Word Count:

To what extent do inequalities in distribution of resources and power

explain processes of ethnic mobilization? Discuss in relation to at least one
case.


Abstract
This paper will discuss the main causal relations between inequalities in the
allocation of resources within a given territory, the subsequent unequal
distribution of power among the population and the mobilisation of those ethnic
groups harmed by these circumstances. To present such analytical framework,
different theoretical premises will be contrasted with a real scenario, which in
this case, will be the ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta. Thus, the paper will
explore the nature of the conflict, remarking the importance of horizontal
inequality to better understand the dynamics of the mobilisation of ethnic
groups such as the Ijaw and the Ogoni.
Introduction
Remove the secondary causes that have produced the great convulsions of the
world and you will almost always find the principle of inequality at the bottom.
Either the poor have attempt to plunder the rich, or the rich to enslave the poor
(Tocqueville, 2002: 710).
Inequality can be perceived in many aspects of life, but in those societies where
ethnicity divisions are strongly rooted, inequalities may lead to the mobilisation
of those groups feeling harmed. This paper will narrow such scenario to present
the correlation between ethnic mobilisations and inequality in terms of
distribution of resources and the consequent power they provide. And for the
purpose of this essay, such theoretical statement will be explored within the real
case of Nigeria, more specifically, the conflict in the Niger Delta. For the last two
decades, Nigerias history has been influenced by different ethnic groups,
structuring its political and economic system around an institutionalized social
inequality (Ukeje, 2002:11). Besides the already ethnically divided state, the
increasing presence of oil multi-corporations across the nation, such as Shell or
Chevron, raised the intensity of ethnic disputes around the economic profit from
oil revenues. In the case of the Niger Delta, this situation reached its highest
dimension, creating a socio-political arena of violent resistance from native
ethnic groups, such as the Ijaws and the Ogonis, and oppression from the
Nigerian government. However, this mobilisation do not only entail a fight for a
fair share of oil revenues, decades of oil exploitation, environmental degradation
and state neglect has created an impoverished, marginalized and exploited
citizenry (Ikelegbe, 2005: 208).
Politically mis-represented, with their traditional economy and subsistence
highly affected by environmental problems caused by oil extraction, and not
even a fair share of the profit from that oil led these ethnic groups from peaceful
means of protest, such as petitions or expensive civil litigations into an armed
mobilisation (Ukeje, 2002). Thus, in this paper I will discuss the degree to which
this situation, understood from a horizontal inequality perspective, has
determined the mobilisation of ethnic groups.
Nature of ethnic conflicts
When it comes to ethnic conflicts leading to violence there are different possible
explanations of their true motives. On the one hand, we can explain the causes in
historical terms, ultimately leading to diverse aspects such as cultural hatred or
religious disputes. According to this theory, ethnic conflicts can be best explained
from a foundationalist perspective, where individuals brought together by a
feeling of shared blood and a positive social identity disesteem any other group
due to cultural or religious differences. On the other hand, greed-based theories
such as the economy of war defends that ethnic conflicts do not happen because
of historical and social resentment but due to the economic opportunities given
to rebels to profit from war (Ukiwo, 2007). According to this theory, socio-
political grievances may be used as an excuse for warlords and rebels to actually
make economic profit from ethnic conflicts. However, this conflict is quite more
complexed than that, and another perspective would be more suitable to explain
its origins and motivations. Claude Ake states than ethnic conflict should be
labelled as democratic conflicts, where those groups excluded from the
commonwealth fight to regain their rights as free and equal citizens (Ake cited in
Ukiwo, 2007). This explanation, commonly know as horizontal inequality, can be
understood as a political panorama where certain sectors of a society, minority
ethnic groups in this case, do not enjoy the same citizenship status as other
groups at the top of the system. Suffering from a socio-economic marginalisation,
these minority groups are not only excluded from power at state level but also
experience difficulties in their self-determination at the regional level. In the case
of the Niger Delta, this could be seen through the situation that Ijaws and Ogonis
are experiencing in that region, lacking of representation and obligated to give
up their land for the states benefit without any rights in exchange. After all,
according to the Pareto optimality, for the distribution of resources it is not
possible for one party to improve without making another partys situation
worse.
Thus, Steward (2000 and 2002 cited in Mancini, 2005: 8) argues that horizontal
inequalities, defined as differences between culturally formed groups in political
opportunities, social access, economic assets, employment and income
determine the chances of violent conflicts to happen. However, it should be
noted that inequalities in terms of income distribution do not always lead to
political conflict. It is within a framework of high inter-ethnic dispute when
political conflict reach its highest rate (Sriskandarajah, 2003).
Therefore, an approach purely based on economic inequality does not support
this argument. Different groups are not only separated by patrimony, but also by
many other cultural aspects such as religion, language, way of living ( Mogues
and Carter, 2004). Thus, for a better analysis of group division, we should
consider the concept of economic polarisation. According to such concept,
polarisation captures the extent to which society is clustered around a small
number of distant and relatively internally homogeneous groupings (Mancini,
2005: 9) The more polarised the society is, the more probability there is for a
communal conflict.
Dynamics of the Niger Delta conflict
Is Nigeria a polarised society? With multiple ethnic groups, such as the Igbo,
Yoruba, Hausa Fulani, Tiv or Shuwa among others, which may co-exist but also
do not embrace outsiders, one could agree that Nigeria is a closed classificatory
system (Tunga, 2011: 88). Nigeria is a divided country where people generally
perceive themselves as more ethnic and less national. However, for a better
understanding of the reasons for insurgency in the Niger Delta, it is necessary to
examine the origins of the conflict.
After the colonisation of Nigeria by the British Empire and the subsequent
division of the territory in different regions, the destiny of certain ethnic groups
was marked for the centuries to come. One of those groups were the Ijaws. The
importance of living in a trading post determined which groups would become
intermediaries and thus acquire an important role during the colonial period.
This situation ultimately led to the marginalisation of Western Ijaws, who were
totally cut off from trade and become infamous as pirates (Ukiwo, 2007: 592).
And later on, since the 1950s, the minorities from the region have been
protesting against such marginalisation and the politics of exclusion by the
political parties and governments (Ikelegbe, 2005).
However, after the independence, two major events would transform the
Nigerian ethnic panorama and the situation of Ijaws in the Niger Delta. The first
event was the division of Nigerian into states, which began with 12 states in
1967 to the current 36 states. This geographical restructuring of the country led
to multiple political improvements such as a greater level of representation for
minority groups, the reduction of power of the central government, the creation
of cross-regional coalitions between minorities or the prevention from tribal or
ethnic heroes to emerge (Tunga, 2011). The second event was the introduction
of the Structural Adjustment Program in 1986. This program, which set a series
of requisites in order to assist the country to solve its external debt problems, led
to the downsizing of the Delta state and the resurgence of ethnic nationalism
and identity politics in the country (Ukiwo, 2007: 599). A perfect example of this
new tendency was the creation of the Ijaw National Congress (INC) in 1991. By
this time, not only Ijaws, but also Ogonis began to perfect their ethnic identity
and to fight against unfair treatment by the government, being this new wave of
self-determination the trigger of the violent conflict between those minorities,
which protested against the unfair distribution of oil revenues, and the
multinational oil companies, defended by the national government. Thus, from
the 1990s the inhabitants of Ogoniland, Ijaw land and other ethnic groups began
an ambitious program of disrupting oil production, which would ultimately lead
to the occupation and shutting of oil facilities, abduction of MCN staff, hijack and
seizure of MCN helicopters and boats, stoppage of production and other related
activities undertaken by youth, women and community activists (Ikelegbe,
2005: 215).
However, this conflict does not only emerge from the insufficient income that the
region obtains from oil extraction. Ecological impacts from oil spillage and gas
flaring are the other side of populations distress (Watts, 2003). According to
Eckersleys (2007) notion of ecocide, the destruction of the ecosystem highly
affects the population due to the repercussions that such ecological distress have
not only on basic needs for survival but also on some of the most important
resources that are the basis for the regions exports and traditional economy,
such as those of cotton, rubber or cacao. (Okonta and Douglas, 2001).
Oil has sometimes been labelled as the devils excrement, for Nigeria it seems
that for the most part of the population it has resulted to be a complete curse.
Thus we can agree with Herbst (1996), when he once said that oil made of the
Nigerian state the greatest single development tragedy in the world today.
The mobilisation of ethnic groups in the Niger Delta
After this brief exposition of the origins and evolution of the conflict it is time to
explain how these events and their socio-economic consequences led to the
mobilisations of ethnic groups in the Niger Delta.
First, we must address the basic question of how those groups were formed in
terms of ethnic identity. Ethnicity can be defined as a social category of people
with a shared cultural heritage: common ancestry, language, or religion which
gives them a distinctive social identity (Macionis, 2010 cited in Tunga, 2011:
88). This social construction has been part of human history since its origins, but
it would be after the end of the cold war when this concept would experience its
highest manifestation worldwide with a massive upsurge in identity (ethnic and
religious) mobilisations [] performing its function as a bulwark of succor for
those left behind by the relentless march of modernity (Olarinmoye, 2004: 2). In
the case of Nigeria, ethnic groups are classified according to their mother tongue
and ancestry, although it can happen that some members who no longer speak
the mother tongue of the group, still feel attached to their ethnic origins (Tunga,
2011).
Thus, after explaining different aspects of the nature of ethnic identity, we
should now continue to explore what factors tend to drive those ethnic groups to
mobilise. It can be argued that nationalism is a key factor for mobilisation and
the subsequent conflict. We can see this case in Northern Ireland, former
Yugoslavia or the Basque Country among other examples, and Africa is no
exception. Generally, African states dealing with ethnic conflicts have been
hindered by their incapability to develop genuine nationalism, due to the
emergence of these states after colonialism as quasi-states in which the
allegiance of citizens reside more with their primordial groups than the state
(Jackson, 1990 cited in Anugwom, 2002: 4). Thus, the Nigerian state has failed
when dealing with ethnic conflicts since the state itself is ethnicised. In this
situation, the power elites benefit sectional interests and deprive other groups,
which ultimately leads to most groups pledging allegiances of primordial nature
(Idowu, 1999).
Another fact to take into consideration when explaining ethnic mobilisation is
the nature of groups, their composition. On the one hand, we have the elites,
generally formed by the elder population, and on the hand we have the youths.
According to Olarinmoye (2004), this union of the elites and the youths can be
defined as a politically deviant group since it is not governed by procedural
norms and they use illegitimate means to achieve their goals. Olarinmoye also
divides these associations into two different categories. First, we have the elitist
politically deviant group, controlled by the elites, who use mass recruits as
pressure groups to attack the state though violent activities to achieve their
demands, seeking a bigger share of the resource structure of the state. Secondly,
we have the militant politically deviant group, mostly composed by the youths,
who basically seek to change the status quo. They believe that the objectives of
the elites do not necessarily benefit the lumpen, and so, through militant and
extremist political tactics, they try to challenge the system. Thus, in the Niger
Delta we can see how the youths, embarked on guerrilla warfare against the oil
companies and the government, ignore the orders from the elders showing their
anger through violence, using guns, cutlasses, and kidnapping (Ukeje, 2002: 25).
However, we must not ignore another sector of the population when exploring
ethnic mobilisation. Women also play an important role within the conflict and
through more peaceful means, women actively participate in demonstrations,
form pressure groups and present their demands to the local rulers, oil
corporations and the government. Unfortunately, the compensations that oil
companies sometimes pay to local communities are often distributed only among
the men (Ukeje, 2002).
Finally, after having analysed diverse aspects of ethnic mobilisations, such as
some of their main causes and how groups are formed and composed, we should
bring the theory to a more practical level, exposing the dynamics of real cases. As
mentioned above, the two major ethnic groups who mobilised in the Niger Delta
are the Ijaw and the Ogoni.
The Ijaw is the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria but yet a political minority,
not only at national level but also in all states they live except Bayelsa. Thus, due
to this minority status, one of the major complaints Ijaws have reside on the
difficulties they experience to access state and federal political appointments or
being employed by the government and oil-prospecting companies (Ukiwo,
2007). Among the activists of the Ijaw mobilisation we can find two different
groups. On the one hand, there is a peaceful sector of the group, among whom we
can find former student activists for example, who created pan-ethnic youth
organizations such as the Movement for the Survival of Ijaw Ethnic Nationality
(MOSIEN), the Movement for Reparations to Ogbia (MORETO) and the Ijaw
Youth Council (IYC). On the other hand we have another sector, mostly
composed by youths too, but who preferred a more violent mobilisation due to
the complete inefficiency of dialogue and the deployment of soldiers by the
government to quell community protests against oil companies (Ukiwo, 2007).
The Ogoni, however, is one of the smaller ethnic groups in southeastern Nigeria
and in the Niger Delta region, therefore, they have also suffered a severe
disadvantage in resource allocation since they completely lack of power to
influence government decisions on policy (Nnoli, 2005). As Isumonah states
(1997 cited in Ukeje, 2002), Ogoni demands are characterised by a significant
political, cultural and economic background, what led to a sustained disruption
of oil activities that not only threatened the oil multinationals, but also the
accumulative base of the Nigerian State. Thus, Ogonis have become a symbol for
minority ethnic groups in their struggle for a fair and just share of national
resources (Nnoli, 2005: 17).
Conclusion
There are different causes that can lead to ethnic conflict and mobilisation. As we
can see in the Bosnian war, religion can be an important trigger for conflict. In
the Troubles, religion is again a key concept, but this time we also find
nationalism and political agitation, exactly as we see in the Basque Country or
Catalonia in Spain.
None of those cases specifically deal with inequality in socio-economics terms,
but there are many others ethnic conflicts that do result from a struggle for
power and wealth among members of constituent ethnic groups (Nnoli, 2005:1).
As mentioned before, in a situation of clear horizontal inequality, the ethnic
groups in the top monopolise power, which in many cases, it is a result of a
stronger economic position. As we can see in the case of Nigeria, rentier states,
that is to say, states which develop their economy around the rent of their
natural resources to external clients tend to develop these social inequalities
between different groups, and in Nigeria, these groups are based on ethnicity.
Thus, we can conclude that an unfair distribution of resources and the
subsequent share of the profit and power they provide do represent an
important cause for ethnic mobilisation, which in many cases, ultimately leads to
a violent ethnic conflict.
Nevertheless, from a more positive perspective, we can see a changing pattern
on the nature of the conflict in the Niger Delta. As Anugwom (2002) states, the
ethnic mobilisation is deriving towards an improvement of their lot in
democratic terms, that is to say, ethnic groups are no longer pursuing a zero sum
game. Instead, they aim for a sustainable socio-economic dispensation. And for
that purpose, different measures such as the respect for self-determination, an
improved allocation of oil revenues, better ecological policies or the creation of
employment for local people could promote better relationship between
governments, oil companies and the local communities (Ukeje, 2002).
After all, to finish the Tocquevilles quote with which this paper begins, if, then, a
society can ever be found in which everyman shall have something to keep and
little to take from others, much will have been done for peace (Tocqueville,
2002: 710).



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