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We commonly take for granted that other humans are conscious. This assumption can be
justified by an inductive argument called the argument by analogy (ABA). The ABA can be
used to logically infer from similar behavior (non-linguistic and linguistic) that other humans are
conscious in the same ways as we individually are. I will argue that since the ABA is one means
of justifying the existence of conscious states of other humans, and because we typically only
rely on behavior to infer the conscious states of other humans, we can reasonably use the ABA to
justify the existence of certain conscious states of particular animals based on behaviors that are
sufficiently similar to human behavior. So, by using the ABA to justify the existence of the
conscious states of animals, I contend that some animals are not only conscious but
introspectively self-conscious.
I. Core Concepts
Again, introspective self-consciousness (ISC) is the sort of consciousness that is the main focus
of the current project. The conception of ISC espoused here will consist of three distinct but
related core capacities:
ISC1: The capacity to be conscious of one’s mental states. This only requires that one be
capable of being conscious of one’s particular mental state or mental states. It does not
entail the ability either to distinguish mental state A from mental state B or to be
conscious of mental states as one’s own.
ISC2: The capacity for mental state deliberation. This implies that one is capable of
distinguishing two or more mental states from one another.
ISC3: The capacity to be conscious of one’s psychological self. This implies that one is
conscious of oneself as the subject of experience.
Let’s now consider the relationship between each of these. Logically speaking, ISC1 is a
necessary condition for ISC2 and ISC3. If one is incapable of being conscious of one’s own
mental states, then one could not engage in mental state deliberation and could not experience a
mental state as one’s own. Next, ISC2 and ISC3 are (individually) sufficient conditions for ISC1.
That is, if one is capable of ISC2 or ISC3, then one must possess ISC1. There is, however, no
necessary relationship between ISC2 and ISC3. It stands to reason that a being can possess ISC3
without possessing ISC2 and visa versa. It may seem that ISC2 is a necessary condition, but not
sufficient condition for having ISC3, but this need not be the case. From my perspective, I do not
deliberate between mental states and then pick out which mental states are mine. As a matter of
fact, I cannot even imagine what it would be like to experience a mental state as something other
than mine – I experience my mental states immediately as my own. Furthermore, there is nothing
about ISC3 that logically necessitates ISC2. Consequently, it seems possible (both physically and
logically) for a being to possess ISC3 independently of ISC2 and visa versa.
Now that we have a working definition for ‘introspective self-consciousness’, we can
consider the proposed method for justifying the claim that some animals possess introspective
self-consciousness: the argument by analogy.
A has property X
B is similar to A
Therefore, B probably has property X
To make the ABA work for attributing ISC to others, we must demonstrate that the
observed similarities constitute a relational similarity. A relational similarity represents a strong
correlation between a set of elements possessed by two entities (e.g. certain types of behavior
and ISC). This means that ISC must be strongly correlated to some element (or set of elements)
possessed by the two entities being compared. Further, when used to infer the conscious states of
others, the ABA requires that we make a generalization based on one instance (one’s own
conscious states). That is, the ISC that I can be most certain of is my own; and based on my
knowledge about my ISC, I am able to correlate certain behaviors of mine (both non-linguistic
and linguistic behaviors) with my ISC. So, since the ABA (as used to infer the ISC of others)
requires making a generalization based on one instance – my own ISC – and I experience a
strong correlation between my Behavior Y and my ISC, I can rely on the behavior of others that
is similar enough to mine to infer that others possess ISC. For example:
In the above argument, the correlation exists between ISC and Behavior Y; and any being
exhibiting Behavior Y probably possesses ISC. I say “probably,” because the ABA cannot prove
that the argument’s conclusion is true; at most the ABA can give us reason to accept the
conclusion as probably true. With a clearer understanding of what makes the ABA work, I offer
the following formulation of the ABA, which will be used throughout the remainder of this
essay.
1
Some may object, here, by pointing out that this narrow focus weakens my case; the more robust the similarities
between humans and animals, the better the analogical argument. With this in mind, it would be helpful to offer a
more robust set of similarities, which would include neurophysiologic and evolutionary considerations, for these are
important aspects of the similarity upon which the analogical argument is based. However, as indicated at the
beginning of section II, mere similarity does not make the ABA work. Instead, we must demonstrate a correlation
(analogy) between the element(s) possessed by the entities being compared.
2
For the sake of simplicity, I will consider only neurophysiology and not evolutionary continuity (homology) since
the latter appears to offer support to the claim that humans and some animals have strong neurophysiologic
similarities.
3
For example, when dealing with living beings, one must have a complex central nervous system (CCNS) in order
to have mental states – if one does not have a CCNS, then one cannot have mental states.
4
For example, Tom is a human; and because he is human, he shares with me strong neurophysiologic similarities.
Tom has been medically pronounced to be brain-dead, and therefore cannot have mental states.
5
For example, very young children (typically) are completely oblivious of others’ neurophysiology but they are
capable of knowing the mental states of other humans (particularly their guardians).
6
For example, Jerry is a human who is in a coma. I can know that Jerry has a CCNS while not knowing any of his
mental states. (What I am arguing here is not that Jerry does not have mental states; just that I cannot know his
mental states.)
7
I acknowledge that this is a contentious claim and given my space limitations, I will not defend this claim in the
current project.
8
Note: mental states can be either conscious or unconscious.
9
Consider Jerry’s case. Jerry may actually have (or be experiencing) metal states while exhibiting no behavioral
indication that he is having them; and in this situation, since he is exhibiting no behavior, there is no way for any
observer to know that Jerry is having mental states. What about doing a brain scan on him, which could reveal his
conscious activity? Even if Jerry’s brain scan came back positive for certain signature brainwaves that indicate that
he is introspectively self-conscious we would still need to establish a correlation between certain signature
brainwaves and mental states, and this can only be done through behavior.
10
For example, additional scans of Jerry’s brain indicate that he is in a persistent coma. However, if Jerry is able to
speak or blink his eyes (to communicate in Morris Code, for example) an observer can take this behavior as a
reasonable guarantee that Jerry is having mental states.
11
To reiterate, there is a strong correlation between certain kinds of my behavior (both non-linguistic and linguistic)
and ISC; and this can be justified by using my own ISC as a base case. And since behavior (both non-linguistic and
linguistic) is a sufficient condition for justifying (through the application of the ABA) the existence of mental states
in others – specifically ISC – I will focus only on behavior – particularly, two specific types of behavior. As a
reminder, the form of the ABA being applied here is as follows.
There is a strong correlation between ISC and Behavior Y in me
Some animals exhibit Behavior Y
Therefore, some animals are probably introspectively self-conscious
12
Consider the description of an uncertainty test. Both rhesus monkeys and bottlenosed dolphin have been issued
the uncertainty test, which requires the subjects to discriminate between two stimuli. The monkeys were asked to
discriminate between groups of dots that were either sparse or dense and the dolphin were asked to discriminate
between sound frequencies that were either high or low. These respective tests attempted to force the subjects to
make difficult perceptual discriminations without allowing them to report (in any way) on their uncertainty or cope
with the uncertainty. (J. David Smith, Jonathan Schull, Jared Strote, Kelli McGee, Roian Egnor, and Linda Erb,
“The Uncertainty Response in the Bottlenosed Dolphin (Tursiops truncates),” Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General 124, no. 4 (1995): 391.) The tests only allow the subjects to select (typically in the form of depressing a
lever or button) one of three options: dense/high, sparse/low, or uncertain. (Cognitive and comparative psychologists
have, over the years, determined which behaviors certain animals engage in when experiencing cognitive
difficulties, particularly uncertainty. Based on this information, researchers issuing the uncertainty test determined
that the animal subjects were uncertain by observing the animals’ behavior when selecting the ‘uncertain’ response.
Furthermore, the animals apparently do not interpret the ‘uncertain’ option as ‘middle’ or ‘medium’. According to
Smith et al., “If the animal were simply making a middle response to middle stimuli, no special behaviors would
occur.” That is, if the animal subjects interpreted the ‘uncertain’ response as ‘middle’, they would exhibit the same
behavior as when they select the ‘dense/high’ or ‘sparse/low’ options. J. David Smith, et al., “The Uncertainty
Response in the Bottlenosed Dolphin (Tursiops truncates),” 400.)
III. C. 2. The Possible Necessity of Language to Gain Epistemic Access to Animal ISC3
While the uncertainty test helps to establish a basis from which we can reasonably infer that
some animals are capable of ISC1-2, the test fails to establish a basis from which we can infer that
they are aware of their uncertainty as their own uncertainty. Unfortunately, I cannot imagine
what sort of non-linguistic behavior that could demonstrate one’s consciousness of one’s own
psychological self (ISC3) (this could be due to the author’s lack of imagination). It seems that the
only way that we (individually) know that others are conscious of their respective psychological
selves is through linguistic behavior. This does not in itself mean that those beings who are
incapable of linguistic behavior or who are capable of linguistic behavior but are merely without
such a form of communication (e.g. languageless humans) lack ISC3. The point is that while it is
possible for an animal to possess ISC3 without being able to linguistically communicate the
possession of such a capacity, it maybe impossible for us to attribute (through the ABA) ISC3 to
animals (or other beings) who lack the capacity for linguistic behavior.
13
To learn more about uncertainty tests and the debate concerning such tests see the following articles. J. David
Smith et.al, “The Uncertainty Response in the Bottlenosed Dolphin (Tursiops truncates),” 391-408; J. David Smith,
Wendy E. Shields, and David A. Washburn, “The Comparative Psychology of Uncertainty Monitoring and
Metacognition,” Behavior and Brain Sciences 26 (2003): 317-373; Robert R. Hampton, Aaron Zivin, and Elisabeth
A Murray, “Rhesus Monkeys (Macaca mulatta) Discriminate Between Knowing and Not Knowing and Collect
Information as Needed Before Acting,” Animal Cognition 7 (2004): 239-246; Derek Browne, “Do Dolphins Know
Their Own Minds?” Biology and Philosophy 19 (2004): 633-653; and Robert R. Hampton and Benjamin M.
Hampstead, “Spontaneous Behavior of a Rhesus Monkey (Macaca mulatta) During Memory Tests Suggests
Memory Awareness,” Behavioral Processes 72 (2006): 184-189.
14
J. David Smith et. al, “The Comparative Psychology of Uncertainty Monitoring and Metacognition,” 320-326.
15
Some amazingly interesting examples of chimpanzees learning and using ASL have been described in Roger
Fouts’ book Next of Kin: What Chimpanzees Have Taught Me About Who We Are. The examples described in Fouts’
book are more akin to anecdotal observations than scientific observations, representing interactions between the
Fouts family and the chimps that he studied and subsequently had relationships with. Even though Fouts
successfully taught several chimps ASL, this does not necessarily mean that these languaged chimps are capable of
ISC3. It could be that these chimps are only capable of reporting on their mental states (i.e. ISC1-2) and not conscious
of their psychological selves; it is also possible that these chimps were not even capable of ISC1-2. However, some of
the conversations recounted in Next of Kin seem to suggest that the chimps were conscious of their psychological
selves.
Some may claim that all that Fouts’ account can do is help to support the claim that some primates are
aware of their own emotional states, but does little to help support the claim that they are conscious of themselves as
the subject experiencing their own emotional states.
16
Such programs currently exist and are commonly referred to as “chatterbots.”