TOPIC CASE TITLE FACTS & DOCTRINE

WEEK 1
INTRODUCTION
TORT VS. QUASI-DELICT
DAMAGE, DAMAGES & INJURY
NAGUIAT vs. NLRC
Facts: Naguiat is the president and a stockholder of the Clark Field Taxi, Inc. (CFTI). Due to the
phase-out of the US bases in the coutry, Clark Air Base was closed and the taxi drivers of CFTI
were separated from service. The drivers filed a complaint for the payment of separation pay
due to the termination/phase-out. NLRC held Naguiat and the company solidarily liable for
the payment of separation pay.
Doctrine: Under the Corporation Code, Sergio F. Naguiat is liable because:
a. Sergio F. Naguiat was the president of CFTI who actively managed the business. Thus,
applying the ruling in A.C. Ransom, he falls within the meaning of employer as
contemplated by the Labor Code, who may be held jointly and severally liable for the
obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees.
b. Stockholders who are actively engaged in the management or operation of the
business and affairs of a close corporation shall be personally liable for corporate torts
unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability insurance.
Our jurisprudence is wanting to the definite scope of corporate tort. Essentially, tort
consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Simply
states, it is a breach of legal duty.
VINZONS-CHATO vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP.
Facts: Vinzons-Chato, then BIR Commissioner, issued Revenue Memorandum Circular 37-93
reclassifying the cigarettes manufactured by Fortune Tobacco as locally manufactured
cigarettes bearing a foreign brand. This made the products subject to a higher ad valorem
tax of 55% compared to 20-45%.
Doctrine: A public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in the
course of the performance of the functions of the office where the public officer (1) VIOLATED
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT under A32 CC general law with specific subject i.e. deals with
violation of constitutional rights and (2) if he/she acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence
special law with general subject i.e. all actionable acts of public officer.
Tort is a wrong, defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives injury, directly or indirectly in person, property or reputation.
CIVIL LIABILTY IN TORT IS DETERMINED BY CONDUCT and not by the mental state of the
tortfeasor.
Intention of the legislature: to create a DISTINCT CAUSE OF ACTION in the nature of tort for
violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of motive or intent of defendant.
BARREDO vs. GARCIA
Facts: A Head-on collision between a taxi and carretela resulted in the death of a 16-yr old
boy who was a passenger of the carretela. The taxi driver was convicted in a crim case but
the right to file a sep civil action was reserved. The parents of the boy sued Barredo, the
drivers employer for damages. Barredo contends that under the RPC, his liability is only
subsidiary, hence he cannot be held liable as no civil action has been filed against the driver.
Doctrine: Fontanillas single negligent act which caused the vehicular mishap produces a civil
liability arising either from a crime under the penal code or a separate responsibility for fault
under the civil code (quasi-delict), w/ a distinct legal identity from crimes. Under the civil
code, an employers liability caused by the injurious acts of his employee is primary and not
subsidiary like that of the penal code. In this case, Barredo is being sued not on the basis of
the crime but on the basis of a civil code quasi-delict (a.k.a. culpa aquilana or culpa extra-
contractual), therefore the civil code provisions on quasi-delict w/ its primary liability for
employers apply.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or
cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the
Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if
there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all
acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted
that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of
traffic when nobody is hurt.
Foundations
1. Article 365 RPC punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to
hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope
and application in actual life.
2. To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which
cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance
of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be
many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs.
3. To hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to
sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to
compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining
relief. [shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice]
4. Because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting
that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
[use of the vehicle of culpa aquiliana]
ELCANO vs. HILL
Facts: Reginald Hill, son of Marvin Hill and an emancipated minor, was charged in a criminal
complaint or killing Agapito Elcano. Reginald was acquitted on the ground that his act was
not criminal due to lack of intent to kill coupled with mistake. Thus, spouses Elcano filed a civil
action for damages.
Doctrine: The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for
quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Art. 2176 where it refers to fault or negligence, covers not only acts not punishable by law
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
CINCO vs. CANONOY
Facts: Cincos car and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by the spouses
Pepitocollided. Cinco filed a civil action for damage to property against the jeepneys driver
and operators. Thereafter, he also filed a criminal case against the jeepney driver. CFI upheld
the suspension of the civil case pending the determination of the criminal case.
Doctrine: Liability being predicated on a QD, the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent civil action as specifically provided for in Art. 2177 of the CC.
The purpose of the quasi-delict is to provide an effective route to justice (in this case, the fact
that drivers dont have enough money or income to quickly compensate the victim).
Art. 2176 of the CC is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to
property. It makes no distinction between damage to persons and damage to property.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS INC.
Vs. CA & GERONIMO
Facts: Canteen owner filed an action for damages against Coca-Cola when her business
closed rendering her jobless and destitute. She and her customers found fiber-like matter and
foreign substances in the soft-drinks (Coke and Sprite) she sold significantly affecting her sales
which led to her closing her canteen.
Coca-Cola moved to dismiss the action on the grounds of failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and prescription claiming that the action is based on a breach of warranty
(prescribes after 6 mos) and not on quasi-delict (4 years).
Doctrine: While it may be true that pre-existing contractual relations between the parties may,
as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be
deemed to arise from quasi-delict, i.e. the act which breaks the contract may also be a
quasi-delict.
Under American Law, the liabilities of the manufacturer or seller of injury-causing products
may be based on negligence, breach of warranty, tort, or other grounds such as fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH
vs. CA & GONZALES
Facts: Gonzales filed this suit for damages for the damages she incurred by reason of their
live-in relationship and the consequent breach by Baksh of their agreement to marry.
Baksh is an Iranian exchange student studying medicine at the Lyceum in Dagupan.
Gonzales is a waitress at a luncheonette. Baksh frequented the place and soon they were
introduced to each other.
Doctrine: Art 2176 is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of
willfulness or intent. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the
commission, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by
the Penal Code while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of
Art 21, would have been beyond redress.
PEOPLE vs. BALLESTEROS
Facts: The Ballesteros group allegedly gave the Algiam group dagger looks at a local dance
party. The Algiam group decided to head home instead of reacting to the provocation.
Afterwards, Algiam group was fired upon from the rear.
Doctrine: DAMAGES the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury
sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequences w/c the law imposes for
the breach of some duty or the violation of some right
CUSTODIO vs. CA & MABASA
Facts: Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2-door apartment situated in the interior part of
the street. There are 2 possible passageways. The owners of the lots where the passageways
pass through constructed an adobe fence. They constructed said fence due to an incident
when Santoss daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of Mabasas tenant.
There is also a claim where some footwear was lost and when drunken tenants banged at
their doors. The construction of the fence led to the tenants vacating the units they occupied.
Doctrine: The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. The act must not only be hurtful, but also wrongful
(damnum et injuria).
In this case, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Petitioner cannot be said
to have violated the principle of abuse of right. For the said principle to be applied, it is
essential that the following requisites concur: (1) defendant should have acted in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) acts should be willful; and (3)
presence of damage or injury to the plaintiff.
Petitioners act of construction a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as
owners. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to
enclose and fence their property (See Art.430 CC).
Whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by the Mabasas is damnum absque
injuria. There is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a
lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable
loss to another.
injury
Illegal invasion of a legal right
damage
loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered
WEEK 2
ELEMENTS OF QD
QD vs. DELICT
QD vs. CONTRACT
PNR vs. BRUNTY
Facts: Rhonda Brunty, Ethel Bruntys daughter, was travelling to Baguio with Juan Garcia &
Rodolfo Mercelita, their driver. Brunty partys Mercedes Benz and the PNR Traon collided at
the railroad crossing at Rizal, Moncada, Tarlac. As a result of the collision, Mercelita and
Brunty died while Garcia sustained serious physical injuries.
Doctrine: PNR was negligent because of its failure to provide the necessary safety device to
ensure the safety of motorists in crossing the railroad track. As such, it is liable for damages for
violating Art. 2176 CC.
In a long line of cases, the Court held that in order to sustain a claim based on quasi -delict,
the following requisites must concur:
1. damage to plaintiff;
2. negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose acts he
must respond was guilty; and
3. connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damage.
BPI vs. LIFETIME
Facts: Lifetime Marketing opened a current account with BPI. LMC sales agents would have
to deposit their collections or payment to LMC in this account. LMC and BPI made a special
arrangement that LMCs agents have to accomplish 3 copies of deposit slips with the 3
rd

copy to be retained and held by the teller for the LMC authorized representative to retrieve.
Alice Laurel, is one of LMC's "Educational Consultants" or agents. Alice Laurel deposited
checks to LMC's subject account at different branches of BPI. However, each check
deposited were retrieved by Alice Laurel after the deposit slips were machine-validated,
except thirteen (13) checks, which bore no machine validation. Alice Laurel presented the
machine-validated deposit slips to LMC which, on the strength thereof, considered her
account paid. LMC even granted her certain privileges or prizes based on the deposits she
made.
Doctrine: LMC being defrauded by one of its agents (who absconded) sought recovery from
BPI based on LMC cause of action based on tort.
There are three elements of quasi-delict:
1. fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond;
2. damages suffered by the plaintiff; and
3. (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff (causality)
GARCIA vs. SALVADOR
Facts: Salvador underwent a medical check-up from the Community Diagnostic Center.
Garcia conducted an Hepatitis B Atigen Test without the supervision of a licensed physician
or pathologist. According to the test results, Salvador was found positive for Hepatitis B thus
she was terminated from work. Salvadors father also suffered a heart attack due to said
incident.
Doctrine: Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand.
Elements of actionable conduct
1. duty
2. breach
3. injury
4. proximate causation
GREGORIO vs. CA
Facts: Datuin and Sansio Philippines filed a case against Gregorio for violation of BP 22.
Gregorio was not able to receive notice since the address stated in the complaint was
incorrect. She was indicted, arrested and detained. Later, Datuin and Sansio filed an affidavit
of desistance and so case was dismissed.
Doctrine: In Art 2176, plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of evidence: 1.the damages
suffered by him; 2. the fault or negligence of defendant; 3. the connection of cause and
effect between fault or negligence and damage suffered; 4. that there was no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties.
ANDAMO vs. IAC
Facts: Spouses Andamo owns a parcel of land which is adjacent to the lot of the Missionaries
of Our Lady of La Sallette Inc. Waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake were
constructed within private respondents property which allegedly inundiated and eroded the
Andamos land, caused a young man to drown, damaged the Andamos crops and fences
and endangered their lives and their laborers during the rainy season.
Doctrine: The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its title or
heading but by the body of the pleading or complaint itself.
Acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case except in the
event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action
arose did not exist.
Elements of Quasi-delict
1. damage suffered by plaintiff
2. fault or negligence of the defendant or some person he is responsible for
3. the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the
damage.
OCCENA vs. ICAMINA
Facts: A criminal case for Grave Oral Defamation was filed against Vegafria for her words
against Occena, which words were Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor,
malugus, Hudas. Occena, in the trial, did not reserve his right to file a separate civil action for
damages and actively intervened thru a private prosecutor. Vegafria was convicted of the
offense of Slight Oral Defamation and sentenced to pay a fine of P50. No damages were
awarded to petitioner in view of the trial courts opinion that the facts and circumstances of
the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages.
Doctrine: In criminal cases, the criminal liability is to the state while the civil liability is to the
person injured (if any).
Accordingly, where the civil action is deemed instituted (if no reservation is made or a
separate action is filed) with the criminal action, and judgment has been rendered, there are
two appeals which may be taken. The accused can appeal as regards both the civil and
criminal actions, while the complainant may appeal with respect to the civil action.
What gives rise to the civil liability: obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission whether done intentionally or
negligently, and whether or not punishable by law
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good
intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
LG FOODS vs. PHILADELFA
Facts: 7-yr old son of the spouses Vallejera died when he was hit by a car driven by Ferrer, an
employee of the LG Foods. Pending his case of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide,
Ferrer committed suicide, which caused his case to be dismissed. Respondents opted to file
an action for damages against petitioner for their negligence in their supervision and
selection of employee which caused the death of their son.
Doctrine: Victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an
action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana).
Culpa aquiliana may hold the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee;
defense of diligence of a good father of the family
Culpa criminal can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction
of its employee; requires the guilty and insolvency of the employe

CANGCO vs. MANILA
RAILROAD
Facts: Jose Cangco, alighting from a coach of Manila Railroad, stepped on some
watermelons piled on the platform in the train station and as a result of which, he slipped,
rolled under the coach, injured his arm to warrant amputation.
Doctrine: Manresa explains that culpa may mean a source of obligation between parties not
formerly connected by any legal tie and culpa as an accident in the performance of pre-
existing obligation.
The liability of employers for the negligence of employees to whom they are not bound by
contract is not based on respondeat superior but on Art. 1902.
The relationship between contractual liability and extra-contractual liability is likened to
concentric circles. When parties are bound under a contract, it doesnt mean that they are
not/cant be liable for QD.
Mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him for extra-
contractual liability.
FGU INSURANCE vs.
SARMIENTO
Facts: GPSs Isuzu truck, containing 30 units of Condura S.D. white refrigerators, collided with
an unidentified truck. Said collision resulted in damage to the cargoes. FGU, insurer of the
cargoes, paid Concepcion the value of the cargoes. Then, it sought reimbursement against
GPS.
Doctrine: In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure
of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. A breach upon the
contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that which may have
been lost or suffered. The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make
recompense to the one who has been injured unless he can show extenuating circumstances
like proof of his exercise of due diligence or of the attendance of fortuitous event.
CALALAS vs. CA
Facts: Eliza Jujeurche Sunga is a PE major at Siliman University. She took a jeep owned and
operated by Vicente Calalas. As the jeep was already full, the conductor gave Sunga a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the jeep as an extention seat. As
another passenger was getting of the jeep, Sunga had to give way. At that moment, an Isuzu
truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion
of the jeep. Sunga sustained a fracture on her leg. She was confined for two weeks and her
leg was put in a cast for a period of three months.
Doctrine: In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the
basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by
proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in the case the common
carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. In case of death or injuries to
passengers, there is a presumption of fault or negligence against common carriers unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence.
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck
was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in
actions for quasi-delict, not in actuation involving breach of contracts.
Quasi-delict source: negligence of the tortfeasor; basis of action: negligence or fault which
must be clearly established
Culpa contractual negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation; action can
be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract & the failure on the part of
the obligor to perform his obligation
BATAL vs. SAN PEDRO
Facts: The spouses Luz and Kenichiro then contracted the services of Frank Batal (Frank) who
represented himself as a surveyor to conduct a survey of their lot for the sum of P6,500.00. The
Batal spouses were contracted for doing a survey by the respondents in order to place a
perimeter fence around their lot. However, Frank being not a licensed Geodetic Engineer
made mistakes in the survey which resulted to an encroachment of the fence into an
adjacent lot: resulting to damage to the respondents.
Doctrine: Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses: either as
1. culpa aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates
a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons NOT formally
bound by any other obligation. Culpa aquiliana is governed by Article 2176 of the Civil
Code and the immediately following Articles. OR
2. as culpa contractual, which is the fault or negligence incident in the performance of
an obligation which already existed, and which increases the liability from such already
existing obligation. Culpa contractual is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same
Code.
FORES vs. MIRANDA
Facts: Miranda was riding a passenger jeepney owned by Fores. The jeep was descending
the Sta. Mesa bridge too fast, got out of control and hit the bridge wall Miranda was badly
injured.
Doctrine: In culpa-contractual, no element of fault or negligence on the part of the obligor
need be alleged so long as there is a breach by that party. it is the breaching party who has
the burden to prove that the breach was due to fortuitous event. In quasi-delict, fault or
negligence on the part of the injurer must be proven by the injured, along with the damages
he suffered and that the negligent act of the other was the proximate cause of his injury.
In culpa-contractual, the carrier cannot escape liability by proving that he exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervisions of his employees unlike in quasi-delict.
FAR EAST vs. CA
Facts: Luis Luna got a credit card from Far East Bank, and had a supplemental card. The
supplemental card was lost and so the bank put both credit cards as hot cards, as per
companys internal security policy. Luna was not informed about this policy and tried to use
his card to pay for a despedida lunch, but the card was dishonored. Bank tried to make
amends but Luna still sued it.
Doctrine: Test to determine whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie a breach of
contract: where without a pre-existing contract between the parties, an act or omission can
nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself.
If cause of action is based on contract, and without the contract an act or omission cannot
by itself be an actionable tort, then malice or bad faith must be proved in order to recover
damages.
Bad faith includes gross, but not simple negligence; implies a conscious and intentional
design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will
AIR FRANCE vs.
CARRASCOSO
Facts: Rafael Carrascoso, civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino piligrims to
Lourdes. Air France, through Philippine Airlines Inc., issued to Carrascoso a first class round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, Carrascoso traveled at first
class but at Bangkok, the manager asked him to vacate his seat because there was a white
man who had a better right to the seat. Carrascoso refused and there was a commotion
until he finally transferred.
Doctrine: Bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose.
Air Frances contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of
Carrascosos action as we have said is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation
of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
PSBA vs. CA
Facts: Carlos Bautista, a third year commerece student enrolled at PSBA, was stabbed inside
the premises of PSBA. It was established that his assailants were elements from outside the
school.
Doctrine: A2180 plainly provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by
pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils
or students while in its custody. This material situation does not exist in the present case.
Instead, PSBAs liability is for breach of contract. When an academic institution accepts
students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral
obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes
to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. They also must meet the
implicit obligation of providing their students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in
attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can be
properly educated when there looms in the school premises a constant threat to life and
limb.
SYQUIA vs. CA
Facts: When the Syquias were to transfer the remains of Vicente Juan, they discovered that
the coffins concrete vault had a hole from w/c muddy water flows out. The coffin & the
remains were destroyed by water, soil, and silt. The Syquias argue that Manila Memorial is
liable for either breach of contract or QD.
Doctrine: If there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, liability is based on
a breach of contract and not QD. In the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, the
diligence to be observed is that of a good father of a family.
Negligence omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and
corresponds with the circumstances of the person, time and place
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT vs.
NAVIDAD
Facts: Nicanor Navidad, drunk, entered EDSA LRT, after paying his fare and getting his token,
and stood on the platform near the LRT tracks. A security guard, Junelito Escartin,
approached Navidad after which a fistfight ensued. Navidad fell on the tracks and died
immediately when he was struck by the incoming train, driven by Rodolfo Roman.
Doctrine: The duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not
only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and
where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high
diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the
safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the
services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the
common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
When an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source
of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be
said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers:
1. through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or
2. on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the
common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission
3. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been
negligent, and

by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still
establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts
upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force
majeure.
CONSOLIDATED BANK vs. CA
Facts: LC Diazs messenger was instructed to deposit with Solidbank. He had to leave since he
still has to make a deposit with Allied Bank so he left the passbook with Teller No. 6. When he
returned, Teller No. 6 gave the passbook to another person. An unauthorized withdrawal of
PhP 300,000 was made against the savings account of LC Diaz.
Doctrine: In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a
presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to
prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In culpa aquiliana, the plaintiff has the burden of
proving that the defendant was negligent.
WEEK 3
CONCEPT OF NEGLIGENCE
STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR
CHILDREN, EXPERTS & MEDICAL
PROFESSIONALS
PICART vs. SMITH
Facts: The plaintiff was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an automobile ahead he improperly
pulled his horse over to the railing on the right. As the defendant neared the bridge, he blew
his horn to give warning of his approach. He gave two more successive blasts as he saw that
the man on horseback was not observing the rule of the road. The driver of the automobile
guided his car toward the plaintiff without diminution of speed until he was only a few feet
away. He then turned to the right but passed so closely to the horse that the latter being
frightened, jumped around and was killed by the passing car.
Doctrine: The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby
injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: Would a prudent man, in
the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person
injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued. If so, the law
imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precaution against its
mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of
harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is the constitutive fact
of negligence.
PNR vs. BRUNTY
Doctrine: This Court has previously determined the liability of the PNR for damages for its
failure to put adequate safety measures. Such failure is evidence of negligence and
disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance requiring it because
public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.

SICAM vs. JORGE
Facts: Lulu V. Jorge pawned several pieces of jewelry with Agencia de R.C. Sicam to secure a
loan in the total amount of 59,500. Two armed men entered the pawnshop and took away
whatever cash and jewelry were found inside the pawnshop vault.
Doctrine: The very measures which petitioners had allegedly adopted show that to them the
possibility of robbery was not only foreseeable, but actually foreseen and anticipated.
Petitioner Sicams testimony, in effect, contradicts petitioners defense of fortuitous event.
Citing Cruz v Gangan, the court defined NEGLIGENCE as the omission to do something which
a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs, would do; or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man
would not do. It is want of care required by the circumstances.
Petitioners own testimony revealed that there were no security measures adopted by
petitioners in the operation of the pawnshop.
PNR vs. CA & AMORES
Facts: Jose Amores was driving his car along Kahilum St., Pandacan. When he crossed the
railroad tracks, he was hit by a PNR train. Jose Amores died as a result of this collision. There
was neither a signal nor crossing bar at the intersection of the street w/ the railroad to warn
motorists of an approaching train. There was only a defective standard signboard Stop,
Look, and Listen, which was dilapidated. Furthermore, despite applying the brakes right
before impact, the train still dragged Joses car a distance of 10 meters.
Doctrine: PNR is responsible not only for failing to put the adequate warning signs at the
railroad crossing, but also for the negligent act of its train driver Borja in speeding. This liability
proceeds from the juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. This primary liability can
only be negated by showing due diligence, something which has not been done by PNR in
this case.
Negligence- the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby
such other person suffers injury.
CORINTHIAN GARDENS vs.
SPOUSES TANJANGCO
Facts: Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco own Lots 68 and 69, located at Corinthian
Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which managed by Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc.
Frank and Teresita Cuaso own lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos lots. Because a
relocation survey is necessary before the Cuasos could construct a house, Corinthian referred
Engr. De Dios to them. De Dios conducted all the previous surveys of Corinthian. After the
Cuasos constructed their house employing the service of C.B. Paraz & Construction as builder,
their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot 69 by 87 square meters.
Doctrine: Test to determine existence of negligence: Did the defendant in committing the
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would
have used in the same situation? Existence of negligence is not determine by reference to
the personal judgment of the actor in the situation but the law considers what would be
reckless, blameworthy or negligent in a man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability according to that standard.
By its Manual and Rules and Regulations, Corinthian, through its representative, in the
approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections of on-going
construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in ensuring compliance with the
approved plans. By its own rules, Corinthian imposes its authority over all it members, not
allowing constructions without its approval. If the inspection is merely table inspection and
the approval granted to every member is mere formality, then the purpose of the rules would
be defeated.

TAYLOR vs. MANILA
RAILROAD
Facts: David Taylor is a 15-year old boy who is described to be mature intellectually and
physically for his age. A son of a mechanical engineer, he has worked as a cabin boy for a
ship when he was thirteen, has worked as a mechanic and has considerable aptitude and
training in mechanics. At the Manila Electric power plant, the two boys found twenty to thirty
brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground which they gathered and brought home. The
caps are explosives which are detonated by the use of electricity. Along the way, they met a
girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9, who went with them to Manuels house where they tried
to ignite the caps by inserting the wires of the caps into the electric sockets and hitting them
with a hammer and stones. They finally succeeded by opening the caps and igniting the
powder inside with a match. The three were injured. David lost one of his eyes due to the
injuries.
Doctrine: The care and caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity
only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of the case. The law
fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it
negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such
acts. Plaintiff was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to
understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which
would have avoided the injury which resulted for his own deliberate act. Although the owner
of the premises was negligent leaving the caps exposed n its premises, plaintiffs own act was
the principal and proximate cause of the accident.
JARCO MARKETING vs. CA
Facts: Criselda and Zhieneth (Z for short) were mother and daughter. They were shopping in
Syvels Department Store in Makati. Criselda was signing her credit card when she felt a
sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her and saw that her
daughter Z was pinned beneath the stores gift wrapping counter/structure.
Doctrine: An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence
attaches. It is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without
any human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which
under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected.
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.
Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused
by fault of any person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested
by common prudence.
A person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory
negligence as a matter of law. And even if it was she who caused the incident by climbing
the counter, it would not have occurred if the base was stable.

YLARDE vs. AQUINO
Facts: In Gabaldon Primary School, Aquino, deciding to help his fellow teacher bury huge
concrete blocks (remnants of the old school shop destroyed during WWII), ordered his pupils
(initially 18, only 4 the next day) to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in order to make a
hole wherein the stone can be buried. When hole was deep enough, Aquino ordered the
children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went to get some rope. Before
leaving, Aquino allegedly told the children not to touch the stone. A few minutes after he
left, 3 of the kids, including Ylarde, jumped into the pit and played while the remaining kid,
jumped on top of the block causing it to slide down towards the opening. Only Ylarde was
hurt (pinned to the wall in a standing position) as the other two were fast enough to jump out.
3 days later, Ylarde died.
Doctrine: Aquinos fault and gross negligence is clear based from the following facts:
1. He failed to hire manual laborers instead of utilizing his pupils
2. He required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging
knowing the block was lying nearby and could easily slide
3. He ordered the children to level the soil around the excavation when he knew the
block was at the brink of falling
4. He went to a place where he would not be able to check on the childrens safety.
5. He left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
Only 10 yrs old at the time, Ylardes death cannot have caused his own death by his own
reckless imprudence. At his age hes expected to be playful and daring, which is natural to a
boy his age.
The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person
endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as
an adult, but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of
his age and experience.
The standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree
of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge
and experience under the same or similar circumstances.
CULION vs. PHILIPPINE
MOTORS
Facts: Culion had the engine of Gwendoline (motor schooner) changed. Quest of Phil Motors
did the job. He was skilled in automobile & tractor engines. The connection bet the fuel tank
& the carburetor was problematic, fuel leaked and dripped to the engine compartment and
the floor. A backfire occurred, the engine was covered w/ flames, and the whole boat was
burned.
Doctrine: When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things that require
professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care & skill of one
ordinarily skilled in the work that he attempts to do.
Quest didnt use the skill that wouldve been exhibited by an expert in gasoline boat engines
o Quest had experience in fixing automobile & tractor engines but it doesnt show
that he was experienced in boat engines.
o Perhaps this is the reason why he took the matter of the fuel leak lightly something
that would make boat engine experts do greater & adequate precautions against
danger.
The burning of Gwendoline was not an unavoidable accident. It wouldnt have occurred if
not for Quests carelessness or lack of skill. The test of liability is not whether the injury was
accidental in a sense, but whether Quest was free from blame.

US vs. PINEDA
Facts: Pineda, a pharmacist and drug store owner, gave the wrong prescription for race
horses. Instead of giving potassium chlorate, he gave Santos barium chlorate. When Santos
gave the supposed potassium chlorate solution to 2 of his sick horses, the horses died shortly
afterwards.
Doctrine: The profession of pharmacy is one demanding care and skill. The care required must
be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the
superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells.
According to the Supreme Court of Kentucky, the legal maxim applicable to druggists is
caveat venditor instead of caveat emptor. That is, let him be certain that he does not sell to a
purchaser or send to a patient one drug for another. If he does these things, he cannot
escape civil responsibility, upon the alleged pretexts that it was an accidental or an innocent
mistake; that he had been very careful and particular, and had used extraordinary care and
diligence in preparing or compounding the medicines as required. Such excuses will not avail
him.
The delivery of a poisonous drug by mistake by the druggist is prima facie negligence thus
placing the burden on him to show that the mistake was under the circumstances consistent
with the exercise of due care.
The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and
the vendee do not stand at arms length as in ordinary transactions.
For the druggist, mistake is negligence and care is no defense.
MERCURY DRUG vs. DE LEON
Facts: Judge de Leon noticed that his left eye was reddish and that he had difficulty reading.
He met a balikbayan doctor friend who prescribed Cortisporin Opthalmic and Ceftin for
his eye problem. The following morning, he bought the prescription at Mercury Drug. The
pharmacist assistant, petitioner Aurmela Ganzon, gave him Cortisporin Otic Solution.
Doctrine: The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and druggists must exercise
care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. A
druggists mistake, under the most favorable aspect for himself, is negligence. And such
mistake cannot be countenanced or tolerated, as it is a mistake of the gravest kind and of
the most disastrous effect. There exists an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take
precaution to prevent death or injury to any person who relies on ones absolute honesty and
peculiar learning. It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public
interest. This cannot be more real for Mercury Drug, the countrys biggest drugstore chain. This
Court cannot tolerate any form of negligence which can jeopardize the health and safety of
its loyal patrons.

CRUZ vs. CA
Facts: Lydia Umali, the victim was examined by the Dr. Cruz who found a "myoma in her
uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation. After the operation, outside the
operating room Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank,
gasping for breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and they have to get it from a
nearby hospital. In the evening, Lydia went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to
60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so
she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. Upon Lydia's arrival at the San
Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room, however, she still died out of
"Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" but in the latter part, the expert testimony
said that t is due to hemorrhagic shock.
Doctrine: For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and
care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion.
The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization
that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable
of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the
circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive of conduct falling below the
standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing the same
operation. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted,
as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the
necessary precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his
clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert
opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench.
Admitted qualification of physician presumption of necessary precaution, employing the
best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients
Burden shifts to prosecution to produce expert testimony to rebut presumption.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the
treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by
other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of
medical science.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES vs.
AGANA
Facts: Mrs. Agana went to Medical City Hospital complaining of bloody anal discharge and
difficult bowel movement. She diagnosed there by Dr. Ampil who said that she had cancer of
the sigmoid. Surgical sponges are left inside the surgical incision after the operation. Mrs.
Agana suffered from excruciating pain therefrom afterwards.
Doctrine: Traditionally, professionals such as doctors working in hospitals were not considered
employees within the meaning of Article 2180 of the civil code because their work was not
within the control of the hospitals. However, recent developments in medical care and
jurisprudence in the US as well as here has abandoned that view. Once a physician
undertakes the treatment and care of a patient, the law imposes on him certain obligations.
In order to escape liability, he must possess that reasonable degree of learning, skill and
experience required by his profession. At the same time, he must apply reasonable care and
diligence in the exercise of his skill and the application of his knowledge, and exert his best
judgment.
Standard of care for hospitals/health care providers reasonable, prudent health care
provider
CANTRE vs. GO
Facts: Dr. Milagros Cantre is a specialist in Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Dr. Jesus
Delgado Memorial Hospital. She was the attending physician of Nora Go. Nora suffered
profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta which were not
completely expelled from her womb at delivery. Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in
drop of her blood pressure to 40over 0. While she was massaging Noras uterus for it to
contract and stop bleeding, she ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby. Nora
remained unconscious until she recovered. While in the recovery room, Noras husband John
David noticed a fresh gaping wound 2 & by 3 & inches in the inner portion of Noras left
arm, close to the armpit. The nurse informed him it was a burn.
Doctrine: In cases of medical negligence, res ipsa loquitor allows mere existence of injury to
satisfy a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls instruments
causing the injury.
CAYAO-LASAM vs. SPOUSES
RAMOLETE
Facts: Cayao-Lasam is the doctor of Editha Ramolete, three months pregnant, who was
brought to the Lorma Medical Center in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal bleeding. She
was admitted to LMC upon advice of Cayao-Lasam via phone. Two pelvic sonograms were
performed on Editha revealing the fetuss weak cardiac pulsation and no fetal movement.
Cayao-Lasam advised Editha to undergo a Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or
raspa which she performed on Editha. In the operating room, Cayao-Lasam was very vocal
about not finding an abortus but since Editha had said she had passed a meaty mass,
Cayao-Lasam assumed that the abortus had already been expelled. Editha was
subsequently discharged and was advised to return for a check-up which she failed to do.
After 1 months, Editha againt went to the LMC complaining of vomiting and severe
abdominal pains. She was found to have a massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage and a
ruptured uterus. A hysterectomy was performed, removing her uterus. As a result, she could
never bear a child again.
Doctrine: Medical malpractice, in our jurisdiction, is often brought as a civil action for
damages under Art. 2176. (Editha did not file a civil suit with a lower court. Rather, she and
her husband filed a Complaint with the PRC.) As Edithas physician, Cayao-Lasam was duty-
bound to use at least the same level of care that any reasonably competent doctor would
use to treat a condition under the same circumstances.

LUCAS vs. DR. TUANO
Facts: Peter Lucas went to see the Dr Tuano at St Lukes. He complained of conjunctivitis (sore
eyes) in his right eye. He told the doctor that he had been suffering of it for 9 days already
and that he had been taking MAXITROL, a steroid based eyedrop. Dr Tuano prescribed
Spersacet-C eyedrops. When Lucas returned, the sore eyes had cleared up, but he had
developed Epidemic Kerato Conjunctivitis (EKC) in the same eye. MAXITROL was prescribed
for him. When he returned, the EKC had subsided and so the dosage was lowered. Upon
another return however, it had recurred and progressed and he was again told to increase
dosage of MAXITROL.This continued for about 2 months. It was during this time that his wife
read the accompanying literature of MAXITROL saying that prolonged use may result in
GLAUCOMA. Upon another visit to Dr Tuano, it was discovered that the intraocular pressure
(IOP) in his right eye was way above the normal level. He was told to stop MAXITROL and use
DIAMOX to lower IOP. Seeking a second opinion, he saw Dr Aquino who was a specialist in
Glaucoma. He was diagnosed with STEROID INDUCED GLAUCOMA and had to undergo laser
trabeculoplasty to attempt to control the high IOP of his eye.
Doctrine: A standard of conduct must first be established in a patient-physician relationship
for there to be any possibility of a finding of breach.
In this case, no expert testimony was offered by Lucas. He did not produce the doctors he
saw, in order for them to establish the standard of conduct needed in the medical profession,
particularly in the field of opthalmology. This knowledge is best known to the experts of the
field. As there was no standard established, it could not be said that Dr Tuano was negligent
and that he breached his duty as a physician. His assertion that he was prudent in the
performance of his duties, as he performed testing every time he saw Lucas but did not
detect any adverse reaction, is not disputed by the evidence, and must stand.
WEEK 4
DEGREES OF NEGLIGENCE
BURDEN OF PROOF &
PRESUMPTIONS
RES IPSA LQUITUR
AMEDO vs. RIO
Facts: Seaman drowned trying to retrieve his 2-peso bill. Wife sued to recover but the case
was dismissed.
Doctrine: Notorious negligence has been held to be tantamount to gross negligence.
Gross negligence is define to be the want of even slight care and diligence.
By gross negligence is meant "such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the
person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness, and is indifferent,
or worse, to the danger of injury to person or property of others." ... The negligence must
amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or property."
It cannot be denied that in jumping into the sea, one mile and a half from the seashore of
Arceli, Dumarang, Palawan, Filomeno failed to exercise "even slight care and diligence," that
he displayed a "reckless disregard of the safety" of his person, that he could not have been
but conscious of the probable consequences" of his carelessness and that he was "indifferent,
or worse, to the danger of injury.
MARINDUQUE IRON MINES
vs. WORKMENS
Facts: Mamador and other laborers of MIMA boarded the companys truck on its way to the
Talantunan mine camp. While trying to overtake another truck on the company road, the
truck turned over & hit a coconut tree. Mamador died & the others were injured.
Doctrine: Gross negligence implies conscious indifference to consequences pursuing a
course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury utter disregard of
consequences. The violation of the companys prohibition to ride the trucks is evidence of
negligence. But getting a free ride on the truck isnt gross negligence no risk apparent.
ILAO-ORETA vs. RONQUILLO
Facts: Spouses Ronquillo is still childless. They consulted Dr. Concepcion Ilao-Oreta, an
obstetrician-gynecologist-consultant at St. Lukes and Chief of the Reproductive
Endocrinology and Infertility Section. Eva Marie agreed to undergo a laparoscopic
procedure. Dr. Ilao-Oreta did not arrive at the schedules time and no prior notice of its
cancellation was received by the Ronquillos. Dr. Ilao-Oreta was on her honeymoon in Hawaii.
Doctrine: Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or
diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences
without exercising any effort to avoid them. It is characterized by want of even slight care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other
persons may be affected.
Records show that Dr. Ilao-Oreta left an admitting order with her secretary for one of the
spouses to pick up, apprised Eva Marie of the necessary preparations for the procedure and
instructed the hospital staff to perform pre-operative treatments before leaving for Hawaii.
These acts reflect an earnest intention to perform the procedure on the day and time
scheduled.
It is common knowledge that excitement attends its preparations. Her negligence could then
be partly attributed to human frailty which rules out its characterization as gross.
LAYUGAN vs. IAC
Facts: Layugan was repairing the tire of a cargo truck loaded with 10 big round logs, which
was parked along a National Highway. Godofredo's Isuzu truck, driven by Serrano, bumped
the parked truck and pinned Layugan to the ground causing injuries to his left forearm and
left foot (his leg had to be amputated due to gangrene).
Doctrine: Negligence Defined
"The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by the personal judgment of
the actor in a given situation; It is the law that determines what would be reckless or
negligent. The Law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man
of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that."
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur Defined
The thing speaks for itself.
Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon
proof that instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that
the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence.
Rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from
mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident and
circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in absence of negligence it
would not have occurred and that thing which caused injury is shown to have been
under management and control of alleged wrongdoer.
Under this doctrine, the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence
where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that injury was caused by an agency or
instrumentality under exclusive control and management of defendant, and that the
occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if
reasonable care had been used.
When it can be invoked
The doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved,
direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
It has generally been held that the presumption of inference arising from the doctrine
cannot be availed of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or
presents evidence as to the specific act of negligence which is the cause of the injury
complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of the
accident and all the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly
appear.
Once the actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, whether by the
plaintiff or by the defendant, no presumptions will be involved and the doctrine
becomes inapplicable when the circumstances have been so completely eludicated
that no inference of defendant's liability can reasonably be made, whatever the
source of the evidence, as in this case.
RAMOS vs. CA
Facts: Erlinda was advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall
bladder which she did under the supervision of Dr. Hosaka and Dr. Gutierrez. Dr. Hosaka was
the head surgeon, who chose Dr. Gutierrez as the anesthesiologist for the operation. Dr.
Gutierrez committed a mistake in intubating the patient resulting to the patient's nailbed
becoming bluish and the patient, thereafter, was placed in trendelenburg position, because
of the decrease of blood supply to the patient's brain. The evidence further shows that the
patient suffered brain damage because of the absence of oxygen in her brain for
approximately four to five minutes which, in turn, caused the patient to become comatose.
Doctrine: Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself. The phrase res ipsa loquitur is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference
or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present
a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing which caused
the injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his
servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not happen if those
who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by
the defendants want of care.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of
common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may
justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality
causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with
negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and on the
basis of such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the
mere occurrence of the accident itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction with
the doctrine of common knowledge.
However, much has been said that res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and, as
such, does not create or constitute an independent or separate ground of liability. Instead, it
is considered as merely evidentiary or in the nature of a procedural rule. It is regarded as a
mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience since it furnishes a substitute for, and
relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing specific proof of negligence. In other words,
mere invocation and application of the doctrine does not dispense with the requirement of
proof of negligence.
Elements of res ipsa loquitur
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones
negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated
First, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally occur in the
process of a gall bladder operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not happen in the
absence of negligence of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of
endotracheal tube.
Second, the instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal
tube, were all under the exclusive control of the physicians-in-charge.
Lastly, Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence because she was under
the influence of anesthetics which rendered her unconscious.
TAN vs. JAM TRANSIT
Facts: Tan is the owner of a passenger-type jitney driven by Ramirez & w/c was loaded w/
balut and salted eggs. The Jam Transit bus was bound to Manila & was driven by Dimayuga.
The jitney was hit by the bus, along an intersection while the bus was overtaking the jitney.
Doctrine: Res ipsa loquitur can still apply even when there is evidence presented provided
that such is not direct evidence. No direct evidence was presented as to the exact position
of the bus & the jitney during the collision. These may only be inferred from the pictures of the
vehicles taken after the incident.
Requisites of res ipsa loquitur
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones
negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or
defendants; and
3. 3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated.
CANTRE vs. GO
Doctrine: Requisites of res ipsa loquitur
1. the accident is a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones
negligence;
2. it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant/s;
3. 3. possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is
eliminated
BATIQUIN vs. CA
Facts: Dr. Batiquin performed a caesarian operation of Villegas. Patient experience much
pain after the operation and submitted hersef to another surgery. She was found to have an
ovarian cyst on both ovaries and a piece of rubber material was embedded on the right side
of her uterus.
Doctrine: Res ipsa loquitor "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care."
Black's law dictionary: The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that
defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that [the] instrumentality causing injury was
in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinary does not
happen in absence of negligence.
Nature - not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case,
is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable
negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall be prima
facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of the duty
of due care.
When it can be invoked: when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available
Res ipsa loquitur was applied even with the presentation of Dr. Khostestimony since it did not
amount to direct evidence.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES vs.
AGANA
Doctrine: Requisites of Res Ipsa Loquitur (the thing speaks for itself):
1. occurrence of an injury
2. the thing which caused the injury was under the control and management of the
defendant
3. the occurrence would not have happened in the ordinary course of things if those in
control and management used proper care
4. the absence of explanation of defendant
DM CONSUNJI vs. CA
Facts: Jose Juego, a construction worker of DM Consunji, fell 14 floors while working in the
elevator core of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building. He was then on a steel platform
(attached to a chain block through 4 cable wires on each corner) which fell. According to
the police report of the officer who investigated the mishap, the accident was caused
because there was no safety lock which fastened the platform and the chain firmly together.
What was used was merely a pin, inserted in between the chain and the wires. The
unfastening or getting loose of the pin, which was inevitable, then caused the platform to
fall along with Juego.
Doctrine: As a rule of evidence, the doctrine is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes
a substitute for specific proof of negligence.
A theoretical basis is necessity the necessity of evidence which is absent or not available. (in
this case, the defendant can prove it was negligent or prudent, but the plaintiff has no way of
doing either)
The requisites of Res Ipsa Loquitur, all present in the case at bar, are:
1. The accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent
(no worker is going to fall from the floor of a building to the basement while performing
work in a construction site unless someone is negligent);
2. The instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control
of the person charged with negligence (the construction site with all its paraphernalia
and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and
management of Consunji); and
3. The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured (No contributory negligence was attributed to the
deceased worker).
COLLEGE ASSURANCE vs.
BELFRANLT
Facts: CAP and CACP leased several units on the second and third floors of a building owned
by Belfranlt. Fire destroyed the portions of the building including the 3d floor units occupied by
the petitioners. Field investigation by an unnamed arson investigator disclosed that the fire
originated from the store room occupied by CAP due to an accident involving an
overheated coffee percolator.
Doctrine: Bare denial is not adequate defense under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Requisites of res ipsa loquitur
1. the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2. the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3. the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on
the part of the person injured.
WEEK 5
DEFENSES AGAINST CHARGE OF
NEGLIGENCE
PLAINTIFFS NEGLIGENCE IS
PROXIMATE CAUSE
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF
PLAINTIFF FORTUITOUS EVENT
PLAINTIFFS ASSUMPTION OF RISK
[VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA]
MANILA ELECTRIC vs.
REMOQUILLO
Facts: Antonios media agua was leaking & so Efren came to his 3-story house to repair it. The
media agua was below the window, parallel to it was the Meralco electric wires. Efren was
standing on the media agua. His son, through the window, handed him a 3x6 galvanized
iron sheet to cover the leaking portion of the media agua. Unfortunately, the lower end of the
iron sheet came into contact with the Meralco electric wires. He was electrocuted & he died.
Doctrine: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by w/c the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the
injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such
injury wouldnt have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances w/c result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent
act or condition is the proximate cause (corpus juris).
The principal and proximate cause was Efrens reckless & negligent act of turning around and
swinging the iron sheet w/o taking any precaution.
BERNARDO vs. LEGASPI
Facts: The CFI of Manila dismissed the complaint and cross-complaint filed by both Bernardo
and Legaspi brought about by the collision between their automobiles. CFI of Manila found
both of them negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a
character and extent that would prevent them both from recovering.
Doctrine: Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness contributes to
the principal occurrence, i.e. the accident, as one of the determining causes thereof, he
cannot recover. Since both of them contributed to the determining cause of the accident by
their negligent acts, neither can recover.
BERNAL vs. HOUSE
Facts: The procession of Holy Friday was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso, plaintiff,
with her 5 y/o daughter Purificacion Bernal came to attend the religious celebration. The little
girl was allowed to get a short distance in advance of her mother and her friends. When in
front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., an automobile appeared from
the opposite direction which so frightened the child that she turned to run, with the result that
she fell into the street gutter. At that time there was hot water in this gutter or ditch coming
from the Electric & Ice Plant of J.V. House. When the mother and her companions reached
the child, they found her face downward in the hot water. She died.
Doctrine: The mother and the child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing
abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one
could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child
running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.
PLDT vs. CA
Facts: Spouses Esteban filed action for damages for injuries sustained when their jeep ran over
a mound of earth and fell into an open trench, an excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT
for the installation of its underground conduit system. The Court held that the accident which
befell private respondents was due to the lack of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban
and was not imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.
Doctrine: A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of
proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive of
negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence. Whosoever relies on
negligence for his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of proving the existence
of the same if contested, otherwise his action must fail.
The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, but to the unexplained abrupt
swerving of the jeep (of Spouses Esteban) from the inside lane. The presence of warning signs
could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to
inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. With the drizzle, he
should not have run on dim lights, but should have put on his regular lights which should have
made him see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time. If he was running on the outside lane at 25
kilometers an hour, even on dim lights, his failure to see the ACCIDENT MOUND in time to
brake the car was negligence on his part. The ACCIDENT MOUND was relatively big and
visible, being 2 to 3 feet high and 1-1/2 feet wide. If he did not see the ACCIDENT MOUND in
time, he would not have seen any warning sign either. He knew of the existence and location
of the ACCIDENT MOUND, having seen it many previous times. With ordinary precaution, he
should have driven his jeep on the night of the accident so as to avoid hitting the ACCIDENT
MOUND. xxx The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site
of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted
act would have prevented the injury.
NPC vs. HEIRS OF CASIONAN
Facts: NPC has high-tension 69 KV electrical transmission lines in Itogon, Benguet. In one area
there, the transmission lines are only 8-10 feet from the ground where there is a trail regularly
used by members of the community. Noble Casionan and his friend were walking along said
trail carrying bamboo poles to be used for their pocket mining operations when Nobles pole
accidentally touched the exposed high-voltage wire. He died instantly of electrocution.
Doctrine: Violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the proximate
cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was intended to
be prevented by the statute. Xxx To determine xxx negligence, it is not sufficient to rely solely
on the violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine xxx behavior in
relation to the contemporaneous circumstances of the accident.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal
cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to
conform for his own protection. There is contributory negligence when the partys act showed
lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in
danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person
injured which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the
injury.
GENOBIAGON vs. CA
Facts: Eighty-one year old Rita Cabrera was crossing the street. The woman started to cross
when the first rig was approaching her, but as Genobiagon's vehicle was going so fast not
only because of the steep down-grade of the road, but also because he was trying to
overtake the rig ahead of him, the appellant's rig bumped the old woman at the right side of
T. Padilla Market. The woman, as a consequence, fell at the middle of the road. Genobiagon
continued to drive on, but a by-stander, one Vicente Mangyao, who had just closed his store
in the market in order to celebrate the coming of the New Year, and who saw the incident
right before him, shouted at the appellant to stop.
Doctrine: The alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the
accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases
committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another
to evade the effects of his own negligence.
MH RAKES vs. ATLANTIC
Facts: M.H. Rakes is a negro laborer for Atlantic who was at work transporting iron rails from a
barge in the harbor to the companys yard near the Malecon in Manila using a hand car on
a track. Due to a defect in the track, the car sagged and the rails slid off and caught Rakes,
breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee. He sued for damages.
Doctrine: Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the event
itself without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not
entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own proper hurt. Xxx Where he
contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover.
Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury,
less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence.
LAMBERT vs. HEIRS OF RAY
Facts: , Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan City and
borrowed the latters motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around
Iligan City. Ray drove the motorcycle. At around past 10pm, after eating supper at Honas
Restaurant and imbibing a bottle (or two) of beer, they traversed the highway towards
Tambo at a high speed. Upon reaching Brgy. Sto Rosario, they figured in an accident with a
Tamaraw jeepney, owned by Nelen Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot. The jeepney
was traveling in the same direction, but as it approached the road where it was to turn left, it
veered to the right for allowance. Ray who was following closely behind, instinctively veered
to the left but it was also the moment when the jeep sharply turned to the left towards the
side of the road.
Doctrine: The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly
responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear
the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the
damages actually caused by his negligence. Xxx [The] circumstances, although not
constituting the proximate cause of his demise and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same
result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered and determined in terms of
percentages of the total cause.
JUNTILLA vs. FUNTANAR
Facts: Juntilla is a passenger of a jeepney, driven by Camoro, registered under the franchise
of Fontanar, but was actually owned by Banzon. En route to Cebu City from Danao City, the
right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. The plaintiff who was sitting at the
front seat was thrown out of the vehicle, causing him to lose consciousness and to suffer
several bodily injuries. [passenger who lost his Omega watch]
Doctrine: A caso fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: 1) The cause of the
unforeseen and unexpect occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his
obligation, must be independent of the human will. 2) It must be impossible to foresee the
event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to
avoid. 3) The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his
obligation in a normal manner. And 4) the obligor (debtor must be free from any participation
in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
The accident was caused either through the negligence of the driver or because of
mechanical defects in the tire. Common carriers should teach their drivers not to overload
their vehicles, not to exceed safe and legal speed limits, and to know the correct measures to
take when a tire blows up thus insuring the safety of passengers at all times.
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE vs.
CA
Facts: The Dimaanos own a house on the same street as petitioners 4-storey school building.
Typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila. During the typhoon, the roof of the College was partly
ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of the
Dimaanos.
Doctrine: The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which
defines it as an event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen.
Escriche elaborates it as an unexpected event or act of God which could neither be
foreseen nor resisted. Civilist Arturo M Tolentino adds that fortuitous events may be
produced by two general causes: 1) by nature xxx and 2) by the act of man xxx.
The person seeking exoneration from liability must not be guilty of negligence. The facts
constitutive of negligence must be affirmatively established by competent evidence and not
merely by presumptions & conclusions w/o basis of fact.
A typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event. It may be foreseen but may not be avoided despite
foresight, diligence or care. The Dimaanos merely relied on Engr. Reynas ocular inspection.
They did not bother to present to the court the structural plans of the buildings. Neither di d
they show any deviation from that plan. Typhoons always hit the country and if the roofings
werent firmly anchored to the trusses, the building wouldnt have lasted years & several
typhoons stronger than Saling. Typhoon Saling, a fortuitous event, was the proximate cause of
the damage to the Dimaanos house. Thus, no damages may be awarded to them.
SICAM vs. JORGE
Doctrine: When the effect is found to be partly the result of a persons participation whether
by active intervention, neglect or failure to act the whole occurrence is humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

COLLEGE ASSURANCE vs.
BELFRANTL
Doctrine: If the negligence or fault of the obligor coincided with the occurrence of the
fortuitous event, and caused the loss or damage or the aggravation thereof, the fortuitous
event cannot shield the obligor from liability for his negligence.
AFIALDA vs. HISOLE
Facts: Loreto Afialda was employed by the spouses Hisole as the caretaker of their carabaos
for a fixed compensation. While tending the animals, Afialda was gored by one carabao.
Doctrine: The resolution of this case hinges on the proper interpretation of Article 1905 of the
Civil Code. The statute names the possessor or user of the animal as the person liable for any
damages it may cause. Said possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and
is therefore the one in a position to prevent it from causing damage. The carabao was in the
custody and under the control of Afialda.
Being injured by the carabao was one of the risks of the occupation which he had voluntarily
assumed and for which he must take the consequences. [veritable accident of labor]
ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC vs.
CA
Facts: Because typhoon Gening, there was flooding in Laoag City. Between 5:30 and
6:00am, when the floodwater was receding, Isabel Lao Juan ventured out of the house of her
son-in-law on Guerrero St. to look after damaged merchandise in Five Sisters Emporium, which
she owns. While wading through a waist-deep floodwater, Isabel Lao Juan screamed Ay
and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but fear dissuaded them
from doing so because on the spot where the deceased Isabel Lao Jaun sank they saw an
electric wire dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water.
Doctrine: A person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a
known danger he must abide by the consequences (volenti non fit injuria), if an emergency is
found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his
endangered property.
NIKKO HOTEL vs. ROBERTO
REYES
Facts: Roberto Reyes aka Amay Bisaya filed action for damages under the human relations
provisions of the Civil Code against Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim for allegedly causing him a
traumatic experience when Ms. Lim asked him to leave a party (he was not invited; he was
helping Dr. Filart carry the fruit basket).
Doctrine: The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not esteemed in
law as injury) refers to self inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger,
even if he is not negligent in doing so.
where he was not invited by the celebrant. Thus she (and Nikko) is not liable under Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and
expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a
very close distance.
Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and
discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the
contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible.
Mr. Reyess version of the story is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who
alleges proves.
PRESCRIPTION
KRAMER vs. CA
Facts: F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by Ernesto Kramer was navigating its way from
Marinduque to Manila when the boat figured in a collision with another vessel, the M/V Asia
Philippines owned by Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B
Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish catch.
Doctrine: The right of action to bring suit accrues when there exists a cause of action, which
consists of 3 elements, namely
1. a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is
created
2. an obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right
3. an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff
The prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, that is,
the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff, which is
the time when the cause of action arises.
In this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need
not wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry, that the
collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action
for damages.
WEEK 6
PROXIMATE/REMOTE/CONCURRENT
CAUSE
EFFICIENT INTERVENING CAUSE
BUT FOR/SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST
CAUSE vs. CONDITION
BATACLAN vs. MEDINA
Facts: At 2AM, while bus was running very fast on a highway, one of the front tires burst and
vehicle began to zigzag until it fell into a ditch and turned turtle. Four of its passengers could
not get out of the overturned bus. It appeared that as the bus overturned, gasoline began to
leak from the tank on the side of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the
bus and the ground under and around it. About 10 men, one of them carrying a lighted
torch, approached the overturned bus to help those trapped inside, and almost immediately
a fierce fire started, burning all four passengers inside.
Doctrine: Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion,
all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal
connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent
and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

GABETO vs. ARANETA
Facts: Basilio Ilano and Proceso Gayetano took a carromata near Plaza Gay in the City of
Iloilo to go to a cockpit in Calle Ledesma. When the driver, Julio Pagnaya turned his horse
and started in the direction indicated, Agaton Araneta stepped out into the street, and
laying his hands on the reins, stopped the horse, protesting that he had called the carromata
first. Pagnaya replied that he did not see Araneta and at the same time, pulled on the reigns
of the bridle to free the horse from Araneta. Because the harness of the bridle was either
loose or rotten, the bit came out of the horses mouth. Pagnaya then got out in order to fix
the bridle and the horse was pulled into the curb. The horse, being free from the control of the
bit, moved forward, pulling one of the wheels up on the sidewalk and pushing Pagnaya over.
The horse continued to move forward and the carromata hit a telephone box which fell over.
The crash of the box frightened the horse and it ran at full speed up the street. Basilio Ilano
had alighted from the carromata beforehand but Gayetano was still inside. When the horse
reached the front of the Mission hospital, Gayetano jumped and sustained injuries that killed
him.
Doctrine: The stopping of the rig by Araneta in the middle of the street was too remote from
the accident that presently ensued to be considered the legal or proximate cause thereof.
The driver was the person primarily responsible for the control of the animal, and the
defendant cannot be charged with liability for the accident resulting from the action of the
horse thereafter
FAR EASTERN SHIPPING vs.
CA
Facts: M/V Pavlodar, owned and operated by Far Eastern Shipping Company, arrived at the
Port of Manila. It was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port. Capt. Abellana was
assigned by the Philippine Ports Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Senen
Gavino was assigned by the Manila Pilots Association to conduct docking maneuvers for the
safe berthing of the vessel to Berth 4. One-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine
stopped. At about 2,000 feet from the pier, he ordered the anchor dropped. However, the
anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion
ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the
crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured
Gavino that there was nothing to it. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold,
he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron, noticed that
the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not
take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the full-astern code. Before the right anchor and
additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the
pier causing considerable damage to the pier and the vessel.
Doctrine: [N]egligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an
injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other
than plaintiffs, is the proximate cause of the injury. Xxx Where several causes producing an
injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have
happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had
against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it
may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the
injured person was not the same.
There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them
are liable for the total damage.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION vs.
IAC
Facts: Dionisio, going home from a party, bumped a dump truck. His headlights were turned
off to avoid getting caught since he has no curfew pass. Thus, he was not able to see a dump
truck parked in a protruding manner on the side of his road. He suffered injuries due to the
collision.
Doctrine: So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents
which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite impossible to
distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as invariably the
case, the latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. Xxx Even the
lapse of a considerable time during which the condition remains static will not necessarily
affect liability. Xxx Cause and condition still find occasional mention in the decisions; but
the distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer
to the type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in
a position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not
the distinction between cause and condition which is important, but the nature of the risk
and the character of the intervening cause.
Dionisios negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it
were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and
the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.
If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular
circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to
guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason. Xxx In all of these
cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendants conduct to produce the
result, and in each case the defendants negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff
against that very risk. Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact
that the risk or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has
subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the
scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendants negligence. Xxx The risk created by
the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable negligence of others.
Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission o feach
party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of
the community.
DY TEBAN vs. JOSE CHING
Facts: A three-way collision occurred among a passenger bus, a prime mover w/ trailer, and
a Nissan van. The prime mover was parked at the side of the road hours after a tire blowout,
the trailer was still skewed to the main road. The bus tried to avoid the trailer & thus swerved to
the other lane. The Nissan van, coming from the other lane, tried to avoid the bus. In the end,
both the bus and the Nissan van hit the prime mover.
Doctrine: There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff must,
however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury.
That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or
injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or omission.
The skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate cause of the collision. The skewed
parking of the prime mover triggered the series of events that led to the collision, particularly
the swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van.
According to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent
acts or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in
combination, the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person and it is
impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury, either is responsible
for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not have caused the entire injury, or the
same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tortfeasor.
MERCURY DRUG vs. BAKING
Facts: Dr. Sy prescribed to Baking Diamicron for his blood sugar and Benalize tablets for his
triglyceride. Baking proceeded to the Mercury Drug Alabang Branch to buy his medicines.
The saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum, which is
a potent sleeping tablet. Unaware that he was given the wrong medicine, Baking took one
pill of Dormicum on 3 consecutive days. On the third day he took the medicine, Baking
figured in a vehicular accident. He fell asleep while driving resulting in his car colliding with
Josie Peraltas car. He could not remember anything about the collision nor even felt its
impact.
Doctrine: Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would
not have occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case,
upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy, and precedent.
The vehicular accident could not have occurred had Mercury Drugs employee been careful
in reading Dr. Sys prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, it is unlikely that
Baking would fall asleep while driving his car.
PILIPINAS BANK vs. CA
Facts: Florencio Reyes asked PCIBs manager to deposit P32k to his current account in
Pilipinas Bank to fund checks he issued postdated Oct. 10 and 12, 1978. Upon presentment of
said checks, they were dishonored due to insufficient funds. The Pilipinas Bank teller deposited
said amount into the account of another person with the first name Florencio. The court
held that the negligence of the teller in not reading Reyess last name was the proximate
cause of the injury suffered by Reyes. Pilipinas Bank was held liable for moral damages and
attorneys fees.
Doctrine: The concept of proximate cause is well defined in our corpus of jurisprudence as
any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the result complained of and without which would not have occurred and
from which it ought to have been foreseen or reasonably anticipated by a person of ordinary
case that the injury complained of or some similar injury, would result therefrom as a natural
and probable consequence.
URBANO vs. IAC
Facts: Javier was hacked by Urbano using a bolo (Urbanos palay was flooded with water
from the irrigation canal which Javier opened). Javier sustained a wound on his right palm
when he parried the blow using said hand. Javier and Urbano, however, agreed to settle their
differences. On the 22
nd
day after the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital where he
eventually died the next day. Information was filed against Urbano for Homicide.
Doctrine: The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing
with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victims death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us
to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening
cause later or bdtween the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection
was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. Xxx There is a likelihood that the wound was
but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions,
with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javiers death with which the petitioner
had nothing to do.
Death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused.
PRIOR AND REMOTE CAUSE cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there INTERVENED between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause
MCKEE vs. IAC
Facts: When the McKees were about to cross a bridge along the highway, 2 boys suddenly
darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. The boys were moving
back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose
blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the other lane of the highway
(opposite direction), he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and
thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with a truck
driven by Galang and loaded with two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000
kilos. The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said
bridge.
Doctrine: No negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary
prudent man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away
from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such
immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the vehicle in the
opposite lane would be several meters away and could very well slow down, move to the
side of the road and give way to the oncoming car.
Under what is known as the emergency rule, one who suddenly finds himself in a place of
danger, and is required to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted
to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method, unless the
emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Considering the
sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, Jose Koh adopted the best
means possible in the given situation to avoid hitting them.
MANILA ELECTRIC vs.
REMOQUILLO
Doctrine: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the
injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the
injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such
injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in
the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the
proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
TEAGUE vs. FERNANDEZ
Facts: City ordinance requires that for 2-storey buildings, there must be 2 stairways of 1.2
meters width. The beauty school only had one stairway with width of 1.5 m on its second
floor. When a fire broke out in a nearby store, students of the school panicked and rushed out
of the building through the stairway. A stampede occurred and four students died as a result.
Doctrine: The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered
remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of
the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or
ordinance was intended to prevent.
But take note, to consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury
does not portray the situation in its true perspective. It would be more accurate to say that
the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the
ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one.
And thus, the principle of proximate cause applies to such violation.
PHILIPPINE RABBIT vs. CA
Facts: A jeepney owned by spouses Mangune and operated by Manalo was carrying
passengers to Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan from Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The
passengers were going to Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan for the holidays. On the way, the
right rear wheel of the jeepney came loose. Manalo applied the brakes and the jeepney
swerved to the opposite lane, doing a complete U-turn as it did so and was then bumped
from behind by a Rabbit Bus driven by delos Reyes. Three passengers died while the rest
suffered physical injuries. Both drivers were charged with Multiple Homicide.
Doctrine: It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actors conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw
nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not
prevent him from being liable.
RODRIGUEZA vs. MANILA
RAILROAD
Facts: Rodrigueza and 3 others houses were along the railroad line of the company.
Rodriguezas house was of strong materials, although the roof was covered with nipa and
cogon. The others houses were of light construction. One day, one of its trains passed over
said line, and a great quantity of sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive.
Fire was thereby communicated to the four houses and the same were entirely consumed. It
is alleged in the brief of the company that the fire was first communicated to the house of
Rodriguea, from whence it spread to the others, although this is not proven.
Doctrine: The proximate and only cause of the damage was the negligent act of the
defendant in causing that fire. The circumstance that Rodriguezas house was partly on the
property of the defendant and therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was
an antecedent condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that
circumstance cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence to bar his right of action.
First, the condition was not created by himself; second, his house remained on this ground by
the toleration and therefore consent of the company; third, even supposing that his house
was improperly there, this fact would not justify the defendant in negligently destroying it.
The circumstance that the company upon planting its line told him to remove his house did
not convert his occupancy into a trespass, or impose upon him any additional responsibility
over and above what the law itself imposes in such situation. It must be remembered that the
company could at any time have removed said house in the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, but it elected not to do so.
WEEK 7
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
PICART vs. SMITH
Doctrine: Where both parties are guilty of negligence, but the negligent act of one succeeds
that of the other by an appreciable interval of time, the one who has the last reasonable
opportunity to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the
consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party.
The law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails
to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party.
BUSTAMANTE vs. CA
Facts: The sand & gravel truck and the passenger bus were approaching each other on
opposite lanes at the highway in Tanza Cavite. They were about 30m away when bus driver
saw that the truck was on the wrong lane (bus lane) and that the trucks front wheels of were
wiggling. He ignored it thinking that the truck driver was just joking. Bus driver shifted from 4
th

to 3
rd
gear to gain acceleration uphill in order to overtake the hand tractor before it. While
overtaking the tractor, the truck & bus sideswiped each other at their left sides. The front left
side (barandilla) of the truck ripped off the left sidewall of the passenger bus from drivers seat
to the last rear seat. Bus passengers were thrown out & died. Truck skidded towards the bus
lane & landed on a residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling it.
Doctrine: The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the
defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence.
As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of
avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third
person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences
of the accident.
The principle of last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier
to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence.

PHOENIX vs. IAC
Facts: Dionisio, going home from a party, bumped a dump truck. His headlights were turned
off to avoid getting caught since he has no curfew pass. Thus, he was not able to see a dump
truck parked in a protruding manner on the side of his road. He suffered injuries due to the
collision.
Doctrine: It is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil
Code of the Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in common law was to
mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule that of contributory
negligence. The common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all
by a plaintiff who was negligent, even if the plaintiffs negligence was relatively minor as
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. The common law notion of last
clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent
provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the causalty and failed to
do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance
doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory
negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has
been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
PHIL. BANK OF COMMERCE
vs. CA
Facts: RMC is in the business of selling appliances. It has two separate current accounts with
the Pasig Branch of PBC. Romeo Lipana, Pres. and GM of RMC, entrusted the aforementioned
amount of RMC funds in cash to his secretary Irene Yabut. Instead of depositing them in the
current accounts of RMC, she deposited them in her husbands (Bienvenido Cotass) account
who also has an account with the same bank. Irene Yabut's modus operandi is far from
complicated. She would accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit slip, an original and a
duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current
account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband
but the name of the account holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would,
however, validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of these deposit slips
retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the duplicate slip.
Doctrine: Under the doctrine of last clear chance (also referred to, at times as supervening
negligence or as discovered peril), Phil. Bank of Commerce was indeed the culpable party.
This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it is impossible to determine
whose fault or negligence should be attributed to avoid the impending harm and failed to
do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.

GLAN vs. IAC
Facts: A jeep (owned by Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc.) driven by Engineer Orlando
T. Calibo (husband and father of private respondents) with Agripino Roranes, and Maximo
Patos as passengers, approached from the South Lizada Bridge towards the direction of
Davao City. The cargo track, loaded with cement bags, GI sheets, plywood, driven by
defendant Paul Zacarias, coming from the opposite direction of Davao City and bound for
Glan, South Cotabato, had just crossed said bridge. At about 59 yards after crossing the
bridge (slight curve), the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of which
Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical injuries. Zacarias was unhurt.
As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left side of
the jeep, including its fender and hood, was extensively damaged.
Doctrine: The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to
accident liability.
From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial
doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at
that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away
from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only
thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of
avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right to expect, as the Appellate Court would
have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.
PANTRANCO vs. BAESA
Facts: Baesa family and friends were in a private jeepney going someplace to celebrate the
wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses. They had just entered the highway, been on it for
about two meters when a speeding Pantranco bus encroached on the jeepneys lane while
negotiating a curve and collided w/ it. Several of the Baesas and friends were killed while the
others were badly injured. The driver of the Pantranco bus, Ramirez, fled the scene and was
never heard from again.
Doctrine: For the doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who
allegedly had the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the existence of the
peril or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it. One cannot be expected to
avoid an accident or injury if he does not know or could not have known the existence of the
peril.
This Court has held that the last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.
CANLAS vs. CA
Facts: Canlas sold 2 parcels of land to Maosca. In turn, Maosca issued him 2 checks for
850,000. Upon receipt of checks, Canlas delivered to Maosca the transfer certificates if title
of the parcels. Later, one of the checks written by Maosca for 450,000 bounced. Maosca
using the transfer certificate of titles, obtained a loan from the bank with the subject parcels
of land as collateral. Two impostors posing as the spouses Canlas were procured by Maosca
in order to apply for the loan.
Doctrine: The antecedent negligence of a person does not preclude the recovery of
damages caused by the supervening negligence of the latter, who had the last fair chance
to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.
Assuming that Osmundo Canlas was negligent in giving Vicente Manosca the opportunity to
perpetuate fraud, by entrusting to latter the owners copy of the transfer certificates of title of
subject parcels of land, it cannot be denied that the bank had the last clear chance to
prevent the fraud, by the simple expedient of faithfully complying with the requirements for
banks to ascertain the identity of the persons transacting with them.
CONSOLIDATED BANK vs. CA
Doctrine: We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. Solidbank is
liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its contractual
obligation to LC Diaz. This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the
defendant from liability.

ENGADA vs. CA
Facts: Iran was driving a Tamaraw bound for Iolilo City. On board was the owner, Seyan. While
traversing the road along Barangay Acquit, Barotac Nuevo, the Tamaraw passengers saw
from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by Engada. When it was 30
meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzus right signal light flashed, at the same time, it
swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-
on collision with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up, and so Iran swerved to the left.
Unfortunately, the pick-up also swerved to its right at this moment. The two vehicles collided,
with the Tamaraw being hit at its right front passenger side. The Tamaraws head and chassis
separated from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield.
The pick-up stopped diagonally astride the center of the road.
Doctrine: An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to
act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought
about by his own negligence.
No convincing evidence was adduced by petitioner to support his invocation of the [doctrine
of last clear chance]. Instead, what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and
the proper application of the emergency rule. Xxx There was no clear chance to speak of.
PNR vs. BRUNTY
Doctrine: The proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of
petitioner, we hold that the last clear chance doctrine finds no application in the instant
case.
Where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is appreciably later than that
of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused the loss,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so i s chargeable
with the loss.
LAPANDAY vs. ANGALA
Facts: Pickup was on the outer lane when it took a left-turn. Crewcab driving fast behind the
pickup. Crewcab bumped into the pickup along the north-bound lane of Agdao, Davao
City. The crewcabs left door, front left fender and front bumper were damaged.
Doctrine: In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. Since
Deocampo was driving the rear vehicle, he had full control of the situation since he was in a
position to observe the vehicle in front of him. Deocampo had the responsibility of avoiding
bumping the vehicle in front of him. Xxx Deocampo could have avoided the vehicle if he was
not driving very fast while following the pick-up.
WEEK 8
TORTFEASOR
WORCESTER vs. OCAMPO
Facts: This action arising from civil liability for a libel charge stemmed from the editorial article,
Birds of Prey and the previous malicious persecutions and attack on Worcester in the El
Renacimiento and Muling Pagsilang.
Doctrine: Joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage,
advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of
it after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same
extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves.
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The person
injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damage
caused by all, and all are together jointly liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for
one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act are not joined with him
as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant as
compared with that of the others.
Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be apportioned among them,
except among themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of
each paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the full amount.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY

CHAPMAN vs. UNDERWOOD
Facts: Along Calle Herran, there was single-track street-car line with occasional switches to
allow cars to meet and pass each other. One of these switches was located at the scene of
the accident, subject of this litigation. J.H. Chapman was trying to board a San Marcelino
car trough the rear platform when he was struck by Mr. James Underwoords automobile,
which was at that time driven by his chauffer.
Doctrine: As we have said, the driver does not fall within the list of persons in article 1903 of the
civil code for whose acts the defendant would be responsible. An owner who sits in his
automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a violation of the law by the
performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity to observe them
and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for such acts. Xxx
On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the owner
having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or
violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time
the act was committed, is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefore. The act
complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that
the owner, by his acquiescence, makes his drivers act his own.
CAEDO vs. YU KHE THAI
Facts: Marcial Caedo, with his family, was driving his Mercury car on his way from his home in
Quezon City to the airport, where his son Ephraim was scheduled to take a plane for Mindoro.
Coming from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael
Bernardo at the wheel, taking the owner from his Paraaque home to Wack Wack for his
regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at fairly moderate speeds, considering the
condition of the road and the absence of traffic. Ahead of the Cadillac, going in the same
direction, was a caretella owned by a certain Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing
another horse by means of a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side
and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian Bautista. The Mercury was coming on its own
lane from the opposite direction. Bernardo, instead of slowing down or stopping altogether
behind the carretela until that lane was clear, veered to the left in order to pass. As he did so
the curved end of his car's right rear bumper caught the forward rim of the rig's left wheel,
wrenching it off and carrying it along as the car skidded obliquely to the other lane, where it
collided with the oncoming vehicle.
Doctrine: The basis of the masters liability in civil law is not respondeat superior but rather the
relationship of pater familias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if
known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence
if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.
No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his master. Negligence on
the part of the latter, if any, must be sought in the immediate setting and circumstances of
the accident, that is, in his failure to detain the driver from pursuing a course which not only
gave him clear notice of the danger but also sufficient time to act upon it.
Car owners are not held to a uniform and inflexible standard of diligence as are professional
drivers. Xxx The test of his (car owner-employer) negligence, within the meaning of Article
2184, is his omission to do that which the evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in
order to avoid the accident. Xxx [A] maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to
one passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
PARENTS/GUARDIANS

EXCONDE vs. CAPUNO
Facts: Dante Capuno, 15 years old, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School, was
instructed by the city schools supervisor to attend a parade in honor of Rizal in San Pablo
City. From the school, the students boarded a jeep, and when it started to run, Dante took
hold of the wheel, while the driver sat on his left side (remember that the steering wheel is at
the LEFT side). The jeep turned turtle and 2 passengers died. Delfin Capuno, the father, was
not with Dante at the time of the accident, nor did he know that Dante was going to attend
a parade. He only found out after the accident when Dante told him about it.
Doctrine: The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the minor children who live
with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise
over them which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them, keeping them in
their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means, while (sic),
on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only
way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family.
SALEN vs. BALCE
Facts: Carlos Salen (single) died due to wounds caused by Gumersindo Balce, 18, single and
living with Jose Balce, his father. Gumersindo was convicted of homicide and was sentenced
to imprisonment and to pay Carlos heirs indemnity. But Gumersindo was insolvent, hence
Severino Salen and Elena Salbanera (Salens), the parents (and heirs) of Carlos, demanded
from Jose to pay but he refused.
Doctrine: It is true that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly
liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an imbecile, an insane, under 9
years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment, unless it
appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits
the act under any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability. Xxx But a minor
over 15 who acts with discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the
Code is silent as to the subsidiary liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that
case, resort should be had to The general law which is our Civil Code.
To hold that (Article 2180) does not apply to the instant case because it only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes
the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no
liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Verily, the void that
apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular provision of our Civil
Code xxx.
This is a typical case of parental subsidiary liability arising from the criminal act of a minor son.

ELCANO vs. HILL
Doctrine: It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint
and solidary liability of parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the
obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from
causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in
providing that a minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued
without the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. And
surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor
child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does
not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering of real
property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their consent.

LIBI vs. IAC
Facts: Wendell Libi and Julie Ann Gotiong were lovers of 2 years. Julie Ann decided to break
with Wendell because according to her, he was sadistic and irresponsible. The two were
found dead in the Gotiong residence, with one gunshot each. A gun, registered in the name
of Wendells dad, Cresencio Libi, was found in the scene of the crime. The gun was the same
gun kept in the safety deposit box of the spouses. There were two keys, one kept by each
spouse. That of the wifes was always kept in her purse, and this was a fact known to Wendell.
Doctrine: Our concern (on the categorization of their liability as being subsidiary, and not
primary) stems from our readings that if the liability of parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of
their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil
liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered
direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense.
We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as
contemplated in Article of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply
Article 2194 of said code which provides for solidary liability of joint torfeasors, the persons
responsible for the act or omission, in this case the minor and the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable. Accordingly, such parental liability is
primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180 provides that the
responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for such damages is
buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be
answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency
of the former.
Parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal
offenses committed by their minor children under their legal authority or control, or who live in
their company, unless it is proven that the former acted with the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent such damages. Xxx With regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years
of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such
primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to article 2180 of the Civil Code.
TAMARGO vs. CA
Facts: The petition to adopt Adelberto Tamargo, the minor who shot Jennifer Tamargo, was
granted only after such shooting incident occurred. Adopters claim that Adelbertos natural
parents are the proper parties to the civil case filed by the parents of Jennifer. Adelbertos
natural parents claim that the adopters must be the proper parties or that parental authority
retroacts to the filing of the petition for adoption.
Doctrine: The principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently designated as
vicarious liability, or the doctrine of imputed negligence under Anglo-American tort law,
where a person is not only liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed
by others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible. Thus,
parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the duties and responsibilities of
parents their parental authority which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining
of the child.
The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the Court xxx in the following
terms: With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or
omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect and our Legislature has so elected to
limit such liability to cases in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is
morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability,
without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the
negligence of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual liability with
certain well-defined exceptions to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed
to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise
due care in ones own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and
control of ones agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reasons of their status,
occupy a position of dependency with respect to the operson made liable for their conduct.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor children living with them,
may be seen to be based upon the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortuous act, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and
natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control. Parental liability
is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental
education in the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental
dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be overturned under Article
2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.
No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents xxx could have
arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed.
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in the adopting parents
during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely
because the adopting parents are given actual custody of the child during such period.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
TEACHERS MERCADO vs. CA
Facts: Augusto lent his pitogo to another classmate who lent it to another classmate. All of
them didnt know that Augusto was the owner of the pitogo. When Manuel saw that Augusto
was trying to get it from the borrower, Manuel intervened. Augusto was enraged & pushed
Manuel. Manuel, in turn, pushed Augusto. Augusto got a razor & cut Manuel on the cheek.
Doctrine: It would seem that the clause so long as they remain in their custody,
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these
circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass
from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the
pupil. Xxx The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not appy, nor
does paragraph 2 of said articles, which makes father or mother responsible for the damages
caused by their minor children.
Even if we assume that said court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict when it
imposed the moral damages, yet the facts found by said court indicate that Augustos
resentment, which motivated the assault, was occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had
tried to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of Mercado to get his pitogo from Renato.
Xxx The proximate cause of the injury caused to Quisumbing was Quisumbings own fault or
negligence for having interfered with Mercado while trying to get the pitogo from another
boy.
PALISOC vs. BRILLANTES
Facts: During the recess, Cruz and Daffon were working on a machine while Palisoc was
merely looking at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a
foreman. Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon gave Palisoc a strong flat blow
on the face followed by a fistblow in the stomach. Palisoc retreated to avoid fistblows but
Daffon followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block
which caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. Despite the first
aid, he was not revived. He died even after being brought to the hospital.
Doctrine: The rational of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortuous acts of
their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a
certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to
exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child. Xxx In the law of torts, the
governing principle that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well
as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the students activities during the
whole time that they are at attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take
the necessary precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and hazards
that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that some student themselves may
inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students. The lower court therefore erred in
law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be held liable
under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his
classmate and victim lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of
the school. As stated above, the phrase used in the cited article so long as (the students)
remain in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that
for such liability to attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortioys act must live and
board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well
as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be deemed to have been set aside by the
present decision.

AMADORA vs. CA
Facts: Alfredo Amadora was a 17 y/o graduating student at the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos. 3 days before the commencement exercises, he was shot and killed by a fellow
student, Pablito Daffon in the school auditorium. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru
reckless imprudence.
Doctrine: The court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to
all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than
technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will
attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first part of the provision. This is
the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and
only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other words, teachers
in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in
nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of
reddendo singula singulis, teachers should apply to the words pupils and students and
heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word apprentices.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of alegitimate student right, and even in the
enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the
student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in
the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and
atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the
school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a
position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and actual physical control but
refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result
of such influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the parent
shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the premises of the school at any
time when its authority could be validly exercised over him.
The teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent, who will be liable
only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the
student under him regardless of the students age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached
to the teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of
age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.

SALVOSA vs. IAC
Facts: Jimmy Abon, the killer, was the duly appointed armorer of the Baguio Colleges
Foundation ROTC. He received his appointment from the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Not
being an employee of the BCF, AFP also pays his salary and gives him orders. He was also a
commerce student of the same school. Abon shot Napoleon Castro - a student of the
University of Baguio - with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the
ROTC Unit of the BCF. Castro died and Abon was convicted of homicide by Military
Commission No. 30 of AFP.
Doctrine: In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not at attendance in the school cannot
be in recess thereat. A recess, as the concept is embraced in the phrase at attendance in
the school, contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where
the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school
premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does
not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a
school without more does not constitute attending school or being in the protective and
supervisory custody of the school, as contemplated in the law.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY vs.
CARPITANOS
Facts: Sherwin Carpitanos was on a school field trip riding a jeep driven by a school mate. The
jeep turned turtle and Sherwin dies. His parents sue the school, the driver, the drivers parents,
and the jeep owner for damages. Court rules that St Marys is not liable for damages since it
was proven that the immediate cause of the accident was not the negligence of St Marys or
the reckless driving of the student, but the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep. Arts. 218 and 219 under which St Marys was sought to be held responsible does not
apply because it wasnt the negligent act of their student w/c was the proximate cause of
the accident.
Doctrine: However, for the petitioner (St Marys) to be liable, there must be a finding that the
act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused
because the negligence, must have a causal connection to the accident.
The special parental authority under 218, FC applies to:
1. the school, its administrators and teachers
2. the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care
This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions, and other affairs of the pupils and students
outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers.
Under 219, FC, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental
authority are principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor under their supervision, instruction or custody.
WEEK 9
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
OWNERS/MANAGERS OF
ESTABLISHMENTS
EMPLOYERS
PHIL. RABBIT vs. PHIL.
AMERICAN
Facts: Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck, owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along
the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and thus the truck bumped the bus driven by
Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc.
Doctrine: We are of the opinion that those terms (employers and owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise) do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be
gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term manager (director in the Spanish
version) is used in the sense of employer. xxx No tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be
fastened on Balingit as manager xxx because he himself may be regarded as an employee
or dependiente of his employer xxx.
PHILTRANCO vs. CA
Facts: Ramon Acuesta was riding his easy rider bicycle along Gomez St. of Calbayog City.
Perpendicular to Gomez St. was Magsaysay Blvd. where a Philtranco bus, being driven by
defendant Rogasiones Manilhig, was being pushed by people, from behind and from the
side, to jumpstart the bus. As the bus was pushed, its engine started and continued to move
at the exact moment that Acuesta was directly in front of the bus. The running motion was
enhanced by the starting of the engine and Acuesta was bumped and run over by the bus
which did not stop but continued to go towards the direction of Rosales Bridge and towards
one end of Gomez St.
Doctrine: We have consistently held that the liability of the registered owner of a public
service vehicle xxx for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct,
and joint and several or solidary with the driver. xxx Since the employers liability is primary,
direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover
what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to
the action based on quasi-delict.
LAMPESA vs. DE VERA
Facts: De Vera Jr boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Baguio City. It was driven by
Modesto Tollas, and owned by Felix Ramos. Upon reaching the Km. 4 marker of the national
highway, the jeepney came to a complete stop to allow a truck, owned by Lampesa and
then being driven by Copsiyat, to cross the path of the jeepney in order to park at a private
parking lot on the right side of the road. As Tollas began to maneuver the jeepney slowly
along its path, the truck, which had just left the pavement, suddenly started to slide back
towards the jeepney until its rear left portion hit the right side of the jeepney. De Vera, who
was seated at the front passenger seat and holding on to the handle of the right side of
jeepney, noticed his left middle finger got cut off.
Doctrine: Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption
instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or supervision of said
employee. To rebut this presumption, the employer must present adequate and convincing
proof that he exercised care and diligence in the selection and supervision of his employees.
An employer xxx was duty bound to do more. He should have carefully examined (the
drivers) qualifications, experiences and record of service, if any. (He) must also show that he
exercised due supervision over (the employee) after his selection.
SPOUSES JAYME vs. APOSTOL
Facts: An Isuzu pick-up truck, driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of
Koronadal, registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but was then in the possession of
Ernesto Simbulan, and ridden by Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato, accidentally
hit Marvin Jayme, a minor, who was crossing the National Highway on Poblacion, Polomok,
South Cotabato. The intensity of collision sent Marvin some 50 ms. from the point of impact
indicating that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident. Despite
medical attention, Marvin died after six days due to the severe head injuries.
Doctrine: To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the following
requisites must be established: 1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally
or through another; 2) That the service to be rendered (is) in accordance with orders which
the employer has the authority to give at all times; and 3) That the illicit act of the employee
was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.
An employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the
employer to another person or entity because control over the employee subsists.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to
Lozano, he still cannot be held liable. xxx Mere giving of directions to the driver does not
establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render on the
employer of the driver. Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow
employee although the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicles
operation. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious
liability, the drivers negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only
happens to be an occupant of the vehicle.
The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in
governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. xxx It has already been remarked
that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence
to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in
the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be
shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued,
the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
TAN vs. JAM TRANSIT
Doctrine: Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi
patris families in the section (sic) (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its
employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by its employee, an employer must
overcome the presumption, by presenting convincing proof that he exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.
In this case, aside from the testimony of Dimayuga, JAM did not present any other evidence,
whether documentary or testimonial, in its favor. Inevitably, the presumption of its negligence
as Dimayugas employer stands and it is, thus, solidarily liable for the damages sustained by
petitioner.

SALUDAGA vs. FEU
Facts: Joseph Saludaga was a 2
nd
year FEU-Law student when he was shot by Alejandro
Rosete, a security guard on duty. Rosete said that it was acciental FEU filed a 3
rd
party
complaint against its security services contractor to indemnify them for whatever would be
adjudged in favor of Saludaga. Saludaga sued FEU for damages for breach of student-school
contract, for not having provided a safe & secure environment and an atmosphere
conducive to learning.
Doctrine: Respondents cannot be held liable for damages under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code
because respondents are not the employers of Rosete. The latter was employed by Galaxy.
The instructions issued by respondents Secuirity Consultant to Galaxy and its security guards
are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the contract for services
entered into by a principal and a security agency. They cannot be construed as the element
of control as to treat respondents as the employers of Rosete.
Where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or
security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or
harmful acts committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to
the clients or customers of such agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a security
agency has no hand in selecting who among the pool of security guards or watchmen
employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be
demanded from the client whose premises or property are protected by the security guards.

CASTILLEX vs. VASQUEZ
Facts: Romeo So Vasquez was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda.
He was travelling counter-clockwise, the normal flow of traffic, but without any protective
helmet or goggles. Benjamin Abad, a Production Manager of Castilex Industries Corp, drove
the said car out of the parking lot of Goldies Restaurant where he had some snacks after
working overtime and had a chat with his friends. Instead of going around the Osmea
Rotunda, he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to general
Maxilom St. or to Belvic St. A collision occurred between the motorcycle and Toyota Hi-Luz
Pick-up. Vasquez sustained severe injuries as a result of the collision.
Doctrine: The phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry
found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the
employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his
employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task.
4
th
paragraph
owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or
on the occasion of their functions
5
th
paragraph
employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry
encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned
task
expansion of paragraph 4 in both employer coverage and acts included
negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or
industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned
task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the
occasion of their functions

Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or From Meals
employee is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his employment in the absence of
evidence of some special business benefit to the employer
evidence that by using the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals, an employee
is enabled to reduce his time-off and so devote more time to the performance of his
duties supports the finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his
employment while so driving the vehicle
Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or From Work
traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or concern of
the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer
in the absence of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere
performance of the services available at the place where he is needed, the employee
is not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's
motor vehicle
special errand or roving commission employee continues in the service of his employer
until he actually reaches home
employer is not liable, even if the employee is deemed to be acting within the scope
of his employment, when the employee has left the direct route of his work or back
home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own
Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
employer is not generally liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle
during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a
regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as
business purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer

FILAMER vs. IAC
Facts: Potenciano Kapunan, Sr., an 82 y/o retired schoolteacher (now deceased), was struck
by the Pinoy jeep owned by petitioner Filamer and driven by its alleged employee, Funtecha,
as Kapunan, Sr. was walking along Roxas Ave., Roxas City. Funtecha was a working student,
being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was assigned to clean the
school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day. Having a student
driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and was allowed, to take over the
vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. The place where Allan lives
is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the
house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian
Institute.
Doctrine: The clause within the scope of their assigned tasks for purposes of raising the
presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of
the infliction of the injury or damage. Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle
derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a presumptive liability of the employer is
determined by nswering the question of whether or not the servant was at the time of the
accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business.
He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that the (employer)
may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving
at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the (employer).
Supervision includes the formation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of its
employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public
and persons with whom the employer has relations through his employees. An employer is
expected to impose upon its employees the necessary discipline called for in the
performance of any act indispensable to the business and beneficial to their employer.
NPC vs. CA
Facts: A convoy of four dump trucks owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC) left
Marawi City bound for Iligan City. One of the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a
head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The incident resulted in the death of three persons
riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical injuries to seventeen other passengers.
Doctrine: It is apparent that Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code will
determine the liability of NPC in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person for any
negligent act of the employees of the labor-only contractor. This is consistent with the ruling
that a finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that
an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner (principal contractor) and
the labor-only contractor, including the latters workers.
VALENZUELA vs. CA
Facts: Lourdes Valenzuela was driving her car along Aurora Blvd when she felt that one of her
cars tires might be flat. She parked her car close to the sidewalk at a lighted place where
there were people who could help her w/ her flat tire. It was 2 am and raining. She had just
gotten out of her car, and when she was standing at the left rear portion of her car trying to
get something out of the trunk, a speeding car driven by Richard Li hit her. She was thrown
back towards the windshield, which broke, of Richards car and then dragged underneath
the car. As a result, her left leg was amputated at the middle thigh and she suffered other
injuries. Richard Li was a managerial employee of Alexander Commercial Inc.
Doctrine: Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent
supervision of its employee during the performance of the latters assigned tasks would be
enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either the employees
private activities or during the performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or
unrelated to the employees tasks.
When a company gives full use and enjoyment of a company car to its employee, it in effect
guarantees that it is, like every good father, satisfied that its employee will use the privilege
reasonably and responsibly.
Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of
situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for the unlimited use of a company car
therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the
private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car, the managerial employee or
company sales agent. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the
purpose of furthering the companys image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to
see to it that the managerial or other employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of
a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES vs.
AGANA [part 1]
Doctrine: Many courts now allow claims for hospital vicarious liability under the theories of
respondeat superior, apparent authority, ostensible authority, or agency by estoppel.
Private hospitals hire, fire, and exercise real control over their attending and visiting
consultant staff. While consultants are not, technically employees, xxx the control
exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of
an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In
assessing whether such a relationshiop in fact exists, the control test is determining.
Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists
between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the holding out theory, or doctrine of
ostensible agency or agency by estoppel, has its origin from the law of agency. It imposes
liability, not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the
actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that
the relationship or the authority exists. xxx Thus, in cases where it can be shown that a hospital,
by its actions, has held out a particular physician as its agent and/or employee and that a
patient has accepted treatment from that physician in the reasonable belief that it is being
rendered in behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will be liable for the physicians
negligence.
A hospital, following the doctrine of corporate responsibility, has the duty to see that it meets
the standards of responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty includes the proper
supervision of the members of its medical staff. Xxx [A] patient who enters a hospital does so
with the reasonable expectation that it will attempt to cure him. The hospital accordingly has
the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treatment prescribed and
administered by the physicians practicing in its premises.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES vs.
AGANA [part 2]
Doctrine: PSI is not only vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of
the Civil Code, but also directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176.
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES vs.
AGANA [part 3]
Doctrine: Professional therefore cannot be held vicariously liable to Agana under the principle
of respondeat superior for lack of an employer-employee relationship but they are STILL liable
to Agana under Doctrine of Apparent Authority and Corporate Liability/Negligence.


MERCURY DRUG vs. HUANG
Facts: Stephen, a promising young lad, figured in an accident with Mercurys truck and was
paralyzed. Stephen was driving the car along the leftmost lane. The truck driven by Del
Rosario was on the lane next to the right. Suddenly, the truck swerved to its left and slammed
into the front right side of the car. The collision hurled the car over the island where it hit a
lamppost, spun around and landed on the opposite lane. The truck also hit a lamppost, ran
over the car and zigzagged towards, and finally stopped in front of Buellah Land Church.
Doctrine: To be relieved of liability, (employer) should show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in the supervision of the
performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. With
respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate standard
operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit
concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
STATE
MERITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF
PI
Facts: Meritt, riding on a motorcycle, was bumped by the General Hospital Ambulance,
causing plaintiff severe injuries, causing his physical as well as mental condition a noticeable
depreciation. Act No. 2457 was enacted which authorized E. Merritt to bring a suit against the
Government and authorized the Attorney-General to appear in the said suit. It was passed by
the Legislature to allow plaintiff to bring suit in the courts against the Government in order that
the question of who is responsible for the accident may be decided.
Doctrine: The Government says Justice Story, does not undertake to guarantee to any
person the fidelity of the officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve i t in all
its operations in endless embarrassment, difficulties and losses, which would be subversive of
the public interest. No claim arises against any government in favor of an individual, by
reason of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or
agents. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its
liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.
The responsibility of the state is limited to that which it comtracts through a special agent, duly
empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act or charged with some
definite purpose which gives rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or
omissions imputable to a public official charged with some administrative or technical office
who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility.
ROSETE vs. AUDITOR
GENERAL
Facts: There was a fire at the ECA motor pool in Azcarraga, reducing to ashes the books,
jewelry, clothing, furniture, silverwares, and other household equipment of the Rosetes. The
building that was burned was used by ECA as a bodega in w/c oil and gasoling have been
stored. Fraino had just filled his cigarette-lighter w/ gasoline near the gasoline drum into w/c
gasoline was then being drained. He ignited his cigarette-lighter. The spark produced by it set
fire on the gasoline, burning the bodega as well as the surroundings.
Doctrine: There was no showing that whatever negligence that may be imputed to the ECA &
its officers was done by the special agent because the officers of the ECA didnt act as
special agents of the government in storing gasoline in the ECA warehouse.
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code distinguishes the special agent from the official
with specific duty or duties to perform. Under the meaning of the paragraph, the word official
comprises all officials and employees of the government who exercise duties of their
respective public offices. All others who are acting by commission of the government belong
to the class of special agents, whether individual or juridical bodies.
The ECA was not a branch or office of the government, such as the legislative bodies, the
executive bodies, or the tribunals. It was an agency set up for specific purposes which were
not attainable through the official functions entrusted by law to the government or its
branches.

MENDOZA vs. DE LEON
Facts: Marcos Mendoza was awarded a lease of an exclusive ferry privilege by the municipal
council of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan pursuant to Act No. 1634 of the Philippine
Commission. After a little more than 1 year, Mendoza was forcibly ejected pursuant to a
resolution adopted by the councillors who awarded to franchise for the same ferry to another
person.
Doctrine: Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the Municipal Code have
both governmental and corporate or business functions. Of the first class are the adoption of
regulations against fire and disease, preservation of the public peace, maintenance of
municipal prisons, establishment of primary schools and post-offices, etc. Of the latter class
are the establishment of municipal waterworks for the use of the inhabitants, the construction
and maintenance of municipal slaughterhouses, markets, stables, bathing establishments,
wharves, ferries, and fisheries.
Governmental powers
municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers or agents in the performance of its
governmental functions
governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character by being delegated to
the municipal governments
State being immune for injuries suffered by private individuals in the administration of
strictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the municipality in the
performance of the same duties, unless it is expressly made liable by statute
Corporate or proprietary powers
municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance of its corporate
or proprietary or business functions
should be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far as its liability to third
persons on contract or in tort is concerned
its contracts, validly entered into, may be enforced and damages may be collected
from it for the torts of its officers or agents within the scope of their employment in
precisely the same manner and to the same extent as those of private corporations or
individuals
principle of respondeat superior applies
upon an authorized contract, the government officials are liable in the same manner
and to the same extent as private corporations or natural persons
FONTANILLA vs. MALIAMAN
Facts: A pickup owned and operated by respondent National Irrigation Administration, a
government agency, then driven officially by Hugo Garcia, an employee of said agency as
its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son of herein petitioners,
and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway.
Doctrine: It may not be amiss to state at this point that the functions of government have
been classified into governmental or constituent and propriety or ministrant. The former
involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes
merely the exercise of propriety functions and thus considered as optional.
Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the
agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency,
which is the irrigation of lands.
WEEK 10
INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTIONS
VIOLATION OF CIVIL & POLITICAL
RIGHTS
DEFAMATION, FRAUD & PHYSICAL
INJURIES
NEGLECT OF DUTY
MHP GARMENTS vs. CA
Facts: MHP Garments, Inc., (petitioner) was awarded by the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the
exclusive franchise to sell and distribute official Boy Scouts uniforms, supplies, badges, and
insignias. MHP received information that respondents Agnes Villa Cruz, Mirasol Lugatiman,
and Gertrudes Gonzales were selling Boy Scouts items and paraphernalia without any
authority. De Guzman, an employee of MHP, was tasked to undertake surveillance and to
make a report to the Philippine Constabulary (PC). , De Guzman, Captain Renato M. Peafiel,
and two (2) other constabulary men went to the stores of respondents at the Marikina Public
Market. Without any warrant, they seized the boy and girl scouts pants, dresses, and suits on
display at respondents' stalls.
Doctrine: A person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to
actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefore. In
addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded. xxx The very nature of Article 32 is that
the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or
bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the
effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers
on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely,
the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the
United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.
The decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an
officer or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly
responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible
has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Xxx While it
would certainly be too nave to expect that violators of human rights would easily be
deterred by the prospect of facing damages suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no
uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well
as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. Xxx Neither can it be said that
only those shown to have participated directly should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil
Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for its violations.
SILAHIS vs. SOLUTA
Facts: Silahis International Hotel officers (private persons) have been receiving reports that the
office of the hotel employees union, located within the hotel building itself, is being used as a
venue for illegal activities. They conducted surveillance of certain suspected union officers
and those going in and out of the room. One day, the hotel security officers conducted a
search of the union office. The security officers claim that the search was w/ the consent of
union officer Babay. Their search yielded a bag of marijuana leaves.
Doctrine: As constitutional rights, like the right to be secure in ones person, house, papers,
and effects against unreasonable search and seizures, occupy a lofty position in every
civilized and democratic community and infrequently susceptible to abuse, their violation,
whether constituting a penal offense or not, must be guarded against.
Under Article 32, not only public officers but also private individuals may be held civilly liable
for violation of constitutional rights enumerated in Article 32, among them is the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
VINZONS-CHATO vs.
FORTUNE
Doctrine: The general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person may
suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his
assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office
which he/she leads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it
would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the
scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.
Xxx In addition, xxx a public officer who directly or indirectly violates the constitutional rights of
another, may be validly sued for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code even if his acts
were not so tainted with malice or bad faith.
Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private
capacity for acts done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where
said public officer: 1) acted with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or 2) where the public
officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.
Article 32 was patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortuous act
which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right,
whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property, or reputation.
There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the
conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under
which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes
given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the
act itself, would determine whether the act was wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather,
the absence of an evil motive, does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of
anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that defendant acted
without evil intent.
Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an
act that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort
for impairment of rights and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals
specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of
public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code. While the Civil
Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law, Article 32 of the same
Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows
redress froma particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers.

VINZONS-CHATO vs.
FORTUNE [part 2]
Doctrine: Two types of duties exercised by public officers:
1. Of Duties to the Public. The first of these classes embraces those officers whose duty
is owing primarily to the public collectively to the body politic and not to any
particular individual; who act for the public at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of
the public treasury.
2. Of Duties to Individuals. The second class above referred to includes those who,
while they owe to the public the general duty of a proper administration of their
respective offices, yet become, by reason of their employment by a particular
individual to do some act for him in an official capacity, under a special and particular
obligation to him as an individual. They serve individuals chiefly and usually receive
their compensation from fees paid by each individual who employs them.
When what is involved is a "duty owing to the public in general", an individual cannot have a
cause of action for damages against the public officer. In such a case, there is damage to
the individual but no wrong to him. In performing or failing to perform a public duty, the
officer has touched his interest to his prejudice; but the officer owes no duty to him as an
individual. The remedy in this case is not judicial but political.
The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or
special injury on account of the public officer's improper performance or non-performance of
his public duty. Damage alone does not constitute a wrong.
Juxtaposed with Article 32, the principle may now translate into the rule that an individual
can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that
violates a constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the former.

MADEJA vs. CARO
Facts: Dr. Eva A. Japzon was accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death
of Cleto Madeja after an appendectomy in the now defunct CFI of Eastern Samar. Carmen
Madeja, widow of the deceased, reserved her right to file a separate civil action for
damages.
Doctrine: The term physical injuries is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.
The article in question uses the words defamation, fraud, and physical injuries.
Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific
provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms as means of offenses defined therein,
so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to impart to them
any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this
apparent circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms physical injuries could not have
been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult
to believe that the Code Commission would have used terms in the same article some in
their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term physical injuries
should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, because the
terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission
recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault
and battery in American Law, and this recommendation must have been accepted by the
Legislature when it approved the article intact as recommended. If the intent has been to
establish a civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action
should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or
attempted homicide, or even death.

ARAFILES vs. PHIL.
JOURNALISTS
Facts: A working student Emelita Despuig reported to the police that Director Arafiles of the
National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences was responsible for the following: 1) she had been
abducted then raped on March 14 1987 and 2) an attempt was made to rape her again just
a few hours before. The whole time a reporter was there. He interviewed Despuig. An alleged
defamatory article was published. About a year after the publication, Arafiles instituted a
complaint against the respondents on account of the grossly malicious and overly
sensationalized reporting in the news item.
Doctrine: Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely
unrelated to the purely criminal aspect of the case. A civil action for libel under this article
shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of
evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency or result of
the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by
the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising
therefrom.
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not
consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or
abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers should be given such leeway and
tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in
our democracy. In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to
race with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should
not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the
choice of words.

MVRS vs. ISLAMIC
Facts: Islamic Dawah filed a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in
behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against the plaintiffs, arising from an article
published in the 1 August 1992 issue of Bulgar, a daily tabloid.
ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga
Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit
na sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong
Diyos at sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw
na tinatawag nilang Ramadan.
Doctrine: As a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove as part of his
prima facie case that the defendant 1) published a statement that was 2) defamatory 3) of
and concerning the plaintiff. To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the
plaintiff must show that: a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless
disregard of the plaintiff; b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous; c) There was a causal
connection between the defendants conduct and the plaintiffs mental distress; and d) The
plaintiffs mental distress was extreme and severe.
It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander
per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious,
whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the
absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the language is offensive to the
plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an
identified or identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a
particular member of a class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all
impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and expression, as well as of the press,
under the Bill of Rights.
Defamation of a large group does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an
individual unless it can be shown that he is the target of the defamatory matter.

CAPUNO vs. PEPSI
Facts: A vehicular collision occurred between a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck driven by Elordi & a
private car driven by Cipriano Capuno killing him & his 2 passengers, the Spouses Buan. Elordi
was charged w/ triple homicide through reckless imprudence in the Pampanga CFI. The info
was amended to include claims for damages by the heirs of the 3 victims. While the crim case
was pending, the Intestate Estate of the Buan spouses & their heirs filed a civil action for
damages.
Doctrine: There can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages
based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4) years. An action based
on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the question of when the
prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run, that is, from the day (the action) may be
brought, which means from the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed. The
institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil
action based on a quasi-delict.
The term physical injuries in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing death.
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS vs.
ARGOS
Facts: Costa, Argos and Pineda had serious differences. When the positions of general
managers became redundant, Argos and Pineda agreed to the termination of their services
for which they signed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. Costa issued a Personnel
Announcement describing Argos and Pineda as persona non grata and urged IFFIs
employees not to have further dealing with the 2.
Doctrine: Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It
does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability,
because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or
when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to
have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties. Any action brought against the
employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is premature.

CORPUS vs. PAJE
Facts: Victory Liner Bus driven by Felardo Paje collided w/ a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia
in Lubao, Pampanga resulting in Marcias death and physical injuries to two other persons.
Paje was found guilty and was convicted of the crime charged in said information. Paje
appealed to the CA. While Pajes appeal was still pending at the CA, Marcias heirs instituted
a separate civil action for damages BASED UPON THE CRIMINAL ACT of reckless imprudence
against Paje AND Victory Liner, praying that they be ordered to pay the amounts of damages
being claimed by the heirs of Marcia jointly and severally.
Doctrine: The offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies
in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be
punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty;
it does not qualify the substance of the offense.
As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in
Article 33 of the Civil Code, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be
instituted in connection with said offense.
Homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general rule
that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based
upon the same criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved his right to institute
a separate civil action. In the language of the Rules of Court, the extinction of the criminal
action by acquittal of the defendant on the ground that the criminal act charged against
him did not exist, necessarily extinguished also the civil action for damages based on the
same act.

BONITE vs. ZOSA
Facts: Florencio Bonite was working as "caminero" of the Bureau of Public Highways when he
was hit by a truck driven by Abamonga, as a result of which, Bonite died on that same day.
Court reinstated a civil case filed by heirs of the deceased which was dismissed by CFI due to:
(a) lack of reservation to file independent civil action and (b) case is already res judicata. The
criminal case, earlier filed, was dismissed based on reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
accused.
Doctrine: When the accused in a criminal case is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may still be instituted against him, and only a preponderance of evidence is required
to hold the accused liable. The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal of the accused,
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt.
In addition to anchoring their right to bring a separate civil action for damages under the
express provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, petitioners may base such separate civil
action for damages on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Acquittal of the accused from a
charge of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, is not a bar to a
subsequent civil action for recovery of civil liability, arising not from criminal negligence, but
from a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. It has been held that Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in
referring to fault or negligence covers acts not punishable by law as well as acts that may
be criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed to
recover damages on both scores (delict and quasi-delict).
Article 29 of the Civil Code does not state that the right to file an independent civil action for
damages (under said article) can be availed of only in offenses not arising from a tortuous
act. The only requisite set forth therein for the exercise of the right to file a civil action for
damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in the criminal action based on
reasonable doubt. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that where the law does
not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not mentioned in Article 33, no independent
civil action for damages arising from reckless imprudence or criminal negligence may be
instituted under said article.

JERVOSA vs. PEOPLE
Facts: Marcelo Jervoso was convicted of homicide for fatally stabbing Rogelio Jervoso w/ a
bolo in the back. Marcelos wife was also convicted, but w/ slight physical injuries only for
hitting the victim, Rogelio, w/ a stone to the head while the latter was being stabbed by
Marcelo. Despite the fact that the heirs of the victim reserved the right to file a separate civil
action in the case in the trial court, the RTC made the additional ruling ordering the accused
to indemnify the heirs of the victim for P30K. The RTC ruling was affirmed in toto by the CA on
appeal, including the award of indemnity.
Doctrine: Having reserved and filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a separate civil
action to recover the civil liability of the accused arising from the crimes charged, the heirs of
the deceased Rogelio Jervoso, are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case
against the accused, for they are not entitled to recover damages twice for the same
criminal act of the accused.
DULAY vs. CA
Facts: Torzuela, security guard, while on duty shot Atty. Dulay due to an altercation. Dullays
widow filed for an action to recover damages against the employers. Employers opposed
claiming that Article 2180 in connection with Article 33 applies only to negligent acts and
since Torzuelas act was voluntary and intentional, they are only subsidiarily liable under RPC.
Doctrine: The filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal
action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an
express reservation. There is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil
Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional. The term physical injuries in article 33 has already been construed
to include bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated,
and attempted homicide.

WEEK 11
HUMAN RELATIONS TORTS
VELAYO vs. SHELL
Facts: CALI informed its principal creditors that it was in a state of insolvency and had to stop
operations. The creditors agreed to form a committee that would take charge of the
distribution of assets. Fitzgerald, an employee of Shell, was appointed a member of the
committee. After the committee met, Shell made a transfer of credit against CALI to
American Shell Oil Company. American Shell Oil filed a complaint against CALI and a writ of
attachment was issued on CALIs C-54 plane.
Doctrine: The Code Commission commenting on this article, says the following:
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved (as it was approved), would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold numbers of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.
But, it may be asked, would this proposed article obliterate the boundary line between
morality and law? The answer is that, in the last analysis, every good law draws its breath of
life from morals, from those principles which are written with words of fire in the conscience of
man. If this premises is admitted, then the proposed rule is a prudent earnest of justice in the
face of the impossibility of enumerating, one by one, all wrongs which cause damages. When
it is reflected that while codes of law and statutes have changed from age to age, the
conscience of man has remained fixed to its ancient moorings, one cannot but feel that it is
safe and salutary to transmute, as far as may be, moral norms into legal rules, thus imparting
to every legal system that enduring quality which ought to be one of its superlative attributes.
Furthermore, there is no belief of more baneful consequence upon the social order than that
a person may with impunity cause damage to his fellow-men so long as he does not break
any law of the State, though he may be defying the most sacred postulates of morality. What
is more, the victim loses faith in the ability of the government to afford him protection or relief.
A provision similar to the one under consideration is embodied in article 826 of the German
Civil Code.
The same observations may be made concerning injurious acts that are contrary to public
policy but are not forbidden by statute. There are countless acts of such character, but have
not been foreseen by the lawmakers. Among these are many business practices that are
unfair or oppressive, and certain acts of landholders and employers affecting their tenants
and employees which contravene the public policy of social justice.
Another rule is expressed in Article 24 which compels the return of a thing acquired without
just or legal grounds. This provision embodies the doctrine that no person should unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another, which has been one of the mainstays of every legal
system for centuries. It is most needful that this ancient principles be clearly and specifically
consecrated in the proposed Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the
lawmaker, no one may unjustly benefit himself to the prejudice of another.

GLOBE MACKAY vs. CA
Facts: Globe discovered, upon report of Tobias, fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos. A day after the anomalies were
reported, Hendry, who was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of
Globe, confronted Tobias and stated that he was the number one suspect. Tobias was order
to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table
drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
Doctrine: One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of
"some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of the social order." The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy
the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out
its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant
to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to
the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of
justice". Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19. This article, known
to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the
performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by
law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised
in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of
human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
proper.
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid
test which can be applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the
legal and factual circumstances called for its application, the question of whether or not the
principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article
21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not
constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable. This
principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that even granting that
petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which
that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held
liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive
manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi -delictual acts
committed by petitioners.
Malicious prosecution
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted
by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the filing of a
suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution. The mere dismissal by
the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious
prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in
bad faith.

ALBENSON vs. CA
Facts: Guaranteed issued Albenson a check as payment for the mild steel plates it ordered.
The check bounced. Albenson found out that the check belonged to Eugenio Baltao. It filed
a complaint for violation of BP 22 against Eugenio S. Baltao. However, it appears that the
respondent had a namesake, his son Eugenio Baltao III. The elder Baltao then filed a suit for
damages against Albenson.
Doctrine: The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following:
1. There is a legal right or duty
2. which is exercised in bad faith
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general
sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own
sanction
Thus, anyone who, whether willfully or negligently, in the exercise of his legal right or duty,
causes damage to another, shall indemnify his victim for injuries suffered thereby.
Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements:
1. There is an act which is legal
2. but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy
3. and it is done with intent to injure
There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act must be intentional.
However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either willfully, or negligently.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted
by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person, and that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution. (Manila Gas Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 602 [1980]). Still, private
respondent argues that liability under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code is so
encompassing that it likewise includes liability for damages for malicious prosecution under
Article 2219 (8). True, a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution is allowed under the
New Civil Code, more specifically Articles 19, 20, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, and 2219 (8) thereof. In
order that such a case can prosper, however, the following three (3) elements must be
present, to wit: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was
himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in
bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was
actuated or impelled by legal malice.
Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the act wrongful and
subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to
impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may
not be charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. And an adverse decision
does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's fees to the winning party.

AMONOY vs. GUTIERREZ
Facts: Lots were mortgaged to Amonoy by spouses Gutierrez as security for his Attorney's fees.
He was unpaid so Amonoy moved for forclosure and won in the public auction. An Order was
granted by RTC to demolish the structures in the lots, the house of respondents included. A
TRO for the demolition was granted to the spouses. TRO was later lifted by SC judgment.
However, even before the lifting of the TRO, the houses were already demolished. Spouses
filed complaint for damages
Doctrine: Damnum absque injuria. Under this principle, the legitimate exercise of a persons
rights, even if it causes loss to another, does not automatically result in an actionable injury.
The law does not prescribe a remedy for the loss. This principle does not, however, apply
when there is an abuse of a persons right, or when the exercise of this right is suspended or
extinguished pursuant to a court order. Indeed, in the availment of ones rights, one must act
with justice, give others their due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a persons
rights is a loss without injury -- damnum absque injuria -- for which the law gives no remedy. In
other words, one who merely exercises ones rights does no actionable injury and cannot be
held liable for damages.
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which
gives it life, is repugnant to the modern concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person
exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another x x x. Over and above the specific
precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of justice x x x; and he who violates them
violates the law. For this reason, it is not permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.
UE vs. JADER
Facts: Jader was a law student at the University of the East. He failed to take the regular
exam for Practice Court I so he was given an incomplete grade. He took the removals but he
was given a grade of five. Jader attended the graduation and prepared for the bar. He
later learned of his deficiency. Jader sued UE for damages.
Doctrine: Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution
by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good
faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even
though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or
belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.
In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury
that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they
act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense
of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society
will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under
conditions of civilized society.
Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious
knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party
liable.
BARONS MARKETING vs. CA
Facts: Phelps Dodge appointed Barons as one of its dealers of electrical wires and cables.
Barons purchased items on credit, which it sold to MERALCO. Barons asked if it can pay its
outstanding account in monthly installments but Phelps declined. Phelps filed a complaint to
recover the amount. In its answer, Barons admitted purchasing the items but denied the
amount. It also stated that it suffered injury to its reputation.
Doctrine: Test of Abuse of Right. Modern jurisprudence does not permit acts which, al though
not unlawful, are anti-social. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the
only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate,
the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right. The principle does
not permit acts which, without utility or legitimate purpose cause damage to another,
because they violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just.
Hence, every abnormal exercise of a right, contrary to its socio-economic purpose, is an
abuse that will give rise to liability. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must
be no intention to injure another. Ultimately, however, and in practice, courts, in the sound
exercise of their discretion, will have to determine all the facts and circumstances when the
exercise of a right is unjust, or when there has been an abuse of right.

DIAZ vs. DAVAO LIGHT
Facts: DLPC disconnected the meter installed at Diazs hotel building due to its failure to settle
its unpaid electric consumption bill. A lessee, NFA Kadiwa, applied for electricity service. This
was granted hence a new meter was installed. When NFA closed, it informed Davao Light
that its right to the connection would be transferred to Diaz. Diaz refused to let Davao Light
remove the meter. Numerous suits were filed by each party.
Doctrine: Thus, malice or bad faith is at the core of the above provisions. Good faith refers to
the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists
of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of
another. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the
same. Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple
negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of
fraud .Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.
WASSMER vs. VELEZ
Facts: Wassmer and Velez were about to get married. However, two days before the
wedding, Velez wrote a note stating that they would have to postpone the wedding
because his mother was opposed to it. A day before the wedding, he wired Wassmer a note
saying that he would return soon. He never showed up again. Wassmer sued for damages.
Doctrine: It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to
law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that
"any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Surely this is not a
case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid.
TANJANGCO vs. CA
Facts: Tanjanco, courted the Santos, both being of adult age. In consideration of Tanjanco's
promise of marriage, Santos consented to sexual intercourse. Tanjanco succeeded in having
carnal access with Santos until Dec. 1959. As a result, Santos got pregnant. To avoid
embarrassment, Santos resigned from her job. Santos then sued Tanjanco for damages.
Doctrine: The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse,
or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded. To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no
seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path
of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to
have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the
sexual embraces of her seducer.
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is
the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of
the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the
commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases
would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by
which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit.

BAKSH vs. CA
Doctrine: If a man's promise to marry is the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in
a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a ploy to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21. This is not because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation that followed.
It is essential that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. In this case, Gonzales was a victim of moral seduction.
On Art. 21: designed to expand the concept of torts or QD in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statue of torts.
PE vs. PE
Facts: Alfonso Pe, a married man and a collateral relative, frequented Lolitas house on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Alfonso and Lolita then fell
in love. Lolita's parents heard about the affair (exchange of notes, trysts in different barrios)
so they refused to let them see each other. Lolita left the house and disappeared. Lolitas
relatives filed an action for damages.
Doctrine: Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that
defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has
caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married
man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
Alfonso, a married man, seduced Lolita through trickery to the extent that she fell in love with
him. Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
QUE vs. IAC
Facts: Que filed a complaint for estafa against Nicolas because of the checks the latter
issued as payment for canvass strollers were dishonored. Nicolas allegedly did not continue
payment because of the defective canvass strollers which he never returned to Que. The
charge was dismissed in the fiscal level. Nicolas filed a complaint for malicious prosecution.
Doctrine: The general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. xxx If the charge,
although false, was made with an honest belief in its truth and justice, and there were
reasonable grounds on which such a belief could be founded, the accusation could not be
held to have been false in the legal sense.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted
by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person that it was initiated deliberately by the
defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless. Concededly, the mere act of
submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious
prosecution.
In a free society, controversies are heard and settled under the rule of law in the forum of the
courts of justice. It is one of the virtues of our system of government that if a person feels he
has been aggrieved, he does not have to take the law into his hands or resort to the use of
force for the vindication of his injury. The courts are there to hear and act on his complaint.
The right to litigate is an escape valve to relieve the pressures of personal disagreements that
might otherwise explode in physical confrontation, It is necessary not only for upholding one's
claims when they are unjustly denied but also for the maintenance of peace if not goodwill
among incipient antagonists. Without the right to litigate, conflicting claims cannot be
examined and resolved in accordance with one of the primary purposes of government,
which is to provide for a just and orderly society.

DRILON vs. CA
Facts: Adaza was charged with the crime of Rebellion with murder and frustrated murder by
the petitioners. Without the case being terminated he filed for a case of malicious
prosecution against petitioners who filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied by RTC and
CA.
Doctrine: An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil
suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause,
after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant
therein. The gist of the action is the putting of legal process in force, regularly, for the mere
purpose of vexation or injury. The statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious
prosecution are found in the provisions of the New Civil Code on Human Relations and on
damages particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217 and 2219 (8).
Thus, in order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove three (3)
elements:
1. the fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the
prosecutor and that the action finally terminated with an acquittal
2. that in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause
3. that the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice, that is by improper or
sinister motive
All these requisites must concur.
A doubtful or difficult question of law may become the basis of good faith and, in this regard,
the law always accords to public officials the presumption of good faith and regularity in the
performance of official duties.
MAGBANUA vs. JUNSAY
Facts: An info was filed against a maid for robbery of some jewelry and cash from her master.
She was acquitted because her confession was a product of torture & that the investigators
werent able to prove the presence of the necklace in the maids room as claimed by her
master. The maid filed a suit for damages against her master, the latter contending that the
cause of action is for physical injuries and violation of rights thus prescribed. The maid insists
that her cause of action is for malicious prosecution.
Doctrine: In this jurisdiction, the term malicious prosecution has been defined as an action for
damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal
proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination
of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein.[38]While
generally associated with unfounded criminal actions, the term has been expanded to
include unfounded civil suits instituted just to vex and humiliate the defendant despite the
absence of a cause of action or probable cause.
Elements of malicious prosecution
1. the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he
instigated its commencement
2. the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal
3. in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause
4. the prosecution was impelled by legal malice -- an improper or a sinister motive
The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong
provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the
charges were false and groundless.

GRAND UNION vs. ESPINO
Facts: Espino found a cylindrical rat tail file which he needed in his hobby and had been
wanting to buy. Espino and his wife chanced on Espinos aunts maid in the supermarket.
While talking to the maid, Espino stuck the file into his shirts front breast pocket with a good
part of the merchandise exposed. He was approached by the guard and made to file an
incident report. Espino offered to pay for the file but instead, his money was taken as an
incentive to the guards for apprehending pilferers. A lot of people witnessed the incident.
Doctrine: Nonetheless, the false accusation charged against the private respondent after
detaining and interrogating him by the uniformed guards and the mode and manner in
which he was subjected, shouting at him, imposing upon him a fine, threatening to call the
police and in the presence and hearing of many people at the Supermarket which brought
and caused him humiliation and embarrassment, sufficiently rendered the petitioners liable
for damages under Articles 19 and 21 in relation to Article 2219 of the Civil Code. We rule that
under the facts of the case at bar, petitioners wilfully caused loss or injury to private
respondent in a manner that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. It is
against morals, good customs and public policy to humiliate, embarrass and degrade the
dignity of a person. Everyone must respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of
mind of his neighbors and other persons (Article 26, Civil Code). And one must act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
However, a reduction of the award for damages is warranted since Espinos forgetfulness
started the chain of events which led to his embarrassment and humiliation.
CARPIO vs. VALMONTE
Facts: Valmonte, a wedding coordinator, was publicly accused by the brides aunt, Carpio,
of stealing her jewelry. She was searched and questioned by the guard and the police.
Carpio refused to apologize so Valmonte filed a suit for damages.
Doctrine: When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held
accountable. One is not allowed to exercise his right in a manner which would cause
unnecessary prejudice to another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs.
Thus, a person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right,
that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with negligence or
abuse.
QUISABA vs. STA. INES
Facts: : Quisaba, an internal auditor of Sta. Ines, was ordered by Robert Hyde, the VP, to
purchase logs for the companys plant. Quisaba refused because it wasnt part of his job. As
a result, he was demoted. Quisaba filed a complaint for damages, termination pay, and
attorneys fees. Sta. Ines said that the NLRC had jurisdiction.
Doctrine: Civil law consists of that mass of precepts that determine or regulate the relations ...
that exist between members of a society for the protection of private interests. The "right" of
the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with the manner in which the
right was exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or
oppressively, as the complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil
Code which prohibits acts of oppression by either capital or labor against the other, and
article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction for
which, by way of moral damages, is provided in article 2219, no. 10.

GARCIA vs. SALVADOR
Doctrine: Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides: Art. 20.Every person who, contrary to law,
willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. The
foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who suffers
damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision. This was
incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damage
because another has violated some legal provision.

ST. LOUIS vs. CA
Facts: St. Louis Realty caused to be published an ad depicting the Arcadio Family in front of
Dr. Aramils residence, making it appear that the house was owned by the Arcadios. Aramil
protested. Plaintiff stopped publication, but did not rectify. Aramil extra judicially demanded
damages. This is when St Louis Realty published a new ad showing the Arcadios in their real
home. Aramil filed complaint for damages claiming mental anguish and reduction in income
Doctrine: Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the
private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief.

GREGORIO vs. CA
Doctrine: On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for
damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting
a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal
security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6)
right to peace of mind.
WEEK 12
POSSESSOR OF ANIMALS
VESTIL vs. IAC
Facts: Theness Uy was bitten by Andoy, the dog of Vestils father, when the victim was playing
with Vestils child in their compound. Theness, who was only 3 yrs old, was brought to the
hospital and was later discharged, but after 9 days she was readmitted for exhibiting signs of
hydrophobia and vomiting of saliva. The next day she died of broncho-pneumonia. Uys sued
Vestil for being the possessor of Andoy. Vestils claimed that they dont own the dog, that it
was a tame animal, and that Theness provoked the dog so it bit her.
Doctrine: Ownership of the dog is hardly the point. What must be determined is the possession
of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership
of the dog or of the house.
The obligation imposed by Article 2183 of the Civil Code is not based on the negligence or on
the presumed lack of vigilance of the possessor or user of the animal causing damage. It is
based on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses animals
for his utility, pleasure or service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause.
THROWN/FALLING FROM A
BUILDING
DINCONG vs. KANAAN
Facts: The Dingcongs rented a house and established Central Hotel. Kanaan, et.al. rented the
ground floor of house where they established the American Bazaar. Echeverria rented room
in the hotel. One night, Echevarria, carelessly left the faucet open when retiring to bed,
causing the water to run off and spill to the ground, wetting the articles and merchandise of
the Kanaan's "American Bazaar" in the ground floor. Kanaans filed complaint for damages
against Echevarria and Dingcongs.
Doctrine: Jose Dingcong being co-lessee and manger of the hotel and in complete
possession of the upper floor, is liable to the respondents for the damages caused by the
things thrown or falling from the building. Moreover, Jose D. did not exercise the diligence of a
good father of the family in preventing such damage. Since the water pipes were under
repair and since he knew that Echevarria would use the faucet, he should have provided the
faucet with a receptacle with drainage and not satisfied himself with merely providing an
ordinary basin which, upon being filled, will overflow and seep through the floor.
DEATH/INJURIES IN THE COURSE OF
EMPLOYMENT
AFABLE vs. SINGER SEWING
MACHINE
Facts: One Sunday afternoon, Leopoldo Madlangbayan, a collector for the Singer Sewing
Machine Company, while riding his bicycle was run over and killed by a truck. At the time of
his death he was returning home after making some collections. The widow and children of
Madlangbayan brought an action to recover from the defendant corporation under Act No.
3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812. The complaint was subsequently amended, and they
sought to recover under sections 8 and 10 of Act No. 3428.
Doctrine: The ER is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an
employee while in the course of the employment". As a general rule an EE is not entitled to
recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or
returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does not arise out of and
in the course of his employment.
The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its
character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances
under which the accident takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of
the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might
happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries
arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the
workman's employment of incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is
possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a
special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are
equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are
excluded.
The Court doesnt mean that an EE can never recover for injuries suffered while of his way to
or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment. In the case at bar, if Leopoldo
had been killed while going from house to house in SFDM, the plaintiffs would have the right
to recover.
ALARCON vs. ALARCON
Facts: Juan Alarcon, a school teacher, hired Urzino Arzaa and his brother to dig a well on
Alarcons land in Caramoan, Camarines Sur. Urzino was lowered into the hole with a rope to
dig deeper. Upon the reaching the bottom, Urzino quickly remarked that he was not feeling
well. Generoso told him to get ready to be pulled up. Just a moment afterwards, Urzino
fainted and slumped helplessly into a sitting position. Generoso lowered a ladder and
proceeded to descend into the hole. After having gone down about 2 meters, Generoso felt
a current of hot air with an obnoxious odor around him. Generoso realized that he was not
feeling well.
Doctrine: Juan Alarcon does not own any enterprise. Alarcon is merely a school teacher who
needed a well. Alarcon does not fall under the category of other employers mentioned in
Article 1711. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, other employers must be construed to
refer to persons who belong to a class analogous to owners of enterprises such as those
operating a business or engaged in a particular industry or trade, requiring the managers to
contract the services of laborers, workers and/or employees.
According to the Code Commission, the purpose of Section 2, Chapter 3, Title VIII CC is to
uphold the principle of social justice. In keeping with this fundamental policy, the Project of
Civil Code, while on the one hand guaranteeing property rights, has on the other seen to it
that the toiling masses are assured of a fair and just treatment by capital or management.
The terms "capital", "management", "industrialist", "manager" and "owners of enterprises"
indicate that they contemplate those engaged more or less in business or industry.
INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS
GILCHRIST vs. CUDDY
Facts: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomar. Gilchrist was the owner of a theatre in
Iloilo. They entered into a contract whereby Cuddy leased to Gilchrist the Zigomar for
exhibition in his theatre for a week for P125. Days before the delivery date, Cuddy returned
the money already paid by Gilchrist so that he can lease the film to Espejo and Zaldarriaga
instead and receive P350 for the film for the same period. Gilchrist filed a case for specific
performance against Cuddy, Espejo and Zaldarriaga. He also prayed for damages against
Espejo and Zaldarriaga for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy.
Doctrine: Where there was no malice in the interference, and the impulse behind ones
conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a
malicious interferer.
Gilchrist was facing the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of the fact that
the appellants had induced Cuddy to rent to them the film Gilchrist had counted upon as his
feature film. It is quite apparent that to estimate with any degree of accuracy the damages
which Gilchrist would likely suffer from such an event would be quite difficult if not impossible.
If he allowed the appellants to exhibit the film in Iloilo, it would be useless for him to exhibit it
again, as the desire of the public to witness the production would have been already
satisfied.
Appellants have the legal liability for interfering with the contract and causing its breach. This
liability arises from unlawful acts and not from contractual obligations to induce Cuddy to
violate his contract with Gilchrist.
Art 1902 CC provides that a person who, by act or omission causes damage to another when
there is fault or negligence, shall be obliged to pay for the damage done. There is nothing in
this article which requires as a condition precedent to the liability of the tortfeasor that he
must know the identity of a person to whom he causes damage. No such knowledge is
required in order that the injured party may recover for the damages suffered.
SO PING BUN vs. CA
Facts: Tek Hua Trading originally entered into a lease agreement with DC Chuan covering
stalls in Binondo. The contracts were initially for 1 year but were continued on month to month
basis upon expiration of the 1 yr. Tek Hua was dissolved, original members of Tek Hua formed
Tek Hua Enterprises (THE) with Manuel Tiong as one of the incorporators. However, the stalls
were occupied by the grandson (So Ping Bun) of one of the original incorporators of Tek Hua
under business name Trendsetter Marketing. New lease contracts with increase in rent were
sent to THE, although not signed. THE through Tiong asked So Ping Bun to vacate the stalls so
THE would be able to go back to business BUT instead, SO PING BUN SECURED A NEW LEASE
AGEEMENT WITH DC CHUAN.
Doctrine: One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of
anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if
1. the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment
interfered with
2. the invasion is substantial
3. the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion
4. the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable
under general negligence rules.
The elements of tort interference are:
1. existence of a valid contract
2. knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract
3. interference of the third person is without justification or excuse.
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a
cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person
of the enjoyment by the other of his private property. Ex. Third person induces a party to
renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract.
Interference can be justified even if the interferer acted for the sole purpose of furthering his
financial interest but without bad faith.

LAGON vs. CA
Facts: Jose Lagon, the petitioner, purchased from the estate of Bai Tonina Sepi two (2) parcels
of land. Few months after the sale, Menandro Lapuz filed a complaint for torts and damages
against Lagon. Lapuz claims that he had entered into a contract of lease over 3 parcels of
land with Bai Tonina Sepi.
Doctrine: Lack of knowledge and malice on the conduct of Lagon precludes recovery of
damages. Court said this is a case involving Damnum Absque Injuria
Interference is penalized because it violates the property rights of a party in a contract to
reap the benefits that should result therefrom.
Financial profit or motive will not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable for
damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved
LIABILITY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS
GUILATCO vs. DAGUPAN
Facts: Guilatco, a court interpreter, fell into a manhole at Perez Blvd. which is owned by the
national Government. She fractured her right leg, thus was hospitalized, operated on, and
confined. City Engineer testified that he supervises the maintenance of said manholes and
sees to it that they are properly covered. City Charter of Dagupan also says that the city
supervises and manages National roads and national sidewalks.
Doctrine: It is not even necessary for the defective road or street to belong to the province,
city or municipality for liability to attach. The article only requires that either control or
supervision is exercised over the defective road or street.
In this case, control or supervision is provided for in the charter of Dagupan and is exercised
through the City Engineer. The charter only lays down general rules regulating that liability of
the city. On the other hand, article 2189 applies in particular to the liability arising from
defective streets, public buildings and other public works.
QUEZON CITY vs. DACARA
Facts: While driving an 87 Toyota Corolla 4-door Sedan at around 1 a.m., Fulgencio Dacara,
Jr., son of Fulgencio P. Dacara, Sr. and owner of the vehicle, rammed into a pile of
earth/street diggings found at Matahimik St., Quezon City. The street was then being repaired
by the Quezon City government. As a result, Dacara Jr. sustained bodily injuries and the
vehicle suffered extensive damage for it turned turtle when it hit the pile of earth.
Doctrine: Negligence of a person whether natural or juridical over a particular set of events is
transfixed by the attending circumstances so that the greater the danger known or
reasonably anticipated, the greater is the degree of care required to be observed. The
provisions of Article 2189 of the New Civil Code capsulizes the responsibility of the city
government relative to the maintenance of roads and bridges since it exercises the control
and supervision over the same. Failure of the defendant to comply with the statutory provision
found in the subject-article is tantamount to negligence per se which renders the City
government liable.
Harsh application of the law ensues as a result thereof but the state assumed the responsibility
for the maintenance and repair of the roads and bridges and neither exception nor
exculpation from liability would deem just and equitable.
WEEK 13
DAMAGES
ACTUAL OR COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES

PNOC vs. CA
Facts: The M/V Ma. Efigenia XV, owned by respondent Ma. Efigenia Fishing Corp. collided
with the vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Co. The
Board of Marine Inquiry rendered a decision finding the Petroparcel at fault and thus the
respondent filed an action for damages against Luzon Stevedoring and the Petroparcels
captain. During the pendency of the case, petitioner PNOC acquired the Petroparcel and
was substituted in place of Luzon Stevedoring in the complaint.
Doctrine: A party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually
suffered and duly proved. Indeed, basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, the
amount of loss must not only be capable of proof but must actually be proven with a
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or best evidence
obtainable of the actual amount thereof. The claimant is duty-bound to point out specific
facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne. A court
cannot merely rely on speculations, conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and amount of
damages as well as hearsay or uncorroborated testimony whose truth is suspect. Such are the
jurisprudential precepts that the Court now applies in resolving the instant petition.
There are two kinds of actual damages: dano emergente of loss of what a person possesses,
and lucro cesante or the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to
him.
In order to recover actual damages, plaintiff must prove the actual amount of loss with
reasonable degree of certainty. The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated
if no evidence would be presented on either side. Damages cannot be presumed.
GATCHALIAN vs. DELIM
Facts: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, a minibus owned by the Delim
spouses, respondents in this case. She was allegedly on her way to confer with the district
supervisor of public schools for a substitute teachers job. Later, while the bus was running
along the highway, a snapping sound was suddenly heard and shortly thereafter, the vehicle
bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell
into a ditch.
She alleged in her complaint that her injuries had left her with a conspicuous white scar on
her forehead, generating mental suffering and feeling of inferiority on her part. She also
alleged that the scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for
employment.
Doctrine: The claim for lost revenue as a teacher may not be granted. At the time of the
accident, she was not employed at all, being only a substitute. She was a casual employee
and had been laid off. This employment was occasional and episodic, and contingent upon
the availability of vacancies.
The claim for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead is another
matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is
violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages
are due and assessable. She is entitled to be placed as near as possible to the condition that
she was before the mishap. If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the
victim, the cost of surgery may be expected to be correspondingly modest.
YU vs. NGO YET TE
Facts: Spouses Yu bought from Te bars of detergent soap worth P594,240 paid by three
postdated checks, which were returned dishonored and stamped ACCOUNT CLOSED upon
presentation for encashment.
Doctrine: The wrongfulness of the attachment does not warrant the automatic award of
damages to the attachment defendant; the latter must first discharge the burden of proving
the nature and extent of the loss or injury incurred by reason of the wrongful attachment. To
merit an award of actual damages arising from a wrongful attachment, the attachment
defendant must prove, with the best evidence obtainable, the fact of loss or injury suffered
and the amount thereof. Such loss or injury must be of the kind which is not only capable of
proof but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. As to its amount,
the same must be measurable based on specific facts, and not on guesswork or speculation.
By no stretch of the imagination can we consider ticket sales for five days sufficient evidence
of the average daily income of the passenger bus, much less its mean income. Not even the
unrebutted testimony of Josefa Yu can add credence to such evidence for the testimony
itself lacks corroboration. It also appeared that long before the passenger bus was placed
under preliminary attachment the same had been previously attached by the Sheriff of
Mandaue City in connection with another case and that it was placed in the Cebu Bonded
Warehousing Corporation, Cebu City. Thus, Sps Yu cannot complain that they were
unreasonably deprived of the use of the passenger bus by reason of the subsequent wrongful
attachment

CANDANO vs. SUGATA-ON
Facts: Melquiades was employed as 3
rd
engineer of M/V David, Jr. of Candano Shipping with
a P7,800 salary. M/V David Jr left the Davao City Port w/ its cargo & 20 crew members. The
vessel encountered rough seas and strong winds along Surigao del Sur thus it tilted at 3 on its
starboard side. The waves hammered the tilting vessel, the seawaters swallowed up the main
deck, the vessel tilted up to 30. The captain changed course from North to South but the
tilting grew at a dangerous level, rendering the vessel beyond control. The Capt ordered the
crew members to abandon ship. The ship sank together w/ the cargo near Lianga Bay,
Surigao del Sur. Among the 20 crew members, 12 survived, 1 died, 7 were missing. 1 of those
missing was Melquiades.
Doctrine: In the same breadth, the ER shall be liable for death or personal injury of its EEs in the
course of employment as sanctioned by Art 1711 NCC. The liability of the ER to the EE arose
from the employment contract and is also imbued w/ public interest. When the employee
died or was injured in the occasion of employment, the obligation of the employer for
indemnity, automatically attaches. The indemnity may partake of the form of actual, moral,
nominal, temperate, liquidated or exemplary damages, as the case may be depending on
the factual milieu of the case and considering the criterion for the award of these damages
as outlined by our jurisprudence.
Only the actual damages for unearned income is warranted by circumstances because it
wasnt proven that Melquiades cause of death is a fortuitous event for w/c Candano cant
be faulted.
Formula for computation of unearned income:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross annual income - reasonable and
necessary living expenses)
Formula for computation of life expectancy:
2 / 3 x [80 age of deceased at the time of death]
Court reduced life expectancy multiplier in some cases considering the med history of a
person or the fact of dangerous/risky activities undertaken.
MERCURY DRUG vs. HUANG
Doctrine: Mercury & del Rosario are also liable for the natural and probable consequences of
the act or omission per Art 2202. Doctors who attended to Stephen say that his chances of
walking & again and performing basic bodily functions are nil. For the rest of his life, he will
need continuous rehab and therapy to prevent further complications such as pneumonia,
bladder and rectum infection, renal failure, sepsis and severe bedsores, osteoporosis and
fractures, and other spinal cord injury-related conditions. He will be completely dependent
on the care and support of his family. SC affirmed award of P23,461,062 for Stephens life care
cost, based on his average monthly expense and the actuarial computation of the remaining
years that he is expected to live; and the conservative amount of 10M, as reduced by TC, for
the loss or impairment of his earning capacity, considering his age, probable life expectancy,
the state of his health, and his mental and physical condition before the accident
CIVIL INDEMNITY
PEOPLE vs. BUBAN
Facts: [murder] Ruel testified that as he was about to sleep in their hut, he noticed that the
clothes hanging on the wall move. He then saw accused Buban, Rey Castillo and Bombi
Torres with a rifle inserted through a torn portion atop their bamboo wall. Said trio had been
milling around their house in a pick-up. When he was about to go down the hut, he saw the
gun fire and his father fall.
Doctrine: When death occurs due to crime, the following may be recovered:
1. Civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim
2. Actual or compensatory damages
3. Moral damages
4. Exemplary damages
5. Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
6. Interest, in proper cases
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof
other than the commission of the crime. Based on current jurisprudence, the award of civil
indemnity ex delicto of P75,000 in favor of the heirs of Arsenio Imperial is in order.
PEOPLE vs. ASTROLOGO
Facts: Astrologo raped his daughter. His daughter used to live with her grandmother,
Astrologos mother. But some time before the rape incident, Astrologo fetched her to live with
him and his family.
Doctrine: Civil indemnity, which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages,
is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.
PEOPLE vs. APACIBLE
Doctrine: The Court reduces the amount of civil indemnity awarded by the appellate court
from P75,000 to P50,000, as determined by the trial court. People v. Anod explains why the
award of P75,000 as civil indemnity lies only in cases where the proper imposable penalty is
death, viz:
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of the Death Penalty on June 24, 2006, the penalty meted to the accused was
reduced to reclusion perpetua. This jurisprudential trend was followed in the recent case
of People of the Philippines v. Generoso Rolida y Moreno, etc., where this Court also
increased the civil indemnity from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.
PEOPLE vs. LLANAS
Doctrine: The award of PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and the same amount as
moral damages for each count of qualified rape is in line with existing case law. In rape
cases, the concurrence, as here, of the victim's minority (under 18) and her relationship with
the offender is a special qualifying circumstance for which the law prescribes the penalty of
death under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. While the new law prohibits the imposition
of death, the penalty provided for a heinous crime is still death and qualified rape is still a
heinous offense.
CRISOSTOMO vs. PEOPLE
Doctrine: In robbery with homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages in the amount of
P50,000 each is granted automatically in the absence of any qualifying aggravating
circumstances. These awards are mandatory without need of allegation and evidence other
than the death of the victim owing to the fact of the commission of the crime. In this case, the
CA properly awarded the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity. In addition, we also award
the amount of P50,000 as moral damages.
To be entitled to compensatory damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and the best
evidence obtainable to the injured party. "Receipts should support claims of actual
damages.
PEOPLE vs. NAZARENO
Doctrine: The award for civil indemnity is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the victim
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. To conform with recent
jurisprudence, however, the amount awarded by the Court of Appeals is hereby increased to
P75,000.00.

PHIL. HAWK CORP. vs. LEE
Doctrine: Further, the Court of Appeals correctly awarded respondent civil indemnity for the
death of her husband, which has been fixed by current jurisprudence at P50,000. The award is
proper under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code.
ATTORNEYS FEES
QUIRANTE vs. IAC
Facts: Dr. Indalecio Casasola had a contract with a building contractor, Guerrero. Guerrero
failed to perform his part of the contract within the period specified. Casasola through his
counsel Quirante, sued both Guerrero and Philamgen before the CFI for damages, with
Philamgen filing a cross-claim against Guerrero for indemnification. Quirante filed a motion for
confirmation of his attorneys fees in TC, in relation to a damages case involving his client Dr.
Casasola as plaintiff/ claimant.
Doctrine: The attorney's fees being claimed by Quirante is different from attorney's fees as an
item of damages provided for under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, wherein the award is
made in favor of the litigant, not of his counsel, and the litigant, not his counsel, is the
judgment creditor who may enforce the judgment for attorney's fees by execution.
Quirante's claims are based on an alleged contract for professional services, with them as the
creditors and the Casasolas as the debtors.
YU vs. NGO YET TE
Doctrine: Attorneys fees cannot be awarded when moral and exemplary damages are not
granted, the exception however is when a party incurred expenses to lift a wrongfully issued
writ of attachment. Without a doubt, Spouses Yu waged a protracted legal battle to fight off
the illegal attachment of their properties and pursue their claims for damages. It is only just
and equitable that they be awarded reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of P30,000.
MERALCO vs. RAMOY
Doctrine: Since the Court does not deem it proper to award exemplary damages in this case,
then the CA's award for attorney's fees should likewise be deleted, as Article 2208 of the Civil
Code states that in the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees cannot be recovered except in
cases provided for in said Article.
BRIONES vs. MACABAGDAL
Doctrine: Under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation are
recoverable only in the concept of actual damages, not as moral damages nor judicial costs.
Hence, such must be specifically prayed foras was not done in this caseand may not be
deemed incorporated within a general prayer for "such other relief and remedy as this court
may deem just and equitable." It must also be noted that aside from the following, the body
of the trial courts decision was devoid of any statement regarding attorneys fees. In Scott
Consultants & Resource Development Corporation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we reiterated
that attorneys fees are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The power of the
court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands factual, legal,
and equitable justification; its basis cannot be left to speculation or conjecture. Where
granted, the court must explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the
dispositive portion thereof, the legal reason for the award of attorneys fees.
BANK OF AMERICA vs. PHIL.
RACING CLUB
Doctrine: The awards of attorneys fees and litigation expenses in favor of respondent are not
justified under the circumstances and, thus, must be deleted. The power of the court to
award attorneys fees and litigation expenses under Article 2208 of the NCC demands
factual, legal, and equitable justification.
An adverse decision does not ipso facto justify an award of attorneys fees to the winning
party. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to
protect his rights, still attorneys fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad
faith could be reflected in a partys persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction
of the righteousness of his cause.
GOMEZ vs. GOMEZ-SAMSON
Facts: Augusto Gomez, as special administrator of his aunts (Consuelo Ariston) intestate
estate, sued his first cousins and uncle, in order to annul certain deeds of donation w/c he
alleges that his relatives forged in order to obtain, through fraud, certain properties of his late
aunt. He claims in court that after his aunt Consuelo died, his relatives (the ones he sued)
fraudulently prepared or caused to be prepared certain deeds of donation inter vivos, by
forging the signature of his aunt Consuelo on them and antedating their notarial
acknowledgement to a date before her death.
Doctrine: Attorneys fees should also be deleted, as it was supposed to be the consequence
of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding by Augusto.

FRIAS vs. SAN DIEGO-SISON
Facts: Bobie Rose Frias - the owner of a house and lot located Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa,
Metro Manila, acquired from Island Masters Realty and Development Corporation (IMRDC).
The property is covered by a TCT in the name of IMRDC. Frias and Dra. Flora San Diego-Sison
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement over the property. Frias received from San Diego-
Sison two million pesos in cash and one million pesos in a post-dated check dated February
28, 1990, instead of 1991, which rendered said check stale. Frias gave San Diego-Sison the TCT
in the name of IMRDC and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the property between Frias and
IMRDC. San Diego-Sison decided not to purchase the property and notified Frias, and
reminded her of their agreement that the amount of two million pesos which Frias received
from San Diego-Sison should be considered as a loan payable within six months. Frias failed to
pay. Frias reported that her owners copy of TCT was lost an executed an affidavit of loss and
filed a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of said title. Petition was
granted but was subsequently set aside due to San Diego-Sisons petition for relief from
judgment.
Doctrine: The award of attorney's fees is the exception rather than the general rule. As such, it
is necessary for the trial court to make findings of facts and law that would bring the case
within the exception and justify the grant of such award. The matter of attorney's fees cannot
be mentioned only in the dispositive portion of the decision.
INTEREST
SORIAMONT STEAMSHIP vs.
SPRINT TRANSPORT
Doctrine: Under Article 2209 of the Civil Code, when an obligation not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money is breached, then an interest on the amount of damages awarded
may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. Clearly, the
monetary judgment in favor of Sprint does not involve a loan or forbearance of money;
hence, the proper imposable rate of interest is six (6%) percent.
Consistent with the foregoing jurisprudence, and later on affirmed in more recent cases,
when the judgment awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of
legal interest shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period
being deemed to be by then an equivalent of a forbearance of credit. Thus, from the time
the judgment becomes final until its full satisfaction, the applicable rate of legal interest shall
be twelve percent (12%).
PAN PACIFIC SERVICE vs.
EQUITABLE PCI BANK
Doctrine: Article 1956 of the Civil Code, which refers to monetary interest, specifically
mandates that no interest shall be due unless it has been expressly stipulated in writing.
Therefore, payment of monetary interest is allowed only if:
1. there was an express stipulation for the payment of interest; and
2. the agreement for the payment of interest was reduced in writing. The concurrence of
the two conditions is required for the payment of monetary interest.
We agree with petitioners interpretation that in case of default, the consent of the
respondent is not needed in order to impose interest at the current bank lending rate.

WEEK 14
MORAL DAMAGES
KIERULF vs. CA
Facts: One of Pantrancos buses was traveling along EDSA when the driver lost control of the
bus, causing it to swerve to the left, and then to fly over the center island, ending up on the
wrong side of the road. The front of the bus bumped the front portion of an Isuzu pickup
driven Porfirio Legaspi, causing damage to both vehicles and injuries to both Legaspi and his
passenger Lucila Kierulf, wife of Victor Kierulf, owner of the pickup and employer of Legaspi.
As a consequence of the incident, Lucila suffered injuries which required major surgery and
prolonged treatment by specialists. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found for
Legaspi and the Kierulfs. The spouses Kierulf, however, averred that the disfigurement of
Lucilas physical appearance due to the accident could not but affect their marital right of
consortium and asked that the moral damages awarded be increased from P100, 000 to one
million pesos, not only for Lucila, but also for her husband. They also averred that the social
and financial standing of Lucila should also be considered in fixing the award of moral
damages.
Doctrine: In order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof
of moral suffering, mental anguish, fright and the like. While no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, it is nevertheless essential that the
claimant show the existence of the factual basis for damages and its causal connection to
the defendants acts.
Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason
of the defendant's culpable action.
Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it
must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case must be governed by its
own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount.
The yardstick should be that the amount awarded should not be so palpably and
scandalously excessive as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption
on the part of the trial judge. Neither should it be so little or so paltry that it rubs salt to the
injury already inflicted on plaintiffs.
The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal
to the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured person.
The Court noted that the Rodriguez case clearly reversed the original common law view first
enunciated in the case of Deshotel vs. Atchison, that a wife could not recover for the loss of
her husband's services by the act of a third party.
Rodriguez ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no longer capable
of giving love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has
suffered a direct and real personal loss.
The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding moral
damages. The factual circumstances prior to the accident show that no "rude and rough"
reception, no "menacing attitude," no "supercilious manner," no "abusive language and
highly scornful reference" was given her. The social and financial standing of a claimant of
moral damages may be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or she was
subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social
and financial standing.
When social & financial standing may be considered in awarding MD: only if he or she was
subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offenders knowledge of his or her social
and financial standing.

SULPICIO LINES vs. CURSO
Facts: Dr Curso boarded at the port of Manila the MV Dona Marilyn, an inter-island vessel
owned by Sulpicio, bound for Tacloban. The vessel sank in the afternoon of Oct 24 due to the
inclement sea and weather conditions brought about by Typhoon Unsang. His body was
never recovered. He was then 48 years old, working as a resident physician at the Naval
District Hospital in Naval, Biliran.
Doctrine: As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract, unless there is fraud or bad faith. As an exception, moral
damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract of carriage that results in the death
of a passenger, in accordance with Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206 (3) of the Civil
Code.
The omission from Article 2206 (3) of the brothers and sisters of the deceased passenger
reveals the legislative intent to exclude them from the recovery of moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
According to Villanueva v Salvador, the conditions for awarding moral damages are:
1. there must be an injury, whether physical, mental, or psychological, clearly
substantiated by the claimant;
2. there must be a culpable act or omission factually established;
3. the wrongful act or omission of the defendant must be the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the claimant; and
4. the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the
Civil Code.

BF METAL vs. LOMOTAN
Facts: Umuyon was driving an owner-type jeep owned by respondents, Sps. Lomotan. Jeep
was cruising along Felix Ave in Cainta, Rizal at a moderate speed (20-30 kph). A speeding
ten-wheeler truck, driven by Onofre Rivera, from the opposite lane suddenly rammed into the
jeep, which became a total wreck, after the truck overtook a car invading the jeeps lane.
Doctrine: In the case of moral damages, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule.
Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and alleviate the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar harm unjustly caused to a person.
In order that an award of moral damages can be aptly justified, the claimant must be able to
satisfactorily prove that he has suffered such damages and that the injury causing it has
sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
Then, too, the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or
omission. The claimant must establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with
the acts of the defendant.
Requisites:
1. Evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering
sustained by the claimant;
2. A culpable act or omission factually established;
3. Proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
damages sustained by the claimant; and
4. That the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Article
2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code
In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b)
where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may aptly be recovered. This
rule also applies, as aforestated, to breaches of contract where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith.
In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of
physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal
arrest, illegal search, or defamation.
EXPERT TRAVEL vs. CA
Facts: Expertravel issued to respondent Ricardo Lo four round-trip plane tickets to Hong Kong,
together with hotel accommodations and transfers for a total cost of P39, 677.20.

Alleging that Lo had failed to pay the amount due, Expertravel caused several demands to
be made. Since the demands were ignored by Lo, Expertravel filed a complaint for recovery
of the amount. Lo answered that his account with Expertravel had already been fully paid.
The account had been remitted to Expertravel through its then Chairperson Ma. Rocio de
Vega who was theretofore authorized to deal with the respondents clients.
Doctrine: Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to compensate and
alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
unjustly caused to a person.
Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages, nevertheless, must
somehow be proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted.
Such damages, to be recoverable, must be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission
the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the aggrieved party.
Conditions for an award of moral damages
(1) There must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained
by the claimant;
(2) There must be a culpable act or omission factually established;
(3) The wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant;
(4) The award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219.
Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for
an award of attorney's fees, such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a
ground for an award of moral damages.
The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the
right to litigate. The anguish suffered by a person for having been made a defendant in a civil
suit would be no different from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled
to court, a situation that cannot by itself be a cogent reason for the award of moral
damages. If the rule were otherwise, then moral damages must every time be awarded in
favor of the prevailing defendant against an unsuccessful plaintiff.
In breach of contract
o Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral
damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty
of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself
is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries.
o By special rule in Art 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code, moral
damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a
breach of carriage.
Culpa aquiliana or QD
o Moral damages may be aptly recovered
1. when an act or omission causes physical injuries,
2. where the defendant is guilty of intentional tort, (footnote: In this latter case,
moral damages may be recovered even in loss of or damage to property)
o This rule also applies to contracts when breached by tort
Culpa criminal
o Moral damages could be lawfully due when the accused is found guilty of physical
injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary detention, illegal
arrest, illegal search, or defamation.
o Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a claim for moral damages.

MIJARES vs. CA
Facts: Metro Drug supplied pharmaceutical products to the Mijares spouses drugstore and to
the Ospital ng Maynila Consumers Cooperative Drugstore, which is also operated by Editha
Mijares, as an officer of the Co-op. The Co-op was dissolved and ceased operations in 1986,
and its space was leased out to Solomon Silverio who also put up a drugstore. MD made
deliveries to Silverios store for almost a year, amounting to 32K. Silverio issued a check, for
partial payment under the account name of his store, which was dishonored. MD filed a
complaint to collect from Editha, despite having been informed that they no longer did
business in Ospital. Court found suit to be unfounded.
Doctrine: Spouses Mijares have failed to show that Metro Drug was motivated by bad faith
when it instituted the action for collection.
Malicious prosecution, both in criminal and civil cases, requires the presence of two elements,
to wit: a) malice; and b) absence of probable cause.
Moral damages cannot be recovered from a person who has filed a complaint against
another in good faith, or without malice or bad faith.
INDUSTRIAL INSURANCE vs.
BONDAD
Facts: The Bondads packed passenger jeepney was at a stop position due to a flat tire along
the South Expressway coming from Alabang towards the general direction of Makati, in from
of Merville Subd. when the DM Transit bus driven by Eduardo Diaz hit and bumped the rear
left side portion of the Bondads jeepney. Due to the severe impact caused, the DM Transit
bus swerved to the left and collided with the right side portion of Grace Moraless Galant
Sigma, which was travelling in the same direction, taking the innermost lane. Moraless Sigma
was dragged to its left side and hit the concrete wall. The DM Transit bus was recklessly
engaged in a race with a Baliuag Transit Bus and tried to outrun the former by using the
shoulder of the road, a tactic that is very common along the South Expressway. Unfortunately,
Bondads jeep was at a stop at the shoulder along the path of the bus.
Doctrine: We affirm the award of moral damages. To sustain this award, it must be shown that
(1) the claimant suffered injury, and
(2) such injury sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil
Code.
It is not enough that the claimant alleges mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings,
social humiliation, and the like as a result of the acts of the other party. It is necessary that
such acts be shown to have been tainted with bad faith or ill motive.
In the case at bar, it has been shown that the petitioner acted in bad faith in compelling
respondents to litigate an unfounded claim. As a result, Respondent Ligorio Bondad "could no
longer concentrate on his job." Moreover, Pablo Bondad became sick and even suffered a
mild stroke.
Indeed, respondents' anxiety is not difficult to understand. They were innocently attending to
a flat tire on the shoulder of the road; the next thing they knew, they were already being
blamed for an accident.
Worse, they were forced to commute all the way from Laguna to Makati in order to attend
the hearings. Under the circumstances of this case, the award of moral damages is justified.
TRIPLE EIGHT vs. NLRC
Facts: Erlinda Osdana was recruited by Triple 8 as a food server in Saudi Arabia. Bad working
conditions made her ill and she had to be confined in a hospital. She was transferred several
times, but she again became ill and required 2 surgeries. After this, she was no longer given
any assignments even if she was willing and able to do light work. She was dismissed from
work and not given any separation pay. Triple 8 refused to help her, so she filed an illegal
dismissal case. LA and NLRC both ruled in her favor and awarded her damages.
Doctrine: Moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was
attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.

PEOPLE vs. PIRAME
Facts: Pirame and 2 other guys were charged w/ murder for killing a guy named Pedro
Torrenueva. The aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse
of superior strength were alleged in the information. According to the eye witness testimony
during trial, Pirame held the victim while his two companions beat the victim to death w/ an
iron pipe and a piece of wood. Afterwards, they supposedly buried the corpse in a well.
Doctrine: The award of moral damages is unsupported. The widow of the victim did not testify
on any mental anguish or emotional distress which she suffered as a result of her husbands
death.
ARCONA vs. CA
Facts: Carlos Arcona was convicted of homicide and was ordered to pay 10K as moral
damages. He appealed claiming self-defense.
Doctrine: Moral damages should be increased to 50K. As borne out by human experience a
violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part
of the victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a
loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such brutal death not only steals
from the family of the deceased his life, love, support and affection but also leaves them with
a gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral damage
must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional
sufferings.
VALENZUELA vs. CA
Doctrine: Well beyond the hospitalization period (which was paid for by Li), she will be
required to undergo adjustments in her prosthetic devise due to the shrinkage of the stump
from the healing process. These adjustments entail costs, prosthetic replacements and
months of physical and occupational rehabilitation and therapy. During her lifetime, the
prosthetic devise will have to be replaced and readjusted to changes in the size of her lower
limb effected by the biological changes of middle age, menopause and aging. Assuming
she reaches menopause, the prosthetic will have to be adjusted in response to the changes
in bone resulting from a precipitate decrease in calcium levels observed in post-menopausal
women.
In other words, the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would
also be permanently changing and adjusting to physiological changes which he body would
normally undergo through the years. All these adjustments, it has been documented, are
painful.
The foregoing discussion does not even scratch the surface of the nature of the resulting
damage because it is highly speculative to estimate the amount of psychological pain,
damage and injury which goes with the sudden severing of a vital portion of the human body.
A prosthetic device, however technologically advanced, will only allow a reasonable
amount of functional restoration of the motor functions of the lower limb. The sensory
functions are forever lost. The resultant anxiety, sleeplessness, psychological injury, mental
and physical pain are inestimable.
As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Courts discretion, we are of the opinion
that the amount of 1M granted by the RTC is in greater accord with the extent and nature of
the injury physical and psychological suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Lis grossly
negligent driving of his Mitsubishi Lancer.
LOPEZ vs. PAN AMERICAN
Facts: Senate President Pro Tempore Fernando Lopez reserved first class tickets with Pan-Am
for him, his wife, his daughter and her husband. The tickets were issued and paid for, but on
the day of the flight, they were informed that they could not be accommodated as first class
passengers, because first class was already fully booked. They were constrained to take the
flight as tourist passengers, under protest. Lopez filed a suit for damages, alleging breach of
contracts in bad faith, and asked for 500K as actual and moral damages. CFI awarded 150K
in moral damages.
Doctrine: Moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith (Art 2220 CC).
As a proximate result of defendants breach in bad faith of its contracts with plaintiffs, the
latter suffered social humiliation, wounded feelings, serious anxiety and mental anguish.
Plaintiffs were traveling with first class tickets issued by defendant and yet they were given
only the tourist class. At stop-overs, they were expected to be among the first-class
passengers by those awaiting to welcome them, only to be found among the tourist
passengers; it is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to
be expected from the contractual undertaking.
Maria Lopez, the wife, shares his prestige and therefore his humiliation. She suffered physical
discomfort during the 13-hour flight. She was actually sick then and was advised by the
doctor to go to the United States. It is not hard to see that in her condition then a physical
discomfort sustained for thirteen hours may well be considered a physical suffering.
Mr and Mrs Alfredo Montelibano were traveling as immediate members of the family of
Senator Lopez. They formed part of the party of Lopez, as shown in their reservation cards. As
such, they also shared his prestige and humiliation.

PEOPLE vs. LIZANO
Facts: Lizano was charged with 3 counts of rape for raping AAA, 11-year old, while the latter
living under the same house of appellant and his wife, who is AAAs aunt.
Doctrine: Moral damages is also automatically granted in rape cases without need of further
proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim had
actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such award.
STREBEL vs. FIGUERAS
Facts: Strebel, a Mobilgas station owner sued Acting Labor Secretary Figueras, Director of
Labor Jose and Assistant City Fiscal Ruperto. In one of his causes action, he cited the incident
of the transfer of his son-in-law (Hernandez) from the BOI to the Bureau of Prisons. He claims
that Figueras influenced the DOJ Secretary to effect such transfer and is seeking moral and
actual damages.
Doctrine: As a general rule, the right of recovery for mental suffering resulting from bodily
injuries is restricted to the person who has suffered the bodily hurt, and there can be no
recovery for distress caused by sympathy for another's suffering, or for fright due to a wrong
against a third person. So the anguish of mind arising as to the safety of others who may be in
personal peril from the same cause cannot be taken into consideration . . . damages are not
recoverable for fright or shock even when sustained as a result of wilful act, unless such act
was directed toward person or property or person seeking recovery.
In law, mental anguish is restricted as a rule, to such mental pain or suffering as arises from an
injury or wrong to the person himself, as distinguished from that form of mental suffering which
is the accompaniment of sympathy or sorrow for another's suffering or which arises from a
contemplation of wrongs committed on the person of another.
ABS-CBN vs. CA
Facts: ABS and Viva executed a Film Exhibition Agreement whereby Viva gave ABS an
exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. ABS was given a right of first refusal to 24 films. Vivas
agent gave ABS (through Charo Santos) a list of 36 films to choose 24 from. Santos only liked
10 (including Maging Sino Ka Man) and did not accept it. According to Lopez of ABS, there
was a napkin agreement for Viva to sell 14 films for P36M. Vivas agent denied such
agreement. Deals with ABS failed, so then Viva made a deal with RBS granting the latter the
exclusive right to 104 film, including the 14 films in the napkin agreement. RBS made print
ads of the anticipated airing of Maging Sino Ka Man. ABS filed a complaint for specific
performance w/ a prayer for injunction. Complaint was dismissed and moral damages were
awarded to RBS for having its reputation debased by the filing of the complaint.
Doctrine: Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.
The award is not meant to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant, but to
enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to obviate
then moral suffering he has undergone.
It is aimed at the restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the spiritual status quo ante,
and should be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
The award of moral damages cannot be granted in favor of a corporation because, being
an artificial person and having existence only in legal contemplation, it has no feelings, no
emotions, no senses, It cannot, therefore, experience physical suffering and mental anguish,
which call be experienced only by one having a nervous system.
The statement in People v. Manero and Mambulao Lumber Co. v. PNB that a corporation
may recover moral damages if it "has a good reputation that is debased, resulting in social
humiliation" is an obiter dictum.

REPUBLIC vs. TUVERA
Facts: Twin Peaks was engaged in the real estate business w/ Victor as one of its 5
incorporating stockholders, owning 48% of the shares. Marcos granted Twin Peaks a Timber
Licensing Agreement (TLA 356), acting on Twin Peaks VP & Treasures letter, to operate on
26K hectares of forest land. They were allowed to cut timber and to export narra. The instant
action originated from a civil complaint for restitution and damages filed by the Republic of
the Philippines against Marcos and his longtime aide Juan Tuvera, as well as Tuvera's son
Victor and a corporation the younger Tuvera had controlled. Trial on the case against the
Tuveras proceeded separately before the Sandiganbayan. After the Republic had presented
its evidence, the Tuveras successfully moved for the dismissal of the case on demurrer to
evidence. The demurrer was sustained, and it falls upon this Court to ascertain the absence or
existence of sufficient proof to support the relief sought by the Republic against the Tuveras.
Doctrine: A juridical person is generally not entitled to moral damages because, unlike a
natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded
feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish or moral shock.
Nevertheless, AMEC's claim for moral damages falls under item 7 of Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. This provision expressly authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel,
slander or any other form of defamation. Art 2219(7) does not qualify whether the plaintiff is a
natural or juridical person. Therefore, a juridical person such as a corporation can validly
complain for libel or any other form of defamation and claim for moral damages.
It may avail of moral damages under the analogous cases listed in Art 2219, such as for libel,
slander or any other form of defamation. Suffice it to say that the action at bar does not
involve any of the analogous cases under Article 2219, and indeed upon an intelligent
reading of Article 2219, it is difficult to see how the Republic could sustain any of the injuries
contemplated therein. Any lawyer for the Republic who poses a claim for moral damages in
behalf of the State stands in risk of serious ridicule.
GLOBE MACKAY vs. CA
Doctrine: Moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of CC.
WEEK 15
NOMINAL DAMAGES
ROBES-FRANCISCO vs. CFI
Facts:
Doctrine:
TEMPERATE DAMAGES
FRANCISCO vs. FERRER
Facts:
Doctrine:
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
GONZALES vs. PEOPLE
Facts:
Doctrine:
EXEMPLARY/CORRECTIVE
DAMAGES
PLENO vs. CA
Facts:
Doctrine:

RAMOS vs. CA
Facts:
Doctrine:

PNR vs. ETHEL
Facts:
Doctrine:

REPUBLIC vs. TUVERA
Facts:
Doctrine:

TITAN vs. UNI-FIELD
Facts:
Doctrine:

PEOPLE vs. DALISAY
Facts:
Doctrine:

PNB vs. CA
Facts:
Doctrine:

PEOPLE DIUNSAY-JALANDONI
Facts:
Doctrine:

REPUBLIC vs. TUVERA
Facts:
Doctrine: