12) Overview of the Security Challenges to Pakistan..28
13) Major Conflict Stricken Zones.31
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14) Karachi Power Dynamics.39 15) Drone Attacks and its Viability.41
16) Ongoing Sectarian Conflicts44
17) Religious Extremism and Shia Genocide44
18) Terrorism.46
19) De-Weaponisation47
20) Kashmir Issue48
21) Pakistan Nuclear Security52
22) Key Groups.53
23) Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)...54
24) Border Insecurity.58
25) Conclusion...59
26) Questions a Resolution Must Answer...59
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Message from the Committee Directors:
Greetings Delegates, so we shall be meeting again. Before everything else, welcome to the Pakistan Cabinet at PAFMUN 2014. I, Ramsha Wasti, shall be your committee director alongside the very talented Khushhal Nadir Hadi. I am a first semester student at IBA, and have had the honor of being associated with PAFMUN since its inception back in 2012; serving as an ACD in 2012, and then as the President of PAFMUN 2013. I was introduced to Model United Nations a couple of years ago, and since then, it has been a fast paced journey. I have attended various MUNs in varying capacities, participating both as a delegate as well as the member of several secretariats. Honestly speaking, I was thoroughly disappointed when I was forcibly placed in Pakistan National Security Council at ZABMUN 2013. I never had any intention to go to PNSC, but those four days, which were extremely grueling, made me realize the importance of this very council, and harvested my interest in Pakistani Politics. It is easier to sit in the comfort of our homes, and blame our politicians for the worsening conditions of the country. But it is rather difficult to put ourselves in their shoes, analyze the issues deteriorating Pakistan and then to come up with pragmatic and implementable solutions. It is comparatively easier for us to blame the government for the Kashmir issue, insurgencies in Balochistan, and riots and killings in Karachi or all across the country, for that fact, but it is utmost difficult and challenging to assume the roles of these very politicians and devise a future strategy or a security policy for Pakistan. So before you come to this committee, I want you to realize that you yes, you, as an individual, do have the potential to make an effort and bring about a change no matter how small or insignificant it may be in your opinion. Pakistans Cabinet helps, and takes you to the first step of change by giving you an insight into the politics of Pakistan ranging from the defense policy to the foreign one. Moreover, over the course of my MUN career, I have heard a whole lot of people complain that MUNs are generally monopolized by those delegates who can speak well in English. Well, you dont need to worry about that anymore because at Pakistan Cabinet, PAFMUN14, you can speak in Urdu, English, or in a mixture of both. In the midst of all this, dont forget the piles of research because I have a habit of questioning the delegates and grilling them to a great extent which ultimately makes you a better debater. While your aim with respect to the conference should be to research well, critically analyze everything, and practice the art of diplomacy, my aim is to make sure that you gain something positive out of the conference and you feel like you have improved when you walk out of the gates of PAF Chapter. Lets just say that Pakistan Cabinet shall test you to the limits and will develop your personality over the course of four days. See you guys soon. Godspeed!
Syeda Ramsha Wasti, Committee Director Pakistan Cabinet, PAFMUN 2014. 3
Greetings, Delegates! I am Khushhal Nadir Hadi, and I have the esteemed honour of serving as your Committee Director for the Pakistan Cabinet at PAFMUN 2014. I also have the pleasure of chairing alongside the multi-talented and versatile Ramsha Wasti, a very dear friend of mine. A little bit about me would be welcome, I suppose, since that seems to be the point behind this intro. I am currently in my first year MBBS at the Khyber Medical College, Peshawar. Having been a part of PAFMUN since its conception, in various capacities, I have witnessed firsthand the wonders of PAFMUN 2012 as well as the excellence that was PAFMUN 2013. Public Speaking is like second nature to me, having being involved in it over the past decade. I love swimming, football, Sherlock/Arrow/Game of Thrones, and am a DOTA- addict (oh yes, we medical students have spare time too ) The rest of my credentials and qualifications are no more than a short question away, as I do not wish to bore you with such tedious details, For the moment, at least. This is the very first time PAFMUN is hosting a Pakistan Cabinet, so naturally both Wasti and I are looking forward to seeing how you delegates are going to cope with the duress of a specialized, personality-based committee. We have some rather entertaining ideas about the Pakistan Cabinet, so be wary: this isnt for those with tachycardia. If youre weak at heart, do not, I repeat, do not select the Pakistan Cabinet as your committee. If you do decide that this is for you, then we expect you to be well-researched, confident, and most importantly, spontaneous. Because we will NOT hesitate at throwing surprise after surprise at you; after all, this is Pakistan were talking about, where spontaneous, sudden events are the very norm! That will be all delegates. May the odds be ever in your favor!
Regards, Khushhal Nadir Hadi, Committee Director Pakistan Cabinet, PAFMUN 2014.
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Message from the Secretary Generals:
Dear Delegates and all our friends, It is my distinct pleasure, and my honor to welcome you to the third annual edition of The City School PAF Chapter Model United Nations (PAFMUN) Conference. Over the duration of the conference we aim to present to all participants of PAFMUN 2014 a comprehensive and unique simulation of the political impetus that drives the intricacies of international relations. With a host team and secretariat boasting of some of the most experienced and knowledgeable individuals nationally, PAFMUN looks to continue acting as a pioneer for all such conferences as it shall continue to strive for unparalleled academic excellence. The nine committees at PAFMUN 2014 have been hand-picked by the members of our secretariat and as a collective they shall put forth a large selection of topics that shall look to challenge every facet of a delegates ability and preparation. PAFMUN 2014 shall also once again consist of a historical committee in order to push delegates understanding of the impact of past decisions and mistakes. PAFMUN has always looked to push the boundaries of excellence within both academics and its organizational power and this year shall be no different as our team works around the clock relentlessly in order to ensure an experience that is thoroughly enjoyable for all participants, from the best academic content around, to the most entertaining socials. I hope to see you all at the beautiful PAF Chapter campus in February to share a story of epic proportions alongside myself and the rest of the PAFMUN team. Regards, Yelmaz Waris Mujtaba, Secretary General, PAFMUN 2014
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Greetings Delegates, It is with immense pleasure that I welcome you all to the Third edition of the largest school-based MUN conference in Pakistan, PAFMUN 2014. I am an A level student at The City School PAF Chapter, also serving as the President of the schools Public Speaking Society, along with Co-Presidents Yasir Thara and Syeda Amna Zubia.
We started off two years back with a vision to achieve, succeed and excel in all aspects of intellectual thinking, social cooperation and enhancement of analytical comprehension of the most significant issues which the world faces today, I take immense pride to say that we have served our word by comprising a large score of delegates in the past and aim to take this legacy of excellence to a whole new level this year.
What distinguishes PAFMUN from all other conferences is the ultimate amount of stress provided by the governing body upon the real essence of the conference The debates. This year, we aim towards providing the most challenging, thought provoking and excruciating topics in the wide range of committees which we have. From a historical committee to Pakistans very own cabinet, we have covered every possible aspect a delegate needs to address when attending such a conference, providing him the knowledge and exposure of a lifetime.
Our aim is not just to intellectually stuff our delegates but also give them a chance to socially groom and grow, which we provide through our enthralling social events, where diplomacy is the name of the game. The tireless hard work and utmost dedication by Team PAFMUN is proof enough to show the credibility and sincerity of the conference to the event and to its attendees, promising an unforgettable four day event. With all that written above, I hope to see you all as a part of PAFMUN this February.
Regards, Muhammad Usman Baig, Deputy Secretary General, PAFMUN 2014. 6
Message from the CIU:
It was said a few years ago that if the human race is wiped out in the next 50 years, it will not be because of disease or an asteroid hitting the earth, but because of foreign policy and international relations. In a world where thousands of nuclear weapons exist and more countries are trying to acquire them, where suicide terrorist strikes come without warning and thousands die each day from poverty caused by the way the international system operates, we need to know about and understand international affairs. Greetings, I am Rahim Rasool and as being part of the executive council of Pafmun 2014, I welcome you all to this highly prestigious event. Ill be heading the Central Intelligence Unit along with my hardworking partner Rumail Jawed. For the past 4 years I am involved in the Model United Nation circuit. Attending my first ever MUN some few years back, came to me a strong realization of being inherently attached to this; my extensive love for international relations and geo-politics was the significant reason. Unlike other departments of the organizing committee, the Central Intelligence Unit will directly be managing the affairs of all the committees at Pafmun 2014. Likewise CIU will be responsible for setting the course of the committee, ensuring the intellectual level of debate and determining crisis!! Pafmun encourages delegates representing their allotted countries, to share their thoughts on international matters and form connections that will enable them to implement their visions for the future and hence create a better tomorrow. As form of advice from CIU, participation in committee, constructive input to discussion and leadership potentials are all admirable aspects for a delegate. Best of luck, see you in February.
Regards, Rahim Rasool Central Intelligence Unit, PAFMUN 2014.
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Honorable Delegates With immense delight and pride I extend to you the heartiest of welcomes to PAF model United Nations of 2014. I am Rumael Jawed Baig currently in the final year of my A levels from the City School PAF Chapter. I have been associated with MUNs since last year and ever since I dived in the ocean of diplomacy there is no way of coming back. Along with my very talented partner and debater, Rahim Rasool I will be rendering the services of the Central Intelligence Unit and will be adding the spices and essential salts to the committee proceedings so that the delegates achieve excellence at MUNning . By adding different crisis situation and turning the direction of the committee we, the CIU, will guide the delegates to success, fun and far away from boredom. By partaking in this opportunity to engage with fellow students on critical issues, my endeavor is to help and give impetus in transforming all of you into better diplomats of the future who are not only aware of current affairs and international relations, but are also able to analyze global dynamics. In this conference you will be able to be able to bring to affect your negotiations, writing, researching and debating skills and mix these ingredients to cook up the perfect recipe of diplomacy. I wish all of you the best of luck. See you guys in February. Regards, Rumael Jawed Baig Central Intelligence Unit, PAFMUN 2014.
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Topic Area A:
INTERNET CENSORSHIP LAWS WITHIN PAKISTAN
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Introduction to topic: Pakistan has seen an increase in citizen journalism and online activism in recent years, despite numerous social and political obstacles to internet access. Successive military and civilian governments have adopted various measures to control the internet in Pakistan, which they frame as necessary for combatting terrorism and the preservation of Islam. However, censorship decisions often reflect political motives, as coverage of political independence movements is consistently censored or the influence of religious extremists who believe information and communications technologies (ICTs) spread obscenity. While internet penetration continued to improve in 2012 and early 2013, internet freedom in Pakistan looks increasingly precarious, a trend that could have significant consequences for the countrys socioeconomic development. Long-awaited general elections to the countrys national assembly took place on May 11, 2013, unseating the coalition led by the Pakistan People's Party and its co-chair, President Zardari, who remained in office until his term expired in September 2013. The Pakistan Muslim League under Nawaz Sharif, a former prime minister, formed the next government in June. In the run-up to the polls, information restrictions were focused on maintaining security. An anti-Islamic video on YouTube that sparked unrest around the Muslim world caused the government to block access to the entire site in September 2012, followed by an additional 20,000 websites deemed to contain offensive content. Authorities also blocked mobile phone networks throughout major urban centers during many religious or national holidays. These supposed security measures, while restricting ICT usage for hundreds of thousands of users, failed to curb the rate of violent, often fatal attacks on journalists and internet users. Islamic militant groups targeted internet cafs and mobile phone stores with explosive devices, and the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility for the shooting of 15-year-old blogger and rights activist Malala Yousufzai in Swat. A worldwide social media campaign of support for the teenager was launched; she survived 10
skull surgery and now lives in the United Kingdom. Legal measures also threatened digital rights, particularly over sensitive religious issues. At least two of the 23 criminal investigations launched in 2012 under Pakistans strict blasphemy laws, which carry the death penalty, involved content sent by mobile phone. A Twitter spat escalated into a defamation suit after a political website accused a religious leader of inciting hatred. Moreover, in January 2013, the regulatory authority chairman Farooq Ahmed Khan announced that a blocking mechanism to filter un-Islamic, pornographic, and blasphemous material from websites would be activated in Pakistan within 60 days. Whether such technology is now in place, however, and how closely it relates to a 2012 proposal by the National ICT Research and Development Fund for a national internet firewall which was ostensibly scrapped due to public opposition, is unclearas are the surveillance implications of the mechanism for private communications sent via ICTs. In February 2013, the upper house of parliament passed the counter-terrorist Fair Trial Act 2012, which allows security agencies to monitor electronic communications; though the surveillance requires a judicial warrant, some fear the Acts broad wording leaves it open to abuse. Despite a proactive defense of internet freedom by engaged civil society groups and their embrace of online tools to promote electoral transparency, recent developments indicate a worrisome movement from ad hoc censorship towards systematized filtering and monitoring that the authorities preferred not to acknowledge before the international community. Subsequent to a Universal Periodic Review of its human rights practices in late 2012, Pakistan was elected a member of the United Nations Human Rights Council for 2013-2015. While its pledge to the council supporting its candidacy referenced Pakistans free media and vibrant civil society, the countrys UN mission made no mention of the internet at all, or its recent moves to curtail citizens digital rights. IMPEDIMENTS TO INTERNET ACCESS:
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Internet penetration in Pakistan stood at 10 percent in 2012, according to the International Telecommunications Union. A local report put the figure at 16 percent in mid-2013. Mobile penetration was at 67 percent. Low literacy, difficult economic conditions, and cultural resistance have limited the proliferation of ICTs in Pakistan. Poor copper wire infrastructure and inadequate monitoring of service quality by the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) have historically stymied the expansion of broadband internet. While the cost of internet use has fallen considerably in the last few years, access remains out of reach for the majority of people in Pakistan, and most users go online at their workplace or school. Cyber-cafes are largely limited to major cities, and recent news reports about employees stealing data to harass female clients online have contributed to public perceptions that they are unsafe.
Better quality broadband services remain concentrated in urban areas like Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Hyderabad, Faisalabad, and Islamabad. According to 2012 data, there are 50 operational internet service providers (ISPs) throughout Pakistan, along with ten broadband service providers and five hybrid fiber-coaxial operators providing broadband internet. All ISPs are controlled by the government through the PTA. For its backbone, the country is connected via the government-controlled Pakistan Internet Exchange with the SEA-ME-WE 3 and 4 cables, along with backup bandwidth provided by Trans-World Associates. Local media reported under-sea fiber optic cables sustaining damage in two separate incidents in March 2013, disrupting to up to 50 percent of the countrys connections.
Most remote areas lack broadband, while slow, intermittent connections render any meaningful online activities, such as multimedia training for students and entrepreneurs, challenging. Conflict-stricken areas like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North West Frontier Province) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) have significantly reduced internet access. Pakistan faced frequent electricity shortfalls throughout 2012, resulting in 12
outages lasting several hours across the country. The situation was particularly grim in rural areas where rolling blackouts extended to as many as 20 hours a day.
Bureaucratic hurdles have also slowed the development of 3G or 4G networks, and wireless service providers using the high- capacity data network WiMax or high-speed broadband technology EVDO, along with mobile operators Mobilink, Ufone, Telenor, Warid, and Zong have struggled to attract consumers due to high prices and poor coverage. In late 2012, a National Assembly standing committee declared the PTA had violated rules in auctioning 3G licenses. The prime minister approved a new 3G policy for Pakistan and began auctioning contracts to service providers in January 2013.
The PTA is responsible for issuing licenses to telecommunications companies and internet and mobile service providers through a bureaucratic process that includes hefty licensing fees. By contrast, internet cafes do not require a license to operate, and opening an internet cafe is relatively easy. However, in January 2012, the provincial cabinet in Punjab approved a Net Cafe Regulations Act (Punjab Cyber & Gaming Cafe Regulation Act 2012), which some analysts noted would oblige cafe owners to register their businesses, among other requirements that could potentially restrict user anonymity. The document was never made public, and after provincial elections in May 2013 reshuffled the local administration, it was unclear when the regulations would be implemented, or if other provinces would follow suit.
Pakistani authorities often deliberately obstruct ICT access in the southern province of Balochistan, where a conflict between Baloch nationalists and state security forces or anti-separatist militias has persisted since 1948. During the national March 25 Pakistan Day celebrations in 2012, mobile service was cut in the entire province based on Interior Minister Rehman Maliks order to implement national security policy, according to the chairman of the PTA. At least one local official denied security concerns and characterized the shutdown as 13
routine maintenance, but many Baloch people saw the move as discriminatory.
The same tactic was used throughout the year in cities facing possible security threats. PTA and security officials partially suspended mobile networks in urban areas around the country for a religious holiday in November 2012, during a religious procession in January 2013, to thwart attacks on a political march on Pakistans capital city led by a reformist cleric, and on New Years Eve and Eid-ul- Fitr. Civil society groups consider these actions an attack on citizens freedom of expression, and an international service provider is seeking damages from the PTA and the information ministry for loss of revenue.
The prime minister appoints the chair and members of the PTA, which reports to the ministry of information technology and telecommunication. International free expression groups and experts have serious reservations about the PTAs openness and independence as a regulatory body. LIMITS ON CONTENT: The governments efforts to systematize website blocking by creating and installing new equipment for nationwide content filtering were among the most concerning developments of 2012 and 2013. While the first attempt was supposedly quashed in March 2012, PTA officials were still voicing their intent to implement new blocking technology in 2013. They received an unexpected boost by the battle over YouTube, which was unilaterally blocked in Pakistan in the wake of an offensive, anti- Islamic upload. Since Google declined to remove the video, the government refused to restore access to its video-sharing platform until it would block the unwanted content directly. In May 2013, the status of the new firewall remained unclear. Since January 2003, the government of Pakistan has taken steps to censor some online content, and the system for doing so has become increasingly sophisticated. A wide variety of government agencies are involved in the censorship of online content, but the PTA is the main one. Authorities can 14
block URLs at the internet exchange point through the PIE, and individual ISPs are required to carry out content-related directives issued by the PTA or have their license suspended. Individuals or groups also play a role, petitioning courts to order the ministry to enact moral bans on online or traditional media content. Presumably, the PTA maintains the list of sites to filter, but the details are not known. There are no published guidelines outlining how or why content is blocked or what mechanisms are available to challenge it. Error messages seen by users trying to access blocked websites usually refer to the censored content as blasphemous or state that the site is restricted.
Censorship targets some content, such as pornography, on moral grounds and can be inconsistent across ISPs, according to an August 2012 Open-Net Initiative report. A range of provisions, in the 1996 Pakistan Telecommunications Act, supports censorship for the protection of national security and Islam. Authorities also cite Section 99 of the penal code, which allows the government to restrict information that might be prejudicial to the national interest, to justify filtering anti-military, blasphemous, or anti-state content. Critics believe these issues can serve as a cover for politically motivated censorship of dissenting voices. Information disseminated by Balochi and Sindhi political dissidents, for example, is among the nations most systematically censored content. In 2010, authorities blocked the regions first English-language news website The Baloch Hal a year after its launch.
Information perceived as damaging to the image of the military or top politicians is also targeted, such as a satirical music video about military generals, which was replaced on video-sharing site Vimeo by a page telling viewers that it was prohibited within Pakistan in mid-2013. The website of the Lal- Masjid mosque in Islamabad has been blocked since 2007 when it became the center of a government stand-off with conservative clerics. In July 2011, the website of the popular American music magazine Rolling Stone was blocked by at 15
least 13 ISPs after the site published a blog post discussing Pakistan's insane military spending. Rollingstone.com remains blocked as of February 2013 along with the website of the Toronto Sun newspaper, supposedly because it published articles by Canada-based secularist and journalist TarekFateh criticizing the Pakistani military.
Since website blocking was first observed in Pakistan, much of it has targeted social media and communication apps. In 2006, the PTA, responding to widespread public pressure, instructed ISPs to block websites displaying controversial cartoon images of the Prophet Mohammed, many on Googles blog hosting platform Blogger. In 2010, over 10,500 websites were blocked, including many on Facebook, YouTube, Flickr and Wikipedia, after the Lahore High Court ruled in favor of a legal appeal made by the Islamic Lawyers Movement over the Facebook page, Everybody Draw Mohammed Day. Mobile phone providers also completely halted Blackberry services; functionality was only gradually restored, though web-browsing functions remained restricted for longer. While most social-networking and blog-hosting platforms were available and widely used throughout 2012 and early 2013, there were several temporary disruptions of Facebook and Twitter services, and different religious groups persistently exerted pressure on the Pakistani courts to ban Facebook completely. Groups and individuals affiliated with political and religious parties have also filed court petitions against YouTube.
The most wide-reaching ban in 2012 was imposed after a Californian internet user uploaded a 14-minute video to YouTube ostensibly promoting a movie he had created to denounce Islam titled The Innocence of Muslims. In September, the clip was dubbed into other languages, garnering hundreds of thousands of views and sparking violent anti- American protests in several Muslim countries. In Pakistan, they resulted in at least 19 deaths. Google, which owns YouTube, temporarily blocked versions of the video in some countries but declined to remove it altogether, and it remained accessible in Pakistan, despite Prime Minister 16
Raja Pervez Ashrafs request that it be taken down. News reports in Pakistan attributed this to the lack of a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the U.S., a legal agreement through with countries can negotiate over companies compliance with local laws, but how far this affected Googles decision is unclear. In response, the information ministry instituted a site-wide block on YouTube on September 17, 2012. By October 9, another 20,000 websites were blocked, not just for featuring the anti-Islamic movie, but also for hosting material that the PTA characterized as objectionable.
Prior to this incident, many blocks were implemented on a temporary basis to calm protests against online content. In 2012, however, civil society groups protested against the ban, which affected more than seven million users of the service in Pakistan, to no avail, and it continued almost uninterrupted through May 2013. The civil society organization Bytes for All filed a petition against the block in the Lahore High Court in January; hearings are ongoing. Students who frequently refer to YouTube online lectures were particularly affected, and one institution, Pakistans Virtual University, moved all educational material formerly hosted on YouTube to its own servers. In early 2013, Pakistani officials stated that the ban would stay in place until Google removed the content or until a nationwide filtering mechanism was in place, allowing them to control what YouTube content is available for themselves.
The government set out to acquire such a mechanism in February 2012 on grounds that the ISPs and backbone providers were unable to manage the volume of blacklisted sites manually. The National ICT Research and Development Fund invited ICT companies to submit proposals to develop and operate a national level URL Filtering and Blocking System, preferably one able to handle a block list of up to 50 million URLs with a processing delay of not more than 1 millisecond. Websites with blasphemous, un-Islamic, offensive, objectionable, unethical, and immoral material would be targeted, according to the notice. After widespread protest from civil society, the 17
request for proposals was apparently shelved, although that change was announced in the media rather than an official press release. In January 2013, PTA Chairman Farooq Ahmed Khan announced that an apparently unrelated new mechanism for blocking un-Islamic, pornographic, and blasphemous material from websites would be activated in Pakistan within 60 days, according to the Pakistan Today newspaper. Other news reports were less clear about the timing for implementing new filtering devices, possibly reflecting internal disputes between the PTA and the information ministry over costs and responsibility for the project.
Authorities also target users seeking to access blocked content. In August 2011, the PTA sent a legal notice to all ISPs in the country urging them to report customers using encryption and virtual private networks (VPNs), technology that allows internet users to go online undetected, access blocked websites, and conceal communications from government monitoring, on grounds of curbing communication between terrorists. International and civil society organizations in Pakistan raised effective voice against this repressive development; however, the order still stands as of early 2013.
Despite existing limitations on online content, and looming new ones, Pakistanis have relatively open access to international news organizations and other independent media, as well as a range of websites representing Pakistani political parties, local civil society groups, and international human rights organizations. ICTs, particularly mobile phones, promote social mobilization, especially on free expression issues. The 2010 floods in Pakistan, for example, inspired many Pakistani citizens and members of the diaspora to mobilize and raise funds online. Nevertheless, most online commentators exercise a degree of self- censorship when writing on topics such as religion, blasphemy, separatist movements, and womens and LGBT rights.
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The relationship between citizen journalism and traditional media in Pakistan is mutually reinforcing. In 2013, reports of election rigging spread via Facebook and Twitter, prompting traditional media coverage. Social media advocacy also advanced a police investigation into the shooting murder of 20- year old uptown Karachi resident Shahzeb Khan in December 2012. The mainstream media and police initially responded with apathy to news of the attack, perhaps because one of his alleged assailants was well-connected. However, a cameraman uploaded footage of the incident to YouTube for users still accessing the banned service via proxy servers. Thousands subsequently expressed concern for Shahzeb on Twitter and Facebook until the chief justice of the Supreme Court directed Karachi police to expedite the investigation. A court sentenced two perpetrators to death and their accomplices to life imprisonment in June. VIOLATIONS OF USER RIGHTS:
In February 2013, the upper house of parliament granted security agencies permission to monitor private e-mails and mobile phone communications collect evidence of terrorist activity when they passed a piece of 2012 legislation governing trials. Other legal challenges faced by ICT users included a defamation suit stemming from comments made via Twitter, and of the 23-odd blasphemy cases reported in 2012, at least two involved text messages, causing one family to flee their home and one arrest. Though attacks on journalists from traditional media far outstripped those on bloggers and internet users, both groups received threats. In a case which resounded around the world, insurgents shot and seriously injured MalalaYousufzai for creating online content for the BBC about her life as a school-girl in a Taliban-controlled region of Pakistan. Article 19 of the Pakistani constitution establishes freedom of speech as a fundamental right, although it is subject to several restrictions. Pakistan also became a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 2010. In 2011, Pakistan Peoples Party lawmaker Sherry Rehman, now ambassador to the United 19
States, introduced the Right to Information Bill in the National Assembly, a law that would prevent all public bodies from blocking a requesters access to public records. A Senate sub-committee reviewed the draft in June 2013 in preparation for tabling it for parliament to pass.
Section 124 of the Pakistan penal code on sedition by words or visible representation is broadly worded, though it has been used infrequently to punish journalists and online speech. However, Section 295(c), which covers blasphemy, has been invoked to limit freedom of expression and has featured in most recent cases concerning internet speech. In 2010, police initiated legal proceedings against Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg over the page titled, Everyone Draw Mohammad Day. The maximum punishment for blasphemy is life imprisonment or the death penalty, though the charges against Zuckerberg appear to have been quietly dropped after they were ridiculed in the press.
At least 23 blasphemy cases involving 27 defendants were reported in 2012, according to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Some of these involved electronic media. In October 2012, for example, neighbors filed a police complaint against a 16-year-old Christian boy in Karachi for allegedly sending them a blasphemous text message.Reflecting the difficulty of proving intent in such cases, media reports published conflicting accounts of the message, some reporting that the unnamed boy acknowledged forwarding a message but denied creating it, and others saying the message was sent when his mobile phone was commandeered by friends. His family fled the area and neighbors ransacked their house. A second text message resulted in the arrest of the sender, even though he claimed to have circulated the blasphemous content to resolve a dispute with a customer.
Accusing someone of blasphemy leaves them vulnerable to attack, regardless of whether it has foundation, while attempts to reform the punitive laws leave even politicians vulnerable. In January 2013, the Supreme 20
Court ordered an investigation into Ambassador Sherry Rehman after a businessman accused her of blaspheming the Prophet during an October 2010 television talk show appearance to defend proposed changes to the blasphemy laws; police and lower courts had refused to consider the case. Three months after that TV appearance, Salman Taseer, the governor of Punjab, was murdered by his own bodyguard for criticizing the same laws.
The 2004 Defamation Act allows for imprisonment of up to five years, and observers fear a chilling effect if it is used to launch court cases for online expression, particularly since internet users are already seeking to prosecute their rivals. In January 2013, a Twitter feud escalated into a defamation suit when TahirAshrafi, head of the Pakistan Ulema Council of Muslim clerics and scholars, announced that he would initiate civil proceedings against Let Us Build Pakistan, a political website, for allegedly inciting sectarian violence. A writer on the site, which critics censure for spreading hate speech, had accused Ashrafi of forming alliances with banned extremist groups.
Government surveillance is a concern for activists, bloggers, and media representatives in Balochistan, as well as ordinary internet users wishing to comment openly on the state or religion, notably atheist groups. Pakistani authorities, particularly intelligence agencies, appear to have been expanding their monitoring activities in recent years, while provincial officials have been exerting pressure on the central government to grant local police forces greater surveillance powers and location tracking abilities, ostensibly to curb terrorism and violent crimes. ISPs, telecommunications companies, and SIM card vendors are required to authenticate the National Identity Card details of prospective customers with the National Database Registration Authority before providing service. Furthermore, under the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Ordinance, a 2007 bill that required ISPs to retain traffic data for a minimum of 90 days, among other regulationstelecommunications companies 21
were required to keep logs of customer communications and pass them to security agencies when directed by the PTA. While the bill officially expired in 2009, the practice is reportedly still active.
In February 2013, the upper house of parliament passed the Fair Trial Act 2012, which had been approved by the National Assembly in December. The legislation allows security agencies to seek a judicial warrant to monitor private communications to neutralize and prevent a threat or any attempt to carry out scheduled offenses; and covers information sent from or received in Pakistan or between Pakistani citizens whether they are resident in the country or not. The bill was proposed by Law Minister Farooq Hamid Naek to thwart terrorism, but its critics counter that the acts wording leaves it open to abuse, and that it grants powers to a broad range of agencies. Under the law, service providers face a one-year jail term or a fine of up to PKR 10 million ($105,000) for failing to cooperate with the warrant.
In 2013, a report by Citizen Lab indicated that Pakistani citizens may be vulnerable to oversight through a software tool present in the country. The Governmental IT Intrusion and Remote Monitoring Solutions known as FinFisher Suite described in the report includes the FinSpy tool, which attacks the victims machine with malware to collect data including Skype audio, key logs, and screenshots. The analysis found FinFishers command and control servers in 36 countries globally, including Pakistan, on the PTCL network. This does not confirm that actors in Pakistan are knowingly taking advantage of its capabilities. Nevertheless, civil society organizations called on PTCL to investigate and disable FinFisher tools.
Pakistan is also reported to be a long-time customer of Narus, a U.S.-based firm known for designing technology that allows for monitoring of traffic flows and deep-packet inspection of internet communications, and some media reports say Pakistani authorities have also acquired surveillance technology from China. In 2013, when news reports described the possible introduction of new 22
filtering software to address the YouTube crisis, some said the information ministry objected to its additional capacities for monitoring communications. PTA chief Farooq Ahmed Khan denied any intent to use it for surveillance.
Several free expression activists and bloggers have reported receiving death threats. Many publicize them, and sometimes attract more, on Twitter. Most are sent via text message from untraceable, unregistered mobile phone connections, often originating from the tribal areas of the country, and several include specific details from the recipients social media profiles or other online activity. In addition, some militant Islamic groups in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA attack cybercafs, which they consider sites of moral degradation. In January 2012, an explosion outside an internet cafe in Peshawar, provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, killed two people; at least three more attacks on cybercafs or mobile phone stores were reported in different areas of the country in the first half of 2013.
Technical attacks against the websites of NGOs, opposition groups, and activists are common in Pakistan but typically go unreported due to self-censorship. Minority organizations such as the Catholic-run human rights advocacy group National Commission for Justice and Peace have also been subject to technical attacks. The websites of government agencies are also commonly attacked, often by ideological hackers attempting to make a political statement. In March 2013, an unidentified hacker defaced the electoral commissions website in advance of election. Hackers defaced websites belonging to the Supreme Court and the PTA in October 2011 demanding stricter controls for online pornography. Hackers have also infiltrated Pakistans internet registry PKNIC, which manages the countrys top level domains, including major news websites and Microsoft and Google regional homepages. The first attack came on November 24, 2012 and resulted in several sites being defaced, including Googles search engine, which was replaced with an image of penguins and a Turkish-language message reading Pakistan 23
Downed. The PKNIC failed to adjust its security and was infiltrated again on February 4, 2013, apparently to highlight ongoing vulnerabilities. Current Situation: On September 17, 2012 Islamabad blocked access to the popular video-sharing website after it aired a trailer for a low- budget American film deemed offensive to Islam and the Prophet Mohammed. Pakistan summoned the most senior diplomat of the United States present in the country to protest against Innocence of Muslims, demanding that the film be removed and severe action taken against its producers. A year later, the film is barely mentioned but YouTube, whose parent company is US multinational Google Inc, is still banned in Pakistan, as it is in China and Iran. Pakistan is no stranger to censorship. Foreign television programmes deemed offensive are blocked while scenes considered too daring are censored in films shown at cinemas.But the YouTube ban is in name only. Internet users can easily access the site through a simple proxy or Virtual Private Network (VPN). Only 10 per cent of Pakistan's estimated 180 million people have access to the Internet, one of the lowest rates in the world. This ban has no impact, a Pakistani declares, who still feels guilty about logging onto YouTube. As a Muslim, I'm ashamed... because 'Innocence of Muslims' defiled Islam. Pakistan blocked the site only after Google was unable to block access to the film because it has no antenna in the country. Although Google's executive chairman Eric Schmidt defended hosting the film, the company did have the technology to block access to it in countries such as Egypt, India and Saudi Arabia. Aside from blocking the popular video- sharing website, the Pakistani government also ordered that websites be monitored for anti-Islamic content. The Citizen Lab 24
at the University of Toronto, which specializes in Internet censorship, says Pakistan has used Canadian company Netsweeper to filter websites relating to sensitive religious topics and unreliable, independent media. The researchers also say that pornographic content and political websites from Balochistan Pakistan's southwestern province which has been gripped by separatist insurgency for the past few years are among those blocked. Shortly after former military ruler Pervez Musharraf was arrested in April, Pakistan shut down access to a satirical song posted on YouTube's rival, Vimeo that poked fun at the army. People believe that the authorities are bent on a wider campaign of Internet censorship, not just restricting access to items considered blasphemous in the Muslim nation. Shahzad Ahmad, director of Internet rights campaign group, Bytes for All, believes that online censorship serves a wider political agenda than just shutting down blasphemous content. The government is trying to curtail, limit and curb citizen freedom of expression, Ahmad declared. He says citizens are waging a cyberwar against Pakistani institutions who are blocking and filtering Internet content. There is a very clear defiance from users, particularly from the youth on government filtering, he added. Bytes For All has gone to court in Lahore, demanding an end to illegal and illegitimate censorship of the Internet. The fight is vital to stop the government developing tools of censorship that threaten the security and private lives of individuals, says Farieha Aziz, a director at the Bolo Bhi advocacy group that is closely following the case, which encompasses the YouTube ban. Software surveillance FinFisher, developed by British company Gamma and able to access content on personal computers, has been detected recently on Pakistani servers. Although it is unclear whether it has been deployed by Pakistan's own intelligence agencies or foreigners, the 25
National Security Agency (NSA) scandal in the United States has greatly heightened suspicions. In Pakistan, the cyber war has only just begun. Questions a Resolution Must Answer: What measures must be taken to prevent offensive content? What can be done to block specified content instead of the entire site(if applicable)? Which key organizations must regulate the content over internet? To what extent must internet freedom be provided in Pakistan? What modifications can be brought in Internet Regulation Bill? How to ensure transparency in monitoring of illicit content? How to control content on social media that incites ethnic conflict? How to ensure that democratic principles are conserved in regards of censoring content that may target government authorities? Is there a need to revamp the current definition of 'offensive content' provided by the PEMRA?
26
TOPIC AREA B: DEVISING A SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY FOR PAKISTAN 27
Introduction: Pakistan is passing through probably the most critical phase of its history. Despite the succession of the second civil government, it seems as if nothing has changed in the country. There is much confusion between the major political parties on some of the most challenging issues. However, the worst matters consist of those related to national security. It is the basic duty of the state to protect the life and property of its citizens. Any failure in doing so creates disharmony between the state and its inhabitants. Pakistan is facing serious security issues from Gilgit to Karachi while politicians and state institutions appear to be crippled. The politics of so-called right and left has divided public opinion. The law and order situation is the worst in decades. Besides, there is no consensus on the line of action to cope with. The mess is everywhere, be it FATA, Baluchistan, Karachi, interior Sindh or Punjab. One may hardly hear anything soothing from the center. In one of his recent statements, the law minister of Punjab clearly stated that his party, the government and security establishment were not on the same wavelength in terms of security policy for the country. It is surprising and somewhat heartbreaking that the PML-N despite its tall electoral claims has so far failed to provide any direction to deal with state-threatening security challenges. The basic of needs is safety and security whereas the PML-N government is focusing on other trivial matters. State institutions not only remain lacking in capacity but are badly suffering at the hands of political interference, an example of which is the Sikandar incident in the heart of Islamabad. Retreat of the state is providing a boost to outlaws in all parts of the country. The deteriorating security situation is also giving Pakistan a notorious name on an international level, the price of which every Pakistani pays when he travels abroad. Pakistan has been turned into a burning kiln for its own people. Nations rise from the ashes and reach the skies. There is always an opportunity in the worst of times. The state and government must act in unison and take Pakistan out of its quagmire. Overview of Security Challenges to Pakistan: The pivotal concern of Pakistans national life is security, both internal and external i.e. countrys defense from hostile forces from within and without. Pakistan is facing 28
extensive challenges to its security which have direct linkages to external threats. The vulnerable security of any state is a sweet dish for major key players of international politics as well as for regional players to secure their interests. Nevertheless, rise of terrorism in the aftermath of American attack on Afghanistan in October 2001 has worsened the security situation of the county to an unprecedented degree. Moreover it has brought a lot of foreign influence in the region but especially in Pakistan because Pakistan has a special geo-strategic location in the region. Pakistans security challenges can be categorized in traditional challenges and non-traditional ones. As far as traditional challenges are concerned, terrorism remains to be the primary threat to the internal security of Pakistan. However, crimes do have a strong nexus. Drug cartels, criminal gangs have joined hands with terrorists for economic gains. Terrorism and crime are the main challenges with hosts of threats enablers and multipliers. These traditional threats have peculiar manifestation in various regions of Pakistan. It may be noticed that the main players involved in the internal security environment are polity, clergy, militants, feudal elite, tribal chieftains and criminal mafias. Foreign players are virtually a rider clause in each case. One of the most vital region in witch these activates are carried out is Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). It is the chief boiling point and a source of terrorism in the country. It not only promotes terrorism in different parts of the country but is also a safe heaven for terrorists and criminal gangs. The terrorists of this region are continuously challenging the authority of the government. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is the chief organization which is operating in these areas, which is a composition of twenty eight different groups. Along with the trans-nationalist TTP, the evidence of foreign players intervention in the region has been noticed various times. The modern weapons and training of these high profile terrorists show the participation of foreign players in Pakistani areas. About 4000 people had been killed in 2012 among which 600 were security personnel and the remaining were civilians. Terrorists attacked 1485 times on security forces and the security forces arrested 1138 terrorists during 2012. These facts and figures show the wide range activities of terrorists in all 29
the parts of the country and chiefly in tribal areas. Beside these two regions Karachi, the economic hub of Pakistan, is facing numerous tides of instability. But Karachi has different dynamics of instability as compared to FATA and Baluchistan. Vital security issues in Karachi are street crimes, car snatching, burglary, kidnapping and the most critical target killing. Each act of crime is lamentable and cannot be endorsed. Certainly more than the crimes, it is processional religiosity and dirty politics (political mafias) which are responsible for the miserable plight of the metropolis. Different political parties are involved in this filthy game. These political parties are occupied in different areas of the city. They are involved in killing the opposite members of their rival panty. They collect money by using force in their dominated areas. This situation has a worse impact upon the economy of the country because the city generates the lion share of 67% for the national exchequer and 35% of the GDP. Processions and law and order situation stops the wheel of industry and according to an estimate, one day procession costs the loss of approximately three to five billion rupees. Certainly Karachi needs a different kind of treatment in internal security campaign of the country. Beside these areas, Madrassas or religious seminaries too have a role in security related issues in Pakistan. These Madrassas are promoting extremism because they are teaching purely sect-based education which results in extremism. This extremism leads to intolerance for other sects and adds extremism in the society. Starting with about 189 in 1947, Pakistan today has thousands of Madrassas but no one knows the exact number, estimate ranges from 12,000 to 40,000. Sectarian violence is also a serious threat to Pakistan national security. In the recent years Pakistan faced sharp sectarian violence. Inter-faith violence is also common involving violence against members of non-Muslims faiths, particularly Ahmadis, Hindus and Christians, who along with Parsis, Sikhs and Buddhists account for fewer than 4% of 180 million strong populations. Sectarian violence on the other hand, unfolds between the two main sects of Islam, Shias and Sunnis, but violent incidents between the Braveli and Deobandi sub sects of Sunni Islam are also on rise. The current sectarian violence can be traced to the rise of Pakistani Taliban in the mid 2000s. This sectarian violence certainly is the outcome or aftermath of the U.S led war against terrorism.No doubt sectarian violence is the most dangerous threat to Pakistans national security after terrorism. 30
Another security threat to Pakistan is the deployment of 700,000 troops of India in Jammu and Kashmir. Indian troops withdrawal from Kashmir is vital to prevent another Indo-Pak war. The conflicts between India and Pakistan are a permanent source of threats to national security of both countries. Indian authorities have been quick to look towards Pakistan as the main cause of Indias internal security issues such as the attack at Mumbai in November 2008. On the other hand, Pakistani forces have recovered weapons of Indian origin in operations against non-state actors in Baluchistan and the Swat valley, suggesting that there has been a serious attempt on the part of India to destabilize Pakistans internal security. The ongoing US led war against terrorism in Afghanistan also has a dramatic effect on Pakistans security. Pakistan is already facing a tough battle against militants in tribal areas. Moreover, greater number of militants would add to the miseries of already fragile security of Pakistan. Major Conflict Stricken Zones: Bal uchi stan: The cur r ent scenar i o of t he conf l i ct i n Bal uchi st an st ar t ed bui l di ng up when t he f eder al aut hor i t i es i n Paki st an i ni t i at ed devel opment of Gwadar Por t wi t h r oad and r ai l l i nks. The devel opment pr oj ect s of t he coast al hi ghway and t he Gwadar por t have been al so opposed by Bal och nat i onal i st s. Bal ochi r esi st ance t o def y gover nment s ef f or t s t o st ar t Gwadar was based on t he char ge t hat i t wi l l change Bal ochi et hni c cul t ur e. Bal ochi di saf f ect i on gr ew mor e i n t he af t er mat h of t he at t ack on t he Tal i ban i n Af ghani st an and t he est abl i shment of US bases i n Pasni , Gwadar , Dal bandi n and J acobabad i n Si ndh. Thi s was not so much because of t he US mi l i t ar y pr esence, but because of admi ni st r at i on s deci si on t o est abl i sh some ar my cant onment s i n Bal ochi st an. Dur i ng t he ei ght year s of Mushar r af s mi l i t ar y r ul e i n Paki st an, t he absence of pol i t i cal pr ocess t hat was necessar y t o deal wi t h t he i nsur genci es r esul t ed i n t he f ur t her al i enat i on of even moder at e Bal och nat i onal i st f r om t he Feder at i on of Paki st an. I t shut t he door s of negot i at i on pr ocess wi t h t he Bal och Leader s. 31
Thi s conf l i ct became mor e i nt ense, i n 2006, when NawabBugt i , t he Bal och t r i bal l eader and ex- chi ef mi ni st er and gover nor of Bal uchi st an, was ki l l ed i n an ar my oper at i on. He had been accused by Paki st an s gover nment f or car r yi ng out ser i es of bomb bl ast s, ki l l i ngs of hi s own peopl e and mai nl y t he r ocket at t ack on t he Pr esi dent of Paki st an. He was l auded as a l eader of Bal och by t he nat i onal i st s who had di ed f i ght i ng f or t hei r cause and was t ur ned i nt o a her o. Dur i ng t hi s t i me, t he pol i t i cal par t i es di d not pl ay t hei r r ol e t o r ai se t he i ssue of depr i vat i on and negl ect ed i t at ser i ous l evel . Thi s was not l i mi t ed t o t he r ul i ng par t i es; unf or t unat el y opposi t i on al so i gnor ed t he Bal uchi st an i ssue. I n t he Al l Par t i es Conf er ence t hat was hel d i n 2007, t o pl an a col l ect i ve l i ne of act i on t o deal wi t h t he di f f er ent pr obl ems f aced by Paki st an, t he Bal uchi st an pr obl em was not even i ncl uded i n t he agenda. The danger , as ment i oned ear l i er , i s t wo- f ol d. The educat ed mi ddl e cl ass i n Bal och t owns has st ar t ed r al l yi ng behi nd nat i onal i st s and even sar dar s. These sar dar s wi l l never del i ver but l i ke t he ot her Paki st ani s, ar e bei ng f ool ed i nt o ut opi an i deal i sm. Secondl y var i ous vest ed l ocal , nat i onal and i nt er nat i onal i nt er est s ar e t r yi ng t o t ake advant age of t hi s si t uat i on. To summar i ze, t he nat i onal i st s compl ai nt s ar e mi x of ol d and new. Ol der compl ai nt s consi st of l ack of aut onomy, expl oi t at i on of r esour ces and l ack of devel opment . I n addi t i on, t he new compl ai nt s ar e t hat hundr eds of peopl e ar e mi ssi ng i n act i on and t her e has been a si l ent war t hat nat i onal i st s al l ege st at e i s wagi ng upon t hem. This region has different dynamics of militancy. In Baluchistan, there are militant groups with some 159 training camps in various areas of the province (40 are allegedly supported by Indian Raw), housing some 2000 to 5000 guerrillas who are operating hundreds of militant acts. These groups are not only targeting security forces, but also destroying state assets. Hosts of foreign players are also supporting unrest in the province due to its resources and geo strategic location. Raw is accused certainly for playing negative role in Baluchistan. 32
Some scholars also referred to an undeclared proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the province of Baluchistan. Baluchistan poses a serious threat to national security, sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan. The province of Baluchistan increased its efforts for political and economic autonomy from Islamabad, with armed groups attacking gas pipelines, railways and power transmission lines and launching rocket attacks on military targets. The military is said to have placed 123,000 troops in the Province in attempts to maintain control. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have reported that government forces (the military, intelligence agencies and the paramilitary Frontier Corps) have engaged in "kill and dump" operations including targeted killings of opposition leaders and activists and enforced disappearances Baloch armed groups have also been accused of killing civilians and destroying private property. They have claimed a series of bombings on the gas infrastructure. Teachers and other government workers seem to have been particularly targeted. Also, the Hazara Shi'a community in Baluchistan has claimed to have hundreds of its members killed by Taliban and Sunni extremists since 2004. Human Rights Watch documented continued disappearances and an upsurge in killings of suspected Baloch militants and opposition activists by the military, intelligence agencies, and the paramilitary Frontier Corps. Baloch nationalists and other militant groups also stepped up attacks on non-Baloch civilians, teachers, and education facilities, as well as against security forces in the province. Pakistan's military continued to publicly resist government reconciliation efforts and attempts to locate ethnic Baloch, who had been subject to disappearances. The government appeared powerless to rein in the militarys abuses. Human Rights Watch recorded the killing of at least 200 Baloch nationalist activists during the year, as well as dozens of new cases of disappearances. Since the beginning of 2011, human rights activists and academics, critical of the military, have also been killed in the province. They include Siddique Eido, a coordinator for the nongovernmental Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP); Saba Dashtiyari, a professor at the University of Balochistan and an acclaimed Baloch 33
writer and poet; and Baloch politician Abdul Salam. North and South Wazi ri stan: The regions bordering Afghanistan, North and South Waziristan, continued to see conflict between supporters of the regions strengthening Taliban, and the Pakistani government. In early 2008, for example, there were reports that up to 90 fighters were killed in clashes in the tribal region of South Waziristan, near the Afghan border, where militants have been openly challenging the army. Clashes continued with a report in mid-January of Uzbek fighters being killed in an assault on the house of a local administrator. It was claimed by AFP that Pakistan had deployed more than 90,000 troops to this tribal belt to combat Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants who fled Afghanistan after the 2001 invasion by US-led forces invaded the country. In April 2007, President Pervez Musharraf admitted publicly for the first time that the army was helping tribal fighters battling foreign militants. In late January 2008, Pakistan sent reinforcements to the South Waziristan region on the Afghan border to target an Islamic rebel commander accused of involvement in the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Shortly afterwards, the army claimed to have killed 40 Islamic militants and arrested 30 more during two days of fighting along its border with Afghanistan. In 2009, there were reports of helicopter gunships stepping up attacks aimed at suspected militant hideouts in Waziristan. The USA has offered to train Pakistani security forces in their fight against Al-Qaeda- linked militants. American drone attacks have also taken place in Waziristan, with their number estimated at 51 in 2009 and increasing to 118 in 2010. In 2012, Pakistani lawmakers called on the US to stop its drone incursions in the country. Swat val l ey: Beginning in April 2009, the Pakistani army conducted a sustained offensive against Taliban militants in the Swat valley, in the north of the country. This came after sharia law was imposed in the region as part of a deal between authorities and the Taliban, with the latter failing to disarm completely and even spreading to neighboring regions. Early in the fighting, Human Rights Watch called on the Pakistani army to stop its use of landmines and human 34
shields as they placed civilians at unnecessary risk. In July 2009, the Government declared the operation a success and refugees began returning to the region. Several militants surrendered. However, pockets of resistance remained, including revenge suicide attacks and accusations of extrajudicial killings of suspected militants by army forces continued to surface. Human rights groups and local residents have also reported findings of mass graves. Moreover, as of spring 2011, Pakistan continued to deny that it was involved in a non-international armed conflict in the northern part of the country and consequently refused to grant detainees there the rights afforded them by international law. FATA: FATA has remained in international focus, particularly since the turbulent Cold War years. Owing to its geostrategic location, the region became a playground for the rival forces competing to extend their spheres of influence. On departure of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, FATA lost its importance temporarily, only to re-emerge on the global scene after 9/11. Tribesmen, who have guarded their independent status for centuries, were however quick to realize the extreme sensitivity of the situation arising out of the 9/11 when the government of Pakistan decided to deploy troops along the western border. The tribesmen rose to the occasion and in an impressive display of patriotism not only gave a rousing welcome to the troops but joined them physically to guard the border. Some areas which had been inaccessible in the past were thus opened up for the first time in history without a single shot being fired. Today, the situation in FATA is extremely volatile having dangerous repercussions not only for the area but also for the country, for the region and for the entire world. So, it becomes important to understand the situation and then look for a way forward. There are hardly any easy solutions to this very complex problem as a number of visible as well as invisible factors are involved. The current situation in FATA, indeed, cannot be seen in isolation. One has to see it in the backdrop of US attack on Afghanistan in 2001 and the following state of affairs. In the first week of December 2001, the Allied Forces launched an operation in Tora Bora which lies just opposite to Kurram agency. These are the low hills of Koh-e- Sufaid (White Mountain) on the Afghanistan side, very close to the Pakistan border. Pakistan and its military command were not 35
informed by the US/NATO about this operation and they came to know about it through media. In the face of this Tora Bora operation, some fleeing militants might have crossed over to the tribal areas in search of refuge as there was no presence of law enforcing agencies and government officials in these "No-go areas". There was realization of this possible movement on the Pakistan side and as Pakistan did not want it to happen, the decision was taken to deploy Pak army in the area. As a result of this decision, there were more than 240 people who came across and were caught without a shot being fired. This happened with the assistance and support of the tribesmen, showing how patriotic and cooperative these people were who have now gone hostile. Pakistan army was also taken very peacefully into Khyber agency and "No-go areas" such as Tirah, east of Kurram agency. Next was Mohmand Agency. Almost one- fourth of Mohmand agency area was inaccessible; Pakistan got reports from Allied Forces that a lot of Al-Qaeda people are hiding there. Pakistan said that it will block the border and launch an operation in its territory to find Al-Qaeda people. Pakistan army started its movement at 3'o clock in the morning on 20 th of June 2003 and by 6'o clock in the evening reached the Afghan border. Pakistan army says it was not an operation and just a walkover as the tribesmen were very cooperative. They marched with the army. By August 2003, all the erstwhile inaccessible areas were under army's control. Pak troops were deployed on the border, on the zero line. Pakistan's military operations continued after that and are still continuing in Bajour and Mohmand while some limited operation is taking place in Khyber Agency. Also, there is operation in Swat - in its settled area. Exact figures of casualties of all these operations are not available but the estimates are that Pakistani forces have killed approximately over 2500 people believed to have links with Al-Qaeda elements, including the local militants. Over 1,800 of Pakistan's own troops have been killed and over 3,000 have been wounded. Regarding the foreigners present and killed in FATA, different nationalities are mentioned. Foreigners apprehended were over 600 including 240 apprehended in December 2001. Pakistan during last few years tried to bring the militants onboard by holding talks with them; on some occasions, agreements were reached. The agreements, however, were never allowed to succeed. It is quite evident that Americans did not want such agreements. The famous Shakai agreement of April 2004 with militant leader Nek 36
Mohammad was the first such deal. It was made after there were bloody clashes in Wana starting on the 16 th of March, 2004. Nek Muhammad was killed in a US missile strike within one week of signing the agreement; fighting erupted within hours after his death and continued till the end of 2004. In the case of Bajour, Pakistani authorities decided to get an undertaking from the tribesmen, not a formal agreement. As per the undertaking, tribesmen were to refrain from certain acts and concede that government will reserve the right to act against them if they did not conform to the undertaking. The then governor had got the undertaking approved. It was decided for the tribesmen to come and sign the undertaking on October 30, 2006 at 9 a.m. Somehow this news leaked out and at 5 a.m. on October 30,
the Madrassah involved in negotiations was bombed. Bajour has never recovered since. The present government in NWFP also signed some deals with the militants. However, all such deals have been strongly opposed and sabotaged one way or the other. The argument is that the truce resulting from the agreements gives the militants time to regroup and reorganize. However, it is deliberately ignored that military operation has been resulting in the spread of militancy from one tribal area to another and also to settled areas. People have been provoked to disregard agreements and get back to fighting. The reaction to such sabotaged deals and military operations is fatal, for instance in Dargai, 42 innocent recruits were killed by a suicide bomber. Militancy is fast spreading. Nobody could have ever imagined that there will be any operation in Mohmand as it was peaceful until recently; Khyber is also simmering. It is a very dangerous trend, indeed. Situation of Karachi: Karachi is Pakistans only metropolitan city, despite other cities having being designated as metropolitan areas for the purposes of local government, which has overwhelming numbers of population that belong to all segments of Pakistani society. It is known as the largest Pashtun city in the world: the city hosts more Pashtuns than any other city in the world, even in Pakistans Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, or Afghanistan, the traditional Pashtun homeland. Rural-to- urban migration in Sindh has always been directed more towards Karachi than towards Hyderabad or other settled cities because of the vast, multidimensional economic opportunities it affords to its residents. And just as the importance of Karachis economy 37
cannot be understated for the daily or monthly livelihood of a Karachi citizen, the same cannot be underemphasized for the economy of Pakistan, and more importantly, its tax base and tax revenues. The poor state of law and order resulting from the 201011 surges in ethno-political violence enabled militant groups to consolidate their presence and launch attacks in Karachi. There have been unconfirmed reports of the Afghan Taliban leadership relocating to the city. The TTP, an umbrella movement uniting militant factions in Pakistans northwestern tribal areas, has increased its fundraising and recruitment activities in the city and launched several high-profile attacks. Additionally, Karachi has witnessed a resurgence of militant groups with a sectarian agenda. The multiple and frequently intersecting strands of militancy, described in depth below, are potentially the most destabilizing element in Karachis short- term future. Despite the exorbitant spike in violence against citizens over the past 5-to-10 years, the city keeps humming and the resilient residents of Karachi continue to go about their daily lives forever under the shadow of instant death, or the specter of something worse (like kidnapping, or torture). No less than a dozen citizens of Karachi die every day every single day in violent, crime-related incidents, and the citys yearly crime statistics are horrific: under the previous PPP government, which has its home base in Sindh since its formation, the citys yearly crime statistics registered between 2,000 and 3,000 deaths, with the highest being 2,500 reported deaths in 2012 noted as the bloodiest year in Karachi so far. The daily statistics alone show that over a hundred people die in Karachi every month because of crime alone. And crime in Karachi is not a simple phenomenon to explain: poverty, inequality and easy access to unregistered weaponry is compounded by the fact that ethnic, political, and even economic rivalries can lead to a spike in violence, often targeting a specific community or people from a particular ethnic or religious background. With all the troubles Pakistan is facing and has been facing since 2001 Karachi is truly the melting pot which represents a cross-section of all those problems; but the melting pot is bubbling and ready to burst because ineffective policing (mainly due to politicized hiring at the lower cadres) and citizens disenchantment with existing governance mechanisms have transformed the melting pot into a powder keg on a haystack. All it needs is someone to light a match and throw it in the wrong direction and there are many who possess the matchbox. 38
Sources in the security apparatus deployed in Karachi, including the Rangers, and in the intelligence community say that Karachi is the typical example of a city wrought by proxy warfare in what they call the New Great Game: an intricate web of alliances and enmities at the global, regional, and local level that ultimately translates into Pakistanis killing Pakistanis for a variety of motives. While policies can go only as far as paper, policy implementation is the most important consideration for the government and the bureaucracy. The proper incentives must be offered to both law enforcement operatives and intelligence operatives in the field within Pakistan so that reactive policing measures can become proactive and preventative policing activities. To this effect, amendments and updates in the anti-terror laws of Pakistan (as opposed to anti-terror policies) are also desperately needed: near the end of its parliamentary tenure, in March 2013, the previous National Assembly and Senate finally enacted new anti-terror legislation, while Pakistan had bled for almost a decade. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has recently stated that a new, much more potent anti- terror law was in the final stages of legislation and enactment, and those charged under this law would not be allowed release on bail. For the stabilization of Karachi, the Sindh government promulgated a witness protection law on September 18 that will go a long way in protecting those who identify criminal elements and testify against them in court: it is no secret that journalists, lawyers, prosecutors, and even judges have been targeted for assassination in the past. Karachi Power Dynamics: Historically, target killers and criminals have been deployed in ethno-political violence between Karachis Mohajirs, represented by the MQM party, and Pashtuns, represented by the ANP. As recently as 2007 a political showdown between the MQM and ANP threatened to spark widespread ethnic violence: Since the May 12, 2007, clashes, the ANP has consolidated its political presence in Karachi. For the first time the party won two seats out of forty-two from Karachi in the Sindh provincial assembly during the 2008 general elections; the MQM won thirty-four, while the PPP secured six seats. By adopting a narrative of ethnic victimization, the ANP claims to represent Karachis Pashtun population, which it estimates to be 22 percent of the total, up from about 12 percent in 1998. The partys reach has been bolstered by the migration of over 300,000 Pashtuns, who have fled to the city in recent years to escape the fallout of military operations against militants in Pakistans tribal belt and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. 39
The ANPs political and demographic gains have led the MQM to fear that it is losing the grip over Karachi that it has enjoyed since a landslide victory in the 2005 general elections. The party previously won control of the city during the 1988 general elections. Mohajirs currently make up 48 percent of Karachis population, but the MQM, unlike the ANP and PPP, has no provincial base from which to draw new supporters. The recent surge in ethno-political violence is therefore understood to be a show of strength before the 2013 general elections, during which, some analysts argue, the MQM resorted to all measures necessary to maintain its dominant political position. In this context, frequent target killings aim to discourage further migration to the city. But violence is also used to accommodate for the citys shifting demographics: Since the transfer of a few thousand votes from one constituency to another can greatly affect election results, target killings have been used to terrorize members of an ethnic group into relocating to safer, ethnically homogenous areas. As such, violence has been used to demarcate electoral zones along ethnic lines. The ethno-political clashes between Mohajirs and Pashtuns are no longer the only violent ethnic dynamic in the city: Ethnic Sindhis and Balochis, represented by the PPP, increasingly have taken part. Like Pashtuns, Sindhis have migrated to Karachi, the provincial capital of the Sindh province, in significant numbers in search of employment. Refugees affected by successive summers of flooding in 2010 and 2011 also relocated to Sindhi goths (villages) that cluster around the citys periphery, particularly near entry and exit points along the National Highway. With a growing constituency in the city, the PPP is eager to gain access to the citys limited land, utilities, and financial resources with which to woo potential voters. The PPP is also seeking better representation in Karachi: In the 2008 elections it won over a quarter of the popular vote in Karachi, but only three out of the twenty National Assembly seats from the city owing to outdated electoral districting. Thus, while the violent history is rooted in specific tensions between rural and urban, province and city, bureaucracy and decentralized local governance, it is ultimately a clash between the rural-Sindh- based PPP and Karachi-based MQM over the citys resources and administration. Karachi contains 30 percent of Sindhs total population, employs 71.6 percent of the total industrial labor force of Sindh, generates 74.8 percent of the provinces total industrial output, and provides 78 percent of all private sector jobs in the province. Without Karachi, Sindh is relatively underdeveloped and impoverished, and yet Sindhis struggle for political representation and access within the provincial capital. Sindhi nationalist political 40
parties, such as the Sindh TarraqiPassand Party, Jeay Sindh QaumiMahaz (JSQM), and AwamiTehrik (AT), often cite this grievance. More recently, some PPP elements also have seized the narrative of greater Sindhi representation in Karachi. In 2011, former Sindh home minister and PPP representative ZulfiqarMirza began championing Sindhi rights and issuing anti-MQM comments. His diatribes led to intense ethno-political clashes in the summer of 2011. Whatever relationship the PPP and MQM establish, Sindhis are likely to have a growing voice in Karachis political dynamic. In March 2012 the JSQM staged a rally in Karachi to call for an independent Sindh province. A few days later, to protest government delays in investigating the cause of the sudden death on April 7 of the partys leader, Bashir Qureshi, the JSQM announced a strike. The strike call was observed across the city as markets closed, public transport halted, and three men were killed in firing incidents, demonstrating the increasing street power of Sindhi nationalist parties. Two months later, on May 22, the Sindhi nationalist party AT organized a rally to oppose the increasing appearance of graffiti calling for a separate mohajir province to be carved out of Sindh. Unidentified snipers opened fire on the rally, leading to clashes throughout the city in which thirteen people were killed and thirty- five injured. The seesawing between systems has exacerbated the lack of governance and effective service delivery at the grassroots level across Karachi. It has also highlighted how widespread urban violence is used as a political tool for parties to gain the upper hand during deadlocked negotiations and extract concessions from their rivals. As such, Karachis violence can be understood as a symptom of debilitated democratic processes. Disagreements on the composition of electoral lists led to violent clashes for control over polling stations during general elections. Concerns about voter listsas well as contradictory political narratives by the MQM, PPP, and ANP about Karachis shifting demographics, stem partly from delays in conducting the national census. The lack of accurate census data on Karachi perpetuates problems of inadequate service delivery and poor governance. It also fuels violence as political parties exaggerate or underestimate their total constituencies in the service of narratives of ethnic marginalization that, in turn, fuel interethnic clashes. Drone Attacks and its Viability: U.S. drones have struck targets in Pakistan an estimated 140 times since 2004. Property and homes have been destroyed and thousands have been killed or injured. While many challenge U.S. drone strikes as a matter of strategy, there are also serious 41
concerns over the fundamental legality of such strikes. The U.S. is not at war with Pakistan, yet conducts air strikes in its territory on a near daily basis. Individuals are targeted for killing without any due process of law or attempts to detain. Almost nothing is known about how the program operates or what measures are taken to ensure compliance with international law. Drone strikes killed 181 people in Pakistan including some senior militant commanders. Since 2004, the CIA operated drones have killed 3306 people in 391 strikes inside Pakistan, most of them unknown suspected militants including hundreds of civilians. During 2013, 22 drone strikes were carried out in North Waziristan killing 131 people while 83 were reportedly injured. Four strikes were witnessed in South Waziristan where 44 people were killed and 24 injured. The CIA also extended its drone strikes beyond FATA in 2013, and hit a madrassa in Hangu district of KP. In 2013, Nawaz Sharif became first Pakistani ruler who raised the issue of drone attacks at UN General Assembly since 2004 when the CIA started its covert controversial campaign in Pakistan. Previous governments used to condemn drone attacks but ignored to raise the issue at international level. During the year, Pakistan gained some achievements at diplomatic front against drone strikes. In December 2013, UN General Assembly declared that drone strikes are violation of international law. While federal government initiated campaign against drone strikes at international level in 2013, Pakistan Tehreek- e-Insaf and Jamat-e-Islami kept the public protest alive. A change in approach was visible during the year 2013, as the CIA had tried to limit signature attacks in which generally unknown suspected militants were killed. Mounting public pressure in Pakistan and criticism at international level forced powerful American agency to focus more on militant commanders and lowering collateral damage. However, the damage had already been done as excessive use of drone strikes against suspected militants, funeral prayers and, rescue teams sparked international condemnation of the drone campaign. UN special rapporteur Ben Emmerson declared that drone strikes violated Pakistans sovereignty. Recently UN General Assembly has also declared that drone strikes are against International Law. Drone strikes remained most controversial issue between U.S. and Pakistan. The CIA has kept alive its tradition of droning , during or right after high level visits of Pakistani leaders/officials to U.S. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif criticized drone attacks in his speech in UN General Assembly and termed 42
them the violation of Pakistan sovereignty and international law. However, the CIA responded with drone attacks on 29 th and 30 th of September, respectively just two and three days after his speech. A welcome drone attack was also carried out on September 22 when Nawaz Sharif left Pakistan for U.S. to attend the UNGA session. Elimination of Hakeemullah Mehsud by drone strike during back-door negotiations sparked public protest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where ruling political party Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf along with its religious ally Jamat-e-Islami blocked NATO supply through the province with use of public support. The protest forced NATO to stop supply to and from Afghanistan through Torkham border and resorted to Chaman crossing in Balochistan. Despite continuous public protests, blockade of NATO supply and condemnation at international level, U.S. has not shown any signs that it will abandon drone strikes in Pakistan. Three drone attacks have been reported after PTI-JI started blockade of NATO supply including one attack in Hangu district of KP province. One legal issue too often overlooked is Pakistans legal obligations when it comes to drone strikes. Even if Pakistan has consented to such strikes, obviating concerns regarding national sovereignty, Pakistan still has a responsibility to respect and protect the human rights of its own citizens and other individuals within its territory. Extrajudicial killing is prohibited under international law and Pakistan cannot support or even acquiesce in the extrajudicial killing of individuals within its territory by other states unless certain conditions are met. If Pakistan were itself engaged in armed conflict with those groups or individuals being targeted by U.S. drones, then it could consent to such killings. For some groups, such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, it seems clear that Pakistan is in a state of armed conflict and could legally target members of the group as combatants. However, it seems doubtful that Pakistan is in a state of armed conflict with many other groups targeted by U.S. drones, such as al- Qaeda or the Haqqani network. Pakistan may therefore be violating its obligations under human rights law in consenting to the extrajudicial killing of members of such groups. Such individuals should be arrested and tried, an obligation that cannot be skirted by permitting a foreign state to engage in summary execution. It is also worth emphasizing that Pakistani consent to U.S. strikes should also bring with it a responsibility to ensure such attacks conform to International Humanitarian Law (IHL). Pakistan should demand more information from the U.S., including 43
increased transparency and articulating of clear policies on distinction and proportionality. Any Pakistani consent should be conditioned upon the U.S. demonstrating its activities conform to IHL.
Ongoing Sectarian Conflict: While Punjabis represent the majority of the population, Pakistan is home to a constellation of communities based on regional, religious, or historical identities: Bengalis, Baluchs, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Sunni, Shia and Ahmadi Muslims, Sikhs, Jains, Hindus, Christians and Jews, Muhajirs and refugees from Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Gujarat. Sectarian and religious violence have been a recurrent feature of Pakistans history since 1947, both in the form of violent conflict between religious communities, and in the form of one-sided violence against religious minorities. Inter-religious conflicts surfaced as early as in the early 1950s, when religious parties, and in particular the Jamaat-e-Islami, called for excluding Ahmadiyya community from Islam. Ahmadis have consistently experienced severe discrimination both from the government and from other Muslim sects. Hindus are generally second-class citizens facing daily structural violence punctuated by occasional episodes of mass anti-Hindu violence and massacres. Sectarian conflict further escalated after the Taliban victory in Afghanistan, as a pattern of assassinations of sect leaders and activists emerged. After 1997, mass killings of civilians on a sectarian basis became more frequent. Sectarian violence has involved groups on both sides, including the Shia group Sipah-e Muhammad Pakistan (SMP; the Army of Muhammad) created in 1991. However, anti- Shia violence has been on the rise, and since the 1990s there has been marked anti-Shia violence perpetrated armed militant groups with ties to Saudi Arabia operating in Pakistan. Armed groups have also been involved in violence against non-Muslims. In August 2009, a mob, guided by Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, attacked Christians on alleged desecration of Quran in the city of Gojra (Toba Tek Singh district). In this episode, seven Christians were killed and 20 were injured, and 50 homes were burnt. Religious Extremism and Shia Genocide: Shia Muslims make up nearly 20% of Pakistans 200 million population i.e. 40 million and are spread across the country with the northern Gilgit Baltistan region and Kurram Agency on Afghanistan border being the only Shia majority regions. 44
Using the ideology of Takfir, due to which Shia are declared infidels and worthy of being killed, several thousand Shia have been killed, injured or disabled for life by anti-Shia militants. The worrying fact is that these militants run organized intimidation campaigns against the Shia and create resentment for them in the society to gather support and sympathy for their cause of exterminating the Shia. The state has turned a blind eye to the organizations and militants killing the Shia and they operate freely, their leaders enjoying public space. One notorious anti-Shia organization Ahl-e-Sunnat-Wal- Jamaat (ASWJ) has continued its task of killing the Shia. Its sister organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) regularly claims responsibility of attacks on the Shia. Both of these are known to have links with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. According to independent estimates, nearly 12,000 Shia have been killed in Pakistan as a result of direct attacks on them for their faith. Another 9000 10,000 Shia have been killed as part of the terrorism which have engulfed the country. An Amnesty International report from 2002 states that only in the city of Karachi between the 1992 2002, seventy Shia doctors were killed. In total, nearly 200 Shia doctors have been killed while other professionals killed include lawyers, academics, educationists, sportsmen, entrepreneurs and poets to mention. Shia processions or Imam Bargahs (worship places) are attacked regularly every year across the country in the Muslim month of Muharram; and more than a hundred such incidents have been recorded. Other than killings en masse, they are also victim of targeted killings across the country where individuals are shot dead just because of their Shia faith. On paper, the anti-Shia militant organizations are banned but they operate freely ad publicly take responsibility of killing the Shia after every attack. Their leaders are on record having said that they will make it so tough for Shia in Pakistan that they (Shia) will say where we go now and that is precisely what has happened. It appears as if all state institutions in Pakistan including the security agencies and Judiciary are working in partnership to exterminate Shia from Pakistan.
The Shia community has remained peaceful and there is no history of even a single incident of indiscriminate violence by Shia on anyone. Even retaliation or reprisal attacks have been nonexistent for several years but violence has not stopped. It is high time that the community be protected before it is too late.
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Human Right organizations like Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and Asian Human Rights Commission usually release the data on number of Shia killed in a year but this data is not accurate for the simple reason that they do not use independent sources to get this information but rely purely on mainstream media. The problem with this approach is that there is a tendency in Pakistani media not to use the word Shia while reporting any incident of violence against the Shia whether it is targeted killing or bombing for mass killing. Therefore, only a small proportion of total Shia killings are counted in the statistics of Human Rights groups. Let us consider the gruesome incident of Chillas massacre which happened on 3rd April 2012 when six passenger buses enroute the Shia majority region of Gilgit Baltistan were stopped, passengers were offloaded and their Identity cards were scanned for Shia names and backs were checked for marks of self-flagellation (a Shia practice). All of those identified as Shia were shot dead on spot. This was not the only incident of its kind. Similar incidents when Shia were killed are proper identification include the Kohistan massacre of February 2012 and Mastung Baluchistan incident of September 2011 and January 2014. The media did report these incidents but failed to mention the word Shia. Because of this reason and the fact that medias reporting on Shia killings is limited to major cities and incidents from remote towns and villages go unreported, the statistics of Shia killings released by Human Rights organizations are extremely lowered down. The Jihadis (militants) produced by the madressahs which the military funded are inherently anti-Shia and in their free time, when they are not busy in Afghanistan or elsewhere, routinely kill the Shia across Pakistan. For the countrys security establishment, the violence against the Shia is a collateral damage in-house, a price they have to pay for the strategic depth they want. Some organizations, however, were formed with the sole reason to intimidate, threaten and kill the Shia. Terrorism: Security situation in Pakistan remained tense and volatile. There have been various security incidents which describe the grave nature of situation in FATA, Swat and other parts of NWFP as well as violence reported from insurgency hit province Baluchistan. Security forces operations with more focused intensity continued in Mohmand Agency, Khyber Agency, Swat and settled areas of NWFP. The backlash from the militants groups in the conflict zone was pronounced and vigor, resulting into more number of casualties among the security forces as well 46
as civilians. The militants also carried out abduction of government and civil persons in Khyber Agency, Swat and Kohat area. The government's writ in Swat has shrunk to lowest ebb amid increased violence and organized attacks by the hard core militants of MaulanaFazlullah. The militants in Swat continued attacks on government schools and property of political figures / opponent groups. After attacks on security forces in Swat and Mohmand Agency, military launched ground and air attacks on suspected hideouts of militants network / HQ's. However the militants suffered heavy casualties in Mohmand Agency.
Violence in Pakistan has been on the rise, particularly since 2007, as terrorist groups have targeted political leaders, the military and police, tribal leaders, and schools. Though virtually unheard of a decade ago, suicide bombings have become ubiquitous in recent years, a reflection of al-Qaeda's influence, experts say. Three such attacks were documented in 2002 and 2003 combined; at the trend's peak in 2009 there were seventy-six attacks, and there were thirty-seven in the first ten months of 2013, according to the New Delhibased South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). Besides providing militant groups in Pakistan with technical expertise and capabilities, al- Qaeda also promotes cooperation among them. CTC's Rassler wrote in 2009 that al- Qaeda "assumed a role as mediator and coalition builder among various Pakistani militant group factions by promoting the unification of entities that have opposed one another or had conflicting ideas about whether to target the Pakistani state." The Taliban, meanwhile, has become ever more entrenched in Pakistan, building a nationwide network by finding common cause with terrorist groups that target the Shia and the Pakistani state while establishing roots, and a lucrative criminal enterprise, in Karachi. Pakistani paramilitary Rangers launched a campaign in September 2013 to address the city's criminal and terrorist groups, reportedly arresting over 1,500 suspects in a month. Meanwhile, Pakistan's political parties advocated negotiations with the Taliban in part to stave off even higher levels of violence in Punjab and other populated areas, Tankel writes. SATP reported 2,745 civilians and 601 security forces killed in terrorist violence in the first ten months of 2013, roughly on pace with the prior two years. Deweaponization: The major supply line of firearms can be traced back to the tribal areas. Durra Adam 47
Khel, not very far from the provincial capital Peshawar, is known the world over for its legendary arms bazaar and weapon manufacturing units. Seasoned gunsmiths over the decades have been involved in the business, manufacturing firearms of small, medium and long range caliber, known for high quality. Some of the widely sought after automatic brands like AK47 and 7MM are replicated here with precision and perfection. Weapons produced in Durra were a helpline to the jihadists against the Soviet Union and Kashmir wars but that supply line has dried up now and these arms are finding place in many parts of the country through known and unknown routes. No amount of raids, hold-ups and recoveries can help tackle the problem unless the main sources of supply are vigilantly monitored with effective control. It is time to regulate the production and supply of weapons. This has to be completely in concert with the stakeholders by taking them on board. The tribesmen on balance are an amenable lot, having faith in the consultative process. The federal government, in this regard, should prepare a roadmap and policy framework, seeking professional input from the Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF). The provincial governments should simultaneously undertake a campaign for the registration of unregistered arms. Unless we have complete information and data about arms in circulation, the policy of de-weaponisation will be a non-starter. Illicit arms-holders should either surrender arms or get them registered. A one-time amnesty will have to be given in this regard. This should be followed by campaigns for recovering leftover arms. According to a conservative estimate, over 50 per cent of weapons in the country are not registered. Pakistan stands amongst the top six countries in the world in terms of private ownership of firearms. A very heavy responsibility rests on the shoulders of major political stakeholders. They need to rein in their armed wings. In the past, it was just one party which was allegedly singled out in this regard. Now, all key stakeholders and sectarian outfits in the country fall in this category. The political, religious and sectarian outfits have to off- guard their militants, lest some other force is constrained to perform this unavoidable task. Kashmir Issue: From a Pakistani perspective Kashmir is the core issue and the root cause of tension with India. It maintains that India is in unlawful occupation of J&K and it is the right of the people of the state to determine their future in accordance with their aspirations. Pakistan 48
has made great sacrifices to pursue a proactive Kashmir policy and its defense and foreign policy is significantly influenced by this attitude. Here, the nuclearization of South Asia, impact of events of 9/11 on the region, demands of globalization and the destabilizing effect on the internal polity for the support to militants were major factors that brought about a change in Pakistan to seek a path of cooperation and engage in a peace process. For India too, the consequences have been no less grim, although being a much bigger country with more resources it can mask the real picture. New Delhi feels that its clout with major powers is sufficiently high to contain any adverse fallout from human right violations. Nonetheless, Kashmir remains a serious barrier to actualization of Indias full economic and political potential and is a black spot on its otherwise ascending international image. External and internal factors led both governments to agree to a composite dialogue nearly four years ago. Three rounds of talks covering an agreed basket of subjects ranging from Jammu & Kashmir, peace and security, resolution of Siachen and Sir Creek and economic and cultural issues have been completed. As the fourth round was due to take place in July 2006, an unfortunate terrorist attack on a train near Mumbai killed hundreds of innocent passengers. India, without any concrete evidence blamed certain elements in Pakistan for the incident and suspended the dialogue process. The impasse was only broken when the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India, meeting on the side-lines of the Havana Non-Aligned summit, decided to resume the composite dialogue and reiterated their commitment to the peace process. It is significant that both leaders also agreed to an institutionalized framework for combating the common threat of terrorism. Both India and Pakistan in the course of the last three rounds have been able to develop certain conventional and nuclear Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) aimed at regulating the dynamics of their security competition. Some progress has also been made in creating conditions for developing economic and cultural interaction between the two parts of Kashmir. For example, the agreement on a cease fire along the 750 kilometer line of control and Siachen glacier is still holding. A host of CBMs covering travel between the two sides of Kashmir and allowing leaders of the resistance movement (APHC), and other Kashmiri leaders, to travel to Pakistan has had a favorable impact in reducing tensions. Nonetheless, lack of progress on settlement of the Kashmir dispute as well as relatively less difficult issues such as Siachen, Sir Creek and the Baghliar dam remain a major impediment towards normalization of 49
relations between the two countries. Pakistan is not prepared to accept the status quo as a permanent solution to Kashmir because that is the problem and cannot be the solution. It realizes Indias constraints and sensitivities to any major territorial adjustments. As a compromise, self governance has been suggested for Kashmir that would give the state of J&K a special status in the Indian constitution. Islamabad maintains that details of this proposal can be worked out in consultation with the resistance groups, represented by APHC and other elements in J&K and Pakistan. It aims at devolution of maximum administrative, financial and executive powers to the State, while retaining only communications, defense and foreign affairs with India. This could give Kashmiri people a sense of participation in running their affairs. Withdrawal of Indian military from J&K is another major precondition that Pakistan and the APHC is demanding for moving the peace process forward. India so far has been unwilling, as it does not want to loosen its authoritarian grip on the people. Any viable solution to the Kashmir conflict will need to address not only the interests of India and Pakistan but more so of the Kashmiris. Bringing the militants into the political process at some stage would also be necessary for ensuring durable peace. There is a general awareness of the complexity of the Kashmir problem but given political will it is surely possible to make significant progress in the resolution of the dispute. For India to keep harping on cross border infiltration and trying to view Kashmir through the prism of terrorism would be a travesty of truth and would keep India away from finding a viable solution to the protracted conflict. This policy may have found resonance in Western capitals and was an expedient measure to keep pressure on Islamabad to stop supporting the Kashmir cause, but has not worked. This is because it fails to address the root cause for the deep alienation of the people, especially those living in the Valley and in Muslim majority districts of Jammu. Here, human suffering is widespread, gross atrocities are committed by security forces and a large presence of the military and Para-military forces approximating 600 000 to 700 000 enforce a coercive regime on the people. This generates a cycle of violence, based on the action-reaction syndrome. In reality, Kashmir represents a live, ongoing, human problem and even if Pakistan were to totally withdraw and put the question of J&K at the back burner, insurgency will not go away just as the insurgency in Palestine would not fade away. The delegates of this committee in this case, while addressing the issue at session, are required to lay out an explicit plan which can be effective to sooth the ongoing conflict that majorly influences the defense and 50
security of Pakistan. In this regard they are also required to discourse on the various active militias and the spur of terror that rises from the both the sides of border that is tearing Pakistan to its fragile seams. Pakistans Nuclear Security: Chronic political instability in Pakistan and the current offensive against the Taliban in the northwest of the country have called attention to the issue of the security of the countrys nuclear weapons. Some observers fear that Pakistans strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Pakistans nuclear energy program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a bloody war with India that probably triggered a political decision in January 1972 (just one month later) to begin a secret nuclear weapons program. Deterring Indias nuclear weapons and augmenting Pakistans inferior conventional forces are widely believed to be the primary missions for Islamabads nuclear arsenal. Observers point to Indias 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion as the pivotal moment that gave additional urgency to the program. Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge- based uranium enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Highly- enriched uranium (HEU) is one of two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons; the other is plutonium. The countrys main enrichment facility is a centrifuge plant located at Kahuta; Pakistan may have other enrichment sites. Pakistani efforts to improve the security of its nuclear weapons have been on-going and include some cooperation with the United States. Since the 1998 Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests, the international community has increased attention to reducing the risk of nuclear war in South Asia. The two countries most recently came to the brink of full-scale war in 1999 and 2002, and, realizing the dangers, have developed some risk reduction measures to prevent accidental nuclear war. Islamabad has also developed its command and control systems and improved security of military and civilian nuclear facilities. Since the 2004 revelations of an extensive international nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear official Abdul Qadeer Khan, as well as possible connections between Pakistani nuclear scientists and Al Qaeda, Islamabad has made additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. The main security challenges for Pakistans nuclear arsenal are keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders. 51
Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons and appears to be augmenting its weapons production facilities, as well as deploying additional delivery vehiclessteps that will enable both quantitative and qualitative improvements in Islamabads nuclear arsenal. In the fall of 2007 and early 2008, some observers expressed concern about the security of the countrys arsenal if political instability were to persist. Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said in a November 5, 2007, interview that, although then- President Musharraf claimed to be in firm control of the nuclear arsenal, she feared this control could weaken due to instability in the country. Similarly, Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center has argued that a prolonged period of turbulence and infighting among the countrys President, Prime Minister, and Army Chief could jeopardize the armys unity of command, which is essential for nuclear security. During that time, U.S. military officials also expressed concern about the security of Pakistans nuclear weapons. Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, also has expressed fears that a radical regime could take power in Pakistan, and thereby acquire nuclear weapons. Experts also worry that while nuclear weapons are currently under firm control, with warheads disassembled, technology could be sold off by insiders during a worsened crisis. Pakistans command and control over its nuclear weapons is compartmentalized and includes strict operational security. The governments command and control system is based on C4I2SR (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance). Islamabads Strategic Command Organization has a three-tiered structure, consisting of the National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces Commands. Pakistani officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials. For example, Islamabad adopted in September 2004 new national export controls legislation which includes a requirement that the government issue control lists for goods, technologies, material, and equipment which may contribute to designing, development, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems. According to a February 2008 presentation by Zafar Ali, Director of Pakistans Strategic Export Controls Division (SECDIV),102 the lists, which were issued in October 2005 and are to be periodically updated, include items controlled by multilateral export control 52
regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The export controls legislation also includes a catch-all clause, which requires exporters to notify the government if they are aware or suspect that goods or technology are intended by the end-user for use in nuclear or biological weapons, or missiles capable of delivering such weapons. Pakistan has pledged no-first-use against non-nuclear-weapon states, but has not ruled out first-use against a nuclear-armed aggressor, such as India. Some analysts say this ambiguity serves to maintain deterrence against Indias conventional superiority; the Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated May 21 that there are acquisitions of sophisticated weaponry by our neighbor which will disturb the conventional balance between our two countries and hence, lower the nuclear threshold. Other analysts argue that keeping the first-use option against New Delhi allows Islamabad to conduct sub- conventional operations, such as support for low intensity conflict or proxy war in Kashmir, while effectively deterring India at the strategic level. Pakistan has reportedly addressed issues of survivability through pursuing a second strike capability, possibly building hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities, deploying road-mobile missiles, deploying air defenses around strategic sites, and utilizing concealment measures. Key groups: The numerous terrorist groups operating in Pakistan have tended to fall into one of the five categories laid out by Ashley J. Tellis, a senior associate at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in a January 2008 Congressional testimony: 1. Sectarian: Religiously motivated groups such as the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Shia Tehrik-e- Jafria that are engaged in violence within Pakistan. 2. The Pakistani Taliban: A coalition of extremist groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), led by Mullah Fazlullah. 3. Anti-Indian: Groups focused on the Kashmir dispute that operate with the alleged support of the Pakistani military and the intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI), such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Harakatul- Mujahadeen 4. Afghan Taliban: The original Taliban movement and especially its Kandahari leadership centered around Mullah Mohammad Omar, believed to be based in Quetta 53
5. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates: The global jihadist organization founded by Osama bin Laden and led by Ayman al-Zawahiri; Other militant groups fall outside of Tellis' framework, including secessionist groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army in southwest Pakistan and the Haqqani network. Inter-Service Intelligence: For the West there is arguably at present no more important intelligence organization than Pakistans Directorate of Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), yet after decades of close co-operation the ISI remains an enigma. The ISI was established within the Pakistan Army to supplement the existing Military Intelligence (MI) as a means to address the lack of inter-service intelligence co-operation which had proven so disastrous for Pakistan in the 1947 Indo-Pak war. Trained from its early days by UKs Military Intelligence, and a little later by the CIA and, for a short spell, the French SDECE, the ISI originally had no role beyond that of military intelligence- gathering except in relation to the disputed region in Pakistan Administered Kashmir and the Northern areas of Gilgit and Baltistan. The assumption of martial law in Pakistan for this first time in 1958 under Lt Gen Ayub Khan brought the ISI into the political realm. It was tasked by Ayub with three roles which continue to define it: (a) to safeguard Pakistans interests, (b) to monitor political opposition, and (c) to sustain military rule in Pakistan. It is clear from these functions that the ISI from 1958, if not before, viewed its raison detre first and foremost in terms of the Pakistan military rather than in relation to any broader concept of the defense and security of the nation-state or of the people of Pakistan. Moreover, Ayub Khans formulation gave the ISI primacy amongst the other intelligence agencies in Pakistan the MI and the civilian Intelligence Bureau (IB) because it combined in the one agency the dual roles of internal and external intelligence. Unlike the UKs MI5 and MI6 or the USs FBI and CIA, the ISI faces no equivalent turf-war with a powerful internal rival, and is thus able to integrate the internal and external facets of its work with profound implications for the way it operates and the power it is able to exercise within Pakistan and outside it.
The Haqqani Network: The Haqqani Network, whose operations straddle the porous Afghan-Pakistani border known as the Durand Line, has proven a valuable ally to the Pakistani Taliban in some of these pursuits. The Haqqanis have not only fought alongside the TTP and Afghan 54
Taliban in Afghanistan, but have also served as influential mediators between the TTP and Islamabad. Pakistan has long been a supporter and beneficiary of the Haqqanis, according to CTC. The network has helped Islamabad manage militant groups in FATA, and provided leverage against India in the struggle over Kashmir. Pakistan sees the Pashtun group, which has been among the most lethal to NATO forces in Afghanistan, as a potential source of leverage after the scheduled withdrawal of coalition troops at the end of 2014. Police and law-enforcement agencies: As the army drives Taliban fighters from their strongholds in the Swat Valley and elsewhere, the militants have shifted their attention to Pakistan's cities and civilian law enforcement must shoulder the burden for fighting terrorism, especially poorly equipped police. Underpaid, poorly trained and ill- equipped Pakistan's policehas become crucial fighters in the war to rid the country of Taliban militants.
"The police in this situation are not trained, equipped or geared to fight insurgency," said Malik Naveed Khan, inspector general of the North-West Frontier Province police and the conflict zone's top cop. "It's a very serious war. You're fighting the shadows of an invisible army."
For a force of 50,000, Khan's department has 7,500 bulletproof vests and 17,000 automatic rifles. The department lacks explosives- detection equipment, a computerized fingerprint database and updated forensic equipment. The microscopes that technicians use to conduct ballistics examinations, Khan said, "are the same ones used in high schools." It is generally believed in the West that military action can resolve the terrorism problem in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region as well as help efforts to thwart violent radicalism throughout the region. This idea, while sounding sensible when peering at Pakistan from the outside, misses an important reality on the ground: according to a new report released by the Asia Society, it is the domestic police force that can best root out terror networks, find and disable their financial support, and even manage de-radicalization programs in association with local communities.
When faced with a serious internal security crisis, it is crucial that a state pursue reform that entails capacity building not just in the military and civilian government, but within the law enforcement sector. Pakistan is a case in point. The state is facing a variety of internal security challenges that are severely 55
limiting its citizens' potential as well as creating tension between neighbors and potential allies abroad. Without police and law enforcement reform, stability is likely to continue eluding Pakistan. Meaningful reform is not going to be an easy endeavor. A high number of terrorist attacks and increasingly troubling crime patterns tell the story of a state under siege. An increase in targeted killings of political and religious leaders, attacks on armed forces and police, kidnapping for ransom by the Taliban, and mob justice' incidents show just how daunting the challenges for the police have become. Pakistan's efforts to combat crime and to counter terrorist activities are being outpaced by the innovation and agility of criminal networks and protean terrorist organizations. Radicalized elements within the political and religious spheres further complicate security challenges. Interestingly, the international support provided to Pakistan for antiterrorism operations in the last decade was largely geared towards the defense sector, and very little of that ever reached police. This created a situation in which military control trumped local knowledge and know-how. A balanced approach is needed to help Pakistan tackle both internal and external challenges more effectively. Few know that Pakistan is among the top five police-contributing countries to the United Nations over the last decade, and the professional performance of Pakistani officers in UN peacekeeping operations is rated highly. However, Pakistan has no mechanism in place to utilize the services of these officers in such a way that police institutions in-country might benefit from this experience. Many Pakistani police officers were successful in getting Fulbright scholarships and Hubert Humphrey fellowships in the United States in recent years as well. Thus, there is a lot of untapped potential in the country that can help transform the law enforcement institutions. Evidence suggests that a law enforcement model, which by its very nature is linked to rule of law as well as democracy, offers the best bet to confront the menace of terrorism, transnational crime, as well as insurgencies. Placing a priority on law enforcement reform can help improve Pakistans security in more ways than one. Negotiations with the Pakistani Taliban: Supporters of the Afghan Taliban who sought refuge in Pakistan's tribal areas morphed into a distinct entity following the Pakistani army's initial incursion into the semiautonomous region in 2002. In 56
December 2007, about thirteen disparate militant groups coalesced under the umbrella of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban, led by BaitullahMehsud of South Waziristan. After a U.S. drone strike killed Baitullah in August 2009, his cousin and deputy HakimullahMehsud assumed leadership of the TTP. Hakimullah was reportedly prepared to take part in imminent peace talks with Islamabad when he was killed in a U.S. drone strike along with a top deputy in November 2013. But analysts say the prospects for peace talks were dim. Hakimullah declared war against the state, saying in October 2013: "Pakistan's system is un-Islamic, and we want it replaced with an Islamic system. This demand and this desire will continue even after the American withdrawal [from Afghanistan]." Stephen Tankel, scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, notes that if talks had been allowed to fail, Pakistani public opinion would have turned more decisively against the Taliban rather than the United States, whom many blame for the insurgency's resilience. A shura council chose hard-liner Mullah Fazlullah as Hakimullah's successor shortly after his death. Fazlullahrejects talks with the government. Analysts question whether Fazlullah can maintain TTP cohesion as the first emir from outside the Mehsud tribe. The predominantly Pashtun group draws membership from all of FATA's seven agencies as well as several settled districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa in the northwest. The TTP has declared jihad against the Pakistani state, seeks to control territory, enforces sharia, and fights NATO forces in Afghanistan. "We will target security forces, government installations, political leaders, and police," AsmatullahShaheen, head of the shura council that selected Mullah Fazlullah, told Reuters, adding, "We will not target civilians, bazaars, or public places. People do not need to be afraid." It's difficult to assess the size of the Pakistani Taliban. "There are not reliable estimates of how large the TTP is, largely due to challenges associated with even defining the borders of the group and the loose-knit nature of how it is organized along either sub-tribal or sub-regional lines," CTC's Rassler says. The Pakistani Taliban has targeted security forces and civilians alike; among its most audacious attacks have been bombings of Islamabad's Marriott Hotel in September 2008, which killed at least sixty people, and Peshawar's Pearl Continental Hotel in June 2009, in which seventeen were killed. TTP expressed transnational ambitions when it claimed responsibility for a failed bombing in New York's Times Square in May 2010. 57
The Punjabi Taliban, a loose conglomeration of militant groups of Punjabi origin, gained prominence after major 2008 and 2009 attacks in the cities of Lahore, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi. The network has both sectarian and Kashmir-oriented aims. It has chafed at the Pakistani Taliban's central leadership, Jane's Intelligence Review reported in late August 2013, but is uniquely capable of "mounting complex operations in urban environments," particularly in Punjab, Pakistan's most populous and politically significant province. Border Insecurity: The porous and volatile border with Afghanistan poses the greatest threat in form of illegal movement, smuggling of arms / stolen vehicles, and drug trafficking. 10,000 to 30,000 people cross Chaman and Torkham border points daily, which include legal immigrants, traders, personnel from NGOs and NATO assets. Besides, 5000 to 6000 illegal crossings take place daily using frequented and unfrequented routes. This happens despite the fact that there are some 821 border posts held by Pakistans security forces on Pakistani side of the border and around 120 NATO and Afghan posts on Afghan side. The greatest threat along Pak- Afghan border is from movement of militant elements and drug traffickers. To increase control on Pak-Afghan Border, official immigration points along the border should be increased. There is a need to have at least one immigration point for each province so as to check the tendency of illegal crossing. In the recent past, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates and some high officials alleged that Pakistans failure to stop insurgents from Pakistani side of the border has resulted into 40 per cent rise in the militants attacks in east Afghanistan.Also stating that infiltration of insurgents in Afghanistan takes place from the safe-havens of FATA. They have also been accusing Pak Army and Pakistans intelligence agency, ISI of close contact with the Afghan Taliban. Their media has also left no stone unturned for blaming Pakistan for cross-border terrorism in Afghanistan, also involving ISI. It is mentionable that on June 1, more than 500 heavily armed militants who entered Pakistans Upper Dir area from Afghanistan killed more than 30 police and paramilitary soldiers. Police said that well-trained terrorists, who targeted a check post, also destroyed two schools and several houses with rocket and gunfire attacks, while killing a number of innocent people. The exact location of armed assault, carried out by militants, lies about 20 kilometers inside the Pakistani territory, which shares a common border with Afghan province of Kunar. 58
It is notable that during the Swat and Malakand military operations, ISPR spokesman, Maj-Gen Athar Abbas had revealed in various press briefings that a number of foreigners from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia, Libya and India including Afghans, having connections with the enemy countries were arrested. In one of briefings, he had disclosed that 400 foreign fighters were captured along with huge caches of sophisticated weapons, made of India and American-Afghan fighters had been infiltrated into Pakistan with the help of some external agencies bordering Afghanistan. Conclusion: Security is a shared responsibility of state and society. However, it is the primary obligation of the state not only to ensure security using all instruments of statecraft, but also to take on board all segments of the nation. The kind of complex internal security environment that we live in today cannot be patched up without breaking foreign nexuses. This makes a case of stronger exterior maneuver and international cooperation. Yet again, internal security can be mathematized as 90% internal expression and 10% external influence. If we put our house in order internally, we cannot fear of external manipulations. We need to move beyond a general state of denial both as a state and society. The first step is diagnosis of the problems persisting within the edi ice of our society and next comes the remedial therapy. This all is possible only if we carry out bold analysis of internal issues facing Pakistan and employ a multi-pronged strategy transparently. If done, the dream of a secure, stable and prosperous Pakistan can certainly come true. Questions a Resolution Must Answer: What absolute security plan should be implemented by the Government? How could transparency of security agencies be assured? Which is the best way to limit the manufacture and proliferation of arms in Pakistan? To what degreeshould drone attacks be permitted in Pakistans territory? What mechanism should be employed to prevent ethnic genocide? How to ensure the preventionof deterioration of order in Baluchistan? What is the most effective Deweaponization mechanism that should be in process by the Government? In what way to can target killings in Karachi be prevented? To what extent must civil intelligence agencies need to be involved? 59
What powers shall be granted to law enforcement agencies such as Police, FIA, Rangers, CID, and FIA etc.? Is negotiation with the Taliban a viable option for peace and stability in the northern areas of Pakistan? If yes, on what basis will these negotiations occur? Who will act as the negotiating parties (the PTI, the PML-N, TTP representatives, in what proportion etc.)? If no, then on what scale should there be an operation in militancy rife regions? What areas are to be targeted, how many forces are to be deployed and over what period of time? What is the future path Pakistani foreign policy needs to take with regards to growing criticism from international quarters, especially India, Afghanistan and the US, with prime focus on the War on Terror and Baluchistan? Suggest ways to improve surveillance capability and vehicle checking by posts on borders. 60