In the following instances, the Court reckoned it wise to liberally apply the

rules of procedure in order to achieve the substantial ends of justice, viz.:

!" #atters of life, liberty, honor or property$ %" counsel&s negligence
without any participatory negligence on the part of the client$ '" the
e(istence of special or co#pelling circu#stances$ )" the #erits of the
case$ *" a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules$ +" a lack of any showing that
the review sought is #erely frivolous and dilatory$ and ," the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. -'./
0ince the case below s1uarely falls within the above#entioned instances,
in that it involves deprivation of respondent bank&s property, not to
#ention that its 2nswer introduces a valid defense against petitioner&s
cause of action, and that the filing of the 2nswer will not unjustly prejudice
or delay the case, the C2 therefore did not co##it any error in annulling
the trial court&s decision, ordering the latter to ad#it the 2nswer, and to try
the case.
3ules of procedure are #ere tools intended to facilitate the attain#ent of
justice, rather than frustrate it. 2 strict and rigid application of the rules
#ust always be eschewed when it would subvert the pri#ary objective of
the rules, that is, to enhance fair trials and e(pedite justice. 4echnicalities
should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party.
5very party6litigant #ust be afforded the a#plest opportunity for the proper
and just deter#ination of his cause, free fro# the constraints of
technicalities.7 ([2005V1105] GUILLERMO DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, verss
!O"# DEODORO $# %I%O" &n' ME(ROPOLI(A" )A"* + (RU%( CO#
(ME(RO)A"*,, Res-on'ents#, G#R# "o# 1.2./., 2005 %e- 2/, 2n' Division,
8hile the rule that negligence of counsel binds the client #ay be rela(ed
where adherence thereto would result in outright deprivation of the client&s
liberty or property or where the interests of justice so re1uire ( ( (7
([2005V0] %OU(!EC! DEVELOPME"( CORP# &n'1or REMCOR &n'
RICARDO LU, Petitioners, verss "A(IO"AL LA)OR RELA(IO"%
COMMI%%IO" ((2ir' Division,, RODRIGO LAPEZ, %R# &n' RE3"ALDO
GAMU(A", Res-on'ents#, G#R# "o# 1.4540, 2005 $&n 12, 5r' Division,
8hile in the following circu#stances, this Court departed fro# the rule
that negligence of counsel generally binds the clients, to wit:
!" where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of
due process of law$
%" when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client9s
liberty or property$ or
'" where the interests of justice so re1uire,- 0arraga, 0r. v. :anco ;ilipino
0avings and <ortgage :ank, '=' 0C32 *++, *,) %..%"/
such e(ceptions are unavailing in the instant case. 2tty. Corteza&s
ine(cusable negligence did not a#ount to his client&s deprivation of due
process of law. 4he right to due process safeguards the opportunity to be
heard and to sub#it any evidence one #ay have in support of his clai# or
defense.- >el <ar v. Court of 2ppeals, ',= 0C32 %=*, '.) %..%"/ It cannot
be gainsaid that the re1uire#ents of due process were observed in the
instant case as petitioner was never deprived of his day in court as in fact
he was afforded every opportunity to be heard.7 ([200.V11.4] DIO"I%IO )#
AZUCE"A, Petitioner, verss 6OREIG" MA"PO7ER %ERVICE%, *#%#
*A%MI(O &n' 6OR(U"E LI6E + GE"ERAL A%%URA"CE CO#, I"C#
Res-on'ents#, G# R# "o# 1.0455, 200. O8t 25, 5r' Division,
2s a general rule, a client is bound by his counsel9s conduct, negligence,
and #istakes in handling the case during the trial ;ernandez vs. 4an 4ing
4ic, ! 0C32 !!'? -!=+!/$ 3ivera vs. @da. de Cruz, %+ 0C32 *? -!=+?/$ >on
Aino Butierrez C 0ons, Inc. vs. Court of 2ppeals, +! 0C32 ?, -!=,)/.
Dowever the rule ad#its e(ceptions. 2 new trial #ay be granted where the
inco#petency of counsel is so great that the defendant is prejudiced and
prevented fro# fairly presenting his defense Eeople vs. <anzanilla, )'
Ehil. !+, -!=%%/$ !+ C.F. !!)*$ %) C.F.0. +?". 8here a case is not tried on the
#erits because of the negligence of counsel rather than the plaintiff, the
case #ay be dis#issed but, in the interest of justice, without prejudice to
the filing of a new action >e Aos 3eyes vs. Capule, !.% Ehil. )+) -!=*,/.
Clearly, petitioner was deprived of her right to present and prove her
defense due to the negligence of her counsel. 4he appearance of a certain
2tty. :uen Ga#ar is of no co##ent as there was no client6attorney
relationship between hi# and petitioner who did not engage his services to
represent her is said cases. 4he fact that notices of the pro#ulgation of
judg#ent were sent to petitioner at her address of record produced no
legal conse1uence because notice to a party is not effective notice in law
5lli vs. >itan, * 0C32 *.' -!=+%/$ <ata vs. 3ita Aegarda, Inc. , 0C32 %%,
-!=+'/".
8e rule, therefore, that under the facts of the case, petitioner was deprived
of due process of law. It is the better part of judicial wisdo# and prudence
to accord the petitioner the opportunity to prove her defense. It is
abhorrent to the judicial conscience to consign petitioner to the ordeals of
i#prison#ent without affording her full opportunity to present her
evidence including, of course, the assistance of co#petent counselling.7
([1445V255] ROMI"A M# %UAREZ, -etitioner, vs# (!E COUR( O6 APPEAL%,
PRE%IDI"G $UDGE O6 (!E REGIO"AL (RIAL COUR(, )RA"C! L9I,
A"GELE% CI(3, res-on'ents#, G#R# "o# 41155, 1445 M&r 22, 5r' Division,
Eetitioners thus filed a <otion for Aeave to 0uspend the 3ules and to
2d#it the 2ttached 0econd <otion for 3econsideration.-!?/ In a 3esolution
dated <ay *, %..!, we held that petitioners& failure to file a #otion for
reconsideration or to appeal the order of the trial court dated Hove#ber %,,
!==? was due to the negligence of their for#er counsel which #ay result in
their deprivation of property without due process of law. Dence, following a
liberal application of the rules, we resolved to reinstate the petition and
re1uire respondents to co##ent thereon.-!=/
3espondents failed to file their co##ent despite service of the above
3esolution on their respective counsel of record on <arch %., %..!-%./ and
<arch !*, %..!.-%!/ Dence, private respondents were dee#ed to have
waived the filing of their Co##ent.
Eetitioners argue that their counsel of record, without their knowledge and
consent, agreed to sub#it the case for decision without presenting their
evidence. ;urther#ore, their counsel failed to notify the# of the order
dated Hove#ber %,, !==?. 4hey only learned of the said order four #onths
later, after which they filed a petition for relief therefro#. Dowever, the trial
court reckoned the date of notice of the order fro# the receipt of a copy
thereof by petitioners& counsel on >ece#ber !+, !==?. 2ccordingly, the trial
court denied the petition for relief.
Eetitioners further argue that the Court of 2ppeals erred in dis#issing their
petition for certiorari on purely technical grounds, arguing that the
technical defects should not be allowed to override the pri#ordial and
issues raised and the substantive rights involved.
8hile it is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client, this rule
is not without e(ception. In cases where reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law,- Aegarda v. Court of
2ppeals, !=* 0C32 )!?, )%,6)%? -!==!// or when its application will result
in outright deprivation of the client&s liberty or property or where the
interests of justice so re1uire, relief is accorded to the client who suffered
by reason of the lawyer&s gross or palpable #istake or negligence.- 2guilar
v. Court of 2ppeals, %*. 0C32 ',!, ',)6',* -!==*//
In the recent case of 2pe( <ining, Inc. v. Court of 2ppeals, '!= 0C32 )*+
-!===/ we ruled:
If the inco#petence, ignorance or ine(perience of counsel is so great and
the error co##itted as a result thereof is so serious that the client, who
otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and denied his day in court, the
litigation #ay be reopened to give the client another chance to present his
case. 0i#ilarly, when an unsuccessful party has been prevented fro# fully
and fairly presenting his case as a result of his lawyer&s professional
delin1uency or infidelity the litigation #ay be reopened to allow the party to
present his side. 8here counsel is guilty of gross ignorance, negligence
and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client&s being held liable for
da#ages in a da#age suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the
judg#ent #ay be set aside on such ground.
In view of the foregoing circu#stances, higher interests of justice and
e1uity de#and that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their
defense. Eetitioners #ay not be #ade suffer for the lawyer&s #istakes and
should be afforded another opportunity, at least, to introduce evidence on
their behalf. 4o cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone
rather than rectify a serious injustice to a party whose only fault was to
repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers.-%*/
It cannot even be said that petitioners were re#iss in not apprising
the#selves of the status of their case. Daving engaged the services of
counsel, they had justifiable reason to e(pect that their interests in the
case will be a#ply protected.
2 client #ay reasonably e(pect that his counsel will #ake good his
representations and has the right to e(pect that his lawyer will protect his
interests during the trial of his case. ;or the general e#ploy#ent of an
attorney to prosecute or defend a case or proceeding ordinarily vests in a
plaintiff&s attorney the i#plied authority to take all steps or do all acts
necessary or incidental to the regular and orderly prosecution and
#anage#ent of the suit, and in a defendant&s attorney, the power to take
such steps as he dee#s necessary to defend the suit and protect the
interests of the defendant.-%+/
Indeed, the funda#ental purpose of procedural rules is to afford each
litigant every opportunity to present evidence in their behalf in order that
substantial justice is achieved. Court litigations are pri#arily for the search
of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are
given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out
such truth. 4he dispensation of justice and vindication of legiti#ate
grievances should not be barred by technicalities.- 2brajano v. Court of
2ppeals, ')' 0C32 +?, ?+ -%.../$ Eeople v. 5bias, ')% 0C32 +,*, +=.
-%...//
Dence, in cases where a party was denied this right, we have rela(ed the
stringent application of procedural rules in order to allow a party the
chance to be heard. 4his policy applies with e1ual force in case of appeals.
It has been consistently held that the dis#issal of appeals on purely
technical grounds is frowned upon.
((( ((( (((, Idis#issal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned
upon and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override,
substantial justice, and thereby defeat their very ai#s.I @erily, this Court, in
the e(ercise of its e1uity jurisdiction, #ay even stay the dis#issal of
appeals grounded #erely on technicalities, especially in this case where
petitioners& appeal appears pri#a facie worthy of the C2&s full
consideration on the #erits.- Eiglas6Ja#ao 0ari60ari Chapter", et al. v.
HA3C, B.3. Ho. !'?**+, <ay =, %..!$ Cusi6Dernandez v. >iaz, et al., ''+
0C32 !!', !%. -%.../$ Eacific Aife 2ssurance Corporation v. 0ison, %==
0C32 !+, %% -!==?//
In the case at bar, there e(ist cogent reasons to apply the foregoing
principles. Eetitioners were deprived of their right to present evidence at
the trial proper through the gross and palpable #istake of their lawyer, who
agreed to a sub#ission of the case for decision without fully substantiating
their defense. In addition, petitioners were deprived of their right to appeal
the adverse order of the trial court when their lawyer failed to pro#ptly
notify the# of the sa#e, to enable the# to #ove for reconsideration or
appeal in due course. 4hus, the rela(ation of the strict application of
technical rules is warranted. Aabad v. Kniversity of 0outheastern
Ehilippines, et al., B.3. Ho. !'=++*, 2ugust =, %..!7 (DORO(EO %ALAZAR
&n' DOZE" CO"%(RUC(IO" A"D DEVELOPME"( CORPORA(IO",
-etitioners, vs# COUR( O6 APPEAL%, 6or:er %event2 Division, !O"#
)E"IG"O G# GAVIOLA, Presi'in; $';e o< t2e Re;ion&= (ri&= Cort o< Ce>
Cit?, )r&n82 4, %O6IA REPO"(E, MARCO% LA(ORZA, A)U"DIO REPO"(E,
$A"UARIO REPO"(E, !EIR% O6 GUILLERMO "AVARRO, !EIR% O6
MIGUEL REPO"(E, !EIR% O6 MAR(A PADA3AO &n' 6ELICIDAD %UARI"G,
res-on'ents#2002 6e> /1st DivisionG#R# "o# 1.2420"EGLIGE"CE O6
COU"%EL,
4he doctrinal rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client.
- <acondray C Co., Inc. v. Erovident Insurance Corporation, B.3. Ho.
!*)'.*, >ece#ber =, %..), ))* 0C32 +)), +*)/ Ltherwise, there would be
no end to a suit so long as a new counsel could be e#ployed who would
allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent,
e(perienced, or learned.- 0aint Aouis Kniversity v. Cordero, B.3. Ho.
!))!!?, Fuly %!, %..), )') 0C32 *,*, *?)/
Dowever, this rule ad#its certain e(ceptions, such as: !" where reckless
or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law$
%" when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client&s
liberty or property$ or '" where the interests of justice so re1uire.- 0arraga,
0r. v. :anco ;ilipino 0avings and <ortgage :ank, ))% Ehil. **, +) %..%"/
Indeed, there have been instances when this court had accorded relief to
the client who suffered by reason of their lawyer&s gross or palpable
#istake or negligence.- 2E5M <ining, Inc. v. Court of 2ppeals, ',, Ehil.
)?%, )=*6)=+ !==="/ 4he instant case does not fall under any of the
e(ceptions.
4he essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to
be heard and to sub#it any evidence one #ay have in support of one&s
defense. 8here the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal
argu#ents or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can present its side7
or defend its interest in due course7, there is no denial of procedural due
process.- 2ir Ehilippines Corporation v. International :usiness 2viation
0ervices Ehils., Inc., B.3. Ho. !*!=+', 0epte#ber =, %..), )'? 0C32 *!, ++6
+,/
In the case at bar, while petitioners& for#er counsel failed to file an answer
to the co#plaint filed by Knion :ank, however, he seasonably filed a notice
of appeal fro# the decision of the trial court. Knder the 3ules of Court, in
ordinary appealed cases to the Court of 2ppeals, the appellant #ay include
in his assign#ent of errors any 1uestion of law and fact that has been
raised in the court below and which is within the issues fra#ed by the
parties.- 0ection !*, 3ule )) of the 3ules of Court/ Eetitioners were thus
afforded the chance to raise their defenses as the case is opened for
co#prehensive review by the appellate court.
In @ictory Ainer, Inc. v. Ba##ad, B.3. Ho. !*=+'+, Hove#ber %*, %..), )))
0C32 '**, we held that:
... -4/o sustain petitioner&s argu#ents that it was denied due process of law
due to negligence of its counsel would set a dangerous precedent. It
would enable every party to render inutile any adverse order or decision
through the si#ple e(pedient of alleging gross negligence on the part of its
counsel. 4he Court will not countenance such a farce which contradicts
long6settled doctrines of trial and procedure.- Id. at '+)6'+*/
8e find no reason to depart fro# this ruling. :esides, there is no
co#pelling reason to rela( the rules in favor of petitioners, who are not
entirely bla#eless. Eetitioners should have taken a #ore active role in the
proceedings of the case against the#. Aitigants represented by counsel
should not e(pect that all they need to do is sit back, rela( and await the
outco#e of their case.- <acondray C Co., Inc. v. Erovident Insurance
Corporation, supra at +*)/7 (%P%# 7ILLIAM G# 6RIE"D &n' MARIA RE"EE
6RIE"D &n' $O!" DOE, Petitioners, verss U"IO" )A"* O6 (!E
P!ILIPPI"E%, Res-on'ent#2005 "ov 241st DivisionG#R# "o# 1/50/0,