JAMES ANDREW SPOKES, ESQ.

9270 SIEGEN LN., STE. 603

BATON ROUGE, LA 70808
Name: LLOYD, SAMUEL JOHN PHILIP
U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Ofice fr Immigration Review
Board o. f /111111igratio11 Appeals
Ofice o. f the Chief Clerk
5107 Leesburg Pike. Suite 2000
Falls Church, Virginia 20530
OHS/ICE OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL-OAK
P.O. BOX 1128
OAKDALE, LA 71463-1128
A029-971-939
Date of this Notice: 0412812014
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Greer, Anne J.
Guendelsberger, John
Pauley, Roger A.
Sincerely,
Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
For more unpublished BIA decisions, visit www.irac.net/unpublished
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Cite as: Samuel John Philip Lloyd, A029 971 939 (BIA Apr. 28, 2014)
U.S. Deparent of Justce
Executive Ofce fr Imigation Review
Decision of te Boad of Imigation Appeals
Falls Church, Virginia 20530
File: A029 971 939 - Oakdae, LA
In re: SAMUEL JOH PHILIP LLOYD
I REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
APPEAL
Date:
ON BEHF OF RESPONDENT: Jaes Andrew Spokes, Esquire
ON BEHALF OF DHS:
CHGE:
Cassie A. Togersen
Assistat Chief Counsel
APR 2 8 Z014
Notce: Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), l&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)J -
Convicted of aggavated felony
APPLICATION: Termination of proceedings
Te respondent appeals the Immigration Judge's November 14, 2013, decision fnding h
removable a chaged and ordering h removed fom te United States. The appea will be
sustained, ad the proceedings will be terminated.
On appeal, the respondent contends that the Immigation Judge ered in determining that his
September 20, 2010, conviction fr the ofense of aggavated buglay in violation of Tenessee
Code Annotated section 39-14-403, is a aggavated felony under section 10l(a)(43)(G) of te
Imgaton ad Natonality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(G) (.J. at 2-3). See Respondent's
Bref at 5-7. I ts regad, te respondent agues, inter a/ia, te Igaton Judge ered f
fnding tat his conviction falls within the generic meaning of a "burglay" becaue of te overly
broad deftion of the ter "habitation" a used in the Tennessee statte which includes, inter
alia, vehicles. See id.
Te respondent was convicted under section 3 9-14-403 of the Tenessee Code defng
"aggavated burglay" as a "burglary of a habitation as defned" by sections 39-14-401 ad 402
of the Tennessee Code. Section 39-14-401 defnes "habitation" to include "ay stucture,
including buildings, module units, mobile homes, tailers, and tents, which is defned or adapted
fr overght accommodation of persons." See T.C.A. 39-14-401(l)(A). It also defnes
'habitation" to include "a self-propelled vehicle tat is designed or adapted fr the overght
accomodation of persons," and "each separately secured or occupied portion of te stcte or
vehicle ad each stucture appurenant to or connected with the stucture of vehcle." See T .C.A.
39-14-401(l)(B) ad (C). I addition, te "Comments of the Tenessee Sentencing
Commission" that accompany section 39-14-403 of te Tennessee Code provide that "[t]he ter
'habitation,' . . . is broader tha 'building' because it includes vehicles and stctures other tha
buildings." See id.
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Cite as: Samuel John Philip Lloyd, A029 971 939 (BIA Apr. 28, 2014)
A029 971 939
The basic elements of a generic burglary offense are: ( 1) unlawfl or unprivileged entry into,
or remaining in; (2) a building or other structure; (3) with the intent to commit a crime. See
Talor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990); see also Lopez-Elias v. Reno, 209 F.3d 788
(5th Cir. 2000); Matter of Perez, 22 l&N Dec. 1325 (BIA 2000). The Tennessee statute under
which the respondent was convicted includes, inter alia, vehicles in its definition of "habitation."
The record of conviction in this case does not clarif what type of "habitation" was the subject of
the respondent's conviction (Exh. 3). As such, the Department of Homeland Security has not
estalished the respondent's removability as charged based on a conviction for an aggravated
felony burglary ofense, as defned by section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act, on the basis of the
evidence presented.
Accordingly, the appeal will be sustained, and the proceedings will be terminated.
ORDER: The appeal is sustained, and the proceedings are terminated.

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Cite as: Samuel John Philip Lloyd, A029 971 939 (BIA Apr. 28, 2014)