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Petitioner cecilio De Villa was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner moved to dismiss the information on the following grounds: no offense was committed. A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the RTC ruling was filed by the petitioner in The Court of Appeals.
Petitioner cecilio De Villa was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner moved to dismiss the information on the following grounds: no offense was committed. A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the RTC ruling was filed by the petitioner in The Court of Appeals.
Petitioner cecilio De Villa was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner moved to dismiss the information on the following grounds: no offense was committed. A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the RTC ruling was filed by the petitioner in The Court of Appeals.
[P]etitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondent court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense was committed since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligation created is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure Uniform Value of Philippine Coin and Currency). A petition for certiorari seeking to declare the nullity of the RTC ruling was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition with costs against the petitioner. A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals, thus elevated to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not: (1) The Regional Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case; and, (2) The check in question, drawn against the dollar account of petitioner with a foreign bank, is covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22).
HELD: YES on both cases. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. For the first issue: The trial courts jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be questioned, as Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide. The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati, Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action (Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).
For the second issue: Exception in the Statute. It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courts should not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]). The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of the then Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view.
People vs. Echavez G.R. Nos. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980
FACTS:
Petitioner Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. Before the accused could be arraigned, respondent Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five informations (out of 16 raffled) on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through stealth and strategy, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 772 which penalizes squatting and similar acts, (also) apply to agricultural lands.
HELD:
NO. Appeal was devoid of merit.Trial courts dismissal was affirmed.
RATIO:
[T]he lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.
The rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.
Buenaseda vs. Flavier G.R. No. 106719. September 21, 1993
FACTS:
The petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman directing the preventive suspension of petitioners Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda et.al. The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Supreme Court required respondent Secretary to comply with the aforestated status quo order. The Solicitor General, in his comment, stated that (a) The authority of the Ombudsman is only to recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend; and (b) Assuming the Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been met in the instant case
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.
HELD:
YES. Petition was dismissed, status quo lifted and set aside.
RATIO:
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power to recommend the suspension of a public official or employees (Sec. 13 *3+), it referred to suspension, as a punitive measure. All the words associated with the word suspension in said provision referred to penalties in administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, the word suspension should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.
ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC G.R. No. 109902. August 02, 1994
FACTS:
Petitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. The complaints were consolidated and after hearing, the Labor Arbiter declared petitioners regular project employees who shall continue their employment as such for as long as such *project+ activity exists, but entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. It also ordered payment of salary differentials.
The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiters decision. It affirmed the Labor Arbiters holding that petitioners were project employees since they were hired to perform work in a specific undertaking the Five Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had been determined at the time of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the business of steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.
The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that they are regular employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are necessary, desirable and work-related to private respondents main business, steel-making; and (ii) they have rendered service for six (6) or more years to private respondent NSC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are considered permanent employees as opposed to being only project employees of NSC.
HELD:
NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolutions affirmed.
RATIO:
Function of the proviso. Petitioners are not considered permanent employees. However, contrary to petitioners apprehensions, the designation of named employees as project employees and their assignment to a specific project are effected and implemented in good faith, and not merely as a means of evading otherwise applicable requirements of labor laws.
On the claim that petitioners service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as regular employees, the Supreme Court believed this claim is without legal basis. The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as project employees. The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code, quoted above, providing that an employee who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to project employees.
Geotina vs Court of Tax Appeals G.R. No. L-33500 August 30, 1971
FACTS: Petitioner is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. On December 22, 1970, the vessel M/V "Mindanao Sea" arrived at the Port of Manila carrying 37,042 cartons fresh apples consigned to herein petitioner. After payment of the taxes and duties on the portion of the shipment consisting of 10,000 cartons of fresh apples covered by Bills of Lading Nos. PM-1, PM-2, PM-3 and PM-4, the necessary transfer permits were issued by the Collector of Customs of Manila. While this portion of the importation was being unloaded from the carrying vessel and transported to the designated cold storage house, the Collector of Customs, on December 22, 1970, issued warrants of seizure and detention (S.I. Nos. 11993 to 11996) ordering the seizure of a portion of the goods already unloaded and their detention for allegedly having been imported in violation of Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295, in relation to Section 2530 (f) of the Tariff and Customs Code "pending termination of the seizure proceedings thereof and/or until further orders."
ISSUE: Whether or not the fresh apples in question are "articles of prohibited importation.
HELD:
Pangilinan vs Alvendia G.R. No. L-10690 , June 28, 1957
FACTS: Petitioners Apolonio Pangilinan, Mariano Bundalian, Miguel Galang, and Valentin Santos are tenants of respondents Felisa Alvendia in barrios San Nicolas and Sto. Cristo, Florida Blanca, Pampanga, under tenancy contracts executed on July 17, 1953 (Exhibits A, B, C, and D). On July 27, 1954, respondent Alvendia filed a petition in the Court of Industrial Relations for the ejectment of petitioners on the ground that for the agricultural years 1953-54 and 1954-55, they did not personally perform the principal work of plowing and harrowing on their respective landholdings, but entrusted said work to other persons, notwithstanding repeated demands by respondent that they do the farm work themselves. Petitioners in their answer, denied respondent's claims, and alleged that they were the ones working the land although at times, they were helped by their children and sons-in-law; and that respondent filed the ejectment action against them because they refused to sign tenancy contracts with her on the 45-55 sharing basis and insisted on a 70-30 sharing basis.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners violated the law and their tenancy contracts in entrusting their farm work to such relatives.
HELD: No. Republic Act 1199 defines "tenant" as:. . . a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purpose of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system; While "immediate farm household," according to the same Act, includes:. . . the members of the family of the tenant, and such other person or persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him operate the farm enterprise. Under the above definition of "tenant" given by Republic Act 1199, petitioners were within their legal rights in asking assistance in their farm work from their sons-in-law or grandsons. Such relatives fall within the phrase "the members of the family of the tenant"; and the law does not require that these members of the tenant's family be dependent on him for support, such qualification being applicable only to "such other person or persons, whether related to the tenant or not", whom, as they are "dependent upon him for support" and usually help him operate the frame enterprise", the law considers also part of the tenant's immediate household.
Amadora vs. CA GR No. L47745, April 15, 1988
Facts: Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. While they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a classmate, Pablito Damon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped. After trial, the CIF of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs. On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely absolved.
Issue: Whether or not teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for the death of Alfredo Amadora.
Ruling: The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question (Art. 2180) should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic.
Following the canon of reddendo singular singuli, where the school is academic, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student. This is the general rule. Reason: Old academic schools, the heads just supervise the teachers who are the ones directly involved with the students.
Where the school is for arts and trades, it is the head and only he who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. Reason: Old schools of arts and trades saw the masters or heads of the school personally and directly instructed the apprentices.
Therefore, the heads are not liable. The teacher-in-charge is not also liable because theres no showing that he was negligent in enforcing discipline against the accused or that he waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school, or condoned their non-observance. Also, the fact that he wasnt present cant be considered against him because he wasnt required to report on that day. Classes had already ceased.