Taada vs Tuvera

FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
The Solicitor General, who is the respondent argued that while publication was necessary
as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUE: Whether or not a publication shall be made in newspaper of general circulation.
RULING/HELD: All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it
is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.

Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs Torres
FACTS: DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private
employment agencies of Filipino Domestic Helpers going to Hong Kong in view of the need
to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for the same.
RULING: The orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The
reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code Art. 2. Laws shall take
effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.

De Jesus vs Commission on Audit
FACTS: On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (Rep. Act 6758), entitled "An Act Prescribing
A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For
Other Purposes", took effect. Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of
allowances and additional compensation into standardized salary rates. Certain additional
compensations, however, were exempted from consolidation. To implement Rep. Act 6758,
the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification effective November
1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic salary.
ISSUE: Whether DBM-CCC 10 is legally effective despite its lack of publication in the Official
Gazette.
HELD: The applicable provision of law requiring publication in the Official Gazette is found
in Article 2 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines. Following the doctrine enunciated in
Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10 is in the nature of an administrative circular
the purpose of which is to enforce or implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be
effective and enforceable, DBM-CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. In the present
case under scrutiny, it is decisively clear that DBM-CCC No. 10, which completely disallows
payment of allowances and other additional compensation to government officials and
employees, starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere interpretative or internal regulation.
It is something more than that. And why not, when it tends to deprive government workers
of their allowances and additional compensation sorely needed to keep body and soul
together.

Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union vs. Vega
FACTS: On January 2, 1992, RA 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) which was signed
into law by Pres. Corazon Aquino and which was published in the Official Gazette on
February 24, 1992.Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual
claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. In May 1992, Central
Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the late mandate
for rehabilitation and reopening, respondent Judge Vega continued with the liquidation
proceedings of the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10,
1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.
HELD:The Supreme Court upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days
following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the authority to provide for
exceptions as indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided. Citing Tanada vs Tuvera,
this clause refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication, which
cannot in any event be omitted. The reason is that such omission would affect due process
in so far as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it.

De Roy vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS: The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners Feliza P. De Roy and
Virgilio Ramos collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the
respondent Luis Bernal resulting in injuries to private respondents to private respondents
and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by
petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the
former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. The trial
courts order was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. On the last day of the 15 days
period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
because it was no longer within the grace period. Petitioners now contend that the rule in
the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette at the time of the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding.
HELD:There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as
the SCRA and law journals.

Unciano Paramedical College vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS: Some nursing students were not admitted for the second semester for organizing a
student body council which was not allowed by the school which was allegedly a violation
of the school regulations. The school argued that under the ALCUAZ DOCTRINE, schools
have the discretion to admit students for the second semester because upon enrolment of a
student in the first semester, the contract was for that semester only. However a new
doctrine was later on promulgated which abandoned the Alcuaz doctrine which is now the
Non doctrine.
ISSUE: Whether or not the new Non doctrine be applied retroactively to the case.
HELD: The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that
arose before its promulgation on May 20, 1990 as in this case, which was filed on April 16,
1990. If it were otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools
similarly situated who relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2, 1988,
which recognized the termination of contract theory. When a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted
on the faith thereof.

Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
FACTS: Five siblings inherited in equal pro in diviso shares a parcel of land registered in
the name of their deceased parents. Two siblings sold their share to the same vendee. By
virtue of such agreements, the Petitioners occupied after the said sales, 2/5 of the lot,
representing the portions bought. They subsequently enclosed their portion with a fence
and built a semi-concrete house. One of the sisters filed a complaint invoking the right to
redeem the area sold. The trial court dismissed this complaint because the time had lapsed,
not having been exercised within 30 days from notice of the sales.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid notice.
HELD: Although there was no written notice, there was actual knowledge of the sales
satisfying the requirement of the law. It is unbelievable that the co-heirs were unaware of
the sale, with the erection of a permanent semi-concrete structure. While Art.1088 of the
Civil Code stresses the need for a written notice of sale; the Petitioners claimed that
because there was no written notice, despite their obvious knowledge of it, the 30-day
period for redemption had not yet begun. The intent of the lawmakers was to ensure that
the redemption was properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as
the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. The coheirs in this case were
undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given to them.

People vs. Jabinal
FACTS: On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a revolver
without the requisite license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration because,
although he had no license or permit, he had appointments as Secret Agent from the
Provincial Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial
Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to
possess and carry the said firearm.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme
Courts rulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.
RULING: The appellant was acquitted. Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in
themselves not laws, are never the less evidence of what the law means; this is the reason
why Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides that, Judicial decisions applying and
interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system. The
interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court constitutes in a way a part of the law as of
the date the law was originally passed, since the courts construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the lawthus construed intends to effectuate. When
a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on
the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Cui vs. Arellano University
FACTS: Emeterio Cui enrolled in Arellano University where finished his law studies in the
up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in
which plaintiff was studying law in defendant Law College, he was awarded scholarship
grants and his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after ends of the semester. Cui
left the Arellano University law college and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year
law in the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of
the latter university. He applied to take the bar examination in which he needed the
transcripts of his records in defendant Arellano University. The defendant refused until
after he had paid back the P1,033 87, noting the contract that he signed which stated that in
consideration of the scholarship granted to him by the University, he waives his right to
transfer to another school without having refunded to the defendant the equivalent of the
scholarship cash and followed by Memorandum No. 38 that the Director of Private Schools
issued.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between Cui and the respondent university, whereby
the former waives his right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the
defendant the equivalent of the scholarship cash valid or not?
HELD: The contract of waiver between the plaintiff and respondent on September 10,
1951, is a direct violation of Memorandum No. 38 and hence null and void. The contract
was contrary to sound policy and civic honesty. The policy enunciated in Memorandum
No.38, s. 1949 is sound policy. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is
understood that such scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and
other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the
recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.
Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.

Assalli vs. Commisioner of Customs
FACTS: On September 10, 1950, at about noon time, a customs patrol team on board Patrol
Boat ST-23 intercepted the five (5) sailing vessels in question on the high seas, between
British North Borneo and Sulu while they were heading towards Tawi-tawi, Sulu. After
ordering the vessels to stop, the customs officers boarded and found on board, 181 cases of
'Herald' cigarettes, 9 cases of 'Camel' cigarettes, and some pieces of rattan chairs. The
sailing vessels are all of Philippine registry, owned and manned by Filipino residents of
Sulu, and of less than thirty (30) tons burden. They came from Sandakan, British North
Borneo, but did not possess any permit from the Commissioner of Customs to engage in the
importation of merchandise into any port of the Sulu sea, as required by Section 1363(a) of
the Revised Administrative Code. Their cargoes were not covered by the required import
license under Republic Act No. 426, otherwise known as the Import Control Law. The
petitioners assails the validity of the action taken by the respondent Commissioner of
Customs by the plea that the repeal of Republic Act No. 426 abated whatever liability could
have been incurred.
ISSUE: Whether the expiration of Republic Act 426 abated whatever liability the
petitioners have incurred?
RULING: Jurisdiction is determined by law in force at the commission of the act and
continuous until the termination of the case except only when the repeal: expressly
prohibit the exercise of jurisdiction, when the provision penalizing the act is repealed and
the act is no longer punishable, when the court failed to provide a counsel when the
accused did not waive his right to counsel.