Forces of Fortune: The Rise Of The New Muslim Middle Class And

What It Will Mean For Our World.

Author: Vali Nasr

Publisher: Free Press New York
Year of publication: 2009

Vali Nasr’s Forces of Fortune appears timely and analytical. Nasr’s analysis

focuses on the Muslim world from a new vantage point: its middle class and

their business pursuits. So Forces of Fortune represents a major shift from

previous studies in produced in recent times. This is particularly true of

studies in the Post-9/11 era on the Muslim world, and especially the Middle

East where earlier emphasis had been placed on conflict and political turmoil.

In Forces of Fortune, however, the author “reveals that there is a vital but

unseen rising force in the Islamic world - a new business minded middle class

that is building a vibrant new Muslim world economy that holds the key to

winning the cold war against Iran and extremists” (from the description of the

book on the front flap).

Nasr takes us from the Iranian revolution to present day Iran, as well as

beyond to other places, such as Pakistan, the Arab world and the entire region

of Middle East, to emphasize the fact that it is business and capitalism that

will become the governing forces of these regions, and not the political

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conflicts, religious inclinations or social turmoil, as the case has been made

for the past several decades. So, according to the author’s arguments, there is

what we may call a paradigm shift in the dynamics of the Muslim world and

the movers and shakers of this shift are driven not by political ideologies of

governments, nor religious fervor of revolutionaries (read fundamentalists),

but, rather, they are propelled by the commerce of an emerging Middle class.

Nasr’s text is written in simple, easy-to-understand English yet is inclusive of

the politics and the history of this complex region, thus providing a depth of

insight into the highly complicated and controversial dynamics of the Islamic

world. The author reports the ground realities about the emerging business

minded Middle class and its commerce as a tool for social change.

The perspective of the book is clearly Western, and specifically American, as

it often addresses US and Western policymakers, suggesting how best they

can employ new policies to deal with countries like Iran, UAE and the whole

of the Middle East. The primary intended audience, therefore, are the

American and Western governments, particularly the foreign policymakers

and key players in the formation of economic policy. The book presents

commerce as an alternative to deal with the menace of extremism, particularly

of the type emanating from and supported by Iran. The author believes that by

supporting the new business minded middle class, the US and its allies can

have a more effective intervention in the Middle East and other Muslim

regions while governing its own foreign policy.

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Nasr cautions that "We will do ourselves a disservice if we think of our future

with the Muslim world only in terms of today’s conflict. These conflicts are

serious, and we must prevail in them but we should also recognize that that

there are other forces at work in the Muslim world and that they too deserve

our attention - they may ultimately matter more to us” (p. 2).

One of the strengths of the book is its stress on learning new lessons from the

past. This is particularly impressive because it draws such lessons from past

political decisions and the results these decisions produced, juxtaposing them

with new hopes that would arise if decisions were altered. Nasr then focuses

on new possibilities that lay ahead and are within then realm of feasibility.

Forces of Fortune thus directly refers to changes in US foreign policy. An

example as explained in the book is that of past and present Iran-US relations.

Nasr notes that, for most of the past three decades, this relationship has been

frozen in stalemate, characterized by no diplomatic relations but also no direct

confrontations. Post 9/11, however, things appear to have changed. The Bush

administration, the author believes, attacked Iraq in the hope that it would not

only affect Iraq but also have a direct impact on Iran. This impact, however,

did not materialize. To the contrary, the results were the opposite of those

intended.

In the words of Vali Nasr, “they (referring to Cheney and Rumsfeld of the

Bush administration) believed the toppling of Saddam Hussein and the rise of

reasonably stable democratic new Iraq next door to Iran would stir Iranians

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into revolt and sufficiently unnerve the country’s clerical rulers to provide that

opening. The bitter irony was that when American troops showed up in Iraq,

the grip of the Iran’s ruling clerics was strengthened” (p.3).

In light of this development, the author observes that Iran became more

powerful and its power could be seen in its anti-American campaign, which

was now manifested in an article of faith not only in Iran but in most of the

Muslim world. Additionally the author sees Iran’s strength in other

developments such as Iran’s increased support to terrorism through funds,

training and weaponry, and also in its seeking increased power and status by

building its nuclear program.

The author further observes that the US, by attacking Taliban in Afghanistan

in 2001, and by toppling Saddam Hussein and uprooting Baathism in Iraq, has

fortified Iran’s power to its east and west, thus giving an unprecedented

position of power to Iran in the gulf region.

However, Nasr also notes that despite these powers that Iran has gained in

recent times, they have not been sufficient to change regional dynamics with

such hard political powers. Nasr quotes the examples of India, Brazil, and

China as countries that have emerged as new powers in the region, not

because of their nuclear assets or military grandeur but due to their

performance in economic reforms. In this context, the author sheds new light

on Iran’s position. Nasr classifies Iran as an isolated economy and believes

that its “hard power is not its most effective means to greater influence” (p. 6).

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What does make Iran influential, the author points out, is its trade ties in

central Asia, the Persian gulf, western Afghanistan, and southern Iraq where it

does business in agricultural products, electricity, natural gas and

manufactured goods. Such trade ties are more powerful to Iran than its

strategic and military ties with Hezbollah or its longstanding alliance with

Syria.

From these comparisons the author intends to suggest that the menace of Iran

cannot be corrected by looking to its strategic ties and political alliances, but

rather by calculating its economic strengths and trade ties within and outside

the region.

In yet another stark comparison, the author observes that Iran’s GDP is about

the same as that of Massachusetts. Its spending on its military is less than 6

billion dollars which is less than one third of similar spending by Saudi Arabia

and is close to half of Turkey’s or Israel’s military spending. With this

comparison the author raises a key question: How can a country with an

economy the size of Massachusetts and the lowest military expenditure in its

neighborhood take on the US and claim great power status?

According to Nasr’s book, Iran may think that its nuclear capability will help

it to take on US might and in fact, as the author notes, the US obsession with

Iran’s nuclear ambitions in the last few years has only convinced Iran that it

really will.

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To counter this belief, the author goes back to its example of India, comparing

it Pakistan, saying that both acquired nuclear power at almost the same time,

yet it is India which today is poised to hold the greatest power status. This, the

author concludes, is due to India’s economic growth and not its nuclear assets.

So in essence the author argues that the US and the West should also work

towards building trade and commerce relations with the emerging business

middle class in order to, one hand weaken Iran or at least control its power,

and on the other hand strengthen its relationship with the Muslim world by

forging economic alliances in the Muslim regions. emphasizing this point, the

author again cautions the West by saying that “the West must remain vigilant

against fundamentalism, but that must stop western policymakers and publics

from seeing the ‘whole picture’ in the Middle East, and the vital truth of the

region is that the fundamentalist strain of Islam is not practiced by the vast

majority of the population and is not on the rise” (p.10).

In order to show evidence that the Muslim world and particularly the Middle

East is a site of thriving economies and not the turmoil of conflict, the author

maps the business dynamics of the region. Describing the examples of

Lebanese banks with higher interest rates and less financial threats, Beirut’s

electronic markets and fashionable home furnishing shops clubbed with

Tehran’s shopping malls, some 280 television channels, and high per capita

use of internet and social media websites even by the clerics. More examples

include war-torn Afghanistan with 8 million mobile phones in use, and when

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considering Pakistan this number increased to 78 million in the same year,

2008, up from a mere 750,000 in 2001.

Nasr expands this list of examples to cover Dubai, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait and Bahrain to emphasize the new capitalism and economic growth

funded by new consumers of halal food, whose demands are constantly

increasing, banking services and financial services which are fueled by new

interests of the new middle class which looks for profit through pious ways.

Such pursuits of business piety, the author observes, in terms of Islamic

banking and sharia-compliant investments which are mushrooming across the

region. The notion of piety in entrepreneurial pursuits is therefore the very

engine that is driving the middle class in particular and the Muslim world in

general.

The linkage of piety and business is not only path breaking but is also thought

provoking. It is understandable that the Islamic Revolution, the effects of

which were far beyond the territory of Iran and then later the war on terror,

which was viewed by most Muslims as war on Islam, not only gave rise to a

sense of fear within the Muslim demography, this fear was also soon

manifested into an article of faith. The result was seen in increased Islamic

practice and adherence to Islamic vales within the Muslim community across

the world, and now, as shown by the thorough research of Nasr’s book, with

the new economic Muslim middle class and its offering of new Islamic,

sharia-compliant goods and services, this new form of economy backs a new

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form of emerging consumerism. The keys players of this economy are the

Muslims across the world and the keys consumers are the same Muslims who

form one fifth of the world’s population.

This argument has come across very strongly in the book and is supported by

empirical studies of the national economies and ethnographic studies.

In addition to arguing in favour of the emerging capitalism in the Muslim

world, the author has also proved a very strong historical analysis of events to

prove how and why the old secularism failed to achieve what the new

capitalism in the Muslim word is achieving.

Taking the examples of Atatürk of Turkey and Reza Shah Khan of

prerevolutionary Iran, the author recalls the history of reforms by these leaders

and how they failed to create stable and viable states. Nasr observes that

“Atatürk and Reza Shah Khan propelled their countries to modernity, and they

brought great advances, but the state driven style of development they

pioneered also led to great problems” (p.85) The author goes on to explain

that “overreliance on top-down economic decision-making led to patronage

states rather than robust capitalist economies” (p.85) Additionally the book

takes into account the amount of corruption and mismanagement that such

states brought as result of which only one class of elite became wealthy while

few economic incentives went to the majority of the masses.

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Nasr’s book is an excellent observation and comparison in the content of the

new emerging middle class that is representative of the Muslim demographics

of today and not just an elite segment of the population.

In sharp contrast to this secularism and its leaders was the Islamic Revolution

spearheaded by Khomeini. The book explains this phenomenon with deep

insight and analysis, which provides a unique picture of the revolution which

was predominantly supported by merchants, shopkeepers and traders.

Providing an insightful dynamics of the revolution, the author informs us of

“the alliance of the secular and the religious, the once Kemalist but now

disaffected middle class and the pious lower class masses that made the

revolution. The decisive factor was the willingness of so many of those in the

middle class to put their hatred of the monarchy above the longstanding social

divide that separated them from the religious lower class” (p.119).

With this reading of the demography the author goes on to shed light on a

fascinating irony that was at the very core of the Islamic Revolution. This

becomes clear as the author explains “the irony was that although the Iranian

Revolution could never have happened without the secular middle class, as it

gained steam, the middle class could not retain control; in the end they stood

no chance against the rising tide of Khomeini’s lower class supporters and

they would pay the high price for their ill conceived alliance. Blinded by their

hatred of the Pahlavis, they acted against their own interests, and with the

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Pahlavis gone, Khomeini and his followers would make short work of their

plans for themselves in the new government” (p.119).

Such an analysis of the middle class of the revolution that acted against its

own interests and its juxtaposition with the new emerging middle class of

today’s Iran and the whole of Muslim world makes this text an important text

both for the policymakers, governments and economists as well as students of

Middle Eastern affairs. But the historical analysis of the text makes it no less

interesting and relevant to students and lovers of the modern history of the

Muslim world.

Another aspect of the book looks at the dynamics of fundamentalism but does

so from an economic perspective. The author arguers that fundamentalism has

increased most in times of economic, political and social depression.

Whenever and wherever the general conditions of economics have shown

improvement, with better jobs and prospects of economic development, the

terrorism and its activities have lost ground. On the contrary, the author

observes, “the less commerce there is among the lower classes, and poorer the

society, the more appeal the revolutionaries will exert” (p.168). The evidence

of this argument is provided in the text with examples of extremist groups in

Egypt and Pakistan.

In yet another fascinating aspect the author makes a refreshingly hopeful

observation. Calling them “the prophets of change”, (p.176) the author looks

at the new era of the Muslim world and writes, “With the allure of the state,

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both secular and Islamic, having lost all its luster the Muslim world is

embracing something altogether different: pluralism”(p.176). The actors of

this pluralism, the author believes, are the new brand of “bloggers, rappers,

fashion designers, televangelists, human rights activists and self styled Islamic

gurus and thinkers of all stripes” (p.176). This band of pluralists is

“secularist in their mix but this is by and large an Islamic resurgence which

celebrates piety while rejecting violence and extremism” (p.176).

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