Akira Omoto PDF

Akira OMOTO, Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology
(omoto@nr.titech.ac.jp)
Fukushima accident
What happened in Japan and why?
Outline
What happened?
Why?- What Fukushima accident tells us about
weakness in the context of Defense in Depth
Issue of cultural attitude behind decision-making
Organization
Nuclear community
National
A. Omoto, IVA, 2013Nov29 2
A. Omoto, IVA, 2013Nov29
3
Government Report to the IAEA, June2011 Initiation from B, then propagated
westwards to area A, and further to the North and South down to Ibaraki
Source area of the 3.11 earthquake (multi-segment rupture)
Tb/B R/B
[SOURCE] http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/betu11_j/images/110618l.pdf and TEPCO May 23 report
Flooding of Electric Equipment Room in turbine building
(Metal-clad, Power Center, Control Center, DC battery)
Hx/B
Inundation height
14-15m
Assumed Tsunami
height 5.7m
Tb/B
R/B
Failure of AC-independent systems as time
Core melt, hydrogen generation and explosion
3.11 PM Earthquake and Tsunami left the plant under
Complete SBO (AC/DC) + Isolation from Heat Sink
Long term
Depressurize reactor system
Activate Low Pressure water injection systems
Accident Management
Short term
Core cooling by AC-independent systems: use of decay heat
as driving force
automatic response
Sequence of accident (Unit 2 & 3)
What happened?
Organization
Nuclear community
National
Recent Tsunamis (1933 Okujiri, 1993 Okujiri, 2004 Smatra)
and advent of plate tectonics study
triggered re-evaluation
of design basis Tsunami
Level 1 Defense in Depth
Prevention of abnormal operation and failures
History of re-evaluation of Tsunami height by TEPCO
Design basis
(1966)
3m
5.7m
Re-evaluation of
Design basis Tsunami
using JSCE code(2002)
Probabilistic Tsunami hazard study
(2006): 10(-5)/year for 10m
Hypothetical analysis (2008) 15.7m
TEPCO studies: Tsunami deposit, Tall Tsunami wall
TEPCO organized experts panel for review.
However, deposit study did not help
model construction very much
In this annex, an outline is presented of:
the methodology, namely the Tsunami
Assessment Method for Nuclear Power
Plants in Japan published by the JSCE (Japan
Society of Civil Engineers) in February 2002.
Historical tsunami study
The first step is to conduct literature surveys
for dominant historical tsunamis affecting
the target site, and then the validity of
recorded tsunami heights needs to be
examined. On the basis of the results, fault
models for numerical simulations for
historical tsunamis can be set up.
ANNEX II: ASSESSMENT OF TSUNAMI HAZARD:
Current practice in some states
1) Implicit assumptions in professional societys guide need
scrutiny
2) Deposit study does not necessarily lead to a complete model
3) When uncertainty is very high, prepared by thinking;
- Where is cliff edge ?
- What is possible to increase distance to cliff edge?
Technical lessons
Dialogue/critical review among experts in different
disciplinary areas
Lack of critical thinking, questioning attitude
Listening to alternative/opposing views
Lack of preparedness to beyond assumed condition
Waiting, expecting uncertainty will be reduced
Relevant cultural attitude issues
Prevention of abnormal operation and failures
Storegga slide
Amongst the largest known landslide
Study of deposited sediment
8,000 years ago
Around 10% of Tsunami by landslide?
Storegga tsunami deposits,
Scotland
Accident Management (AM) was prepared after Chernobyl, but
not assuming extensive damages by external /security events
damages to
System, Structure, Components
Offsite power
Heat Sink
AM was not robust enough, especially against external event, SBO
Independence of each layer of Defense-in-Depth
Nexus between safety and security
Control of accident beyond Design Basis
Lack of critical thinking, questioning attitudewhy not assume?
Waiting by expecting until uncertainty will be reduced
Technical lessons
Communication system
Team
Overall offsite actions (evacuation and food control)
helped reduce health risks
Identified problems
Offsite centers function was lost
Confusion in implementation of EPR
Delineation of responsibility including PM,
communication among decision-makers
Needs to revisit
Delineation of responsibility, command line, coordination
Design and function of offsite center
Offsite emergency plan (zoning and others)
Technical lessons
Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR)
Complacency Accident will not happen here
Not intended to say Accident like Fukushima is only uniquely
happening in a unique natural and social environment
What happened?
Organization
Nuclear community
National
A WARNING in Sec. overview, Kemeny report, 1979
We have stated that
fundamental changes must
occur in organizations,
procedures, and, above all,
in the attitudes of people.
No amount of technical
"fixes will cure this
underlying problem.
In a culture where it is impolite to say no and where ritual
must be observed before all else, I think that Western style
safety culture will be very hard for the Japanese to accept.
But there were also extraordinary even heroic efforts
made by the brilliant dedicated engineers, operators
I do not doubt that the Japanese Nuclear industry has the
capability to transform to a nuclear operations safety culture.
Prof. D. Klein, Ex Chairman
of USNRC,
The Ripon Forum, Summer 2011
Influence of national culture?
This was a disaster Made in Japan.: Its fundamental
causes are to be found in the ingrained conventions of
Japanese culture (our reflexive obedience; our reluctance to
question authority; our devotion to sticking with the
program; our groupism; and our insularity)
Prof. K. Kurokawa in chairmans
message to the Diets Investigation
Committees Report (2012 July)
[source] http://naiic.go.jp/wp-content/uploads/
2012/07/NAIIC_report_lo_res2.pdf
Influence of national culture?
6. Priority of risk management (Utility)
Business environment (vertical integration, cost-plus
tariffs, relations with local governor & mayor)
Where do we need transformation in attitude?
7. Continuous safety improvement, being trusted
by the society
2. Complacency Accident cannot happen here
5. Parochialism
Vertical silo when multi-disciplinary issues involved
3. Professionalism and responsible use
Heavy outsourcing (Utility)
Lack of expertise (Regulation)
1. Critical thinking and listening to alternative views
4. Imagine what may happen if assumption was
wrong
University of Tokyos Nuclear GCOE study
Why nuclear community in Japan failed to prevent
this accident by interviews to 24 well-recognized
experts in nuclear community
Why nuclear community in Japan failed
to prevent this accident?
[SOURCE] A. Omoto et al, Global 2011, December 2011
Focus on internal events in PSA
No question to US origin designs in early phase (Electric
Equipment room in UG of Turbine Building)
Lack of tension between Regulators/Operators
No question asked to NE programme implemented
under the National Policy

1. Collectivism(as versus Individualism)
Structure of sentence: subject + noun + verb
Think/Act as a group
No serious debate
Not much speaking out:
Tall trees much wind
Better bend than break
Some salient features of national culture
2. Less critical/reflective thinking, questioning attitude
Education is, more or less, for transfer of knowledge
rather than teaching how to think
Difference in traits of safety culture: raising concern
[INPO Fukushima LL report] decision-making approach did not provide for
independent challenge or second checks by other groups within the organization.
[SOURCE] http://geert-hofstede.com/japan.html
Power Distance
(hierarchical society)
Individualism
Masculinity
(driven by competition,
Achievement)
Uncertainty
avoidance
Long-term
orientation
3. Lack of big-picture thinking, lose sight of substance :
being distracted by formality and details
[Ex] independence of regulatory body to enable safety-first
decision-makingForget what independence is for and strict
independence is leading to isolation
Although Nisbetts The geology of thoughts argues Asian see
object as an integral part of environment (see forest that tree)
4. Culture in Engineering : Heavy emphasis on component
reliability/quality, while weak in system thinking;
[Ex] why B5b was not considered in Japan?
[Ex] Construction of tall Tsunami breakwater wallwhat about
preparedness beyond design basis Tsunami?
Some salient features of national culture
1. Dedication
INPO special report on the nuclear accident, Nov. 2011
Some workers lost their homes and families to the earthquake
and tsunami, yet continued to work
Generally speaking, Utilities employee have mentality of
dedication through work for the better of the society,
whereas the society does not think so
Look at positive side
2. Compassion
4. Hard-working
3. Politeness (though being lost)
Assessment
Impact of cultural attitudes (organization,
professional society, national) on decision-
making, clarifying causal relationship
Socio-technical structure to control risks
International comparative study
For better decision-making & risk management
Future actions?
.thank you for your attention
Supplementary slides
Why 11 out of 14 NPPs along the coastal line affected by
Tsunami had escaped from core melt?
1) Tsunami height and
Elevation of facilities
2) Availability of power
a) Offsite power
b) Location of Power
Distribution Equipment
& Battery room
c) Air-cooled EDG
3) Accident Management
using then-available
resources including
availability of resources
Onagawa 1F1-3 1F5-6 2F1-4 Tokai
1. Loss of safety function was caused by SBO (in this case, complete
loss of AC/DC power) combined with LHS (loss of heat sink). LOOP
(Loss of offsite power) by earthquake* was a part of the cause
leading to SBO. However, LOOP itself does not lead to accident, since
onsite emergency power sources are installed as backup. In case of
Fukushima, flooding (by Tsunami) of Electric Equipment Room in
Turbine Building was the cause of SBO, where power from
emergency power sources cannot supplied to safety equipments
needing power.
*All the 7 offsite power lines to 1F were lost due to failure of breaker,
cable damage and collapse of transmission line tower.
Was Fukushima accident triggered by damage caused by
Earthquake rather than Tsunami?
2. TEPCO estimates no significant damage was given to systems to
perform safety function by earthquake itself, since:
1) Transient response shows no indication of failure of safety-
related systems,
2) Walk-down of similar units found no sign of damage, and
3) Seismic response analysis supports no damage to safety systems
would have been given by earthquake
3. The level of acceleration by the 3.11 earthquake was almost the same
as design basis. It is know from inspection of damages at KK NPS at
earthquake (2007) and of damages at Onagawa NPS at 3.11
earthquake (2011), SSC (Structure/System/Component) at NPS
shows robustness against earthquake. In case of KK, even to 2-3
times the magnitude of design basis earthquake.
Nr. MWe 3.11 Observed (max. gal) Design (Ss) (max. gal)
N-S E-W Vertical N-S E-W Vertical
1Fuku1 460 460 447 258 487 489 412
1Fuku2 784 348 550 302 441 438 420
1Fuku3 784 322 507 231 449 441 429
1Fuku4 784 281 319 200 447 445 422
1Fuku5 784 311 548 256 452 452 427
1Fuku6 1100 298 444 244 445 448 415
Comparison of Design Basis and plant response on 3.11 at
the Basement of Reactor Building
Reactor Scram by the earthquake
Set points :
Horizontal=135 gal, Vertical=100 gal

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Akira OMOTO, Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology

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