Valhall Corrosion Events and Management

Learning Pack
Eldar Larsen, Head of Operations, BP Norway.
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Valhall Corrosion Events - Summary
Summary
Hydrocarbon leak HIPO on 6th March 2009 caused by Microbial Induced Corrosion
(MIC)
resulted in crude and gas leak, First Aid Incident, emergency plant shutdown &
muster.
Valhall eventually shutdown for 10 weeks for corrosion inspection and repairs.
during which three further incidences of MIC and 44 anomalies identified.
Major Lessons
Behaviours of MIC were misunderstood
Areas of high flow rate were previously thought unlikely to experience MIC, this
assumption failed to identify internal pipe work scaling can provide environment for
MIC activity.
Inadequate application of hazard Recognition, risk awareness and control of work.
The initial inspection routine was inappropriate and directly led to exposure of the
individual and the resultant FAI.
15 specific improvement opportunities identified as a result of the incident and plant
investigations (7 organisational, 5 work process and 3 performance management).
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Microbial Induced Corrosion
What is MIC?
MIC is Microbial Induced Corrosion.
MIC of carbon steel typically manifests itself as localised corrosion or pitting attack following the
development of a surface biofilm.
The anaerobic environments of oil and water transport pipework often support the growth of biofilms,
which almost invariably contain sulphate-reducing bacteria (SRB), a major cause of MIC.
SRB containing biofilms generate H2S.
H2S results in formation of Iron sulphide within the biofilm.
Iron sulphides are cathodic to bare steel and can have the effect of greatly increasing corrosion at
anodic sites.
Why does MIC occur?
MIC can occur in all systems that contain water with SRBs.
Prediction of corrosion rates attributed to MIC is unreliable
uncertainty of the onset of localized corrosion/pitting ,whether it proceeds at a constant rate.
Parameters that can influence MIC include pH, temperature, nutrition, velocity of fluids, presence of
deposits.
MIC is more likely to occur at locations with low fluid velocity such as in dead legs, under deposits,
scale.
All metals are susceptible to MIC. Carbon steels have generally been found to be most susceptible.
MIC mitigation relies on effective biocide dosing regimes.
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Reference - Valhall Timeline
1982
Valhall start
production,
Incl. Jet
washing
separators
using sea-
water. By
mid-90s
using mainly
produced
water
1998
New Metering
Skid installed.
Small bore
pipe work not
commissioned
in Workmate
1999
RBI Analysis
performed
MIC internal
corrosion not
sufficiently
identified as a
threat.
2000
Inspection
scheme
constructed
which
identified
external
inspection of
Liquids
metering
package as a
whole
2004-2006
Chemical
cleaning of
fast loop to
aid
calibration
due to scale
build up
Ongoing
Biocide
treatment of
Sulphate
Reducing
Bacteria
(SRB) on
Produced
Water (PW)
system
ongoing and
working
2007
SRBs in 2nd
stage separator
0-460/ml
Sept 2007
Cor. Mngt. Health
Check: Valhall
Prod. Water
Sulfate Reducing
Bacteria (SRB)
contamination as
a high risk and
recommends a
microbial audit by
microbial
specialist
06.Mar.2009
Leak in 1
pipe fast
loop
HIPO
02.Apr.2009
Upstream
skimmed oil
tank
17.Apr.2009
Leak in 6
prod. water
pipe
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Reference - Valhall Timeline
Events and response:
6th March 2009 Metering fast loop (F&G ESD).
Limited awareness of MIC, deemed low probability. Limited spot checking by X-ray outside the
fast loop. No SD justified by residual corrosion risk. No additional resources.
2nd April 2009 T-337 pressure increase (No ESD).
Start up after a compressor incident increased flare backpressure which burst a MIC in the
produced water system.
15 days (6 + 9) shutdown looking for MIC with Eddy current and X-ray w. crew of 3.
17th April 2009 6 produced water pipe (No ESD).
Restart attempt failed when a MIC burst in the prod. water system. Had been inspected in very
close vicinity. Increasing realization of the criticality of adequate inspection rigour.
10 days shutdown, 100% inspection of prod. water system by Eddy current and X-ray, extended
risk based approach. Increased offshore resources.
27th April 2009 Condensate return to prod. water system. (F&G ESD).
Pipe burst during start up attempt. Contained highly volatile condensate.
Realized technology gap. Changed to SLOFEC scanning successfully.
30+ team offshore. Task force onshore. True 100% inspection beyond produced water. RIB
revision.
1st June 2009 Successful restart.
10 weeks of production loss and serious HSE incidents.
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Valhall Corrosion Event (March 6
th
2009)
Summary of first event.
A seep or sweating leak observed coming from
an insulated 1 carbon steel pipe was prepared
for inspection following removal of the insulation.
The pipe was on the crude export metering skid
and contained a mixture of crude oil and gas at
25 bar pressure.
On removal of insulation, the leak was observed
not to originate from the flange as originally
expected.
An inspector examining the pipe initially used a
blade to scrape off paint at the leak site.
During a later visit, the inspector touched the
leak site with his finger and was sprayed in the
face with oil under pressure.
During hydrocarbon release, the hole enlarged to
10mm diameter.
Valhall went to full Emergency Shutdown and
muster.
Hydrocarbon leak on metering skid First Aid Incident Emergency Plant Shutdown
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Inherent Design
Plant Layout
Control, Alarm &
Shutdown system
Inspection (RBI) and
Corrosion Management
practices failed to identify and
mitigate the internal corrosion
threat/risk that led to the failure
RBI assessment not updated
to reflect changes to operating
and/or process conditions
Maintenance
& Inspection
Learning from
the Past
Actions from
2007/2008 Health
Checks to improve
Biocide treatment
and to conduct
Microbial survey not
completed
Force Inspection
procedures
inconsistent with
requirements of HSE
Directive for visual
inspection
Operations
Procedures
Inspection Engineer
delegated inspection task to
NDT Technician.
Effective
Supervision /
Leadership
Training &
Competency
Failure to
follow CoW
and RBI
procedures
Work Control
Inadequate Hazard Recognition and
Risk Awareness job treated as
routine and Level 2 work permit.
CoW - Failure to isolate energy
source prior to work
CoW - Failure to comply with
requirements for Visual Inspection
Support to Next
of Kin & Injured
Relief and
Blowdown
system
Audit & Self
Regulation
No apparent MoC for chemical
treatment of Fast Loop line.
1 line not identified on risk-
based inspection schedule
Management
of Change
Active & Passive
Fire Protection
Escape /
Access
Rescue &
Recovery
HAZARD
Hydrocarbon
Inventory at
25bar in Fast
Loop line
Investigation &
Lessons Learned
HAZARD
REALISATION
Loss of
containment
First Aid injury
& HiPo
Hazard Barrier Diagram
Heirarchy of control Bias towards hardware/inherent safety & reducing the scope for human error multi barrier defence
Four Point Check
not used.
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Valhall Corrosion Event (April 2
nd
2009)
Summary of second event.
A leak in the Produced Water System followed
a gas compression upset. Area isolated &
upstream vessel drained.
25mm hole found in drain line.
Areas of low flow and dead-legs were identified
and inspected. 6 further MIC incidents
observed.
Investigation initiated to ensure appropriate
analysis and response prior to restart.
Management verification of process mitigations
and corrosion mapping & repair effort.
Targeted inspected discovers further incidence of MIC
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Valhall MIC Response
The third event: Defining the Scope of Work
Produced Water identified as being the main
host of Sulphate Reducing Bacterias (SRBs)
Considered potential contamination of other
systems vs HC leak risks.
Scope agreed by Ops, Process TA, Corrosion
Mgmt TA, Inspection & CM Contractor.
Produced Water System was 100% inspected.
Risk Based Hotspot Execution Water wetted
surfaces eg Low spots, Sumps, Deadlegs etc.
Waste injection on drilling platform (DP).
Well systems, confined to slurry lines.
Crude Oil processing including the
metering system.
Closed Drains System.
Oil Return from PW Flash Drum to Oil Return
tank
Orientation of defect; 9 oclock position on vertical
pipe
Unpredicted nature and location of corrosion required a new approach to
immediate reaction inspection.
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Leak in 6produced water high flow
pipework
A 8 mm hole was discovered during
preparation for plant restart following
inspection program triggered two gas
detectors & ESD.
Critical Factor 1
Microbial induced Corrosion (MiC)
mechanism in the produced water
system
Critical Factor 2
Inspection (RBI) and Corrosion
Management practices failed to identify
the corrosion risk in high level, high flow
pipework
Targeted inspected discovers further incidence of MIC in high flow pipework
Valhall Corrosion Event.
Summary of forth event.
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Valhall MIC project Inspection
Extensive inspection effort required to execute
identified scope 30+strong team.
SLOFEC technology used
Priority 1 scope Identified 44 anomalies
23 MIC Related
21 Non-MIC-related
19 spools replaced, 5 temporarily repaired & 20
scheduled for ongoing inspection following start-up
Assurance processes followed by No go/Go
verification reviews
Priority 2 inspection scope identified for post start up
inspection.
No. 10 T-337 Flange corrosion
Following fresh focussed risk assessment an intense and prioritised
inspection programme was initiated.
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Lessons Learnt
Direct cause
Cross contamination of oil production system with SRB via the produced water
system.
Inadequate awareness, inspection and mitigation as analysis did not identify oil
system as at risk from SRB corrosion.
Insufficient chemical injection (such as biocide and corrosion inhibitor) and
sampling and analysis to control microbial activity.
As a result MIC occurred within oil systems.
Underlying causes
Improvement opportunities identified within:
Organization (7 subcategories with recommendations)
Work Processes (5 subcategories with recommendations)
Performance Management (3 subcategories with recommendations)