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DOI: 10.1177/097542531200300111
2012 3: 203 Environment and Urbanization Asia
Abhay Pethe, Sahil Gandhi, Vaidehi Tandel and Sirus Libeiro
Using IAD Framework
Anatomy of Ownership and Management of Public Land in Mumbai : Setting an Agenda

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Anatomy of Ownership
and Management of
Public Land in Mumbai
Setting an Agenda Using
IAD Framework
Abhay Pethe, Sahil Gandhi,
Vaidehi Tandel and Sirus Libeiro
Abstract
Mumbai is facing significant challenges in terms of infrastructure deficit and paucity of land owing to its
mismanagement and stringent regulations. These problems could be resolvedthrough policy tweaks
if public organizations that own land, managed these assets efficiently. This would not only augment
the effective land supply in the city, but would also enable public organizations to unlock the poten-
tial value of their land assets. This could help in financing infrastructure projects. The first step in
realizing the locked values of public land would be an understanding of the extant situation of Public
Land in Mumbai which suffers from several deficiencies: ambiguity in land ownership, inefficient utiliza-
tion, unauthorized settlements, and rent seeking, which cumulatively distort land markets. This article
attempts to deconstruct the situation of Ownership and Management Public Land in Mumbai using the
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework in order to clarify the underlying institutions
that work in tandem to influence the outcomes and suggest an agenda for further research.
Keywords
Mumbai (India), urban land markets, public land, governance, institutional analysis and development
framework
Introduction
In Mumbai almost every second person in the city resides in slums (Pethe, 2012). The increase in
Mumbais population is being absorbed by the slums (Annez et al. 2010: 12), which is an indicator that
the formal land markets in Mumbai are unresponsive to the increasing demand for housing. This unre-
sponsiveness arises not just from the natural constraints surrounding the available land mass but also the
stringent regulations and processes involved in the use of public land. These factors have resulted in
severe distortions in land markets and high land values which in turn have inevitably resulted in reorga-
nizations and contestations among the various actors within the land markets in Mumbai (Pethe, 2010a;
Whitehead and More, 2007; Weinstein, 2008; Zrah, 2007). Among these various actors, the State is a
Article
Environment and Urbanization ASIA
3(1) 203220
2012 National Institute
of Urban Affairs (NIUA)
SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London,
New Delhi, Singapore,
Washington DC
DOI: 10.1177/097542531200300111
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204 Abhay Pethe, Sahil Gandhi, Vaidehi Tandel and Sirus Libeiro
Environment and Urbanization ASIA, 3, 1 (2012): 203220
dominant player and is in a position to directly as well as indirectly impact the functioning of land mar-
kets. The role of different public organizations as owners of land potentially enables them to directly
intervene in land markets and exploit the economic value of their land assets. All of this has prompted
this article on the Ownership and Management of Public Land (henceforth OMPL)
1
in Mumbai as an
initial response in setting an agenda to study urban land markets in Mumbai.
Rajack (2009), in a cross-country study, finds that better management of public land bears positive
relationship to land market outcomes. His analysis finds a correlation between limited or no land bank-
ing with better land market outcomes. Although Rajacks findings are tentative, for the purpose of this
article, it will not be erroneous to assumegiven the substantive evidencethat the extant OMPL in
Mumbai hinders the responsiveness of the land market and thus affects land market outcomes.
OMPL in Mumbai is a complex subject involving several actorspublic and privateas well as a
plethora of formal and informal institutions. The public actors involved in the land market in Mumbai
belong to all the three tiers of the federal set-up.
2
The public actors in Mumbais land market include the
State and Central governments, their parastatals, and the local government-Municipal Corporation of
Greater Mumbai (MCGM). The relationshipsfunctional, financial, and politicalbetween the three
tiers of the federal setup also implicitly dictates the interactions at the horizontal levelbetween central
parastatals, state parastatals and MCGMthereby affecting the management of public land in the city.
The divergence between market forces that have marginalized large sections of the population from for-
mal land markets, coupled with substantial unutilized public land have opened up spaces for public
actors to collude with real estate interest groups as well as enter into informal arrangements with slum-
lords. Instances of valuable land being kept outside the market further add to the paucity of land.
3
Such
exclusion of vast tracts of land from the formal markets not only leads to an artificial scarcity of land but
also results in failure to capitalize on the realizable value of this land.
Land asset management and its appropriate leveraging could provide impetus to funding large scale
infrastructure projects
4
in the city as well as provide relief to the fund starved public organizations oper-
ating in Mumbai. In a one-off instance, the financial gain made by the MMRDA by leveraging the
Bandra Kurla Complex area is an apt example of asset management strategies (Peterson, 2009: 9095;
McKinsey, 2010: 23) that have successfully unlocked and extracted land values to fund infrastructure
projects. Of course this was done by outright sale of land, which may not be an optimal method since
land eventually gets exhausted and the question of sustainability of organizational future has to be faced.
It must be noted that, this article is not primarily concerned with alternative means of or various routes
to unlock these land values. However, keeping effective land management as the goal, it aims, as a first
step, to deconstruct the situation into its different aspects and provide clarity on the complex nature of
OMPL that exists in Mumbai today. This article hopes to set the ground for further and more in-depth
analysis of the relationships between various actors, the rules in play and the resulting interactions.
The first step would be to attain a substantial understanding of the extant situation, with all the actors
involved and their respective incentives laid down in a systematic manner. These complexities need to
be deconstructed with analytical tools that would enrich our understanding of the problematic as well as
provide clarity for prescribing reforms. One such analytical frameworkwhich the article usesis the
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed by Elinor Ostrom and her
colleagues.
5

The article comprises seven sections including this introduction. The second section provides an over-
view of urban land markets in Mumbai. The third section discusses the situation of ownership and man-
agement of public land in Mumbai. The fourth section provides a primer on the IAD framework. The
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Setting an Agenda Using IAD Framework 205
Environment and Urbanization ASIA, 3, 1 (2012): 203220
fifth section analyzes the OMPL in Mumbai within the IAD framework. The sixth section outlines the
implications of the analysis and the seventh section concludes.
Urban Land Markets in Mumbai
The supply of land in any city is a function of its land mass and state policies that govern land use
(Satterthwaite, 2009: 299300) with the implied allowable floor space. Given the fact that Mumbai is
located on a narrow peninsular strip, the land mass poses a natural, topographical constraint for the citys
overall land supply. The scarcity of land supply in Mumbai is further exacerbated by artificial restric-
tions on development owing to rigid Floor Space Index (FSI) regulations (Bertaud, 2004, 2008, 2010).

Besides FSI, land use and development in Mumbai is also regulated by the several Development Control
Regulations (DCRs).
6
While the FSI has remained rigid, DCRs have been amendedoften to serve the
interests of the politicians and private developers, as is evidenced from the case of DCR 58 (c.f. Pethe,
2010b, Weinstein and Ren, 2009).
These constraints in the supply of land have resulted in soaring real estate prices which has adversely
affected the land markets. Pethe (2010a, 2010b) postulates that for land markets to work efficiently, they
must be aware of and in consonance with three essential economic principles(i) the one price also the
no arbitrage principle, (ii) the intrinsic equilibrating relation between stocks and flows and (iii) the
goodness of law supplemented by the epsilon truthfulness. The one price principle, in the context of
land markets, implies adjusting FSI policy to changing demand and also calls for incentive compatible
implementation and regulatory regimes that would eliminate the possibility of arbitrage gains. However,
housing policies in Mumbai lead to a violation of the equilibrating principle between stock and flow, that
is, the market value of the dwelling, and the household beneficiaries incomes (with the liability of ra-
tional property tax (say), open up spaces for arbitrage gains to be made (Gandhi, 2012). The goodness of
law principle which is concerned with the incentive compatibility of any policy and contract design,
appears to be completely neglected by the policies and regulations pertaining to land markets in Mumbai.
The last is true about other things like political expenditure laws that invariably impinge on land mat-
ters. Thus Mumbais land markets fail to adhere to the economic principles, resulting in severe distor-
tions which perpetrate rent seeking practices and exclude large sections of the population from formal
housing (Gandhi, 2012) and thus formal land markets.
The above conjuncture has led to the exclusion of a large (poor and vulnerable) section of the society,
giving way to a thriving informal housing market through arrangements with various agents and agen-
cies (including political). Informal housingor slumsis characterized by absence of de jure property
rights, informal payments and enforcement, and a slumlord-politician nexus. Attempts to include the
marginalized sections within formal housing by incentivizing private developers (such as awarding them
Incentive FSI, Transferrable Development Rights (TDRs)) have worked at cross purposes, with the mar-
ginalized sections in informal housing being included in formal housing, while at the same time, being
pushed away from the high valued land that they occupy.
7

These distortions and the consequent high land values have resulted in all actors having a stake in the
outcomes, and the resultant changing patterns of ownership, distribution and usage of land being an apt
representation of the extant power structures in Mumbai. Given the fact that land markets comprise vari-
ous sub-markets, and an array of institutions such as land-use regulations, DCRs, and others, the article
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206 Abhay Pethe, Sahil Gandhi, Vaidehi Tandel and Sirus Libeiro
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focuses on the situation of OMPL which, along with being a potential source for meeting the housing
needs of the city and financing large infrastructure projects, is an apt prototype for the working of land
markets in Mumbai.
Ownership and Management and Public Land in Mumbai
Rajack (2009) states that according to Buckley and Kalarickal (2006), large amounts of land held by the
public organizations have made land markets in Mumbai unresponsive to demand.
8
Public land in
Mumbai is characterized by multiple ownership by organizations and departments belonging to different
levels of government within the federal set-up of India. Further, these governmentsvia their parastatals
or departmentsnot only own land in Mumbai but are also in some way have a say in the management
of urban land. Thus, public land ownership in Mumbai is characterized by multiple owners and the
nature of their relationships (whether at a vertical or horizontal level) affects the managementowing to
conflicts and ambiguity regarding ownershipand thus thwarts effective and efficient land usage for the
city.
Absence of clear property rights coupled with public organizations leasing out land to other agencies
has resulted in ambiguity regarding ownership of public land. For instance, Maharashtra Housing and
Area Development Authority (MHADA), a parastatal created to provide affordable housing, has no
information regarding the amount of land that it owns (Times of India, 2010). There are ample instances
of various public bodies being at loggerheads with each other over the ownership and use of land in
Mumbai. For instance, in 2010, the Indian Air Force (IAF) accused MHADA of grabbing its land ille-
gally in order to undertake slum rehabilitation projects for the squatter settlements on that land (DNA,
2010).
9

Moreover, inefficient monitoring of public lands and the confusion regarding ownership has resulted
in encroachment condoned by a nexus between government officials, politicians, and slumlords (Times
of India, 2009). Encroachment of unauthorized settlements abounds on vacant public land. Although the
latest figures are not known owing to lack of data, the magnitude can be discerned from the fact that in
2001, 43.13 per cent of the total slum pockets were situated on (single owner) public land in Mumbai
(Mumbai HDR, 2009). Records from the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) reveal that 61 per cent of
SRA projects are located on public land.
10
According to estimates, approximately 77 per cent of Dharavi
land is owned by MCGM (Patel et al., 2009: 245). Land around airports has witnessed massive encroach-
ment over the years. It was estimated in 2007 that 276 acres of land at the Chhatrapati Shivaji International
Airport has been encroached upon (Indian Express, 2007). In 2011, the encroachment around the Juhu
Airport belonging to the Airport Authority of India (AAI) was located about 100 meters from the runway
(Times of India, 2011b). These encroachments have become a breeding ground for health and safety
disasters owing to its unplanned nature and haphazard growth. Owing to the informal nature of these set-
tlements as well as ambiguity regarding which public agency owns the land, rehabilitation and compen-
sation is a contentious issue in a post disaster scenario.
11

Such ambiguity regarding ownership of public land is exploited by public actors, in collusion with
real estate developers, for rent seeking. The Adarsh Society scam is a prime example of such public mal-
feasance in the management of public land. The scam is alleged to have involved a tract of land undergo-
ing a land use change from public to private residential use (Free Press Journal, 2011) with the appropriate
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Setting an Agenda Using IAD Framework 207
Environment and Urbanization ASIA, 3, 1 (2012): 203220
clearances and permits from all departments and authorities despite it violating the Coastal Regulation
Zone norms (The Hindu, 2010) as well as being a major threat to security (Deccan Herald, 2011) due to
its proximity to a defense areaNavy Nagar. The scam brought to the fore the blatant abuse of discre-
tionary powers (NDTV, 2010c) as well as the manner in which the relevant actors exploited the ambigu-
ity of ownership of land (DNA, 2011; Times of India, 2011c). The fact that flats in the housing society
were allotted to family members of many politicians, bureaucrats, and defense personnel, (NDTV, 2010b)
exposed this nexus.
The divergence between market forces, and large unutilized public land, coupled with large marginal-
ized sections, has not only opened up spaces for collusion between real estate interest groups and the
public actors but has also led to informal arrangements between slumlords and public actors. There arises
out of these interactions, a void in the governance structure, as the fragmentation between the privileged
actors and the marginalized becomes sharper, which is filled by the civil society. In summary, inefficien-
cies in OMPL have led to distortions in land markets, ambiguity of information, rent seeking, inefficient
utilization of public land, and unauthorized settlements on public land. These findings validate Bertauds
(2009: 5) claim that large government land holding leads to a decrease in land supply, increase in land
prices, and has a positive impact on the size of the informal sector.
OMPL in Mumbai needs to be deconstructed with analytical tools that would enrich our understand-
ing of the problematic as well as provide clarity for prescribing reforms. One such analytical frame-
workwhich is used hereis the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework developed
by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues.
IAD Framework
The IAD framework was proposed by Elinor Ostrom and other scholars and has evolved with the
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. The Workshop was conceptual-
ized in 1973 as an exercise in developing an analytical tool used to carry out empirical studies and policy
analysis (Jagger, 2009). Elinor Ostrom has worked closely with the Workshop for studying metropolitan
governance and Common Pool Resources (CPRs). Following the introduction of the Polycentric form
of governance in Polanyi (1951) and V. Ostrom et al. (1961), E. Ostrom and her colleagues undertook a
seminal study of metropolitan governance with emphasis on metropolitan policing (E. Ostrom et al.,
1978).
12
It argued against the conventionally preferred unitary or mono-centric governance structure
by expounding upon the benefits of a system characterized by multiple and overlapping centres of
decision-making (Bushouse, 2011: 106). This, in conjunction with similar studies on various Local
Public Economies
13
and CPRs, aimed at establishing and studying community organization as well as
means of sustaining self-governance models.
This led to the evolution of a broad and a dynamic framework, which could be applicable across
different theories, situations, and institutions and environments. Thus the IAD framework emerged with
the aim of gaining a deeper understanding of the complexities that characterize human interactions
(E. Ostrom, 2010) whilst acknowledging the propensity of institutions to evolve over time (Nelson and
Winter, 1982) and space. The adaptive nature of this framework has led to it being increasingly used by
researchers in a wide range of issues and also led to variants of the framework emerging, the most recent
one being the social-ecological systems (SESs) framework (E. Ostrom, 2011).
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208 Abhay Pethe, Sahil Gandhi, Vaidehi Tandel and Sirus Libeiro
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The IAD framework consists of five elements:
1) External variablesthat comprise (i) biophysical conditions, (ii) attributes of the community, and
(iii) rules-in-use.
2) The Action Situationwhich includes actors and their relationships, and seven working rules
3) Interactions between the various actors which feed back into the action situation
4) Outcomesthat feedback into the Action Situation and External Variables.
5) Evaluative Criteriathat assess the outcomes as well as processes
The first step in an IAD framework is to define the external variables, which are, attributes of the
physical world and the community, and the rules in use, which affect the action situation. The action situ-
ation comprises actors in certain positions whose actions are governed by seven working rules. The
interactions among various actors within the action situation lead to outcomes which feedback into the
external variables and action situation.
The Action Situation is the crux of this framework and can also be described as a black box
(McGinnis, 2011: 172). The first prerequisite in examining the action situation would be listing the
actors and identifying their relationships. Furthermore, there is a need to specify the seven working rules
in the context of the issue at hand. Borrowing from game-theoretic language, E. Ostrom and Basurto
(2011: 323) classify the working rules in a generic manner as:
Actors in positions choosing among actions at particular stages of a decision process in light of their control
over a choice node, the information they have, the outcomes that are likely, and the benets and costs they per-
ceive for these outcomes.
The IAD framework is useful for a detailed analysis of different aspects of a problem being studied
and further makes provision for evaluating the situation on grounds of efficiency, equity, sustainability,
accountability and other criteria. A salient feature of this framework is that this evaluation is possible
not only for the outcomes, but also, to the processes that lead to these outcomes (E. Ostrom, 2005: 66;
2011: 16).
Ownership and Management of Public Land within IAD
As discussed previously, inefficiencies in OMPL in Mumbai have led to distortions in land markets,
ambiguity regarding ownership, inefficient utilization of public land, unauthorized settlements on public
land, and rent seeking. These outcomes are contextualized using an IAD representation as shown in
Figure 1. The external variables are the topographical constraints, heterogeneous groups of citizens, and
formal land regulations and the federal set-up which affect the Action SituationOMPL.
External Variables
It is clear from the discussion in earlier sections that topographical constraints such as natural land mass
coupled with a component of the rules-in-use viz. the stringent land regulations, are major exogenous
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Setting an Agenda Using IAD Framework 209
Environment and Urbanization ASIA, 3, 1 (2012): 203220
factors that affect the Action Situation. These factors result in high land values, which exclude a majority
of the population from the formal housing market, continuing at the margin made up of migrants from
other states. Given the heterogeneous nature of the population, this exclusion has considerable impact on
the power structure and the resulting conflict is detrimental to the socio-political adhesion of the city.
The recurrences of confrontation between the different sections of society have reinforced the extant
power imbalances and subverted the notion of equal citizenship (cf. Anjaria, 2009; Zrah, 2009).
14
This
has hindered effective information flows, and collective action among citizens, ultimately affecting their
ability to monitor public agents. The federal set-up, which is also a part of the rules-in-use, provides a
macro-frame and determines relationships between the three tiers of government, all of whom have a
stake in Mumbais land market. This set-up ultimately shapes some of their incentives within the action
situation.
Action Situation
Having identified the broad framework and discussed at length the external variables, the next step is to
deconstruct the Action Situation of OMPL. To reiterate, the action situation comprises two partsthe
actors and their relationships, and the seven working rules.
The following sub-section enumerates the various actors involved in the OMPL.
i. Actors and their Relationships within the Action Situation
Figure 2 maps the relevant actors and their relationships.
The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM), Central Government and Government of
Maharashtra (GoM), and state and central parastatals, all own substantial tracts of land in Mumbai.
15
It
is pertinent to illustrate the formal relationships between these organizations (as shown by arrows).
Figure 1. IAD Framework for Analyzing OMPL
Source: Created by authors based on E. Ostrom (2011: 10).
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210 Abhay Pethe, Sahil Gandhi, Vaidehi Tandel and Sirus Libeiro
Environment and Urbanization ASIA, 3, 1 (2012): 203220
These relationshipssome of which are owing to the federal set-upgo beyond the immediate realm of
land governance. For the sake of keeping Figure 1 less complex, the Central Governmentalthough it
is an important actorhas not been included.
17

The GoM not only has a financial and functional relationship with MCGM, but also appoints its
Municipal Commissioner. Apart from this, the GoM appoints CEOs in state parastatals. These public
bodies, along with the central parastatals and the Central Government, provide public goods and services
to citizens. Pertinent to our discussion of OMPL, is the segregation of citizens into those who are ex-
cluded, due to economic factors, from the formal housing market, and those who are not. These citizens
elect the legislative members in the state and central governments, and corporators in MCGM and the
diverse interests of different citizen-groups foster the well known vote-bank politics.
The contestations among different citizen groups and the increasing need to empower the marginal-
ized sections of Mumbais population have led to the rise of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
and Community Based Organizations (CBOs) who, as supervisors, occupy important space in the gov-
ernance structure for facilitating collective action among citizens, and providing a crucial link between
citizens and public bodies. Patel and Arputham (2007, 2008), and Patel and Sharma (1998) chronicle the
Figure 2. Relationship of Actors in OMPL
Source: Created by authors.
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Setting an Agenda Using IAD Framework 211
Environment and Urbanization ASIA, 3, 1 (2012): 203220
manner in which NGOs and alliances among slum dwellers greatly augment the latters bargaining
strength and create a space for them to be proactively involved in designing solutions for the redevelop-
ment and resettlement. Patel and Sharma (1998) demonstrate how communities settled on public land
canwith the support of NGOsbe empowered to negotiate a fair deal for themselves with public organ-
izations. However, Sanyal and Mukhija (2001) show that the presence of NGOs may in fact lead to un-
foreseen conflicts between the stakeholders and under certain conditions can benefit the marginalized
communities.
It is important to add the caveat here that the NGOs and CBOs themselves have differentand often-
times, contrastingobjectives. Also, the real estate interest group, via its informal relationships (as repre-
sented by the dotted lines) with agents within the GoM and the MCGM,
17
occupies an important position
in the figure. There exists a demand and supply relationship between the real estate interest group and
the citizens.
Figure 1 not only portrays actors and relationships in OMPL, but is also an accurate representation of
the governance structure in Mumbai.
18
Clearly the governance structure is polycentric in nature, having
several actors at the horizontal level (shown in the figure as Mumbai level) and also having interactions
with the state and the centre. Hence, the nature of OMPL in Mumbai is multi-level (involving the local,
state and national levels within the federal set-up), multi-type (with nested, overlapping and frag-
mented jurisdictions), multi-sectoral (various public and private organizations, civil society, and oth-
ers), and multi-functional (with units performing specific functions) making it polycentric in nature
(McGinnis, 2011: 171172; E. Ostrom 2010).
Working Rules within the Action Situation
The next step is to lay down the seven working rules that affect interactions between various actors. We
classify these rules as formalhaving a legal recognition, and informalwhich have no legal recogni-
tion but are backed by social sanctions or norms.
1. Boundary Rules: Define the entry and exit conditions for actors
B1: Formal actors: Entry by public organizations in the action situation is through ownership or
legal mandate to manage land.
Ownership: Multiple public organizations already own land in Mumbai. High land values in
Mumbai restrict their further entry into the action situation via the market. However, the state
government can acquire land by exercising the power of eminent domain. Transferable Develop-
ment Rights (TDRs) can also be used as a tool to either enter or intensify the presence of certain
parastatals.
Management: Although land is a state subject, the Twelfth Schedule of the 74th Constitutional
Amendment Act gives MCGM (limited) power to regulate land use. Also the Slum Rehabilitation
Authority (SRA) has the duty to survey and review existing slum pockets and bring them under
the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme.
B2: Informal Actors: Citizens who are excluded from the formal housing market can enter as
direct stakeholders in the action situation by encroaching on public land. This is contingent upon:
Networks: Being a part of a social network (sometimes caste or community based) in order to
gain access to informal tenements/businesses.
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Payment: An extensive informal market for housing requires dwellers to make an initial payment
for entry.
2. Position Rules: Assign positions in the situation.
P1: Formal positions: These are legally mandated positions, which are filled either through an
elective process or by nomination. External monitors also belong to this category.
Elected Positions
The position of the Chief Minister (CM) of Maharashtra, who, by convention and practice, heads
the Urban Development Department (UDD), has powers in matters concerning land in Mumbai.
Corporators of MCGM are accountable for managing affairs within their jurisdictions.
MayorThe titular head of MCGM is elected by the Corporators.
Nominated Positions
CM Appointees: The Commissioner of MCGM, heads of various state parastatals and secretaries
of UDD.
Central Parastatals: Their heads are appointed by the respective ministries in the Central Govern-
ment; thus keeping the Prime Ministers Office in the loop.
Non-Governmental Actors: NGO representatives in ward committees are nominated by the rele-
vant Corporators.
External Monitors: NGOs and CBOs hold important positions as supervisors and have a stake
in the outcomes.
P2: Informal positions
Slumlords: Determined on the basis of coercion and political patronage. Within the slums, these
actors have social and political acceptance.
3. Choice Rules: List out all possible actions for actors in positions.
C1: Formal Choices
Usage: An organization may keep its land vacant or utilize it productively.
Data Bank: Each organization may maintain a comprehensive database of its own land.
Effective Monitoring: Public organizations may monitor land in order to deter potential
encroachment.
C2: Informal Choices
Collusion: Agents within public organizations may, informally, collude with non-public actors to
seek rents.
Encroachment: Excluded citizens may choose to encroach upon public land.
4. Information Rules: Specify the level and channel of information for actors.
I1: Formal Information Stocks and Flows
Centralized Data System: No such system exists. Formal mechanisms for inter and intra- orga-
nizational data movements do not exist and, when they do, they are accompanied by heavy trans-
action costs.
Land Audit/Surveys: No formal arrangement exists for a systematic audit by public bodies of
their own land. Also, no regular audits of the citys land use pattern and ownership by the relevant
bodies.
Information Asymmetry: Certain positions have an information advantage attached to them.
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Disclosure of Discretion: There are discretionary powers related to land matters vested upon
certain positions. However, there exist public disclosure laws when these are used by agents in
those positions for exercising large discretions.
Access to Information: The Right to Information (RTI) is the sole tool for seeking information
from public offices/agencies.
Dissemination by Supervisors: These organizations are crucial when it comes to transmitting
and interpreting information between public organizations and agents, and citizens.
I2: Informal Informational Flows:
Inter-organizational flows: Political norms and inter-party dynamics play a vital role when it
comes to inter and intra-organizational information movements.
Collusion: There exists a channel among the formal actors and also between formal actors and
interest groups for dissemination of information related to land matters.
5. Scope Rules: Delimit the potential outcomes.
S1: Formal: Zoning laws such as Development Plans (DPs) and others which demarcate the No
Development Zones and Coastal Regulation Zones delimit development of public land (e.g.
defense land in Colaba).
S2: Informal: Encroachment on public land delimits its usage.
6. Aggregation Rules: Specify level of control by actors in positions in the selection of actions.
A1: Formal Rules
Overarching Central Authority: The CM has the final authority in many decisions pertaining to
public land.
Parastatal Decisions: Bureaucrats have limited autonomy over the functioning of their organiza-
tions since they are answerable to their respective ministries.
A2: Informal Rules
Real Estate Interest group: Exert influence through informal channels, by funding political
elections, or through some other quid pro quo arrangements with public agents in order to alter
policy and official positions to serve their respective interests.
Slumlords: Slum lords play a decisive role in ensuring the persistence of slums and also control
access to basic amenities. Regular payments made to them by slum dwellers for accessing these
amenities significantly increases their power in decision making.
Influence of Supervisors: NGOs/CBOs can put pressure on the agencies in a number of ways
such as filing Public Interest Litigations, and approaching the media. Their ability to influence
decisions is enhanced as NGOs are being backed by multilateral organizations.
7. Pay Off Rules: Affect benefits and costs of actors based on the outcome and action chosen.
Y1: Formal Payoffs
Taxation: There is no tax on vacant public land.
Elections: The threat of elections and actions by citizens may act as a deterrent on decision mak-
ing by the politicians.
Accountability: No formal mechanismexcept in the intra-organizational sense of departmental
inquiriesfor holding parastatals accountable for non-performance.
Penalty: No penalty for agencies for lapses in monitoring and maintaining public land.
Y2: Informal Payoffs
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214 Abhay Pethe, Sahil Gandhi, Vaidehi Tandel and Sirus Libeiro
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Political funding and rents: Due to high land values in Mumbai, politicians procure rents and
extracts means of funding election campaigns by colluding with real estate interest groups.
Incentives of bureaucrats: Promotions, salaries, and increments of bureaucrats are not linked to
efficient usage of their respective positions and available resources. Promotions, especially, are
often linked to political patronage and monetary incentives are often linked to rent seeking.
Monitoring: No decisive penalty/action deterring encroachment, indeed there exists in fact a
perverse incentive for not monitoring in the form of vote bank opportunities.
On-The-Ground Rents: Encroachment provides junior agents with the opportunity to earn side
payments.
ii Interactions and Outcomes
The outcomes of OMPL can be perceived as equilibriums resulting from the strategic interactions among
the different actors involved in the Action Situation that are governed by their incentives which can be
represented as a payoff function comprising seven working rules. The outcomes as a product of interac-
tions between external variables, rules and actors have been represented as the following:
Inefficient utilization of public land is the result of actors in formal positions exercising their
choice of keeping land unproductive due to the (1) absence of taxes on vacant land, (2) absence of
formal mechanism for holding parastatals accountable for non-performance and (3) no penalty in
case of failure to monitor public land. The inefficient utilization of public land affects land supply
and contributesin some wayto the high land prices.
Ambiguity: (1) Nonexistent centralized data systems, (2) nonexistent land audits, and (3) absence
of penalties for improper maintenance of land records, (4) absence of inter-organizational channels
for informational flow, lead to ambiguity regarding the ownership of public land.
Unauthorized Settlements: Interactions between slumlords and public actors that allow the pro-
liferation and persistence of slums are the result of (1) on-the-ground rents that are shared by both,
(2) perverse incentives created by SRA and (3) absence of monitoring of land.
Rent Seeking: The aggregative effect of (1) informal informational flows, (2) information advan-
tage with certain positions, (3) ineffective rules disclosing use of discretion, and (4) political fund-
ing incentivizing collusion among public and private actors as well as among actors in formal and
informal positions.
The inefficiencies in the land markets lead to high values which can be extracted by public actors, in
collusion with private actors, through rent seeking practices. The scope for rents further creates incen-
tives for actors to fortify those rules that help maintain the distortions in land markets and maintain the
artificially high land values, keep land ownership details ambiguous, and encourage encroachment on
public land. These outcomes ultimately amalgamate to create distortions in the land markets.
Thus while on the one hand, the outcomes are affected by interactions between actors whose underly-
ing foundations are the working rules within the Action Situation, on the other, these outcomes feedback
into the Action Situation and the External variables which cumulatively contribute to the stickiness of the
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working rules as well as the rules-in-use. Thus, modifying the rules becomes an exigent task requiring
incentive-compatible reforms that directly or peripherally aid in ameliorating the sub-optimal outcomes
of OMPL.
iii Evaluative Criteria
It would be pertinent to assess the outcomes and processes involved in the OMPL in Mumbai. Ostrom
(2011) enumerates certain evaluative criteria that would serve as useful parameters by which to judge the
performance of the system as a whole. We use some of these criteria are used in order to gauge the per-
formance of OMPL in Mumbai.
Economic efficiency: Economic efficiency would entail that the land with the public organizations is
being put to its most optimal use. However, it is found that public land is not being utilized in a manner
that fully exploits its economic value; in other words, its usage is highly inefficient.
Re-distributional Equity: Very often, the goal of public organizations is to achieve an equitable redis-
tribution of resources rather than strive for efficiency. With this objective, public land ought to be utilized
for the provision of essential goods and services, especiallygiven the constraints facing the land
marketshousing for the poor. The inadequate provision of these indicates that the public organizations
do not fare any better in terms of achieving redistributive equity. However, the large tracts of vacant land
provide opportunities for encroachment and proliferation of slums. Thus public organizations inadver-
tently redistribute land toward housing the citys poor, albeit in an informal sense.
Accountability: The processes of collection and dissemination of information are instrumental in ensur-
ing accountability of public actors to citizens. The malfunctioning of such processes in the OMPL situa-
tion impedes accountability. Also, there is a complete absence of accountability of parastatals to the
citizens.
Conformance to Values of Local Actors: The institutional framework underlying OMPL creates oppor-
tunities for rent seeking and collusion, as well as incentives for public actors to optimize their own utili-
ties whilst imposing high costs to society.
Thus, irrespective of the criteria used to assess their performance it is found that the processes and
outcomes of OMPL are antithetical to the wider interests of the public.
Further Implications
It is arduous to ascertain the precise effect of the each working rule independently on the OMPL and
implies therefore, that the effect of reforming one particular rule on the functioning of OMPL would be
difficult to determine. Insteadfrom the analysis in the previous sectionwe see that it is the working
rules operating in tandem that influences interactions in a manner that produces inefficient outcomes.
Therefore, it would be prudent to undertake holistic reforms that aim to address majority of the deficien-
cies in the working rules underlying the OMPL in Mumbai. Naturally, these reforms would pertain to not
only the arena of public land management but also the extant governance system in the city that affects
much of the interactions among public organizations involved in OMPL.
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According to Pethe et al. (2011) the ostensibly polycentric governance system in Mumbai resulted in
a dire collective action problem among the public organizations in the region. The multi-level relations
have a strong bearing in impeding the collective action among organizations at the horizontal level
thereby leading to several destructive conflicts. Empowering the hitherto marginalized Metropolitan
Planning Committee (MPC)a mandatory planning and coordination body under Article 243 ZE in the
74th amendmentwill not be the solution to resolving the governance issues. Feiock and Scholz (2010)
opine that a mono-centric governance system at a metropolitan level, would lead to the institutional col-
lective action dilemma that is persistent in the metropolitan region, becoming an intra-organizational
dilemma. Instead, governance reforms should focus on strengthening the existing polycentric gover-
nance system (Pethe et al., 2011) through the creation of certain enabling institutions. These institutions
include mechanisms for making parastatals responsive to citizens, creating a system of checks and bal-
ances, rationalizing and making transparent all usage of discretionary power with all positions, among
others.
Conclusion
There is a heavy backlog of infrastructure in Mumbai that is bound to impede future growth and hamper
the quality of living. Public organizations that are involved in infrastructure provision can leverage
the land that they own to raise some finances towards meeting this objective. However, the inefficiencies
in OMPL in Mumbai, such as inefficient utilization of public land, ambiguity regarding public owner-
ship, proliferation of unauthorized settlements on public land, and rent seeking, lead to distorting land
markets.
This black box of OMPL is deconstructed using the Institutional Analysis and Development frame-
work. In doing so, we gain an understanding of how the presence of certain working rules and the rules-
in-use operating together, lead to the aforementioned outcomes. It also explains how feedbacks from the
interactions into the Action Situation and from the outcomes into the Action Situation and External vari-
ables result in the stickiness of certain formal and informal rules and hence the inefficient outcomes
becoming entrenched. Ameliorating this situation requires a best response strategy of undertaking sys-
tem-wide reforms pertaining to land and governance in Mumbai. Thus, this article, by way of a prologue,
clues us into the manifold interventions that are necessary and that will have to beseverally and some-
times sequentiallyundertaken to tackle the problem whilst remaining within the realm of technical as
well as socio-political and economic feasibility.
Notes
1. The term Ownership and Management of Public Land is borrowed from Robin Rajacks work Does the
Ownership and Management of Public Land Matter to Market Outcomes? which was presented at World Bank
Urban Symposium, 2006. A revised version of this paper was later included as a chapter in Urban Land Markets:
Improving Land Management for successful Urbanization (refer Rajack, 2009).
2. The high tax revenues accruing from the city region incentivizes all the three tiers to maintain a stakedirectly
or indirectlyin the city (Pethe, 2010a).
3. For instance, about 12.5 per cent of land in the island city is owned by the Port Trust of India (Annez, 2011).
4. Annez et al. (2010: 49) recommend leveraging public lands to finance the expansion of basic urban infrastructure.
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Setting an Agenda Using IAD Framework 217
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5. Mooya (2011) validates the use of IAD framework in analyzing complex urban situations by applying it to urban
real estate markets and proposing policy recommendations for poverty alleviation.
6. For understanding the impact of density regulations on land markets in Mumbai please refer to Nallathiga
(2006).
7. Nainan (2008) opines that the use of TDRwhich is essentially a planning toolby private developers has
accelerated and exacerbated this process of fragmentation.
8. Bertauds (2009: 14) example of the misuse of public land by the Mumbai Port Trust illustrates the governments
incapacity to manage land.
9. In this case, it is believed that the Air Force lost control of their land when slums were allowed to wantonly
thrive without any sort of checks by the owners themselves (NDTV, 2010a).
10. This percentage has been calculated from the data made available from SRA- January 2011.
11. For instance, after a fire broke out in a slum in Mumbai, there was considerable delay in rehabilitating affected
families owing to a dispute between the Railways and the State Government regarding the ownership of the land
on which the slums were located (Times of India, 2011a).
12. See Aligica and Tarko (2011) for a overview on Polycentricity. Refer to V. Ostrom (1999), E. Ostrom and Parks
(1999), McGinnis (1999) and, Andersson and E. Ostrom (2008) for some studies on polycentric governance.
13. See Oakerson and Parks (1988, 1989).
14. Fernandes (2004) opines that state practices as well as the rising dominance of the middle class have harboured
class inequalities resulting in exclusionary forms of citizenship.
15. No data available on the breakup of owners.
16. By adding arrows establishing relationships of central government with state government, central parastatals,
Community Based Organizations (CBOs) and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and citizens, one
could extend the figure to include Central Government.
17. We are aware that there might be informal relationships with agents in parastatals and interest groups.
18. By replacing MCGM with ULBs and considering all interest groups, this figure could represent MMRs extant
governance structure.
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Abhay Pethe, Sahil Gandhi, Vaidehi Tandel are with the Department of Economics, University of
Mumbai, and Sirus Libeiro is an independent researcher. The authors would like to thank Elinor Ostrom
for her comments and Shirish Patel for his comments on an earlier draft. E-mails: Abhay Pethe: ampethe@
gmail.com; Sahil Gandhi: sahil.gandhi1@gmail.com; Vaidehi Tandel: vaidehi.tandel@gmail.com; Sirus
Libeiro: slibeiro@gmail.com.
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