of 8iafran humanitarian calamity. 4learly, -enghor wasn&t
falling for the emotional manipulations the 8iafrans are using the humanitarian
situation to mar)et li)e salesmen of dubious artefacts. (wechue&s says that all the
countries (African! that recognised 8iafra as a state did so because of the
humanitarian catastrophe not that they saw any value in a sovereign 8iafra. =e writes0
+The leaders of 8iafra should understand that the sympathy which compelled these
countries to give them recognition was provo)ed by the suffering of the ordinary
people whom the 8iafran leadership despite their earlier assurances proved unable to
protect and that the act of recognition was not a premeditated approval of the political
choice of secession. 7i)e the secession itself, it was more a ?EA4TI'N AHAIN-T
than a GE4I-I'N >'?.,
I recommend ?alph (wechue&s boo) to every Nigerian not only because of the
analysis and conclusions he supplies about the war, but because the man is
18
coruscatingly intelligent. %resident -enghor praises him further0 +what he proposes to
us, after presenting us with a series of verifiable facts, is more than "ust a solution. It
is a method of finding solutions that are at once "ust and effective. =erein lies his
double merit. (wechue is a man well informed and conse$uently ob"ective. =e is a
man of principle who is at the same time a realist. All through the length of the wor),
which is clear and brief, we find the combination of practice and theory, of
methodical pragmatism and moral rationalism M a characteristic which mar)s out the
very best amongst the anglophones., In other words, he is everything Achebe is not.
'f course the epic humanitarian catastrophe was 8iafra&s golden goose. Their leaders
were drumming give#me#guns#o#I#want#to#fight#o songs and dances on the bloated
bellies of those )washior)or children. Achebe writes revealingly0 +'"u)wu seied
upon this humanitarian emergency and channelled the 8iafran propaganda machinery
to broadcast and showcase the suffering of 8iafra to the world. In one speech he
accused Howon of a Ncalculated war of destruction and genocide.& Enown in some
circles as the N8iafran babies& speech, it was hugely effective and touched the hearts
of many around the world. This mo*e was 4rilliant in a couple of respects. >irst, it
deflected from himself or his war cabinet any sentiment of culpability and outrage
that might have been welling up in the hearts and minds of 8iafrans, and second, it
was another opportunity to cast his arch nemesis, Howon, in a negative light (pg 123;
italics mine!., '"u)wu never made efforts to ta)e care of those little children as any
leader with a heart would do. Instead, Achebe continues0 he +dispatched several of his
ambassadors to world&s capitals hoping to 4uild on the momentum from his
broadcast., 8ut the world capitals refused to be duped. Their spies and diplomats
were collating ob"ective facts and insider&s accounts and sending them. -ir 7ouis
*banefo, the 8iafran chief "ustice, then emitted a nessum dorma howl0 +Jif we are
19
condemned to die, all right, we will die. 8ut at least let the world, and the (nited
-tates, be honest about it (pg 122!.,
(wechue did what Achebe never did0 acting from a firm moral base, he berated
'"u)wu and all the 8iafran leaders for rallying Igbos to die en mass for the secession.
+Sovereignty or mass suicide, he writes +is an irresponsible slogan unworthy of the
sanction or encouragement of any serious and sensible leadership., 9hat could have
caused a thin)ing man to at least flinch, Achebe re"oices in. =ere the unthin)ing man
is narrating the +e/plosion of musical, lyrical, and poetic creativity and artistry
(pg252!, that the 8iafran war had brought about0 +8ut if the price is death for all we
hold dear,D Then let us die without a shred of fearJD-pilling our blood we&ll count a
privilege;JD9e shall remember those who died in mass;J(pg 251!, That was the
8iafran national anthem, 7and of the ?ising -un. Achebe continues0 +The anthem
was set to the beautiful music of the >innish composer Aean -ibeliusJ., >or Igbos to
ever compare the 8iafran deaths to the =olocaust is to desecrate the =olocaust and
cast insults on the memory of the Aewish dead. European Aewry never had an anthem
rallying themselves to mass deaths this way.
Another telling episode in the boo) is the war#ready celebrations amongst 8iafran
4hristians in their houses of Hod0 +8iafran churches made lin)s to the persecution of
the early 4hristians, others on radio to the In$uisition and the persecution of the
Aewish people. The prevalent mantra of the time was NOjukwu nye anyi egbe ka anyi
nuo agha& M N'"u)wu give us guns to fight a war.& It was an energetic, infectious duty
song, one sung to a well#)nown melody and used effectively to recruit young men
into the %eople&s Army (the army of the ?epublic of 8iafra!. 8ut in the early stages of
the war, when the 8iafran army grew $uite rapidly, sadly '"u)wu had no guns to give
20
those brave souls(pg 2F2!., .es Achebe&s words0 Nsadly&J Nbrave souls&J in the
house of Hod@ .et pages before, Gon *ichael 4orleone told us he had renounced
-atan and all his evil wor)s.
The wrongheaded intransigence of '"u)wu to ta)e another path in place of secession
that was even alarming to neutral observers never ma)es it into this boo) unli)e other
boo)s that recounted the stories. Nnamdi Ai)iwe&s )ri!ins of Ci*il War lists the
properties '"u)wu stole even before he declared secession0 how +he obstructed the
passage of goods belonging to neighbouring countries li)e, 4ameroon, 4had and
Niger, and e/propriated them., Achebe writes that wealthy 8iafrans& private accounts
were used to buy hardwares for the war. =e never tells us that '"u)wu stole via armed
robbery, money worth billions in today rates at the 48N branches at 8enin, 4alabar
and Enugu because he had no money to prosecute a war he was obsessed with
fighting without thin)ing the conse$uences through very well. Achebe never berates
'"u)wu both then and now that he is recollecting with benefit of hindsight on clearly
stupid "udgements. >or instance, swindled by propaganda, Gic) Tiger, the 7iverpool#
based Nigerian bo/er renounced his *8E to come and fight on the side of 8iafra.
Achebe writes0 +'"u)wu made Gic) Tiger a lieutenant in the army of 8iafra as soon
as he enlisted (pg 25P.!, That was a man with no military training or bac)ground
given over hundred fighters to command as an assistant of a captain by "ust showing
up in Nigeria.
Achebe goes on to praise '"u)wu as a man who needed little or no advice. +This trait
would bring '"u)wu in direct collision with some senior 8iafrans, such as Gr Nnamdi
Ai)iwe, KGrL *ichael ')para, Gr ')echu)wu I)e"iani and a few others who were
concerned about '"u)wu&s tendency toward introversion and independent decision
21
ma)ing (pg22B!., The Americans did not dignify dictatorship with fanciful language
the way Achebe does; they called it by its proper name. =ere is a telegram cabled to
9ashington and some other American embassies worldwide0
+Internal situation has changed a great deal since secession was first declared.
'"u)wu now rules as a dictator and moves about surrounded by retinue of relatives
and yes men. ?esponsible Ibos who had been advising him at the start of the war have
been eliminated in one way or the other from the picture because they came to believe
accommodation of some sorts would have to be reached with >*HKHowon&s >ederal
*ilitary HovernmentL. -ituation so bad that 8iafran representative in %aris
')echu)wu *eu has $uit in disgust. Ai)iwe refuses to go bac) to 8iafra and is
sitting in 7ondon as an e/ile. '"u)wu&s propaganda machine, by succeeding in
creating the impression of some forward movement, mas)ed the cold fact that
8iafrans are unable to brea) out of >*H&s encirclement.,
That was 1
nd
of >ebruary 2B:B M 22months to the end of the war. =ad '"u)wu listened
to the advice of +responsible Ibos, in his inner caucus all along, more lives would
have been saved, instead he surrounded himself with irresponsible Igbos li)e Achebe
and other yes men. Ta)e the chapter #he $e'ublic o! Bia!ra: #he Intellectual
(oundation o! a New Nation) Achebe&s committee was National Huidance
4ommittee; his office was in '"u)wu&s state house. +'"u)wu then told me he wanted
the new committee to report directly to him, outside the control of the cabinet. I
became immediately apprehensiveJNevertheless I went ahead and chose a larger
committee of e/perts for the tas) at hand (pg 2;;!., Then the e/perts started to wor)
on what was to become the Ahiara Geclaration which '"u)wu read on radio Aune 2,
2B:B +very close to the end of the war., There was starvation, great panic, epidemic,
22
an/iety, bereavements and despair in the streets. Even according to 8iafra&s
propaganda statistics over a million were already dead. The war was obviously
unwinnable. >ederal forces had captured Enugu 8iafra&s first capital, (muahia, the
second capital, 'nitsha, %ort =arcourt, 4alabar, Nsu))a and many places in 8iafra.
8iafran troops were desperately fleeing and hiding. .et Achebe and his '/ford and
4ambridge Igbo intellectuals who clearly had the ear of '"u)wu and put truth into it
in order to prevent further deaths were busy writing sycophantic declarations. KN.(.
A)pan too who was the secretary to 8iafran government was particularly scathing on
these +arrogant, +ignorant, intellectuals in his own boo), The stru!!le For
SuccessionL +The day this declaration was published and read by '"u)wu was a day
of celebration in 8iafra,, Achebe writes. +*y late brother >ran) described the effect
of this Ahiara Geclaration this way0 NOdika si gbabia agbagba& (It was as if we
should be dancing to what '"u)wu was saying!. %eople listened from wherever they
were. It sounded right to them0 freedom, $uality, self#determination, e/cellence.
'"u)wu read it beautifully that day. =e had a gift for oratory(pg 2;B!., It was a day of
celebrations indeed. Now we )now that Abacha&s *inisters of 7ies and Gishonest
>abrications, 4omrade (che 4hu)umeri"ie and Gr 9alter 'fonagoro had a common
precedent.
The Americans too too) note of the two and a half hour long Geclaration and cabled
this commentary to 9ashington0
+'"u)wu repeatedly develops the theme that Nour disability is racial. The root cause of
our problems lies in the fact that we are blac).& 4onsidering the humanitarian and
political support in response to 8iafran propaganda, the level of relief flown in, and
the concern e/pressed by private organiations and governments, '"u)wu&s speech is
23
almost unreal as he omits even a passing reference to the International ?ed 4ross,
4aritas or >rench military assistance., That was people whom '"u)wu accused of
being racists. The Americans continue0 +In his efforts to foster solidarity and support
for continuing the war and maintaining the secession, '"u)wu appeals as much to fear
and /enophobiaJ '"u)wu sees the Nigerian civil war in almost conspiratorial terms.
>or e/ample0 he describes the war as the Nlatest recrudescence in our time of the age#
old struggle of the blac)man for his true stature of man. 9e are the latest victims of a
wic)ed collusion between the three traditional curses of the blac)man0 racism, Arab#
*uslim e/pansionism and white economic imperialism.,
All along the Americans )new of the ruthlessly efficient 8iafran propaganda. They
$uestioned how they arrived at the 13DC3D53,333 )illed in the North before the war.
?eviewing '"u)wu&s radio broadcast of 2;
th
November 2B:P, the Americans cabled
this to 9ashington0 +'"u)wu claimed 53,333 were Nslaughtered li)e cattle& in 2B::,
adding that in the course of war Nwell over one million of us have been )illed, yet the
world is unimpressed and loo)s on in indifference.& (4omment0 this is the highest
figure we have seen him use for the pre#war deaths, and the one million claimed )illed
since the war began is inconsistent with his assertion in the same speech that :,F33
8iafrans have been )illed daily since Auly :, 2B:F.!
They also noted '"u)wu&s fabrications in his broadcast of C2
st
of 'ctober 2B:B that
%resident Ni/on +had ac)nowledged fact of genocide,, that earlier on, he, NHeneral&
'"u)wu called on Ni/on +to live up to his words., 9hen at the inception of
secession, 8iafran ?adio broadcast the countries that had recognised 8iafra, the
Americans informed 9ashington0 +>ollowing countries have denied recognition of
8iafra0 (-, (--?, Ethiopia, Israel, Australia, Hhana, HuineaJwording of statements
24
varies greatly, but all disapprove of secession, or use words such as recognition,
integrity of Nigeria, support for federal government. (Aune B, 2B:F!, In fact, '"u)wu
and the 8iafran pro"ect were one long crisis of credibility. In the cable of 11
nd
of *ay
2B:B, the Americans cabled 9ashington0 +=ow he ('"u)wu! can continue to deceive
his people, and apparently get away with it, is minor miracle, but difficult to see how
much delusions can last much longer.,
8y the time truth finally triumphed over propaganda, the 8iafrans had to find another
man to blame for the war and the deaths0 Enter 4hief Aeremiah 'bafemi Awolowo,
the 7osi of I)enne (whom Achebe falsely claimed '"u)wu released from prison!.
>irst to what the autobiography of =arold -mith, one of the colonial officers the
8ritish Hovernment sent to rig Nigeria&s pre#Independent elections in favour of the
North had to say about Awolowo0
+8ut the 8ritish were not treated as gods by the .oruba. In my e/perience, the
.oruba regarded themselves as superior to the 8ritish and one only had to read a boo)
written by Awolowo, the 9estern leader, to )now why. The .oruba were often highly
intelligent and they taunted the 8ritish with sending inferior people to Nigeria. The
Igbo would be humble and avert his eyes in the presence of a European. The .oruba
child would loo) at an important European and shout, N=ello, white man,& as if he
were a frea).,
9hat is more0 +Awolowo in the 9est had taunted the 8ritish by claiming that his
Hovernment had accomplished more in the space of two or three years for his people
than the 8ritish had since they arrived in 9est Africa., 'f course Achebe )nows
about these facts because he $uoted from the boo) but only the part favourable to his
agenda. -mith again0
25
+The thrust of the 8ritish Hovernment&s policy was against the Action Hroup led by
4hief Awolowo which ruled in the 9estern ?egion. Not only was the 8ritish
Hovernment wor)ing hand in glove with the North which was a puppet state favoured
and controlled by the 8ritish administration, but it was colluding through ')otie Eboh
with Gr Ai)iwe M <i) M the leader of the largely Igbo N4N4 which ruled in the
East., *ore0 +9e tric)ed Ai)iwe into accepting to be president having )nown that
8alewa will be the main man with power. Awolowo has to go to "ail to cripple his
genius plans for a greater Nigeria.,
Achebe reveals his own mentality we never suspected before0 +9e KintellectualsL
were especially disheartened by the disintegration of the state because we were
brought up in the belief we were destined to rule Kpg 23PL., =e uses this mind#set of
his to "udge Awolowo0
+It is my impression that 4hief 'bafemi Awolowo was driven by an overriding
ambition for power, for himself in particular and for his .oruba people in generalJ
=owever Awolowo saw the dominant Igbos at the time as the obstacle to that goal,
and when the opportunity arose M the Nigeria M 8iafra 9ar M his ambition drove him
into a freny to go to every length to achieve his dreams. In the 8iafran case it meant
hatching up a diabolical policy to reduce the number of his enemies significantly
through starvation M eliminating over two million people, mainly members of future
generation (pg1CC!.,
This is a blood libel and an evil lie. It will taint Albert 4hinualumogu Achebe forever.
Awolowo built the first stadium in Africa, the first TI station in Africa, the first high
rise building in Nigeria, first industrial estate, cocoa development board, 'dua
Investment Hroup li)e the current Gubai 9orld or 4hinese Investment 4orporation.
26
=e offered free universal education and free universal primary healthcare that
America has been struggling to achieve for the past 133 years. 9hat is more
important, Awolowo never situated all these in his hometown of I)enne in 'gun state;
he spread them round the region he presided on. And the free universal education and
free primary healthcare were available to anyone of any tribe or nationality including
Nupe, Igbos, I"aw and Hhanaians living in the 9estern ?egion. Awolowo was
interested in bettering the lives of everyone not "ust the .oruba.
'f course we )now that the lasting legacy of the 8iafra war was the creation of a
well#organied .oruba#bashing industrial comple/ head$uartered in Igbo
consciousness wor)ing with machine regularity from generation to generation and
whose genuine aim is to fundamentally deflect blame from '"u)wu and the 8iafran
hierarchy until misunderstandings are perverted into evidence of .oruba guilt,
outright lies are perverted into undisputed truth. .es, Awolowo was a master
architect of the war to defeat the secession, the American documents called him +the
Acting %rime *inister, to the C1 year old Howon. -o let us proceed to e/amine the
case made against him one by one.
On the so*called Awolowo Blockade
To tal) about a bloc)ade of Awolowo on 8iafra is to concede that the control of
8iafra&s borders was already under his control. The control or defence of borders is
the main aim of any war since the beginning of war ma)ing all over the world. That is
why the best of (- battleships and fighter "ets are currently patrolling east and west
coasts and airspace. That was why Troy built impossibly high fortifications around
their city. 'ne of the main reasons ?oman Empire collapsed was that its boundaries
were getting too vast to be defended by an incommensurate number of men and
27
resources. 8ut the C;year old Heneral, 7t 4olonel '"u)wu led 8iafra to secede based
on only two thousand professional soldiers and e/tremely few artillery; they didn&t
have enough to defend their borders. +If the Nigerian side had )nown the state of
8iafran troops including their morale, they would have pursued them even on canoes
across the ?iver Niger. =ad the Nigerians ta)en up such pursuit, they might have
ta)en 'nitsha, Aw)a and Enugu that same day., That is Achi)e (denwa who was a
8iafran soldier and later became the governor of Imo writing about the >ederal defeat
of 8iafra in the *idwest during the early wee)s of the war in his own recollection
i!erian6Biafra War7 Even, the so#called Aanuary boys, Neogwu and Ifea"una both
voiced their concern that the 8iafran soldiers were vastly underprepared for any )ind
of war. Achebe also admits that0 +8iafran soldiers marched into war one man behind
the other because they had only one rifle between them, and the thin)ing was that if
one soldier was )illed in combat the other would pic) up the only weapon available
and continue fighting(pg 25C!.,
Therefore, before the first bullet was fired, the secession was not only a failure but
was an epic humanitarian catastrophe waiting to happen. Awolowo told '"u)wu one
of the reasons the 9est won&t be able to "oin the secession was because the region
already occupied by Northern troops didn&t have enough loyal men in the Nigerian
army to defend the region. 9eaned on the hermeneutics of .oruba history, Awolowo
was not persuaded by the seductive but senseless logic that the Nigerian forces would
lose because they would not be able to prosecute war on two fronts if the 9est "oined
the East in seceding. At one point during the Eiri"i war in the 2B
th
century, 8ashorun
'gunmola(omo arogunde yo! the Eingdom of Ibadan&s generalissimo was
simultaneously warring with five neighbouring and far#flung )ingdoms. Ibadan never
lost. To defeat Ibadan you don&t have to defeat even its retreating soldiers only, you
28
have to defeat those dull#loo)ing but patriotic hills surrounding it. In fact, one of the
reasons why Ibadan was so belligerent in its history was that those mighty hills
allowed her to spend little resources defending and more on attac)ing. 8ut 8iafra was
not surrounded by hills literarily or figuratively. =er borders were so porous that
they fell easily into the opponent&s hand. Gays after declaration of secession, the sea
boundary of 8iafra was already being manned by Nigeria&s battleships. 8y the si/th
wee) all the boundaries of 8iafra were already under the control of Nigerian
government.
I conducted an e/periment with my Igbo colleagues. 7et us assume that Awolowo or
the entire 9est adopted a Nsiddon loo)& approach. Graw the map of 8iafra complete
with the Atlantic 'cean, Niger and 8enue bridges as Holden Hate 8ridge and
8roo)lyn 8ridge and call the place (-A. I as)ed them to outline the strategies to
capture (-A in the event of a war. Their strategies were not different from the path
the 8iafran propaganda accused Nigerian government of ta)ing. And in fact had only
Awolowo&s 9estern ?egion seceded, the strategy to recapture it would not be at
variance with the one used against 8iafra because the 9est is geographically an
enantiomer of the East. It was the same bloc)ade *a"or Neogwu used before going
in to capture and )ill in cold blood their targets0 the -ardauna and his senior wife,
Ademulegun and his eight months pregnant wife, *rs. 7atifa Noble in the presence of
their two children -olape and Eole. (As -olape recollects years later, Neogwu was a
family friend who used to come often to their house to eat pounded yam and egusi
soup.! It was the same bloc)ade 4aptain Emmanuel Nwobosi imposed to capture
>ani#Eayode and )ill A)intola, the 9estern %remier. It was the same bloc)ade
American Navy -eals imposed around 'sama 8in 7aden&s hideout before they
oomed in.
29
+9hat about the neighbouring country, (4ameroon! whose side was it on@, 'ne of
my participants as)ed. 'f course 4ameroon was firmly on the Nigerian side yet they
have a sieable Igbo population and Ai)iwe&s Igbo party was N4N4 M National
4ouncil for Nigerian and the 4ameroons. 8ut '"u)wu had stepped on their toes0 he
had stolen enough of their goods and supplies that they helped the federal side to ta)e
4alabar and cooperated with the naval bloc)ade of 8iafra. As the (- -tate
Gepartment&s cable of 1B
th
November 2B:P discloses0 +H>?4KHovernment of the
>ederal ?epublic of 4ameroonL continues to support >*H Kfederal military
governmentL and recently ordered the dissolution of newly formed 4ameroon relief
organisation(4A*?'! which was being organied to receive 8iafran children in west
4ameroon., Note to '"u)wu in case of ne/t time0 8e careful of the message your
actions send to your friends. 9hen they turn against you, they won&t be nice.
On the so*called Awolowo+s star%ation 'olicy)
In Achebe&s boo) one could see several places where 8iafrans violated the basis of
Heneva conventions. .ou could see where villagers who were non#combatants and
should have been protected under Heneva conventions were ta)ing machetes to the
nec)s of >ederal soldiers hence becoming legitimate targets of war themselves.
Another stri)ing instance was when Achebe was with his e/tended family and
overnight their compound was turned into military base without their consent (pg
2F1!. =eavens forbid the Nigerian side bombed the base. .es, the 8iafran propaganda
machine would go to wor) that an innocent illustrious family had been eradicated by
the +genocidal Nigerian army, and may even use it as an evidence of war crime. 8ut
30
the truth is that, the 8iafran army deserved condemnation for compromising Achebe&s
household.
As part of security preparation for the last 'lympics, the 8ritish Army commandeered
a strategic high#rise residential building and placed surface#to#air missiles at the top.
The residents protested and went to court. 7et us assume a war bro)e out and the
enemy flatten the whole building. =e has not committed a war crime because it was
the 8ritish army that made the civilian residents a legitimate target in the first place.
(nfortunate though it may sound, schools, hospitals, churches, mos$ues, relief centres
become legitimate targets once military activities begin to go on there in the event of
a war. 4hec) for instance the current =amas tactics against Israel or the bombing of
the (niversity of Nigeria, Nsu))a when it allowed itself to become the head$uarters
of local 8iafran army with several professors "oining in e/pedition force to hunt down
lost >ederal soldiers in the bush and their wives bac) on campus too) care of
wounded 8iafran soldiers and students were going for daily drills and rifle shooting
practice under %rof Aohn 4. Ene, Gean of >aculty of -ciences and 4ommander
(niversity Gefence 4orps as revealed in the (- secret cable of 2:D3:D2B:F. 'r the
>ederal raid on the 4atholic 4athedral of The *ost =oly Trinity, 'nitsha when it was
discovered 8iafran snipers with their ammunitions were operating from there.
9hen a plane or ship is designated as flying relief supplies to war sufferers, it must
not be used to supply arms. 'nce it does, it is no longer covered by Heneva
conventions. There was an Austrian 4ount, 4arl Hustaf von ?osen whom Achebe
praises a lot for his humanitarian assistance in flying relief efforts to 8iafra. This is
what the 4ount&s wife had to say0 +=e told me he was going to 8iafra but he didn&t
say he would be bombing *IHs (pg C33!., Achebe writes of the von ?osen0 +=e led
31
multiple relief flights with humanitarian aid into (li airport M 8iafra&s chief airstrip.
>ed up with Nigerian air force interference with his peaceful missions, he entered the
war heroes& hall of fame after leading a five#plane assault on Nigerian aircraft in %ort
=arcourt, 8enin 4ity, (ghelli, Enugu, and some other locations. =e too) the Nigerian
air force by total surprise and destroyed several -oviet#supplied aircraft in the
process., That was someone flying humanitarian aid. =ow would the >ederal side
begin to see other humanitarian flights that were supposed to be carrying food and
medical supplies to war#ravished children@ 4yprian E)wensi a writer and head of
e/ternal publicity for 8iafra admitted in his post#war reminiscences that the relief
materials had arms built into them. (The American documents too confirmed it. The
same =an) 9arton which the relief agencies were using to fly food into 8iafra was
the one '"u)wu was using to deliver arms. 7t 4ol. *erle, the >rench military attachQ
in Habon was in charge of shipments of >rench arms from >rance through Habon to
8iafra. =e was also the head of >rench ?ed 4ross operating in 8iafra!
'f course the Nigerian side )new this and mandated all relief flights to 8iafra to
submit themselves for inspection at the %ort =arcourt airport. That was the
interference Achebe claimed the 4ount was fed up with. (Anyway the 4ount never
claimed such in that :
th
Auly 2B:B interview he gave the 2ondon )4ser*er! Those
planes that passed their inspection delivered their relief. Those that did not were shot
down. 'ne particular case was the -wiss ?ed 4ross G4F >light heading towards the
(li strip (pg 232!. After repeated warnings to change course and land for inspection, it
was shot down. The 8iafran propaganda went to wor) saying it was part of the
genocide policies of Nigerian military to destroy merciful food supplies meant for the
malnourished children.
32
Never mind that many of the relief supplies meant for the children were either
ambushed by soldiers or ended up in the blac) mar)ets. E)wensi again0 +%eople were
stealing and selling the food. .ou could buy it in the mar)et but you couldn&t get it in
the relief centres., 8ut why would 8iafra rely on food from thousands of miles away
when their normal antebellum route of supply was merely tens of miles nearby in the
*idwest and Northern Nigeria, the food bas)et of the nation@ It was because of the
supply of arms and ammunition. '"u)wu and the 8iafran leadership never cared about
those poor children. In a memorandum to the 9hite =ouse, 8en"amin ?ead, the
E/ecutive -ecretary of (- -tate Gepartment writes0 +8ecause of the absence of other
airlines willing to ma)e haardous flights into 8iafra, the I4?4KInternational
4ommittee 'f The ?ed 4rossL has been forced to charter planes from =enry 9arton,
an American citien, who is widely )nown to be 8iafra&s only gun runner. In
engaging 9arton, the I4?4 is ris)ing its good relations with the >*H, which has
long feared that I4?4 flights might provide opportunity for gun running., 9hen
Awolowo offered to reopen the usual food corridors, '"u)wu flatly refused. Achebe
writes0 +'"u)wu li)e many 8iafrans, was concerned about the prospect that Nigerians
could poison the food supplies (pg122!., Awolowo let in the food supplies for the
children anyway wor)ing with the cover of 4aritas and ?ed 4ross. Achebe can tell
lies0 +In America, the Ni/on administration increased diplomatic pressure on the
Howon administration to open up avenues for international relief agencies at about the
same time, following months of impasse over the logistics of supply route.(pg 112!,
There was neither pressure nor its increment.
+The problem of disaster relief in 8iafra is not the lac) of supplies or means of
transport but the lac) of access, particularly by a land corridor to 8iafra., 9illiam 8.
*acomber, Ar, the Assistant -ecretary for 4ongressional ?elations wrote in a letter
33
dated 13 Gecember 2B:P to 4ongresswoman >lorence Gwyer when she sought
clarification on the plight of 8iafran refugees she )ept seeing in the media. +The
authorities K8iafranL on the spot, under the conditions of civil war have given a higher
priority to politico#military considerations than to arranging food to be delivered to
8iafra. In early November K2B:PL the Nigerian government told the I4?4
KInternational 4ommittee of the ?ed 4rossL that it would agree to daylight relief
flights to the ma"or airstrip now held by 8iafra if the I4?4 could give assurances that
the strip would handle only relief flight in daylight hours. 9e welcome this step by
the >ederal Hovernment (>*H!, which would substantially increase the flow of relief.
-o far, however, the 8iafran authorities have refused to agree. 9e find it
incomprehensible that despite the millions of 8iafran lives at sta)e, the 8iafran
leadership has not yet given its agreement. The Nigerian government has also offered
to cooperate in efforts to open a land corridor to 8iafran#held territory. 9e hope that
the 8iafran authorities will respond positively to this but heretofore they have alleged
they fear the food may be poisoned while transiting >*H territory.,
7ater when Awolowo visited the battlefronts and saw the heartrending impact of
)washior)or on the children, he as)ed about the food supplies, only to discover that
soldiers were ambushing the supplies, feeding themselves and the top hierarchy so as
to continue the war. They never cared about those suffering children. Awolowo
decided this +dangerous policy, must stop. To protect those children who were
suffering because of the war, he as)ed for a stop to the food supply that was
inevitably going to the soldiers and the 8iafran plutocrats unnecessarily elongating a
war they would never win.
34
It ta)es deep wisdom to understand Awolowo&s concern for the poor 8iafran children.
As he himself repeatedly said +only the deep can understand the deep., -o let&s distil
this wisdom for Achebe to understand. There was a family of beggars from Niger
?epublic I once saw at >alomo roundabout, in I)oyi, 7agos. The useless parents lay
idle all day and night under the bridge and sent their children around to beg for alms.
'ne would literarily have a big stone in place of a heart not to help those children
once they approached you. They were really suffering and stin)ing. 4hurch members
from of 'ur 7ady of Assumption, >alomo (one of the richest in the country! decided
to help the children, bathing them, sprucing them up in decent clothes and giving
them nourishing food. 8y the following day, their parents have redressed the children
in tattered and stin)ing clothes because that was the form that was needed to compel
emotions from people and get huge alms.
As someone who now understood clearly what the parents were using their )ids for,
are you still supposed to be giving those children alms@ ('nce 4ameroon too realised
that to the 8iafran authorities, the suffering )washior)or children e/isted for show
business and arms trade, they not only refused to ta)e them into their country, they
disbanded the newly formed relief agency dedicated to their welfare.! Now consider
what these manipulative parents of filthy children in >alomo, I)oyi would say when
they discover alms are no longer coming in@ N7oo) at these rich people from a rich
house of Hod; aren&t they supposed to be )ind and merciful to suffering little
children@& This perspective of irresponsible parents was the basis of accusing
Awolowo of genocide through starvation. 9hat is more, Achebe boasts of 8iafran
prowess in manufacturing 'gbuniwe, Nthe mass )illing bombs&, he boasted of 8iafran
innovative refinement of petroleum that )ept 8iafran vehicles on the road throughout
the war without western technological help, but the most basic of human necessities M
35
the production or the supply of food M they had no clue. And the farmers that were
supposed to grow food as the (- documents noted were conscripted into the 8iafran
army during planting season of 2B:F. The fertiliers that could have been used to
better their lands were used to ma)e 'gbunigwe, the mass#)illing bombs. And yet
Achebe claimed the starvation was Awolowo&s fault.
On #he #wenty Pound Policy
Throughout the war, as the (- -tate Gepartment&s confidential files disclose, there
was no shortage of people and +isms, to blame for the failure of war. At different
times and to different audiences, 8iafrans blamed racism, neo#imperialism,
colonialism for the war. 9hen '"u)wu sent %ius ')igbo to the mainly 7atin America
to solicit for funds and arms for 8iafra, he blamed the war on +the desire of Arab
*uslims who saw 8iafra as the only obstacle to the spread of Islam in Africa,.
')igbo noted to his audiences that +8iafra is :3R 4atholic and ;3R %rotestant., =e
told them what they wanted to hear. Also, during several of his radio addresses,
'"u)wu blamed the war on the 8ritish %rime *inister, =arold 9ilson who supplied
25R of Nigeria&s arms. =e called the Ewashior)or afflicting 8iafran children =arold
9ilson -yndrome or =erod Gisease. 7i)e the biblical Eing =erod, '"u)wu said,
=arold 9ilson wanted to e/terminate the children of 8iafra. They believed him.
9hile the blame#ArabsD=ausaDIslam narrative, blame 9ilsonDracismDimperialism
narratives that were so potently alive during the war are now safely dead, the blame
Awolowo for starvation narrative is well alive going viral from generation to
generation because it serves a political purpose, appeals to pre"udices. To the
Americans who monitored and documented everything about the war, there was no
time Awolowo was blamed for the starvation or deaths in these 12,333 pages.
36
=owever, after the war, it was through this twenty pound policy that the blame M
Awolowo narrative began. To develop it, they seied on this policy and wor)ed their
way bac) to include what Awolowo may have said or done and mi/ them together
form a pernicious narrative.
The twenty#pounds#for#every#Igbo was a myth; it never happened. 9hat happened
then was a currency crisis. 'n the C3
th
of Gecember 2B:F during the war, Awolowo
decided to change the Nigerian currency in circulation in order to render the SCF
million '"u)wu had stolen useless for buying foreign weapons. The 8iafran
leadership $uic)ly too) the loot, mopped up the ones they could get in circulation and
headed to Europe to e/change them for hard currencies. Eventually they introduced
8iafran notes as the only legal tender. There were around S2;B million 8iafran
pounds in circulation by the end of the war M an average of S23 per every Igbo. After
the war, there was a general scramble to e/change these notes for the new Nigerian
notes. As Awolowo e/plained, he didn&t )now on what basis these notes were
produced. It is li)e someone bringing a single fifty billion <imbabwean dollar note to
the ban) and e/pected to be given fifty billion naira. The e/change rate should be
)nown to determine the worth of the <imbabwean dollar. 4urrently, CB billion
<imbabwean dollars is worth 2 (- dollar. In the case of 8iafra, the worth of the
currency was un)nown; they were produced out of desperation with la/ security
features to boot. In his statement of 2
st
>ebruary 2B:P, Gr %ius ')igbo, 8iafra&s
4ommissioner of Economic Affairs said that +the lac) of international acceptance and
lac) of a commensurate e/change rate was immaterial since the currency was
intended only for circulation in 8iafra., In other words, it is worthless outside 8iafra.
After the war those that had this "un) money were carting them to Nigerian ban)s
hoping to get e$uivalent new Nigerian notes. No ban)er or economists of sense would
37
approve that. Awolowo in his move to rehabilitate the Igbos and restore economic
normalcy approved the payment of 13 Nigerian pounds flat rate for every 8iafran
notes depositor. It was never S13 for every Igbo. S13 for every 8iafran@ That would
have been around SC33 million when Nigeria&s annual budget before the war was
SC;1.11 million for a population of 5Fmillion.
On the Indigenization Decree)
The true winner of the civil war was the Nigerian military class who succeeded in
using everybody against everybody and continue their indefinite aggrandiement of
the self by fleecing the country to the bone as the ne/t C3 years confirmed. After the
Aanuary coup, Aguyi#Ironsi used Gr Nwafor 'riu, the acting president, to capture
power. 9hat Neogwu and Ifea"una wanted to use bloodletting to achieve, he grabbed
it on +a scrap piece of paper, as -hehu -hagari&s eyewitness account Bec1oned to
Ser*e discloses. The e/ 0or1 Times describes it as a coup within a coup. Howon
used Awolowo for the war and to )eep the country economically viable. =e too)
advantage of the failed secession to perpetuate himself in power. +Ho 'n 9ith 'ne
Nigeria (H'9'N!,, he stumped. =e was not only Nigeria&s longest serving head of
state, he was the longest looter of Nigeria&s treasury. '"u)wu too as 9ole -oyin)a
observes in his own ipsissima verba 0ou ,ust Set Forth At Da/n, was also
interested in con$uering Nigeria not only in seceding. (n)nown to Iictor 8an"o and
his Third >orce, '"u)wu had embedded special companies within the Third >orce to
topple 8an"o and hand control of Nigeria to him in case 8an"o succeeds in con$uering
the 9est and 7agos.
The indigenisation decree had nothing to do with disenfranchising the Igbos or other
8iafrans of economic power. As was the vogue in 2; African nations then,
38
indigenisation and nationalisation was the ruling military class and their friends& way
of dressing their bottomless impulse to loot with the populist cloa) of fighting
western imperialism and neo#colonialism. >or their roles during the war, Awolowo or
4hief Anthony Enahoro should be getting ma"or oil bloc)s. 8ut no, they were
interested in nation#building not treasury#looting. =ow can Achebe e/plain someone
li)e Achi)e (denwa who as a 8iafran soldier fought for the so#called liberation and
self#determination his people only to become a governor ;3years later and rob his
people of billions@ And yet he is one of those still propagating the myth indigenisation
decree was to disenfranchise the Igbos The Nigerian ruling thieves span all tribes and
so are their victims.
Indeed Awolowo could be Nethnocentric.& The .oruba region li)e pre#European
(nion Europe was always in a state of constant war. Ibadan vs E)iti vs Egba vs 'ndo
vs I"ebus vs Ife vs I"esha vs Egbado etc. It was because of this internecine war that
made .oruba land susceptible to easy >rench colonialism to the west (Gahomey,
8enin ?epublic! and 8ritish ?oyal Niger 4ompany ta)ing the rest. 9hen Awolowo
+resuscitated ethnic pride,, he used it to rally .oruba to stop fighting and )illing each
other. This resuscitation wasn&t to elevate the .oruba so that they would dominate
other tribes. Achebe observes0 +Awolowo transformed the Action Hroup into a
formidable, highly disciplined political machine that often outperformed the N4N4 in
regional elections. It did so by meticulously galvaniing political support in .oruba
land and among the riverine and minority groups in the Niger Gelta who shared
similar dread of the prospects of Igbo political domination (pg;5!.,
Achebe never addresses this dread even though he mentions it in two other places.
Nowhere in the boo) does he stump for brotherliness or ma)e a stand for tribal
39
harmony. In 2B:2, the 8ritish 4ameroonians had to decide their fate through a (N
plebiscite since their lands were too small and landloc)ed to stand as a country. The
peoples of the Northern 4ameroons voted to belong to northern Nigeria while the
peoples of the -outhern 4ameroons not wanting to belong to the Igbos dominating the
Easter ?egion of Nigeria decided to belong to the ?epublic of 4ameroon even though
they were >rench#spea)ing. The reason why minorities need to be very afraid at the
prospects of collaborating with Igbos is an important topic Achebe conspicuously
s)ips, instead he spends the final pages of the boo) resurrecting the ;; years old
propaganda of genocide.
To prepare us to be swindled, Achebe litters the boo) with hyped phrases and
sentences li)e +-mash the 8iafrans,, +presence of organied genocide,(pg B1!J +the
Nigerian forces decided to purge the city of its Igbo inhabitants (pg2CF!,J +the cost
in human life made it one of the bloodiest civil wars in human history(pg 11F!J
+prospect of annihilation (pg 12F!,J +-tanding on the precipice of annihilation (pg
12F!., 9hereas those that can rightly tal) of annihilation were the people of Abudu.
The American document of 25D23D:F noted0 +As the N8iafrans& retreated from 8enin
to Agbor, they )illed all the men, women and children they could find who were not
Ibos. The town of Abudu, one of the larger places between Agbor and 8enin, lost
virtually all of its population with the e/ception of a few who had escaped to the
bush., Those that can rightly tal) of annihilation were the Aews. Not only do Nai
policy documents say so, on#the#ground facts support that. In %oland, Hermany,
Austria and the 8altic countries alone, =itler aiming for 233R, )illed B3R of Aews.
The writer, 4yprian E)wensi, a chief of 8iafran propaganda says0 +9e gave the
number of children dying per day as 2,333. 4an you prove that@ 4an you disprove it@
8ut can you believe it@ That is propaganda., -o let us ta)e the 8iafran propaganda at
40
its highest and assume C million, i.e. 233,333 per month died in the C3months war.
The Iietnamese genuinely lost close to C million to the Iietnam 9ar but they do not
tal) of America&s plan to annihilate them.
Neither do the Aapanese, the world&s first and only victims of nuclear e/plosion.
Ai)iwe repeatedly argued that though Igbos were )illed in the North, it doesn&t mean
the tribe was +slated for slaughter, as a policy. Even 4olin 7egum whom Achebe
claims was the first to describe the 2B:: revenge )illings of Igbos in the North as
pogroms does not thin) so too. 'n pg P1 instead of stating the source of 7egum
article, Achebe references his own interview in Transition. =owever in the 2ondon
)4ser*er of 1: *ay 2B:P, 7egum writes0 +It is clear that there is no systematic
attempt at e/terminating Ibos to "ustify charge of genocide., Also '"u)wu&s hitherto
un)nown Girector of Intelligence and E/ternal 4ommunications, the Irish priest ?ev
>r Eevin Goheny too said in a secret but fran) conversation with an American
diplomat that the claim of genocide is +highly e/aggerated but without it 8iafrans
would have given up fighting long time ago., 8iafra&s biggest arms donor, >rance
sent a five man delegation headed by Aymar Achille#>ould and 7ouis *assoubre on
5
th
>ebruary 2B:B to investigate the genocide claims, they reported bac) to 4harles
Haulle, the >rench president, there was no genocide.
If there was any intention to e/terminate Igbos, after '"u)wu had fled and the
8iafran military had been completely paralysed, why didn&t the Nigerian military
seied the opportunity to turn the guns on the defenceless 8iafrans and mow them
down, or carpet bomb them@ They never did that. Instead there were steps to welcome
them bac) into the fold. It is wic)ed and irresponsible of anyone to )eep on tal)ing
of +genocide, or +prospect of annihilation, when the conte/t and facts on ground had
41
been revealed to say otherwise. It is insulting to the memory of true genocide
victims. +If you are blind, describing an elephant is easy., Achebe writes in The
'ducation of a British"Protected Child. +.ou can call it, li)e one of the si/ blind
men in the fable, a huge tree trun); or perhaps a gigantic fan; or an enormous rope,
and so on. 8ut having eyes, far from ma)ing such descriptions easy, actually
complicates them., Achebe throughout the boo) choose the easy path of the blind
over the comple/ tas) of a conscientious writer. =aving ta)en a low road, he wants to
arrive at a high point by invo)ing the *andela E/ample in the final pages. *andela
described Achebe as the writer +in whose company the prison walls fell down., 9ith
this his presumably last boo), There Was A Country, Achebe is the writer in whose
company dangerous walls are rising up0 walls of tribal hatred, walls of lies, walls of
sloppy thin)ing and lay research, wall of propaganda and walls of moral ineptitude.
# Damola Awoyokun& a ,tructural and Marine "ngineer in -ondon is also
the ".ecuti%e "ditor o! P/c 5e*ie/) e can be reached at e.ecuti%eeditor A#
'wc*re%iew DO# com
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