International Journal of Computer Trends and Technology (IJCTT) volume 4 Issue 9Sep 2013

ISSN: 2231-2803 http://www.ijcttjournal.org Page 3171

Blocking Selective J amming Attacks
M.Vijay Kumar, M.Tech
Student, CSE Dept, ASRA

Abstract the wide capacity of the wireless connectivity
results it exposed to considered interference attacks, well
known as jamming. The thought of interrupting with wireless
transmissions will become as a platform and increases of
Denial-of-Service attacks on wireless connectivity. As a
critical situation, jamming has been known under an external
threat model. Moreover, antagonist of perfect skills of
protocol requirements and network confidential things makes
invisible jamming attacks that wont come under notice. In
this paper, we identify crisis of selective jamming attacks in
wireless connectivity. Such attacks, the attacker work on these
attacks very less time only, gives most preference to the
information which was passed through messages. Explanation
of benefits of choosen jamming based on network
performance was presented in two real time applications or
case studies. A chosen attack on TCP and another is on
routing. We explore that selecting jamming attacks are cause
of doing packets which of real-time were declared at physical
layer. To make cautious about the attacks, we created three
schemes that restrict packet in reality classification by
attaching cryptographic primitives with physical-layer
attributes. We guess the security of our approaches and
calculate their computational and communication in future.
I. I NTRODUCTI ON
In Wireless networks nodes have to interconnect with each
other in wireless connectivity to process continuously without
any interruptions. Moreover, the open nature of this security
threats. Attackers with a transceiver can easily create some
interruptions on wireless transmissions, like adding some un
wanted messages, or jamming. While monitoring and message
injection we are capable of preventing those attacks with the
help of cryptographic methods, jamming attacks are critical to
prevent. Those create most Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks
opposite wireless networks. They create it as normal jamming,
Prof. M.Madhavi, M.Tech CSE
Associate Professor, ASRA

that we think but they usually send uninterrupted jamming signal
and they used to send unwanted messages continuously.
If jammer is not a part of the jammer then it is treated
as external threat. Cause of this model, jamming makes
uninterrupted or random transmission of exotic interference
signals. The concept of always-on results many problems.
First thing it has to transmit continuous transmission signals to
the nodes continuously which they are in need. And next one is
due to continuous high transmission there will be problem of
attacking. The purpose of anti-jamming method based on spread-
spectrum (SS) communications, or may be like jamming
evasion. SS techniques works on by providing bit-level
protection by exploring bits based upon a secret pseudo-noise
(PN) code, well known in the communicating parties only. These
types of techniques can only protect wireless transmissions case
of external threat model. Hiding of secrets due to node adjusting
neutralizes the advantages of SS. Broadcast communications are
have to be aware of all secret bits to prevent the internal
jamming threats. As per technique adjustments a single receiver
is capable to reveal relevant cryptographic data. In this paper, we
mention the crisis of jamming under an internal threat model.
We under taken a sophisticated adversary who is aware of
network secrets and taking into process or reality details of
network protocols not only in physical layer at any one in the
stack of network. The method adversary was developed based on
internal knowledge is only for launching chosen jamming
attacks in which particular messages of high Importance are
triggered. Those situations in reality are be like as, a jammer can
target route-request or reply messages at the routing layer to
block route discovery, or target TCP updates in a TCP session to
critically degrade the result of an end-to-end flow. To create
chosen jamming attacks, the adversary must be efficient of
developing a classify-then-jam position before the finishing of
a wireless transmission. Those situations can be declared by two
International Journal of Computer Trends and Technology (IJCTT) volume 4 Issue 9Sep 2013
ISSN: 2231-2803 http://www.ijcttjournal.org Page 3172
ways one is classifying transmitted packets using protocol
semantics and another way is by decoding packets. In last
method, the jammers have chances by decode the initial few
bits
of a packet for backup and useful packet identifiers such as


packet type, source and receiver address. After declaring, the
adversary must induce a perfect number of bit errors so that
the packet is not able to backup at the receiver. Chosen
jamming needs acknowledgement knowledge of not only
physical (PHY) layer at the same time of upper layers in
network stack.
I II . DEVEL OPMENT ENVI RONMENT
a) Network module
We identifies the crisis of blocking interruptive jamming
node from allocating m in real time, thus moderating Js
performance to do work on jamming. The network contains a
collection of nodes attached through wireless
communications. Nodes is of free to interact directly in the
case of they are within communication premises, or indirectly
through number of hops. Nodes interaction will be done in
uncast mode and also in another broadcast mode.
Communications are in two ways those are unencrypted and
encrypted by nodes. For encrypted broadcast
communications, symmetric keys are spreader range of
receivers. These keys are created using preshared pair wise
keys or asymmetric cryptography.
b) Real Time Packet declaration/Classification
As a point of view generic communication system
characterized in Fig. In Physical layer, a packet m is gone be
encoded, interleaved, and modified before it is converted over
the wireless channel. At the destination node which is nothing
but receives, the signal is demodulated, deinterleaved, and
decoded, to backup the original packet m.

Even in the case of key has to be remained as a secret; the
static portions of a sent packet could capable to packet
classification. All of this is cause for computationally-efficient
encryption techniques like block encryption; the encryption of a
prefix plaintext with the same key yields a static cipher text
prefix. After all, an adversary who is known of the underlying
protocol declares that can use the static cipher text portions of

a transmitted packet to classify it.
c) Selective/chosen J amming Module
We explored the impact of selective jamming attacks on the
network capability. Develop selective jamming attacks in two
multi-hop wireless network ways. In the first way, the attacker
pointed a TCP connection created over a multi-hop wireless
route. In another way, the jammer pointed network-layer control
messages passing during the route creating process selective
jamming would be the encryption of transmitted packets with
help of static key. Anyway, for broadcast data transactions, this
static decryption key must aware to all receivers which are in
need and hence, is affected to adjust. An adversary in possession
of the decryption key can start decrypting as fast as the reception
of the first cipher text block.
d) Strong Hiding Commitment Scheme (SHCS)
We explored a high definition one that is strong hiding
commitment scheme (SHCS), which works on symmetric
cryptography. Our key motto is to fulfill the strong hiding
property while making computational and transmission
efficiently. The computations have to done of SHCS is one
symmetric encryption at source and one symmetric decryption at
destination. Reason cause is the header information is permuted
as a trailer and encrypted, all receivers in the vicinity of a sender
have to gain the complete packet and decrypt it, before the
International Journal of Computer Trends and Technology (IJCTT) volume 4 Issue 9Sep 2013
ISSN: 2231-2803 http://www.ijcttjournal.org Page 3173
packet type and destination can be determined. However, in
wireless protocols such as 802.11, the whole packet is
received at the MAC layer before it is fixed if the packet must
be terminated or be used for further applications. If some parts
of the MAC header are deemed not to be useful information to
the jammer, they kept constant unencrypted in the header of
the packet, thus avoiding the decryption operation at the
receiver.
e) Cryptographic Puzzle Hiding Scheme (CPHS)
We present a packet hiding scheme based on cryptographic
puzzles. The main idea behind such puzzles is to force the
recipient of a puzzle execute a pre-defined set of
computations before he is able to extract a secret of interest.
The time required for obtaining the solution of a puzzle
depends on its hardness and the computational ability of the
solver. The advantage of
the puzzle based scheme is that its security does not rely on
the PHY layer parameters. However, it has higher
computation and communication overhead. We consider
several puzzle schemes

as the basis for CPHS. For each scheme, we analyze the
implementation details which impact security and
performance. Cryptographic puzzles are primitives originally
suggested by Merkle as a method for establishing a secret
over an insecure channel. They find a wide range of
applications from preventing DoS attacks to providing
broadcast authentication and key escrow schemes.
I V. REL ATED WORK
SELECTIVE JAMMING ATTACKS

The open nature of the wireless medium leaves it vulnerable
to jamming attacks. Jamming in wireless networks has been
primarily analyzed under an external adversarial model, as a
severe form of denial of service (DoS) against the PHY layer.
Existing anti-jamming strategies employ some form of spread
spectrum (SS) communication, in which the signal is spread
across a large bandwidth according to a pseudo-noise (PN)
code. However, SS can protect wireless communications only
to the extent that the PN codes remain secret. Insiders with
knowledge of the commonly shared PN codes can still launch
jamming attacks. Using their knowledge of the protocols
specifics, they can selectively target particular
channels/layers/protocols/packets. We describe two types of
selective jamming attacks against WMNs, which employ
channel and data selectivity.
A. Channel-Selective Jamming
In a typical WMN, one or more channels are reserved for
broadcasting control information. These channels, referred
to as control channels, facilitate operations such as network
discovery, time synchronization, coordination of shared medium
access, routing path discovery and others, without interfering
with the communications of STAs with MAPs. An adversary
who selectively targets the control channels can efficiently
launch a DoS attack with a fairly limited amount of resources
(control traffic is low-rate compared to data traffic). To launch a
channel selective jamming attack, the adversary must be aware
of the location of the targeted channel, whether defined by a
separate frequency band, time slot, or PN code. Note that
control channels are inherently broadcast and hence, every
intended receiver must be aware of the secrets used to protect
the transmission of control packets. The compromise of a single
receiver, be it a MAP or an MP, reveals those secrets to the
adversary. Example: We illustrate the impact of channel
selective jamming on CSMA/CA-based medium access control
(MAC) protocols for multi-channel WMNs. A multi-channel
MAC (MMAC) protocol is employed to coordinate access of
multiple nodes residing in the same collision domain to the
common set of channels. A class of MMAC protocols proposed
for ad hoc networks such as WMNs follows a split-phase design
(e.g., [5]). In this design, time is split into alternating control
and data transmission phases.
International Journal of Computer Trends and Technology (IJCTT) volume 4 Issue 9Sep 2013
ISSN: 2231-2803 http://www.ijcttjournal.org Page 3174

B. Countering Channel-Selective Attacks
Several anti-jamming methods have been proposed to address
channel-selective attacks from insider nodes. All methods
trade communication efficiency for stronger resilience to
jamming. We give a brief description of such anti-jamming
approaches.
Assignment of unique PN codes: An alternative method
for neutralizing channel-selective attacks is to dynamically
vary the location of the broadcast channel, based on the
physical location of the communicating nodes [7]. The main
motivation for this architecture is that any broadcast is
inherently confined to the communication range of the
broadcaster. Hence, for broadcasts intended for receivers in
different collision domains, there is no particular advantage in
using the same broadcast channel, other than the design
simplicity. The assignment of different broadcast channels to
different network regions leads to an inherent partitioning of
the network into clusters. Information regarding the location
of the control channel in one cluster cannot be exploited at
another.
C. Data-Selective Jamming
To further improve the energy efficiency of selective
jamming and reduce the risk of detection, an inside attacker
can exercise a greater degree of selectivity by targeting
specific packets of high importance. One way of launching a
data-selective jamming attack, is by classifying packets
before their transmission is completed. An example of this
attack is shown

in Fig. 3(a). MPA transmits a packet to MPB. Inside attacker
MAPJ classifies the transmitted packet after overhearing its
first few bytes. MAPJ then interferes with the reception of the
rest of the packet at MPB: Referring to the generic packet
format in Fig. 3(b), a packet can be classified based on the
headers of various layers.
D. Countering Data-Selective Jamming Attacks
An intuitive solution for preventing packet classification is to
encrypt transmitted packets with a secret key. In this case, the
entire packet, including its headers, has to be encrypted. While a
shared key suffices to protect point-to-point-communications,
for broadcast packets, this key must be shared by all intended
receivers. Thus, this key is also known to an inside jammer. In
symmetric encryption schemes based on block encryption,
reception of one cipher text block is sufficient to obtain the
corresponding plaintext block, if the decryption key is known.
Hence, encryption alone does not prevent insiders from
classifying broadcasted packets. To prevent classification, a
packet must remain hidden until it is transmitted in its entirety.
One possible way for temporarily hiding the transmitted packet
is to employ commitment schemes. In a commitment scheme,
the transmitting node hides the packet by broadcasting a
committed version of it.
SELECTIVE DROPPING ATTACKS
If selective jamming is not successful due to anti jamming
measures, an insider can selectively drop packets post-
reception. Once a packet has been received, the compromised
node can inspect the packet headers, classify the packet, and
decide whether to forward it or not. Such an action is often
termed as misbehavior [10][13]. Post-reception dropping is
less flexible than selective jamming because the adversary is
restricted to dropping only the packets routed through it.
Nonetheless, the impact on the WMN performance can be
significant. Examples: Consider a compromised MP targeting
the routing functionality in WMNs. By selectively dropping
route request and route reply packets employed by the routing
protocol, as defined in the of the 802.11s standard [2], the
compromised MP can prevent the discovery of any route that
passes through it, delay the route discovery process, and force
alternative, possibly inefficient paths. Alternatively, the
International Journal of Computer Trends and Technology (IJCTT) volume 4 Issue 9Sep 2013
ISSN: 2231-2803 http://www.ijcttjournal.org Page 3175
compromised MP can allow the establishment of a route via

itself, but throttle the rate of the end-to-end connection at the
transport layer. This attack can be actualized by selective
dropping of critical control packets that regulate the end-to-
end transmission rate and effective throughput. For example,
the dropping of cumulative TCP acknowledgments results in
the end to end retransmission of the entire batch of pending
data packets.
1.1 A Layered Model for Jamming
Together jamming and sensing can be broken down into a
layered model similar to the OSI stack. We break it down into
three levels for convenience as shown in Figure 1. The
Link/Physical layer directly interacts with the media. If a
higher layer requests a packet to be jammed, then this lower
layer generates the physical signal and ensures that a packet
and each of its link layer retries are jammed. This layer also
provides the basic sensing capability of packet duration and
timing.
If sophisticated enough it could shield the upper layer from
Link, MAC, and Physical layer control packets such as
RTS/CTS and only report the higher OSI layer packets to the
higher layer sensing and jamming. The Transport/Network
Layer interacts with the corresponding Ad Hoc, IP, TCP, and
UDP protocols. This layer senses packet types and traffic
flows which can then be targeted by jamming. The
Application layer senses HTTP sessions, VoIP set up and the
like and targets specific user activities for jamming.

Size: The physical layer could measure the transmission start
and stop times or use other signal processing techniques to
estimate the packet size in bytes.
Timing: Similarly the packet start time can be estimated.
Source Token: While the actual address of the transmitter
source may not be known. Analysis of the transmitter signal
(signal strength, angle of arrival, etc.) could distinguish
different transmitters so that each transmitter could be assigned
a unique token.
Destination Token: As noted before, receiver ACKs can be
identified in many protocols by the unique timing. Similarly by
analysis of which node ACKs a transmission, the destination
might also be identified.
Unicast vs. Broadcast: In many MAC and Link protocols,
broadcast packets are not acknowledged while unicast packets
are acknowledged. This could be used to identify whether a
packet is unicast or broadcast. While all of these are possible,
only the first two Size and Timing are assumed available in this
paper since these make the fewest assumptions about the
underlying network.
1.2 Sensing & Jamming in Ad Hoc Networks
In network protocols, certain critical packets are necessary for
operation. Jamming TCP-SYN or TCP-SYN-ACK packets will
prevent a TCP connection from being established. Jamming
ARP-REQUEST or ARP-RESPONSE packets will prevent IP
from associating IP and MAC addresses. Jamming a few
protocol control packets can prevent or delay connections;
preventing the connection when the goal is to shut the
connection down and delaying the connection when the goal is
to inhibit communication without being detected. As suggested
from the above, knowing which packet to jam is the key to
getting significant jamming gains. A sensor needs to identify the
key control packets from different protocols.
Sensing can be online or offline. In online sensing packets are
identified as they are received. This can be difficult since in
some cases a packet is identified within a protocol sequence that
has not yet completed. Offline sensing is allowed to classify
packets received in the past based on packets received both
before and after the packet in question. Offline sensing is not
directly useful for jamming. However, it can provide data that
allows the attacker to better characterize the victim network and
International Journal of Computer Trends and Technology (IJCTT) volume 4 Issue 9Sep 2013
ISSN: 2231-2803 http://www.ijcttjournal.org Page 3176
improve its online sensing. These jamming and sensing ideas
are explored more in a later section. Ad hoc networks add
another protocol that can be attacked. Jamming AODV-
RREQ or AODV-RREP packets will prevent ad hoc routes
from ever being established. Ad hoc network protocols add
additional packet types that can be detected.


V. CONCL USI ON
We identified the crisis of selective jamming attacks in
wireless networks. We under taken an internal adversary
model. The advantage of this model is that the jammer is part
of a network. Which is a better part then the making the
progress about protocol specifications and public network
confidential matters. Here in our application transmitted
packets in real time were classified by jammers only in the
way by decoding the initial few symbols of processing
transmission. We explored the result of selective jamming
attacks on TCP and routing protocols. Our researches
explained that a selective jammer have impact on efficiency
with less effort. We created three schemes that converts a
selective jammer to a random one. This is gone work in the
way by blocking real-time packet classification. The schemes
which we define in this paper attaches cryptographic
primitives such as commitment schemes, cryptographic
puzzles, and all-or-nothing transformations (AONTs) with
physical layer features. We estimated the security of our
schemes and computed the performance which benefits future
works alot.
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International Journal of Computer Trends and Technology (IJCTT) volume 4 Issue 9Sep 2013
ISSN: 2231-2803 http://www.ijcttjournal.org Page 3177

First A. Author: M. Vijay Kumar received his B.Tech
(CSE) degree from Jawaharlal Nehru Technological
University (JNTUH), Hyderabad in 2010. He is currently a
M.Tech student in the Computer Science Engineering from
Jawaharlal Nehru Technological University (JNTUH),
Hyderabad. His Research interests are in the areas of
Wireless and Network Security, with current focus on
pocket security system.


Second B. Author: M. MADHAVI Associate Professor
received her M.Tech degree in computer Science Engineering
from Lords Institute of Engineering & Technology (JNTUH)
in the year of 2011 and she received from B.Tech from KITS
Warangal. Her interest are in the field of Data mining
&computer Networks. mail:madhavi_3101@yahoo.co.in