Rawls' Principles of Justice in the Original Position

Omar Siddiqui (1067327)

Submitted to Dr. Seaman
Poli Sci 4FF3
April 11
th
, 2014
Why would persons, in Rawls' view, choose his two principles of justice in the original position?
In John Rawls' A Theory Of Justice, he sets out several conceptions to follow in the social
contract tradition set out by philosophers such as Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Rawls' variation on
the social contract is the initial situation (also known as the original position), in which all individuals
are situated behind a veil of ignorance. The reason for such a position is so that John Rawls may
demonstrate his two principles of justice, and argue that in such a circumstance, individuals would
accept these principles due to the fact that they are simply the best possible principles. In this paper I
will first examine how the original position and the veil of ignorance operate. Then I will critically
analyze both of Rawls' principles of justice, before moving onto an explanation of why individuals in
the original position would opt for his principles.
Rawls gives several definitions for his two principles of justice. He begins by defining the
concept of principles of justice as principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their
own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their
association (Rawls, 11). Before setting out to describe what these two principles of justice are, it is
first important to examine Rawls' original position. In regards to the aforementioned principles, Rawls
posits that these principles are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This veil, much like the original
position itself, is a hypothetical scenario in which all elements of social distinction are unknown.
Specifically, Rawls describes the situation of the veil of ignorance as follows:
Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class
position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, his intelligence, strength, their conceptions of the good or their special psychological
propensities (Rawls, 12).
According to Rawls, this ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles
by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances (Rawls, 12). What he
means by this is that since no one knows their particular condition, it is impossible to design principles
which favour their particular condition. Rawls provides the example of a man is relatively wealthy
(Rawls, 18-19). This man might find that taxes for welfare are unjust, and thus wish to advance a
principle which does not take away his wealth. Yet he has no knowledge of the fact that he is wealthy,
so there would be no opportunity for him to make such a claim. In contrast, a rather poor person would
most likely propose the opposite principle: that taxes for welfare are necessary and completely just. Yet
again, this individual does not know his own situation with regards to wealth, so he could not make this
claim. As he states, it should be impossible to tailor principles to the circumstances of ones own case
(Rawls, 18). This seems similar to the question of how to ensure that a person cutting a cake does so
equally. The answer to this scenario is that the cake cutter is made to choose his piece last. If he was to
cut the cake unevenly (in able to take the largest piece for himself), this would be unjust. However, if
he was forced to be the last to choose his slice, being a rational self-interested individual, he would
make it so that all slices were equal. As a result of this, everyone would benefit, rather than one person
taking a larger slice.
In Rawls' case, the same is true of those choosing the principles of justice: we do not know our
circumstances, so we cannot possibly choose principles which would benefit only us. Thus it is best to
choose principles which benefit everyone. He provides his own example of this: the two principles,
according to Rawls, are those a person would choose for the design of a society in which his enemy is
to assign him his place (Rawls, 152). Although he is quick to announce that we should not base our
reasoning off of this premise of an enemy in charge of society, as this is a false premise. However, the
analogy of the cake cutter as well as the example proposed by Rawls both demonstrate how we are to
go about deciding which principles of justice to choose. Rawls adds that we should insure further that
particular inclinations and aspirations, and persons conception of their good do not affect the principles
adopted (Rawls, 18). As added incentive, Rawls insists on the finality of the agreement made in the
original position: since the original agreement is final and made in perpetuity, there is no second
chance (Rawls, 176). There is a rather large burden of commitment here: these are the standards which
will govern the life prospects of the individual, and so there is an incredible amount of pressure to
ensure that the correct principles are chosen. Indeed, Rawls writes that the parties must stick by their
commitment no matter the circumstances, otherwise they will not have acted in good faith (Rawls,
176). The principles of justice are those which rational persons concerned to advance their interests
would consent to as equals when none are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social and
natural contingencies (Rawls, 19). In a hypothetical situation (the veil of ignorance) where all men are
of equal liberty, the choice they would make is what determines the principles of justice (Rawls, 12).
This is akin to the social contracts of Hobbes and Locke, however the difference is that in this case,
the content of the relevant agreement is not to enter a given society or adopt a given form of
government, but to accept certain moral principles (Rawls, 16). The use of the word contract is
essential here, because it implies a certain publicity to the agreement. If a contract is made, by
definition, two or more people agree upon it and have knowledge of the details therein. The most
crucial aspect of this definition is that we as individuals are not left wondering whether or not others
abide by the contract: if the principles are the outcome of an agreement, citizens have a knowledge of
the principles that others follow.
Having explained the original situation, I will now turn to Rawls' two definitions of the
principles of justice. His first definition of the principles of justice is as follows:
The persons in the initial situation would choose two rather different principles: the first requires
equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the second holds that social and
economic inequalities, for example, inequalities of wealth and authority, are only just if they
result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members
of society. (14-15)
He reiterates and adjusts these principles several times throughout his book under revised definitions.
The second time, they are as follows: (i) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others, and (ii) social and economic inequalities are to
be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyones advantage, and (b)
attached to positions and offices open to all (Rawls, 60). It is important to note that these principles are
lexical, that is to say, the first takes priority over the second (Rawls, 244). The final, full definition
given by Rawls for the two principles of justice also takes into account the lexical priority and the
distribution of social goods:
In order to understand the first principle, it is necessary to examine what Rawls means by basic
rights and duties. Rawls lists the basic liberties of the citizen: Political liberty (the right to vote and to
be eligible for public office), together with freedom of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and
freedom of thought; freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of
law (Rawls, 61). Since the citizens of a just society are required to have the same basic rights, these
liberties are all required to be equal. The second principle is a littler more difficult to understand. At
first glance, it is jarring to hear Rawls claim that social and economic inequalities may be considered
just under any circumstance. Yet he clarifies this in the second definition listed above; the inequalities
must be arranged in such a way that they are to everyone's advantage. What Rawls means by this is
that inequalities are permissible when they maximize, or at least all contribute to, the long-term
expectations of the least fortunate group in society (Rawls, 151). As a final definition for this paper, the
first principle requires each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal
basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all (Rawls, 302). The second principle
requires social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to the offices
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls, 302).
The reason for choosing Rawls' two principles of justice is simply that it is the best way of
enabling a well-ordered society in which even the least advantaged benefit from social distribution.
Justice as fairness requires that all primary social goods be distributed equally unless an unequal
distribution would be to everyones advantage (Rawls, 150). These social goods in question include
liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect (Rawls, 303). This type of
well-ordered society would be able eliminate or at least to control mens inclinations to injustice ,
and therefore warring and intolerant sects, say, are much less likely to exist, or to be a danger, once
such a society is established (Rawls, 245). He is claiming that his two principles of justice would lead
to a society in which everyone was not only better off in terms of social circumstances, but also safer.
On an individual level, Rawls states that the decision to choose his principles of justice is simply a
rational one. It is not reasonable for someone to expect more than an equal share in the division of
social goods. This would be unfair and impractical, seeing as no one has any knowledge of their social
circumstances or the amount of social goods (i.e., income, wealth, opportunity). Nor is it rational for
someone to agree to less than an equal share, as this would intentionally place them at a disadvantage.
Since Rawls is referring to individuals who are not only disinterested in other people's interests, but
also self-interested, it would be illogical for them to agree to a lesser share of the aforementioned social
goods. Thus the sensible thing to do is to "acknowledge as the first principle of justice one requiring an
equal distribution (Rawls 150). This way, everyone benefits, but as Rawls insists, it is crucial to look
at the system from the standpoint of the least advantaged representative man (Rawls, 151). If, from the
perspective of the least well off member, society is considered to be just, than the principles of justice
must necessarily be just.
Furthermore, the principles of justice manifest in the basic structure of society mens desire to
treat one another not as means only but as ends in themselves (Rawls, 179). Though this point is rather
contentious, as Rawls is assuming men have a desire to treat each other as ends-in-themselves, Rawls'
definition is far more simple than that: it means treating men in accordance with the principles to which
they would consent in an original position of equality (Rawls, 180). Of crucial importance here is that
we as individuals do not sacrifice our individual liberties in order to obtain greater economic or social
gain. Rawls creates a rule of First Priority, also known as the Priority of Liberty, which is as follows:
The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted
only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases: (a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the
total system of liberty shared by all, and (b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those
citizens with the lesser liberty (Rawls, 302)
The second rule of priority is that of Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare, and it is listed as
follows:
The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that of
maximizing the sum of advantages, and fair opportunity is prior to the different principle. There
are two cases: (a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the
lesser opportunity, and (b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of
those bearing this hardship (Rawls, 302-303).
These principles address the fact that there is a lexical priority to the principles of justice in which
liberty (the first principle) takes precedent over the second principle. This is because the basic liberties
in question are for the most part inalienable in the sense that, they take priority over social and
economic equality: A departure from the institutions of equal liberty required by the first principle
cannot be justified by, or compensated for, by greater social and economic advantages (Rawls, 61).
Overall, individuals in the original position would choose Rawls' principles of justice because they are
self-interested and they know nothing about their circumstances. Rawls contrasts this with
utilitarianism and the concept of utility itself, in which we as individuals must be interested in the good
of others. Yet perhaps this is a major flaw in utilitarianism: while we are no doubt interested in the well-
being of others, as Rawls demonstrated by claiming we have an interest in treating others as ends in
themselves rather than means to an end, we also are more concerned with our own interests. If we can
maximize our social goods, our wealth and income, our opportunities, we will. Yet in the social
position we are blind to the advantages or disadvantages we have, and so we are forced to take a
gamble by accepting rules which will benefit others as well as us. Yet we choose these principles
because in the long run they will benefit us.
People would choose these principles of justice because they are not malicious towards others:
Rawls believes the principles of justice are a force for good. While there may still be injustice after the
fact, that is another matter. No principles are chosen which intentionally put others at a disadvantage.
His principles, he argues, are the best available, and they serve the interests of free, mutually
disinterested, equal, and rational human beings. All the other choices, he argues, feature holes for the
least well off in society to stay disadvantaged, rather than be addressed by the social structure. The
equality of men in the original position requires two things: that systems of ends are not ranked in
value, and that each man is presumed to have the requisite ability to understand and to act upon
whatever principles are adopted (Rawls, 19). Rawls argues that what makes this theory most alluring to
individuals is that even though the original position never existed, it is a point of referral for which we
may all check the justice in our society. He writes that Our social situation is just if it is such that by
this sequence of hypothetical agreements we would have contracted into the general system of rules
which defines it" (Rawls, 13). He further elaborates: "whenever social institutions satisfy these
principles, those engaged in them can say to one another that they are co-operating on terms to which
they would agree if they were free and equal persons whose relations with respect to one another were
fair (Rawls, 13). These two statements sum up the bulk of the pragmatic nature of Rawls' theory of
justice. There is an expectation that all will follow the principles of justice, because, given that they
emerged in the form of a hypothetical contract in the hypothetical original situation, they are known to
all. Essentially, Rawls is saying that we can refer back to a hypothetical time in which we did not know
our advantages and disadvantages. At this point in time, would our conception of justice fit in with our
current social system? If the answer is no, changes need to be made. It is by a lack of dissent, rather
than explicit agreement, that we show support for the rules of justice. While no society, especially in
the modern day, was built on a group of men banding together with no knowledge of their
circumstances and setting out principles of justice as fairness, Rawls argues that this is as close as we
will come to a just society; Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close
as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons
would assent to under circumstances that are fair (Rawls, 13). Thus, Justice as Fairness.
Rawls has set out to show that a system of justice which follows his two principles, aptly named
justice as fairness, would provide for a socially beneficial system in which all members of society
flourish and thrive, including the least well off. He does so by allowing inequalities, yet only in the
circumstance that such inequalities are to the advantage of the least well off. Furthermore, he ensures
that the principles of justice treat all men with their basic liberties, following in a long tradition of
liberal thought. Individuals who were in such a position would no doubt choose Rawls' principles,
simply because they offer the best opportunities under the definitions that Rawls himself has set out.
Whether or not such a position (including a modern metaphorical position in which we remove
ourselves from our social positions for a minute to think back to a hypothetical time) would ever be
possible is another question.
Works Cited
Rawls, John. A Theory of justice. Original ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 20051971. Print.