Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, :o11 DOI: 10.

1163/001972411X552382
Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:, brill.nl/iij
: A Precious Gar|and of
Buddhist Phi|osophica| Systems
*
Eviatar Shu|man
Te Hebrew University of Jerusalem
e-mail: taritar@yahoo.com
Abstract
N ag arjuna's Ratn avali is a unique text, delicately weaving subtle philosophical
argument with political, ethical and religious instructions. Tis combination be-
tween philosophy and worldly-oriented concerns causes N ag arjuna to denne the
Madhyamaka's philosophical contribution in remarkably lucid fashion. Tis paper
is an attempt to listen to the Ratn avali's philosophy in its own terms and to denne
the basic position put forward by N ag arjuna in the text: While attempting to
convert his patron S atav ahana king to a Mah ay ana viewpoint, N ag arjuna redennes
the Buddha's nirv a

na as the ontological nature of reality; the Buddha's cessation"

upon his passing into nirv a

na is interpreted as a description of how the world

exists, beyond existence and non-existence. Tus N ag arjuna is able to supply a new
explanation for fundamental Buddhist portraits of the Buddha-why the Buddha
refrained fromanswering metaphysical questions about the nature of the world and
why his teachings were termed, deep", ungraspable" and without foundation."
Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, :o11.
Keywords
Ratn avali; Precious Garland; N ag arjuna; Madhyamaka
Introduction
Te attribution of the Ratn avali (R

A) to N ag arjuna has been steadily

gaining acceptance in scholarly circles.
1
Nevertheless, the doctrines of this
*)
I thank Eli Franco, Michael Hahn, Anne MacDonald, Sara McClintock and Cristina
Scherrer-Schaub for their most valuable remarks on an earlier draft of this paper.
1)
Hahn (1,8:: I, 1,88), Lindtner (1,8:, unquestioned by Williams's [1,8] review),
Nakamura (1,8, [1,8o]: :-:), Vetter (1,,:), Walser (:oo:, :oo: ch. : and appen-
dix), Scherrer-Schaub (:oo;: ;o1). Vetter (section III) raises some doubt about N ag arjuna's
o: Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:,
intriguing text-a relatively early summary of Mah ay ana doctrines at dif-
ferent stages of their development, presented as a letter to a ruling king-
have yet to be fully explored. Te Ratn avali is indeed as challenging as it is
fascinating, being an assemblage of doctrines of too wide a spectrum to be
apprehended by one vision or discussion. Te text treats topics as diverse
as Buddhist meditation, Buddhist philosophies of dinerent sorts, Buddhist
practice, worship, and the path to Buddhahood, the nature of Buddhahood
in its physical and spiritual manifestations, and Buddhist polemics and pol-
itics, while all these diverse Buddhist realms of inquiry are intertwined with
a long lecture on recommended royal policy in the nelds of construction,
governance, economics, society and religion.
Te complexity of the R

A raises a number of questions regarding its

nature. Leaving aside a number of minor inconsistencies between dinerent
parts of the text,
2
as well as a number of important discrepancies between
authorship of the R

A, but nnds that all that can be said with authority is that the work was
not written in the same period in which N ag arjuna wrote the MMK.
2)
A preliminary list of questionable passages would consist of:
(1) Te structuring of the chapters, which is clearly arbitrary (see also Vetter [1,,:: :,,]):
Te discussion in chapter one nows naturally into chapter two, and continues for about
: verses; the nnal two verses of chapter appear to be the beginning of chapter ; less
problematic is the instruction on how to develop the : signs of a great man, which
begins in :.;o, and is connected thematically to the explanation of how the marks of
a Buddha are created with which chapter begins.
Tis awkward division of the chapters raises the possibility that the R

A we encounter
today is an enlarged and elaborated version of an earlier text written by N ag arjuna.
To this observation could be added Vetter's (1,,:: section III, esp. oo-o1) statis-
tical analysis of stylistic features, which raises questions regarding the authorship of
chapter . In this regard, Hahn's (1,8:a) analysis of the discrepancy between the men-
tioning of ; moral faults in .: and the , moral faults listed in verses .-, appears
to have been solved by Schmithausen (1,8o, see also Okada and Hahn [1,8: 1:]).
(:) Te king obviously has an intricate acquaintance with Mah ay ana doctrine, which
allows N ag arjuna to make many extremely subtle and counter-intuitive statements
throughout chapter one (e.g. 1.:, 1., 1.oo, see below), including the presentation of
many arguments that are absolutely incomprehensible without a sustained earlier study
of the MMK (e.g. 1.;, 1.;, 1.o). Tis clear enthusiastic acceptance of Mah ay ana
teachings is dimcult to reconcile with the well-known statements in .o;-.,8, where
N ag arjuna appears to be pleading for the Mah ay ana's right to exist (see the references
in note 1 below).
() E.g., the disagreement between :.:,, which states that people (loka, the world") are
displeased by adharma governance (niti), and .1 that states that a king who acts
according to adharma is generally praised by his dependants.
Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:, o
the Sanskrit and Tibetan editions of the text,
3
the major question that must
be answered is whether the king to whom the R

A is addressed is a historical
or a literary ngure. While most scholars who have worked on the R

Aviewed
the king as a historical ruler of the S atav ahana dynasty, there are many
reasons to question the idea that the text was addressed to a true historical
ruler. Simply put, it seems quite curious that any king who is not literally on
the doorstep of going forth" to renunciation, and is not extremely learned
in the intricate subtleties of Buddhist doctrine, could or would be willing to
appreciate or even to endure many aspects of the advice given to him in the
text.
4
And if the king is indeed prepared to become a monk, as N ag arjuna
() In 1.;o-1.,8, the author explains how the king will achieve the bodily marks of a great
man through moral and altruistic behaviour. Ten, in :.,:-:.,8, the text explains how
the king will obtain the ; supernatural powers (

rddhis) by other means, which include

aspects of devotion, altruism, meditation and wisdom, and then become a conqueror
who possesses the highest aspects" (:.,8d: rnam pa`i mchog ldan rgyal bar `gyur).
On a more general level, it remains unclear how the many lists of advice given to the
king relate to one another, and, in light of the other considerations listed, the possibility
arises that some of these lists are later insertions or elaborations.
() In .8-.o1, N ag arjuna analyzes emptiness in terms of the relation between the senses
and their objects (indriy a

nindriy arth a) and the elements (bh uta). Te argument is a

clear parallel to the more elaborate discussion of the elements in 1.8o-1.,:, but the
author gives no reference to the previous discussion.
3)
Dunne and McClintock (1,,;: -). See, for example, :.:. A discrepancy between
the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions that is particularly important is 1.1. Hahn (1,8:: ::)
follows the Tibetan and Chinese editions and corrects Tucci's (1,: 18) nirodham ca
prapacottha

m to nirodham c aprapacottha

m (See also Hahn [1,8;: ,o]). Both Dunne and

McClintock (1,,;: 1o) and Hopkins (1,,;: 1oo) follow this reading, which must be mis-
taken. 1.1 is a corollary of 1.o, which states that one avoids (nopaiti) the view of non-
existence (n astit am) once one has seen the arising of cause and enect (hetuphalotp ada

m
d

tv a) and accepted (abhyupetya) that the true nature (yath abh utya) of the world (loka)
is born of prapaca (prapacaja). 1.1 then supplies the complementary statement that
one does not go to (nopay ati) the view of existence (astit am), following a true understand-
ing (yath abh uty ad) that cessation is realized to be born of prapaca as well (nirodham ca
prapacottha

m up agata

m [for the reading up agata

m instead of up agata

h see Hahn (1,8;:

,o)]). Tis important pair of verses must be seen as a unit which states together that since
the arising and cessation of the world are both born of prapaca, one avoids the two extremes
of existence and non-existence.
4)
Although the same may surely be said about N ag arjuna's Suh

rllekha (Letter to a friend",

addressed as well to a king, most probably from the S atav ahana dynasty [Lindtner (1,8o:
:,8)]). It appears probable that the king is a devout Buddhist from the outset, since in
verse : N ag arjuna naturally characterizes the (Buddhist) dharma he is about to preach as
the sole excellence" (ek anta-kaly a

na). In this verse N ag arjuna states that he will explain

o Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:,
warmly recommends at the close of chapter , of what relevance would
be the lengthy advice on royal policy? What king (or anyone else, for that
matter) would tolerate, for instance, the extremely negative view of women
expressed in verses :.8-:.o:, which, among other repulsive descriptions,
compares the man who lusts for a woman to a pig, since both are attached
to a place nlled with excrement, urine and vomit (:.)? What king would
seriously contemplate appointing ministers in charge of placing umbrellas,
fans and tweezers for removing thorns at the crossroads (.o) or of feeding
the ants in his domain (.,)?
5
What king who is not a Buddhist adept
would understand the complex and absolutely counter-intuitive arguments
regarding the notions of existence and non-existence, articulated in verses
such as 1.oo,
6
where N ag arjuna says that because he is a nihilist he must
not be a nihilist?
Surely, the poetic and creative impulses of the R

A must be examined
more carefully.
7
But although the observations just outlined should cause
the dharma so as to cause it to arise in the king and turn him into a vessel for the true
dharma (saddharma-bh ajana), what will lead him to spiritual fulnllment (siddhi). Later on,
verse o1 compares the Buddhist views to those of the S a

mkhyas, the Vaise

sikas, the Jains

and the Pudgalav adins, and in verses 1.oo-o, N ag arjuna refutes the Sautrantrika doctrine of
momentariness. Te king was obviously conversant with the religious thought of numerous
traditions, and appears to have achieved a conviction favoring the Buddhist vision of truth,
since in verse o: N ag arjuna then proceeds to denne the Buddha's teachings as the unique
gift of dharma" (dharma-yautaka), being the only teaching to truly transcend existence and
non-existence. (with regard to the relation between N ag arjuna's system and other Indian
systems of his day, see also Lindtner's [1,,,: 1::] interesting remarks on the inclusive nature
of the text, which refers to a number of well-known non-Buddhist scriptures, most salient
among them the Bhagavad-git a. See also Scherrer-Schaub [:oo;].)
Te perception of the king as a devout Buddhist is emphasized by verses such as 1.;o
and :.:o, where N ag arjuna terms people who have no understanding of the doctrine of
emptiness stupid" (amedhasa, m urkha). Perhaps, though, the tendency to see the dinerent
Indian religious paths (dharmas) as fully distinct is inadequate. When all Indian traditions
are inclusive by nature and borrow from each other, it can be suggested that all participate
in the search for truth (dharma). Te king would thus be interested in the notion of dharma
in many traditions, possibly favoring more than one.
It must be noted that Sastri's (1,) identincation of the king as brahmanical is a
misinterpretation of R

A .;,-8o. See note 1o below.

5)
Regarding N ag arjuna's irregular vision of kingship and its functions-which may actually
be quite regular in the context of classical Indian thinking in these nelds-see Scherrer-
Schaub (:oo;: section II).
6)
See note , below.
7)
Te ambiguity of the R

A was also recognized by the Tibetan scholastic tradition, which

debated whether the text should be included with N ag arjuna's other philosophical texts in
the philosophical-analytical (yukti) corpus" (rigs tshogs), or rather amongst the more worldly
Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:, o
us to inquire into the goals of the R

A and question its unity, they should

not be taken to imply that the text as a whole is not authentic. Quite
the contrary, in fact, as there is clearly a deep congruence between the
teachings of N ag arjuna in the R

A and in his other major philosophical

texts.
8
Nevertheless, these observations do suggest that the authorship and
transmission of the R

A are worthy of further scrutiny, and that the study of

N ag arjuna's philosophical and political views must also concern itself with
the literary aspects of his works.
Although the questions raised by the Ratn avali's literary dimensions
remain, the prospects raised by the study of text's philosophy are promis-
ing. Te R

A is possibly the earliest extant Buddhist text that is not a s utra

to present traditional Mah ay ana doctrines. It is thus a markedly impor-
tant text for understanding the history of (relatively) early Mah ay ana-
doctrine. Moreover, now that modern scholars have reached a plausible
and even convincing hypothesis for the historical and geographical context
of the text, we are anorded the rare opportunity to date and locate cen-
tral developments in the history of Buddhist ideas. Te studies conducted
by Sastri (1,) and Mabbett (1,,8), and more recently and thoroughly
by Walser (:oo:, :oo: ch. :), all agree, albeit somewhat tentatively, that
N ag arjuna lived and wrote in the lower Krishna Valley in what is today
the vicinity of the Andhra Pradesh Guntur district, possibly in Amar avati
(Dh anyaka

taka) or N ag arjunako

da.
9
Mabbett and Walser both agree that
N ag arjuna should be dated between the last few decades of the second cen-
tury ci and the nrst few decades of the third century ci.
10
oriented treatises of the sermon (parikath a) corpus" (gtam tshogs). See Ruegg (1,81: 8,
:o) and Williams (1,8: ;o-8), as well as my reference to dinerent genres in N ag arjuna's
writings in Shulman (:oo, [:oo;]: section I).
8)
See also Scherrer-Schaub (:oo;: ;oo, n. :;). Here I refer mainly to metaphysical and
soteriological positions expressed in the Y

S and

SS, and less to the analytic method of the
MMK and the Vigrahavy avartani.
9)
Te geographical placing of N ag arjuna in these sources is based primarily on careful anal-
yses of N agarjuna's hagiographies, of prophecies of his birth in numerous s utras and s astras,
most importantly the La nk avat ara and Mah amegha s utras, and on the records of Chinese
pilgrims and other Chinese sources. All these sources rely heavily on the understanding
available from B a

n a's Har

sacarita (Ruegg [1,81]: . n. 11). and from Chinese sources that

N ag arjuna's patron was a S atav ahana king. Walser (:oo: o1-;,) devotes particular atten-
tion to the connection between N ag arjuna and the S atav ahana king, showing its probability.
See also Jan (1,;o), who argues against the notion that there was more than one N ag arjuna,
whom he believes to have taught at N ag arjunako

da.
10)
See also Jan (1,;o: 18-1,), who connrms these dates, citing similar conclusions
by Lamotte and Robinson. Te most important advance in the dating of N ag arjuna was
oo Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:,
Te insights anorded by the R

A are further intensined by the complex

and compounded nature of the text. Precisely because of the anomalous
relation between subtle philosophical thinking and the worldly-oriented
Buddhist concerns that are essential to this text, the R

A speaks in an
uncommonly clear voice. A study of the R

A underlines N ag arjuna's own

sense of the potential advances stimulated in the Buddhist tradition by the
rising Mah ay ana thought. When N ag arjuna called for royal support for his
Buddhist vision and tradition in the making, he had to denne precisely
what was wrong with the old Buddhist system, and explain how his new
system solves the problems he identined. We can thus pinpoint in what
sense N ag arjuna saw himself as an innovator and appreciate the stage of
Buddhist philosophical development at the time of the text's composition.
Since N ag arjuna's re-dennition of Buddhist truth in the R

A should be
considered the heart of the philosophical portion of the work, we can
also feel greater conndence that we are discussing its original authentic
positions.
To date, the philosophical aspects of the R

A have been neglected in

the modern study of Madhyamaka.
11
At times, the R

A has been grouped

uncritically with other philosophical texts written by N ag arjuna, but rarely
introduced by Walser's discussion of the artistic motifs in R

A .1-: and .o in light of

studies of art history. See also Scherrer-Schaub's (:oo,: ) remarks on the importance of
these same artistic motifs in the R

A for understanding the role of art in Buddhist praxis.

Sastri (1,: :o1-:o:) dates N ag arjuna to the nrst century ci, following a mistaken
reading of R

A .;,-8o that speak of depressed and undeveloped people" who censure

the Mah ay ana. Sastri believes these verses show that the king to whom this letter was
addressed broke away fromthe faith of his father, grandfather and others, and that he became
brahmanical." Tere appears to be no reason for Sastri's conclusion here, and these verses
should be seen as part of N ag arjuna's bid to achieve royal support for the Mah ay ana, as has
been discussed by Walser (:oo: ch. )
Tere are obviously other studies that supply dinerent dates and locations for N ag arjuna,
which are discussed in these sources (see esp. Mabbett [1,88: :-]). It is the basic
congruence between these three studies, which rely on a wide range of source materials,
that makes their hypotheses so appealing. For a thorough summary of earlier scholarly
discussions regarding the dating of N ag arjuna and a number of related questions, see Ruegg
(1,81: n. 11, pp. -o).
11)
Studies that focus on philosophical aspects of the R

A are Kaln (1,, [1,8]) and

Hopkins (1,8;: ch. ), who both concentrate of Gyel-tsap-je's commentary on the text.
Preliminary remarks on the philosophical contents of the R

A, in service of a comparison of
its teachings with the MMK, appear in Vetter (1,,:: o-oo) and Walser (:oo:: :1o-:18,
:oo: :;:-:;). See also Turman (1,8o), Lindtner (1,,,) and Scherrer-Schaub (:oo;,
see note o8 below).
Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:, o;
has an attempt been made to assess the unique voice of this irregular
philosophical (or political) text. In general, modern scholarly interest in
the R

A has focused on three central ends. First, the text has been used as
an aid in the dating and placing of N ag arjuna.
12
Second, scholars have used
N ag arjuna's attempt to legitimize the Mah ay ana in .o;-,; as evidence for
the understanding that during the days of N ag arjuna, the Mah ay ana was
still a minority movement lacking a secure institutional basis.
13
Finally, the
R

A has contributed to a discussion of Mah ay ana Buddhism's political and

social instructions.
14
In this paper I will attempt to denne the main argument of the R

A's
philosophical portion, which occupies the nrst chapter, together with the
nrst quarter of the second chapter.
15
Tis analysis will show that the cen-
tral philosophical concern of the text is to oner an explicit and straightfor-
ward dennition, new to its day, of the basic meanings of Buddhist truth.
N ag arjuna provides revised explanations for central perceptions of the Bud-
dha and of his message: He believes that his Mah ay ana theory of empti-
ness convincingly explains why the Buddha refrained from giving positive
answers to metaphysical questions, why the Buddha was initially disin-
clined to teach, and why the Buddha characterized his teachings as deep,"
ungraspable" and without foundation". In order to make room for new
portraits of the Buddha and of his doctrine, N ag arjuna points to inco-
herencies in earlier Buddhist understandings of the Buddha's nirv a

na and
of his teachings.
16
N ag arjuna attempts to persuade his patron king that the
Mah ay ana vision of emptiness is the most attractive philosophy amongst
the Indian systems of his day, and that it supplies the most reasonable
12)
Sastri (1,), Ichimura (1,,:), Mabbett (1,,8), and Walser (:oo:, :oo).
13)
Schopen (:ooo: o-1:), Walser (:oo: ch. ).
14)
Te most important study in this regard is Scherrer-Schaub (:oo;). See also Turman
(1,8o) and Garneld (:oo:: ch. 11 [Buddhism and Democracy"]). I thank Oren Hanner
for bringing Garneld's study to my attention and for pointing out that this is a separate neld
of inquiry concerning the R

A.
15)
Tucci (1,: o;). It would be quite dimcult to verify Turman's (1,8o: 18) view
that two thirds of the text refer to the topic of selnessness. I will not discuss here the
other philosophical section of the text, R

A .8-o, since (a) Te relation between this

shorter philosophical section and the main philosophical discussion in chapters 1 and : is
unclear, and (b) Tis section does not add signincantly new materials relevant to the present
discussion.
16)
Turman (1,8o: 1,-:o) believes N ag arjuna is arguing not with rival Buddhist systems
but with the

Ajivikas, C arv akas and other such Indian negativistic thinkers."
o8 Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:,
account of Buddhist truth. When closely reading the R

A we are thus able to

appreciate two important worlds of Buddhist meaning. First, we encounter
the culturally accepted understanding of Buddhist truth popular at the
time N ag arjuna wrote his text. Second, we can identify the shift N ag arjuna
wished to cause in the Buddhist sensitivities of his benefactor.
In the introduction to his translation of the

S ura ngama-sam adhi-s utra
(

SSS), tienne Lamotte states that .[T]he Madhyamaka is still very close
to early Buddhism, but introduces onto the ontological level that which the
early Buddhists had founded on a historical level."
17
It is not fully apparent
what Lamotte intended by the early Buddhist historical level," but it is
clear that he understood that the Mah ay ana infused the earlier Buddhist
concepts with ontological signincance. As he says earlier in the same work:
Te Dharmanair atmya completely overturned the meaning of the Noble
Truths that

S akyamuni had taught . Te adherent of the Great Vehicle
understands that all is sunering, but painful things do not exist. Sunering
originates in craving, but non existent things do not arise in any way:
dependent origination (pratityasamutp ada) is non-origination (anutp ada).
Tere is a cessation of sunering, Nirv a

na, but, being non-existent, things are

originally in Nirv a

na` : Sams ara is no dinerent from Nirv a

na.
18
Lamotte shows that a major aspect of early Madhyamaka thought involved
the imbuing of earlier Buddhist concepts, whose focus was in the realms
of meditative concentration,
19
with ontological purport. Tus nirv a

na be-
comes a term which characterizes the nature of existence, rather than refer-
ring to a meditative achievement at the acme of the Buddhist path. A
similar understanding has also been expressed by Johannes Bronkhorst
(:oo,: 1:o-1:,) with regard to other important early Mah ay ana s utras,
most importantly the Kasyapaparivarta. Bronkhorst too shows how in early
Mah ay ana meditative experiences were interpreted as ontological state-
ments about the nature of reality.
Forty-nve years after its nrst appearance, not much more than faint
echoes of Lamotte's vivid depiction of Mah ay ana thinking remain in the
realms of scholarly inquiry. Possibly because of the clarity of Lamotte's
17)
Lamotte :oo,, pp. ;-8.
18)
Lamotte :oo,, p. : (emphasis mine). See also the quote from the

S ura ngama-sam adhi-
s utra that follows the previous quote from Lamotte on p. 8.
19)
See section III.1 in Lamotte's introduction, especially the focus on the essential relation
between praj a and sam adhi in the Small Vehicle.
Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:, o,
formulation, scholarly minds have turned in other directions, and the study
of Indian Madhyamaka today is heavily informed by modern Western
philosophical concerns. Te following analysis of the philosophical vision
of the R

A however will reveal that this text voices understandings that are
strikingly close to those expressed by Lamotte regarding the

SSS. Rather
than discussing epistemological questions that revolve around the nature
of language or knowedge, N ag arjuna's concerns are deeply entrenched in
the Buddhist world of renection: N ag arjuna dennes cessation (nirodha) not
as a meditative state or a description of the Buddha's parinirv a

na upon his
death, but as the fundamental characteristic of reality. Te world in front
of us is already annihilated," and thus nothing can cease. Te analysis of
the R

A will allow us to deepen our understanding of the shift N ag arjuna

enected in the history of Buddhist ideas, with specinc attention to what he
felt was valuable in his words. It will be shown that a major concern of the
strand of Mah ay ana to which both N ag arjuna and the

SSS belong was to
design the perception of Buddhist realization anew. In a deeper sense, this
inquiry may be understood to be part of the sustained Buddhist interest in
the fundamental question of what a Buddha actually is.
20
Te Phi|osophy of the
Chapter one of the R

A opens with a strong emphasis on the need for

developing good karma. In fact, N ag arjuna as the mentor of the S atav ahana
king argues in a manner that N ag arjuna the author of the MMK should
have been suspicious of, making statements such as a short life comes from
killing" (1.1) or bad color comes from anger" (1.18). Tis part of the text
(R

A 1.1-:, esp. 1.1-18) is certainly at odds with MMK 1; and

S unyat a-
saptati (

SS) -, the central places where N ag arjuna discusses karma,

as well as with his general views on causation introduced in chapter 1 of
the MMK and elaborated in chapters ;, :o and :1. Te clear connection
between specined actions and their inevitable results seems at odds with
the more familiar elements of N ag arjuna's philosophy, such as his denial of
causation in MMK 1.1 and the statement that karma lacks svabh ava and is
20)
Tese questions are also pivotal in Scherrer-Schaub's (:oo;) discussion of the R

A's
views on kingship and in the connection she makes between Buddhist philosophical or
gnoseological understandings and N ag arjuna's political instructions. Te interest in the
nature of Buddhahood is fundamental to the R

A's instruction on how to create the marks

of a great man and the body of a Buddha in :.;o-.1 as well.
1o Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:,
unarisen (anutp ada) in MMK 1;.:1 and

SS . It is true that if one wishes
to emphasize MMK : as the central articulation of the MMK's thought,
and thus to understand emptiness as identical with dependent-origination,
the discrepancy may not be as severe as it might otherwise appear. But the
inherent relation between an action and its particular and mandatory result,
together with the weighty moralistic attitude conveyed by such a relation,
is beyond what the logic of the MMK can allow for.
21
Te structure of the discussion in this part of the text is denned in
verses -o, where N ag arjuna states that the arising of dharma (dhar-
m abhyudaya),
22
which he equates with practices based on faith (sraddh a),
will lead to the highest good (nai

hsreyasa),
23
which he equates with liber-
ation (mok

sa) and that results from knowledge (praj a).

24
Tis approach
relies heavily on the notion of the two truths," in which conventional
truth is a term for Buddhist teachings that have no true reality, but that
nonetheless lead one to realization.
25
We understand, together with the
21)
Here we have a good example of the limits of a reading of Madhaymaka that relies on
the notion of the two truths and that understands emptiness only as a lack of svabh ava in
entities. When such a reading is accepted, one can easily develop elaborate views on what
is right or wrong, good or bad, etc., and little is left of the notion of emptiness, let alone of
the no-view" approach. See my discussion in Shulman (:oo, [:oo;]).
22)
See note : for a discussion of this term.
23)
Hopkins (1,,;: o) discusses the meaning of nai

hsreyasa. My translation follows Dunne

and McClintock (1,,;).
24)
R

A 1. Where there is nrst the dharma of rising-high, the arising of the highest good
will follow. Because rising-high is attained, it naturally leads to the highest good.
pr ag dharmo `bhyudayo yatra pasc an nai

hsreyasodaya

h /
sampr apy abhyudaya

m yasm ad eti nai

hsreyasa

m kram at //
Other translators translate abhyudaya as perfect life," perfection" (Tucci), elevation"
(Dunne and McClintock) or high status" (Hopkins), basing themselves also on verse
that says sukham abhyudayas tatra mok

so nai

hsreyaso mata

h (Here, abhyudaya is understood

as happiness, liberation as the highest good"). Te translation chosen here-rising-high"-
intends to preserve the word play between (dharmo) 'bhyudaya (the dharma of rising-high")
and nai

hsreyasodaya (the arising of the highest good"). Te idea is that one rises higher
and higher, experiencing the blessings of his good karma along the way (elevation", high
status", etc.), until he reaches the full realization of truth. In verse N ag arjuna further
explains that the rising-high" of dharma comes from faith, while the rising to the highest
good is achieved through wisdom:
One obtains dharma through faith, and knows (dharma) truly through wisdom.
Of the two, which are distinct, wisdom is chief, but faith precedes it.
sr addhatv ad bhajate dharmam pr ajatv ad vetti tattvata

h /
praj a pradh ana

m tv anayo

h sraddh a p urva ngam asya tu //

25)
See Y

S :1-:: and MMK :.8-1o for verses in which N ag arjuna clearly dennes his
understanding of the two truths doctrine, and my discussion of this issue in Shulman (:oo;
[:oo,]: section III).
Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:, 11
king, that one must practice the dharma in order to reach the higher and
more meaningful peaks along the Buddhist path that are attained through
intense engagement with Buddhist thought.
N ag arjuna summarizes the nrst part of the text in verse ::
1.: Trough the (four) absorptions (dhy ana), the (four) immeasurables
(apram a

na) and the (four) formless absorptions (ar upya), one reaches bliss
such as that of Brahm a. Tis, in short, is the dharma of rising-high and its
fruit.
dhy an apram a

n ar upyais tu br ahm adya

m sukham asnute /
ity abhyudayadharmo `ya

m phala

m c asya sam asata

h //
26
Te meditations that were essential to the Buddhist understanding of lib-
eration at its foundational period
27
are here relegated to a lower and pre-
liminary level of practice. According to N ag arjuna, these meditations rep-
resent the culmination of the practices based on faith that prepare the prac-
titioner for the higher levels of practice connected with wisdom. In making
this statement N ag arjuna is no more than reiterating the common under-
standing of the Buddhist path that was prevalent at his day. Buddhism had
already grown to value wisdom more than sam adhi meditation, and the
fact that N ag arjuna culminates this stage of his instruction by stating that
the most cherished forms of sam adhi are inferior to realization produced
by wisdom highlights this point.
28
But this is hardly N ag arjuna's main con-
cern, which is rather to address the contents of Buddhist realization as he
understands it, i.e., to re-denne wisdom. N ag arjuna now begins to pursue
these interests:
26)
Unless stated otherwise, the quotations from the Sanskrit and the Tibetan text of the
R

A are taken from Hahn (1,8:), together with the corrections onered in Hahn (1,8;). All
translations are my own. For the translation of abhyudaya as rising-high" see note : above.
27)
Tese are the (four) absorptions (dhy ana), the (four) immeasurables (apram a

na) and the

(four) formless absorptions (ar upya)" spoken of in the verse. For discussions of the impor-
tance of these meditations to early Buddhist soteriology, see Schmithausen (1,81), Grimths
(1,81, 1,8, 1,8o), Vetter (1,88), Bronkhorst (1,,), Wynne (:oo;) and Shulman (:o1o:
section II).
28)
For studies that address the problem of the relation between sam adhi and wisdom
(pa a, prajn a) and the manner in which wisdom came to be preferred to concentration,
see Gombrich (1,,o: ch. ), as well as Grimths (1,8o: introduction), Vetter (1,88) and
Shulman (:o1o: section II).
1: Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:,
1.:o I am not, I will not be, I have not, I will not have."
Tis very statement, which is fearful to the childish,
extinguishes fear for the wise.
n asmy aha

m na bhavi

sy ami na me `sti na bhavi

syati /
iti b alasya sa

mtr asa

h pa

ditasya bhaya-k

saya

h //
N ag arjuna opens his philosophical argument in the R

A with a dennition
of the accepted content of Buddhist wisdom that focuses on the concept
of selnessness. According to the traditional exposition of this insight, self-
lessness refers to the lack of a true self of the individual, the fact that there
is no Self (capital S), and therefore that the sense of the I" (aha

mk ara, the
normal notion of self ) lacks true foundation.
29
Although this understanding
is presented in early Buddhist s utras in many dinerent ways,
30
N ag arjuna
is here relying on what grew to become the common articulation of the
doctrine of selnessness, the fact that there is no possible relation between
the S/self and the aggregates.
31
In referring to the refutation of the relation between the Self ( atman)
or the sense of I (aha

mk ara) and the aggregates, N ag arjuna is relying on a

specinc understanding regarding the nature of transmigration. Sa

ms ara is
thought of as the revolving of the person in the round of rebirths, propelled
by his karma.
32
More precisely, from grasping at the self, that is, through
being attached to the aggregates, one is impelled to take rebirth and the
29)
See MMK 18.:cd: No-I and no-mine follow from the quieting of the Self and what
belongs to the Self " (nirmamo niraha

mk ara

h sam ad atm atmaninayo

h).
30)
Collins (1,8:: ch. ).
31)
R

A 1.:8-:,, see the translation of 1.:, below.

32)
R

A 1.:;ab: aha

mk arapras uteya

m mamak aropasa

mhit a praj a (Tese people issue forth

from the sense of I, and are amassed from the sense of mine").
Just so long as there is grasping at the aggregates, there is also the sense of I.
Ten again, when there is the sense of I, there is karma, and from this again (re-)birth.
skandhagr aho y avad asti t avad ev aham ity api /
aha

mk are sati puna

h karma janma tata

h puna

h // (R

A 1.)
Hahn [1,8;: ,o] corrects asti to asm at in the nrst p ada of 1., but it seems that this
correction is dimcult to reconcile with the context. Te nrst line of the verse could possibly
do without the asti, but the asm at would have to relate to the previous verses (1-).
Tese verses speak of

Ananda's achieving a vision of dharma following the understanding
that the aggregates are like a mirror and therefore that there is no I. It seems out of place to
then state in verse that because of this" (asm at) there is a grasping at the aggregates"
(skandhagraho).
Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:, 1
aggregates are propelled into existence.
33
Tus, sa

ms ara is based on the

mutual conditioning of the self and the aggregates. But to N ag arjuna this
common Buddhist view makes no sense, since:
1.:, Te aggregates arise from the sense of I.
Tis sense of I is unreal in actual fact.
How can the sprout whose seed is unreal be true?
aha

mk arodbhav a

h skandh a

h so `ha

mk aro `n

rto `rthata

h
34
/
bija

m yasy an

rta

m tasya praroha

h satyata

h kuta

h //
Tis verse supplies the most important philosophical argument employed
by N ag arjuna in the R

A. In many later verses N ag arjuna will refer to his

refutation of causation, familiar from the MMK but introduced here only
in the verse just quoted. Te idea is that once the well-known Buddhist
refutation of the Self is accepted, there is actually nothing that can give
rise to the aggregates. Moreover, since the sense of I and the aggregates
rely on each other, both cannot be true. Tis is, in fact, one of N ag arjuna's
and the Mah ay ana's important contributions to Buddhist understanding
-once there is no Self, there are no aggregates either, since the percep-
tion of dependence denes the veracity of all participants in the arithmetic
of dependence. When dependence is the law, there is really nothing that
can depend, this rule applying to all that appears to exist. Tis understand-
33)
See also R

A 1.o: Seeing the aggregates as unreal, the sense of I is thus relinquished.

Following the relinquishment of the sense of I, there is no renewed coming into being of
the aggregates.
skandh an asaty an d

tvaivam aha

mk ara

h prahiyate /
aha

mk araprah a

n ac ca na puna

h skandha-sa

mbhava

h //
Tis understanding relies on the classic doctrine of the 1: links, and particularly on the
passage between links , (grasping, up ad ana) and 1o (re-birth/becoming, bhava). See also
MMK :o.;-8.
34)
In the R

A, N ag arjuna makes very frequent use of the term arthata

h (Tibetan don du),

translated here in dinerent ways according to the context-in actual fact", actually", in
enect", really", and so forth. At times, N ag arjuna prefers the term tattvata

h (Tibetan yang
dag tu)-in truth", real", etc. Madhyamaka dogmatists would probably wish to equate
these terms with svabh avata

h (essentially", by way of inherent existence"), which appears

in the R

A but is far less common. To my mind, such a reading is alien to the logic and
style of the text. Te terms do convey similar notions regarding the manner in which the
subject under discussion can be said to exist, but the use of arthata

h or tattvata

h, rather
than svabh avata

h, is signincant and points to the fact that N agarjuna's analysis is not only a
refutation of svabh avic" or inherent" existence. See my discussion of this point in Shulman
(:oo, [:oo;]: section II).
1 Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:,
ing is expressed many times in N ag arjuna's other writings,
35
as well as in a
number of verses further on in the R

A.
36
In the particular example pre-
sented by N ag arjuna in this verse, an example that obviously resonates
with the king's familiarity with Buddhist doctrine, it is argued that the
sense of self cannot be true, since if the aggregates arise from the grasp-
ing at a self that is unreal, they must be unreal as well. Te aggregates
can no longer be relied on as a fundamental Buddhist concept, and must
be understood as illusory. N ag arjuna makes a statement to this enect in
verse o:
1.o Tis wheel of sa

ms ara,
which consists of the three aspects (of the sense of I, action and rebirth),
which has no beginning, middle or end and is based on mutual causation,
turns like a whirling nreband.
trivartmaitad an adyantamadhya

m sa

ms arama

dalam /
al atama

dalaprakhyam bhramaty anyonyahetukam //

Te wheel of sa

ms ara is based on the sense of self which is unreal and on

the grasping at the aggregates that are unreal as well. Te wheel turns, but
since its components have no reality, it cannot be real either.
37
Sa

ms ara
is thus similar to a whirling nreband, a familiar example for an illusory
phenomenon.
38
Tis statement will later be coupled with the claim that
nirv a

na, as it is conceived of by the Buddhist tradition familiar to both the

35)
See, for instance MMK 1o.8-1o, Y

S , and my discussion of this point in Shulman

(:oo, [:oo;]: section III).
36)
In 1.; N ag arjuna says that there is no coherent relation between cause and enect both
truly" (tattvata

h) and conceptually" or conventionally" (prajapter):

A cause produced previously or simultaneously (with its enect) is actually a non-cause,
since (in these cases) arising is non-dependent. (Tis is true both) conceptually and truly.
pr agj ata

h sahaj atas ca hetur ahetuko `rthata

h /
prajapter apratitatv ad utpattes caiva tattvata

h //
See also 1.88 on page :: below. Tere are obviously other verses in the R

A in which
N ag arjuna relies on the notion of dependence, such as 1.8 and 1.o. But these verses should
be understood as an articulation of a preliminary observation on the level of conventional
truth that will later be transcended.
37)
In verses 1.1-, N ag arjuna also equates the relation of the self and the aggregates to
the appearance of the renection of a face in a mirror. For another usage of the whirling-
nreband simile, see

SS oo.
38)
See also N ag arjuna's refutation of the reality of sa

ms ara in MMK :1.1-:1.

Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:, 1
king and N ag arjuna, doesn't appear to be reasonable either. Tus the nrst
chapter of the R

A is espousing a teaching on par with the statements in

MMK :.1,-:o and Yukti

sa

tik a -o about the non-distinction between,

and the unreality of, sa

ms ara and nirv a

na. As N ag arjuna claims in verse o:

1.o Coming, going and abiding
are unreal with regard to both the world and nirv a

na.
Terefore, what distinction between them could there be actually?
dvayor apy agatigati yat sthitis ca na tattvata

h /
lokanirv a

nayos tasm ad vise

sa

h ka iv arthata

h
39
//
Not only sa

ms ara, but also nirv a

na is unreal. Returning to the earlier argu-

ment concerning the illusory nature of sa

ms ara, N ag arjuna is now ready to

present his demand that the king accept the ontological consequences of his
analysis. Coupling his arguments against the reality of the aggregates with
the traditional Buddhist formulation of nirv a

na, N ag arjuna nowchallenges

his benefactor:
1.o Tat all this will not exist in nirv a

na is not fearful to you.

Why is its (all this) non-existence spoken of here is a cause of fear to you?
1.1 In liberation there is no Self and there are no aggregates.
If you are fond of liberation of this sort,
Why are you not fond of
the removal of the Self and the aggregates right here?
na bhavi

syati nirv a

ne sarvam etan na te bhayam /

ucyam ana ih abh avas tasya te ki

m bhaya

mkara

h //
mok

se n atm a na ca skandh a mok

sas ced id

rsa

h priya

h /
atmaskandh apanayana

m kim ihaiva na te priyam //

Te R

A demonstrates that the principle regarding the lack of distinction

between sa

ms ara and nirv a

na must be taken literally. Tere really is no

nirv a

na, or, in the words of Lamotte, nirv a

na is no more than the ontolog-

ical nature of the world. N ag arjuna adds here an important understand-
ing to Lamotte's formulation: It is the doctrine of the annihilation of the
39)
Although not attested by the Sanskrit manuscripts of the R

A, a reading for the nnal

p ada as kuto `rthata

h, rather than ka iv arthata

h, is worth considering. In this case the verse

would have precisely the same ending as the verse that precedes it and the two that follow it
as well, although Hahn (1,8;: ,1) suggests reading nu ko instead of kuto for the nnal p ada
of 1.o.
1o Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:,
aggregates upon nirv a

na that lends itself to the newontological understand-

ing.
40
Te aggregates do not merely cease upon the entry into parinirv a

na,
but do not exist right here in everyday reality."
We may note the allusion to fear in verse o, which was also central
to verse 1.:o with which N ag arjuna opened his philosophical discussion.
41
While listening to the R

A the king is demanded to demonstrate his virya,

his courage and vitality. It is this rhetorical device that is the key to opening
the king's eyes to the cogency of the Mah ay ana viewpoint. N ag arjuna hints
that if the king does not accept the R

A's arguments regarding the logical

necessities of the most fundamental Buddhist doctrines, he must be a
coward. Indeed, the teaching is frightening and dimcult to decipher, since
it demands an uprooting of all regular notions of truth.
N ag arjuna will now provide his own dennition for nirv a

na:
1.: When nirv a

na is not non-existence,
how could it possibly possess existence?
Nirv a

na is called
the termination of grasping at existence and non-existence.
na c abh avo `pi nirv a

na

m kuta eva tasya bh avat a /

bh av abh ava-par amarsa-k

sayo nirv a

nam ucyate //
Nirv a

na does not exist and does not not-exist.

42
In fact, nirv a

na is the
full transcendence beyond any notion of existence or non-existence, so
that these ideas or intuitions subside. Te nrst part of this verse supplies
the challenging mirror image to N ag arjuna's common refutation of non-
existence. Normally, N ag arjuna says that there must be something exis-
tent in order for there to be something non-existent.
43
In the present verse
he asks how nirv a

na could exist if it is not non-existence. N ag arjuna is

arguing that only if nirv a

na is utter non-existence can it be a true cessa-

tion of all sa

ms aric reality, and can thus exist as nirv a

na.
44
Nirv a

na must
40)
I amreferring to the doctrine that only upon death will the Buddha achieve a full nirv a

na
without remainder (nirup adi nibb ana), or without the aggregates (khandha-parinibb ana).
See Harvey (1,,: ch. 11, esp. 181-18:) and Gethin (1,,8: ;-;o).
41)
See also verses 1.: and 1.,, as well as the connection N ag arjuna makes between not
understanding Mah ay ana teachings and fear in 1.;o-;,.
42)
See also MMK :.
43)
MMK ., 1., :.;.
44)
See also 1. and 1.8.
Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:, 1;
be nothing in order to be something. Terefore, nirv a

na is incoherent, as
it must contradict itself, and can only be thought of as a complete quieting
of all grasping at existence and non-existence.
Te argument against existence and non-existence now becomes the
heart of the discussion. In verses 1.-o: N ag arjuna argues for an onto-
logical middle-way according to which the world truly does not exist or
non-exist, and is characterized as devoid of arising, abiding and cessation,
and similar to a mirage. Existence and non-existence are terms that necessi-
tate each other and therefore cancel each other out.
45
Verse ; encapsulates
much of the discussion:
1.; Te one who holds the view of non-existence goes to a bad rebirth,
and the one who holds the view of existence goes to a good rebirth.
Trough true understanding, the one who relies on non-duality
goes to liberation.
n astiko durgati

m y ati sugati

m y ati c astika

h /
yath abh utaparij an an mok

sam advayanisrita

h //
Non-duality refers here to the unreality of existence and non-existence, and
she or he whose mind is non-dual in this sense achieves liberation.
46
It
is important to note that the views of existence and non-existence were
denned in verses and as the fruits of actions existing or non-existing,
respectively. Verse then denned liberation as the going beyond merit
and de-merit, following the quieting of existence and non-existence
through knowledge."
47
Te middle-way between or beyond existence and
non-existence must be one that amrms neither the truth nor the falsehood
45)
R

A 1.,: If, for somebody, following the refutation of existence, non-existence is essen-
tially done away with, why, following the refutation of non-existence, is existence not done
away with?
sy ad astid u

sa

n ad asya n astit ak

sipyate `rthata

h /
n astit ad u

sa

n ad eva

m kasm an n ak

sipyate `stit a //
46)
N ag arjuna makes no reference in the R

A, or in his other philosophical writings for

that matter, to the non-duality of subject and object (which may, in turn, be inferred from
his discussion of perception in MMK and

SS o-;). He does refer many times (e.g.
MMK .8 and 1.1o) to the non-reality of existence and non-existence, which is crucial to
the argument in the R

A. See also the uncommon statement in R

A :.ab: Te seen, the

heard, etc., are said by the Wise one not to be true and not to be false" (d

tasrut adya

m
munin a na satya

m na

soditam), and the dennition of the world in :.ab as beyond truth

and falsehood" (saty an

rt atita).
47)
1.ab: j an an n astyastit as ante

h p apapu

nyavyatikrama

h.
18 Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:,
of causality.
48
Only one who does not rely on existence and non-existence
in any way will know truth and be liberated.
In the next verses N ag arjuna proceeds to speak of the errors implicit
in the notions of both existence and non-existence. He devotes particular
attention to the denial of the view of non-existence, a view that is com-
monly applied to the Madhyamaka.
49
N ag arjuna then proceeds in 1.o1 to
suggest that the king inquire with the S a

mkhyas, the Vaise

sikas, the Jains

and the (Buddhist) Pudgalav adins, whether they preach that the world is
beyond existence and non-existence."
50
Next he will suggest that this tran-
scendence of existence and non-existence is the unique and denning prop-
erty of the Buddhist dharma:
1.o: Know that because of this
the Buddhas' deathless teaching that transcends existence and non-existence
was called deep" and the unique gift of dharma."
dharmayautakam ity asm an n astyastitvavyatikramam /
viddhi gambhiram ity ukta

m buddh an a

ms asan am

rtam //
Te rare ability to transcend both existence and non-existence is what,
according to N ag arjuna, dennes the Buddhist truth.
51
Moreover, we learn, it
is thanks to this subtle feature that the Buddhist dharma is called
deep" (gambhira). Next, following an excursion in which N ag arjuna de-
bates the doctrine of momentariness (1.oo-;:), N ag arjuna equates major
48)
See the references in note o to the characterization of the world of perceptual objects
to be beyond truth and falsehood" in R

A :.-.
49)
Tis argument includes the rather bizarre 1.oo:
How will those for whom, as a result of relying on bodhi, there is no assertion, no
conduct, no mind, and who in enect are (immersed) in non-existence-be known as
nihilists?
na pratij a na carita

m na citta

m bodhinisray at /
n astikatve `rthato ye

s a

m katha

m te n astik a

h sm

rt a

h //
As has been pointed out by Tucci (1,: :1, note :), the point must be that so long as
something is negated, something must be amrmed in order to be negated.
Eli Franco (private communication) has suggested taking the n astikatve as the subjects
of the verse in nominative plural, which may be preferable but does not alter the basic
statement that nihilists must not be nihilists. A translation along these lines would be:
How will those nihilists, for whom, as a result of relying on bodhi, there is no assertion,
no conduct, no mind-be known as nihilists?
50)
sas a

mkhyaul ukyanirgranthapudgalaskandhav adinam /

p

rccha loka

m yadi vadaty astin astivyatikramam //

51)
See also Kaln (1,, [1,8]: ;).
Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:, 1,
hallmarks of Buddhist philosophy with the world's being neither existent
nor non-existent:
1.; Tis is why, following cessation,
there is, in fact, no less of the world.
And why, when asked if the world has an end,
Te Buddha remained silent.
1.; And this is precisely why the intelligent
understand the omniscient to be omniscient,
since he did not teach this dharma of depths
to people who were unnt receptacles.
1.; Tis dharma, the highest good,
is called deep, ungraspable and without foundation
by the Buddhas, the seers of truth.
niv

rtes tena lokasya nopaity unatvam arthata

h /
antav an iti lokas ca p

tas t u

ni

m jino `bhavat //
sarvaja iti sarvajo budhais tenaiva gamyate /
yenaitad dharmagambhirya

m nov ac abh ajane jane //

iti nai

hsreyaso dharmo gambhiro ni

sparigraha

h /
an alaya iti prokta

h sa

mbuddhais tattvadarsibhi

h
52
//
Why was the Buddhist dharma termed deep" (gambhira), without foun-
dation" (an alaya) and ungraspable (ni

sparigraha)?
53
Why did the Buddha
hesitate before he decided to teach his message?
54
Why did he remain silent
when asked about the nature of the world? N ag arjuna supplies one sim-
ple and compelling answer to these persistent Buddhist questions: It is
because his Buddhist vision realizes the deep," without foundation" and
ungraspable" nature of the world, because reality is truly beyond exis-
tence and non-existence. Tere really is no nature to the world and no true
52)
Hahn (1,8;) records sattva[-darsibhi

h] as a possible correction according to the

Ratn avali-

tik a and the Chinese translation of the R

A (p. 8) and according to the newly

discovered Nepali manuscript he worked on (p. 8o). Nevertheless, he does not suggest this
reading as an emendation to his text (pp. 8,-,,). Indeed, although the reading sattva is not
impossible in this context, the accepted reading tattva nts the context much better.
53)
In R

A :.1; N ag arjuna also terms the Buddhist dharma innnitely subtle" (atis uk

sma)
and beyond perception" (apratyak

sa), and in :., hidden" (guhya).

54)
N ag arjuna returns to this statement in R

A :.18:
Terefore the wise one turned from teaching the dharma upon awakening. Because of
its being so deep, he knew that this dharma would be dimcult to comprehend for regular
people.
sambudhy asm an niv

rtto `bh ud dharma

m desayitu

m muni

h /
durj anam atigambhiry aj j atv a dharmam ima

m janai

h //
:o Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:,
characteristic can be onered for it, not even impermanence, dependence or
emptiness.
Te three verses just quoted represent the acme of the R

A's philosophical
contribution. Te world-interpreted in light of the recognition that the
cessation of the aggregates at nirv a

na is best understood as a description

of the ontological nature of reality-is denned as beyond existence and
non-existence. According to the Madhyamaka, this insight proves to be
the heart of Buddhist realization and a fundamental feature of the Buddhist
understanding of the Buddha and of his teaching.
In chapter :, N ag arjuna returns to the question of why the Buddha
avoided answering philosophical questions regarding the nature of the
world. In fact, this question forms the core of the philosophical portion of
this chapter. In verse o N ag arjuna wonders how something about which
one can only say 'no' (yat caiva

m sarvath a neti) could have been taught

by the Buddha to be with or without an end, both or neither?"
55
In order
to answer his own query N ag arjuna dennes the world as being like an
illusion" (:.,: mayopamatva

m lokasya), comparing it to an illusory elephant

that has no beginning and no end, is not real in any way, and goes nowhere,
is nowhere, and comes from nowhere (R

A :.,-1). Supplied with this

dennition, he is now prepared to explain why the Buddha was unwilling to
denne the nature of the world:
:.1 What, in reality, is this world, whose nature exceeds the three times,
and that exists or non-exists only by worldly-convention (vyavah ara)?
:.1 Tis is why, and for no other reason,
the four modalities of [being] with an end, without an end, both or neither,
were left unanswered by the Buddha.
traik alyavyativ

rtt atm a loka eva

m nu ko `rthata

h /
yo `sti n asty athav api sy ad anyatra vyavah arata

h //
catu

sprak aram ity asm at s anto `nanto dvayo `dvaya

h /
buddhena hetor n anyasm ad ayam avy ak

rta

h k

rta

h //
N ag arjuna's re-dennition of the Buddha and of his realization has come
full circle. Cessation is no more than the nature of the world and of
the aggregates, which do not really exist.
56
Tey do not not-exist either,
55)
yac caiva

m sarvath a neti sarvajas tat katha

m vadet /
s antam ity athav ananta

m dvaya

m v advayam eva v a //
56)
It is worth noting the Buddhist association between the term world" (loka) and the nve
aggregates. See Gethin (1,8o: o).
Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:, :1
though, and thus all that can be said of them is that they are similar
to an illusion, beyond existence and non-existence. When the Buddha's
realization consisted of an awakening to this undennable vision regarding
the unreality of reality, or better, the reality of unreality, all he could say
was that it was deep, without foundation and ungraspable." He also, quite
naturally, hesitated before teaching it, as it cannot be taught. Finally, he
had not much choice but to remain silent and leave metaphysical questions
unanswered.
R

A 1.8o-1oo
In order to fully appreciate the R

A's teaching that the world neither exists

nor non-exists and is similar to an illusion, one further point must be
emphasized. According to N ag arjuna's vision of emptiness, the fact that
there is no true reality-that things cannot be established in any way
and do not exist either of themselves or in dependence-dictates that
the objective" aspects of reality depend on consciousness. Once things
lack a true nature of their own, they cannot be distinguished from their
perception.
57
In R

A 1.8o-1oo N ag arjuna summarizes his argument for the doctrine

of emptiness so that the king will not be ruined (1.;8ab: mi phung bar
bgyi slad) by those lost people who fear the fearless abode and ruin oth-
ers" (1.;;ab: te na

t a n asyanty any an abhayasth anabhirava

h). It will not be

possible to treat the whole of the argument in full detail here, but only to
concentrate on the relation between the refutation of existence and non-
existence and the dependence of reality on consciousness. N ag arjuna begins
his argument with a fairly common articulation of the doctrine of empti-
ness. He uses the example of the person (skyes bu) that is not real (yang dag
du min) because of being composed of the elements, which are also denned
as unreal due to being composites themselves (8o-81). Still more problems
of identity arise because of the mutual relation between the elements and
their dependence on their properties (8-8;). Terefore the elements nei-
ther exist in themselves, nor in mutuality (88-,o). A representative verse
of this discussion is 1.88:
57)
See the structuring of this argument and an exposition of its expression in N ag arjuna's
philosophical works in Shulman (:oo; [:oo,]).
:: Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:,
1.88 If each one of them (the elements) exists of its own-
How will it exist in mutuality?
If each one of them (the elements) does not exist of its own-
How will it exist in mutuality?
so sor rang yod de dag ni / ji lta bur na phan tshun yod /
so sor rang yod ma yin pa / de dag ji ltar phan tshun yod //
Tere is no coherent way to denne existence, and the elements cannot be
understood to exist individually or relationally: If the elements have their
own nature individually-they do not exist relationally; If they do not have
their own nature individually-how can they relate? Tis understanding is
next applied to a long list of fundamental perceptual categories (,1-,:).
What this means, in turn, is that whatever appears to exist relates to the
way it is conceived by and construed in consciousness, since there is no way
to reliably understand its existence from its own side. N ag arjuna expresses
these notions in verses ,-,:
1., Earth, water, nre, wind,
long and short, subtle and coarse, virtue and so forth
are taught by the Sage to cease in consciousness
1., In this limitless consciousness that cannot be taught, the lord of all,
earth, water, nre and wind nnd no footing.
1., Here, long and short, subtle and coarse, virtue and non-virtue,
here, name and form as well,
fully cease.
sa dang chu dang me dang rlung / ring thung phra dang sbom nyid dang /
dge sogs nyid ni rnam shes su / `gag par `gyur zhes thub pas gsungs //
rnam shes bstan med mtha` yas pa / kun tu bdag po de la ni /
sa dang chu dang me dang ni / rlung gis gnas thob
58
`gyur ma yin //
`dir ni ring dang thung ba dang / phra sbom dge dang mi dge dang /
`dir ni ming dang gzugs dag kyang / ma lus par ni `gag par `gyur //
Tese verses raise interesting questions regarding N ag arjuna's soteriological
views, to which I hope to devote focal attention in a future publication.
Specincally, we must ask what it means that earth and the other elements
and categories cease" (`gag par `gyur, probably nirudhyate) in conscious-
58)
Hahn (1,8:: ;) reads gnas thod and supplies a variant reading of thos. Both readings are
questionable, and I suggest gnas thob-to nnd a place" as a translation of g adhati, to nnd
footing" (see note o below). Tis reading accords with Dunne and McClintock's (1,,;:
:) translation. See also Hopkins (1,,;: 1o;, note a).
Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:, :
ness. It is tempting to read here a claim that reality is fully annihilated in
nirv a

na, when all things are fully known. But such a reading would seem
at odds with the re-interpretation of nirv a

na as the ontological transcen-

dence of both existence and non-existence, as well as with statements such
as following cessation, there is, in fact, no less of the world" (R

A 1.;).
59
R

A 1.,-, probably correspond to Y

S that prefers to say that the ele-

ments are enclosed in consciousness" (vij ane samavarudhyate, rnam par
shes su yang dag `du).
60
In fact, as has been shown with regard to Y

S ,
61
R

A 1.,-, relies
on the scriptural authority of the Kevaddha-sutta of the Digha-Nik aya
(DN11, i:11-::). In this text, the Buddha explains his position regarding
the use of super-natural powers. R

A 1., sums up the Buddha's teaching

in the sutta, where he is asked Where do the four great elements cease
without remainder?"
62
Te Buddha requests a re-dennition of the question,
so that it now asks where do water, earth, nre, wind nnd no footing, and
where do long and short, subtle and course, name and form, cease without
remainder?"
63
Te Buddha's answer is quoted quite literally by N ag arjuna
in R

A 1.,-,.
64
N ag arjuna has clearly deviated in the R

A from earlier Buddhist formu-

lations of nirv a

na. He is eager, though, once again, to read a canonical

understanding of nirv a

na as an ontological description of reality. Te dia-

logue from the Kevaddha-sutta suits his needs perfectly, as it is a teaching
59)
See page 1, above.
60)
Y

S
Tings spoken of, the great elements and so forth, are enclosed in consciousness. When
this is understood, they dissolve. Indeed, they are a mistaken construction.
`byung ba che la sogs bshad pa // rnam par shes su yang dag `du //
de shes pas ni `bral `gyur na // log pas rnam brtags ma yin nam //
mah a-bh ut adi vij ane prokta

m samavarudhyate /
taj-j ane vigama

m y ati nanu mithy a vikalpita

m //
See my discussion of this important verse in Shulman (:oo; [:oo,]: 1oo-1o1).
61)
Lindtner (1,8o: :o1), Scherrer-Schaub (1,,1: :).
62)
kattha nu kho bhante ime catt aro mah a-bh ut a aparises a nirujjhanti. Pali quotes are taken
from the online edition of the Vipassana Reasearch Institute.
63)
kattha apo ca pathavi, tejo v ayo na g adhati; kattha digha ca rassa ca, a

nu

m th ula

m
subh asubha

m; kattha n ama ca r upa ca, asesa

m uparujjhati`ti.
64)
vi a

na

m anidassana

m, ananta

m sabbatopabha

m; ettha apo ca pathavi, tejo v ayo na

g adhati. ettha digha ca rassa ca, a

nu

m th ula

m subh asubha

m; ettha n ama ca r upa ca,

asesa

m uparujjhati; vi a

nassa nirodhena, ettheta

m uparujjhati`ti.
: Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:,
that addresses the relation between realization and ontology and that ques-
tions the reality of the elements, the issue on which N ag arjuna's argument
in this section of the text is based. N ag arjuna sums up his statement on
these matters in verses ,o-,;:
1.,o All that appeared earlier to consciousness,
because it (consciousness) was ignorant of this,
later ceases in consciousness, in this manner,
because it knows this.
1.,; All these phenomena of being
are accepted as fuel for the nre of consciousness.
Tey are quieted after being burned
by one who possesses the light of clear discrimination.
gang ma shes phyir rnam shes la / sngon chad `byung ba de kun ni /
de shes phyir na rnam shes su / phyis ni de ltar `gag par `gyur //
rnam shes me yi bud shing ni / `gro chos `di kun yin par `dod /
de dag ji bzhin rab `byed pa`i / `od dang ldan pas bsregs nas zhi //
Two main soteriological interpretations suggest themselves regarding these
passages-either, upon understanding, the world utterly ceases and noth-
ing is left, or, the ceasing" and the quieting of the phenomena of being"
refer to a perceptual change according to which the same world is per-
ceived without any notion of existence or non-existence being attributed
to it. According to the nrst option, the world never existed to begin with,
and thus cannot be said to not-exist.
65
According to the second reading,
full annihilation of the world is equal to the view of non-existence that
N ag arjuna demands his students to relinquish.
66
While the soteriological
position of the R

A leaves us with open questions, the ontological under-

standing appears quite clear: the great elements depend on consciousness
for their existence, and, in one way or another, cease when this is ascer-
tained. Te Yog ac ara overtones are not mistaken in the context of Mad-
hyamaka ontology:
67
Objective reality cannot be said to be either existent
or non-existent, and, therefore, can no longer be perceived to be objective,
as it must relate to consciousness.
65)
See also R

A 1..
66)
See also R

A 1.;.
67)
Shulman (:oo; [:oo,]: esp. section IV).
Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:, :
Conc|usion
Clearly, much remains to be discussed regarding the ideas that structure
the Ratn avali. Te analysis onered here has not touched upon the R

A's
ethical and political interests and the way these interests are informed
by the philosophical positions treated here.
68
Te literary and religious
aspects of the text require further study as well. Nevertheless, I do hope
that this paper has managed to denne the basic philosophical position of
the R

A and to situate it in its context in the history of Buddhist ideas.

N ag arjuna challenges prevalent understandings of Buddhist truth, assign-
ing new meanings to key Buddhist philosophical conceptions. Mainly, in
tune with the interests of his day and with emergent inclinations in Bud-
dhist circles, N ag arjuna redenned meditation in terms of ontology: Ces-
sation, a term that originally indicated a (non-) cognitive state at nirv a

na,
now becomes a poetic or hermeneutical device used to penetrate the grasp-
ing at the existence of reality. According to the R

A, the world of the aggre-

gates, human experience and the realities in which it manifests, is discov-
ered not to exist by Buddhist wisdom. N ag arjuna's audience, the real or
imagined S atav ahana king, has learned that what the Buddha (or the Bud-
dhists) meant by the cessation of the aggregates upon nirv a

na is that they
never existed to begin with. Realization is not the target of the path but its
very nature.
68)
See Scherrer-Schaub (:oo;) for a discussion of these topics in the R

A. Scherrer-Schaub
rightly reads the R

A as a statement of Mah ay ana political theory, expressing the unique

Mah ay ana emphasis on creating a physical reality, a body, born of religious merit (or the
requisite of merit", pu

nyasambh ara). Tis is, indeed, a supra-mundane political program"

(p. ;;,). In this respect the R

A participates in the wider cultural context that we encounter

in texts of the Dharma-s astra and Artha-s astra genres, voicing the Mah ay ana's emphasis on
ethics and on the non-relinquishing of sa

ms ara.
As a full analysis of the relation between the discussion of the R

A's philosophy conducted

above and the religio-political aspects of text as described by Scherrer-Schaub is far beyond
the scope of this paper, I will make only a short comment. It appears that the R

A's instruc-
tions on kingship and the opportunities kingship supplies on the path to Buddhahood are
intimately related to the redennition of the Buddha's enlightenment as it has been discussed
here. Not only is the crossing beyond existence and non-existence essential to the program
(see also Scherrer-Schaub, section IV), but it is precisely the fact that nirv a

na is redenned as
the ontological characteristic of the universe that allows the Mah ay ana vision to crystallize.
Firstly, Buddhahood is no longer categorically separated from reality, nor is it any more
accessible solely to meditators who cultivate sam adhi meditation. Secondly, it is precisely
the non-objective quality of reality, beyond existence and non-existence and similar to an
illusion, that makes it fully malleable and responsive to the enorts of compassion.
:o Eviatar Shulman / Indo-Iranian Journal ,, (:v11) ,v1-,:,
In the R

A, N ag arjuna dennes the Buddhist vision anew: central Bud-

dhist philosophical images are explained to refer to the Mah ay ana under-
standing of the nature of reality as beyond existence and non-existence. It
seems possible that this new vision was beginning to become the culturally
accepted understanding of Buddhist truth at the turn of the rd century ci
in the vicinity of the modern Guntur district of Andhra Pradesh. Tanks
to the Ratn avali's unique mixture of worldly concerns and Buddhist phi-
losophy, we can improve our chances in the unyielding guessing-game of
Indian history.
Abbreviations
MMK M ula-madhyamaka-k arik a
R

A Ratn avali

SS

S unyat a-saptati

SSS

S ura ngama-sam adhi-s utra
Y

S Yukti-

sa

tik a-k arik a

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