Consti Law

Constitutional Law 1
Cases
Alarcon, Maria Theresa L.

2

Part I
Introduction
A. The Constitution as a social contract

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 183591 - THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, ET AL. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET AL.
G.R. No. 183752 - CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, ET AL. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET AL.
G.R. No. 183893 - THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAURENCE LLUCH
CRUZ v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON
ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET AL.
G.R. No. 183951 - THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as represented
by HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, ET AL. v. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), ET AL.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N. DEANO, petitioner-in-
intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P. SANTOS-
AKBAR,petitioner-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, represented by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDDATU, in his
capacity as Provincial Governor and a resident of the Province of Sultan Kudarat, petitioner-in-
intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, petitioner-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
3

CARLO B. GOMEZ, ET AL., petitioner-in-intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
SEPARATE OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The piece of writing being assailed in these consolidated Petitions is a peace negotiation document,
namely theMemorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli
Agreement of Peace of 2001 (MOA). The Solicitor General explained that this document, prepared by the
joint efforts of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached
between both parties and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.
1
Subsequently,
the Solicitor General moved for the dismissal of the consolidated cases at bar based on changed
circumstances as well as developments which have rendered them moot, particularly the Executive
Department's statement that it would no longer sign the questioned peace negotiation
document.
2
Nonetheless, several parties to the case, as well as other sectors, continue to push for what
they call a "complete determination" of the constitutional issues raised in the present Petitions.
I believe that in light of the pronouncement of the Executive Department to already abandon the MOA, the
issue of its constitutionality has obviously become moot.
The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or
controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision
on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the
most important are the first two requisites.
3

For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy one
which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial
resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or other similar
considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its
purpose has become stale.
4
An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead or when the matter in dispute
has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless the issue is likely
to be raised again between the parties. Simply stated, there is nothing for the court to resolve as the
determination thereof has been overtaken by subsequent events.
5

Such is the case here.
The MOA has not even been signed, and will never be. Its provisions will not at all come into effect. The
MOA will forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of
paper, with no legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any
right. The instant Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on.
They no longer present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.
An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite
legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable
controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former
involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in
character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
6

4

For the Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of the MOA will merely be an academic
exercise. It would, in effect, only be delivering an opinion or advice on what are now hypothetical or
abstract violations of constitutional rights.
In Abbas v. Commission on Elections,
7
the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and Republic Act No. 6734 (the
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) were challenged for purported violations of
the provisions of the Constitution on freedom of religion. The Court held therein that it should not inquire
into the constitutionality of a peace agreement which was already consummated (the 1976 Tripoli
Agreement) and an Organic Act which was already passed into law (R.A. No. 6734) just because of
potential conflicts with the Constitution. Then, with more reason should this Court desist from ruling on the
constitutionality of the MOA which is unsigned, and now entirely abandoned, and as such, cannot even
have any potential conflict with the Constitution.
The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public
interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The
power of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or
addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court
must be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of
constitutional law.
The Executive Department has already manifested to this Court, through the Solicitor General, that it will
not sign the MOA in its present form or in any other form. It has declared the same intent to the public.
For this Court to insist that the issues raised in the instant Petitions cannot be moot for they are still
capable of repetition is to totally ignore the assurance given by the Executive Department that it will not
enter into any other form of the MOA in the future. The Court cannot doubt the sincerity of the Executive
Department on this matter. The Court must accord a co-equal branch of the government nothing less than
trust and the presumption of good faith.
Moreover, I deem it beyond the power of this Court to enjoin the Executive Department from entering into
agreements similar to the MOA in the future, as what petitioners and other opponents of the MOA pray
for. Such prayer once again requires this Court to make a definitive ruling on what are mere hypothetical
facts. A decree granting the same, without the Court having seen or considered the actual agreement and
its terms, would not only be premature, but also too general to make at this point. It will perilously tie the
hands of the Executive Department and limit its options in negotiating peace for Mindanao.
Upon the Executive Department falls the indisputably difficult responsibility of diffusing the highly volatile
situation in Mindanao resulting from the continued clashes between the Philippine military and Muslim
rebel groups. In negotiating for peace, the Executive Department should be given enough leeway and
should not be prevented from offering solutions which may be beyond what the present Constitution
allows, as long as such solutions are agreed upon subject to the amendment of the Constitution by
completely legal means.
Peace negotiations are never simple. If neither party in such negotiations thinks outside the box, all they
would arrive at is a constant impasse. Thus, a counsel for one of the intervenors who assert the
unconstitutionality of the MOA
8
had no choice but to agree as follows:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: Well, we realize the constitutional constraints of
sovereignty, integrity and the like, but isn't there a time that surely will come and the life of our
people when they have to transcend even these limitations?
DEAN AGABIN: Yes, we have seen it happen in several instances, Your Honor.
x x x
5

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And in pursuit of that purpose, the Supreme Court cannot
look beyond the horizon and look for more satisfying result?
DEAN AGABIN: Well, if you mean by looking beyond the horizon, it would mean a violation of the
provisions of the Constitution, then it should not be, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: In some part, we have gone to Malaysia. We have gone
to the OIC, and we have even gone to Libya.
DEAN AGABIN: Yes, Your Honor. But in all these, we have always insisted on preserving the
territorial integrity of the country.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And this dicta or [dogma] is unassailable forever. There
cannot be an exception.
DEAN AGABIN: It is unassailable under the present Constitution, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: But, at least, you can also agree that the Constitution
ought to be changed in order for a country to fulfill its internal obligation as a matter of necessity.
DEAN AGABIN: Yes, if the people so will it, your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: You remember how the emperor of Japan lost his
divinity? They just changed their Constitution, isn't it?
DEAN AGABIN: Yes, it was enforced upon him by Mr. McArthur, and they have no choice.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: Isn't that a very good example of thinking outside the
box? That one day even those who are underground may have to think. But frankly now Dean,
before I end, may I ask, is it possible to meld or modify our Constitutional Order in order to have
some room for the newly developing international notions on Associative Governance Regulation
Movement and Human Rights?
DEAN AGABIN: Yes. It is possible, Your Honor, with the consent of the people.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: And, therefore, we vote it to a referendum or any
consultation beforehand?
DEAN AGABIN: If there is such a proposal for or amendment or revision of the Constitution, yes,
Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE QUISUMBING: So, either initiative or CHA-CHA or CON-AS?
DEAN AGABIN: Yes, Your Honor.
9

It must be noted that the Constitution has been in force for three decades now, yet, peace in Mindanao
still remained to be elusive under its present terms. There is the possibility that the solution to the peace
problem in the Southern Philippines lies beyond the present Constitution. Exploring this possibility and
considering the necessary amendment of the Constitution are not per se unconstitutional. The
Constitution itself implicitly allows for its own amendment by describing, under Article XVII, the means and
requirements therefor. In Tan v. Macapagal,
10
where petitioners claim that the Constitutional Convention
was without power to consider, discuss, or adopt proposals which seek to revise the Constitution through
6

the adoption of a form of government other than the form outlined in the then governing Constitution, the
Court ruled that:
[A]s long as any proposed amendment is still unacted on by [the Convention], there is no room for
the interposition of judicial oversight. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for
ratification may the appropriate case be instituted. Until then, the Courts are devoid of jurisdiction.
x x x.
At this point, there is far from a concrete proposed amendment to the Constitution which the Court can
take cognizance of, much less render a pronouncement upon.
At most, the Court can only exhort the Executive Department to keep in mind that it must negotiate and
secure peace in Mindanao under terms which are most beneficial for the country as a whole, and not just
one group of Muslim insurgents. Transparency and consultation with all major players, which necessarily
include affected local government units and their constituents, are essential to arrive at a more viable and
acceptable peace plan. The nature and extent of any future written agreements should be clearly
established from the very beginning, and the terms thereof carefully drafted and clearly worded, to avoid
misunderstandings or misconstructions by the parties and the public. If a document is meant to be a list of
consensus points still subject to further negotiations, then it should just simply state so.
As a final note, I find it necessary to stress that the Court must not allow itself to be mired in controversies
affecting each step of the peace process in Mindanao. It is not within the province or even the
competence of the Judiciary to tell the Executive Department exactly what and what not, how and how
not, to negotiate for peace with insurgents. Given this kind of situation where war and peace hang in the
balance, where people's lives are at stake, and the Executive Department, under its residual powers, is
tasked to make political decisions in order to find solutions to the insurgency problem, the Court should
respect the political nature of the issues at bar and exercise judicial restraint until an actual controversy is
brought before it.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the GRANT of the Motion to Dismiss filed by the Solicitor General and,
accordingly, for the DISMISSAL of the Petitions at bar for being MOOT and ACADEMIC.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1
Respondent's Manifestation and Motion, 19 August 2008.
2
Id.
3
Joya v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, 24 August 1993, 225
SCRA 568, 575.
4
Id.
5
Santiago v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121908, 26 January 1998, 285 SCRA 16, 22.
6
Guingona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 426 (1998).
7

7
G.R. Nos. 89651 & 89965, 10 November 1989, 179 SCRA 287.
8
Dean Pacifico Agabin is the counsel for Intervenor Manuel A. Roxas III.
9
TSN, pp. 603-611.
10
150 Phil. 778, 785 (1972).

B. How to read the Constitution
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261 November 10, 2003
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,
ATTYS. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G.
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG, petitioners,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention,
8

vs.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR.,
IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO, JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV,
HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN, EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS,
DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ,
ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR.,
CECILIA CARREON-JALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR., GEORGILU YUMUL-
HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON, MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT,
AUGUSTO BACULIO, FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON,
LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO,
HERMINO TEVES, AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR., FRANCIS
NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO
BONDOC, GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT, JOSEPH DURANO,
JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO, GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE
VELARDE, CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA,
JOSEPH SANTIAGO, DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF PLAZA, JV
BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA, ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN
MIGUEL ZUBIRI, BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK COJUANGCO,
MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA, ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR
FALCON, REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO, JR., AND RUY ELIAS
LOPEZ, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA. CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C.
REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR., ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
9

G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M. GONZALES, petitioners,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents,
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR, MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON
MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO, EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO
NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA,
GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE
ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR., JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO,
MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG, DR. BING
ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO
BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA, SALVACION
LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON
SIBULO, MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND NOEL ISORENA, MAU
RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA,
JR., THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX
FUENTEBELLA, ET AL., respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON.
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE
SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III, AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION, petitioners,
vs.
10

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR
TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003
U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C. PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ,
GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS, LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON,
ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R. DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-
ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G. AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF OTHER
CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES FELIX
FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE
IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE,
JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
11

NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION OF THE 86
SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR. AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003
VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U. VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, HON.
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT,
HON. FRANKLIN DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON,
PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD MEMBER,
ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS
ASSOCAITION OF CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL LEGASPI,
CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC],
REPRESENTED BY RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, [MANLAW],
REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ, FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA],
REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO, PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.],
MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE AND INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER, petitioners,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE
SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
12

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter how passionate and seemingly
irreconcilable it may appear to be, over the determination by the independent branches of government of
the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers where the Constitution itself
provides for the means and bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of
the relationship among these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving
the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few
of our countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the present controversy subject of the
instant petitions whether the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution,
and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis. Perhaps even
more truth to the view that it was brought upon by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues
which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the
feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible.
Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the
Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential
truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that
part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by
the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without
destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican government, intended as they are to
insure that governmental power is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of
interdependence and coordination among these branches where the delicate functions of enacting,
interpreting and enforcing laws are harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is
in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency,
act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office,
on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
13

graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and
employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the
proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing, and by a
majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session days from
such referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for
consideration by the House within ten session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. When
sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the
Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No
person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose
of this section. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution, the 12th Congress of the House of
Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House
Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment
Rules
1
approved by the 11th Congress. The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES 12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES
RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
Section 2. Mode of Initiating
Impeachment. Impeachment shall
be initiated only by a verified
RULE V
BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL
Section 16. Impeachment
14

complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint or resolution of
impeachment filed by at least one-
third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House.
Proceedings Deemed Initiated. In
cases where a Member of the House
files a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files a
verified complaint that is endorsed
by a Member of the House through a
resolution of endorsement against
an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated on
the day the Committee on Justice
finds that the verified complaint
and/or resolution against such
official, as the case may be, is
sufficient in substance, or on the
date the House votes to overturn or
affirm the finding of the said
Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution, as the
case may be, is not sufficient in
substance.
In cases where a verified complaint
or a resolution of impeachment is
filed or endorsed, as the case may
be, by at least one-third (1/3) of the
Members of the
House, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated at the time of
the filing of such verified complaint
or resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. No
impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official more
than once within the period of one (1)
year.
Section 17. Bar Against Initiation Of
Impeachment Proceedings. Within
a period of one (1) year from the
date impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in
Section 16 hereof, no impeachment
proceedings, as such, can be
initiated against the same official.
(Italics in the original; emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
2
sponsored by Representative
Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid
of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."
3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
4
(first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices
5
of this
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes."
6
The
15

complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen Piang
Dilangalen,
7
and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003
8
in accordance with
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was
"sufficient in form,"
9
but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.
10
To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in
accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23,
2003, a day after the House Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint
11
was filed with the Secretary General of the House
12
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro,
Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of
Representatives.
13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision
of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against
the same official more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that he has a duty as a member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional
impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of
transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and arbitrary changes in
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"
14
posits that his
right to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto had been violated
due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on
November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and
Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2),
(3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records
of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the Constitution; and
(3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the
issues of the case are of transcendental importance, pray, in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition, the
issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the issuance of a writ "perpetually"
prohibiting respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the Senate has accepted the same, from
proceeding with the impeachment trial.
16

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers,
lawyers and members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for Prohibition
involves public interest as it involves the use of public funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial
on the second impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining Congress
from conducting further proceedings on said second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court has recognized that he
has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG
15
and Chavez v. PEA-
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,
16
prays in his petition for Injunction that the second
impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers and members of the legal
profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second
impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina and Deputy Speaker Raul M.
Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in
ensuring that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray in their petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be
declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they have a right to be protected
against all forms of senseless spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect
the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution
endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared
null and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking cognizance of,
hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition
commanding the Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or to act
on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members are citizens and taxpayers,
and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege
in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second impeachment
complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null
and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a citizen and a member of the Philippine
Bar Association and of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N. Menez, Jr.,
as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent
Injunction to enjoin the House of Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that it is mandated by the Code
of Professional Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules
be declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be permanently enjoined from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition that the House Impeachment Rules be declared unconstitutional.
17

In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et. al., in their petition for
Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v.
Factoran
17
which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ
prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further proceedings
on the second impeachment complaint and that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second
impeachment complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering with the fiscal
matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino, alleging that the issues in his
petition for Prohibition are of national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the
Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered operation of the
Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for
the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment
complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer, alleges in his petition for Prohibition that
respondents Fuentebella and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment complaint, were
"absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of
Impeachment assail the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the (JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as
professors of law they have an abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are trying to inculcate in the minds of their
students," pray that the House of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from trying
the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging his locus standi, but alleging
that the second impeachment complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial
Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of Representatives does
not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare
Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the issues raised in the filing of the
second impeachment complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be
declared null and void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the
Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as citizens and taxpayers, pray in their
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution of
endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of Representatives be declared null and void
and (2) respondents Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from accepting any
Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that they have accepted the same, that
they be prohibited from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263, the first three of the eighteen
which were filed before this Court,
18
prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or
preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket
number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House
Impeachment Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
18

Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295, which were filed on October
28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that
House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration by the Chief Justice of
the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation of the
constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, a motion was put forth
that the second impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it was not carried
because the House of Representatives adjourned for lack of quorum,
19
and as reflected above, to date,
the Articles of Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction which were filed on or before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse
themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the Court directed
him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its Resolution of October 28, 2003,
resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the
Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d)
appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.
20
In addition, this Court called on petitioners and
respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their behalf to
refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De
Venecia, Jr. and/or its co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a Manifestation
asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear, much less prohibit or enjoin the House of
Representatives, which is an independent and co-equal branch of government under the Constitution,
from the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date,
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex Abudante
Cautela)
21
and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of
the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole power, authority and
jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the
one where the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of
Article XI of the Constitution."
22

Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court resolved to (a) consolidate them
with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30
p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a
Manifestation stating that insofar as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis
in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented
before it since (1) its constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court commences only
upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment, which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the
petitions pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this
Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress and this Court in a
"constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question is not
yet ripe for judicial determination.
19

On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262
a "Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed
a Motion for Intervention in G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans Legionnaires
of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys
Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and the arguments of petitioners,
intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the
principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be invoked; who can invoke it; on
what issues and at what time; and whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis Section 3(5) of Article XI
of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues arising from the instant petitions as
well as the myriad arguments and opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for,
this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the threshold and novel issue of whether
or not the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2) whether or
not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3)
the substantive issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in seriatim.
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of judicial review to determine
the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government in Section 1,
Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
as may be established by law.
20

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the
definitive 1936 case of Angara v. Electoral Commission
23
after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the present provision in Article VIII,
Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution
are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial
department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as
much as it was within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however limited, has established a
republican government intended to operate and function as a harmonious whole, under a system
of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided in the said
instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it
would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct
the course of government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would
be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good
government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United States where no
express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power
of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by
popular acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this
moderating power is granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of
our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature,
scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of
the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question
raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and
barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function
is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also
because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.
24
(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
21

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers"
of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels" is inherent in all courts
25
as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable."
26

Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not explicitly conferred upon the
courts by its Constitution, such power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more
than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of Marbury v. Madison
27
that
the power of judicial review was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what shall be the supreme law of
the land, the constitution itself is first mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally,
but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and
strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law
repugnant to the constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by
that instrument.
28
(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant in the 1935 Constitution, the
power of judicial review was exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.
29
And as
pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
30
the
executive and legislative branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this power of
judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall
not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void
and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,
31
judicial review is indeed an integral component of the
delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of
powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are
utilized only for the benefit of the people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of
each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. x x x And the
judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive
and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
32
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
22

boundaries of authority and control between them."
33
To him, "[j]udicial review is the chief, indeed the
only, medium of participation or instrument of intervention of the judiciary in that balancing
operation."
34

To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by "any branch or
instrumentalities of government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for
the first time into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this
Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt from the sponsorship
speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
x x x
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality
of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial
law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during
the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the
defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law
failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court
said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. x x x
x x x
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a
duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter
evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
35
(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
23

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration,
36
this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course
stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional
provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being
essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in
common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the
framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum.
37
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary
38
in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in
mind the object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be
prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the
times, and the condition and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object
is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular
provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as
to make the words consonant to that reason and calculated to effect that purpose.
39
(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue
40
where, speaking through Madame Justice
Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of
constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain
and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
41
(Emphasis and
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. Thus,
in Chiongbian v. De Leon,
42
this Court, through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with
all other provisions of that great document.
43
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
44
this Court affirmed that:
24

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution
is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered
and interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to
stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words
idle and nugatory.
45
(Emphasis supplied)
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. In still
the same case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting
Constitution, resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention "are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority
who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what
appears upon its face." The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's understanding thereof.
46
(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional refinement and jurisprudential application of
the power of judicial review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator
Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the
coverage of judicial review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. that impeachment is a political
action which cannot assume a judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at any
stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of judicial review.
47

For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole power to try" impeachment
cases
48
(1) entirely excludes the application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the
Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.
49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment proceedings are outside the scope of
judicial review, respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely heavily on
American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the case of Nixon v. United States.
50
Thus, they
contend that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate since it runs
counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different fora the powers to try impeachments and to try
crimes; it disturbs the system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the only legislative
check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of finality and difficulty in fashioning
relief.
51
Respondents likewise point to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate
judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence, the American Constitution and
American authorities cannot be credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try
and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec. 3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the legislature, to the
25

total exclusion of the power of judicial review to check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment
process. Nor can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers upon the Senate the
inherently judicial power to determine constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious
application for these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive
merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in the case of Garcia vs.
COMELEC,
52
"[i]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign
jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs."
53
Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to
that of the United States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the colorful words of
Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S.
Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme
Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as
expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an
expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with
respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without limitation,
54
our
Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases,
55
provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3),
(4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and
the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments undermines their finality and may
also lead to conflicts between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise
judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of
the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride."
56

But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in the
Constitution? This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker
v. Carr,
57
"judicially discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion,
through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez
58
and Alejandrino v. Quezon,
59
cited by respondents in support of the
argument that the impeachment power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These
cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to compel the legislature to perform non-
ministerial acts, and do not concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over
congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.,
60
this Court ruled that it is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v.
Angara,
61
in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,
62
this Court declared null and
void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the
election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17,
26

Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,
63
it held that the resolution of whether the House
representation in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review.
In Daza v. Singson,
64
it held that the act of the House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from
the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,
65
it held that
although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not
detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v.
Electoral Commission,
66
it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."
67
Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch
of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts' power of judicial review, like almost all
powers conferred by the Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have
"standing" to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed
as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution
but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect
the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.
68
(Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions, contends that petitioners do not have
standing since only the Chief Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus
curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have standing since this Court had, in
the past, accorded standing to taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving
paramount public interest
70
and transcendental importance,
71
and that procedural matters are subordinate
to the need to determine whether or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves
27

within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them.
72
Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing
transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception that, when the real party in interest is
unable to vindicate his rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who, for
ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, the courts will grant petitioners
standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-in-interest and the rule on standing, for the
former is a concept of civil procedure
73
while the latter has constitutional underpinnings.
74
In view of the
arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato
75
to clarify what is meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has been noted by
authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing because of its constitutional and public
policy underpinnings, is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the
real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are directed towards
ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the
judiciary in certain areas.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not
by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken,
but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. Hence the
question in standing is whether such parties have "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."
x x x
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he is "the party who would
be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"
76
(Citations
omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of
the House of Representatives, none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights
of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own rights as
taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of
the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and legislators when specific
requirements have been met have been given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be
direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but
also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.
77
In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right,
78
the mere fact that
he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
28

In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
79
Before he can invoke the
power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing
the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of
the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public.
80

At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be
entertained.
81
This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief
Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims
infringes his prerogatives as a legislator.
82
Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his
office.
83

While an association has legal personality to represent its members,
84
especially when it is composed of
substantial taxpayers and the outcome will affect their vital interests,
85
the mere invocation by
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the
rule of law and nothing more, although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing. Its
interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. However, a reading of the
petitions shows that it has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view
of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.
86
It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the
rules on standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens, persons intervening must be
sufficiently numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned
87
to enable the court to deal properly
with all interests involved in the suit,
88
for a judgment in a class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the class, is, under theres judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or not they were
before the court.
89
Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently represented as shown
by the divergent issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class
suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionallyallege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their
petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole ground of transcendental
importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the following instructive determinants
formulated by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of
the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.
90
Applying these determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein
are indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner
where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public.
91
Such liberality does not, however, mean that
the requirement that a party should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the
very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial
notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does not thus have
standing.
29

With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules of Court requires an
intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of right, it
may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention.
92

In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners
Candelaria, et. al. in G.R. No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same issues
and the same standing, and no objection on the part of petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been
interposed, this Court as earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and Petition-in-
Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join
petitioner Francisco in G.R. No. 160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that "they
will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of the House of Representatives is
successful," this Court found the requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292,
160295, and 160310 were of transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to raise the additional issue of
whether or not the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of
the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and
World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the matter in
litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the limited purpose of making of
record and arguing a point of view that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to
this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence of the Senate
which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to it from the
House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
he being a member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed. For this reason, and to
fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and
he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must be denied for, while he asserts an
interest as a taxpayer, he failed to meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth
in Dumlao v. Comelec,
93
to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys,
nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and
spent in violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of legislative power," or that
there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
94
(Citations
omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege that the act of petitioners will
result in illegal disbursement of public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper purpose.
Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
30

In Tan v. Macapagal,
95
this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando, held that for a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, "it is a prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or performed by
either branch before a court may come into the picture."
96
Only then may the courts pass on the validity of
what was done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been carried out,
i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of Representatives and the 2001
Rules have already been already promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has
been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant petitions are premature. Amicus
curiaeformer Senate President Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this Court
to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus
recommends that all remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law who suggests to this Court
to take judicial notice of on-going attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment
complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House Impeachment Rules provide for an
opportunity for members to raise constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of Impeachment
are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming
that the Articles are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of their constitutional
infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the Representatives of their signatures
would not, by itself, cure the House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would
such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment complaint since it would only
place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution
97
and, therefore,
petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or both Houses of Congress
before coming to this Court is shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of
Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively
vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be
sought from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,
98
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion defined the term "political
question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance,
namely, a question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers
to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
99
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly without any rhyme or reason, this Court
vacillated on its stance of taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In some cases,
this Court hid behind the cover of the political question doctrine and refused to exercise its power of
31

judicial review.
100
In other cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein issues
involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies.
101
Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v. Executive
Secretary
102
which raised the issue of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this
Court shunted the political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification by the people of a
Constitution is a political question, it being a question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction
over certain cases during the Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a
Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its application on issues
involving political questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I suppose, the usual comment that the
judiciary is the weakest among the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds the
purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with which to enforce its decisions or
commands except the power of reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of God,
and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I
will proceed to read the provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or instrumentality
of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our experience during martial
law. As a matter of fact, it has some antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during
the deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance that in a number of cases
against the government, which then had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the
defense of political questions and got away with it. As a consequence, certain principles
concerning particularly the writ of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and effect of martial law
failed because the government set up the defense of political question. And the Supreme Court
said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not merely
request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further
violations thereof during the martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar
with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the Commission who are not lawyers,
allow me to explain. I will start with a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case
of Javellana vs. the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was announced on
September 22, although the proclamation was dated September 21. The obvious reason for the
delay in its publication was that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent
newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was announced on September 22, the
media hardly published anything about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only
32

because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also because those who succeeded
them in their jobs were under mortal threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The
1971 Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by September 21 or 22 had not
finished the Constitution; it had barely agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to
say that upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971 Constitutional
Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of them was our very own colleague,
Commissioner Calderon. So, the unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by
representatives of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the 1971
Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for about 14 months. The draft of the
1973 Constitution was presented to the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the
President issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of some provisions
in the martial law decree which prohibited discussions, much less public discussions of certain
matters of public concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on the draft of
the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held sometime in January 1973. If I may use a
word famous by our colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the draft of
the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a telling effect that Malacaang felt the
danger of its approval. So, the President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and
announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be held from January 10 to
January 15. But the questions to be submitted in the referendum were not announced until the
eve of its scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the Commission on
Elections, but of what was then designated as "citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the
barangays came into existence. The questions to be propounded were released with proposed
answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to hold a plebiscite because the answers
given in the referendum should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a
motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of the referendum be
suspended. When the motion was being heard before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice
delivered to the Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new Constitution was
already in force because the overwhelming majority of the votes cast in the referendum favored
the Constitution. Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded to the
session room where the case was being heard. I then informed the Court and the parties the
presidential proclamation declaring that the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and
is now in force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential proclamation null and void. The
main defense put up by the government was that the issue was a political question and that the
court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
x x x
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January 15, the vast majority
ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents
of Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of
residence, much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw any
referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of the members of the
Court felt that there had been no referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a big difference between a
referendum and a plebiscite. But another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was
a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This is not the only major case in which
the plea of "political question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue was clearly justiciable.
33

x x x
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its functions, it faced the following
questions: What is judicial power? What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle actual controversies
involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are
guaranteed by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband
complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can
tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we
cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her husband. There are some
rights guaranteed by law, but they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion
would be highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable or enforceable . . .
The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide, hypothetical questions. In a
presidential system of government, the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The
powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is
vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a
duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter
evade the duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners may have an initial food
for thought on the subject of the judiciary.
103
(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief Justice Concepcion further clarified the
concept of judicial power, thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial power is not vested in
the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems to identify political questions
with jurisdictional questions. But there is a difference.
34

MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to ordinary cases but where there is a
question as to whether the government had authority or had abused its authority to the extent of
lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not a political question. Therefore, the court
has the duty to decide.
x x x
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided by the Supreme Court
according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of discretion, amounting to a lack
of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to do away with the
political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define what is judicial power. But the
Gentleman will notice it says, "judicial power includes" and the reason being that the definition
that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from the political question
doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly political questions are
beyond the pale of judicial power.
104
(Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere specter
of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify,
however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions." From this
clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and
(2) those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of
separation of powers to be maintained. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the UP College of Law, this Court has in
fact in a number of cases taken jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the
effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,
105
this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held:
35

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of
judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left
to the political departments to decide.
106
x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
107
through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the
Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that
obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away
with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases."
108
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,
109
speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
110
x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable political questions and non-
justiciable political questions, however. Identification of these two species of political questions may be
problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of Baker v. Carr
111
attempts to
provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for questioning adherence
to a political decision already made; or thepotentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.
112
(Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct
concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion that the
others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American concept of judicial review is
radically different from our current concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our
courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question
lies in the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether
the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall thus
now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
36

I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute valid
impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in accordance with Section 3(4), Article
XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into the Judicial
Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted by the 12th
Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the
Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint over which this Court
has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion of this issue would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation.
Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six grounds for impeachment, two of
these, namely, other high crimes and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission shows that the framers could find no
better way to approximate the boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by alluding
to both positive and negative examples of both, without arriving at their clear cut definition or even a
standard therefor.
114
Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question
which is beyond the scope of its judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the constitutionality of a governmental act
should be avoided whenever possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,
115
this
Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and
decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and
that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may
rest its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be
unavoidable.
116
[Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,
117
where this Court
invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due
process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question only
if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are first
satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely
37

raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the
decision of the case itself.
118
[Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the invalidity of the second
impeachment complaint, collectively raise several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this
controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the remaining
substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that
"the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is applied."
119

In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among other reasons, the second
impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly resulted from a Resolution
120
calling for a legislative
inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be
unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of powers; (c) a violation of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the
judiciary.
121

Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the studied opinion of this Court
that the issue of the constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far
removed from the issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of
said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law touching on the
separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is
required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the fact that
said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their petition which would not be adversely
affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative inquiries has already been
enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,
122
viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the
Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing
in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons
under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the right not be
compelled to testify against one's self.
123

In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete Quirino Quadra, while joining the original
petition of petitioners Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second impeachment
complaint was verified and filed only by Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
Fuentebella, the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution
which reads:
38

Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-
third of all the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of Representatives signed a Resolution of
Endorsement/Impeachment, the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the afore-
mentioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of impeachment" was not filed "by at least
one-third of all the Members of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and
Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have verified the same merely as a
"Resolution of Endorsement." Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of Endorsement
which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement of the abovementioned
Complaint of Representatives Gilberto Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x"
124

Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the Constitution requires in order for said
second impeachment complaint to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in the
Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be "filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-
third of the Members of the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this requirement, they
concede that the second impeachment complaint should have been calendared and referred to the
House Committee on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who opined that for Section 3 (4), Article
XI of the Constitution to apply, there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified the
second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and verified the signatories to a resolution of
impeachment. Justice Maambong likewise asserted that the Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment
signed by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the
resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such resolution of endorsement being
necessary only from at least one Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.
While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and Quadra, does indeed limit the scope
of the constitutional issues to the provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate
against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy. Chief among this is the fact
that only Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a
ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to adopt this additional ground as the
basis for deciding the instant consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of the
original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as unnecessary for the determination of the
instant cases is made easier by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in the
petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and issues as their own. Consequently, they
are not unduly prejudiced by this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked as they are, constitute the very
lis mota of the instant controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article
39

XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred
under Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court
reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for
the Court to not assume jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject
to impeachment."
125
But this argument is very much like saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion
not to pass laws with penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to
them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication
may not be declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as
there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred."
126
Otherwise, this Court would be
shirking from its duty vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with
authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take cognizance of the instant petitions.
127
In the august words
of amicus curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn duty which may not be
renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of government cannot inhibit
itself and must rule upon the challenge because no other office has the authority to do so.
128
On the
occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted upon the
matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with
detachment and fairness."
129
After all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member
of the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass upon the merits of their varied
contentions. For this reason, they expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be
unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral fiber strong enough
to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."
130

The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest had already been settled in the case
ofAbbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal.
131
In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent Senate
Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the
hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested parties to
said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced the Tribunal's membership to only its three
Justices-Members whose disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter. This Court
held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in
the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to
the substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered,
would leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can
perform, but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not prevented from
discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the
highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the
fundamental law.
40

It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of the Constitution could
not have been unaware of the possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators
elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might
surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats
in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such
unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose
disqualification may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal. Justices
and Senators, singly and collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal.
Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the
resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in
the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of
the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire
membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-
Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,
132
it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a majority of them, is nothing
short ofpro tanto depriving the Court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental
law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if that judge is the one
designated by the Constitution to exercise the jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the
Justices of this Court, the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the deprivation
of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very heart of judicial independence. The
proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative
but to abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Justices.
133
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when it exercises its power of
judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,
134
this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of
the power of judicial review, enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v.
TVA
135
as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary
proceeding, declining because to decide such questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and
as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It
never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could
transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless
absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.'
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the
record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This
rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds,
41

one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general
law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging its
decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the
judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of one who fails to show
that he is injured by its operation. Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking
than the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the
challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his official duty will not be
entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a
citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional.
In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained
although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has
availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of
constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided (citations
omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in Ashwander v. TVA from different
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case
2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this Court in the exercise of judicial
review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he must have a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
136

Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for judicial restraint the possibility that
"judicial review of impeachments might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and the
42

[J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial
hearings, and the scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious political instability at
home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable
official.
137
Intervenor Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to enforce its
Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution of its judicial authority and erode public
confidence and faith in the judiciary.
Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the
possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to refrain from
upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases. Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties
just because their action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive act is not regarded as
settled until the Supreme Court has passed upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the
judgment has not only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the petitioner's prayer to nullify an
act for lack of the necessary number of votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the
other, itself constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least quasi-validation,
follows."
138

Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary
139
where this Court was split and "in the end there were not
enough votes either to grant the petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims,"
140
the pre-existing
constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that the coordinate branches of the
government would behave in a lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to believe that any of the branches of
government will behave in a precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and anarchy by
encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by the doctrine in People v.
Veneracion, towit:
141

Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If [public officers], under
the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries
within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes
meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by the
Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.
142

Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedure
for Impeachment Proceedings
adopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia, argues that Sections 16 and 17 of
Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present
Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it
is the House of Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power to initiate all cases
of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article
XI of the Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a verified complaint for
impeachment by any member of the House of Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
43

endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the members of the House. Respondent House
of Representatives concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same officials could not have been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the House of Representatives,
acting as the collective body, has yet to act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term "initiate." Resort to statutory
construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution, Commissioner Florenz Regalado,
who eventually became an Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as "to file,"
as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner Maambong during the Constitutional
Commission proceedings, which he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the oral
arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at which he added that the act of "initiating"
included the act of taking initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the word
"initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the Constitution means to file the complaint and
take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or
set going. As Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely puts it, it
means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes with Justice Regalado's position, and that of
Father Bernas, who elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on November 5, 2003 in
this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a comlexus of acts consisting of
a beginning, a middle and an end. The end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the
Senate. The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the formulation of the
articles of impeachment. The beginning or the initiation is the filing of the complaint and its
referral to the Committee on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by Representatives Cojuangco and
Fuentebella says that impeachment is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in
favor of impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the Committee. Note that
the Rule does not say "impeachment proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated."
The language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal fiction there is an attempt
to postpone it to a time after actual initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is looking into the intent of the law.
Fortunately, the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the procedure and the substantive
provisions on impeachment, I understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these
would need some time for Committee action.
However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the Committee a resolution on
impeachment proceedings, copies of which have been furnished the Members of this body. This
is borne out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and
Good Government which took charge of the last impeachment resolution filed before the First
Batasang Pambansa. For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers several steps in
the impeachment proceedings starting with initiation, action of the Speaker committee action,
calendaring of report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate, trial and judgment by
the Senate.
x x x
44

MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a reconsideration of the approval of
the amendment submitted by Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking
that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor. The procedure,
as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what
is actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution containing the Articles of
Impeachment is the one approved by the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on Style, it appears that
the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary
submitted the recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and
it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which initiates it. It only approves
or disapproves the resolution. So, on that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in
rearranging these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing
with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are
with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my
proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on
record.
x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the approval of Section 3 (3).
My reconsideration will not at all affect the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact
formulation of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding
impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of this provision, that on page 2,
Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings"and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word "resolution" the phrase WITH
THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by"
with OF, so that the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members
of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of
Impeachment OF the Committee or to override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member
shall be recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House of Representatives of
the United States is concerned, really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every
resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the
words "Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing of a
verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will mention again, Madam
President, that my amendment will not vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with
the uniform procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank
you, Madam President.
143
(Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and accepted by the Committee on
the Accountability of Public Officers.
144

It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of the complaint. In his amicus
curiaebrief, Commissioner Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to
initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle
and make it understood once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the
filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does not
initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing of a verified complaint
under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the Constitution."
145

45

Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same view as is Father Bernas, who was
also a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article XI,
Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing must be accompanied by an action to set
the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that the word "initiate," appearing in
the constitutional provision on impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of
impeachment.
x x x
within a period of one year, (Emphasis supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to initiate." The object in the first
sentence is "impeachment case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding."
Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be distinguished from the term
"proceedings." An impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate.
Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring
a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all cases of
impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the
Senate, a "proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated." To
initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a
progressive noun. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the
House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified complaint either by a Member of
the House of Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the
Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which may either
reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee rejects or upholds the
complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either affirms a favorable
resolution of the Committee or overrides a contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If
at least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment are prepared and
transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this
point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully
charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not initiated when the complaint is
transmitted to the Senate for trial because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of
another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment proceeding" initiated when the House
deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that has
already been done. The action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or
beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to
the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal
reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary toinitiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a
complaint does.
146
Thus the line was deleted and is not found in the present Constitution.
46

Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated
against the same official more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second verified
complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By his explanation, this
interpretation is founded on the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to
begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they
understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse
meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings
because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all
cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo
singula singulisby equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae briefs of two former
Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings
are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint
and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of
the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3)
by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified
complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These rules
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different
meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court could not use contemporaneous
construction as an aid in the interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino
147
wherein this
Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were delegates to the Constitution
Convention) on the matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different
footing from the properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he
states that this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional Convention to actors who are so
absorbed in their emotional roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning
because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.
148

Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present petitions. There are at present only two
members of this Court who participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice Davide
and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken part in these proceedings for obvious
reasons. Moreover, this Court has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members of
the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of the deliberations and proceedings
thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3 (8) of Article XI, it is clear and
unequivocal that it and only it has the power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its
argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute power to promulgate its rules. This
assumption, however, is misplaced.
47

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively
carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to
make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary to either affirm
a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary
resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all
the Members of the House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the
Senate shall forthwith proceed.
within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental law. If as alleged
Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter
or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
In Osmea v. Pendatun,
149
this Court held that it is within the province of either House of Congress to
interpret its rules and that it was the best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members.
However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,
150
Justice (later Chief Justice)
Enrique Fernando, speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States v.
Smith,
151
declared that where the construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of
the Legislature, the question becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,
152
quoting United States
v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,
153
Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking for this Court, held that while the
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of method are open to the determination of
the Legislature. In the same case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his Concurring
and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he stressed that in the Philippine setting there is
even more reason for courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor
do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over
he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of
rules of procedure by legislators.
48

Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1) as a window to view the
issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of
the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day,
passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the Speaker, the names of members
sufficient to make a quorum in the hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk
and recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names of the members voting,
and be counted and announced in determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question, therefore, is as to
the validity of this rule, and not what methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for
determining the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own
volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly,
of such a rule present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only
one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should
be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and
the result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are
open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a
rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge
of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional rules,
i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found to
satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any
fundamental right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result sought to be
attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere
invocation of the principle of separation of powers.
154

x x x
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the
political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1,
Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "x x x to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new
and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed
from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous
power to our courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of state
power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the political question doctrine. Led by
the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened
49

the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government.
155

x x x
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not a mere power which it
can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty
of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Rightly or
wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking powers of this Court against the other
branches of government despite their more democratic character, the President and the
legislators being elected by the people.
156

x x x
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of justice. . . to determine
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the
capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis--
vis the other branches of government. This provision was dictated by our experience under
martial law which taught us that a stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort
abuses in government. x x x
x x x
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of government committed
with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to
activism. This transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely
evolutionary but revolutionary.Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court approached
constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution,
there is a shift in stress this Court is mandated to approach constitutional violations not by
finding out what it should not do but what itmust do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty
by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this new constitutional
provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define the parameters of our power to review
violations of the rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against
government abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be
sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has increasingly
emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if not defy, orders of our
courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be
depreciated by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar,
the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the experience of
foreigners.
157
(Italics in the original emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the instant petitions. Here, the third parties
alleging the violation of private rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v. US
158
as basis for arguing that this
Court may not decide on the constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules. As
already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply provides that "the House of Representatives shall
have the sole power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue whatsoever as to how this
"sole power" is to be exercised. No limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court
50

concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of a constitutional power to
the House of Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to impeachment power of the
Philippine House of Representatives since our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several
provisions articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules which state that
impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself
affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is
not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House
of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members
of the House thus clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term "initiate" a meaning
different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint and
referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner,
another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI, Section
3(5) of the Constitution.
In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President Estrada against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and
referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed
by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is always a phenomenon that takes the
center stage of our individual and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair for
human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean the seriousness of the controversy over
the Davide impeachment. For many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating,
mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to
articulate what they respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues involved.
Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or against the impeachment of the Chief Justice,
took to the streets armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the matter. Various
sectors of society - from the business, retired military, to the academe and denominations of faith
offered suggestions for a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the governmental
branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of Impeachment had been constituted, this
Court was specifically asked, told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect
to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment complaint against the subject
respondent public official. When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this
Court, the same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the arguments of "lack of
jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that
may have a bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the constitutionality
of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has
been already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise
51

of its constitutionally vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely
called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in
here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can properly and competently
address and adjudicate in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of
government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under the Court's jurisdiction,
no other course of action can be had but for it to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the process of impeachment has
effectively set up a regime of judicial supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main
issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction
where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because
it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of
the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to complement the discharge by the executive
and legislative of their own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded and
ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of constitutionality of the impeachment
proceedings against the Chief Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to protect a
brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue is as much at stake as is that of the Chief
Justice. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has long held and been entrusted
with the judicial power to resolve conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the
suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by whomsoever
stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it,
so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted to wield
judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is involved when it is
an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's
official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules on the inhibition of
any member of the judiciary from taking part in a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire
institution now from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of impartiality when
one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes
equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure
respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or
instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme
Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases
especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law
and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does not imply that
he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective
of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put to test once again by this
impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other
than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a crisis in government.
But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal
principles, it is equally important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only to
discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon each other.
52

WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional.
Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was
filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.
Puno, and Ynares-Santiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
Vitug, Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate concurring opinion.
Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion received.
Carpio, J., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority opinion and in the separate opinion of J. Vitug.
Corona, J., will write a separate concurring opinion.
Azcuna, J., concur in the separate opinion.

Footnotes
1
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 180-182; Annex "H."
2
Per Special Appearance with Manifestation of House Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. (Rollo,
G.R. No. 160261 at 325-363) the pertinent House Resolution is HR No. 260, but no copy of the
same was submitted before this Court.
3
Id. at 329. Created through PD No. 1949 (July 18, 1984), the JDF was established "to help
ensure and guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and
public policy and required by the impartial administration of justice" by creating a special fund to
augment the allowances of the members and personnel of the Judiciary and to finance the
acquisition, maintenance and repair of office equipment and facilities."
4
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 120-139; Annex "E."
5
The initial complaint impleaded only Justices Artemio V. Panganiban, Josue N. Bellosillo,
Reynato S. Puno, Antonio T. Carpio and Renato C. Corona, and was later amended to include
Justices Jose C. Vitug, and Leonardo A. Quisumbing.
6
Supra note 4 at 123-124.
7
Rollo, G.R. No. 160403 at 48-53; Annex "A."
8
http://www.congress.gov.ph/search/bills/hist_show.php?bill_no=RPT9999
9
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 8.
10
Rollo, G.R. No. 160295 at 11.
11
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 43-84; Annex "B."
53

12
Supra note 2.
13
A perusal of the attachments submitted by the various petitioners reveals the following
signatories to the second impeachment complaint and the accompanying
Resolution/Endorsement. 1. Gilbert Teodoro, Jr., NPC, Tarlac (principal complainant) 2. Felix
Fuentebella, NPC, Camarines Sur (second principal complainant) 3. Julio Ledesma, IV, NPC,
Negros Occidental 4. Henry Lanot, NPC, Lone District of Pasig City 5. Kim Bernardo-Lokin, Party
List-CIBAC 6. Marcelino Libanan, NPC, Lone District of Eastern Samar, (Chairman, House
Committee on Justice) 7. Emmylou Talino-Santos, Independent, 1st District, North Cotobato 8.
Douglas RA. Cagas, NPC, 1st District, Davao del Sur 9. Sherwin Gatchalian, NPC, 1st District,
Valenzuela City 10. Luis Bersamin, Jr., PDSP-PPC, Lone District of Abra 11. Nerissa Soon-Ruiz
Alayon, 6th District, Cebu 12. Ernesto Nieva, Lakas, 1st District, Manila 13. Edgar R. Erice,
Lakas, 2nd District, Kalookan City 14. Ismael Mathay III, Independent, 2nd District, Quezon City
15. Samuel Dangwa, Reporma, Lone District of Benguet 16. Alfredo Maraon, Jr., NPC, 2nd
District, Negros Occidental 17. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon, Reporma, 1st District, Zamboanga del
Norte 18. Agapito A. Aquino, LDP, 2nd District, Makati City 19. Fausto L. Seachon, Jr., NPC, 3rd
District, Masbate 20. Georgilu Yumul-Hermida, Pwersa ng Masa, 4th District, Quezon 21. Jose
Carlos Lacson, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros Occidental 22. Manuel C. Ortega, NPC, 1st District, La
Union 23. Uliran Joaquin, NPC, 1st District, Laguna 24. Soraya C. Jaafar, Lakas, Lone District of
Tawi-Tawi 25. Wilhelmino Sy-Alvarado, Lakas, 1st District, Bulacan 26. Claude P. Bautista, NPC,
2nd District, Davao Del Sur 27. Del De Guzman, Lakas, Lone District of Marikina City 28. Zeneida
Cruz-Ducut, NPC, 2nd District, Pampanga 29. Augusto Baculio, Independent-LDP, 2nd District,
Misamis Oriental 30. Faustino Dy III, NPC-Lakas, 3rd District, Isabela 31. Agusto Boboy Syjuco,
Lakas, 2nd District, Iloilo 32. Rozzano Rufino B. Biazon, LDP, Lone District of Muntinlupa City 33.
Leovigildo B. Banaag, NPC-Lakas, 1st District, Agusan del Norte 34. Eric Singson, LP, 2nd
District, Ilocos Sur 35. Jacinto Paras, Lakas, 1st District, Negros Oriental 36. Jose Solis,
Independent, 2nd District, Sorsogon 37. Renato B. Magtubo, Party List-Partido ng Manggagawa
38. Herminio G. Teves, Lakas, 3rd District, Negros Oriental 39. Amado T. Espino, Jr., Lakas, 2nd
District, Pangasinan 40. Emilio Macias, NPC, 2nd District, Negros Oriental 41. Arthur Y. Pingoy,
Jr., NPC, 2nd District, South Cotobato 42. Francis Nepomuceno, NPC, 1st District, Pampanga
43. Conrado M. Estrella III, NPC, 6th District, Pangasinan 44. Elias Bulut, Jr., NPC, Lone District
of Apayao 45. Jurdin Jesus M. Romualdo, NPC, Lone District of Camiguin 46. Juan Pablo
Bondoc, NPC, 4th District, Pampanga 47. Generoso DC. Tulagan, NPC, 3rd District, Pangasinan
48. Perpetuo Ylagan, Lakas, Lone District of Romblon 49. Michael Duavit, NPC, 1st District, Rizal
50. Joseph Ace H. Durano, NPC, 5th District, Cebu 51. Jesli Lapus, NPC, 3rd District, Tarlac 52.
Carlos Q. Cojuangco, NPC, 4th District, Negros Occidental 53. Georgidi B. Aggabao, NPC, 4th
District, Santiago, Isabela 54. Francis Escudero, NPC, 1st District, Sorsogon 55. Rene M.
Velarde, Party List-Buhay 56. Celso L. Lobregat, LDP, Lone District of Zamboanga City 57. Alipio
Cirilo V. Badelles, NPC, 1st District, Lanao del Norte 58. Didagen P. Dilangalen, Pwersa ng
Masa, Lone District of Maguindanao 59. Abraham B. Mitra, LDP, 2nd District, Palawan 60.
Joseph Santiago, NPC, Lone District of Catanduanes 61. Darlene Antonino-Custodio, NPC, 1st
District of South Cotobato & General Santos City 62. Aleta C. Suarez, LP, 3rd District, Quezon
63. Rodolfo G. Plaza, NPC, Lone District of Agusan del Sur 64. JV Bautista, Party List-Sanlakas
65. Gregorio Ipong, NPC, 2nd District, North Cotabato 66. Gilbert C. Remulla, LDP, 2nd District,
Cavite 67. Rolex T. Suplico, LDP, 5th District, Iloilo 68. Celia Layus, NPC, Cagayan 69. Juan
Miguel Zubiri, Lakas, 3rd District, Bukidnon 70. Benasing Macarambon Jr,. NPC, 2nd District,
Lanao del Sur 71. Josefina Joson, NPC, Lone District of Nueva Ecija 72. Mark Cojuangco, NPC,
5th District, Pangasinan 73. Mauricio Domogan, Lakas, Lone District of Baguio City 74. Ronaldo
B. Zamora, Pwersa ng Masa, Lone District of San Juan 75. Angelo O. Montilla, NPC, Lone
District of Sultan Kudarat 76. Roseller L. Barinaga, NPC, 2nd District, Zamboanga del Norte 77.
Jesnar R. Falcon, NPC, 2nd District, Surigao del Sur 78. Ruy Elias Lopez, NPC, 3rd District,
Davao City.
14
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 5. Petitioner had previously filed two separate impeachment
complaints before the House of Representatives against Ombudsman Aniano Desierto.
54

15
299 SCRA 744 (1998). In Chavez v. PCGG, petitioner Chavez argued that as a taxpayer and a
citizen, he had the legal personality to file a petition demanding that the PCGG make public any
and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to the PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses'
ill-gotten wealth. Petitioner Chavez further argued that the matter of recovering the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses is an issue of transcendental importance to the public. The Supreme
Court, citing Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150
SCRA 530 (1987) and Albano v. Reyes, 175 SCRA 264 (1989) ruled that petitioner had standing.
The Court, however, went on to elaborate that in any event, the question on the standing of
petitioner Chavez was rendered moot by the intervention of the Jopsons who are among the
legitimate claimants to the Marcos wealth.
16
384 SCRA 152 (2002). In Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation,
wherein the petition sought to compel the Public Estates Authority (PEA) to disclose all facts on
its then on-going negotiations with Amari Coastal Development Corporation to reclaim portions of
Manila Bay, the Supreme Court said that petitioner Chavez had the standing to bring a taxpayer's
suit because the petition sought to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.
17
224 SCRA 792 (1993).
18
Subsequent petitions were filed before this Court seeking similar relief. Other than the petitions,
this Court also received Motions for Intervention from among others, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr.,
and Special Appearances by House Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr., and Senate President
Franklin Drilon.
19
Supra note 2 at 10.
20
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Former Constitutional Commissioners Justice Regalado E.
Maambong and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Former Minister of
Justice and Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Deans Pacifico Agabin and Raul C.
Pangalangan, and Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga,.
21
Rollo, G.R. No. 160261 at 275-292.
22
Id. at 292.
23
63 Phil 139 (1936).
24
Id. at 157-159.
25
Vide Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924); Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil 1051 (1957); Ynot
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148 SCRA 659, 665 (1987).
26
Const., art. VIII, sec. 1.
27
5 US 137 (1803).
28
Id. at 180.
29
In In re Prautch, 1 Phil 132 (1902), this Court held that a statute allowing for imprisonment for
non-payment of a debt was invalid. In Casanovas v. Hord, 8 Phil 125 (1907), this Court
invalidated a statute imposing a tax on mining claims on the ground that a government grant
stipulating that the payment of certain taxes by the grantee would be in lieu of other taxes was a
contractual obligation which could not be impaired by subsequent legislation. In Concepcion v.
55

Paredes, 42 Phil 599 (1921), Section 148 (2) of the Administrative Code, as amended, which
provided that judges of the first instance with the same salaries would, by lot, exchange judicial
districts every five years, was declared invalid for being a usurpation of the power of appointment
vested in the Governor General. In McDaniel v. Apacible, 42 Phil 749 (1922), Act No. 2932, in so
far as it declares open to lease lands containing petroleum which have been validly located and
held, was declared invalid for being a depravation of property without due process of law. In U.S.
v. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil 1 (1922), Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorized the Governor-General to
fix the price of rice by proclamation and to make the sale of rice in violation of such a
proclamation a crime, was declared an invalid delegation of legislative power.
30
Vicente V. Mendoza, Sharing The Passion and Action of our Time 62-53 (2003).
31
Supra note 23.
32
Id. at 156-157.
33
Florentino P. Feliciano, The Application of Law: Some Recurring Aspects Of The Process Of
Judicial Review And Decision Making, 37 AMJJUR 17, 24 (1992).
34
Ibid.
35
I Record of the Constitutional Commission 434-436 (1986).
36
31 SCRA 413 (1970)
37
Id. at 422-423; Vide Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770 (1988); Luz Farms v. Secretary of
the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51 (1990); Ordillo v. Commission on
Elections, 192 SCRA 100 (1990).
38
194 SCRA 317 (1991).
39
Id. at 325 citing Maxwell v. Dow, 176 US 581.
40
152 SCRA 284 (1987).
41
Id. at 291 citing Gold Creek Mining v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil 259 (1938), J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc v.
Land Tenure Administration, supra note 36, and I Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the
Philippines 21 ( Fourth Ed. ).
42
82 Phil 771 (1949).
43
Id. at 775.
44
Supra note 38.
45
Id. at 330-331.
46
Id. at 337-338 citing 16 CJS 2.31; Commonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Atl. 220
and Household Finance Corporation v. Shaffner, 203, SW 2d, 734, 356 Mo. 808.
47
Supra note 2.
56

48
Citing Section 3 (6), Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment.
When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the
President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall
preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
49
Supra note 21.
50
506 U.S. 224 (1993).
51
Supra note 2 at 349-350 citing Gerhardt, Michael J. The Federal Impeachment Process: A
Constitutional and Historical Analysis, 1996, p. 119.
52
227 SCRA 100 (1993).
53
Id. at 112.
54
US Constititon. Section 2. x x x The House of Representatives shall have the sole Power of
Impeachment.
55
1987 Constitution, Article XI, Section 3 (1). The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
56
Supra note 2 at 355 citing Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy, 1984,
pp. 112-113.
57
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
58
141 SCRA 263 (1986).
59
Supra note 25.
60
298 SCRA 756 (1998).
61
272 SCRA 18 (1997).
62
201 SCRA 792 (1991).
63
187 SCRA 377 (1990).
64
180 SCRA 496 (1989).
65
Supra note 25.
66
Supra note 23.
67
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 38 at 330-331.
68
Id. at 158-159.
57

69
IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) citing Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993); House
International Building Tenants Association, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 703
(1987); Baker v. Carr, supra note 57.
70
Citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130 (1995).
71
Citing Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997).
72
Citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, 163 SCRA 371, 378 (1988).
73
Rule 3, Section 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party in interest.
74
JG Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 143, 152 (2000).
75
246 SCRA 540 (1995).
76
Id. at 562-564.
77
Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. No. 155001, May 5, 2003 citing BAYAN v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449,
562-563 (2000) and Baker v. Carr, supra note 57; Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733
(2000); TELEBAP v. COMELEC, 289 SCRA 337 (1998).
78
Chavez v. PCGG, supra note 15.
79
Del Mar v. PAGCOR 346 SCRA 485, 501 (2000) citing Kilosbayan, Inc., et.al. v. Morato,
supra note 70;Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 (1980); Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333
(1976); Philconsa v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966); Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110
Phil 331 (1960); Vide Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15 SCRA
569 (1965); Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association
v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
80
BAYAN v. Zamora, supra note 77 citing Bugnay v. Laron, 176 SCRA 240, 251-252 (1989); Vide
Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79; Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77; TELEBAP v.
COMELEC, supra note 77;Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70; Joya v. PCGG, supra note
69; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Philconsa v.
Mathay, supra note 79; Pelaez v. Auditor General, supra note 79; Philconsa v. Gimenez,
supra note 79; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association v. Feliciano, supra note 79; Pascual v.
Sec. of Public Works, supra note 79.
81
Gonzales v. Narvasa, supra note 77 citing Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79; Sanidad v.
COMELEC, supra note 79; Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 (1972).
82
Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., 243 SCRA 436 (1995); Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 at 140-
141 citing Philconsa v. Enriquez, 235 SCRA 506 (1994); Guingona v. PCGG, 207 SCRA 659
(1992); Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 (1990); Tolentino v. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702
(1971).
83
Del Mar v. PAGCOR, supra note 79 at 502-503 citing Philconsa v. Mathay, supra note 79.
58

84
Chinese Flour Importers Association v. Price Stabilization Board, 89 Phil 439, 461 (1951) citing
Gallego et al. vs. Kapisanan Timbulan ng mga Manggagawa, 46 Off. Gaz, 4245.
85
Philippine Constitution Association v. Gimenez, supra note 79 citing Gonzales v.
Hechanova, 118 Phil. 1065 (1963); Pascual v. Secretary, supra note 79.
86
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000).
87
MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, G.R. No. 135306,
January 28, 2003,citing Industrial Generating Co. v. Jenkins 410 SW 2d 658; Los Angeles County
Winans, 109 P 640;Weberpals v. Jenny, 133 NE 62.
88
Mathay v. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559, 570-571 (1974), citing
Moore's Federal Practice 2d ed., Vol. III, pages 3423-3424; 4 Federal Rules Service, pages 454-
455; Johnson, et al., vs. Riverland Levee Dist., et al., 117 2d 711, 715; Borlasa v. Polistico, 47
Phil. 345, 348 (1925).
89
MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, supra note 87, dissenting
opinion of Justice Carpio; Bulig-bulig Kita Kamag-Anak Assoc. v. Sulpicio Lines, 173 SCRA 514,
514-515 (1989); Re: Request of the Heirs of the Passengers of Doa Paz, 159 SCRA 623, 627
(1988) citing Moore, Federal Practice, 2d ed., Vol. 3B, 23-257, 23-258; Board of Optometry v.
Colet, 260 SCRA 88 (1996), citing Section 12, Rule 3, Rules of Court; Mathay v. Consolidated
Bank and Trust Co., supra note 88; Oposa v. Factoran, supra note 17.
90
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994).
91
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, supra note 70 citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,
supra note 38; Philconsa v. Gimnez, supra note 79; Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association v.
Feliciano, supra note 79; Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949); vide Tatad v. Secretary of the
Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997); Santiago v. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
(1997); KMU v. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 (1994); Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 368 (1993); Carpio
v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992);Osmea v. COMELEC, 199 SCRA 750
(1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52 (1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221
(1991); Daza v. Singson, supra note 64; Dumlao v. COMELEC, supra note 79.
92
Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 522, 531 (1999) citing Gibson vs.
Revilla, 92 SCRA 219; Magsaysay-Labrador v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 266, 271 (1989).
93
Supra note 79.
94
Id. at 403.
95
Supra note 81.
96
Id. at 681.
97
SECTION 3. x x x
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member
thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee,
after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its report to the
59

House within sixty session days from such referral, together with the corresponding
resolution. The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House within ten
session days from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either
to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
98
Supra note 25.
99
Id. at 1067.
100
Vide Barcelon v. Baker, 5 Phil. 87 (1905); Montenegro v. Castaeda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952); De
la Llana v. COMELEC, 80 SCRA 525 (1977).
101
Vide Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949); Macias v. COMELEC, 3 SCRA 1 (1961); Cunanan
v. Tan, Jr., 5 SCRA 1 (1962); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774 (1967); Lansang v.
Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971); Tolentino v. COMELEC, supra note 82.
102
50 SCRA 30 (1973).
103
Record of the Constitution Commission, Vol. 1, July 10, 1986 at 434-436.
104
Id. at 439-443.
105
177 SCRA 668 (1989).
106
Id. at 695.
107
203 SCRA 767 (1991).
108
Id. at 776 citing Gonzales v. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452, 463 (1990).
109
Supra note 64.
110
Id. at 501.
111
Supra note 57.
112
Id. at 217.
113
2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 286.
114
Id. at 278, 316, 272, 283-284, 286.
115
76 Phil 516 (1946).
116
Id. at 522.
117
Supra note 37.
60

118
Id. at 58 citing Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform,175 SCRA 343 (1989).
119
Vide concurring opinion of Justice Vicente Mendoza in Estrada v.Desierto, 353 SCRA 452,
550 (2001);Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208, 210-211 (1987) citing Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S.
288 (1936).
120
As adverted to earlier, neither a copy the Resolution nor a record of the hearings conducted by
the House Committee on Justice pursuant to said Resolution was submitted to the Court by any
of the parties.
121
Rollo, G.R. No. 160310 at 38.
122
Supra note 107.
123
Id. at 777 (citations omitted).
124
Rollo, G.R. No. 160262 at 73.
125
Supra note 2 at 342.
126
Perfecto v. Meer, 85 Phil 552, 553 (1950).
127
Estrada v. Desierto, 356 SCRA 108, 155-156 (2001); Vide Abbas v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal, 166 SCRA 651 (1988); Vargas v. Rilloraza, et al., 80 Phil. 297, 315-316 (1948); Planas
v. COMELEC, 49 SCRA 105 (1973), concurring opinion of J. Concepcion.
128
Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703, 705 (1993).
129
Ibid.
130
Ramirez v. Corpuz-Macandog, 144 SCRA 462, 477 (1986).
131
Supra note 127.
132
Estrada v. Desierto, supra note 127.
133
Id. at 155-156 citing Abbas, et al. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, supra note 127; Vargas v.
Rilloraza, et al., supra note 127.
134
135
Supra note 119.
136
Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 103 (1996); Joya v. PCGG, supra note 69 at
575;Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 242 (1993); Santos III v.
Northwestern Airlines,210 SCRA 256, 261-262 (1992), National Economic Protectionism
Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657, 665 (1989).
137
138
61

139
Supra note 102.
140
Supra note 33.
141
249 SCRA 244, 251 (1995).
142
Id. at 251.
143
2 Records of the Constitutional Commission at 342-416.
144
Id. at 416.
145
Commissioner Maambong's Amicus Curiae Brief at 15.
146
2 Record of the Constitutional Commission at 375-376, 416
147
77 Phil. 192 (1946).
148
Justice Hugo Guiterrez's Amicus Curiae Brief at 7.
149
109 Phil. 863 (1960).
150
40 SCRA 58, 68 (1971).
151
286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932).
152
277 SCRA 268, 286 (1997).
153
144 U.S. 1 (1862).
154
155
Id. at 311.
156
Id. at 313.
157
158 Supra note 50.

62

C. A framework for constitutional litigation
Francisco v. House of Representatives, supra
D. The 1987 Constitution: Preamble and Declaration of Principles and State Policies (Article II)
Bernas, the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary (2003),
pp. 1-4; 35-100
Incorporation Clause (Sec. 2)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 162230 April 28, 2010
ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEA, HERMINIHILDA MANIMBO, LEONOR H.
SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA
M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS,
TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO, MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A. SAGUM,
FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEA, EUGENIA M. LALU, JULIANA G. MAGAT,
CECILIA SANGUYO, ANA ALONZO, RUFINA P. MALLARI, ROSARIO M. ALARCON, RUFINA C.
GULAPA, ZOILA B. MANALUS, CORAZON C. CALMA, MARTA A. GULAPA, TEODORA M.
HERNANDEZ, FERMIN B. DELA PEA, MARIA DELA PAZ B. CULALA, ESPERANZA MANAPOL,
JUANITA M. BRIONES, VERGINIA M. GUEVARRA, MAXIMA ANGULO, EMILIA SANGIL, TEOFILA R.
PUNZALAN, JANUARIA G. GARCIA, PERLA B. BALINGIT, BELEN A. CULALA, PILAR Q. GALANG,
ROSARIO C. BUCO, GAUDENCIA C. DELA PEA, RUFINA Q. CATACUTAN, FRANCIA A. BUCO,
PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P.
DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M.
BUCO, PATRICIA A. BERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C.
BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S.
BALINGIT, TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA
S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y.
MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al. In their capacity and as members of the
"Malaya Lolas Organization",Petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE
63

SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DEL CASTILLO, J .:
The Treaty of Peace with Japan, insofar as it barred future claims such as those asserted by plaintiffs in
these actions, exchanged full compensation of plaintiffs for a future peace. History has vindicated the
wisdom of that bargain. And while full compensation for plaintiffs' hardships, in the purely economic
sense, has been denied these former prisoners and countless other survivors of the war, the
immeasurable bounty of life for themselves and their posterity in a free society and in a more peaceful
world services the debt.
1

There is a broad range of vitally important areas that must be regularly decided by the Executive
Department without either challenge or interference by the Judiciary. One such area involves the delicate
arena of foreign relations. It would be strange indeed if the courts and the executive spoke with different
voices in the realm of foreign policy. Precisely because of the nature of the questions presented, and the
lapse of more than 60 years since the conduct complained of, we make no attempt to lay down general
guidelines covering other situations not involved here, and confine the opinion only to the very questions
necessary to reach a decision on this matter.
Factual Antecedents
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Secretary of the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with
the Securities and Exchange Commission, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of
rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.ten.lihpwal
Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and
systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. Their communities were bombed,
houses were looted and burned, and civilians were publicly tortured, mutilated, and slaughtered.
Japanese soldiers forcibly seized the women and held them in houses or cells, where they were
repeatedly raped, beaten, and abused by Japanese soldiers. As a result of the actions of their Japanese
tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and
disability, and mental and emotional suffering.
2

Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ,
DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers
who ordered the establishment of the "comfort women" stations in the Philippines. However, officials of
the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual
claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance
with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Issues
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the
64

crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to
espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Petitioners arguments
Petitioners argue that the general waiver of claims made by the Philippine government in the Treaty of
Peace with Japan is void. They claim that the comfort women system established by Japan, and the
brutal rape and enslavement of petitioners constituted a crime against humanity,
3
sexual slavery,
4
and
torture.
5
They allege that the prohibition against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from
which no derogation is possible; as such, in waiving the claims of Filipina comfort women and failing to
espouse their complaints against Japan, the Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not
to afford impunity for crimes against humanity. Finally, petitioners assert that the Philippine governments
acceptance of the "apologies" made by Japan as well as funds from the Asian Womens Fund (AWF)
were contrary to international law.
Respondents Arguments
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt
with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
6

Article 14 of the Treaty of Peace
7
provides:
Article 14. Claims and Property
a) It is recognized that Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and
suffering caused by it during the war. Nevertheless it is also recognized that the resources of
Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete
reparation for all such damage and suffering and at the present time meet its other obligations.
b) Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the Allied Powers waive all reparations
claims of the Allied Powers, other claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals arising out of
any actions taken by Japan and its nationals in the course of the prosecution of the war, and
claims of the Allied Powers for direct military costs of occupation.
In addition, respondents argue that the apologies made by Japan
8
have been satisfactory, and that Japan
had addressed the individual claims of the women through the atonement money paid by the Asian
Womens Fund.1avvphi1
Historical Background
The comfort women system was the tragic legacy of the Rape of Nanking. In December 1937, Japanese
military forces captured the city of Nanking in China and began a "barbaric campaign of terror" known as
the Rape of Nanking, which included the rapes and murders of an estimated 20,000 to 80,000 Chinese
women, including young girls, pregnant mothers, and elderly women.
9
Document1zzF24331552898
In reaction to international outcry over the incident, the Japanese government sought ways to end
international condemnation
10
by establishing the "comfort women" system. Under this system, the military
could simultaneously appease soldiers' sexual appetites and contain soldiers' activities within a regulated
environment.
11
Comfort stations would also prevent the spread of venereal disease among soldiers and
discourage soldiers from raping inhabitants of occupied territories.
12

65

Daily life as a comfort woman was "unmitigated misery."
13
The military forced victims into barracks-style
stations divided into tiny cubicles where they were forced to live, sleep, and have sex with as many 30
soldiers per day.
14
The 30 minutes allotted for sexual relations with each soldier were 30-minute
increments of unimaginable horror for the women.
15
Disease was rampant.
16
Military doctors regularly
examined the women, but these checks were carried out to prevent the spread of venereal diseases; little
notice was taken of the frequent cigarette burns, bruises, bayonet stabs and even broken bones inflicted
on the women by soldiers. Document1zzF48331552898
Fewer than 30% of the women survived the war.
17
Their agony continued in having to suffer with the
residual physical, psychological, and emotional scars from their former lives. Some returned home and
were ostracized by their families. Some committed suicide. Others, out of shame, never returned home.
18

Efforts to Secure Reparation
The most prominent attempts to compel the Japanese government to accept legal responsibility and pay
compensatory damages for the comfort women system were through a series of lawsuits, discussion at
the United Nations (UN), resolutions by various nations, and the Womens International Criminal Tribunal.
The Japanese government, in turn, responded through a series of public apologies and the creation of the
AWF.
19

Lawsuits
In December 1991, Kim Hak-Sun and two other survivors filed the first lawsuit in Japan by former comfort
women against the Japanese government. The Tokyo District Court however dismissed their
case.
20
Other suits followed,
21
but the Japanese government has, thus far, successfully caused the
dismissal of every case.
22

Undoubtedly frustrated by the failure of litigation before Japanese courts, victims of the comfort women
system brought their claims before the United States (US). On September 18, 2000, 15 comfort women
filed a class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the District of Columbia
23
"seeking money damages
for [allegedly] having been subjected to sexual slavery and torture before and during World War II," in
violation of "both positive and customary international law." The case was filed pursuant to the Alien Tort
Claims Act ("ATCA"),
24
which allowed the plaintiffs to sue the Japanese government in a US federal
district court.
25
On October 4, 2001, the district court dismissed the lawsuit due to lack of jurisdiction over
Japan, stating that "[t]here is no question that this court is not the appropriate forum in which plaintiffs
may seek to reopen x x x discussions nearly half a century later x x x [E]ven if Japan did not enjoy
sovereign immunity, plaintiffs' claims are non-justiciable and must be dismissed."
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case.
26
On appeal,
the US Supreme Court granted the womens petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, and remanded the case.
27
On remand, the Court of Appeals
affirmed its prior decision, noting that "much as we may feel for the plight of the appellants, the courts of
the US simply are not authorized to hear their case."
28
The women again brought their case to the US
Supreme Court which denied their petition for writ of certiorari on February 21, 2006.
Efforts at the United Nations
In 1992, the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Military Sexual Slavery by Japan (KCWS),
submitted a petition to the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), asking for assistance in
investigating crimes committed by Japan against Korean women and seeking reparations for former
comfort women.
29
The UNHRC placed the issue on its agenda and appointed Radhika Coomaraswamy
as the issue's special investigator. In 1996, Coomaraswamy issued a Report reaffirming Japan's
responsibility in forcing Korean women to act as sex slaves for the imperial army, and made the following
recommendations:
66

A. At the national level
137. The Government of Japan should:
(a) Acknowledge that the system of comfort stations set up by the Japanese Imperial Army during
the Second World War was a violation of its obligations under international law and accept legal
responsibility for that violation;
(b) Pay compensation to individual victims of Japanese military sexual slavery according to
principles outlined by the Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on the right to restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation for victims of grave violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms. A special
administrative tribunal for this purpose should be set up with a limited time-frame since many of
the victims are of a very advanced age;
(c) Make a full disclosure of documents and materials in its possession with regard to comfort
stations and other related activities of the Japanese Imperial Army during the Second World War;
(d) Make a public apology in writing to individual women who have come forward and can be
substantiated as women victims of Japanese military sexual slavery;
(e) Raise awareness of these issues by amending educational curricula to reflect historical
realities;
(f) Identify and punish, as far as possible, perpetrators involved in the recruitment and
institutionalization of comfort stations during the Second World War.
Gay J. McDougal, the Special Rapporteur for the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, also presented a report to the Sub-Committee on June 22, 1998 entitled
Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices During
Armed Conflict. The report included an appendix entitled An Analysis of the Legal Liability of the
Government of Japan for 'Comfort Women Stations' established during the Second World War,
30
which
contained the following findings:
68. The present report concludes that the Japanese Government remains liable for grave violations of
human rights and humanitarian law, violations that amount in their totality to crimes against humanity. The
Japanese Governments arguments to the contrary, including arguments that seek to attack the
underlying humanitarian law prohibition of enslavement and rape, remain as unpersuasive today as they
were when they were first raised before the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal more than 50 years ago. In
addition, the Japanese Governments argument that Japan has already settled all claims from the Second
World War through peace treaties and reparations agreements following the war remains equally
unpersuasive. This is due, in large part, to the failure until very recently of the Japanese Government to
admit the extent of the Japanese militarys direct involvement in the establishment and maintenance of
these rape centres. The Japanese Governments silence on this point during the period in which peace
and reparations agreements between Japan and other Asian Governments were being negotiated
following the end of the war must, as a matter of law and justice, preclude Japan from relying today on
these peace treaties to extinguish liability in these cases.
69. The failure to settle these claims more than half a century after the cessation of hostilities is a
testament to the degree to which the lives of women continue to be undervalued. Sadly, this failure to
address crimes of a sexual nature committed on a massive scale during the Second World War has
added to the level of impunity with which similar crimes are committed today. The Government of Japan
has taken some steps to apologize and atone for the rape and enslavement of over 200,000 women and
girls who were brutalized in "comfort stations" during the Second World War. However, anything less than
67

full and unqualified acceptance by the Government of Japan of legal liability and the consequences that
flow from such liability is wholly inadequate. It must now fall to the Government of Japan to take the
necessary final steps to provide adequate redress.
The UN, since then, has not taken any official action directing Japan to provide the reparations sought.
Women's International War Crimes
Tribunal
The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal (WIWCT) was a "people's tribunal" established by a
number of Asian women and human rights organizations, supported by an international coalition of non-
governmental organizations.
31
First proposed in 1998, the WIWCT convened in Tokyo in 2000 in order to
"adjudicate Japan's military sexual violence, in particular the enslavement of comfort women, to bring
those responsible for it to justice, and to end the ongoing cycle of impunity for wartime sexual violence
against women."
After examining the evidence for more than a year, the "tribunal" issued its verdict on December 4, 2001,
finding the former Emperor Hirohito and the State of Japan guilty of crimes against humanity for the rape
and sexual slavery of women.
32
It bears stressing, however, that although the tribunal included
prosecutors, witnesses, and judges, its judgment was not legally binding since the tribunal itself was
organized by private citizens.
Action by Individual Governments
On January 31, 2007, US Representative Michael Honda of California, along with six co-sponsor
representatives, introduced House Resolution 121 which called for Japanese action in light of the ongoing
struggle for closure by former comfort women. The Resolution was formally passed on July 30,
2007,
33
and made four distinct demands:
[I]t is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of Japan (1) should formally
acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its
Imperial Armed Forces' coercion of young women into sexual slavery, known to the world as "comfort
women", during its colonial and wartime occupation of Asia and the Pacific Islands from the 1930s
through the duration of World War II; (2) would help to resolve recurring questions about the sincerity and
status of prior statements if the Prime Minister of Japan were to make such an apology as a public
statement in his official capacity; (3) should clearly and publicly refute any claims that the sexual
enslavement and trafficking of the "comfort women" for the Japanese Imperial Army never occurred; and
(4) should educate current and future generations about this horrible crime while following the
recommendations of the international community with respect to the "comfort women."
34

In December 2007, the European Parliament, the governing body of the European Union, drafted a
resolution similar to House Resolution 121.
35
Entitled, "Justice for Comfort Women," the resolution
demanded: (1) a formal acknowledgment of responsibility by the Japanese government; (2) a removal of
the legal obstacles preventing compensation; and (3) unabridged education of the past. The resolution
also stressed the urgency with which Japan should act on these issues, stating: "the right of individuals to
claim reparations against the government should be expressly recognized in national law, and cases for
reparations for the survivors of sexual slavery, as a crime under international law, should be prioritized,
taking into account the age of the survivors."
The Canadian and Dutch parliaments have each followed suit in drafting resolutions against Japan.
Canada's resolution demands the Japanese government to issue a formal apology, to admit that its
Imperial Military coerced or forced hundreds of thousands of women into sexual slavery, and to restore
references in Japanese textbooks to its war crimes.
36
The Dutch parliament's resolution calls for the
68

Japanese government to uphold the 1993 declaration of remorse made by Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei
Kono.
The Foreign Affairs Committee of the United Kingdoms Parliament also produced a report in November,
2008 entitled, "Global Security: Japan and Korea" which concluded that Japan should acknowledge the
pain caused by the issue of comfort women in order to ensure cooperation between Japan and Korea.
Statements of Remorse made by representatives of the Japanese government
Various officials of the Government of Japan have issued the following public statements concerning the
comfort system:
a) Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono in 1993:
The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime "comfort women" since
December 1991. I wish to announce the findings as a result of that study.
As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long
periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort stations were
operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was,
directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the
transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private
recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that
in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing coercion, etc., and that, at
times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at
comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere.
As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding those from
Japan, those from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean Peninsula was under
Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally
against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.
Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely
injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this
opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of
origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort
women.
It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while listening to the
views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment.
We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to
heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterated our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake
by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history.
As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue outside
Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter, including private
researched related thereto.
b) Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayamas Statement in 1994
69

On the issue of wartime "comfort women", which seriously stained the honor and dignity of many women,
I would like to take this opportunity once again to express my profound and sincere remorse and
apologies"
c) Letters from the Prime Minister of Japan to Individual Comfort Women
The issue of comfort women, with the involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a
grave affront to the honor and dignity of a large number of women.
As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women
who endured immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological
wounds as comfort women.
I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of apology and
remorse, should face up squarely to its past history and accurately convey it to future generations.
d) The Diet (Japanese Parliament) passed resolutions in 1995 and 2005
Solemnly reflecting upon the many instances of colonial rule and acts of aggression that occurred in
modern world history, and recognizing that Japan carried out such acts in the past and inflicted suffering
on the people of other countries, especially in Asia, the Members of this House hereby express deep
remorse. (Resolution of the House of Representatives adopted on June 9, 1995)
e) Various Public Statements by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
I have talked about this matter in the Diet sessions last year, and recently as well, and to the press. I have
been consistent. I will stand by the Kono Statement. This is our consistent position. Further, we have
been apologizing sincerely to those who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable psychological wounds
as comfort women. Former Prime Ministers, including Prime Ministers Koizumi and Hashimoto, have
issued letters to the comfort women. I would like to be clear that I carry the same feeling. This has not
changed even slightly. (Excerpt from Remarks by Prime Minister Abe at an Interview by NHK, March 11,
2007).
I am apologizing here and now. I am apologizing as the Prime Minister and it is as stated in the statement
by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono. (Excerpt from Remarks by Prime Minister Abe at the Budget
Committee, the House of Councilors, the Diet of Japan, March 26, 2007).
I am deeply sympathetic to the former comfort women who suffered hardships, and I have expressed my
apologies for the extremely agonizing circumstances into which they were placed. (Excerpt from
Telephone Conference by Prime Minister Abe to President George W. Bush, April 3, 2007).
I have to express sympathy from the bottom of my heart to those people who were taken as wartime
comfort women. As a human being, I would like to express my sympathies, and also as prime minister of
Japan I need to apologize to them. My administration has been saying all along that we continue to stand
by the Kono Statement. We feel responsible for having forced these women to go through that hardship
and pain as comfort women under the circumstances at the time. (Excerpt from an interview article "A
Conversation with Shinzo Abe" by the Washington Post, April 22, 2007).
x x x both personally and as Prime Minister of Japan, my heart goes out in sympathy to all those who
suffered extreme hardships as comfort women; and I expressed my apologies for the fact that they were
forced to endure such extreme and harsh conditions. Human rights are violated in many parts of the world
during the 20th Century; therefore we must work to make the 21st Century a wonderful century in which
no human rights are violated. And the Government of Japan and I wish to make significant contributions
70

to that end. (Excerpt from Prime Minister Abe's remarks at the Joint Press Availability after the summit
meeting at Camp David between Prime Minister Abe and President Bush, April 27, 2007).
The Asian Women's Fund
Established by the Japanese government in 1995, the AWF represented the government's concrete
attempt to address its moral responsibility by offering monetary compensation to victims of the comfort
women system.
37
The purpose of the AWF was to show atonement of the Japanese people through
expressions of apology and remorse to the former wartime comfort women, to restore their honor, and to
demonstrate Japans strong respect for women.
38

The AWF announced three programs for former comfort women who applied for assistance: (1) an
atonement fund paying 2 million (approximately $20,000) to each woman; (2) medical and welfare
support programs, paying 2.5-3 million ($25,000-$30,000) for each woman; and (3) a letter of apology
from the Japanese Prime Minister to each woman. Funding for the program came from the Japanese
government and private donations from the Japanese people. As of March 2006, the AWF provided 700
million (approximately $7 million) for these programs in South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines; 380
million (approximately $3.8 million) in Indonesia; and 242 million (approximately $2.4 million) in the
Netherlands.
On January 15, 1997, the AWF and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of Understanding
for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were
implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
Our Ruling
Stripped down to its essentials, the issue in this case is whether the Executive Department committed
grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan.
The petition lacks merit.
From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine
whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
Baker v. Carr
39
remains the starting point for analysis under the political question doctrine. There the US
Supreme Court explained that:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without
an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on question.
In Taada v. Cuenco,
40
we held that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions.
41
One such category involves
questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our
71

government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments
of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision."
42
The US Supreme Court has further cautioned that decisions
relating to foreign policy
are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only
by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of
a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.
43

To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly
possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements.
44
However, the
question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the
courts to question. Neither could petitioners herein assail the said determination by the Executive
Department via the instant petition for certiorari.
In the seminal case of US v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
45
the US Supreme Court held that "[t]he
President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
relations."
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment -- perhaps
serious embarrassment -- is to be avoided and success for our aims achieved, congressional legislation
which is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often
accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be
admissible where domestic affairs alone involved. Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity
of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He
has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and
other officials. x x x
This ruling has been incorporated in our jurisprudence through Bayan v. Executive Secretary
46
and
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary;
47
its overreaching principle was, perhaps, best articulated in (now Chief)
Justice Punos dissent in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion:
48

x x x The conduct of foreign relations is full of complexities and consequences, sometimes with life and
death significance to the nation especially in times of war. It can only be entrusted to that department of
government which can act on the basis of the best available information and can decide with
decisiveness. x x x It is also the President who possesses the most comprehensive and the most
confidential information about foreign countries for our diplomatic and consular officials regularly brief him
on meaningful events all over the world. He has also unlimited access to ultra-sensitive military
intelligence data. In fine, the presidential role in foreign affairs is dominant and the President is
traditionally accorded a wider degree of discretion in the conduct of foreign affairs. The regularity, nay,
validity of his actions are adjudged under less stringent standards, lest their judicial repudiation lead to
breach of an international obligation, rupture of state relations, forfeiture of confidence, national
embarrassment and a plethora of other problems with equally undesirable consequences.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our
countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. For us to overturn the Executive Departments determination would
mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to
make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
72

In any event, it cannot reasonably be maintained that the Philippine government was without authority to
negotiate the Treaty of Peace with Japan. And it is equally true that, since time immemorial, when
negotiating peace accords and settling international claims:
x x x [g]overnments have dealt with x x x private claims as their own, treating them as national assets,
and as counters, `chips', in international bargaining. Settlement agreements have lumped, or linked,
claims deriving from private debts with others that were intergovernmental in origin, and concessions in
regard to one category of claims might be set off against concessions in the other, or against larger
political considerations unrelated to debts.
49

Indeed, except as an agreement might otherwise provide, international settlements generally wipe out the
underlying private claims, thereby terminating any recourse under domestic law. In Ware v. Hylton,
50
a
case brought by a British subject to recover a debt confiscated by the Commonwealth of Virginia during
the war, Justice Chase wrote:
I apprehend that the treaty of peace abolishes the subject of the war, and that after peace is concluded,
neither the matter in dispute, nor the conduct of either party, during the war, can ever be revived, or
brought into contest again. All violences, injuries, or damages sustained by the government, or people of
either, during the war, are buried in oblivion; and all those things are implied by the very treaty of peace;
and therefore not necessary to be expressed. Hence it follows, that the restitution of, or compensation for,
British property confiscated, or extinguished, during the war, by any of the United States, could only be
provided for by the treaty of peace; and if there had been no provision, respecting these subjects, in the
treaty, they could not be agitated after the treaty, by the British government, much less by her subjects in
courts of justice. (Emphasis supplied).
This practice of settling claims by means of a peace treaty is certainly nothing new. For instance, in
Dames & Moore v. Regan,
51
the US Supreme Court held:
Not infrequently in affairs between nations, outstanding claims by nationals of one country against the
government of another country are "sources of friction" between the two sovereigns. United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 225, 62 S.Ct. 552, 563, 86 L.Ed. 796 (1942). To resolve these difficulties, nations
have often entered into agreements settling the claims of their respective nationals. As one treatise writer
puts it, international agreements settling claims by nationals of one state against the government of
another "are established international practice reflecting traditional international theory." L. Henkin,
Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 262 (1972). Consistent with that principle, the United States has
repeatedly exercised its sovereign authority to settle the claims of its nationals against foreign countries. x
x x Under such agreements, the President has agreed to renounce or extinguish claims of United States
nationals against foreign governments in return for lump-sum payments or the establishment of arbitration
procedures. To be sure, many of these settlements were encouraged by the United States claimants
themselves, since a claimant's only hope of obtaining any payment at all might lie in having his
Government negotiate a diplomatic settlement on his behalf. But it is also undisputed that the "United
States has sometimes disposed of the claims of its citizens without their consent, or even without
consultation with them, usually without exclusive regard for their interests, as distinguished from those of
the nation as a whole." Henkin,supra, at 262-263. Accord, Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States 213 (1965)(President "may waive or settle a claim against a foreign state x x x
[even] without the consent of the [injured] national"). It is clear that the practice of settling claims
continues today.
Respondents explain that the Allied Powers concluded the Peace Treaty with Japan not necessarily for
the complete atonement of the suffering caused by Japanese aggression during the war, not for the
payment of adequate reparations, but for security purposes. The treaty sought to prevent the spread of
communism in Japan, which occupied a strategic position in the Far East. Thus, the Peace Treaty
compromised individual claims in the collective interest of the free world.
73

This was also the finding in a similar case involving American victims of Japanese slave labor during the
war.
52
In a consolidated case in the Northern District of California,
53
the court dismissed the lawsuits filed,
relying on the 1951 peace treaty with Japan,
54
because of the following policy considerations:
The official record of treaty negotiations establishes that a fundamental goal of the agreement was to
settle the reparations issue once and for all. As the statement of the chief United States negotiator, John
Foster Dulles, makes clear, it was well understood that leaving open the possibility of future claims would
be an unacceptable impediment to a lasting peace:
Reparation is usually the most controversial aspect of peacemaking. The present peace is no exception.
On the one hand, there are claims both vast and just. Japan's aggression caused tremendous cost,
losses and suffering.
On the other hand, to meet these claims, there stands a Japan presently reduced to four home islands
which are unable to produce the food its people need to live, or the raw materials they need to work. x x x
The policy of the United States that Japanese liability for reparations should be sharply limited was
informed by the experience of six years of United States-led occupation of Japan. During the occupation
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) for the region, General Douglas MacArthur,
confiscated Japanese assets in conjunction with the task of managing the economic affairs of the
vanquished nation and with a view to reparations payments. It soon became clear that Japan's financial
condition would render any aggressive reparations plan an exercise in futility. Meanwhile, the importance
of a stable, democratic Japan as a bulwark to communism in the region increased. At the end of 1948,
MacArthur expressed the view that "[t]he use of reparations as a weapon to retard the reconstruction of a
viable economy in Japan should be combated with all possible means" and "recommended that the
reparations issue be settled finally and without delay."
That this policy was embodied in the treaty is clear not only from the negotiations history but also from the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee report recommending approval of the treaty by the Senate. The
committee noted, for example:
Obviously insistence upon the payment of reparations in any proportion commensurate with the claims of
the injured countries and their nationals would wreck Japan's economy, dissipate any credit that it may
possess at present, destroy the initiative of its people, and create misery and chaos in which the seeds of
discontent and communism would flourish. In short, [it] would be contrary to the basic purposes and
policy of x x x the United States x x x.
We thus hold that, from a municipal law perspective, that certiorari will not lie. As a general principle
and particularly here, where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys
conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign
policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the
petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether
further steps are appropriate or necessary.
The Philippines is not under any international obligation to espouse petitioners claims.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim
on the individuals behalf.
55
Even then, it is not the individuals rights that are being asserted, but rather,
the states own rights. Nowhere is this position more clearly reflected than in the dictum of the Permanent
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the 1924 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions Case:
74

By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial
proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its
subjects, respect for the rules of international law. The question, therefore, whether the present dispute
originates in an injury to a private interest, which in point of fact is the case in many international disputes,
is irrelevant from this standpoint. Once a State has taken up a case on behalf of one of its subjects before
an international tribunal, in the eyes of the latter the State is sole claimant.
56

Since the exercise of diplomatic protection is the right of the State, reliance on the right is within the
absolute discretion of states, and the decision whether to exercise the discretion may invariably be
influenced by political considerations other than the legal merits of the particular claim.
57
As clearly stated
by the ICJ in
Barcelona Traction:
The Court would here observe that, within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise
diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the
State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights
are not adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to
national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. The
municipal legislator may lay upon the State an obligation to protect its citizens abroad, and may also
confer upon the national a right to demand the performance of that obligation, and clothe the right with
corresponding sanctions.1awwphi1 However, all these questions remain within the province of municipal
law and do not affect the position internationally.
58
(Emphasis supplied)
The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is
granted, and when will it cease. It retains, in this respect, a discretionary power the exercise of which may
be determined by considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.
The International Law Commissions (ILCs) Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection fully support this
traditional view. They (i) state that "the right of diplomatic protection belongs to or vests in the State,"
59
(ii)
affirm its discretionary nature by clarifying that diplomatic protection is a "sovereign prerogative" of the
State;
60
and (iii) stress that the state "has the right to exercise diplomatic protection
on behalf of a national. It is under no duty or obligation to do so."
61

It has been argued, as petitioners argue now, that the State has a duty to protect its nationals and act on
his/her behalf when rights are injured.
62
However, at present, there is no sufficient evidence to establish a
general international obligation for States to exercise diplomatic protection of their own nationals
abroad.
63
Though, perhaps desirable, neither state practice nor opinio juris has evolved in such a
direction. If it is a duty internationally, it is only a moral and not a legal duty, and there is no means of
enforcing its fulfillment.
64
1avvphi1
We fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally reprehensible as well as
legally prohibited under contemporary international law.
65
However, petitioners take quite a theoretical
leap in claiming that these proscriptions automatically imply that that the Philippines is under a non-
derogable obligation to prosecute international crimes, particularly since petitioners do not demand the
imputation of individual criminal liability, but seek to recover monetary reparations from the state of Japan.
Absent the consent of states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is
no non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Indeed, precisely because of states
reluctance to directly prosecute claims against another state, recent developments support the modern
trend to empower individuals to directly participate in suits against perpetrators of international
crimes.
66
Nonetheless, notwithstanding an array of General Assembly resolutions calling for the
prosecution of crimes against humanity and the strong policy arguments warranting such a rule, the
practice of states does not yet support the present existence of an obligation to prosecute international
75

crimes.
67
Of course a customary duty of prosecution is ideal, but we cannot find enough evidence to
reasonably assert its existence. To the extent that any state practice in this area is widespread, it is in the
practice of granting amnesties, immunity, selective prosecution, or de facto impunity to those who commit
crimes against humanity."
68

Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if
we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to
show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the
Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga
omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term
describingobligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. The concept was
recognized by the ICJ in Barcelona Traction:
x x x an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international
community as a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By
their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved,
all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
omnes.http://www.search.com/reference/Erga_omnes - _note-0#_note-0
Such obligations derive, for example, in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts of
aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the
human person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding
rights of protection have entered into the body of general international law others are conferred by
international instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character.
The Latin phrase, erga omnes, has since become one of the rallying cries of those sharing a belief in the
emergence of a value-based international public order. However, as is so often the case, the reality is
neither so clear nor so bright. Whatever the relevance of obligations erga omnes as a legal concept, its
full potential remains to be realized in practice.
69

The term is closely connected with the international law concept of jus cogens. In international law, the
term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense
that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international
norms of equivalent authority.
70

Early strains of the jus cogens doctrine have existed since the 1700s,
71
but peremptory norms began to
attract greater scholarly attention with the publication of Alfred von Verdross's influential 1937 article,
Forbidden Treaties in International Law.
72
The recognition of jus cogens gained even more force in the
1950s and 1960s with the ILCs preparation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT).
73
Though there was a consensus that certain international norms had attained the status of jus
cogens,
74
the ILC was unable to reach a consensus on the proper criteria for identifying peremptory
norms.
After an extended debate over these and other theories of jus cogens, the ILC concluded ruefully in 1963
that "there is not as yet any generally accepted criterion by which to identify a general rule of international
law as having the character of jus cogens."
75
In a commentary accompanying the draft convention, the
ILC indicated that "the prudent course seems to be to x x x leave the full content of this rule to be worked
out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals."
76
Thus, while the existence of jus
cogens in international law is undisputed, no consensus exists on its substance,
77
beyond a tiny core of
principles and rules.
78

76

Of course, we greatly sympathize with the cause of petitioners, and we cannot begin to comprehend the
unimaginable horror they underwent at the hands of the Japanese soldiers. We are also deeply
concerned that, in apparent contravention of fundamental principles of law, the petitioners appear to be
without a remedy to challenge those that have offended them before appropriate fora. Needless to say,
our government should take the lead in protecting its citizens against violation of their fundamental human
rights. Regrettably, it is not within our power to order the Executive Department to take up the petitioners
cause. Ours is only the power to urge andexhort the Executive Department to take up petitioners cause.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
77

Footnotes
1
In Re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, 114 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. Cal.
2000).
2
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.1 (January 4, 1996), Report of the Special Rapporteur on
violence against women, its causes and consequences, Ms. Radhika Coomaraswamy, in
accordance with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1994/45.
3
Treaty and customary law both provide that when rape is committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed at any civilian population, regardless of its international or internal
character, then it constitutes one of the gravest crimes against humanity. This principle is codified
under Article 6(c) of the 1945 Nuremberg Charter as well as Article 5(c) of the Tokyo Charter,
which enumerated "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian populations, before or during the war" as crimes against humanity,
and extended in scope to include imprisonment, torture and rape by Control Council Law No. 10.
4
Article 1 of the Slavery Convention provides:
For the purpose of the present Convention, the following definitions are agreed upon:
(1) Slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.
(2) The slave trade includes all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a
person with intent to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave
with a view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a
slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every act of trade
or transport in slaves.
Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and Practices
Convention of 1926 (Slavery Convention of 1926), 60 L.N.T.S. 253, entered into
force March 9, 1927.
5
Torture is defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person,
information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to
lawful sanctions. (Convention Against Torture, Article 1.1)
6
Signed at San Francisco, September 8, 1951; Initial entry into force: April 28, 1952. The treaty
was signed
by Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba,Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El
Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala,Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Lao
s, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands,New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, The Philippines, Poland, Saudi
Arabia, the Soviet Union, Sri Lanka, South Africa,Syria, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United
States,Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam. The signatories for the Republic of the Philippines were
Carlos P. Romulo, J.M. Elizalde, Vicente Francisco, Diosdado Macapagal, Emiliano Tirona, and
V.G. Sinco.
78

7
Signed in San Francisco, September 8, 1951, ratified by the Philippine Senate on July 16, 1956.
Signed by the Philippine President on July 18, 1956. Entered into force on July 23, 1956.
8
On September 21, 1992, the Japanese Embassy formally confirmed to the Philippine
government the involvement of the Japanese Imperial Army in the establishment of comfort
women stations.
In May 1993, Japan approved textbooks featuring an account of how comfort women
were forced to work as prostitutes for the Japanese Imperial Army.
On August 4, 1993, Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa, before resigning, formally
apologized to women all over the world who were forced to serve as comfort women:
The Japanese government regrets and sincerely apologizes for the unbearable pain that
these women regardless of their nationalities, suffered while being forced to work as so-
called comfort women.
The Japanese government expresses its heartfelt sentiments of reflection and apology to
all the women for their many sufferings and the injuries to mind and body that cannot be
healed.
The Philippine government, under the administration of then President Fidel V. Ramos,
accepted the formal apology given the Japanese Government. Though the formal
apology came late, it is a most welcome gesture from the government of Japan, which
has been very supportive of our economic development.
9
Richard J. Galvin, The Case for a Japanese Truth Commission Covering World War II Era
Japanese War Crimes, 11 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 59, 64 (2003).
10
See Argibay, Ad Litem Judge, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Speech at the Stefan A. Riesenfeld Symposium: Sexual Slavery and the "Comfort Women" of
World War II, in 21 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 375, 376 (2003).
11
Id.
12
Nearey, Seeking Reparations in the New Milleunium: Will Japan Compensate the "Comfort
Women" of World War II?, 15 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 121, 134 (2001).
13
Ustinia Dolgopol & Snehal Paranjape, Comfort Women: An Unfinished Ordeal 15 (1994).
14
Id. at 48.
15
See Johnson, Comment, Justice for "Comfort Women": Will the Alien Tort Claims Act Bring
Them the Remedies They Seek?, 20 Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 253, 260 (2001).
16
Id. at 261. Soldiers disregarded rules mandating the use of condoms, and thus many women
became pregnant or infected with sexually transmitted diseases.
17
Boling, Mass Rape, Enforced Prostitution, and the Japanese Imperial Army: Japan Eschews
International Legal Responsibility? 3 Occasional Papers/Reprint Series Contemporary Asian
Studies 8 (1995).
79

18
Id.
19
Yamamoto et al., Race, Rights and Reparation 435-38 (2001).
20
Meade, From Shanghai to Globocourt: An Analysis of the "Comfort Women's" Defeat in Hwang
v. Japan, 35 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 211, 233 (2002).
21
Numerous lawsuits immediately followed, including lawsuits filed by the Korean Council for
Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery, and a suit by a Dutch former comfort woman; Fisher, Japan's
Postwar Compensation Litigation, 22 Whittier L. Rev. 35, 44 (2000).
22
The lower court ruling in Ha v. Japan has been the lone courtroom victory for comfort women.
On December 25, 1992, ten Korean women filed the lawsuit with the Yamaguchi Prefectural
Court, seeking an official apology and compensation from the Japanese government. The
plaintiffs claimed that Japan had a moral duty to atone for its wartime crimes and a legal
obligation to compensate them under international and domestic laws. More than five years later,
on April 27, 1998, the court found the Japanese government guilty of negligence and ordered it to
pay 300,000, or $2,270, to each of the three plaintiffs. However, the court denied plaintiffs
demands that the government issue an official apology. Both parties appealed, but Japan's High
Court later overturned the ruling. See Park, Broken Silence: Redressing the Mass Rape and
Sexual Enslavement of Asian Women by the Japanese Government in an Appropriate Forum, 3
Asian-Pac. L. & Pol'y J. 40 (2002); Kim & Kim, Delayed Justice: The Case of the Japanese
Imperial Military Sex Slaves, 16 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 263 (1998). Park, Comfort Women During
WW II: Are U.S. Courts a Final Resort for Justice?, 17 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 403, 408 (2002).
23
Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan ("Hwang I"), 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001), affirmed, 332 F.3d
679 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 901 (2004), remanded to 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1418 (2006).
24
Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1350 (2000). The ATCA gives US federal district courts
original jurisdiction to adjudicate civil cases and award tort damages for violations of the law of
nations or United States treaties. See Ahmed, The Shame of Hwang v. Japan: How the
International Community Has Failed Asia's "Comfort Women, 14 Tex. J. Women & L. 121, 141-42
(2004).
25
Under the ATCA, when a "cause of action is brought against a sovereign nation, the only basis
for obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant is through an exception to the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)." See Jeffords, Will Japan Face Its Past? The Struggle for
Justice for Former Comfort Women, 2 Regent J. Int'l L. 145, 158 (2003/2004). The FSIA (28
U.S.C. 1604 (1994 & Supp. 1999).) grants foreign states immunity from being sued in US
district courts unless the state waives its immunity or the claims fall within certain enumerated
exceptions. The Japanese government successfully argued that it is entitled to sovereign
immunity under the FSIA. The government additionally argued that post-war treaties had resolved
the issue of reparations, which were non-justiciable political questions.
26
See Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan ("Hwang II"), 332 F.3d 679, 680-81 (D.C. Cir. 2003),
vacated, 542 U.S. 901 (2004), remanded to 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
1418 (2006).
27
See Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan ("Hwang III"), 542 U.S. 901 (2004) (memorandum), remanded
to 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1418 (2006).
28
Id.
80

29
Soh, The Comfort Women Project, San Francisco State University (1997-
2001),http://online.sfsu.edu/~soh/comfortwomen.html, at 1234-35.
30
An Analysis Of The Legal Liability Of The Government Of Japan For "Comfort Women
Stations" Established During The Second World War (Appendix); Report on Contemporary Forms
of Slavery: Systematic rape, sexual slavery and slavery-like practices During Armed Conflict,
Final report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Commission on Human Rights (Fiftieth
Session) E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (June 22, 1998).
31
Chinkin, Women's International Tribunal on Japanese Sexual Slavery, 95 Am. J. Int'l. L. 335
(2001).
32
A large amount of evidence was presented to the tribunal for examination. Sixty-four former
comfort women from Korea and other surrounding territories in the Asia-Pacific region testified
before the court. Testimony was also presented by historical scholars, international law scholars,
and two former Japanese soldiers. Additional evidence was submitted by the prosecution teams
of ten different countries, including: North and South Korea, China, Japan, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Taiwan, Malaysia, East Timor, and the Netherlands. Id. at 336.
33
Press Release, Congressman Mike Honda, Rep. Honda Calls on Japan to Apologize for World
War II Exploitation of "Comfort Women" (January 31, 2007).
34
H.R. Res. 121, 110th Cong. (2007) (enacted).
35
European Parliament, Human rights: Chad, Women's Rights in Saudi Arabia, Japan's Wartime
Sex Slaves, Dec. 17, 2007, http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20071210BRI14639&secondRef=ITEM-008-EN.
36
The Comfort Women--A History of Trauma,
http:// taiwan.yam.org.tw/womenweb/conf_women/index_e.html.
37
Yamamoto et al., supra note 19 at 437. The government appointed Bunbei Hara, former
Speaker of the Upper House of the Diet, as the first President of the Asian Women's Fund (1995-
1999). Former Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama succeeded Hara as the second president of
the program (1999-present). See Jeffords, supra note 25 at 158.
38
The Asian Women's Fund, http://www.awf.or.jp/english/project_ atonement.html, at 55.
39
369 U.S. 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).
40
103 Phil 1051, 1068 (1957).
41
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211-222.
42
Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
43
Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
44
Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(2)(a).
81

45
299 US 304, 57 S. Ct. 216, 81 L. Ed, 255 (1936).
46
396 Phil 623, 663 (2000). We held:
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of
State, is the sole organ and authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways,
the President is the chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the
field of foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers and influence, his
conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as Jefferson describes, is "executive
altogether".
47
501 Phil. 304, 313 (2005). We stated:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the
sole organ and authority in external relations and is the country's sole representative with
foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's
mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states.
48
379 Phil. 165, 233-234 (2004).
49
Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution 300 (2d 1996); see Dames and Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688, 101 S.Ct. 2972, 69 L.Ed.2d 918 (1981) (upholding the President's
authority to settle claims of citizens as "a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign
policy dispute between our country and another [at least] where ... Congress acquiesced in the
President's action"); Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi,539 U.S. 396, 424, 123 S.Ct. 2374, 156
L.Ed.2d 376 (2003) (acknowledging "President's authority to provide for settling claims in winding
up international hostilities"). See also Akbayan Citizens Action Party ("Akbayan") v. Aquino, G.R.
No. 170516, July 16, 2008, 558 SCRA 468, 517 where we held that:
x x x While, on first impression, it appears wise to deter Philippine representatives from
entering into compromises, it bears noting that treaty negotiations, or any negotiation for
that matter, normally involve a process of quid pro quo, and oftentimes negotiators have
to be willing to grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more
favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.
50
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 230, 1 L.Ed. 568 (1796).
51
453 U.S. 654, 101 S.Ct. 2972 (1981) (re the establishment of the Iran-United States Claims
Tribunal following the seizure of American personnel as hostages at the American Embassy in
Tehran).
52
Bazyler, The Holocaust Restitution Movement in Comparative Perspective, 20 Berkeley J. Intl.
L. 11, 25-32 (2002).
53
In Re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor Litigation, supra note 1.
54
Treaty of Peace with Japan 1951, 136 UNTS 45.
82

55
The conceptual understanding that individuals have rights and responsibilities in the
international arena does not automatically mean that they have the ability to bring international
claims to assert their rights. Thus, the Permanent Court of International Justice declared that "it is
scarcely necessary to point out that the capacity to possess civil rights does not necessarily imply
the capacity to exercise those rights oneself." Appeal from a Judgment of the
Hungaro/Czeochoslovak Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, Judgment, 1933, PCIJ, Ser. A/B No. 61, p. 208
at 231.
56
PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 2, p. 11, at 16. This traditional view was repeated by the PCIJ in
the Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway Case, the Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian
Loans issued in France,Judgment of July 12, 1929, PCIJ Reports, Series A No. 20; and in
the Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow, Judgment of September 13, 1928, Merits, PCIJ
Reports, Series A No. 17. The ICJ has adopted it in the Reparation for injuries suffered in the
service of the United Nations Advisory Opinion: ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174; the Nottebohm Case
(second phase) Judgment of April 6, 1955: ICJ Reports 1955, p. 4 at p. 24; theInterhandel
Case (Judgment of March 21st, 1959: ICJ Reports 1959, p. 6 at p. 27) and the Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited case, (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5).
57
See Borchard, E., Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad at VI (1915). Under this view, the
considerations underlying the decision to exercise or not diplomatic protection may vary
depending on each case and may rely entirely on policy considerations regardless of the interests
of the directly-injured individual, and the State is not required to provide justification for its
decision.
58
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, case, supra note 56, at p. 44 par. 78.
59
ILC First Reading Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/484, ILC
Report, A/53/10 (F), par. 60, Commentary to Draft Article 2, par. (1); see also, Commentary to
Draft Article 1, par. (3), and text of Draft Article 2.
60
Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 50th session, supra note 60, par.
77.
61
ILC First Reading Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, supra note 60, commentary to Draft
Article 2, par. (2).
62
For instance, Special Rapporteur Dugard proposed that the ILC adopt in its Draft Articles a
provision under which States would be internationally obliged to exercise diplomatic protection in
favor of their nationals injured abroad by grave breaches to jus cogens norms, if the national so
requested and if he/she was not afforded direct access to an international tribunal. The proposed
article reads as follows:
Article [4]1. Unless the injured person is able to bring a claim for such injury before a
competent international court or tribunal, the State of his/her nationality has a legal duty
to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the injured person upon request, if the injury
results from a grave breach of ajus cogens norm attributable to another State. 2. The
state of nationality is relieved of this obligation if: (a) The exercise of diplomatic protection
would seriously endanger the overriding interests of the State and/or its people; (b)
Another State exercises diplomatic protection on behalf of the injured person; (c) The
injured person does not have the effective and dominant nationality of the State. States
are obliged to provide in their municipal law for the enforcement of this right before a
competent domestic court or other independent national authority". Special Rapporteur
John Dugard, appointed in 1999, First Report on Diplomatic Protection, par. 74 (UN Doc.
A/CN.4/506 (March 7, 2000) and Corr. 1 (June 7, 2000) and Add. 1 (April 20, 2000).
83

However, the proposal was not accepted by the ILC, as "the question was still not ripe for
treatment" because "the State practice and their opinio juris still had not evolved in such
direction". Official Records of the General Assembly: 55th session, Supplement No. 10,
Doc. A/55/10 (2000), Report of the ILC on the work of its 52nd session, p. 131. Instead,
Draft Article 19, entitled Recommended Practice, suggests that states should be
encouraged to exercise diplomatic protection especially when significant injury occurred
to the national. Drafted in soft language, the Article does not purport to create any binding
obligations on the state.
In addition, some States have incorporated in their municipal law a duty to exercise
diplomatic protection in favor of their nationals. (Dugard identifies this "obligation" to exist
in the Constitutions of Albania, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia,
China, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Guyana, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lao Peoples
Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania,
Russian Federation, Spain, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey,
Ukraine, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia, albeit with different reaches. J. Dugard, First Report
on diplomatic protection, supra note 13, par. 80), but their enforceability is also, to say the
least, questionable (in many cases there are not even courts competent to review the
decision). Moreover, their existence in no way implies that international law imposes such
an obligation, simply suggesting "that certain States consider diplomatic protection for
their nationals abroad to be desirable" (ILC First Reading Draft Articles on Diplomatic
Protection, supra note 60, Commentary to Draft Article 2, par (2)).
63
Even decisions of national courts support the thesis that general international law as it stands
does not mandate an enforceable legal duty of diplomatic protection.
The traditional view has been challenged in the UK in a case arising from the unlawful
detention by the US of prisoners in Guantanamo Bay. In Abbasi v. Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ([2002] EWCA Civ 1316, 19 September 2002), the
applicant (a British national) sought judicial review of the adequacy of the diplomatic
actions of the British government with the US government. The UK Court of Appeals
came to the conclusion that diplomatic protection did not as such give rise to an
enforceable duty under English Law. It found that "on no view would it be appropriate to
order the Secretary of State to make any specific representations to the United States,
even in the face of what appears to be a clear breach of a fundamental human right, as it
is obvious that this would have an impact on the conduct of foreign policy."
Courts in the UK have also repeatedly held that the decisions taken by the executive in
its dealings with foreign states regarding the protection of British nationals abroad are
non-justiciable.
(1) R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Pirbhai (107
ILR 462 (1985):
"x x x in the context of a situation with serious implications for the conduct of international
relations, the courts should act with a high degree of circumspection in the interests of all
concerned. It can rarely, if ever, be for judges to intervene where diplomats fear to tread."
(p.479, per Sir John Donaldson MR)
(2) R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Ferhut
Butt (116 ILR 607 (1999):
"The general rule is well established that the courts should not interfere in the conduct of
foreign relations by the Executive, most particularly where such interference is likely to
84

have foreign policy repercussions (see R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, ex parte Everett[1989] 1 QB 811 at 820). This extends to
decisions whether or not to seek to persuade a foreign government of any international
obligation (e.g. to respect human rights) which it has assumed. What if any approach
should be made to the Yemeni authorities in regard to the conduct of the trial of these
terrorist charges must be a matter for delicate diplomacy and the considered and
informed judgment of the FCO. In such matters the courts have no supervisory role." (p.
615, per Lightman J).
"Whether and when to seek to interfere or to put pressure on in relation to the legal
process, if ever it is a sensible and a right thing to do, must be a matter for the Executive
and no one else, with their access to information and to local knowledge. It is clearly not
a matter for the courts. It is clearly a high policy decision of a government in relation to its
foreign relations and is not justiciable by way of judicial review." (p.622, per Henry LJ).
(3) R. (Suresh and Manickavasagam) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2001] EWHC Admin 1028 (unreported, 16 November 2001):
"... there is, in my judgment, no duty upon the Secretary of State to ensure that other
nations comply with their human rights obligations. There may be cases where the United
Kingdom Government has, for example by diplomatic means, chosen to seek to
persuade another State to take a certain course in its treatment of British nationals; but
there is no duty to do so." (paragraph 19, per Sir Richard Tucker).
The South African Constitutional Court in Kaunda and others v. President of the Republic
of South Africa and others (Case CCCT23/04) recognized the constitutional basis of the
right of diplomatic protection as enshrined in the South African Constitution, but went on
to hold that the nature and extent of this obligation was an aspect of foreign policy within
the discretion of the executive.
64
Borchard, E., Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 29 (1915).
65
The concept of rape as an international crime is relatively new. This is not to say that rape has
never been historically prohibited, particularly in war. But modern-day sensitivity to the crime of
rape did not emerge until after World War II. In the Nuremberg Charter, the word rape was not
mentioned. The article on crimes against humanity explicitly set forth prohibited acts, but rape
was not mentioned by name. (For example, the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Prussia
and the United States provides that in time of war all women and children "shall not be molested
in their persons." The Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Between his Majesty the King of Prussia
and the United States of America, art. 23, Sept. 10, 1785, U.S.-Pruss., 8 Treaties & Other Int'l
Agreements Of The U.S. 78, 85. The 1863 Lieber Instructions classified rape as a crime of "troop
discipline." (Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus
cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 Duke J. Comp. Intl. L. 219, 224). It specified rape as a capital
crime punishable by the death penalty (Id. at 236). The 1907 Hague Convention protected
women by requiring the protection of their "honour." ("Family honour and rights, the lives of
persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected."
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws & Customs of War on Land, art. 46, Oct. 18, 1907. General
Assembly resolution 95 (I) of December 11, 1946 entitled, "Affirmation of the Principles of
International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nrnberg Tribunal"; General Assembly
document A/64/Add.1 of 1946; See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. Article 6(c) of
the Charter established crimes against humanity as the following:
85

CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or
in connection with any crime within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
The Nuremberg Judgment did not make any reference to rape and rape was not
prosecuted. (Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals Crime
and Punishment in the International Arena,7 ILSA J. Intl. Comp. L. 667, 676.) However,
International Military Tribunal for the Far East prosecuted rape crimes, even though its
Statute did not explicitly criminalize rape. The Far East Tribunal held General Iwane
Matsui, Commander Shunroku Hata and Foreign Minister Hirota criminally responsible for
a series of crimes, including rape, committed by persons under their authority. (The
Tokyo Judgment: Judgment Of The International Military Tribunal For The Far East 445-
54 (1977).
The first mention of rape as a specific crime came in December 1945 when Control
Council Law No. 10 included the term rape in the definition of crimes against humanity.
Law No. 10, adopted by the four occupying powers in Germany, was devised to establish
a uniform basis for prosecuting war criminals in German courts. (Control Council for
Germany, Law No. 10: Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against
Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, 3 Official Gazette Control Council for
Germany 50, 53 (1946))
The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War was the first
modern-day international instrument to establish protections against rape for women.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 27, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entry into force Oct. 20, 1950)
[hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].Furthermore, the ICC, the ICTY, and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have significantly advanced the crime
of rape by enabling it to be prosecuted as genocide, a war crime, and a crime against
humanity.
Rape is clearly emerging as a core crime within humanitarian law. (Appleman, Military
Tribunals and International Crimes 299 (1954); Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian
Norms as Customary Law 47 (1989). A major step in this legal development came in
1949, when rape and sexual assault were included in the Geneva Conventions. Rape is
included in the following acts committed against persons protected by the 1949 Geneva
Conventions: "willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments; willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health." Rape as
a violation of the laws or customs of war generally consists of violations of Article 3 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions, which, in part, prohibits "violence to life and person, in
particular mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; outrages upon personal dignity, in
particular humiliating and degrading treatment." (See Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art.
3(1)(c), 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 3(1)(c), 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art.
3(1)(c), 75 U.N.T.S. 973; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 23, art. 3(1)(c).
Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, directed at protecting civilians during time of
war, states that "women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour,
in particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault."
86

Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions continues to expand the protected rights by
providing that "women shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in
particular against rape, forced prostitution and any form of indecent assault." (Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Article 76(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 4).
66
For instance, the International Criminal Court was established to deal with the "most serious
crimes of concern to the international community," with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, as defined in the Rome Statute. The ICC Prosecutor can investigate
allegations of crimes not only upon referral from the Security Council and state parties, but also
on information from victims, non-governmental organizations or any other reliable source (Article
15). See also the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704 at 36, annex (1993) and S/25704/Add.1 (1993),
adopted by Security Council on 25 May 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
67
Scharf, The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation To Prosecute
Human Rights Crimes, 59(4) Law & Contemp. Probs. 41, 59 (1996). Dugard, Dealing with Crimes
of a Past Regime: Is Amnesty Still an Option?, 12 Leiden J. Int'l L. 1001, 1003 (1999). Gavron,
Amnesties in Light of Developments in International Law and the Establishment of the
International Criminal Court, 51 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 91, 106 (2002).
68
O'Shea, Amnesty for Crime in International Law and Practice 35 (2002).
69
Bruno Simmas much-quoted observation encapsulates this feeling of disappointment:Viewed
realistically, the world of obligations erga omnes is still the world of the "ought" rather than of the
"is"The Charter of the United Nations: A commentary 125 (Simma, ed. 1995). See Tams,
Enforcing Obligations Erga omnes in International Law (2005). In all cases where this principle
has been cited, even the ICJ has found a way to avoid giving force to the claims based on the
erga omnes character of the obligation, despite having recognized them in principle. In the South
West Africa Case, the ICJ declared that an action popularis was incompatible with existing
international law. In the Nicaragua case, it evaded the consequences of a violation of erga omnes
obligations by treating human rights conventions as self-contained regimes. Nicaragua v. US,
Merits, ICJ Reports 1986, 14 et seq. (134, par. 267): "However, where human rights are
protected by international conventions, that protection takes the form of such arrangements for
monitoring or ensuring respect for human rights as are provided for in the conventions
themselves." In the East Timor Case, it denied jurisdiction on the ground that Indonesia was an
"indispensable third party" to the proceedings which had not accepted jurisdiction. (Portugal v.
Australia, ICJ Reports 1995, 90 (102, par 29) "Portugals assertion that the right of peoples to
self-determination has an erga omnes character, is irreproachable."
70
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter VCLT].
71
Classical publicists such as Hugo Grotius, Emer de Vattel, and Christian Wolff drew upon the
Roman law distinction between jus dispositivum (voluntary law) and jus scriptum (obligatory law)
to differentiate consensual agreements between states from the "necessary" principles of
international law that bind all states as a point of conscience regardless of consent. (See Hugonis
Grotii, De Jure Belli et Pacis [On the Law of War and Peace] (William Whewell ed. & trans., John
W. Parker, London 2009) (1625); Emer de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Loi
Naturelle [The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law] 9, 27 (1758) (distinguishing "le
Droit des Gens Naturel, ou Ncessaire" from "le Droit Volontaire"); Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium
Methodo Scientifica Pertractorum [A Scientific Method for Understanding the Law of Nations] 5
(James Brown Scott ed., Joseph H. Drake trans., Clarendon Press 1934) (1764)). Early twentieth-
century publicists such as Lassa Oppenheim and William Hall asserted that states could not
87

abrogate certain "universally recognized principles" by mutual agreement. (William Hall, A
Treatise on International Law 382-83 (8th ed. 1924) (asserting that "fundamental principles of
international law" may "invalidate [], or at least render voidable," conflicting international
agreements); 1 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law 528 (1905).) Judges on the Permanent
Court of International Justice affirmed the existence of peremptory norms in international law by
referencing treaties contra bonos mores (contrary to public policy) in a series of individual
concurring and dissenting opinions. (For example, in the 1934 Oscar Chinn Case, Judge
Schcking's influential dissent stated that neither an international court nor an arbitral tribunal
should apply a treaty provision in contradiction to bonos mores. Oscar Chinn Case, 1934 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 63, at 149-50 (Dec. 12) (Schcking, J., dissenting).
72
Verdross argued that certain discrete rules of international custom had come to be recognized
as having a compulsory character notwithstanding contrary state agreements. At first, Verdross's
vision of international jus cogens encountered skepticism within the legal academy. These voices
of resistance soon found themselves in the minority, however, as the jus cogens concept gained
enhanced recognition and credibility following the Second World War. (See Lauri Hannikainen,
Peremptory Norms (Jus cogens) in International Law: Historical Development, Criteria, Present
Status 150 (1988) (surveying legal scholarship during the period 1945-69 and reporting that
"about eighty per cent [of scholars] held the opinion that there are peremptory norms existing in
international law").
73
In March 1953, the ILC's Special Rapporteur, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, submitted for the ILC's
consideration a partial draft convention on treaties which stated that "[a] treaty, or any of its
provisions, is void if its performance involves an act which is illegal under international law and if
it is declared so to be by the International Court of Justice." Hersch Lauterpacht, Law of Treaties:
Report by Special Rapporteur, [1953] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 90, 93, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/63.
74
See Summary Records of the 877th Meeting, [1966] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 227, 230-231, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/188 (noting that the "emergence of a rule of jus cogens banning aggressive war as
an international crime" was evidence that international law contains "minimum requirement[s] for
safeguarding the existence of the international community").
75
Second Report on the Law of Treaties, [1963] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, 52, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/156.
76
Id. at 53.
77
While the ICJ recently endorsed the jus cogens concept for the first time in its 2006 Judgment
on Preliminary Objections in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Rwanda), it
declined to clarify jus cogens's legal status or to specify any criteria for identifying peremptory
norms. (Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility
of the Application (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda) (Judgment of February 3, 2006), at 31-32,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/126/10435.pdf.
In some municipal cases, courts have declined to recognize international norms as
peremptory while expressing doubt about the proper criteria for identifying jus cogens.
(See, e.g., Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1149 (7th Cir.
2001) (expressing concern that jus cogens should be invoked "[o]nly as a last resort")).
In other cases, national courts have accepted international norms as peremptory, but
have hesitated to enforce these norms for fear that they might thereby compromise state
sovereignty. (See, e.g., Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] 71 O.R.3d 675 (Can.) (holding that the
prohibition against torture does not entail a right to a civil remedy enforceable in a foreign
court)).
88

In Congo v. Rwanda, for example, Judge ad hoc John Dugard observed that the ICJ had
refrained from invoking the jus cogens concept in several previous cases where
peremptory norms manifestly clashed with other principles of general international law.
(See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda)
(Judgment of February 3, 2006), at 2 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Dugard))
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has addressed jus cogens only once, in
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, when it famously rejected the argument that jus cogens
violations would deprive a state of sovereign immunity. Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom,
2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 61).
78
Sztucki, Jus cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 119-123 (1974).

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 173034 October 9, 2007
PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH CARE ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HEALTH SECRETARY FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III; HEALTH UNDER SECRETARIES DR. ETHELYN
P. NIETO, DR. MARGARITA M. GALON, ATTY. ALEXANDER A. PADILLA, & DR. JADE F. DEL
MUNDO; and ASSISTANT SECRETARIES DR. MARIO C. VILLAVERDE, DR. DAVID J. LOZADA,
AND DR. NEMESIO T. GAKO,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J .:
The Court and all parties involved are in agreement that the best nourishment for an infant is mother's
milk. There is nothing greater than for a mother to nurture her beloved child straight from her bosom. The
ideal is, of course, for each and every Filipino child to enjoy the unequaled benefits of breastmilk. But how
should this end be attained?
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The "Milk Code," Relevant International Agreements,
Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR). Petitioner posits that the RIRR is not
valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to
implement.
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-
respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.
1

89

Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the
preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 11
2
of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition
and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
However, on June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk
substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
The main issue raised in the petition is whether respondents officers of the DOH acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and in
violation of the provisions of the Constitution in promulgating the RIRR.
3

On August 15, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution granting a TRO enjoining respondents from
implementing the questioned RIRR.
After the Comment and Reply had been filed, the Court set the case for oral arguments on June 19, 2007.
The Court issued an Advisory (Guidance for Oral Arguments) dated June 5, 2007, to wit:
The Court hereby sets the following issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner is a real party-in-interest;
2. Whether Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
2.1 Whether the RIRR is in accord with the provisions of Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code);
2.2 Whether pertinent international agreements
1
entered into by the Philippines are part of the
law of the land and may be implemented by the DOH through the RIRR; If in the affirmative,
whether the RIRR is in accord with the international agreements;
2.3 Whether Sections 4, 5(w), 22, 32, 47, and 52 of the RIRR violate the due process clause and
are in restraint of trade; and
2.4 Whether Section 13 of the RIRR on Total Effect provides sufficient standards.
_____________
1 (1) United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) the WHO and Unicef "2002 Global
Strategy on Infant and Young Child Feeding;" and (3) various World Health Assembly (WHA)
Resolutions.
90

The parties filed their respective memoranda.
The petition is partly imbued with merit.
On the issue of petitioner's standing
With regard to the issue of whether petitioner may prosecute this case as the real party-in-interest, the
Court adopts the view enunciated in Executive Secretary v. Court of Appeals,
4
to wit:
The modern view is that an association has standing to complain of injuries to its members. This
view fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An association has
standing to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are
affected by the action. An organization has standing to assert the concerns of its
constituents.
x x x x
x x x We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized x x x to act
as the representative of any individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the
manpower recruitment industry, and to perform other acts and activities necessary to accomplish
the purposes embodied therein. The respondent is, thus, the appropriate party to assert the
rights of its members, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. x
x x The respondent [association] is but the medium through which its individual members
seek to make more effective the expression of their voices and the redress of their
grievances.
5
(Emphasis supplied)
which was reasserted in Purok Bagong Silang Association, Inc. v. Yuipco,
6
where the Court ruled that an
association has the legal personality to represent its members because the results of the case will affect
their vital interests.
7

Herein petitioner's Amended Articles of Incorporation contains a similar provision just like in Executive
Secretary, that the association is formed "to represent directly or through approved representatives the
pharmaceutical and health care industry before the Philippine Government and any of its agencies, the
medical professions and the general public."
8
Thus, as an organization, petitioner definitely has an
interest in fulfilling its avowed purpose of representing members who are part of the pharmaceutical and
health care industry. Petitioner is duly authorized
9
to take the appropriate course of action to bring to the
attention of government agencies and the courts any grievance suffered by its members which are
directly affected by the RIRR. Petitioner, which is mandated by its Amended Articles of Incorporation to
represent the entire industry, would be remiss in its duties if it fails to act on governmental action that
would affect any of its industry members, no matter how few or numerous they are. Hence, petitioner,
whose legal identity is deemed fused with its members, should be considered as a real party-in-interest
which stands to be benefited or injured by any judgment in the present action.
On the constitutionality of the provisions of the RIRR
First, the Court will determine if pertinent international instruments adverted to by respondents are part of
the law of the land.
Petitioner assails the RIRR for allegedly going beyond the provisions of the Milk Code, thereby amending
and expanding the coverage of said law. The defense of the DOH is that the RIRR implements not only
the Milk Code but also various international instruments
10
regarding infant and young child nutrition. It is
respondents' position that said international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and
therefore the DOH may implement them through the RIRR.
91

The Court notes that the following international instruments invoked by respondents, namely: (1) The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken by State Parties to diminish infant
and child mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-
being of families, and ensure that women are provided with services and nutrition in connection with
pregnancy and lactation. Said instruments do not contain specific provisions regarding the use or
marketing of breastmilk substitutes.
The international instruments that do have specific provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the
ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
bytransformation or incorporation.
11
The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law.
12

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of
the Constitution which provides that "[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective
unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate." Thus, treaties or
conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be
transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.
13

The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law
through local legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of
law in this jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.
The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to emphasize at this point
that the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other
forms of promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk
Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed
if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
On the other hand, Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.
(Emphasis supplied)
embodies the incorporation method.
14

In Mijares v. Ranada,
15
the Court held thus:
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as
binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established, widespread, and
consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion
92

juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief
that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring
it.
16
(Emphasis supplied)
"Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of general or customary international
law which are binding on all states,
17
i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the
principle of sovereign immunity,
18
a person's right to life, liberty and due process,
19
and pacta sunt
servanda,
20
among others. The concept of "generally accepted principles of law" has also been depicted
in this wise:
Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain "general principles of law" as a primary source of
international law because they have the "character of jus rationale" and are "valid through all kinds
of human societies." (Judge Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the 1966 South West Africa Case, 1966
I.C.J. 296). O'Connell holds that certain priniciples are part of international law because they are "basic
to legal systems generally" and hence part of the jus gentium. These principles, he believes, are
established by a process of reasoning based on the common identity of all legal systems. If there should
be doubt or disagreement, one must look to state practice and determine whether the municipal law
principle provides a just and acceptable solution. x x x
21
(Emphasis supplied)
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas defines customary international law as follows:
Custom or customary international law means "a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation [opinio juris]." (Restatement) This statement
contains the two basic elements of custom: the material factor, that is, how states behave,
and the psychological orsubjective factor, that is, why they behave the way they do.
x x x x
The initial factor for determining the existence of custom is the actual behavior of states. This
includes several elements: duration, consistency, and generality of the practice of states.
The required duration can be either short or long. x x x
x x x x
Duration therefore is not the most important element. More important is the consistency and the
generality of the practice. x x x
x x x x
Once the existence of state practice has been established, it becomes necessary to determine
why states behave the way they do. Do states behave the way they do because they consider it
obligatory to behave thus or do they do it only as a matter of courtesy? Opinio juris, or the
belief that a certain form of behavior is obligatory, is what makes practice an international
rule. Without it, practice is not law.
22
(Underscoring and Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, customary international law is deemed incorporated into our domestic system.
23

WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation. Have they attained the status of
customary law and should they then be deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land?
The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international specialized agencies allied with the
United Nations (UN) by virtue of Article 57,
24
in relation to Article 63
25
of the UN Charter. Under the 1946
93

WHO Constitution, it is the WHA which determines the policies of the WHO,
26
and has the power to adopt
regulations concerning "advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products
moving in international commerce,"
27
and to "make recommendations to members with respect to any
matter within the competence of the Organization."
28
The legal effect of its regulations, as opposed to
recommendations, is quite different.
Regulations, along with conventions and agreements, duly adopted by the WHA bind member
states thus:
Article 19. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt conventions or agreements with
respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization. A two-thirds vote of the Health
Assembly shall be required for the adoption of such conventions or agreements, which shall
come into force for each Member when accepted by it in accordance with its constitutional
processes.
Article 20. Each Member undertakes that it will, within eighteen months after the adoption by
the Health Assembly of a convention or agreement, take action relative to the acceptance of
such convention or agreement. Each Member shall notify the Director-General of the action
taken, and if it does not accept such convention or agreement within the time limit, it will furnish a
statement of the reasons for non-acceptance. In case of acceptance, each Member agrees to
make an annual report to the Director-General in accordance with Chapter XIV.
Article 21. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations concerning: (a) sanitary
and quarantine requirements and other procedures designed to prevent the international spread
of disease; (b) nomenclatures with respect to diseases, causes of death and public health
practices; (c) standards with respect to diagnostic procedures for international use; (d) standards
with respect to the safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products
moving in international commerce; (e) advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and
similar products moving in international commerce.
Article 22. Regulations adopted pursuant to Article 21 shall come into force for all Members after
due notice has been given of their adoption by the Health Assembly except for such Members as
may notify the Director-General of rejection or reservations within the period stated in the
notice. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under
Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members
with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization. (Emphasis supplied)
The absence of a provision in Article 23 of any mechanism by which the recommendation would come
into force for member states is conspicuous.
The former Senior Legal Officer of WHO, Sami Shubber, stated that WHA recommendations are
generally not binding, but they "carry moral and political weight, as they constitute the judgment on a
health issue of the collective membership of the highest international body in the field of health."
29
Even
the ICMBS itself was adopted as a mere recommendation, as WHA Resolution No. 34.22 states:
"The Thirty-Fourth World Health Assembly x x x adopts, in the sense of Article 23 of the
Constitution, the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes annexed to the
present resolution." (Emphasis supplied)
94

The Introduction to the ICMBS also reads as follows:
In January 1981, the Executive Board of the World Health Organization at its sixty-seventh
session, considered the fourth draft of the code, endorsed it, and unanimously recommended to
the Thirty-fourth World Health Assembly the text of a resolution by which it would adopt the
code in the form of a recommendation rather than a regulation. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
The legal value of WHA Resolutions as recommendations is summarized in Article 62 of the WHO
Constitution, to wit:
Art. 62. Each member shall report annually on the action taken with respect to recommendations
made to it by the Organization, and with respect to conventions, agreements and regulations.
Apparently, the WHA Resolution adopting the ICMBS and subsequent WHA Resolutions urging member
states to implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. Thus, unlike what
has been done with the ICMBS whereby the legislature enacted most of the provisions into law
which is the Milk Code, the subsequent WHA Resolutions,
30
specifically providing for exclusive
breastfeeding from 0-6 months, continued breastfeeding up to 24 months, and absolutely
prohibiting advertisements and promotions of breastmilk substitutes, have not been adopted as a
domestic law.
It is propounded that WHA Resolutions may constitute "soft law" or non-binding norms, principles and
practices that influence state behavior.
31

"Soft law" does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter III of
the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice.
32
It is, however, an expression of non-binding
norms, principles, and practices that influence state behavior.
33
Certain declarations and resolutions of
the UN General Assembly fall under this category.
34
The most notable is the UN Declaration of Human
Rights, which this Court has enforced in various cases, specifically, Government of Hongkong Special
Administrative Region v. Olalia,
35
Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,
36
Mijares v. Raada
37
and Shangri-la
International Hotel Management, Ltd. v. Developers Group of Companies, Inc..
38

The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency attached to the UN with the
mandate to promote and protect intellectual property worldwide, has resorted to soft law as a rapid means
of norm creation, in order "to reflect and respond to the changing needs and demands of its
constituents."
39
Other international organizations which have resorted to soft law include the International
Labor Organization and the Food and Agriculture Organization (in the form of the Codex Alimentarius).
40

WHO has resorted to soft law. This was most evident at the time of the Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS) and Avian flu outbreaks.
Although the IHR Resolution does not create new international law binding on WHO
member states, it provides an excellent example of the power of "soft law" in international
relations. International lawyers typically distinguish binding rules of international law-
"hard law"-from non-binding norms, principles, and practices that influence state
behavior-"soft law." WHO has during its existence generated many soft law norms,
creating a "soft law regime" in international governance for public health.
The "soft law" SARS and IHR Resolutions represent significant steps in laying the political
groundwork for improved international cooperation on infectious diseases. These resolutions
clearly define WHO member states' normative duty to cooperate fully with other countries and
with WHO in connection with infectious disease surveillance and response to outbreaks.
95

This duty is neither binding nor enforceable, but, in the wake of the SARS epidemic, the
duty is powerful politically for two reasons. First, the SARS outbreak has taught the lesson that
participating in, and enhancing, international cooperation on infectious disease controls is in a
country's self-interest x x x if this warning is heeded, the "soft law" in the SARS and IHR
Resolution could inform the development of general and consistent state practice on infectious
disease surveillance and outbreak response, perhaps crystallizing eventually into customary
international law on infectious disease prevention and control.
41

In the Philippines, the executive department implemented certain measures recommended by WHO to
address the outbreaks of SARS and Avian flu by issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 201 on April 26,
2003 and E.O. No. 280 on February 2, 2004, delegating to various departments broad powers to close
down schools/establishments, conduct health surveillance and monitoring, and ban importation of poultry
and agricultural products.
It must be emphasized that even under such an international emergency, the duty of a state to implement
the IHR Resolution was still considered not binding or enforceable, although said resolutions had great
political influence.
As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be
established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with
such rules (opinio juris). Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA
Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least
a majority of the member states; neither have respondents proven that any compliance by member states
with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature.
Respondents failed to establish that the provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary
international law that may be deemed part of the law of the land.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic
law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land
that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature.
Second, the Court will determine whether the DOH may implement the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions by virtue of its powers and functions under the Revised Administrative Code even in the
absence of a domestic law.
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 provides that the DOH
shall define the national health policy and implement a national health plan within the framework of the
government's general policies and plans, and issue orders and regulations concerning the
implementation of established health policies.
It is crucial to ascertain whether the absolute prohibition on advertising and other forms of promotion of
breastmilk substitutes provided in some WHA Resolutions has been adopted as part of the national
health policy.
Respondents submit that the national policy on infant and young child feeding is embodied in A.O. No.
2005-0014, dated May 23, 2005. Basically, the Administrative Order declared the following policy
guidelines: (1) ideal breastfeeding practices, such as early initiation of breastfeeding, exclusive
breastfeeding for the first six months, extended breastfeeding up to two years and beyond; (2)
appropriate complementary feeding, which is to start at age six months; (3) micronutrient
supplementation; (4) universal salt iodization; (5) the exercise of other feeding options; and (6) feeding in
exceptionally difficult circumstances. Indeed, the primacy of breastfeeding for children is emphasized as a
national health policy. However, nowhere in A.O. No. 2005-0014 is it declared that as part of such
96

health policy, the advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely
prohibited.
The national policy of protection, promotion and support of breastfeeding cannot automatically be
equated with a total ban on advertising for breastmilk substitutes.
In view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban on the advertising and
promotion of breastmilk substitutes, but instead, specifically creates an IAC which will regulate said
advertising and promotion, it follows that a total ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to a
law amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally authorized branch of government, the
legislature.
Thus, only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be
validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.
Third, the Court will now determine whether the provisions of the RIRR are in accordance with those of
the Milk Code.
In support of its claim that the RIRR is inconsistent with the Milk Code, petitioner alleges the following:
1. The Milk Code limits its coverage to children 0-12 months old, but the RIRR extended its
coverage to "young children" or those from ages two years old and beyond:
MILK CODE RIRR
WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and
adequate nutrition for infants is provided, there is
a need to protect and promote breastfeeding and
to inform the public about the proper use of
breastmilk substitutes and supplements and
related products through adequate, consistent
and objective information and appropriate
regulation of the marketing and distribution of the
said substitutes, supplements and related
products;
SECTION 4(e). "Infant" means a person falling
within the age bracket of 0-12 months.
Section 2. Purpose These Revised Rules and
Regulations are hereby promulgated to ensure
the provision of safe and adequate nutrition for
infants and young children by the promotion,
protection and support of breastfeeding and by
ensuring the proper use of breastmilk substitutes,
breastmilk supplements and related products
when these are medically indicated and only
when necessary, on the basis of adequate
information and through appropriate marketing
and distribution.
Section 5(ff). "Young Child" means a person
from the age of more than twelve (12) months up
to the age of three (3) years (36 months).
2. The Milk Code recognizes that infant formula may be a proper and possible substitute for
breastmilk in certain instances; but the RIRR provides "exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-
6 months" and declares that "there is no substitute nor replacement for breastmilk":
MILK CODE RIRR
WHEREAS, in order to ensure that safe and
adequate nutrition for infants is provided, there is
a need to protect and promote breastfeeding and
to inform the public about the proper use of
breastmilk substitutes and supplements and
related products through adequate, consistent
and objective information and appropriate
regulation of the marketing and distribution of the
Section 4. Declaration of Principles The
following are the underlying principles from which
the revised rules and regulations are premised
upon:
a. Exclusive breastfeeding is for infants from 0 to
97

said substitutes, supplements and related
products;
six (6) months.
b. There is no substitute or replacement for
breastmilk.
3. The Milk Code only regulates and does not impose unreasonable requirements for advertising
and promotion; RIRR imposes an absolute ban on such activities for breastmilk substitutes
intended for infants from 0-24 months old or beyond, and forbids the use of health and nutritional
claims. Section 13 of the RIRR, which provides for a "total effect" in the promotion of products
within the scope of the Code, is vague:
MILK CODE RIRR
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers.

(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing
materials, whether written, audio or visual,
for products within the scope of this Code shall
be printed, published, distributed, exhibited and
broadcast unless such materials are duly
authorized and approved by an inter-agency
committee created herein pursuant to the
applicable standards provided for in this Code.
Section 4. Declaration of Principles The
following are the underlying principles from which
the revised rules and regulations are premised
upon:
x x x x
f. Advertising, promotions, or sponsor-ships of
infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and other
related products are prohibited.
Section 11. Prohibition No advertising,
promotions, sponsorships, or marketing materials
and activities for breastmilk substitutes
intended for infants and young children up to
twenty-four (24) months, shall be allowed,
because they tend to convey or give subliminal
messages or impressions that undermine
breastmilk and breastfeeding or otherwise
exaggerate breastmilk substitutes and/or
replacements, as well as related products
covered within the scope of this Code.
Section 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of
products within the scope of this Code must be
objective and should not equate or make the
product appear to be as good or equal to
breastmilk or breastfeeding in the advertising
concept. It must not in any case undermine
breastmilk or breastfeeding. The "total effect"
should not directly or indirectly suggest that
buying their product would produce better
individuals, or resulting in greater love,
intelligence, ability, harmony or in any manner
bring better health to the baby or other such
exaggerated and unsubstantiated claim.
Section 15. Content of Materials. - The
following shall not be included in advertising,
promotional and marketing materials:
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a. Texts, pictures, illustrations or information
which discourage or tend to undermine the
benefits or superiority of breastfeeding or which
idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes and milk
supplements. In this connection, no pictures of
babies and children together with their mothers,
fathers, siblings, grandparents, other relatives or
caregivers (or yayas) shall be used in any
advertisements for infant formula and breastmilk
supplements;
b. The term "humanized," "maternalized," "close
to mother's milk" or similar words in describing
breastmilk substitutes or milk supplements;
c. Pictures or texts that idealize the use of infant
and milk formula.
Section 16. All health and nutrition claims for
products within the scope of the Code are
absolutely prohibited. For this purpose, any
phrase or words that connotes to increase
emotional, intellectual abilities of the infant and
young child and other like phrases shall not be
allowed.
4. The RIRR imposes additional labeling requirements not found in the Milk Code:
MILK CODE RIRR
SECTION 10. Containers/Label.
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to
provide the necessary information about the
appropriate use of the products, and in such a
way as not to discourage breastfeeding.
(b) Each container shall have a clear,
conspicuous and easily readable and
understandable message in Pilipino or English
printed on it, or on a label, which message can
not readily become separated from it, and which
shall include the following points:
(i) the words "Important Notice" or their
equivalent;
(ii) a statement of the superiority of
breastfeeding;
(iii) a statement that the product shall be used
only on the advice of a health worker as to the
need for its use and the proper methods of use;
Section 26. Content Each container/label shall
contain such message, in both Filipino and
English languages, and which message cannot
be readily separated therefrom, relative the
following points:
(a) The words or phrase "Important Notice" or
"Government Warning" or their equivalent;
(b) A statement of the superiority of
breastfeeding;
(c) A statement that there is no substitute for
breastmilk;
(d) A statement that the product shall be used
only on the advice of a health worker as to the
need for its use and the proper methods of use;
(e) Instructions for appropriate prepara-tion, and
a warning against the health hazards of
inappropriate preparation; and
(f) The health hazards of unnecessary or
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and
(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and a
warning against the health hazards of
inappropriate preparation.
improper use of infant formula and other related
products including information that powdered
infant formula may contain pathogenic
microorganisms and must be prepared and used
appropriately.
5. The Milk Code allows dissemination of information on infant formula to health professionals;
the RIRR totally prohibits such activity:
MILK CODE RIRR
SECTION 7. Health Care System.
(b) No facility of the health care system shall be
used for the purpose of promoting infant formula
or other products within the scope of this
Code. This Code does not, however, preclude
the dissemination of information to health
professionals as provided in Section 8(b).
SECTION 8. Health Workers. -
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and
distributors to health professionals regarding
products within the scope of this Code shall be
restricted to scientific and factual matters and
such information shall not imply or create a belief
that bottle-feeding is equivalent or superior to
breastfeeding. It shall also include the
information specified in Section 5(b).
Section 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or
representatives of products covered by the Code
shall be allowed to conduct or be involved in any
activity on breastfeeding promotion, education
and production of Information, Education and
Communication (IEC) materials on
breastfeeding, holding of or participating as
speakers in classes or seminars for women and
children activities and to avoid the use of these
venues to market their brands or company
names.
SECTION 16. All health and nutrition claims for
products within the scope of the Code are
absolutely prohibited. For this purpose, any
phrase or words that connotes to increase
emotional, intellectual abilities of the infant and
young child and other like phrases shall not be
allowed.
6. The Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in research
and continuing education of health professionals; RIRR absolutely forbids the same.
MILK CODE RIRR
SECTION 8. Health Workers
(e) Manufacturers and distributors of products
within the scope of this Code may assist in the
research, scholarships and continuing education,
of health professionals, in accordance with the
rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry
of Health.
Section 4. Declaration of Principles
The following are the underlying principles from
which the revised rules and regulations are
premised upon:
i. Milk companies, and their
representatives,should not form part of any
policymaking body or entity in relation to the
advancement of breasfeeding.
SECTION 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or
representatives of products covered by the Code
shall be allowed to conduct or be involved in any
activity on breastfeeding promotion, education
and production of Information, Education and
Communication (IEC) materials on
breastfeeding, holding of or participating as
100

speakers in classes or seminars for women and
children activitiesand to avoid the use of these
venues to market their brands or company
names.
SECTION 32. Primary Responsibility of Health
Workers - It is the primary responsibility of the
health workers to promote, protect and support
breastfeeding and appropriate infant and young
child feeding. Part of this responsibility is to
continuously update their knowledge and skills
on breastfeeding. No assistance, support,
logistics or training from milk companies shall be
permitted.
7. The Milk Code regulates the giving of donations; RIRR absolutely prohibits it.
MILK CODE RIRR

(f) Nothing herein contained shall prevent
donations from manufacturers and distributors of
products within the scope of this Code upon
request by or with the approval of the Ministry of
Health.
Section 51. Donations Within the Scope of
This Code - Donations of products, materials,
defined and covered under the Milk Code and
these implementing rules and regulations, shall
be strictly prohibited.
Section 52. Other Donations By Milk
Companies Not Covered by this Code. -
Donations of products, equipments, and the like,
not otherwise falling within the scope of this Code
or these Rules, given by milk companies and
their agents, representatives, whether in kind or
in cash, may only be coursed through the Inter
Agency Committee (IAC), which shall determine
whether such donation be accepted or otherwise.
8. The RIRR provides for administrative sanctions not imposed by the Milk Code.
MILK CODE RIRR
Section 46. Administrative Sanctions. The
following administrative sanctions shall be
imposed upon any person, juridical or natural,
found to have violated the provisions of the Code
and its implementing Rules and Regulations:
a) 1
st
violation Warning;
b) 2
nd
violation Administrative fine of a
minimum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) to Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, depending on the
gravity and extent of the violation, including the
recall of the offending product;
c) 3
rd
violation Administrative Fine of a
minimum of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) to One
101

Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00) Pesos,
depending on the gravity and extent of the
violation, and in addition thereto, the recall of the
offending product, and suspension of the
Certificate of Product Registration (CPR);
d) 4
th
violation Administrative Fine of a minimum
of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) to Five
Hundred (P500,000.00) Thousand Pesos,
depending on the gravity and extent of the
violation; and in addition thereto, the recall of the
product, revocation of the CPR, suspension of
the License to Operate (LTO) for one year;
e) 5
th
and succeeding repeated violations
Administrative Fine of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) Pesos, the recall of the
offending product, cancellation of the CPR,
revocation of the License to Operate (LTO) of the
company concerned, including the blacklisting of
the company to be furnished the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) and the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI);
f) An additional penalty of Two Thou-sand Five
Hundred (P2,500.00) Pesos per day shall be
made for every day the violation continues after
having received the order from the IAC or other
such appropriate body, notifying and penalizing
the company for the infraction.
For purposes of determining whether or not there
is "repeated" violation, each product violation
belonging or owned by a company, including
those of their subsidiaries, are deemed to be
violations of the concerned milk company and
shall not be based on the specific violating
product alone.
9. The RIRR provides for repeal of existing laws to the contrary.
The Court shall resolve the merits of the allegations of petitioner seriatim.
1. Petitioner is mistaken in its claim that the Milk Code's coverage is limited only to children 0-12 months
old. Section 3 of the Milk Code states:
SECTION 3. Scope of the Code The Code applies to the marketing, and practices related
thereto, of the following products: breastmilk substitutes, including infant formula; other milk
products, foods and beverages, including bottle-fed complementary foods, when marketed or
otherwise represented to be suitable, with or without modification, for use as a partial or total
replacement of breastmilk; feeding bottles and teats. It also applies to their quality and availability,
and to information concerning their use.
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Clearly, the coverage of the Milk Code is not dependent on the age of the child but on the kind of
product being marketed to the public. The law treats infant formula, bottle-fed complementary food, and
breastmilk substitute as separate and distinct product categories.
Section 4(h) of the Milk Code defines infant formula as "a breastmilk substitute x x x to satisfy the normal
nutritional requirements of infants up to between four to six months of age, and adapted to their
physiological characteristics"; while under Section 4(b), bottle-fed complementary food refers to "any
food, whether manufactured or locally prepared, suitable as a complement to breastmilk or infant formula,
when either becomes insufficient to satisfy the nutritional requirements of the infant." An infant under
Section 4(e) is a person falling within the age bracket 0-12 months. It is the nourishment of this group of
infants or children aged 0-12 months that is sought to be promoted and protected by the Milk Code.
But there is another target group. Breastmilk substitute is defined under Section 4(a) as "any food being
marketed or otherwise presented as a partial or total replacement for breastmilk, whether or not suitable
for that purpose."This section conspicuously lacks reference to any particular age-group of
children. Hence, the provision of the Milk Code cannot be considered exclusive for children aged
0-12 months. In other words, breastmilk substitutes may also be intended for young children more than
12 months of age. Therefore, by regulating breastmilk substitutes, the Milk Code also intends to protect
and promote the nourishment of children more than 12 months old.
Evidently, as long as what is being marketed falls within the scope of the Milk Code as provided in
Section 3, then it can be subject to regulation pursuant to said law, even if the product is to be used by
children aged over 12 months.
There is, therefore, nothing objectionable with Sections 2
42
and 5(ff)
43
of the RIRR.
2. It is also incorrect for petitioner to say that the RIRR, unlike the Milk Code, does not recognize that
breastmilk substitutes may be a proper and possible substitute for breastmilk.
The entirety of the RIRR, not merely truncated portions thereof, must be considered and construed
together. As held in De Luna v. Pascual,
44
"[t]he particular words, clauses and phrases in the Rule should
not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole."
Section 7 of the RIRR provides that "when medically indicated and only when necessary, the use of
breastmilk substitutes is proper if based on complete and updated information." Section 8 of the RIRR
also states that information and educational materials should include information on the proper use of
infant formula when the use thereof is needed.
Hence, the RIRR, just like the Milk Code, also recognizes that in certain cases, the use of
breastmilk substitutes may be proper.
3. The Court shall ascertain the merits of allegations 3
45
and 4
46
together as they are interlinked with each
other.
To resolve the question of whether the labeling requirements and advertising regulations under the RIRR
are valid, it is important to deal first with the nature, purpose, and depth of the regulatory powers of the
DOH, as defined in general under the 1987 Administrative Code,
47
and as delegated in particular under
the Milk Code.
Health is a legitimate subject matter for regulation by the DOH (and certain other administrative agencies)
in exercise of police powers delegated to it. The sheer span of jurisprudence on that matter precludes the
need to further discuss it.
.48
However, health information, particularly advertising materials on apparently
103

non-toxic products like breastmilk substitutes and supplements, is a relatively new area for regulation by
the DOH.
49

As early as the 1917 Revised Administrative Code of the Philippine Islands,
50
health information was
already within the ambit of the regulatory powers of the predecessor of DOH.
51
Section 938 thereof
charged it with the duty to protect the health of the people, and vested it with such powers as "(g) the
dissemination of hygienic information among the people and especially the inculcation of knowledge
as to the proper care of infants and the methods of preventing and combating dangerous
communicable diseases."
Seventy years later, the 1987 Administrative Code tasked respondent DOH to carry out the state policy
pronounced under Section 15, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, which is "to protect and promote the
right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them."
52
To that end, it was
granted under Section 3 of the Administrative Code the power to "(6) propagate health information
and educate the population on important health, medical and environmental matters which have health
implications."
53

When it comes to information regarding nutrition of infants and young children, however, the Milk Code
specifically delegated to the Ministry of Health (hereinafter referred to as DOH) the power to ensure that
there is adequate, consistent and objective information on breastfeeding and use of breastmilk
substitutes, supplements and related products; and the power to control such information. These are
expressly provided for in Sections 12 and 5(a), to wit:
SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring
x x x x
(b) The Ministry of Health shall be principally responsible for the implementation and enforcement
of the provisions of this Code. For this purpose, the Ministry of Health shall have the following
powers and functions:
(1) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the
implementation of this Code and the accomplishment of its purposes and objectives.
x x x x
(4) To exercise such other powers and functions as may be necessary for or incidental to
the attainment of the purposes and objectives of this Code.
SECTION 5. Information and Education
(a) The government shall ensure that objective and consistent information is provided on infant
feeding, for use by families and those involved in the field of infant nutrition. This responsibility
shall cover the planning, provision, design and dissemination of information, and
the control thereof, on infant nutrition. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, DOH is authorized by the Milk Code to control the content of any information on breastmilk vis-
-visbreastmilk substitutes, supplement and related products, in the following manner:
SECTION 5. x x x
(b) Informational and educational materials, whether written, audio, or visual, dealing with the
feeding of infants and intended to reach pregnant women and mothers of infants, shall include
104

clear information on all the following points: (1) the benefits and superiority of breastfeeding; (2)
maternal nutrition, and the preparation for and maintenance of breastfeeding; (3) the negative
effect on breastfeeding of introducing partial bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing the
decision not to breastfeed; and (5) where needed, the proper use of infant formula, whether
manufactured industrially or home-prepared. When such materials contain information about
the use of infant formula, they shall include the social and financial implications of its use;
the health hazards of inappropriate foods or feeding methods; and, in particular, the health
hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk
substitutes. Such materials shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use of
breastmilk substitutes.
x x x x
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals regarding
products within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual matters,
and such information shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or
superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified in Section 5(b).
SECTION 10. Containers/Label
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the necessary information about the
appropriate use of the products, and in such a way as not to discourage breastfeeding.
x x x x
(d) The term "humanized," "maternalized" or similar terms shall not be used. (Emphasis supplied)
The DOH is also authorized to control the purpose of the information and to whom such information may
be disseminated under Sections 6 through 9 of the Milk Code
54
to ensure that the information that would
reach pregnant women, mothers of infants, and health professionals and workers in the health care
system is restricted to scientific and factual matters and shall not imply or create a belief that
bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding.
It bears emphasis, however, that the DOH's power under the Milk Code to control information regarding
breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the power to control does not encompass
the power to absolutely prohibit the advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes.
The following are the provisions of the Milk Code that unequivocally indicate that the control over
information given to the DOH is not absolute and that absolute prohibition is not contemplated by the
Code:
a) Section 2 which requires adequate information and appropriate marketing and distribution of
breastmilk substitutes, to wit:
SECTION 2. Aim of the Code The aim of the Code is to contribute to the provision of
safe and adequate nutrition for infants by the protection and promotion of breastfeeding
and by ensuring the proper use of breastmilk substitutes and breastmilk supplements
when these are necessary, on the basis of adequate information and through appropriate
marketing and distribution.
105

b) Section 3 which specifically states that the Code applies to the marketing of and practices
related to breastmilk substitutes, including infant formula, and to information concerning their use;
c) Section 5(a) which provides that the government shall ensure that objective and consistent
information is provided on infant feeding;
d) Section 5(b) which provides that written, audio or visual informational and educational
materials shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes
and should include information on the health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of said
product;
e) Section 6(a) in relation to Section 12(a) which creates and empowers the IAC to review and
examine advertising, promotion, and other marketing materials;
f) Section 8(b) which states that milk companies may provide information to health professionals
but such information should be restricted to factual and scientific matters and shall not imply or
create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to breastfeeding; and
g) Section 10 which provides that containers or labels should not contain information that would
discourage breastfeeding and idealize the use of infant formula.
It is in this context that the Court now examines the assailed provisions of the RIRR regarding labeling
and advertising.
Sections 13
55
on "total effect" and 26
56
of Rule VII of the RIRR contain some labeling requirements,
specifically: a) that there be a statement that there is no substitute to breastmilk; and b) that there be a
statement that powdered infant formula may contain pathogenic microorganisms and must be prepared
and used appropriately. Section 16
57
of the RIRR prohibits all health and nutrition claims for products
within the scope of the Milk Code, such as claims of increased emotional and intellectual abilities of the
infant and young child.
These requirements and limitations are consistent with the provisions of Section 8 of the Milk Code, to
wit:
SECTION 8. Health workers -
x x x x
products within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual matters, and
such information shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is equivalent or superior to
breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified in Section 5.
58
(Emphasis supplied)
and Section 10(d)
59
which bars the use on containers and labels of the terms "humanized,"
"maternalized," or similar terms.
These provisions of the Milk Code expressly forbid information that would imply or create a belief that
there is any milk product equivalent to breastmilk or which is humanized or maternalized, as such
information would be inconsistent with the superiority of breastfeeding.
It may be argued that Section 8 of the Milk Code refers only to information given to health workers
regarding breastmilk substitutes, not to containers and labels thereof. However, such restrictive
application of Section 8(b) will result in the absurd situation in which milk companies and distributors are
106

forbidden to claim to health workers that their products are substitutes or equivalents of breastmilk, and
yet be allowed to display on the containers and labels of their products the exact opposite message. That
askewed interpretation of the Milk Code is precisely what Section 5(a) thereof seeks to avoid by
mandating that all information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes be consistent, at the
same time giving the government control over planning, provision, design, and dissemination of
information on infant feeding.
Thus, Section 26(c) of the RIRR which requires containers and labels to state that the product offered is
not a substitute for breastmilk, is a reasonable means of enforcing Section 8(b) of the Milk Code and
deterring circumvention of the protection and promotion of breastfeeding as embodied in Section 2
60
of
the Milk Code.
Section 26(f)
61
of the RIRR is an equally reasonable labeling requirement. It implements Section 5(b) of
the Milk Code which reads:
SECTION 5. x x x
x x x x
clear information on all the following points: x x x (5) where needed, the proper use of infant
formula, whether manufactured industrially or home-prepared. When such materials contain
information about the use of infant formula, they shall include the social and financial implications
of its use; the health hazards of inappropriate foods or feeding methods; and, in particular,
the health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk
substitutes. Such materials shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use of
breastmilk substitutes. (Emphasis supplied)
The label of a product contains information about said product intended for the buyers thereof. The
buyers of breastmilk substitutes are mothers of infants, and Section 26 of the RIRR merely adds a fair
warning about the likelihood of pathogenic microorganisms being present in infant formula and other
related products when these are prepared and used inappropriately.
Petitioners counsel has admitted during the hearing on June 19, 2007 that formula milk is prone to
contaminations and there is as yet no technology that allows production of powdered infant formula that
eliminates all forms of contamination.
62

Ineluctably, the requirement under Section 26(f) of the RIRR for the label to contain the message
regarding health hazards including the possibility of contamination with pathogenic microorganisms is in
accordance with Section 5(b) of the Milk Code.
The authority of DOH to control information regarding breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes and
supplements and related products cannot be questioned. It is its intervention into the area of advertising,
promotion, and marketing that is being assailed by petitioner.
In furtherance of Section 6(a) of the Milk Code, to wit:
(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing materials, whether written, audio or visual, for
products within the scope of this Code shall be printed, published, distributed, exhibited and
107

broadcast unless such materials are duly authorized and approved by an inter-agency committee
created herein pursuant to the applicable standards provided for in this Code.
the Milk Code invested regulatory authority over advertising, promotional and marketing materials to an
IAC, thus:
SECTION 12. Implementation and Monitoring -
(a) For purposes of Section 6(a) of this Code, an inter-agency committee composed of the
following members is hereby created:
Minister of Health ------------------- Chairman
Minister of Trade and Industry ------------------- Member
Minister of Justice ------------------- Member
Minister of Social Services and Development ------------------- Member
The members may designate their duly authorized representative to every meeting of the
Committee.
The Committee shall have the following powers and functions:
(1) To review and examine all advertising. promotion or other marketing materials,
whether written, audio or visual, on products within the scope of this Code;
(2) To approve or disapprove, delete objectionable portions from and prohibit the printing,
publication, distribution, exhibition and broadcast of, all advertising promotion or other
marketing materials, whether written, audio or visual, on products within the scope of this
Code;
(3) To prescribe the internal and operational procedure for the exercise of its powers and
functions as well as the performance of its duties and responsibilities; and
(4) To promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or proper for the
implementation of Section 6(a) of this Code. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 11 of the RIRR, to wit:
SECTION 11. Prohibition No advertising, promotions, sponsorships, or marketing materials and
activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children up to twenty-four (24)
months, shall be allowed, because they tend to convey or give subliminal messages or
impressions that undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding or otherwise exaggerate breastmilk
substitutes and/or replacements, as well as related products covered within the scope of this
Code.
prohibits advertising, promotions, sponsorships or marketing materials and activities for breastmilk
substitutes in line with the RIRRs declaration of principle under Section 4(f), to wit:
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles
108

x x x x
(f) Advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and other
related products are prohibited.
The DOH, through its co-respondents, evidently arrogated to itself not only the regulatory authority given
to the IAC but also imposed absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion, and marketing.
Yet, oddly enough, Section 12 of the RIRR reiterated the requirement of the Milk Code in Section 6
thereof for prior approval by IAC of all advertising, marketing and promotional materials prior to
dissemination.
Even respondents, through the OSG, acknowledged the authority of IAC, and repeatedly insisted, during
the oral arguments on June 19, 2007, that the prohibition under Section 11 is not actually operational, viz:
SOLICITOR GENERAL DEVANADERA:
x x x x
x x x Now, the crux of the matter that is being questioned by Petitioner is whether or not there is
an absolute prohibition on advertising making AO 2006-12 unconstitutional. We maintained that
what AO 2006-12 provides is not an absolute prohibition because Section 11 while it states and it
is entitled prohibition it states that no advertising, promotion, sponsorship or marketing materials
and activities for breast milk substitutes intended for infants and young children up to 24 months
shall be allowed because this is the standard they tend to convey or give subliminal messages or
impression undermine that breastmilk or breastfeeding x x x.
We have to read Section 11 together with the other Sections because the other Section, Section
12, provides for the inter agency committee that is empowered to process and evaluate all the
advertising and promotion materials.
x x x x
What AO 2006-12, what it does, it does not prohibit the sale and manufacture, it simply regulates
the advertisement and the promotions of breastfeeding milk substitutes.
x x x x
Now, the prohibition on advertising, Your Honor, must be taken together with the provision on the
Inter-Agency Committee that processes and evaluates because there may be some information
dissemination that are straight forward information dissemination. What the AO 2006 is trying to
prevent is any material that will undermine the practice of breastfeeding, Your Honor.
x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:
Madam Solicitor General, under the Milk Code, which body has authority or power to promulgate
Rules and Regulations regarding the Advertising, Promotion and Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes?
109

Your Honor, please, it is provided that the Inter-Agency Committee, Your Honor.
x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE SANTIAGO:
x x x Don't you think that the Department of Health overstepped its rule making authority when it
totally banned advertising and promotion under Section 11 prescribed the total effect rule as well
as the content of materials under Section 13 and 15 of the rules and regulations?
Your Honor, please, first we would like to stress that there is no total absolute ban. Second, the
Inter-Agency Committee is under the Department of Health, Your Honor.
x x x x
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE NAZARIO:
x x x Did I hear you correctly, Madam Solicitor, that there is no absolute ban on advertising of
breastmilk substitutes in the Revised Rules?
Yes, your Honor.
But, would you nevertheless agree that there is an absolute ban on advertising of breastmilk
substitutes intended for children two (2) years old and younger?
It's not an absolute ban, Your Honor, because we have the Inter-Agency Committee that can
evaluate some advertising and promotional materials, subject to the standards that we have
stated earlier, which are- they should not undermine breastfeeding, Your Honor.
x x x x
x x x Section 11, while it is titled Prohibition, it must be taken in relation with the other Sections,
particularly 12 and 13 and 15, Your Honor, because it is recognized that the Inter-Agency
Committee has that power to evaluate promotional materials, Your Honor.
So in short, will you please clarify there's no absolute ban on advertisement regarding milk
substitute regarding infants two (2) years below?
We can proudly say that the general rule is that there is a prohibition, however, we take
exceptions and standards have been set. One of which is that, the Inter-Agency Committee can
110

allow if the advertising and promotions will not undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding, Your
Honor.
63

Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code.
However, although it is the IAC which is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the approval
or rejection of advertising, promotional, or other marketing materials under Section 12(a) of the Milk
Code, said provision must be related to Section 6 thereof which in turn provides that the rules and
regulations must be "pursuant to the applicable standards provided for in this Code." Said standards are
set forth in Sections 5(b), 8(b), and 10 of the Code, which, at the risk of being repetitious, and for easy
reference, are quoted hereunder:
x x x x
clear information on all the following points: (1) the benefits and superiority of breastfeeding; (2)
maternal nutrition, and the preparation for and maintenance of breastfeeding; (3) the negative
effect on breastfeeding of introducing partial bottlefeeding; (4) the difficulty of reversing the
decision not to breastfeed; and (5) where needed, the proper use of infant formula, whether
manufactured industrially or home-prepared. When such materials contain information about the
use of infant formula, they shall include the social and financial implications of its use; the health
hazards of inappropriate foods of feeding methods; and, in particular, the health hazards of
unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other breastmilk substitutes. Such materials
shall not use any picture or text which may idealize the use of breastmilk substitutes.
x x x x
SECTION 8. Health Workers.
x x x x
products within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and factual matters and
such information shall not imply or create a belief that bottle feeding is equivalent or superior to
breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified in Section 5(b).
x x x x
(a) Containers and/or labels shall be designed to provide the necessary information about the
appropriate use of the products, and in such a way as not to discourage breastfeeding.
(b) Each container shall have a clear, conspicuous and easily readable and understandable
message in Pilipino or English printed on it, or on a label, which message can not readily become
separated from it, and which shall include the following points:
(i) the words "Important Notice" or their equivalent;
(ii) a statement of the superiority of breastfeeding;
111

(iii) a statement that the product shall be used only on the advice of a health worker as to
the need for its use and the proper methods of use; and
(iv) instructions for appropriate preparation, and a warning against the health hazards of
inappropriate preparation.
Section 12(b) of the Milk Code designates the DOH as the principal implementing agency for the
enforcement of the provisions of the Code. In relation to such responsibility of the DOH, Section 5(a) of
the Milk Code states that:
(a) The government shall ensure that objective and consistent information is provided on infant
feeding, for use by families and those involved in the field of infant nutrition. This responsibility
shall cover the planning, provision, design and dissemination of information, and the control
thereof, on infant nutrition. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the DOH has the significant responsibility to translate into operational terms the standards
set forth in Sections 5, 8, and 10 of the Milk Code, by which the IAC shall screen advertising,
promotional, or other marketing materials.
It is pursuant to such responsibility that the DOH correctly provided for Section 13 in the RIRR which
reads as follows:
SECTION 13. "Total Effect" - Promotion of products within the scope of this Code must be
objective and should not equate or make the product appear to be as good or equal to breastmilk
or breastfeeding in the advertising concept. It must not in any case undermine breastmilk or
breastfeeding. The "total effect" should not directly or indirectly suggest that buying their product
would produce better individuals, or resulting in greater love, intelligence, ability, harmony or in
any manner bring better health to the baby or other such exaggerated and unsubstantiated claim.
Such standards bind the IAC in formulating its rules and regulations on advertising, promotion, and
marketing. Through that single provision, the DOH exercises control over the information content of
advertising, promotional and marketing materials on breastmilk vis-a-vis breastmilk substitutes,
supplements and other related products. It also sets a viable standard against which the IAC may screen
such materials before they are made public.
In Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. vs. Department of Foreign Affairs,
64
the Court held:
x x x [T]his Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: "public interest,"
"justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare."
65

In this case, correct information as to infant feeding and nutrition is infused with public interest and
welfare.
4. With regard to activities for dissemination of information to health professionals, the Court also finds
that there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the Milk Code and the RIRR. Section 7(b)
66
of the
Milk Code, in relation to Section 8(b)
67
of the same Code, allows dissemination of information to health
professionals but suchinformation is restricted to scientific and factual matters.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, Section 22 of the RIRR does not prohibit the giving of information to
health professionals on scientific and factual matters. What it prohibits is the involvement of the
manufacturer and distributor of the products covered by the Code in activities for the promotion,
112

education and production of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials regarding
breastfeeding that are intended forwomen and children. Said provision cannot be construed to
encompass even the dissemination of information to health professionals, as restricted by the Milk
Code.
5. Next, petitioner alleges that Section 8(e)
68
of the Milk Code permits milk manufacturers and distributors
to extend assistance in research and in the continuing education of health professionals, while Sections
22 and 32 of the RIRR absolutely forbid the same. Petitioner also assails Section 4(i)
69
of the RIRR
prohibiting milk manufacturers' and distributors' participation in any policymaking body in relation to the
advancement of breastfeeding.
Section 4(i) of the RIRR provides that milk companies and their representatives should not form part of
any policymaking body or entity in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding. The Court finds nothing
in said provisions which contravenes the Milk Code. Note that under Section 12(b) of the Milk Code, it
is the DOH which shall be principally responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the
provisions of said Code. It is entirely up to the DOH to decide which entities to call upon or allow to be
part of policymaking bodies on breastfeeding. Therefore, the RIRR's prohibition on milk companies
participation in any policymaking body in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding is in accord with
the Milk Code.
Petitioner is also mistaken in arguing that Section 22 of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving
reasearch assistance and continuing education to health professionals. Section 22
70
of the RIRR does
not pertain to research assistance to or the continuing education of health professionals; rather, it
deals with breastfeeding promotion and education for women and children. Nothing in Section 22 of
the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving assistance for research or continuing education to health
professionals; hence, petitioner's argument against this particular provision must be struck down.
It is Sections 9
71
and 10
72
of the RIRR which govern research assistance. Said sections of the RIRR
provide thatresearch assistance for health workers and researchers may be allowed upon approval
of an ethics committee, and with certain disclosure requirements imposed on the milk company
and on the recipient of the research award.
The Milk Code endows the DOH with the power to determine how such research or educational
assistance may be given by milk companies or under what conditions health workers may accept the
assistance. Thus, Sections 9 and 10 of the RIRR imposing limitations on the kind of research done or
extent of assistance given by milk companies are completely in accord with the Milk Code.
Petitioner complains that Section 32
73
of the RIRR prohibits milk companies from giving assistance,
support, logistics or training to health workers. This provision is within the prerogative given to the DOH
under Section 8(e)
74
of the Milk Code, which provides that manufacturers and distributors of breastmilk
substitutes may assist in researches, scholarships and the continuing education, of health
professionals in accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Health, now
DOH.
6. As to the RIRR's prohibition on donations, said provisions are also consistent with the Milk Code.
Section 6(f) of the Milk Code provides that donations may be made by manufacturers and distributors of
breastmilk substitutesupon the request or with the approval of the DOH. The law does not proscribe
the refusal of donations. The Milk Code leaves it purely to the discretion of the DOH whether to request or
accept such donations. The DOH then appropriately exercised its discretion through Section 51
75
of the
RIRR which sets forth its policy not to request or approve donations from manufacturers and distributors
of breastmilk substitutes.
It was within the discretion of the DOH when it provided in Section 52 of the RIRR that any donation from
milk companies not covered by the Code should be coursed through the IAC which shall determine
113

whether such donation should be accepted or refused. As reasoned out by respondents, the DOH is not
mandated by the Milk Code to accept donations. For that matter, no person or entity can be forced to
accept a donation. There is, therefore, no real inconsistency between the RIRR and the law because the
Milk Code does not prohibit the DOH from refusing donations.
7. With regard to Section 46 of the RIRR providing for administrative sanctions that are not found in the
Milk Code, the Court upholds petitioner's objection thereto.
Respondent's reliance on Civil Aeronautics Board v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc.
76
is misplaced. The glaring
difference in said case and the present case before the Court is that, in the Civil Aeronautics Board, the
Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was expressly granted by the law (R.A. No. 776) the power to
impose fines and civil penalties, while the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) was granted by the same law
the power to review on appeal the order or decision of the CAA and to determine whether to impose,
remit, mitigate, increase or compromise such fine and civil penalties. Thus, the Court upheld the CAB's
Resolution imposing administrative fines.
In a more recent case, Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc.,
77
the Court upheld the
Department of Energy (DOE) Circular No. 2000-06-10 implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 33. The
circular provided for fines for the commission of prohibited acts. The Court found that nothing in the
circular contravened the law because the DOE was expressly authorized by B.P. Blg. 33 and R.A. No.
7638 to impose fines or penalties.
In the present case, neither the Milk Code nor the Revised Administrative Code grants the DOH the
authority to fix or impose administrative fines. Thus, without any express grant of power to fix or impose
such fines, the DOH cannot provide for those fines in the RIRR. In this regard, the DOH again exceeded
its authority by providing for such fines or sanctions in Section 46 of the RIRR. Said provision is,
therefore, null and void.
The DOH is not left without any means to enforce its rules and regulations. Section 12(b) (3) of the Milk
Code authorizes the DOH to "cause the prosecution of the violators of this Code and other pertinent laws
on products covered by this Code." Section 13 of the Milk Code provides for the penalties to be imposed
on violators of the provision of the Milk Code or the rules and regulations issued pursuant to it, to wit:
SECTION 13. Sanctions
(a) Any person who violates the provisions of this Code or the rules and regulations issued
pursuant to this Code shall, upon conviction, be punished by a penalty of two (2) months to one
(1) year imprisonment or a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) or both. Should the offense be committed by a juridical
person, the chairman of the Board of Directors, the president, general manager, or the partners
and/or the persons directly responsible therefor, shall be penalized.
(b) Any license, permit or authority issued by any government agency to any health worker,
distributor, manufacturer, or marketing firm or personnel for the practice of their profession or
occupation, or for the pursuit of their business, may, upon recommendation of the Ministry of
Health, be suspended or revoked in the event of repeated violations of this Code, or of the rules
and regulations issued pursuant to this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
8. Petitioners claim that Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws that are contrary to the RIRR is
frivolous.
Section 57 reads:
114

SECTION 57. Repealing Clause - All orders, issuances, and rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with these revised rules and implementing regulations are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Section 57 of the RIRR does not provide for the repeal of laws but only orders, issuances and rules and
regulations. Thus, said provision is valid as it is within the DOH's rule-making power.
An administrative agency like respondent possesses quasi-legislative or rule-making power or the power
to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the Constitution, and subject to the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers.
78
Such express grant of rule-making power necessarily includes the power to amend, revise,
alter, or repeal the same.
79
This is to allow administrative agencies flexibility in formulating and adjusting
the details and manner by which they are to implement the provisions of a law,
80
in order to make it more
responsive to the times. Hence, it is a standard provision in administrative rules that prior issuances of
administrative agencies that are inconsistent therewith are declared repealed or modified.
In fine, only Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 are ultra vires, beyond the authority of the DOH to promulgate and in
contravention of the Milk Code and, therefore, null and void. The rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in
consonance with the Milk Code.
Lastly, petitioner makes a "catch-all" allegation that:
x x x [T]he questioned RIRR sought to be implemented by the Respondents is unnecessary and
oppressive, and is offensive to the due process clause of the Constitution, insofar as the
same is in restraint of trade and because a provision therein is inadequate to provide the public
with a comprehensible basis to determine whether or not they have committed a
violation.
81
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner refers to Sections 4(f),
82
4(i),
83
5(w),
84
11,
85
22,
86
32,
87
46,
88
and 52
89
as the provisions that
suppress the trade of milk and, thus, violate the due process clause of the Constitution.
The framers of the constitution were well aware that trade must be subjected to some form of regulation
for the public good. Public interest must be upheld over business interests.
90
In Pest Management
Association of the Philippines v. Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority,
91
it was held thus:
x x x Furthermore, as held in Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut
Authority,despite the fact that "our present Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a
policy, it nonetheless reserves to the government the power to intervene whenever
necessary to promote the general welfare." There can be no question that the unregulated use
or proliferation of pesticides would be hazardous to our environment. Thus, in the aforecited case,
the Court declared that "free enterprise does not call for removal of protective regulations."
x x x It must be clearly explained and proven by competent evidence just exactly how such
protective regulation would result in the restraint of trade. [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
In this case, petitioner failed to show that the proscription of milk manufacturers participation in any
policymaking body (Section 4(i)), classes and seminars for women and children (Section 22); the giving of
assistance, support and logistics or training (Section 32); and the giving of donations (Section 52) would
unreasonably hamper the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner has not established that the
proscribed activities are indispensable to the trade of breastmilk substitutes. Petitioner failed to
demonstrate that the aforementioned provisions of the RIRR are unreasonable and oppressive for being
in restraint of trade.
115

Petitioner also failed to convince the Court that Section 5(w) of the RIRR is unreasonable and oppressive.
Said section provides for the definition of the term "milk company," to wit:
SECTION 5 x x x. (w) "Milk Company" shall refer to the owner, manufacturer, distributor of infant
formula, follow-up milk, milk formula, milk supplement, breastmilk substitute or replacement, or by
any other description of such nature, including their representatives who promote or otherwise
advance their commercial interests in marketing those products;
On the other hand, Section 4 of the Milk Code provides:
(d) "Distributor" means a person, corporation or any other entity in the public or private sector
engaged in the business (whether directly or indirectly) of marketing at the wholesale or retail
level a product within the scope of this Code. A "primary distributor" is a manufacturer's sales
agent, representative, national distributor or broker.
x x x x
(j) "Manufacturer" means a corporation or other entity in the public or private sector engaged in
the business or function (whether directly or indirectly or through an agent or and entity controlled
by or under contract with it) of manufacturing a products within the scope of this Code.
Notably, the definition in the RIRR merely merged together under the term "milk company" the entities
defined separately under the Milk Code as "distributor" and "manufacturer." The RIRR also enumerated in
Section 5(w) the products manufactured or distributed by an entity that would qualify it as a "milk
company," whereas in the Milk Code, what is used is the phrase "products within the scope of this Code."
Those are the only differences between the definitions given in the Milk Code and the definition as re-
stated in the RIRR.
Since all the regulatory provisions under the Milk Code apply equally to both manufacturers and
distributors, the Court sees no harm in the RIRR providing for just one term to encompass both entities.
The definition of "milk company" in the RIRR and the definitions of "distributor" and "manufacturer"
provided for under the Milk Code are practically the same.
The Court is not convinced that the definition of "milk company" provided in the RIRR would bring about
any change in the treatment or regulation of "distributors" and "manufacturers" of breastmilk substitutes,
as defined under the Milk Code.
Except Sections 4(f), 11 and 46, the rest of the provisions of the RIRR are in consonance with the
objective, purpose and intent of the Milk Code, constituting reasonable regulation of an industry which
affects public health and welfare and, as such, the rest of the RIRR do not constitute illegal restraint of
trade nor are they violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of Administrative Order
No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared NULL and VOID for being ultra vires. The Department
of Health and respondents are PROHIBITED from implementing said provisions.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 15, 2006 is LIFTED insofar as the rest of the
provisions of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chief Justice), Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Corona, Carpio-
Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.
116

Footnotes
1
Section 11, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
Section 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. - Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order
of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the
action and on such terms as are just. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
2
Article 11. Implementation and monitoring
11.1 Governments should take action to give effect to the principles and aim of this Code,
as appropriate to their social and legislative framework, including the adoption of national
legislation, regulations or other suitable measures. For this purpose, governments should
seek, when necessary, the cooperation of WHO, UNICEF and other agencies of the
United Nations system. National policies and measures, including laws and regulations,
which are adopted to give effect to the principles and aim of this Code should be publicly
stated, and should apply on the same basis to all those involved in the manufacture and
marketing of products within the scope of this Code.
x x x x
3
Petition, rollo, p. 12.
4
G.R. No. 131719, May 25, 2004, 429 SCRA 81.
5
Id. at 96-97.
6
G.R. No. 135092, May 4, 2006, 489 SCRA 382.
7
Id. at 396.
8
Annex "G", Petitioner's Memorandum dated July 19, 2007.
9
Annexes "H", "I", and "J" of Petitioner's Memorandum executed by Wyeth Philippines, Inc.,
Bristol Myers Squibb (Phil.), Inc., and Abbott Laboratories, Inc., respectively.
10
a) The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); b) the International Code of Marketing
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS);

c) the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (CSCR); d) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW); e) the Global Strategy for Infant and Young Child Nutrition (Global Strategy);
and f) various resolutions adopted by the World Health Assembly.
11
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., Constitutional Structure and Powers of Government (Notes
and Cases) Part I ( 2005).
12
Id.
13
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., An Introduction to Public International Law, 2002 Ed., p. 57.
117

14
According to Fr. Bernas, the Austrian Constitution (Art. 9) and the Constitution of the Federal
Republic of Germany (Art. 25) also use the incorporation method.
15
G.R. No. 139325, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 397.
16
Id. at 421.
17
Merlin M. Magallona, Fundamentals of Public International Law, 2005 Ed., p. 526.
18
Id. at 525.
19
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19,
2007.
20
Taada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546, 592 (1997).
21
Louis Henkin, Richard C. Pugh, Oscar Schachter, Hans Smit, International Law, Cases and
Materials, 2
nd
Ed., p. 96.
22
Supra note 13, at 10-13.
23
Minucher v. Court of Appeals, 445 Phil. 250, 269 (2003).
24
Article 57. The various specialized agencies, established by intergovernmental agreement and
having wide international responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic,
social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought into relationship with the
United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 63.
Such agencies thus brought into relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to
as specialized agencies.
25
Article 63. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with any of the
agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be
brought into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval
by the General Assembly.
It may coordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and
recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and
to the Members of the United Nations.
26
Article 18. The functions of the Health Assembly shall be: (a) to determine the policies of
the Organization x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
27
Article 21. The Health Assembly shall have authority to adopt regulations concerning: x x x (e)
advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in international
commerce. (Emphasis supplied)
28
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members
with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization. (Emphasis supplied)
29
See David Fidler, Developments Involving SARS, International Law, and Infectious Disease
Control at the Fifty-Sixth Meeting of the World Health Assembly, June 2003, ASIL.
118

30
In Resolution No. 34.22 (May 21, 1981), the WHA, acting under Article 23 of the WHO
Constitution, adopted the ICBMS.
(a) In Resolution No. 35.26 (May 1982), the WHA urged member states to implement
the ICBMS as a "minimum requirement".
(b) In Resolution No. 39.28 (May 16, 1986), the WHA requested the WHO Director
General to direct the attention of member states to the fact that any food or drink given
before complementary feeding is nutritionally required may interfere with the initiation or
maintenance of breastfeeding and therefore should neither be promoted nor encouraged
for us by infants during this period.
(c) In Resolution No. 43.3 (May 14, 1990), the WHA urged member states to protect and
promote breastfeeding as an essential component of nutrition policies so as to enable
infants to be exclusively breastfed during the first four to six months of life.
(d) In Resolution No. 45.34 (May 14, 1992), the WHA urged member states to
implement the targets of the Innocenti Declaration specifically, to give effect to the
ICMBS.
(e) In Resolution No. 46.7 (May 10, 1993), the WHA urged member states to strive to
eliminate under-nutrition, malnutrition and nutritional deficiency among children.
(f) In Resolution No. 47.5 (May 9, 1994), the WHA urged member states to ensure that
there are no donations of supplies of breastmilk substitutes and other products covered
by the ICMBS in any part of the health care system.
(g) In Resolution No. 49.15 (May 25, 1996), the WHA urged member states to ensure
that complementary foods are not marketed for or used in ways that undermine exclusive
and sustained breastfeeding.
(h) In Resolution No. 54.2 (May 2002), the WHA, noting that "despite the fact that the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes and relevant subsequent World
Health Assembly resolutions state that there should be no advertising or other forms of
promotion of products within its scope, new modern communication methods including
electronic means, are currently increasingly being used to promote such products; and
conscious of the need for the Codex Alimentarius Commission to take the International
Code and subsequent relevant Health Assembly resolutions into consideration in dealing
with health claims in the development of food standards and guidelines x x x," urged
member states to develop new approaches to protect, promote and support exclusive
breastfeeding for six months as a global public health recommendation.
(i) In Resolution No. 55.25 (May 15, 2002), the WHA requested the Codex Alimentarius
Commission to ensure that labelling of processed foods for infants and young children be
consistent with the WHO policy under the ICBMS.
(j) In Resolution No. 58.32 (May 25, 2005), the WHA urged member states to continue
to protect and promote exclusive breastfeeding for six months.
(k) In Resolution No. 59.21 (May 27, 2006), the WHA reiterated its support for the Gobal
strategy for Infant and Young Child Feeding.
31
David Fidler, supra note 29.
119

32
Article 38. 1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: a) international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b) international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; c) the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations; d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for
the determination of rules of law.
33
Supra note 29.
34
Louis Henkin, et al., International Law, Cases and Materials, 2
nd
Ed., supra note 21, at 114-
136.
35
Supra note 19.
36
90 Phil. 70 (1951).
37
Supra note 15.
38
G.R. No. 159938, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 405.
39
Edward Kwakwa, Some Comments on Rulemaking at the World Intellectual Property
Organization,www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite; September 13, 2007, 12:33, citing the 1999 WIPO
Resolution Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, 2000 WIPO
Recommendation Concerning Trademark Licenses, and 2001 WIPO Recommendation
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Marks and other Industrial Property Rights in Signs on
the Internet.
40
Id.
41
Supra note 29.
42
Section 2. Purpose These Revised Rules and Regulations are hereby promulgated to ensure
the provision of safe and adequate nutrition for infants and young children by the promotion,
protection and support of breastfeeding and by ensuring the proper use of breastmilk substitutes,
breastmilk supplements and related products when these are medically indicated and only when
necessary, on the basis of adequate information and through appropriate marketing and
distribution. (Underscoring supplied)
43
Section 5(ff). "Young Child" means a person from the age of more than twelve (12) months up
to the age of three (3) years (36 months). (Underscoring supplied)
44
G.R. No. 144218, July 14, 2006, 495 SCRA 42, 55.
45
See pp. 19-21.
46
See p. 21.
47
Executive Order No. 292, made effective on November 23, 1989 by Proclamation No. 495.
48
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 US 11 (1905); Beltran v. Secretary of Health G.R. No.
133640, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 168, 196; St. Lukess Medical Center Employees
120

Association- AFW v.National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 162053, March 7,
2007; Tablarin v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. L-78164, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 730, 741; Pollution
Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 112, 123-
124; Rivera v. Campbell, 34 Phil. 348, 353-354 (1916); Lorenzo v. Director of Health, 50 Phil.
595, 597 (1927).
49
As early as People v. Pomar, 46 Phil. 440, 445 (1924), we already noted that "advancing
civilization is bringing within the scope of police power of the state today things which
were not thought of as being with in such power yesterday. The development of civilization,
the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with [an increasing] desire on the
part of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals
of the state, have brought within the police power of the state many questions for regulation which
formerly were not so considered."
50
Act No. 2711, approved on March 10, 1917.
51
Known then as Public Health Service
52
Section 1, Chapter I, Title IX, Executive Order No. 292.
53
Id. at Section 3.
54
SECTION 6. The General Public and Mothers
(a) No advertising, promotion or other marketing materials, whether written, audio or
visual, for products within the scope of this Code shall be printed, published, distributed,
exhibited and broadcast unless such materials are duly authorized and approved by an
inter-agency committee created herein pursuant to the applicable standards provided for
in this Code.
(b) Manufacturers and distributors shall not be permitted to give, directly or indirectly,
samples and supplies of products within the scope of this Code or gifts of any sort to any
member of the general public, including members of their families, to hospitals and other
health institutions, as well as to personnel within the health care system, save as
otherwise provided in this Code.
(c) There shall be no point-of-sale advertising, giving of samples or any other promotion
devices to induce sales directly to the consumers at the retail level, such as special
displays, discount coupons, premiums, special sales, bonus and tie-in sales for the
products within the scope of this Code. This provision shall not restrict the establishment
of pricing policies and practices intended to provide products at lower prices on a long-
term basis.
(d) Manufactures and distributors shall not distribute to pregnant women or mothers of
infants any gifts or articles or utensils which may promote the use of breastmilk
substitutes or bottlefeeding, nor shall any other groups, institutions or individuals
distribute such gifts, utensils or products to the general public and mothers.
(e) Marketing personnel shall be prohibited from advertising or promoting in any other
manner the products covered by this Code, either directly or indirectly, to pregnant
women or with mother of infants, except as otherwise provided by this Code.
121

(f) Nothing herein contained shall prevent donations from manufacturers and distributors
or products within the scope of this Code upon request by or with the approval of the
Ministry of Health.
SECTION 7. Health Care System
(a) The Ministry of Health shall take appropriate measures to encourage and promote
breastfeeding. It shall provide objective and consistent information, training and advice to
health workers on infant nutrition, and on their obligations under this Code.
(b) No facility of the health care system shall be used for the purpose of promoting infant
formula or other products within the scope of this Code. This Code does not, however,
preclude the dissemination of information to health professionals as provided in Section
8(b).
(c) Facilities of the health care system shall not be used for the display of products within
the scope of this Code, or for placards or posters concerning such products.
(d) The use by the health care system of "professional service" representatives,
"mothercraft nurses" or similar personnel, provided or paid for by manufacturers or
distributors, shall not be permitted.
(e) In health education classes for mothers and the general public, health workers and
community workers shall emphasize the hazards and risks of the improper use of
breastmilk substitutes particularly infant formula. Feeding with infant formula shall be
demonstrated only to mothers who may not be able to breastfeed for medical or other
legitimate reasons.
(a) Health workers shall encourage and promote breastfeeding and shall make
themselves familiar with objectives and consistent information on maternal and infant
nutrition, and with their responsibilities under this Code.
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals
regarding products within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and
factual matters and such information shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is
equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified in
Section 5(b).
(c) No financial or material inducements to promote products within the scope of this
Code shall be offered by manufacturers or distributors to health workers or members of
their families, nor shall these be accepted by the health workers or members of their
families, except as otherwise provided in Section 8(e).
(d) Samples of infant formula or other products within the scope of this Code, or of
equipment or utensils for their preparation or use, shall not be provided to health workers
except when necessary for the purpose of professional evaluation or research in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Health. No
health workers shall give samples of infant formula to pregnant women and mothers of
infants or members of their families.
122

(e) Manufacturers and distributors of products within the scope of this Code may assist in
the research, scholarships and continuing education, of health professionals, in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Health.
SECTION 9. Persons employed by Manufacturers and Distributors Personnel employed in
marketing products within the scope of this Code shall not, as part of their job responsibilities,
perform educational functions in relation to pregnant women or mothers of infants.
55
See p. 20.
56
See p. 21.
57
SECTION 16. All health and nutrition claims for products within the scope of the Code are
absolutely prohibited. For this purpose, any phrase or words that connotes to increase emotional,
intellectual abilities of the infant and young child and other like phrases shall not be allowed.
58
See p. 30.
59
x x x x
(d) The term "humanized", "maternalized" or similar terms shall not be used.
60
SECTION 2. Aim of the Code The aim of the Code is to contribute to the provision of safe
and adequate nutrition for infants by the protection and promotion of breastfeeding and by
ensuring the proper use of breastmilk substitutes and breastmilk supplements when these are
necessary, on the basis of adequate information and through appropriate marketing and
distribution.
61
SECTION 26. Content Each container/label shall contain such message, in both Filipino and
English languages, and which message cannot be readily separated therefrom, relative the
following points:
x x x x
(f) The health hazards of unnecessary or improper use of infant formula and other related
products including information that powdered infant formula may contain pathogenic
microorganisms and must be prepared and used appropriately.
62
TSN of the hearing of June 19, 2007, pp. 114-120.
63
TSN of June 19, 2007 hearing, pp. 193-194, 198, 231, 237-240, 295-300.
64
G.R. No. 152214, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 295.
65
Id. at 314.
66
SECTION 7. Health Care System
x x x x
123

(b) No facility of the health care system shall be used for the purpose of promoting infant
formula or other products within the scope of this Code. This Code does not, however,
preclude the dissemination of information to health professionals as provided in Section
8(b).
67
SECTION 8. Health Workers. -
x x x x
(b) Information provided by manufacturers and distributors to health professionals
regarding products within the scope of this Code shall be restricted to scientific and
factual matters and such information shall not imply or create a belief that bottlefeeding is
equivalent or superior to breastfeeding. It shall also include the information specified in
Section 5(b).
68
SECTION 8. Health Workers -
x x x x
(e) Manufacturers and distributors of products within the scope of this Code may assist in
the research, scholarships and continuing education, of health professionals, in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Health.
69
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles The following are the underlying principles from which
the revised rules and regulations are premised upon:
x x x x
(i) Milk companies, and their representatives, should not form part of any policymaking
body or entity in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding.
70
SECTION 22. No manufacturer, distributor, or representatives of products covered by the Code
shall be allowed to conduct or be involved in any activity on breastfeeding promotion, education
and production of Information, Education and Communication (IEC) materials on
breastfeeding, holding of or participating as speakers in classes or seminars for women and
children activities and to avoid the use of these venues to market their brands or company
names.
71
SECTION 9. Research, Ethics Committee, Purpose - The DOH shall ensure that research
conducted for public policy purposes, relating to infant and young child feeding should, at all
times, be free form any commercial influence/bias; accordingly, the health worker or researcher
involved in such must disclose any actual or potential conflict of interest with the company/person
funding the research. In any event, such research and its findings shall be subjected to
independent peer review. x x x.
72
SECTION 10. Public Disclosure For transparency purposes, a disclosure and/or disclaimer of
the sponsoring company should be done by the company itself, health worker, researcher
involved through verbal declaration during the public presentation of the research and in print
upon publication.
73
SECTION 32. Primary Responsibility of Health Workers It is the primary responsibility of the
health workers to promote, protect and support breastfeeding and appropriate infant and young
child feeding. Part of this responsibility is to continuously update their knowledge and skills on
124

breastfeeding. No assistance, support, logistics or training from milk companies shall be
permitted.
74
Supra note 68.
75
SECTION 51. Donations Within the Scope of This Code - Donations of products, materials,
defined and covered under the Milk Code and these implementing rules and regulations, shall be
strictly prohibited.
76
159-A Phil. 142 (1975).
77
G.R. No. 159149, June 26, 2006, 492 SCRA 638.
78
Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, 456 Phil. 145, 155-
156 (2003).
79
Yazaki Torres Manufacturing, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130584, June 27, 2006, 493
SCRA 86, 97.
80
Supra note 78, at 156.
81
Petitioner's Memorandum.
82
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles The following are the underlying principles from which
the revised rules and regulations are premised upon:
x x x x
(f) Advertising, promotions, or sponsorships of infant formula, breastmilk substitutes and
other related products are prohibited.
83
SECTION 4. Declaration of Principles x x x
(i) Milk companies, and their representatives, should not form part of any policymaking
body or entity in relation to the advancement of breastfeeding.
84
SECTION 5. x x x x (w) "Milk Company" shall refer to the owner, manufacturer, distributor, of
infant formula, follow-up milk, milk formula, milk supplement, breastmilk substitute or
replacement, or by any other description of such nature, including their representatives who
promote or otherwise advance their commercial interests in marketing those products; x x x.
85
SECTION 11. Prohibition No advertising, promotions, sponsorships, or marketing materials
and activities for breastmilk substitutes intended for infants and young children up to twenty-four
(24) months, shall be allowed, because they tend to convey or give subliminal messages or
impressions that undermine breastmilk and breastfeeding or otherwise exaggerate breastmilk
substitutes and/or replacements, as well as related products covered within the scope of this
Code.
86
Supra note 70.
87
Supra note 73.
125

88
SECTION 46. Administrative Sanctions. The following administrative sanctions shall be
imposed upon any person, juridical or natural, found to have violated the provisions of the Code
and its implementing Rules and Regulations:
(a) 1
st
violation Warning;
(b) 2
nd
violation Administrative fine of a minimum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) to Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent of the violation,
including the recall of the offending product;
(c) 3
rd
violation Administrative Fine of a minimum of Sixty Thousand (P60,000.00) to
One Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00) Pesos, depending on the gravity and extent
of the violation, and in addition thereto, the recall of the offending product, and
suspension of the Certificate of Product Registration (CPR);
(d) 4
th
violation Administrative Fine of a minimum of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) to Five Hundred (P500,000.00) Thousand Pesos, depending on the
gravity and extent of the violation; and in addition thereto, the recall of the product,
revocation of the CPR, suspension of the License to Operate (LTO) for one year;
(e) 5
th
and succeeding repeated violations Administrative Fine of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) Pesos, the recall of the offending product, cancellation of the CPR,
revocation of the License to Operate (LTO) of the company concerned, including the
blacklisting of the company to be furnished the Department of Budget and Management
(DBM) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI);
(f) An additional penalty of Two Thou-sand Five Hundred (P2,500.00) Pesos per day
shall be made for every day the violation continues after having received the order from
the IAC or other such appropriate body, notifying and penalizing the company for the
infraction.
For purposes of determining whether or not there is "repeated" violation, each product
violation belonging or owned by a company, including those of their subsidiaries, are
deemed to be violations of the concerned milk company and shall not be based on the
specific violating product alone.
89
SECTION 52. Other Donations By Milk Companies Not Covered by this Code - Donations of
products, equipments, and the like, not otherwise falling within the scope of this Code or these
Rules, given by milk companies and their agents, representatives, whether in kind or in cash, may
only be coursed through the Inter Agency Committee (IAC), which shall determine whether such
donation be accepted or otherwise.
90
Eastern Assurance & Surety Corporation v. Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board, 459 Phil. 395, 399 (2003).
91
G.R. No. 156041, February 21, 2007.

Sanctity of Family (Sec. 12)
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014
126

Right to Health (Sec. 15)
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993
JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and
represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor,
represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and
PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA
FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES
FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their
parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his
parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor,
represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T.
NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA,
MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ,
minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN,
MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA,
minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and
REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA
ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by
their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA,
PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented
by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and
FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and
MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J .:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a
127

cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro
Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein,
now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents.
Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action
geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.
1
The complaint
2
was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit
3
and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines,
taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally
concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn."
4
Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf
to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."
5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a
land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in
which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a
genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous
Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence
reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be
utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this
balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as
(a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well
as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of
salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of
Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity,
with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the
country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural
communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers
and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction
in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire
country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the
floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of
forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated
for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and
(k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
128

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are
so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of
rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and
about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as
Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25
hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not
earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from
and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural
resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
129

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On
March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging
permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative
of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is
desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations
of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of
dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make
full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14,
Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law
and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant
action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth.
6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint
based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue
raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1)
130

the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action
presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.
7
In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the
fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only
represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.
8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the
respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3
of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of
generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit
that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing
in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such
allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that
the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be
properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the
State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled
unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
131

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue
with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject
matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the
Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all
the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are
present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves,
for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue
in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as
hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.
9
Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to
the present as well as future generations.
10
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put
a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the
petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the
issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and
rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but
agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of
all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right
they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to
prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the
Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified
data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with
political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by
this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the
three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.
11

132

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint
itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of
the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and
State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the
civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly
stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments
and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for
they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself,
thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would
be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and
Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment
necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same
and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance.
12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
133

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well
as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources,
13
then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10
June 1987 E.O. No. 192,
14
Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as
may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the
welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection
and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different
segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural
resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also
the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation
of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,
15
specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the
necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the
present as well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development
and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's
being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization,
and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the
bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
134

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment
Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain
and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with
each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity
and well-being."
16
As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian
of the environment for succeeding generations."
17
The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the
said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as
clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No.
192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which
they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and
its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action,
19
the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the
facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity
of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only
issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a
valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint?
20
In Militante vs. Edrosolano,
21
this Court
laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon
a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to
be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they
may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as
the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees
thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation
or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue.
What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and
expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that
protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
135

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law,
22
Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving
the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority
represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what
was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the
government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court,
the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the
legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according
to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson,
23
Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts
clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise
would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.
24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in
his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost
infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber
license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said
licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of
public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of
privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
In Tan vs. Director of Forestry,
25
this Court held:
136

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license
is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or
privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public
welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is
not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a
vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People
vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary:
26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a
privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products
therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within
the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree
No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27,
1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.
27

cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that
a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose,
such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose
of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp.
28
this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute.
The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York,
29
quoted in Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,
30
to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall
137

be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the
detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.
31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing
or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed
in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of
right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The
petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the
questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J ., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to
my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural
resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what
the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their
suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of
"class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
138

petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or
entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may
be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part
of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is
not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that
"the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and
other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of
ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements
pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,
Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other
hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
139

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified
the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a
specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and
implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings
mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners
so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind,
the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well
exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation
is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
or not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis
supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the
right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no
claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments
the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts
should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
140

proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those
companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.

# Separate Opinions
FELICIANO, J ., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to
my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal
principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the
protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural
resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what
the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and,
maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their
suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a
plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of
"class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action
petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental
protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or
entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may
be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part
of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is
not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental
legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that
"the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been
"constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it
cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very
difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a
balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers,
inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of
organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after
141

strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and
other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of
ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements
pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV,
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II,
Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other
hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment
quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified
the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a
specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code
identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and
implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings
mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the
constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of
Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The
implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and
far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a
right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution
that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners
so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind,
the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well
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exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the
existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a
specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons.
One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in
operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation
is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial
power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
or not there has been agrave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis
supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the
right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no
claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments
the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts
should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded
is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those
companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between
petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies
demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest
cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
# Footnotes
1 Rollo, 164; 186.
2 Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.
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3 Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.
4 Rollo, 67.
5 Id., 74.
6 Rollo, 70-73.
7 Annex "B" of Petitions; Id., 43-44.
8 Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.
9 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, 1986, 1508.
10 Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987, E.O. No. 292.
11 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 43-44.
12 Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.
13 For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the National Economy and Patrimony.
14 The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
15 E.O. No. 292.
16 Section 1.
17 Section 2.
18 Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community Investment and
Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs. Vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251
[1966]; Caseas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462 [1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202
SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs. Rosal, 204 SCRA 1 [1991].
19 Section 1(q), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.
20 Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529 [1968]; Virata vs.
Sandiganbayn, supra; Madrona vs. Rosal, supra.
21 39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].
22 1991 ed., 226-227.
23 180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also, Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 [1990];
Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991];
Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 [1991].
24 Rollo, 44.
144

25 125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983].
26 190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990].
27 Article III, 1987 Constitution.
28 110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes omitted.
29 291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947-949.
30 22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968].
31 Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. supra.; Phil.
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, supra.; Alalayan vs. NPC, 24 SCRA
172[1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling vs.
National Housing Authority, 156 SCRA 623 [1987].

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 171947-48 February 15, 2011
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS,
1
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE
COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Petitioners,
vs.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA,
FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON
SANTIAGUEL, and JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
VELASCO, JR., J .:
On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering petitioners to
clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different capacities. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.
76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are
AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening events in the
case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
145

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies
to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class
B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make
them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and
natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government
agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully
implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call
regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure
the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated
completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of general
supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs
under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro
Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their
respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers,
the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros
Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually
discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they
have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws,
ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require
non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a
reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into
these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines
and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and
maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and
Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the
DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and
the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore
the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the
fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance
with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979,
RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the
Manila Bay.
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(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the
discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the
Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control
projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC),
and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the
Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-
Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The
DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the
rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in
coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned
government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-
Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the
Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater
into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as
prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters
within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the
apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal
provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on
pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year
from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the
proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic
tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within
which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation
clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, the DepEd
shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection,
and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of
students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward
achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire
Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act
of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and
preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development
objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and
revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG,
PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of
"continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly
progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.
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SO ORDERED.
The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and the Decision became final in
January 2009.
The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December 18, 2008 Decision. The
Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on
the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution
phase.
In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for
the agencies to perform their assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an encroachment over the powers
and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines.
This view is misplaced.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII
of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative
function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the power of the Court to implement the
December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged encroachment by the Court over
executive functions.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status
reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court. Section 47 of Rule 39 reads:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
x x x x
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have been so adjudged
but also those matters "actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto." Certainly, any
activity that is needed to fully implement a final judgment is necessarily encompassed by said judgment.
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental cases:
Sec. 7. Judgment.If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus
requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant
such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The
court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the
judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate government agency,
evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or observations on the
execution of the judgment.
Sec. 8. Return of the writ.The periodic reports submitted by the respondent detailing compliance with
the judgment shall be contained in partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final
148

return of the writ shall be made to the court by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has
been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. (Emphasis
supplied.)
With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA
means that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Courts orders, the Court
exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.
There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We shall now proceed to the
recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.
Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.
2
An evaluation of the
quarterly progressive reports has shown that (1) there are voluminous quarterly progressive reports that
are being submitted; (2) petitioner-agencies do not have a uniform manner of reporting their cleanup,
rehabilitation and preservation activities; (3) as yet no definite deadlines have been set by petitioner
DENR as to petitioner-agencies timeframe for their respective duties; (4) as of June 2010 there has been
a change in leadership in both the national and local levels; and (5) some agencies have encountered
difficulties in complying with the Courts directives.
In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have to be issued by the Court to
address the said concerns.
Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the Court hereby resolves
to ORDER the following:
(1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency in the Philippine
Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the updated Operational
Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy.
The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality of Manila Bay waters for all four
quarters of 2010 on or before June 30, 2011.
The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of persons and companies in Metro
Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan that generate toxic and hazardous waste
on or before September 30, 2011.
(2) On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall order
the Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and
Bataan; and the Mayors of all the cities and towns in said provinces to inspect all factories, commercial
establishments and private homes along the banks of the major river systemssuch as but not limited to
the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (Paranaque-Zapote, Las Pinas) Rivers,
the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the
Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, and the Laguna De Bayand other minor rivers and
waterways within their jurisdiction that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay and the lands
abutting it, to determine if they have wastewater treatment facilities and/or hygienic septic tanks, as
prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, rules and regulations. Said local government unit (LGU) officials
are given up to September 30, 2011 to finish the inspection of said establishments and houses.
In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate action to ensure compliance by non-
complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes with said law, rules and regulations
requiring the construction or installment of wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks.
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The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on or before December 31, 2011
their respective compliance reports which will contain the names and addresses or offices of the owners
of all the non-complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes, copy furnished the
concerned environmental agency, be it the local DENR office or the Laguna Lake Development Authority.
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain measures intended to ensure
compliance of all non-complying factories, commercial establishments, and private homes.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila shall consider providing
land for the wastewater facilities of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its
concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water, Inc.) within their respective jurisdictions.
(3) The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas in Metro Manila,
Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater treatment facilities. Within the same period,
the concessionaires of the MWSS shall submit their plans and projects for the construction of wastewater
treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion period for said facilities, which shall not
go beyond 2037.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its two concessionaires submit a report
on the amount collected as sewerage fees in their respective areas of operation as of December 31,
2010.
(4) The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or before September 30, 2011 its plan
to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the
completion period for said works, which shall be fully implemented by December 31, 2020.
(5) The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, shall
submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a report on areas in Manila Bay where marine life has to
be restored or improved and the assistance it has extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite,
Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the fisheries and aquatic resources in Manila
Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the marine life in said areas. Within the same period, it
shall submit its five-year plan to restore and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to
assist the aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the completion period for said undertakings.
The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the baseline data as of September 30,
2010 on the pollution loading into the Manila Bay system from agricultural and livestock sources.
(6) The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports the list of violators it has
apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA is further ordered to include in its report the names,
make and capacity of the ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall submit to the Court on or before
June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement its compliance with paragraph 7 of the
dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the completion dates of such measures.
The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire that collects and disposes of the
solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes, which shall state the names, make and capacity
of the ships serviced by it since August 2003 up to the present date, the dates the ships docked at PPA
ports, the number of days the ship was at sea with the corresponding number of passengers and crew
per trip, the volume of solid, liquid and other wastes collected from said ships, the treatment undertaken
and the disposal site for said wastes.
(7) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-
year plan of action on the measures and activities it intends to undertake to apprehend the violators of
Republic Act No. (RA) 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances
150

and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of
violators.
The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action
on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree
No. 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009
and other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the
successful prosecution of violators.
(8) The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the Court on or before June
30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila who, as of December 31,
2010, own and occupy houses, structures, constructions and other encroachments established or built
along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-
Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros, in violation of RA 7279 and
other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal of said
informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid houses, structures, constructions and
encroachments, as well as the completion dates for said activities, which shall be fully implemented not
later than December 31, 2015.
The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Resolution, on
the establishment of a sanitary landfill facility for Metro Manila in compliance with the standards under RA
9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the location of open and controlled dumps
in Metro Manila whose operations are illegal after February 21, 2006,
3
pursuant to Secs. 36 and 37 of RA
9003, and its plan for the closure of these open and controlled dumps to be accomplished not later than
December 31, 2012. Also, on or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, as Chairperson of the
National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC), shall submit a report on the location of all
open and controlled dumps in Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as NSWMC Chairperson, shall submit a
report on whether or not the following landfills strictly comply with Secs. 41 and 42 of RA 9003 on the
establishment and operation of sanitary landfills, to wit:
National Capital Region
1. Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas City
2. Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay Payatas, Quezon City
Region III
3. Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan
4. Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan
5. Brgy. Minuyan, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan
6. Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija
7. Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special Economic Zone
Region IV-A
151

8. Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna
9. Brgy. Sto. Nino, San Pablo City, Laguna
10. Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna
11. Morong, Rizal
12. Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban), Rizal (ISWIMS)
13. Brgy. Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC)
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila are ordered to
jointly submit a report on the average amount of garbage collected monthly per district in all the cities in
Metro Manila from January 2009 up to December 31, 2010 vis--vis the average amount of garbage
disposed monthly in landfills and dumpsites. In its quarterly report for the last quarter of 2010 and
thereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for violations of the penal provisions of RA 9003, RA
9275 and other laws on pollution for the said period.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and
Bataan shall submit the names and addresses of the informal settlers in their respective areas who, as of
September 30, 2010, own or occupy houses, structures, constructions, and other encroachments built
along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite)
River, the Laguna de Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways and esteros that discharge wastewater
into the Manila Bay, in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the
DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit their plan for the removal of said informal settlers and
the demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion
dates for such activities which shall be implemented not later than December 31, 2012.
(9) The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and
addresses of the owners of septic and sludge companies including those that do not have the proper
facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental Sanitation Clearances and shall
require companies to procure a license to operate from the DOH.
The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop a toxic and hazardous waste
management system by June 30, 2011 which will implement segregation of hospital/toxic/hazardous
wastes and prevent mixing with municipal solid waste.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said companies
have proper disposal facilities and the completion dates of compliance.1avvphi1
(10) The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on or before May 31, 2011 a report
on the specific subjects on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection,
environmental laws and the like that it has integrated into the school curricula in all levels for the school
year 2011-2012.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to ensure compliance of all the
schools under its supervision with respect to the integration of the aforementioned subjects in the school
curricula which shall be fully implemented by June 30, 2012.
152

(11) All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports electronically using the forms below.
The agencies may add other key performance indicators that they have identified.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
See dissenting opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
I join the dissent of J. Carpio
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
I join the dissent of J. Carpio
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
See dissenting opinion
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes
153

1
Now the Department of Education (DepEd).
2
On February 10, 2009, the Court En Banc approved a resolution creating an Advisory
Committee "that will verify the reports of the government agencies tasked to clean up the Manila
Bay." It is composed of two members of the Court and three technical experts:
Hon. Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
Chairperson and ponente of MMDA vs. Concerned Residents of Manila
Hon. Jose Midas P. Marquez
Court Administrator
Vice-Chairperson
Members/Technical Experts:
Dr. Gil S. Jacinto
Former Director, UP Marine Science Institute
Dr. Elisea G. Gozun
Chair of Earth Day Network and Former DENR Secretary
Dr. Antonio G.M. La Via
Former DENR Undersecretary
Dean of the Ateneo School of Government
3
Our Decision in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 661, 690, states: "RA 9003 took
effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years [in Sec. 37 of RA
9003] which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill
which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up."
(Emphasis supplied.)

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J .:
The Resolution contains the proposed directives of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee to the concerned
agencies
1
and local government units (LGUs) for the implementation of the 18 December 2008 Decision
of the Court in this case.
Among the directives stated in the Resolution is for the affected agencies to submit to the Court their
plans of action and status reports, thus:
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency in the Philippine Clean
Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the updated Operational Plan for
the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy (OPMBCS);
2

154

The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain measures intended to
ensure compliance of all non-complying factories, commercial establishments, and private
homes;
3

The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas in Metro Manila, Rizal
and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater treatment facilities. Within the same period, the
concessionaires of the MWSS shall submit their plans and projects for the construction of
wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion period for said
facilities, which shall not go beyond 2020;
4

The Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the
list of cities and towns in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan that do not have sewerage
and sanitation facilities. LWUA is further ordered to submit on or before September 30, 2011 its plan
to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities in said cities and towns
and the completion period for said works which shall be fully implemented by December 31,
2020;
5

The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR),
shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a report on areas in Manila Bay where marine life
has to be restored or improved and the assistance it has extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the fisheries and aquatic resources in
Manila Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the marine life in said areas. Within the same
period, it shall submit its five-year plan to restore and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its
future activities to assist the aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the completion period
for said undertakings;
6

The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports the list of violators it has
apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA is further ordered to include in its report the names,
make and capacity of the ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall submit to the Court on or before
June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement its compliance with paragraph 7
of the dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the completion dates of such measures;
7

The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or before June 30, 2011 its
five-year plan of action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to apprehend the
violators of RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances and
regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of
violators;
8

The Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan
of action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of
Presidential Decree (PD) 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine
Coast Guard Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila
Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators;
9

The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the Court on or before June
30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila who own and occupy
houses, structures, constructions and other encroachments established or built in violation of RA
7279 and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-
Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways
and esteros as of December 31, 2010. On or before the same date, the MMDA shall submit its plan for
the removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid houses, structures,
constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates for said activities which shall
be fully implemented not later than December 31, 2015;
10

155

[T]he DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit its plan for the removal of said informal
settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions and encroachments, as well
as the completion dates for such activities which shall be implemented not later than December
31, 2012;
11

[T]he DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said companies have proper disposal
facilities and the completion dates of compliance;
12

On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to ensure compliance of
all the schools under its supervision with respect to the integration of the aforementioned
subjects in the school curricula which shall be fully implemented by June 30, 2012;
13
(Emphasis
supplied)
What is the purpose of requiring these agencies to submit to the Court their plans of action and status
reports? Are these plans to be approved or disapproved by the Court? The Court does not have the
competence or even the jurisdiction to evaluate these plans which involves technical matters
14
best left to
the expertise of the concerned agencies.
The Resolution also requires that the concerned agencies shall "submit [to the Court] their quarterly
reports electronically x x x."
15
Thus, the directive for the concerned agencies to submit to the Court
their quarterly reports is a continuing obligation which extends even beyond the year 2011.
16

The Court is now arrogating unto itself two constitutional powers exclusively vested in the President. First,
the Constitution provides that "executive power shall be vested in the President."
17
This means that
neither the Judiciary nor the Legislature can exercise executive power for executive power is the
exclusive domain of the President. Second, the Constitution provides that the President shall "have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices."
18
Neither the Judiciary nor the
Legislature can exercise control or even supervision over executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
Clearly, the Resolution constitutes an intrusion of the Judiciary into the exclusive domain of the Executive.
In the guise of implementing the 18 December 2008 Decision through the Resolution, the Court is in
effect supervising and directing the different government agencies and LGUs concerned.
In Noblejas v. Teehankee,
19
it was held that the Court cannot be required to exercise administrative
functions such as supervision over executive officials. The issue in that case was whether the
Commissioner of Land Registration may only be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the
conferment upon him by law (Republic Act No. 1151) of the rank and privileges of a Judge of the Court of
First Instance. The Court, answering in the negative, stated:
To adopt petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of
investigating and disciplining all these officials whose functions are plainly executive and the consequent
curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to discipline and
remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution expressly
place under the President's supervision and control.
x x x
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had really
intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of
First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or removed only
upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privilege would be unconstitutional, since it
would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by charging this court with the
administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials, and simultaneously
reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.
20
(Boldfacing supplied)
156

Likewise, in this case, the directives in the Resolution are administrative in nature and circumvent the
constitutional provision which prohibits Supreme Court members from performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions. Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SEC. 12. The members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
Thus, in the case of In Re: Designation of Judge Manzano as Member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice,
21
the Court invalidated the designation of a judge as member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice, which was tasked to receive complaints and to make recommendations
for the speedy disposition of cases of detainees. The Court held that the committee performs
administrative functions
22
which are prohibited under Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
As early as the 1932 case of Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co.,
23
this Court has already
emphasized that the Supreme Court should only exercise judicial power and should not assume any duty
which does not pertain to the administering of judicial functions. In that case, a petition was filed
requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms and the
compensation to be paid to Manila Electric Company for the use of right of way. The Court held that it
would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators,
whose decision of a majority shall be final, to act on the petition of Manila Electric Company. The Court
explained:
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or as members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall within
the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would presuppose the right to
bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction would tend to oust the courts of
jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would then have the
anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken
therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court
would review the decision of its members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions
performed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered as
administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that would result in the performance of duties which the
members of the Supreme Court could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The present
petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court
asked to determine if the members of the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a
court at all.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as
the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other
department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members
should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty
not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.
24

Furthermore, the Resolution orders some LGU officials to inspect the establishments and houses along
major river banks and to "take appropriate action to ensure compliance by non-complying factories,
commercial establishments and private homes with said law, rules and regulations requiring the
construction or installment of wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks."
25
The LGU
officials are also directed to "submit to the DILG on or before December 31, 2011 their respective
compliance reports which shall contain the names and addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-
complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes."
26
Furthermore, the Resolution
mandates that on or before 30 June 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila should
"consider providing land for the wastewater facilities of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage
157

System (MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water Inc.) within their respective
jurisdictions."
27
The Court is in effect ordering these LGU officials how to do their job and even
gives a deadline for their compliance. Again, this is a usurpation of the power of the President to
supervise LGUs under the Constitution and existing laws.
Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that: "The President of the Philippines shall
exercise general supervision over local governments x x x."
28
Under the Local Government Code of
1991,
29
the President exercises general supervision over LGUs, thus:
SECTION 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units. (a) Consistent with the basic policy
on local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to
ensure that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities; through the province with respect to component cities and municipalities;
and through the city and municipality with respect to barangays. (Emphasis supplied)
The Resolution constitutes judicial overreach by usurping and performing executive functions.
The Court must refrain from overstepping its boundaries by taking over the functions of an equal branch
of the government the Executive. The Court should abstain from exercising any function which is not
strictly judicial in character and is not clearly conferred on it by the Constitution.
30
Indeed, as stated by
Justice J.B.L. Reyes inNoblejas v. Teehankee,
31
"the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members
should not and can not be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty
not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions."
32

The directives in the Resolution constitute a judicial encroachment of an executive function which clearly
violates the system of separation of powers that inheres in our democratic republican government. The
principle of separation of powers between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of
government is part of the basic structure of the Philippine Constitution. Thus, the 1987 Constitution
provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;
33
(b) the
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;
34
and (c) the judicial power shall be
vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established.
35

Since the Supreme Court is only granted judicial power, it should not attempt to assume or be compelled
to perform non-judicial functions.
36
Judicial power is defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution as that which "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government." The Resolution contains directives which are outside the ambit of the
Court's judicial functions.
The principle of separation of powers is explained by the Court in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission:
37

The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through
express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution
intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the
various departments of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the
final arbiter, effectively checks the other department in its exercise of its power to determine the law, and
hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
38

158

Even the ponente is passionate about according respect to the system of separation of powers between
the three equal branches of the government. In his dissenting opinion in the 2008 case of Province of
North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
(GRP),
39
Justice Velasco emphatically stated:
Separation of Powers to be Guarded
Over and above the foregoing considerations, however, is the matter of separation of powers which would
likely be disturbed should the Court meander into alien territory of the executive and dictate how the final
shape of the peace agreement with the MILF should look like. The system of separation of powers
contemplates the division of the functions of government into its three (3) branches: the
legislative which is empowered to make laws; the executive which is required to carry out the law;
and the judiciary which is charged with interpreting the law. Consequent to actual delineation of
power, each branch of government is entitled to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.
Being one such branch, the judiciary, as Justice Laurel asserted in Planas v. Gil, "will neither
direct nor restrain executive [or legislative action]." Expressed in another perspective, the system
of separated powers is designed to restrain one branch from inappropriate interference in the
business, or intruding upon the central prerogatives, of another branch; it is a blend of courtesy
and caution, "a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one
branch at the expense of the other." x x x
Under our constitutional set up, there cannot be any serious dispute that the maintenance of the peace,
insuring domestic tranquility and the suppression of violence are the domain and responsibility of the
executive. Now then, if it be important to restrict the great departments of government to the
exercise of their appointed powers, it follows, as a logical corollary, equally important, that one
branch should be left completely independent of the others, independent not in the sense that the
three shall not cooperate in the common end of carrying into effect the purposes of the
constitution, but in the sense that the acts of each shall never be controlled by or subjected to the
influence of either of the branches.
40
(Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, adherence to the principle of separation of powers which is enshrined in our Constitution is
essential to prevent tyranny by prohibiting the concentration of the sovereign powers of state in one
body.
41
Considering that executive power is exclusively vested in the President of the Philippines, the
Judiciary should neither undermine such exercise of executive power by the President nor arrogate
executive power unto itself. The Judiciary must confine itself to the exercise of judicial functions and not
encroach upon the functions of the other branches of the government.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote against the approval of the Resolution.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG), ), Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), Local Water
Utilities Administration (LWUA), Department of Agriculture (DA), Philippine Ports Authority (PPA),
Philippine National Police (PNP), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA),
Department of Health (DOH), Department of Education (DepEd), and Department of Budget and
Management (DBM).
159

2
Resolution, p. 4.
3
Resolution, p. 6.
4
Resolution, p. 6.
5
Resolution, p. 6-7.
6
Resolution, p. 7.
7
Resolution, p. 7.
8
Resolution, p. 8.
9
Resolution, p. 8.
10
Resolution, pp. 8.
11
Resolution, p. 10.
12
Resolution, p. 11.
13
Resolution, p. 11.
14
For instance, the Resolution orders the PPA to "include in its report the activities of the
concessionaire that collects and disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated
wastes, which shall state the names, make and capacity of the ships serviced by it since August
2003 up to the present date, the dates the ships docked at PPA ports, the number of days the
ship was at sea with the corresponding number of passengers and crew per trip, the volume of
solid, liquid and ship-generated wastes collected from said ships, the treatment undertaken and
the disposal site for said wastes;" Resolution, pp. 7-8.
15
Resolution, p.11.
16
For example, the Resolution directs that "[i]n its quarterly report for the last quarter of 2010
andthereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for violations of the penal provisions of
RA 9003, RA 9275 and other laws on pollution for the said period; Resolution, p. 10. (Emphasis
supplied.)
17
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 1.
18
19
131 Phil. 931 (1968).
20
Id. at. 934-935.
21
248 Phil. 487 (1988).
22
Administrative functions are "those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct
and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to
160

better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative
agency by the organic law of its existence." Id. at 491.
23
57 Phil 600 (1932).
24
Id. at 604-605.
25
Resolution, p. 5.
26
Resolution, p. 6.
27
Resolution, p. 6.
28
Emphasis supplied.
29
Republic Act No. 7160.
30
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., supra note 23.
31
Supra note 19.
32
Id. at 936, citing Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil. 600, 605 (1932).
33
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 1.
34
35
Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
36
J. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary 828 (1996).
37
63 Phil. 139 (1936).
38
Id. at 156-157.
39
G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 & 183962, 14 October 2008, 568 SCRA 402.
40
Dissenting Opinion, id. at 669-670. (Citations omitted)
41
S. Carlota, The Three Most Important Features of the Philippine Legal System that Others
Should Understand, in IALS Conference Learning from Each Other: Enriching the Law School
Curriculum in an Interrelated World 177 <www.ialsnet.org/meeting/enriching/carlota.pdf> (visited
5 November 2010).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

DISSENTING OPINION
161

SERENO, J .:
"The judicial whistle needs to be blown for a purpose and with caution. It needs to be remembered that
the Court cannot run the government. The Court has the duty of implementing constitutional safeguards
that protect individual rights but they cannot push back the limits of the Constitution to accommodate the
challenged violation."
1

These are the words of Justice Anand of the Supreme Court of India, from which court the idea of a
continuing mandatory injunction for environmental cases was drawn by the Philippine Supreme Court.
These words express alarm that the Indian judiciary has already taken on the role of running the
government in environmental cases. A similar situation would result in the Philippines were the majority
Resolution to be adopted. Despite having the best of intentions to ensure compliance by petitioners with
their corresponding statutory mandates in an urgent manner, this Court has unfortunately encroached
upon prerogatives solely to be exercised by the President and by Congress.
On 18 December 2008, the Court promulgated its decision in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila
Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, denying the petition of the government agencies, defendants in Civil Case No.
1851-99. It held that the Court of Appeals, subject to some modifications, was correct in affirming the 13
September 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1851-99. It ordered "the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and
restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of
contact recreation."
The Court further issued each of the aforementioned agencies specific orders to comply with their
statutory mandate.
2
Pursuant to the judgment above, the Court established its own Manila Bay Advisory
Committee. Upon the recommendations of the said Committee, the present Resolution was issued. It
encompasses several of the specific instructions laid out by the court in the original case, but also goes
further by requiring reports and updates from the said government agencies, and setting deadlines for the
submission thereof.
I find these directives in the Majority Resolution patently irreconcilable with basic constitutional doctrines
and with the legislative mechanisms already in place, such as the Administrative Code and the Local
Government Code, which explicitly grant control and supervision over these agencies to the President
alone, and to no one else. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the Majority Resolution.
In issuing these directives, the Court has encroached upon the exclusive authority of the Executive
Department and violated the doctrine of Separation of Powers
The Resolution assigned the Department of Natural Resources as the primary agency for environment
protection and required the implementation of its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy. It
ordered the DENR to submit the updated operational plan directly to the Court; to summarize data on the
quality of Manila Bay waters; and to "submit the names and addresses of persons and companiesthat
generate toxic or hazardous waste on or before September 30, 2011."
The Department of the Interior and Local Government is directed to "order the Mayors of all cities in Metro
Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors of all
the cities and towns in said provinces to inspect all factories, commercial establishments and private
homes along the banks of the major river systems" to determine if they have wastewater treatment
facilities, on or before 30 June 2011. The LGUs are given a deadline of 30 September 2011 to finish the
inspection. In cooperation with the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), these local
governments are required to submit their plan for the removal of informal settlers and encroachments
which are in violation of Republic Act No. 7279. The said demolition must take place not later than 31
December 2012.
162

The Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) is required to submit its plans for the
construction of wastewater treatment facilities in areas where needed, the completion period for which
shall not go beyond the year 2020. On or before 30 June 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its
two concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as sewerage fees. The Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) is ordered to submit on or before 30 September 2011 its plan to install and
operate sewerage and sanitation facilities in the towns and cities where needed, which must be fully
implemented by 31 December 2020.
The Department of Agriculture and the Bureau of Aquatic Fisheries and Resources are ordered to submit
on or before 30 June 2011 a list of areas where marine life in Manila Bay has improved, and the
assistance extended to different Local Government Units in this regard. The Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA) is ordered to report the names, make, and capacity of each ship that would dock in PPA ports; the
days they docked and the days they were at sea; the activities of the concessionaire that would collect
solid and liquid ship-generated waste, the volume, treatment and disposal sites for such wastes; and the
violators that PPA has apprehended.
The Department of Health (DOH) is required to submit the names and addresses of septic and sludge
companies that have no treatment facilities. The said agency must also require companies to procure a
"license to operate" issued by the DOH. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and the
seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila must submit a report on the "amount of garbage collected per
districtvis--vis the average amount of garbage disposed monthly in landfills and dumpsites." MMDA
must also submit a plan for the removal of informal settlers and encroachments along NCR Rivers which
violate R.A. No. 7279.
Clearly, the Court has no authority to issue these directives. They fall squarely under the domain of the
executive branch of the state. The issuance of specific instructions to subordinate agencies in the
implementation of policy mandates in all laws, not just those that protect the environment, is an exercise
of the power of supervision and control the sole province of the Office of the President.
Both the 1987 Constitution and Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of the Philippines,
state:
Exercise of Executive Power. - The Executive power shall be vested in the President.
3

Power of Control.- The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
4

In Anak Mindanao Party-list Group v. Executive Secretary,
5
this Court has already asserted that the
enforcement of all laws is the sole domain of the Executive. The Court pronounced that the express
constitutional grant of authority to the Executive is broad and encompassing, such that it justifies
reorganization measures
6
initiated by the President. The Court said:
While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws. The executive
power is vested in the President. It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.
It is the power of carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.
As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. He has control over the executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has
the authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere
with the discretion of its officials. Corollary to the power of control, the President also has the duty of
supervising and enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he is
granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to discharge his
duties effectively.
163

To herein petitioner agencies impleaded below, this Court has given very specific instructions to report
the progress and status of their operations directly to the latter. The Court also required the agencies to
apprise it of any noncompliance with the standards set forth by different laws as to environment
protection. This move is tantamount to making these agencies accountable to the Court instead of the
President. The very occupation streamlined especially for the technical and practical expertise of the
Executive Branch is being usurped without regard for the delineations of power in the Constitution. In fact,
the issuance of the Resolution itself is in direct contravention of the Presidents exclusive power to issue
administrative orders, as shown thus:
Administrative Orders. - Acts of the President which relate to particular aspect of governmental operations
in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
7

The Courts discussion in Ople v. Torres
8
pertaining to the extent and breadth of administrative power
bestowed upon the President is apt:
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined
by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative
efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders,
rules and regulations.

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the
administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
The implementation of the policy laid out by the legislature in the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004,
the Toxic and Hazardous Waste Act or Republic Act 6969, the Environment Code, and other laws geared
towards environment protection is under the competence of the President. Achieved thereby is a
uniform standard of administrative efficiency. And since it is through administrative orders promulgated by
the President that specific operational aspects for these policies are laid out, the Resolution of this Court
overlaps with the Presidents administrative power. No matter how urgent and laudatory the cause of
environment protection has become, it cannot but yield to the higher mandate of separation of powers
and the mechanisms laid out by the people through the Constitution.
One of the directives is that which requires local governments to conduct inspection of homes and
establishments along the riverbanks, and to submit a plan for the removal of certain informal settlers. Not
content with arrogating unto itself the powers of "control" and "supervision" granted by the Administrative
Code to the President over said petitioner administrative agencies, the Court is also violating the latters
general supervisory authority over local governments:
Sec. 18. General Supervision Over Local Governments. - The President shall exercise general
supervision over local governments.
9

Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units.(a) Consistent with the basic policy on
local autonomy, the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units to ensure
that their acts are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
10

The powers expressly vested in any branch of the Government shall not be exercised by, nor delegated
to, any other branch of the Government, except to the extent authorized by the Constitution.
11

164

As has often been repeated by this Court, the doctrine of separation of powers is the very wellspring from
which the Court draws its legitimacy. Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno has traced its origin and
rationale as inhering in the republican system of government:
The principle of separation of powers prevents the concentration of legislative, executive, and judicial
powers to a single branch of government by deftly allocating their exercise to the three branches of
government...
In his famed treatise, The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu authoritatively analyzed the nature of
executive, legislative and judicial powers and with a formidable foresight counselled that any combination
of these powers would create a system with an inherent tendency towards tyrannical actions
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and the executive.
Were it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control;
for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same body, whether of the nobles or of
the people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions,
and that of trying the causes of individuals.
12

Nor is there merit in the contention that these directives will speed up the rehabilitation of Manila Bay
better than if said rehabilitation were left to the appropriate agencies. Expediency is never a reason to
abandon legitimacy. "The Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of dispatch and the
immediate functioning of government. It is the long-term staying power of government that is enhanced by
the mutual accommodation required by the separation of powers."
13

Mandamus does not lie to compel a discretionary act.
In G.R. Nos. 171947-48, the Court explicitly admitted that "[w]hile the implementation of the MMDAs
mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of
doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus."
14
In
denying the appeal of petitioners and affirming the Decision of the RTC, the Court of Appeals stressed
that the trial courts Decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions
under existing laws.
15

In its revised Resolution, the Court is now setting deadlines for the implementation of policy formulations
which require decision-making by the agencies. It has confused an order enjoining a duty, with an order
outlining specific technical rules on how to perform such a duty. Assuming without conceding that
mandamus were availing under Rule 65, the Court can only require a particular action, but it cannot
provide for the means to accomplish such action. It is at this point where the demarcation of the general
act of "cleaning up the Manila Bay" has become blurred, so much so that the Court now engages in the
slippery slope of overseeing technical details.
In Sps. Abaga v. Sps. Panes
16
the Court said:
From the foregoing Rule, there are two situations when a writ of mandamus may issue: (1) when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2) when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which the other is entitled. The "duty" mentioned in the first situation is a ministerial duty, not a
discretionary duty, requiring the exercise of judgmentIn short, for mandamus to lie, the duty sought to
be compelled to be performed must be a ministerial duty, not a discretionary duty, and the petitioner
must show that he has a well-defined, clear and certain right.
165

Discretion, on the other hand, is a faculty conferred upon a court or official by which he may decide the
question either way and still be right.
17

The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms defined in the law itself. Thus,
the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the
corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. This
is the end of any participation by the Court, if it is authorized to participate at all.
In setting a deadline for the accomplishment of these directives, not only has the Court provided the
means of accomplishing the task required, it has actually gone beyond the standards set by the law.
There is nothing in the Environment Code, the Administrative Code, or the Constitution which grants this
authority to the judiciary. It is already settled that, "If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide when and how the duty shall be performed, such duty is not ministerial."
18

In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources,
19
the Court ruled that,
As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform
a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of
a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
court.
The Constitution does not authorize the courts to "monitor" the execution of their decisions.
It is an oft-repeated rule that the Court has no power to issue advisory opinions, much less "directives"
requiring progress reports from the parties respecting the execution of its decisions. The requirements of
"actual case or controversy" and "justiciability" have long been established in order to limit the exercise of
judicial review. While its dedication to the implementation of the fallo in G.R. 171947-48 is admirable, the
Courts power cannot spill over to actual encroachment upon both the "control" and police powers of the
State under the guise of a "continuing mandamus."
In G.R. 171947-48, the Court said: "Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing
mandamus, the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of
ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference."
Needless to say, the "continuing mandamus" in this case runs counter to principles of "actual case or
controversy" and other requisites for judicial review. In fact, the Supreme Court is in danger of acting as a
"super-administrator"
20
the scenario presently unfolding in India where the supposed remedy originated.
There the remedy was first used in Vineet Narain and Others v. Union of India,
21
a public interest case for
corruption filed against high-level officials. Since then, the remedy has been applied to environmental
cases as an oversight and control power by which the Supreme Court of India has created committees
(i.e. the Environment Pollution Authority and the Central Empowered Committee in forest cases) and
allowed these committees to act as the policing agencies.
22
But the most significant judicial intervention in
this regard was the series of orders promulgated by the Court in T.N. Godavarman v. Union of India.
23

Although the Writ Petition filed by Godavarman was an attempt to seek directions from the Court
regarding curbing the illegal felling of trees, the Supreme Court went further to make policy
determinations in an attempt to improve the countrys forests. The Court Order suspending felling of trees
that did not adhere to state government working plans resulted in effectively freezing the countrys timber
industry. The Supreme Court completely banned tree felling in certain north-eastern states to any part of
the country. The courts role was even more pronounced in its later directions. While maintaining the ban
on felling of trees in the seven northeast states, the court directed the state governments to gather,
process, sell, and otherwise manage the already felled timber in the manner its specified the Supreme
166

Court became the supervisor of all forest issues, ranging from controlling, pricing and transport of timber
to management of forest revenue, as well as implementation of its orders.
24

Thus, while it was originally intended to assert public rights in the face of government inaction and
neglect, the remedy is now facing serious criticism as it has spiraled out of control.
25
In fact, even Justice
J. S. Verma, who penned the majority opinion in Vineet Narain in which continuing mandamus first made
its appearance, subsequently pronounced that "judicial activism should be neither judicial ad hocism nor
judicial tyranny."
26
Justice B.N. Srikrishna observed that judges now seem to want to engage themselves
with boundless enthusiasm in complex socio-economic issues raising myriads of facts and ideological
issues that cannot be managed by "judicially manageable standards."
27
Even Former Chief Justice A. S.
Anand, a known defender of judicial activism, has warned against the tendency towards "judicial
adventurism," reiterating the principle that "the role of the judge is that of a referee. I can blow my judicial
whistle when the ball goes out of play; but when the game restarts I must neither take part in it nor tell the
players how to play."
28

Unless our own Supreme Court learns to curb its excesses and apply to this case the standards for
judicial review it has developed over the years and applied to co-equal branches, the scenario in India
could very well play out in the Philippines. The Court must try to maintain a healthy balance between the
departments, precisely as the Constitution mandates, by delineating its "deft strokes and bold
lines,"
29
ever so conscious of the requirements of actual case and controversy. While, admittedly, there
are certain flaws in the operation and implementation of the laws, the judiciary cannot take the initiative to
compensate for such perceived inaction.
The Court stated in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance:
30

Disregard of the essential limits imposed by the case and controversy requirement can in the long run
only result in undermining our authority as a court of law. For, as judges, what we are called upon to
render is judgment according to law, not according to what may appear to be the opinion of the day
Hence, "over nothing but cases and controversies can courts exercise jurisdiction, and it is to make the
exercise of that jurisdiction effective that they are allowed to pass upon constitutional
questions."
31
Admirable though the sentiments of the Court may be, it must act within jurisdictional limits.
These limits are founded upon the traditional requirement of a cause of action: "the act or omission by
which a party violates a right of another."
32
In constitutional cases, for every writ or remedy, there must be
a clear pronouncement of the corresponding right which has been infringed. Only then can there surface
that "clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for decision
from a clash of adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing
conflicting and demanding interests."
33

Unfortunately, the Court fails to distinguish between a pronouncement on violation of rights on one hand,
and non-performance of duties vis--vis operational instructions, on the other. Moreover, it also dabbles
in an interpretation of constitutional rights in a manner that is dangerously pre-emptive of legally available
remedies.
The "continuing mandamus" palpably overlaps with the power of congressional oversight.
Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution states:
The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
167

related thereto. When the security of the state or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
This provision pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Macalintal v. Comelec
34
discussed the scope of
congressional oversight in full. Oversight refers to the power of the legislative department to check,
monitor and ensure that the laws it has enacted are enforced:
The power of Congress does not end with the finished task of legislation. Concomitant with its
principal power to legislate is the auxiliary power to ensure that the laws it enacts are faithfully
executed. As well stressed by one scholar, the legislature "fixes the main lines of substantive policy and
is entitled to see that administrative policy is in harmony with it; it establishes the volume and purpose of
public expenditures and ensures their legality and propriety; it must be satisfied that internal
administrative controls are operating to secure economy and efficiency; and it informs itself of the
conditions of administration of remedial measure.

Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor
bureaucratic compliance with program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly
administered, (c) to eliminate executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of
legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive conformity with the congressional perception of public
interest.

Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies perform
their functions within the authority delegated to them.
Macalintal v. Comelec further discusses that legislative supervision under the oversight power connotes a
continuing and informed awareness on the part of Congress regarding executive operations in a given
administrative area. Because the power to legislate includes the power to ensure that the laws are
enforced, this monitoring power has been granted by the Constitution to the legislature. In cases of
executive non-implementation of statutes, the courts cannot justify the use of "continuing mandamus," as
it would by its very definition overlap with the monitoring power under congressional oversight. The
Resolution does not only encroach upon the general supervisory function of the Executive, it also
diminished and arrogated unto itself the power of congressional oversight.
Conclusion
This Court cannot nobly defend the environmental rights of generations of Filipinos enshrined in the
Constitution while in the same breath eroding the foundations of that very instrument from which it draws
its power. While the remedy of "continuing mandamus" has evolved out of a Third World jurisdiction
similar to ours, we cannot overstep the boundaries laid down by the rule of law. Otherwise, this Court
would rush recklessly beyond the delimitations precisely put in place to safeguard excesses of power.
The tribunal, considered by many citizens as the last guardian of fundamental rights, would then
resemble nothing more than an idol with feet of clay: strong in appearance, but weak in foundation.
The Court becomes a conscience by acting to remind us of limitation on power, even judicial power,
and the interrelation of good purposes with good means. Morality is not an end dissociated from means.
There is a morality of morality, which respects the limitation of office and the fallibility of the human
mindself-limitation is the first mark of the master. That, too is part of the role of the conscience.
35

168

The majority Resolution would, at the same time, cast the light of scrutiny more harshly on judicial action
in which the Courts timely exercise of its powers is called for as in the cases of prisoners languishing in
jail whose cases await speedy resolution by this Court. There would then be nothing to stop the executive
and the legislative departments from considering as fair game the judiciarys own accountability in its
clearly delineated department.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1
Justice Dr. A.S. Anand, Supreme Court of India,"Judicial Review Judicial Activism Need for
Caution," in Soli Sorabjees Law and Justice: An Anthology, Universal Law Publishing Company,
(2003), at 377. Also in Justice A.S. Anand, Millenium Law Lecture Series, Thursday, October 21,
1999, Kochi, Kerala, available at http://airwebworld.com/articles/index.php. (visited 17 November
2010)
2
"In particular: (1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys
environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the
primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is
directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is
ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and
agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance
with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec.
25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in exercising the Presidents power
of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste
management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152),
shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and
Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the
banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not
limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-
Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the
Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water
into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have
wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws,
ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to
require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks
within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes
from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of
closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate,
and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila,
Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
169

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination
with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and
sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of
sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where
needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve
and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in
Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing,
using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in
accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend
violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to
prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such
measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other
ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and
apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood
control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH,
DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development
Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all
structures, constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation of RA
7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR
(Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers,
and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country
more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination
with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned
government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus
(Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways,
and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as
prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On
matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties
on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause
the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the
respective penal provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and
other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one
(1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge
companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and
sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-
complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of
cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
170

(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, the
DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management,
environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate
in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the
importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful
ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the
cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with
the countrys development objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent
with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM,
PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the
principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to
the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with
this Decision.
No costs.
SO ORDERED."
3
E.O. 292, Book II, Chapter 3, Sec. 11; and 1987 Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 1.
4
E.O. 292, Book III, Chapter 1, Sec. 1; and 1987 Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 17.
5
G.R. No. 166052, 29 August 2007, 531 SCRA 583.
6
E.O. 379 and 364 were promulgated, placing the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor
(PCUP) under the supervision and control of the DAR, and the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) as an attached agency under the Department of Agrarian Reform.
7
E.O. 292, Book 3, Title 1, Chapter 2, Sec 3.
8
G.R. No. 127685, 23 July 1998, 293 SCRA 141.
9
1987 Constitution, Art. 2 on State Policies.
10
E.O. 292, Book 3, Title 1, Chapter 6, Sec. 25.
11
E.O 292, Book 2, Chapter 1, Sec 1(8).
12
C.J. Reynato S. Puno, Separate Concurring Opinion, Macalintal v. Comelec, G.R. No .157013,
10 July 2003, 405 SCRA 614.
13
United States v. American Tel. &Tel Co., 567 F 2d 121 (1977), citing J. Brandeis, Separate
Dissenting Opinion, Myers v. United States, US 52 293, 47 (1926).
14
P. 12, MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, 15 December
2008, 574 SCRA 661.
171

15
Id. at 9.
16
G.R. No. 147044, 24 August 2007, 531 SCRA 56, 62- 63.
17
Asuncion v. De Yriarte, 28 Phil 67.
18
Meralco Securities v. Savellano, L-36748, 23 October 1982, 117 SCRA 804.
19
G.R. No. 162243, 29 November 2006, 508 SCRA 498.
20
A term used by Manu Nair, correspondent of The International Environment News, describing
the Supreme Court of India in the Forest Conservation Case. Available
athttp://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business_regulation/environment/nairreportjune05.pdf
. (visited 17 November 2010)
21
1996 SC (2) 199 JT 1996 (1) 708 1996 SCALE (1) SP 31.
22
Rajeev Davan, Supreme Court advocate, Supreme Court of India, Judicial Excessivism,
available at http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/content/judicialexcessivism. (visited 17
November 2010)
23
T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India & Ors (1997) 2 SCC 267.
24
Supra note 20 at page 2.
25
Abhaykumar Dilip Ostwal, Supreme Court advocate, Supreme Court of India, Judicial Activism
and Self-Restraint, available at http://airwebworld.com/articles/index.php. (visited 17 November
2010)
26
Justice J.S. Verma, "Judicial activism should be neither judicial ad hocism nor judicial tyranny",
as published in The Indian Express, 06th April 2007 (http://www.indianexpress.com).
27
Justice B.N. Srikrishna, "Skinning a Cat" (2005) 8 SCC (J) 3.
28
Supra note 1.
29
A phrase used by Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 130 (1936).
30
G.R. No. 115525, 25 August 1994, 435 SCRA 630, holding that judicial inquiry whether the
formal requirements for the enactment of statutes beyond those prescribed by the Constitution
have been observed, is precluded by the principle of separation of powers.
31
Vicente V. Mendoza, "The Nature and Function of Judicial Review," 31 IBP Journal 1 (2005).
32
Rules of Court, Rule 2, Sec. 2.
33
United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1968).
34
Macalintal v. Comelec, G.R. No .157013, 10 July 2003, 405 SCRA 614.
35
Paul Freund, quoting Justice Brandeis, in Law and Justice 36 (1968).
172

E. National Territory (Article I)
Bernas, pp. 5-34
F. State Immunity
Agpalo, Philippine Political Law (2005), pp.6-15

Part II
Amendment of the Constitution (Article XVII)
A. Amendment vs. Revision
B. Prooposal (Secs. 1-3)
1. By Congress as a constituent assembly
2. By Constitutional Convention
Gonzales vs. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774 (1968)

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
MARTIN, J ,:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power of the
incumbent President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the
absence of the interim National Assembly which has not been convened.
173

On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a
national referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among
other things, the issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement,
the period of its existence, the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present
powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential
Decree No. 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of
presidential Decree No. 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"
(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite
relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section 4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text
of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below.
2

On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the
questions to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree
recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National
Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the
referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the
Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite
within the contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of
the interim Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law,
shall include the incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions
of the nation, those who shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors,
and those chosen by the incumbent President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional
representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while the sectors shall be determined by
law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the, manner of their election shall be
prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same
functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and
the regular National Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power
provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the
members, convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall
have been elected. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall
continue to exercise all his powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to
discharge its functions and likewise he shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the
nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime
Minister under this Constitution.
174

4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and
discharge the responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be
subject only to such disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President
(Prime Minister) if he so desires may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers
as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been
lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat
or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly
fails or is unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate
action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of
instructions, which shall form part of the law of the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions, powers,
and composition may be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections may
be called at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any
important matter whether of national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full
force and effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they
have been ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976
National Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced
L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from
holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect
Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well
as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control,
hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent
President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a
consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections,
The Solicitor General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is
political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the
incumbent President has the authority to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step
towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684,
was instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that
the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is
expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.3
175

Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M.
GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent
President cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a
referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the
proposed amendments in such a short period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift
Martial Law, the President need not consult the people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote
would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens
of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
I
Justiciability of question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V.
Sanidad) possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033. It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of
such nature-may be contested by one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its enforcement. At
the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the
theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The breadth of Presidential Decree No.
991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective implementation of its purposes. 5
Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry out its provisions. 6
The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these amounts of
public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to
entertain the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion
affirmatively so that the authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the
domain of judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises
a judicial question. 8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of
normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the
power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of
transition (See. 15, Transitory provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its
active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular
National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been
followed. Rather than calling the National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the
incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed amendments
thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the
regularity regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution
sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as
invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within the competence of
this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the
constitutionality of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme
Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not
only of treaties and statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers
organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so that the Supreme
Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
176

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the
vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely
justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent
President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such
act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the
President that power to propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the
contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution
provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether
the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.
10

We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the
question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted
for submission of the proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy
of vicious circle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and
procedure for the amending process when they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether,
therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the
people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by the Supreme Court in whom the
people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the
constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a prior
not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the preference of the
Court's majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-political
impression. In the Plebiscite Cases,
11
the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality
of Presidential Decree No. 73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or
rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention and appropriating fund s therefore "is a political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously
considered the issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in the Ratification Cases
12
involving the issue
of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102. announcing the Ratification by the
Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention," partakes of the
nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was dismissed, the Court ruled
that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority view, said, Thus,
in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the
question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the
ratification or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of
judicial inquiry because, they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that
the issue was a justiciable one. With Identical unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the
1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the
factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on
August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs.
Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We, accordingly, abandoned and refused
to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in Gonzales vs. Commission on
Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito."
13
The return to Barcelon vs.
Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by the Court.
Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially
the same as those given in support on the political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and
plebiscite cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and
constitutionally untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases
partakes of the nature and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.
177

1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by
the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a
constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its
Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit
the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when
ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than
three months after the approval of such amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is
conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime
Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this
Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article
Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of
normalcy and period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a
Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.
However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election
voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition,
amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the National Assembly upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with
that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly.
Speaking for the majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention
intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim
National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country."
Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen
the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the
fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene
the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor, Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of
fact, the proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel (V) was rejected. The
President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the
people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973
Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In
the referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to
withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of February 27, 1975,
the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was
eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention,
who were deemed automatically members of the I interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion
since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had already resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in the
amending process.16 Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental
charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the
regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly).
178

While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of
constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a
distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative
character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law.
17
Such being the case, approval of the
President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer
18
The prerogative of the President to approve or
disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with
proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.
19

III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis government today
are more or less concentrated in the President.
20
According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of
government power in a democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies
inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been regarded as
imperative that the total power of the government be parceled out among three mutually independent
branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any
one branch should exercise any two or more types of power, and certainly a total disregard of the
separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very definition of tyranny.' In
normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By
this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action
in behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in the life of any government
when all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary
union of executive, legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The more complete the
separation of powers in a constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their
fusion in time of crisis. This is evident in a comparison of the crisis potentialities of the cabinet and
presidential systems of government. In the former the all-important harmony of legislature and executive
is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither guaranteed nor to be to confidently expected. As a result,
cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy than presidential dictatorship. The power of the
state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must also be freed from the normal system
of constitutional and legal limitations.
21
John Locke, on the other hand, claims for the executive in its own
right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of special
exigencies for which the legislative power had not provided.
22
The rationale behind such broad
emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of constitutional
restrains" so that the crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at. That
sun clear authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions,
thus:
23

The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly and shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been
elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen
hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the powers vested in the President and the Prime
Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the interim National Assembly to elect
the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall then exercise their
respective powers vested by this Constitution.
179

All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done
by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid,
binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution,
unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly
modified or repealed by the regular National Assembly.
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the
Constitutional Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim National
Assembly to session, and knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a vacuum in the
exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise, with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would be
paralyzation of the entire governmental machinery."
24
Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely
important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which extends over a period of time. The separation of
executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a distinct obstruction to efficient crisis
government. The steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause for as the steady increase
in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been called upon by the Filipino
people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and
economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the
President's power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the
facts of our political, social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the same,
indefinite power should be attributed to tile President to take emergency measures
25

IV
Authority of the incumbent
President t to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National
Assembly during the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully
addressed to the judgment of the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the
President opted to defer convening of that body in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise,
in the period of transition, the power to propose amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim
National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of the Transitory Provisions). Again,
harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the interim National
Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to assume
that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative
functions? The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions
of the interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly
to propose amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative
power. This, of course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent
assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly
not convened and only the Presidency and the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute
necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the people to
propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very constitution, the Supreme Court
possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy
away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the governmental
machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby impeding
the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times,
that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme.
After all, constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of
the people .26
180

2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and
February 1975, the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The Lupong
Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay,
and the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about the same
number of Kabataang Barangay organizations, Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-
provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the
abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned the lifting of martial law and
amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently
proposed to settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its
existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of its present powers in a referendum
to be held on October 16 .
28
The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree
995 of September 10, 1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members
of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayan
voted in session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted
proposed amendments to the Constitution, including the issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the
"barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the proposed
amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal of
amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on
September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the National
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16.
V
The People is Sovereign
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the Philippines,
a republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that particular organized assembly of
individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the highest power exists."
31
This is the concept of
popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely the people, is sovereign
32
In
consequence, the people may thus write into the Constitution their convictions on any subject they
choose in the absence of express constitutional prohibition.
33
This is because, as Holmes said, the
Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all experiment."
34
"The necessities of orderly government,"
wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter all
future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when
they adopt it.
35

2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign
power as constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the
thinking of a single man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into
enabling forms by the authority who can presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal vein,
the submission of those proposed amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite
expresses but the option of the people themselves implemented only by the authority of the President.
Indeed, it may well be said that the amending process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate
the same and the procedure to be followed reside somehow in a particular body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not
rendered nugatory by the
participation of the 15-year olds.
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1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to be
continued? - is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by
the desire of the Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be felt to
guide the President in pursuing his program for a New Order. For the succeeding question on the
proposed amendments, only those of voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the plebiscite aspect,
as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the new Constitution.
36
On this second question, it would
only be the votes of those 18 years old and above which will have valid bearing on the results. The fact
that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to answer the referendum question and the plebiscite
question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing objectionable in consulting the
people on a given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification of proposed
constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds above) is
readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one containing the ballots
of voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing the ballots of voters eighteen
years of age and above.
37
The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen
shall be counted ahead of the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained in another ballot box.
And, the results of the referendum-plebiscite shall be separately prepared for the age groupings, i.e.,
ballots contained in each of the two boxes.
38

2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely
consultative in character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted
to the people foe their consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the
executive power of the President.
39
It is participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of
whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded, or ex- convicts .
40
A "plebiscite," on the other hand,
involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in
the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the election Literacy, property or
any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the amending process of
the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the
freedom to dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of
Justice Fernando,
41
is impressed with a mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice.
To be sure, there are restraints of the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of that
liberty is aimed at. The for the referendum-plebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing
freedoms of expression and assembly The President himself had announced that he would not
countenance any suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not interested in winning a "yes"
or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand.
42
Thus, the dissenters
soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the proposed
amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled
matter.
43
Even government employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to
participate in public discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues.
44

VIII
Time for deliberation
is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates or
discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of the
day. The people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The
referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested
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brief period for discussion is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional
amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were
allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette of the women's suffrage
amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30, 1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The
constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated Tydings-Kocialskowski was published
in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the scheduled plebiscite (Com.
Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral Congress, the reelection of
the President and Vice President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20 days of
publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the
Parity Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the
independence of the Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20
days prior to the plebiscite (Rep. Act No. 73)."
45

2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when
the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller,
46
the United States Supreme court held
that this matter of submission involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political,
social and economic," which "are essentially political and not justiciable." The constituent body or in the
instant cases, the President, may fix the time within which the people may act. This is because proposal
and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the
natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in time; second, it is only when there is
deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the reasonable implication being
that when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third, ratification is but the
expression of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously.
47
In the words
of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt
needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought
to be regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by proper
body
IN RESUME
The three issues are
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or
justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now
obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set
up the required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a
sufficient and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio
Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G.
Martin are of the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar,
Felix Q. Antonio and Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz
Palma voted in the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting
opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile (59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that there is
concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to the
power of the President to propose amendments.
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Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed
amendments for ratification by the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope,
however that the period of time may be extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio
are of the view that the question is political and therefore beyond the competence and cognizance of this
Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion
in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that
prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the constituent power to propose the
amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with sufficient information and
time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the controlling
cases of Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and
Martin voted to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion,
Associate Justice Fernando concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted
to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision
is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, J, in the result.
Separate Opinions
CASTRO, C.J .:, concurring:
From the challenge as formulated in the three petitions at bar and the grounds advanced be the Solicitor
General in opposition thereto, as well as the arguments adduced by the counsels of the parties at the
hearing had on October 7 and 8, 1976, three vital issues readily project themselves as the centers of
controversy, namely:
(1) Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or
justiciable?
(2) During the present stage of the transition period, and under the environmental circumstances now
obtaining, does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set
up the required machineries and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the
people?
(3) Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a
sufficient and proper, submission"
I
First Issue
The threshold question is not at all one of first impression Specifically on the matter of proposals to
amend the Constitution, this Court, in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1), inceptively announced the
dictum that-
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Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly political function performed by the
Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity and committed to its charges by the
Constitution itself. The exercise of this power is even independent of any intervention by
the Chief Executive. If on grounds of expediency scrupulous attention of the judiciary be
needed to safeguard public interest, there is less reason for judicial inquiry into the
validity of a proposal than into that of a ratification.
In time, however, the validity of the said pronouncement was eroded. In the assessment of the Court
itself-
The force of this precedent has been weakened, however, by Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the Senate
(81 Phil. 818), Avelino vs. Cuenco (L-2581, March 4 and 14, 1949), Tanada vs. Cuenco (L-10520,
February 28, 1957), and Macias vs. Commission on Elections (L-18684, September 14, 1961).
xxx xxx xxx
In short, the issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress-acting as a constituent assembly-violates the
Constitution is essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review, and, to the extent
this view may be inconsistent with the stand taken in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito the latter should be
deemed modified accordingly. The Members of the Court are unanimous on this point." (Gonzales vs.
Commission on Elections, et al, L-28196, November 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774, 786-787).
The abandonment of the Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito doctrine appears to have been completed when, in
Javellana vs. Secretary, et al. (L-36142, March 3l, 1973, 50 SCRA 30), six members of the Court
concurred in the view that the question of whether the 1973 Constitution was ratified in accordance with
the provisions of Article XV (Amendments) of the 1935 Constitution is inherently and essentially
justiciable.
As elucidated therein, with extensive quotations from Tanada vs. Cuenco (103 Phil. 1051)-
... the term 'political question' connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinarily
parlance, namely, a question of policy in matters concerning the government of a State,
as a body politic. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it
refers to 'those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the government.' It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.'
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is
justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not
its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those prescribed or
imposed by the Constitution - would be set at naught." (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, supra).
So it is in the situation here presented. The basic issue is the constitutional validity of the presidential acts
of proposing amendments to the Constitution and of calling a referendum-plebiscite for the ratification of
the proposals made. Evidently, the question does not concern itself with the wisdom of the exercise of the
authority claimed or of the specific amendments proposed. Instead the inquiry vel non is focused solely
on the existence of the said power in the President - a question purely of legality determinable thru
interpretation and construction of the letter and spirit of the Constitution by the Court as the final arbiter in
the delineation of constitutional boundaries and the allocation of constitutional powers.
185

For the Court to shun cognizance of the challenge herein presented, especially in these parlous years,
would be to abdicate its constitutional powers, shirk its constitutional responsibility, and deny the people
their ultimate recourse for judicial determination.
I have thus no hesitancy in concluding that the question here presented is well within the periphery of
judicial inquiry.
II
Second Issue
The main question stands on a different footing; it appears unprecedented both here and elsewhere. Its
solution, I believe, can be found and unraveled only by a critical assessment of the existing legal order in
the light of the prevailing political and factual milieu.
To be sure, there is an impressive array of consistent jurisprudence on the proposition that, normally or
under normal conditions, a Constitution may be amended only in accord with the procedure set forth
therein. Hence, if there be any such prescription for the amendatory process as invariable there is
because one of the essential parts of a Constitution is the so-called "constitution of sovereignty" which
comprises the provision or provisions on the modes in accordance with which formal changes in the
fundamental law may be effected the same would ordinarily be the controlling criterion for the validity of
the amendments sought.
Unfortunately, however, during the present transition period of our political development, no express
provision is extant in the Constitution regarding the agency or agent by whom and the procedure by which
amendments thereto may be proposed and ratified fact overlooked by those who challenge the validity of
the presidential acts in the premises. This is so because there are at least two distinctly in the transition
from the old system of government under the 1935 Constitution to the new one established by the 1973
Constitution.
The first stage comprises the period from the effectivity of the Constitution on January 17, 1973 to the
time the National Assembly is convened by the incumbent President and the interim President and the
interim Prime Minister are chosen Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3[1]. The existence of this stage as an
obvious fact of the nation's political life was recognized by the Court in Aquino vs. Commission on
Elections, et al. (L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275), when it rejected the claim that, under the
1973 Constitution, the President was in duty bound to convene the interim National Assembly soon after
the Constitution took effect.
The second stage embraces the period from the date the interim National Assembly is convened to the
date the Government described in Articles VII to IX of the Constitution is inaugurated, following the
election of the members of the regular National Assembly (Article XVII, Section 1) and the election of the
regular President and Prime Minister,. This is as it should be because it is recognized that the President
has been accorded the discretion to determine when he shall initially convene the interim National
Assembly, and his decision to defer the convocation thereof has found overwhelming support by the
sovereign people in two previous referenda, therein giving reality to an interregnum between the
effectivity of the Constitution and the initial convocation of the interim National Assembly, which
interregnum, as aforesaid, constitutes the first stage in the transition period.
Against this factual backdrop, it is readily discernible that neither of the two sets of provisions embodied in
the Constitution on the amendatory process applied during the said first stage. Thus, Section 15, Article
XVII (Transitory Provisions) provides-
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"Sec. 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a
majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take
effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof."
Patently, the reference to the "interim National Assembly" and the "interim Prime Minister" limits the
application thereof to the second stage of the transition period, i.e.,., after the interim? National Assembly
shall have been convened and the interim Prime Minister shall have been chosen.
Upon the other hand, the provisions of Article XVI (Amendments), to wit-
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by
the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a
constitutional convention.
(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of
ceiling such a convention to the electorate in an election.
SEC. 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months
after the approval of such amendment or revision.
unequivocally contemplate amendments after the regular Government shall have become fully operative,
referring as they do to the National Assembly which will come into being only at that time.
In the face of this constitutional hiatus, we are confronted with the dilemma whether amendments to the
Constitution may be effected during the aforesaid first stage and, if in the affirmative, by whom and in
what manner such amendments may be proposed and ratified.
Susceptibility to change is one of the hallmarks of an Ideal Constitution. Not being a mere declaration of
the traditions of a nation but more the embodiment of a people's hopes and aspirations, its strictures are
not unalterable. They are, instead, dynamic precepts intended to keep in stride with and attuned to the
living social organism they seek to fashion and govern. If it is conceded that "the political or philosophical
aphorism of one generation is doubted by the next and entirely discarded by the third," then a Constitution
must be able to adjust to the changing needs and demands of society so that the latter may survive,
progress and endure. On these verities, there can be no debate.
During the first stage of the transition period in which the Government is at present - which is
understandably the most critical - the need for change may be most pressing and imperative, and to
disavow the existence of the right to amend the Constitution would be sheer political heresy. Such view
would deny the people a mechanism for effecting peaceful change, and belie the organic conception of
the Constitution by depriving it of its means of growth. Such a result obviously could not have been
intended by the framers of the fundamental law.
It seems, however, that the happenstance that the first period would come to pass before the convocation
of the interim National Assembly was not anticipated, hence, the omission of an express mandate to
govern the said situation in so far as amendments are concerned. But such omission through
inadvertence should not, because it cannot, negate the sovereign power of the people to amend the
fundamental charter that governs their lives and their future and perhaps even the very survival of the
nation.
Upon the other hand, it is clear from the afore-quoted provisions on the amendatory process that the
intent was, instead, to provide a simpler and more expeditious mode of amending the Constitution during
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the transition period. For, while under Article XVI thereof, proposals for amendment may be made directly
by the regular National Assembly by a vote of at least three-fourths of all its members, under Section 15
of Article XVII, a bare majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly would suffice for the
purpose. The relaxation and the disparity in the vote requirement are revealing. The can only signify a
recognition of the need to facilitate the adoption of amendments during the second stage of the transition
period so that the interim National Assembly will be able, in a manner of speaking, to iron out the kinks in
the new Constitution, remove imperfections therein, and provide for changed or changing circumstances
before the establishment of the regular Government. In this contest, therefore, it is inutile speculation to
assume that the Constitution was intended to render impotent or ar the effectuation of needful change at
an even more critical period - the first stage. With greater reason, therefore, must the right and power to
amend the Constitution during the first stage of te transition period be upheld, albeit within its express and
implied constraints.
Neither can it be successfully argued, in the same context and in the present posture, that the
Constitution may be amended during the said first stage only by convening the interim National
Assembly. That is to say and require that he said stage must first be brought to an end before any
amendment may be proposed and ratified. Settled jurisprudence does not square with such a proposition.
As aptly noted in Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, et al., supra, the framers of the Constitution set no
deadline for the convening of the interim National Assembly because they could not have foreseen how
long the crises which impelled the proclamation and justify the continued state of martial law would last.
Indeed, the framers committed to the sound judgment is not subject to judicial review, save possibly to
determine whether arbitrariness has infected such exercise; absent such a taint, the matter is solely in the
keeping of the President. To thus content that only by convening the interim National Assembly may the
Constitution be amended at this time would effectively override the judgement vested in the President,
even in default of any he has acted arbitrarily or gravely abuse his discretion. Furthermore, to sustain
such a contention would not only negate the mandate so resoundingly expressed by the people in two
national referenda against the immediate convening of the interim National Assembly, but as well deride
their overwhelming approval of the manner in which the President has exercised the legislative power to
issue proclamations, orders, decrees and instructions having the stature and force of law.
Given the constitutional stalemate or impasse spawned by these supervening developments, the logical
query that compels itself for resolution is: By whom, then, may proposals for the amendment of the
Constitution be made and in what manner may said proposals be ratified by the people?
It is conventional wisdom that, conceptually, the constituent power is not to be confuse with legislative
power in general because the prerogative to propose amendments to the Constitution is not in any sense
embraced within the ambit of ordinary law-making. Hence, there is much to recommend the proposition
that, in default of an express grant thereof, the legislature - traditionally the delegated repository thereof -
may not claim it under a general grant of legislative authority. In the same vein, neither would it be
altogether unassailable to say that because by constitutional tradition and express allocation the
constituent power under the Constitution is locate in the law-making agency and at this stage of the
transition period the law-making authority is firmly recognized as being lodged in the President, the said
constituent power should now logically be in the hands of te President who may thus exercise it in place
of the interim National Assembly. Instead,, as pointed out in Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, et
al., supra, the power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments thereto
... is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours - t o make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental
Law.
As such, it is undoubtedly a power that only the sovereign people, either directly by themselves or
through their chosen delegate, can wield. Since it has been shown that the people, inadvertently or
otherwise, have not delegated that power to inadvertently or otherwise, have not delegated that power to
any instrumentality during the current stage of our hegira from crisis to normalcy, it follows of necessity
that the same remains with them for them to exercise in the manner they see fit and through the agency
188

they choose. And, even if it were conceded that - as it is reputedly the rule in some jurisdictions - a
delegation of the constituent authority amounts to a complete divestiture from the people of the power
delegated which they may not thereafter unilaterally reclaim from the delegate, there would be no
violence donde to such rule, assuming it to be applicable here, inasmuch as that power, under the
environmental circumstance adverted to, has not been delegated to anyone in the first place. The
constituent power during the first stage of the transition period belongs to and remains with the people,
and accordingly may be exercised by them - how and when - at their pleasure.
At this juncture, a flashback to the recent and contemporary political ferment in the country proves
revelatory. The people, shocked and revolted by the "obvious immorality" of the unabashed manner by
which the delegates to the Constitutional Convention virtually legislated themselves into office as ipso
facto members of the interim National Assembly by the mere fiat of voting for the transitory provisions of
the Constitution. and the stark reality that the unwieldy political monstrosity that the interim Assembly
portended to be would have proven to be a veritable drain on the meager financial resources of a nation
struggling for survival, have unequivocally put their foot down, as it were, on the convocation thereof. But
this patently salutary decision of the people proved to be double-edged. It likewise bound the political
machinery of the Government in a virtual straight-jacket and consigned the political evolution of the nation
into a state of suspended animation. Faced with the ensuing dilemma, the people understandably
agitated for a solution. Through consultations in the barangays and sanggunian assemblies, the
instrumentalities through which the people's voice is articulated in the unique system of participatory
democracy in the country today, the underpinnings for the hastening of the return to constitutional
normalcy quickly evolved into an overwhelming sentiment to amend the Constitution in order to replace
the discredited interim National Assembly with what the people believe will be an appropriate agency to
eventually take over the law-making power and thus pave the way for the early lifting of martial rule. In
pursuit of this sentiment, and to translate its constraints into concrete action, the Pambansang Katipunan
ng Barangay, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Kabataang Barangay, the Lupong Tagapagpaganap of
the Katipunan ng mga Barangay, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Kabataang Barangay the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, and finally the Batasang Bayan, to a man and as
one voice, have come forward with definitive proposals for the amendment of the Constitution, and,
choosing the President the only political arm of the State at this time through which that decision could be
implemented and the end in view attained as their spokesman, proposed the amendments under
challenge in the cases at bar.
In the light of this milieu and its imperatives, one thing is inescapable: the proposals now submitted to the
people for their ratification in the forthcoming referendum-plebiscite are factually not of the President; they
are directly those of the people themselves speaking thru their authorized instrumentalities. The President
merely formalized the said proposals in Presidential Decree No. 1033. It being conceded in all quarters
that sovereignty resides in the people and it having been demonstrated that their constituent power to
amend the Constitution has not been delegated by them to any instrumentality of the Government during
the present stage of the transition period of our political development, the conclusion is ineluctable that
their exertion of that residuary power cannot be vulnerable to any constitutional challenge as being ultra
vires. Accordingly, without venturing to rule on whether or not the President is vested with constituent
power as it does not appear necessary to do so in the premises the proposals here challenged, being
acts of the sovereign people no less, cannot be said to be afflicted with unconstitutionality. A fortiori, the
concomitant authority to call a plebiscite and to appropriate funds therefor is even less vulnerable not only
because the President, in exercising said authority has acted as a mere alter ego of the people who made
the proposals, but likewise because the said authority is legislative in nature rather than constituent.
III
Third Issue
Little need be said of the claimed insufficiency and impropriety of the submission of the proposed
amendments for ratification from the standpoint of time. The thesis cannot be disputed that a fair
submission presupposes an adequate time lapse to enable the people to be sufficiently enlightened on
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the merits or demerits of the amendments presented for their ratification or rejection. However,
circumstances there are which unmistakably demonstrated that the is met. Even if the proposal appear to
have been formalized only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1033 on September 22,
1976, they are actually the crystallization of sentiments that for so long have preoccupied the minds of the
people and their authorized representatives, from the very lowest level of the political hierarchy. Hence,
unlike proposals emanating from a legislative body, the same cannot but be said to have been mulled
over, pondered upon, debated, discussed and sufficiently understood by the great masses of the nation
long before they ripened into formal proposals.
Besides. it is a fact of which judicial notice may well be taken that in the not so distant past when the 1973
Constitution was submitted to the people for ratification, an all-out campaign, in which all the delegates of
the Constitutional Convention reportedly participated, was launched to acquaint the people with the
ramifications and working of the new system of government sought to be inaugurated thereunder. It may
thus well be assumed that the people in general have since acquired, in the least, a working knowledge of
the entirety of the Constitution. The changes now proposed the most substantial of which being merely
the replacement of the interim National assembly with another legislative arm for the Government during
the transition period until the regular National Assembly shall have been constituted do not appear to be
of such complexity as to require considerable time to be brought home to the full understanding of the
people. And, in fact, the massive and wide-ranging informational and educational campaign to this end
has been and still is in full swing, with all the media the barangay, the civic and sectoral groups, and even
the religious all over the land in acting and often enthusiastic if not frenetic involvement.
Indeed, when the people cast their votes on October 16, a negative vote could very well mean an
understanding of the proposals which they reject; while an affirmative vote could equally be indicative Of
such understanding and/or an abiding credence in the fidelity with which the President has kept the trust
they have confided to him as President and administrator of martial rule
IV
Conclusion
It is thus my considered view that no question viable for this court to pass judgment upon is posed.
Accordingly, I vote for the outright dismissal of the three petitions at bar.
FERNANDO, J., concurring and dissenting:
These three petitions, the latest in a series of cases starting from Planas v. Commission on Elections
continuing with the epochal resolution in Javellana v. Executive Secretary and followed successively in
three crucial decisions, Aquino v. Ponce Enrile Aquino v. Commission on Elections, and Aquino v Military
Commission,
5
manifest to the same degree the delicate and awesome character of the function of judicial
review. While previous rulings supply guidance and enlightenment, care is to be taken to avoid doctrinaire
rigidity unmindful of altered circumstances and the urgencies of the times. It is inappropriate to resolve
the complex problems of a critical period without full awareness of the consequences that flow from
whatever decision is reached. Jural norms must be read in the context of social facts, There is need
therefore of adjusting inherited principles to new needs. For law, much more so constitutional law, is
simultaneously a reflection of and a force in the society that it controls. No quality then can be more
desirable in constitutional adjudication than that intellectual and imaginative insight which goes into the
heart of the matter. The judiciary must survey things as they are in the light of what they must become It
must inquire into the specific problem posed not only in terms of the teaching of the past but also of the
emerging political and legal theory, especially so under a leadership notable for its innovative approach to
social problems and the vigor of its implementation. This, on the one side. It must equally be borne in
mind through that this Court must be conscious of the risk inherent in its being considered as a mere
subservient instrument of government policy however admittedly salutary or desirable. There is still the
need to demonstrate that the conclusion reached by it in cases appropriate for its determination has
190

support in the law that must be applied. To my mind that was the norm followed, the conclusion reached
being that the three petitions be dismissed. I am in agreement. It is with regret however that based on my
reading of past decisions, both Philippine and American, and more specifically my concurring opinion in
Aquino v. Ponce Enrile, I must dissent from the proposition set forth in the able and scholarly opinion of
Justice Martin that there is concentration of power in the President during a crisis government.
Consequently, I cannot see my way clear to accepting the view that the authority to propose amendments
is not open to question. At the very least, serious doubts could be entertained on the matter.
1. With due respect then, I have to dissociate myself from my brethren who would rule that governmental
powers in a crisis government, following Rossiter, "are more or less concentrated in the President."
Adherence to my concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino v. Ponce Enrile leaves me no choice.
It must be stated at the outset that with the sufficiency of doctrines supplied by our past decisions to point
the way to what I did consider the appropriate response to the basic issue raised in the Aquino and the
other habeas corpus petitions resolved jointly, it was only in the latter portion of my opinion that reference
was made to United States Supreme Court pronouncements on martial law, at the most persuasive in
character and rather few in number "due no doubt to the, absence in the American Constitution of any
provision concerning it." 7 It was understandable then that it was only after the landmark Ex parte Milligan
case, that commentators like Cooley in 1868 and Watson in 1910 paid attention, minimal by that, to the
subject." It was next set forth that in the works on American constitutional law published in this century
specially after the leading cases of cases Sterling v. Constant in and Duncan v. Kahanamoku, "there was
a fuller treatment of the question of martial law While it is the formulation of Willoughby that for me is most
acceptable, my opinion did take note that another commentator, Burdick, came out earlier with a similar
appraisal.
10
Thus: "So called martial law, except in occupied territory of an enemy is merely the calling in
of the aid of military forces by the executive, who is charged with the enforcement of the law, with or
without special authorization by the legislature. Such declaration of martial law does not suspend the civil
law, though it may interfere with the exercise of one's ordinary rights. The right to call out the military
forces to maintain order and enforce the law is simply part of the Police power, It is only justified when it
reasonably appears necessary, and only justifies such acts as reasonably appear necessarily to meet the
exigency, including the arrest, or in extreme cases the. killing of those who create the disorder or oppose
the authorities. When the exigency is over the members of the military forces are criminally and civilly
habit for acts done beyond the scope of reasonable necessity. When honestly and reasonably coping with
a situation of insurrection or riot a member of the military forces cannot be made liable for his acts, and
persons reasonably arrested under such circumstances will not, during the insurrection or riot, be free by
writ of habeas corpus."
11
When the opinion cited Willoughby's concept of martial law, stress was laid on
his being "Partial to the claims of liberty."12 This is evident in the explicit statement from his work quoted
by me: "There is, then, strictly speaking, no such thing in American law as a declaration of martial law
whereby military law is substituted for civil law. So-called declarations of martial law are, indeed, often
made but their legal effect goes no further than to warn citizens that the military powers have been called
upon by the executive to assist him in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency
lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and punishment not commit any acts which will in any way render
more difficult the restoration of order and the enforcement of law. Some of the authorities stating
substantially this doctrine are quoted in the footnote below Nor did I stop there. The words of Willis were
likewise cited: "Martial law proper, that is, military law in case of insurrection, riots, and invasions, is not a
substitute for the civil law, but is rather an aid to the execution of civil law. Declarations of martial law go
no further than to warn citizens that the executive has called upon the military power to assist him in the
maintenance of law and order. While martial law is in force, no new powers are given to the executive and
no civil rights of the individual, other than the writ of habeas corpus, are suspended. The relations
between the citizen and his stature unchanged."
14

The conclusion reached by me as to the state of American federal law on the question of martial law was
expressed thus: 4'1 It is readily evident that even when Milligan supplied the only authoritative doctrine,
Burdick and Willoughby did not ignore the primacy of civil liberties. Willis wrote after Sterling. It would
indeed be surprising if his opinion were otherwise. After Duncan, such an approach becomes even more
strongly fortified. Schwartz, whose treatise is the latest to be published, has this summary of what he
191

considers the present state of American law: 'The Milligan and Duncan cases show plainly that martial
law is the public law of necessity. Necessities alone calls it forth, necessity justifies its exercise; and
necessities measures the extended degree to which it may be It is, the high Court has affirmed, an
unbending rule of law that the exercise of military power, where the rights of the citizen are concerned,
may, never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires. If martial law rule survive the necessities on
which alone it rests, for even a single minute it becomes a mere exercise of lawless violence.' Further:
Sterling v. Constantin is of basic importance. Before it, a number of decisions, including one the highest
Court, went or on the theory that the executive had a free hand in taking martial law measures. Under
them, it has been widely supposed that in proclamation was so far conclusive that any action taken under
it was immune from judicial scrutiny. Sterling v. Constantin definitely discredits these earlier decisions and
the doctrine of conclusiveness derived from them. Under Sterling v. Constantin, where martial law
measures impinge upon personal or property rights-normally beyond the scope of military power, whose
intervention is lawful only because an abnormal Actuation has made it necessary the executive's ipse dixit
is not of itself conclusive of the necessity.'"
15

There was likewise an effort on my part to show what for me is the legal effect of martial law being
expressly provided for in the Constitution rather than being solely predicated on the common law power
based on the urgent need for it because of compelling circumstances incident to the state of actual clash
of arms: "It is not to be lost sight of that the basis for the declaration of martial law in the Philippines is not
mere necessity but an explicit constitutional provision. On the other hand, Milligan, which furnished the
foundation for Sterling and Duncan had its roots in the English common law. There is pertinence therefore
in ascertaining its significance under that system. According to the noted English author, Dicey: 'Martial
law,' in the proper sense of that term, , in which - it means the suspension of ordinary law and the
temporary government of a country or parts of it be military tribunals, is unknown to the law of England.
We have nothing equivalent to what is called in France the "Declaration of the State of Siege," under
which the authority ordinarily vested in the civil power for the maintenance of order and police passes
entirely to the army (autorite militaire). This is an unmistakable proof of the permanent supremacy of the
law under our constitution. There was this qualification: 'Martial law is sometimes employed as a name for
the common law right of the Crown and its servants to repel force by force in the case of invasion,
insurrection, riot, or generally of any violent resistance to the law. This right, or power, is essential to the
very existence of orderly government, and is most assuredly recognized in the most ample manner by the
law of England. It is a power which has in itself no special connection with the existence of an armed
force. The Crown has the right to put down breaches of the peace. Every subject, whether a civilian or a
soldier, whether what is called a servant of the government,' such for example as a policeman, or a
person in no way connected with the administration, not only has the right, but is, as a matter of legal
duty, bound to assist in putting down breaches of the peace. No doubt policemen or soldiers are the
persons who, as being specially employed in the maintenance of order, are most generally called upon to
suppress a riot, but it is clear that all loyal subjects are bound to take their part in the suppression of
riots."
16

Commitment to such an approach results in my inability to subscribe to the belief that martial law in terms
of what is provided both in the 1935 and the present Constitution, affords sufficient justification for the
concentration of powers in the Executive during periods of crisis. The better view, considering the juristic
theory on which our fundamental law rests is that expressed by Justice Black in Duncan v. Kahanamoku:
"Legislatures and courts are not merely cherished American institutions; they are indispensable to our
government.
17
If there has been no observance of such a cardinal concept at the present, it is due to the
fact that before the former Congress could meet in regular session anew, the present Constitution was
adopted, abolishing it and providing for an interim National Assembly, which has not been
convened.
18
So I did view the matter.
2. Nor did I ignore Rossiter in my Aquino v. Ponce Enrile opinion. Reference was made to the first chapter
on his work on Constitutional Dictatorship where he spoke of martial rule as "a device designed for use in
the crisis of invasion or rebellion. It may be most precisely defined as an extension of military government
to the civilian population, the substitution of the will of a military commander for the will of the people's
elected government."
19
Since, for me at least, the Rossiter characterization of martial law has in it more of
192

the common law connotation, less than duly mindful of the jural effects of its inclusion in the Constitution
itself as a legitimate device for coping with emergency conditions in times of grave danger, but always
subject to attendant limitations in accordance with the fundamental postulate of a charter's supremacy, I
felt justified in concluding: "Happily for the Philippines, the declaration of martial law lends itself to the
interpretation that the Burdick, Willoughby, Willis, Schwartz formulations paying due regard to the primacy
of liberty possess relevance. lt cannot be said that the martial rule concept of Rossiter, latitudinarian in
scope, has been adopted, even on the assumption that it can be reconciled with our Constitution. What is
undeniable is that President Marcos has repeatedly maintained that Proclamation No. 1081 was precisely
based on the Constitution and that the validity of acts taken there under could be passed upon by the
Supreme court. For me that is quite reassuring, persuaded as I am likewise that the week- of Rossiter is
opposed to the fundamental concept of our polity, which puts a premium on freedom."
20

3. Candor and accuracy compel the admission that such a conclusion his to be qualified. For in the
opinion of the Court in the aforecited Aquino v. Commission on Elections, penned by Justice Makasiar,
the proposition was expressly affirmed "that as Commander-in-Chief and enforcer or administrator of
martial law, the incumbent President of the Philippines can reclamations, orders and decrees during the
period Martial Law essential to the security and preservation of the Republic, to the defense of the
political and social liberties of the people and to the institution of reforms to prevent the resurgence of
rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as well as to meet the impact of a worldwide
recession, inflation or economic crisis which presently threatens all nations including highly developed
countries."
21
To that extent, Rossiter's view mainly relied upon, now possesses Juristic significant in this
jurisdiction. What, for me at least, gives caused for concern is that with the opinion of the Court this
intrusion of what I would consider an alien element in the limited concept of martial law as set forth in the
Constitution would be allowed further incursion into the corpus of the law, with the invocation of the view
expressed in the last chapter of his work approving tile "concentration of governmental power in a
democracy [as] a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation of
powers."
22
It is to the credit of the late Professor Rossiter as an objective scholar that in the very same
last chapter, just three pages later, he touched explicitly on the undesirable aspect of a constitutional
dictatorship. Thus: "Constitutional Dictatorship is a dangerous thing. A declaration of martial law or the
passage of an enabling act is a step which must always be feared and sometimes bitterly resisted, for it is
at once an admission of the incapacity of democratic institutions to defend the order within which they
function and a too conscious employment of powers and methods long ago outlawed as destructive of
constitutional government. Executive legislation, state control of popular liberties, military courts, and
arbitrary executive action were governmental features attacked by the men who fought for freedom not
because they were inefficient or unsuccessful, but because they were dangerous and oppressive. The
reinstitution of any of these features is a perilous matter, a step to be taken only when the dangers to a
free state will be greater if the dictatorial institution is not adopted."
23

4. It is by virtue of such considerations that I find myself unable to share the view of those of my brethren
who would accord recognition to the Rossiter concept of concentration of governmental power in the
Executive during periods of crisis. This is not to lose sight of the undeniable fact that in this country
through the zeal, vigor, and energy lavished on projects conducive to the general welfare, considerable
progress has been achieved under martial rule. A fair summary may be found in a recent address of the
First Lady before the delegates to the 1976 international Monetary Fund-World Bank Joint Annual
Meeting: "The wonder is that so much has been done in so brief a time. Since September 1972, when
President Marcos established the crisis government, peace and order have been restored in a country
once avoided as one of the most unsafe in the world. We have liberated millions of Filipino farmers from
the bondage of tenancy, in the most vigorous and extensive implementation of agrarian
reform."
24
Further, she said: "A dynamic economy has replaced a stagnant order, and its rewards are
distributed among the many, not hoarded by a few. Our foreign policy, once confined by fear and
suspicion to a narrow alley of self-imposed isolation, now travels the broad expressways of friendship and
constructive interaction with the whole world, these in a new spirit of confidence and self-reliance. And
finally, forced to work out our own salvation, the Filipino has re-discovered the well-springs of his strength
and resilience As Filipinos, we have found our true Identity. And having broken our crisis of Identity, we
are no longer apologetic and afraid. "25 The very Idea of a crisis, however, signifies a transitory, certainly
193

not a permanent, state of things. President Marcos accordingly has not been hesitant in giving utterance
to his conviction that full implementation of the modified parliamentary system under the present
Constitution should not be further delayed. The full restoration of civilian rule can thus be expected. That
is more in accord with the imperatives of a constitutional order. It should not go unnoticed either that the
President has referred to the present regime as one of "constitutional authoritarianism." That has a less
objectionable ring, authority being more Identified with the Idea of law, as based on right, the very
antithesis of naked force, which to the popular mind is associated with dictatorship, even if referred to as
"constitutional."
For me likewise, that equally eminent scholar Corwin, also invoked in the opinion of the Court, while no
doubt a partisan of d strong Presidency, was not averse to constitutional restraints even during periods of
crisis. So I would interpret this excerpt from the fourth edition of his classic treatise on the Presidency: "A
regime of martial law may be compendiously, if not altogether accurately, defined as one in which the
ordinary law, as administered by the ordinary courts, is superseded for the time being by the will of a
military commander. It follows that, when martial law is instituted under national authority, it rests
ultimately on the will of the President of the United States in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief. It
should be added at once, nevertheless, that the subject is one in which the record of actual practice fails
often to support the niceties of theory. Thus, the employment of the military arm in the enforcement of the
civil law does not invariably, or even usually, involve martial law in the strict sense, for, as was noted in
the preceding section, soldiers are often placed simply at the disposal and direction of the civil authorities
as a kind of supplementary police, or posse comitatus on the other hand be reason of the discretion that
the civil authorities themselves are apt to vest in the military in any emergency requiring its assistance,
the line between such an employment of the military and a regime of martial law is frequently any but a
hard and fast one. And partly because of these ambiguities the conception itself of martial law today
bifurcates into two conceptions, one of which shades off into military government and the other into the
situation just described, in which the civil authority remains theoretically in control although dependent on
military aid. Finally, there is the situation that obtained throughout the North during the Civil War, when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended as to certain classes of suspects, although
other characteristics of martial law were generally absent."
26

It is by virtue of the above considerations that, with due respect to the opinion of my brethren, I cannot
yield assent to the Rossiter view of concentration of governmental powers in the Executive during martial
law.
5 There is necessity then, for me at least, that the specific question raised in all three petitions be
squarely faced. It is to the credit of the opinion of the Court that it did so. The basic issue posed concerns
the boundaries of the power of the President during this period of martial law, more precisely whether it
covers proposing amendments to the Constitution. There is the further qualification if the stand of
respondents be taken into account that the interim National Assembly has not been convened and is not
likely to be called into session in deference to the wishes of the people as expressed in three previous
referenda. It is the ruling of the majority that the answer be in the affirmative, such authority being well
within the area of presidential competence. Again I find myself unable to join readily in that conviction. It
does seem to me that the metes and bounds of the executive domain, while still recognizable, do appear
blurred. This is not to assert that there is absolutely no basis for such a conclusion, sustained as it is by a
liberal construction of the principle that underlies Aquino v. Commission on Elections as to the validity of
the exercise of the legislative prerogative by the President as long as the interim National Assembly is not
For me, the stage of certitude has not been reached. I cannot simply ignore the vigorous plea of
petitioners that there is a constitutional deficiency consisting in the absence of any constituent power on
the part of the President, the express provision of the Constitution conferring it on the by team National
Assembly.
27
The learned advocacy reflected in the pleadings as well as the oral discourse of Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza 21 failed to erase the grave doubts in my mind that the Aquino doctrine as
to the possession of legislative competence by the President during this period of transition with the
interim lawmaking body not called into session be thus expanded. The majority of my brethren took that
step. I am not prepared to go that far. I will explain why.
194

The way for me, is beset with obstacles. In the first place, such an approach would lose sight of the
distinction between matters legislative and constituent. That is implicit in the treatise on the 1935
Constitution by Justices Malcolm and Laurel In their casebook published the same year, one of the four
decisions on the subject of constitutional amendments is Ellingham v. Dye 31 which categorically
distinguished between constituent and legislative powers. Dean Sinco, a well-known authority on the
subject, was quite explicit. Thus: "If there had been no express provision in the Constitution granting
Congress the power to propose amendments, it would be outside its authority to assume that power.
Congress may not claim it under the general grant of legislative power for such grant does not carry with
it the right 'to erect the state, institute the form of its government,' which is considered a function inherent
in the people. Congressional lawmaking authority is limited to the power of approving the laws 'of civil
conduct relating to the details and particulars of the government instituted,' the government established
by the people."12 If that distinction be preserved, then for me the aforecited Aquino decision does not
reach the heart of the matter. Nor is this all. In the main opinion of Justice Makasiar as well as that of the
then Justice, now Chief Justice, Castro, support for the ruling that the President cannot be deemed as
devoid of legislative power during this transition stage is supplied by implications from explicit
constitutional provisions.
13
That is not the case with the power to propose amendments. It is solely the
interim National Assembly that is mentioned. That is the barrier that for me is well-nigh insurmountable. If
I limit myself to entertaining doubts rather than registering a dissent on this point, it is solely because of
the consideration, possessed of weight and significance, that there may be indeed in this far-from-
quiescent and static period a need for al. amendments. I do not feel confident therefore that a negative
vote on my part would be warranted. What would justify the step taken by the President, even if no
complete acceptance be accorded to the view that he was a mere conduit of the barangays on this
matter, is that as noted in both qualified concurrences by Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma in
Aquino, as far as the legislative and appropriately powers are concerned, is the necessity that unless
such authority be recognized, there may be paralyzation of governmental activities, While not squarely
applicable, such an approach has, to my mind, a persuasive quality as far as the power to propose
amendments is concerned.
Thus I would confine myself to the expression of serious doubts on the question rather than a dissent.
6. The constitutional issue posed as thus viewed leaves me free to concur in the result that the petitions
be dismissed. That is to accord respect to the principle that judicial review goes no further than to
checking clear infractions of the fundamental law, except in the field of human rights where a much
greater vigilance is required, That is to make of the Constitution a pathway to rather than a barrier against
a desirable objective. -As shown by my concurring and dissenting opinion in Tolentino Commission on
Elections '34 a pre-martial law decision, the fundamental postulate that sovereignty resides in the people
exerts a compelling force requiring the judiciary to refrain as much as possible from denying the people
the opportunity to make known their wishes on matters of the utmost import for the life of the nation,
Constitutional amendments fall in that category. I am fortified in that conviction by the teaching of
persuasive American decisions There is reinforcement to such a conclusion from retired Chief Justice
Concepcion's concurring and dissenting opinion in Aytona v. Castillo,17 Which I consider applicable to
the present situation. These are his words: "It is well settled that the granting of writs of prohibition and
mandamus is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the courts, to be exercised on equitable principles,
and that said writs should be issued when the right to the relief is clear * * by As he noted in his ponencia
in the later case of Gonzales v. Hechanova,19 an action for prohibition, while petitioner was sustained in
his stand, no injunction was issued. This was evident in the dispositive portion where judgment was
rendered "declaring that respondent Executive Secretary had and has no power to authorize the
importation in question; that he exceeded his jurisdiction in granting said authority; that said importation is
not sanctioned by law and is contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the
injunction prayed for must be and is, accordingly, denied."
40
With the illumination thus supplied, it does
not necessarily follow that even a dissent on my part would necessarily compel that I vote for the relief
prayed for. Certainly this is not to belittle in any way the action taken by petitioners in filing these suits.
That, for me, is commendable. It attests to their belief in the rule of law. Even if their contention as to lack
of presidential power be accepted in their entirety, however, there is still discretion that may be exercised
on the matter, prohibition being an equitable remedy. There are, for me, potent considerations that argue
195

against acceding to the plea. With the prospect of the interim National Assembly being convened being
dim, if not non- existent, if only because of the results in three previous referenda, there would be no
constitutional agency other than the Executive who could propose amendments, which, as noted. may
urgently press for adoption. Of even greater weight, to my mind, is the pronouncement by the President
that the plebiscite is intended not only to solve a constitutional anomaly with the country devoid of a
legislative body but also to provide. the machinery be which the termination of martial law could be
hastened. That is a consummation devoutly to be wished. That does militate strongly against the stand of
petitioners. The obstruction they would pose may be fraught with pernicious consequences. It may not be
amiss to refer anew to what I deem the cardinal character of the jural postulate explicitly affirmed in both
the 1935 and the present Constitutions that sovereignty resides in the people. So I made clear in
Tolentino v. Commission on Elections and thereafter in my dissent in Javellana v. The Executive
Secretary" and my concurrence in Aquino v. Commission on Elections. 42 The destiny of the country lies
in their keeping. The role of leadership is not to be minimized. It is crucial it is of the essence.
Nonetheless, it is their will, if given expression in a manner sanctioned by law and with due care that
there be no mistake in its appraisal, that should be controlling. There is all the more reason then to
encourage their participation in the power process. That is to make the regime truly democratic.
Constitutional orthodoxy requires, however, that the fundamental law be followed. So I would interpret
Laski,
43
Corwin,
44
Lerner,
45
, Bryn-Jones,
46
and McIver.47
7. There is reassurance in the thought that this Court has affirmed its commitment to the principle that the
amending process gives rise to a justiciable rather than a political question. So, it has been since the
leading case of Gonzales v. Commission on Election S.
48
It has since then been followed in Tolentino v.
Commission on Elections
49
Planas v. Commission on Elections," and lastly, in Javellana v. The Executive
Secretary This Court did not heed the vigorous plea of the Solicitor General to resurrect the political
question doctrine announced in Mabanag v. Lopez Vito.
52
This is not to deny that the federal rule in the
United States as set forth in the leading case of Coleman v. Miller ,
53
a 1939 decision, and relatively
recent State court decisions, supply ammunition to such a contention.,
51
That may be the case in the
United States, but certainly not in this jurisdiction. Philippine constitutional tradition is to the contrary. It
can trace its origin to these words in the valedictory address before the 1934-35 Constitutional
Convention by the illustrious Claro M. Recto: "It is one of the paradoxes a democracy that the people of
times place more confidence in instrumentalities of the State other than those directly chosen by them for
the exercise of their sovereignty It can be said with truth, therefore, that there has invariably been a
judicial predisposition to activism rather than self-restraint. The thinking all these years has been that it
goes to the heart of constitutionalism. It may be said that this Court has shunned the role of a mere
interpreter; it did exercise at times creative power. It has to that extent participated in the molding of
policy, It has always recognized that in the large and undefined field of constitutional law, adjudication
partakes of the quality of statecraft. The assumption has been that just because it cannot by itself
guarantee the formation, much less the perpetuation of democratic values or, realistically, it cannot
prevail against the pressure of political forces if they are bent in other directions. it does not follow that it
should not contribute its thinking to the extent that it can. It has been asked, it will continue to be asked, to
decide momentous questions at each critical stage of this nation's life.
There must be, however, this caveat. Judicial activism gives rise to difficulties in an era of transformation
and change. A society in flux calls for dynamism in "he law, which must be responsive to the social forces
at work. It cannot remain static. It must be sensitive to life. This Court then must avoid the rigidity of legal
Ideas. It must resist the temptation of allowing in the wasteland of meaningless abstractions. It must face
stubborn reality. It has to have a feel for the complexities of the times. This is not to discount the risk that
it may be swept too far and too fast in the surge of novel concepts. The past too is entitled to a hearing; it
cannot just be summarily ignored. History still has its uses. It is not for this Court to renounce the virtue of
systematic jural consistency. It cannot simply yield to the sovereign sway of the accomplished fact. It must
be deaf to the dissonant dialectic of what appears to be a splintered society. It should strive to be a factor
for unity under a rule of law. There must be, on its part, awareness of the truth that a new juridical age
born before its appointed time may be the cause of unprecedented travail that may not end at birth. It is
by virtue of such considerations that I did strive for a confluence of principle and practicality. I must
confess that I did approach the matter with some misgivings and certainly without any illusion of
196

omniscience. I am comforted by the thought that immortality does not inhere in judicial opinions. 8. 1 am
thus led by my studies on the subject of constitutional law and, much more so, by previous judicial
opinions to concur in the dismissal of the petitions. If I gave expression to byes not currently fashionable,
it is solely due to deeply-ingrained beliefs. Certainly, I am the first to recognize the worth of' the social and
economic reforms so needed by the troubled present that have been introduced and implemented. There
is no thought then of minimizing, much less of refusing to concede, the considerable progress that has
been made and the benefits that have been achieved under this Administration. Again, to reiterate one of
my cherished convictions, I certainly approve of the adherence to the fundamental principle of popular
sovereignty which, to be meaningful however, requires both freedom in its manifestation and accuracy in
ascertaining what it wills. Then, too, it is fitting and proper that a distinction was made between two
aspects of the coming poll, the referendum and the plebiscite. It is only the latter that is impressed with
authoritative force. So the Constitution requires. Lastly, there should be, as I did mention in my
concurrence in Aquino v. Commission on Elections,56 full respect for free speech and press, free
assembly and free association. There should be no thought of branding the opposition as the enemy and
the expression of its views as anathema, Dissent, it is fortunate to note, has been encouraged. It has not
been Identified with disloyalty. That ought to be the case, and not solely due to presidential decrees.
Constructive criticism is to be welcomed not so much because of the right to be heard but because there
may be something worth hearing. That is to ensure a true ferment of Ideas, an interplay of knowledgeable
minds. There are though well- defined limits, One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest,
much less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.. What I mean to stress is that except on a showing
of clear and present danger, there must be respect for the traditional liberties that make a society truly
free.
TEEHANKEE, J ., dissenting:
1. On the merits: I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit and vote to grant
the petitions for the following reasons and considerations:
1
. It is undisputed that neither the 1935
Constitution nor the 1973 Constitution grants to the incumbent President the constituent power to propose
and approve amendments to the Constitution to be submitted to the people for ratification in a plebiscite.
The 1935 Constitution expressly vests the constituent power in Congress, be a three-fourths vote of all its
members, to propose amendments or call a constitutional convention for the purpose The 1973
Constitution expressly vests the constituent power in the regular National Assembly to propose
amendments (by a three-fourths vote of all its members) or "call a constitutional convention" (by a two-
thirds vote of all its members) or "submit the question of calling such convention to the electorate in an
election" (by a majority vote of all its members ) .2
The transitory provisions of the 1973 Constitution expressing vest the constituent power during the period
of transition in the interim National Assembly "upon special call be the Prime Minister (the incumbent
President 3)... by a majority ore of all its members (to) propose amendments."
Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, defines
and delimits the powers of each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and the
constituent power has not been granted to but has been withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it
follows that the President's questioned decrease proposing and submitting constitutional amendments
directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom the power is
expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis.
2. The doctrine in the leading case of Tolentino vs. Comelec is controlling in the case at bar In therein
declaring null and void the acts of the 1971 Constitutional Convention and of the Comelec in calling a
plebiscite with the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971 for the purpose of submitting for the
people's ratification an advance amendment reducing the voting age from 21 years to 18 years, and
issuing writs of prohibition and injunction against the holding of the plebiscite, this Court speaking through
Mr. Justice Barredo ruled that --The Constitutional provisions on amendments "dealing with the procedure
or manner of amending the fundamental law are binding upon the Convention and the other departments
of the government, (land) are no less binding upon the people
197

As long as an amendment is formulated and submitted under the aegis of the present
Charter, any proposal for such amendment which is not in conformity with the letter, spirit
and intent of the Charter for effecting amendments, cannot receive the sanction of this
Court ;
8

The real issue here cannot be whether or not the amending process delineated by the present
Constitution may be disregarded in favor of allowing the sovereign people to express their decision on the
proposed amendments, if only because it is evident that the very Idea of departing from the fundamental
law is anachronistic in the realm of constitutionalism and repugnant to the essence of the rule of law,"; 9
and
-Accordingly barred the plebiscite as improper and premature, since "the provisional nature of the
proposed amendments and the manner of its submission to the people for ratification or rejection" did not
"conform with the mandate of the people themselves in such regard, as expressed in the Constitution
itself', 10 i.e. the mandatory requirements of the amending process as set forth in the Article on
Amendments.
3. Applying the above rulings of Tolentino to the case at bar, mutatis, mutandis, it is clear that where the
proposed amendments are violative of the Constitutional mandate on the amending process not merely
for being a "partial amendment" of a "temporary or provisional character" (as in Tolentino) but more so for
not being proposed and approved by the department vested by the Constitution with the constituent
power to do so, and hence transgressing the substantive provision that it is only the interim National
Assembly, upon special call of the interim Prime Minister, bu a majority vote of all its members that may
propose the amendments, the Court must declare the amendments proposals null and void.
4. This is so because the Constitution is a "superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means" 11
but only by the particular mode and manner prescribed therein by the people. As stressed by Cooley, "by
the Constitution which they establish, (the people) not only tie up the hands of their official agencies but
their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the State, nor the whole people as an aggregate body,
are at liberty to take action in opposition to this fundamental law."
12

The vesting of the constituent power to propose amendments in the legislative body (the regular National
Assembly) or the interim National Assembly during the transition period) or in a constitutional convention
called for the purpose is in accordance with universal practice. "From the very necessity of the case"
Cooley points out "amendments to an existing constitution, or entire revisions of it, must be prepared and
matured by some body of representatives chosen for the purpose. It is obviously impossible for the whole
people to meet, prepare, and discuss the proposed alterations, and there seems to be no feasible mode
by which an expression of their will can be obtained, except by asking it upon the single point of assent or
disapproval." This body of representatives vested with the constituent - power "submits the result of their
deliberations" and "puts in proper form the questions of amendment upon which the people are to pass"-
for ratification or rejection.
13

5. The Court in Tolentino thus rejected the argument "that the end sought to be achieved is to be desired"
and in denying reconsideration in paraphrase of the late Claro M. Recto declared that "let those who
would put aside, invoking grounds at best controversial, any mandate of the fundamental purportedly in
order to attain some laudable objective bear in mind that someday somehow others with purportedly more
laudable objectives may take advantage of the precedent and continue the destruction of the Constitution,
making those who laid down the precedent of justifying deviations from the requirements of the
Constitution the victims of their own folly."
This same apprehension was echoed by now retired Justice Calixto O. Zaldivar in his dissenting opinion
in the Ratification cases
14
that "we will be opening the gates for a similar disregard to the Constitution in
the future. What I mean is that if this Court now declares that a new Constitution is now in force because
the members of the citizens assemblies had approved said new Constitution, although that approval was
198

not in accordance with the procedure and the requirements prescribed in the 1935 Constitution, it can
happen again in some future time that some amendments to the Constitution may be adopted, even in a
manner contrary to the existing Constitution and the law, and then said proposed amendments is
submitted to the people in any manner and what will matter is that a basis is claimed that there was
approval by the people. There will not be stability in our constitutional system, and necessarily no stability
in our government."
6. It is not legally tenable for the majority, without overruling the controlling precedent of Tolentino (and
without mustering the required majority vote to so overrule) to accept the proposed; amendments as valid
notwithstanding their being "not in conformity with the letter, spirit and intent of the provision of the
Charter for effecting amendments" on the reasoning that "If the President has been legitimately
discharging the legislative functions of the interim National Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot
validly discharge the functions."15
In the earlier leading case of Gonzales vs. Comelec
16
, this Court speaking through now retired Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, pointer out that "Indeed, the power to Congress"
17
or to the National
Assembly.18 Where it not for the express grant in the Transitory Provisions of the constituent power to
the interim National Assembly, the interim National Assembly could not claim the power under the general
grant of legislative power during the transition period.
The majority's ruling in the Referendum cases
19
that the Transitory Provision in section 3(2) recognized
the existence of the authority to legislate in favor of the incumbent President during the period of martial
law manifestly cannot be stretched to encompass the constituent power as expressly vested in the interim
National Assembly in derogation of the allotment of powers defined in the Constitution.
Paraphrasing Cooley on the non-delegation of legislative power as one of the settled maxims of
constitutional law,
20
the contituent power has been lodged by the sovereign power of the people with the
interim National Assembly during the transition period and there it must remain as the sole constitutional
agency until the Constitution itself is changed.
As was aptly stated by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the 1936 landmak case of Angara vs. Electoral
Commissioner
21
, "(T)he Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language and restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers sentiment, and the principles
of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living Constitution".
7. Neither is the justification of "constitutional impasses" tenable. The sentiment of the people against the
convening of the interim National Assembly and to have no elections for "at least seven (7) years"
Concededly could not ament the Constitution insofar as the interim National Assembly is concerned
(since it admittendly came into existence "immediately" upon the proclamation of ratification of the 1973
Constitution), much less remove the constituent power from said interim National Assembly.
As stressed in the writer's separate opinion in the Referendum cases
22
, "(W)hile it has been advanced
that the decision to defer the initial convocation of the interim National Assembly was supported by the
results of the referendum in January, 1973 when the people voted against the convening of the interim
National Assembly for at least seven years, such sentiment cannot be given any legal force and effect in
the light of the State's admission at the hearing that such referendums are merely consultative and cannot
amend the Constitution or Provisions which call for the 'immediate existence' and 'initial convening of the
interim National Assembly to 'give priority to measures for the orderly transition from the presidential to
the parliamentary system' and the other urgent measures enumerated in section 5 thereof".
199

While the people reportedly expressed their mandate against the convening of the interim National
Assembly to dischange its legislative tasks during the period of transition under martial law, they certainly
had no opportunity and did not express themselves against convening the interim National Assembly to
discharge the constituent power to propose amendments likewise vested in it by the people's mandate in
the Constitution.
In point of fact, when the holding of the October 16, 1976 referendum was first announced, the
newspapers reported that among the seven questions proposed by the sanggunian and barangay
national executive committies for the referendum was the convening of the interim National Assembly.
23

It was further reported that the proposals which were termed tentative "will be discussed and studied by
(the President), the members of the cabinet, and the security council" and that the barangays felt,
notwithstanding the previous referenda on the convening of the interim National Assembly that "it is time
to again ask the people's opinion of this matter "
24

8. If proposals for constitutional amendments are now deemed necessary to be discussed and adopted
for submittal to the people, strict adherence with the mandatory requirements of the amending process as
provided in the Constitution must be complied with. This means, under the teaching of Tolentino that the
proposed amendments must validly come from the constitutional agency vested with the constituent
power to do so, namely, the interim National Assembly, and not from the executive power as vested in the
Prime Minister (the incumbent President) with the assistance of the Cabinet
25
from whom such power
has been withheld.
It will not do to contend that these proposals represent the voice of the people for as was aptly stated by
Cooley "Me voice of the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force only when
expressed at the times and under the conditions which they themselves have prescribed and pointed out
by the Constitution. ... ."26
The same argument was put forward and rejected by this Court in Tolentino which rejected the contention
that the "Convention being a legislative body of the highest order (and directly elected by the people to
speak their voice) is sovereign, in as such, its acts impugned by petitioner are beyond the control of
Congress and the Courts" and ruled that the constitutional article on the amending process" is nothing
more than a part of the Constitution thus ordained by the people. Hence, in continuing said section, We
must read it as if the people said, "The Constitution may be amended, but it is our will that the
amendment must be proposed and submitted to Us for ratification only in the manner herein provided'".
27

This Court therein stressed that "This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the
Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the same
ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most valued power,
second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers have
chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the
Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the
people within the country and those subject to its sovereignity, ever constitution worthy of the people for
which it is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious
that correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole
Constitution itself, and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation;"
and that "written constitutions are supposed to be designed so as to last for some time, if not for ages, or
for, at least, as long as they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they must
be insulated against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political moods or
fancies. Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and conditions, more or less
stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment."
28

9. The convening of the interim National Assembly to exercise the constituent power to proposed
amendments is the only way to fulfill the express mandate of the Constitution.
200

As Mr. Justice Fernando emphasized for this Court in Mutuc vs. Comelec
29
in the setting as in of a
Comelec resolution banning the use of political taped jingles by candidates for Constitutional Convention
delegates int he special 1970 elections, "the concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting
forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the
lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to amnifst fealty to the rule of law,
with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal heirarchy. The three
departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but
to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the
enactment of statutes must ever be on guart lest the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or
formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore of disregard what it
ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon
the maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law."
This is but to give meaning to the plan and clear mandate of section 15 of the Transitory Provisions
(which allows of no other interpretation) that during the stage of transition the interim National Assembly
alone exercises the constituent power to propose amendments, upon special call therefor. This is
reinforced by the fact that the cited section does not grant to the regular National Assembly of calling a
constitutional convention, thus expressing the will of the Convention (and presumably of the people upon
ratification) that if ever the need to propose amendments arose during the limited period of transition, the
interim National Assembly alone would discharge the task and no constitutional convention could be call
for the purpose.
As to the alleged costs involved in convening the interim National Assembly to propose amendments,
among them its own abolition, (P24 million annually in salaries alone for its 400 members at P600,000.00
per annum per member, assuming that its deliberations could last for one year), suffice it to recall this
Court's pronouncement in Tolentino (in reflecting a similar argument on the costs of holding a plebiscite
separately from the general elections for elective officials) that "it is a matter of public knowledge that
bigger amounts have been spent or thrown to waste for many lesser objectives. ... Surely, the amount of
seventeen million pesos or even more is not too much a price to pay for fealty and loyalty to the
Constitution ... "
30
and that "while the financial costs of a separate plebiscite may be high, it can never be
as much as the dangers involved in disregarding clear mandate of the Constitution, no matter how
laudable the objective" and "no consideration of financial costs shall deter Us from adherence to the
requirements of the Constitution".11
10. The imposition of martial law (and "the problems of rebellion, subversion, secession, recession,
inflation and economic crisis a crisis greater than war")
32
cited by the majority opinion as justifying the
concentration of powers in the President, and the recognition now of his exercising the constituent power
to propose amendments to the Fundamental Law "as agent for and in behalf of the people"
33
has no
constitutional basis.
In the post-war Emergency Powers
33
*, former Chief Justice Ricardo Paras reaffirmed for the Court the
principle that emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. In our democracy the hope and
survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful
'Adherence to the Constitution".
The martial law clause of the 1973 Constitution found in Article IX, section
12
, as stressed by the writer in
his separate opinion in the Referendum Cases,14 "is a verbatim reproduction of Article VII, section 10 (2)
of the 1935 Constitution and provides for the imposition of martial law only 'in case of invasion,
resurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it and hence the use
of the legislative power or more accurately 'military power' under martial rule is limited to such necessary
measures as will safeguard the Republic and suppress the rebellion (or invasion)".
35

11. Article XVII, section 3 (2) of the 1973 Constitution which has been held by the majority in the
Referendum Cases to be the recognition or warrant for the exercise of legislative power by the President
during the period of martial law is but a transitory provision. Together with the martial law clause, they
201

constitute but two provisions which are not to be considered in isolation from the Constitution but as mere
integral parts thereof which must be harmonized consistently with the entire Constitution.
As Cooley restated the rule: "effect is to be given, if possible, to the whole instrument, and to every
section and clause. If different portions seem to conflict, the courts must harmonize them, if practicable,
and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which
may make some words Idle and nugatory.
This rule is applicable with special force to written constitutions, in which the people will
be presumed to have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms,
corresponding with the immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as
possible to implication. It is scarcelly conceivable that a case can arise where a court
would bye justified in declaring any portion of a written constitution nugatory because of
ambiguity. One part may qualify another so as to restrict its operation, or apply it
otherwise than the natural construction would require if it stood by itself; but one part is
not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction the two can be
made to stand together.
36

The transcendental constituent power to propose and approve amendments to the Constitution as well as
set up the machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals has been withheld
from the President (Prime Minister) as sole repository of the Executive Power, presumably in view of the
immense powers already vested in him by the Constitution but just as importantly, because by the very
nature of the constituent power, such amendments proposals have to be prepared, deliberated and
matured by a deliberative assembly of representatives such as the interim National Assembly and hence
may not be antithetically entrusted to one man.
Former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion had observed before the elevation of the l971 Constitutional
Convention that the records of past plebiscites show that the constitutional agency vested with the
exercise of the constituent power (Congress or the Constitutional Convention) really determined the
amendments to the Constitution since the proposals were invariably ratified by the people
37
thus:
"although the people have the reserved power to ratify or reject the action taken by the Convention, such
power is not, in view of the circumstances attending its exercise, as effective as one might otherwise
think: that, despite the requisite ratification by the people, the actual contents of our fundamental law will
really be determined by the Convention; that, accordingly the people should exercise the greatest
possible degree of circumspection in the election of delegates thereto ... "
38

12. Martial law concededly does not abrogate the Constitution nor obliterate its constitutional boundaries
and allocation of powers among the Executive, Legislative and Judicial Departments.
39

It has thus been aptly observed that "Martial law is an emergency regime, authorized by and subject to
the Constitution. Its basic premise is to preserve and to maintain the Republic against the dangers that
threaten it. Such premise imposes constraints and limitations. For the martial law regime fulfills the
constitutional purpose only if, by reason of martial law measures, the Republic is preserved. If by reason
of such measures the Republic is so transformed that it is changed in its nature and becomes a State
other than republican, then martial law is a failure; worse, martial law would have become the enemy of
the Republic rather than its defender and preserver."
40

II. On the question of the Court's jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality of the questioned
presidential decrees: let it be underscored that the Court has long set at rest the question.
The trail was blazed for the Court since the benchmark case of Angara vs. Electoral Commission when
Justice Jose P. Laurel echoed U.S. Chief Justice Marshall's "climactic phrase" that "we must never forget
that it is a Constitution we are expounding" and declared the Court's "solemn and sacred" constitutional
obligation of judicial review and laid down the doctrine that the Philippine Constitution as "a definition of
202

the powers of government" placed upon the judiciary the great burden of "determining the nature, scope
and extent of such powers" and stressed that "when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments . . . but only asserts the solemn
and sacred obliteration entrusted to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under
the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which the instrument
secures and guarantees to them".
At the same time, the Court likewise adhered to the constitutional tenet that political questions, i.e.
questions which are intended by the Constitutional and relevant laws to be conclusively determined by
the "political", i.e. branches of government (namely, the Executive and the Legislative) are outside the
Court's jurisdiction.
41

Thus, in Gonzales,
42
(by a unanimous Court) and in Tolentino
43
(by the required constitutional majority),
the Court has since consistently ruled that when proposing and approving amendments to the
Constitution, the members of Congress. acting as a constituent assembly or the members of the
Constitutional Convention elected directly for the purpose by not have the final say on whether or not their
acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set the same at
naught, contrary to the basic tenet that outs is it government of lawsom not of men, and to the rigid nature
of our Constitution. Such rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the Constitution expressly confers upon the
Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of
treaty-making power".
44

As amplified by former Chief Justice Concepcion in Javellana vs Executive Secretary
45
(by a majority
vote), "when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations. the issue on whether or
not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations by expected, is justiciable
or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its
wisdom Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions and limitations-particularly those prescribed or imposed
by the Constitution would be set at naught".
The fact that the proposed amendments are to be submitted to the people for ratification by no means
makes the question political and non- justiciable since as stressed even in Javellana the issue of validity
of the President's proclamation of ratification of the Constitution presented a justiciable and non-political
question
Stated otherwise, the question of whether the Legislative acting as a constituent assembly or the
Constitutional Convention called fol- the purpose, in proposing amendments to the people for ratification
followed the constitutional procedure and on the amending process is perforce a justiciable question and
does not raise a political question of police or wisdom of the proposed amendments, which if Submitted,
are reserved for the people's decision.
The substantive question presented in the case at bar of whether the President may legally exercise the
constituent power vested in the interim National Assembly (which has not been granted to his office) and
propose constitutional amendments is preeminently a justiciable issue.
Justice Laurel in Angara had duly enjoined that "in times of social disquietude or political excitement, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases
of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine
the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent
units thereof".
To follow the easy way out by disclaiming jurisdiction over the issue as a political question would be
judicial abdication.
203

III. On the question of whether there is a sufficient and proper submittal of the proposed amendments to
the people: Prescinding from the writer's view of the nullity of the questioned decree of lack of authority on
the President's part to excercise the constituent power, I hold that the doctrine of fair and proper
submission first enunciated by a simple majority of by Justices in Gonzales and subsequently officially
adopted by the required constitutional two-thirds majority of the Court in is controlling in the case at bar.
1. There cannot be said to be fair and proper submission of the proposed amendments. As ruled by this
Court in Tolentino where "the proposed amendment in question is expressly saddled with reservations
which naturally impair, in great measures, its very essence as a proposed constitutional amendment" and
where "the way the proposal is worded, read together with the reservations tacked to it by the Convention
thru Section 3 of the questioned resolution, it is too much of a speculation to assume what exactly the
amendment would really amount lo in the end. All in all, as already pointed out in our discussion of
movants' first ground, if this kind of amendment is allowed, the Philippines will appear before the world to
be in the absurd position of being the only country with a constitution containing a provision so ephemeral
no one knows until when it will bet actually in force", there can be no proper submission.
In Tolentino a solitary amendment reducing the voting age to 18 years was struck down by this Court
which ruled that "in order that a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment to the Constitution may be
validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an intelligent appraisal of
the nature of the amendment per se as well as its relation to the other parts of the Constitution with which
it has to form a harmonious whole," and that there was no proper Submission wherein the people are in
the dark as to frame of reference they can base their judgment on
2. The now Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Makasiar with two other members 46 graphically pointed out in
their joint separate opinion that the solitary question "would seem to be uncomplicated and innocuous.
But it is one of life's verities that things which appear to be simple may turn out not to be so simple after
all".
47

They further expressed "essential agreement" with Mr. Justice Conrado V. Sanchez' separate opinion in
Gonzales "on the minimum requirements that must be met in order that there can be a proper submission
to the people of a proposed constitutional amendment" which reads thus:
... we take the view that the words 'submitted to the people for their ratification', if
construed in the light of the nature of the Constitution a fundamental charter that is
legislation direct from the people, an expression of their sovereign will - is that it can only
be amended by the people expressing themselves according to the procedure ordained
by the Constitution. Therefore, amendments must be fairly laid before the people for their
blessing or spurning. The people are not to be mere rubber stamps. They are not to vote
blindly. They must be afforded ample opportunity to mull over the original provisions,
compare them with the proposed amendments, and try to reach a conclusion as the
dictates of their conscience suggest, free from the incubus of extraneous or possibly
insidious influences. We believe the word submitted' can only mean that the government,
within its maximum capabilities, should strain every effort to inform every citizen of the
provisions to be amended, and the proposed amendments and the meaning, nature and
effects thereof. By this, we are not to be understood as saying that, if one citizen or 100
citizens or 1,000 citizens cannot be reached, then there is no submission within the
meaning of the word as intended by the framers of the Constitution. What the
Constitution in effect directs is that the government, in submitting an amendment for
ratification, should put every instrumentality or agency within its structural framework to
enlighten the people, educate them with respect to their act of ratification or rejection.
For, as we have earlier stated, one thing is submission and another is ratification. There
must be fair submission, intelligent. consent or rejection. If with all these safeguards the
people still approve the amendment no matter how prejudicial it is to them, then so be it.
For the people decree their own fate.
48

204

Justice Sanchez therein ended the passage with an apt citation that " ... " The great men who builded the
structure of our state in this respect had the mental vision of a good Constitution voiced by Judge Cooley,
who has said 'A good Constitution should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and. popular
caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not
to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot blood, but the sober second
thought, which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. xxx xxx xxx Changes in
government are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As Montaign says: All great mutations shake
and disorder state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil ;another evil may succeed and a worse'."
49

Justice Sanchez thus stated the rule that has been adopted by the Court in Tolentino that there is no
proper submission "if the people are not sufficiently affirmed of the amendments to be voted upon, to
conscientiously deliberate thereon, to express their will in a genuine manner. ... .."
50

3. From the complex and complicated proposed amendments set forth in the challenged decree and the
plethora of confused and confusing clarifications reported in the daily newspapers, it is manifest that there
is no proper submission of the proposed amendments. Nine (9) proposed constitutional amendments
were officially proposed and made known as per Presidential Decree No. 1033 dated, September 22,
1976 for submittal at the "referendum-plebiscite" called for this coming Saturday, October 16, 1976
wherein the 15-year and under 18-year- olds are enjoined to vote notwithstanding their lack of
qualification under Article VI of the Constitution. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino, an acknowledged
parliamentarian of the highest order, was reported by the newspapers last October 3 to have observed
that "there is no urgency in approving the proposed amendments to the Constitution and suggested that
the question regarding charter changes be modified instead of asking the people to vote on hurriedly
prepared amendments". He further pointed out that "apart from lacking the parliamentary style in the body
of the Constitution, they do not indicate what particular provisions are being repealed or amended".
52

As of this writing, October 11, 1976, the paper today reported his seven-page analysis questioning among
others the proposed granting of dual legislative powers to both the President and the Batasang
Pambansa and remarking that "This dual legislative authority can give rise to confusion and serious
constitutional questions".
53

Aside from the inadequacy of the limited time given for the people's consideration of the proposed
amendments, there can be no proper submission because the proposed amendments are not in proper
form and violate the cardinal rule of amendments of written constitutions that the specific provisions of the
Constitution being repealed or amended as well as how the specific provisions as amended would read,
should be clearly stated in careful and measured terms. There can be no proper submission because the
vagueness and ambiguity of the proposals do not sufficiently inform the people of the amendments for,
conscientious deliberation and intelligent consent or rejection.
4. While the press and the Solicitor General at the hearing have stated that the principal thrust of the
proposals is to substitute the interim National Assembly with an interim Batasang Pambansa, a serious
study thereof in detail would lead to the conclusion that the whole context of the 1973 Constitution proper
would be affected and grave amendments and modifications thereof -would apparently be made, among
others, as follows:
Under Amendment No. 1, the qualification age of members of the interim Batasang Pambansa is reduced
to 18 years;
Under Amendment No. 2, the treaty-concurring power of the Legislature is withheld from the interim
Batasang Pambansa;
Under Amendment No 3, not withstanding the convening of the interim Batasang Pambansa within 30
days from the election and selection of the members (for which there is no fixed date) the incumbent
President apparently becomes a regular President and Prime Minister (not ad interim);
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Under Amendment No. 4, the disqualifications imposed on members of the Cabinet in the Constitution
such as the prohibition against the holding of more than one office in the government including
government-owned or -controlled corporations would appear to be eliminated, if not prescribed by the
President;
Under Amendment No. 5, the President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law is
lifted;
Under Amendment No. 6, there is a duality of legislative authority given the President and the interim
Batasang Pambansa as well as the regular National Assembly, as pointed out by Senator Tolentino, with
the President continuing to exercise legislative powers in case of "grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof" (without definition of terms) or when said Assemblies "fail or are unable to act
adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action", thus radically
affecting provisions of the Constitution governing the said departments;
Under Amendment No. 7, the barangays and Sanggunians would apparently be constitutionalized,
although their functions, power and composition may be altered by law. Referendums (which are not
authorized in the present 1973 Constitution) would also be constitutionalized, giving rise to the possibility
fraught with grave consequences, as acknowledged at the hearing, that amendments to the Constitution
may thereafter be effected by referendum, rather than by the rigid and strict amending process provided
presently in Article XVI of the Constitution;
Under Amendment No. 8, there is a general statement in general that the unspecified provisions of the
Constitution "not inconsistent with any of these amendments" shall continue in full force and effect; and
Under Amendment No. 9. the incumbent President is authorized to proclaim the ratification of the
amendments by the majority of votes cast. It has likewise been stressed by the officials concerned that
the proposed amendments come in a package and may not be voted upon separately but on an "all or
nothing" basis.
5. Whether the people can normally express their will in a genuine manner and with due circumspection
on the proposed amendments amidst the constraints of martial law is yet another question. That a period
of free debate and discussion has to be declared of itself shows the limitations on free debate and
discussion. The facilities for free debate and discussion over the mass media, print and otherwise are
wanting. The President himself is reported to have observed the timidity of the media under martial law
and to have directed the press to air the views of the opposition.
54

Indeed, the voice of the studentry as reflected in the editorial of the Philippine Collegian issue of
September 23, 1976 comes as a welcome and refreshing model of conscientious deliberation, as our
youth analyzes the issues "which will affect generations yet to come" and urge the people to mull over the
pros and cons very carefully", as follows:
THE REFERENDUM ISSUES
On October 16, the people may be asked to decide on two important national issues - the
creation of a new legislative body and the lifting of martial law.
On the first issue, it is almost sure that the interim National Assembly will not be
convened, primarily because of its membership. Majority of the members of the defunct
Congress, who are mandated by the Constitution to become members of the interim
National Assembly, have gained so widespread a notoriety that the mere mention of
Congress conjures the image of a den of thieves who are out to fool the people most of
the time. Among the three branches of government, it was the most discredited. In fact,
upon the declaration of martial law, some people were heard to mutter that a 'regime that
has finally put an end to such congressional shenanigans could not be all that bad'.
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A substitute legislative body is contemplated to help the President in promulgating laws,
and perhaps minimize the issuance of ill-drafted decrees which necessitate constant
amendments. But care should be taken that this new legislative body would not become
a mere rubber stamp akin to those of other totalitarian countries. It should be given real
powers, otherwise we will just have another nebulous creation having the form but
lacking the substance. Already the President has expressed the desire that among the
powers he would like to have with regard to the proposed legislative body is that of
abolishing it in case 'there is a need to do so'. As to what would occasion such a need,
only the President himself can determine. This would afford the Chief Executive almost
total power over the legislature, for he could always offer the members thereof a carrot
and a stick.
On the matter of lifting martial law the people have expressed ambivalent attitudes. Some
of them, remembering the turmoil that prevailed before the declaration of martial law,
have expressed the fear that its lifting might precipitate the revival of the abuses of the
past, and provide an occasion for evil elements to resurface with their usual tricks. Others
say that it is about time martial law was lifted since the peace and order situation has
already stabilized and the economy seems to have been parked up.
The regime of martial law has been with us for four years now. No doubt, martial law has
initially secured some reforms for the country The people were quite willing to participate
in the new experiment, thrilled by the novelty of it all. After the euphoria, however, the
people seem to have gone back to the old ways, with the exception that some of our
freedoms were taken away, and an authoritarian regime established.
We must bear in mind that martial law was envisioned only to cope with an existing
national crisis, It was not meant to be availed of for a long period of time, otherwise it
would undermine our adherence to a democratic form of government. In the words of the
Constitution. martial law shall only be declared in times of 'rebellion, insurrection,.
invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it'. Since we no
longer suffer from internal disturbances of a gargantuan scale, it is about time we
seriously rethink the 'necessity' of prolonging the martial law regime. If we justify the
continuance of martial by economic or other reasons other than the foregoing
constitutional grounds, then our faith in the Constitution might be questioned. Even
without martial law,. the incumbent Chief Executive still holds vast powers under the
constitution. After all, the gains of the New Society can be secured without sacrificing the
freedom of our people. If the converse is true, then we might have to conclude that the
Filipinos deserve a dictatorial form of government. The referendum results will show
whether the people themselves have adopted this sad conclusion.
The response of the people to the foregoing issues will affect generations yet to come, so
they should mull over the pros and cons very carefully."
6. This opinion by written in the same spirit as the President's exhortations on the first anniversary of
proclamation of the 1973 Constitution that we "let the Constitution remain firm and stable" so that it may
"guide the people", and that we "remain steadfast on the rule of law and the Constitution" as he recalled
his rejection of the "exercise (of) power that can be Identified merely with a revolutionary government"
that makes its own law, thus:
. . . Whoever he may be and whatever position he may happen to have, whether in
government or outside government, it is absolutely necessary now that we look solemnly
and perceptively into the Constitution and try to discover for ourselves what our role is in
the successful implementation of that Constitution. With this thought, therefore, we can
agree on one thing and that is: Let all of us age, let all of us then pass away as a pace in
the development of our country. but let the Constitution remain firm and stable and let
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institutions grow in strength from day to day, from achievement to achievement, and so
long as that Constitution stands, whoever may the man in power be, whatever may his
purpose be, that Constitution will guide the people and no man, however, powerful he
may be, will dare to destroy and wreck the foundation of such a Constitution.
These are the reasons why I personally, having proclaimed martial law, having been
often induced to exercise power that can be Identified merely with a revolutionary
government, have remained steadfast or the rule of law and the Constitution.
54
*
IV. A final word on the Court's resolution of October 5, 1976 which in reply to the Comelec query allowed
by a vote of 7 to 3, judges of all courts, after office hours, "to accept invitations to act as resource
speakers under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 991, as amended, as well as to take sides in
discussions and debates on the referendum-plebiscite questions under Section 7 of the same Decree."
55

The writer with Mr. Justice Makasiar and Madame Justice Munoz Palma had dissented from the majority
resolution, with all due respect, on the ground that the non-participation of judges in such public
discussions and debates on the referendum-plebiscite questions would preserve the traditional non-
involvement of the judiciary in public discussions of controversial issues. This is essential for the
maintenance and enhancement of the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary. The questions of the
validity of the scheduled referendum- plebiscite and of whether there is proper submission of the
proposed amendments were precisely subjudice by virtue of the cases at bar.
The lifting of the traditional inhibition of judges from public discussion and debate might blemish the
image and independence of the judiciary. Aside from the fact that the fixing of a time limit for the
acceptance of their courtesy resignations to avoid an indefinite state of insecurity of their tenure in office
still spends litigants and their relatives and friends as well as a good sector of the public would be hesitant
to air views contrary to that of the.
Judge. Justices Makasiar and Munoz Palma who share these views have agreed that we make them of
record here, since we understand that the permission given in the resolution is nevertheless addressed to
the personal decision and conscience of each judge, and these views may he of some guidance to them.
BARREDO, J .,: concurring:
While I am in full agreement with the majority of my brethren that the herein petitions should be
dismissed, as in fact I vote for their dismissal, I deem it imperative that I should state separately the
considerations that have impelled me to do so.
Perhaps, it is best that I should start by trying to disabuse the minds of those who have doubts as to
whether or not I should have taken part in the consideration and resolution of these cases. Indeed, it
would not be befitting my position in this Highest Tribunal of the land for me to leave unmentioned the
circumstances which have given cause, I presume, for others to feel apprehensive that my participation in
these proceedings might detract from that degree of faith in the impartiality that the Court's judgment
herein should ordinarily command. In a way, it can be said, of course, that I am the one most responsible
for such a rather problematical situation, and it is precisely for this reason that I have decided to begin this
opinion with a discussion of why I have not inhibited myself, trusting most confidently that what I have to
say will be taken in the same spirit of good faith, sincerity and purity of purpose in which I am resolved to
offer the same.
Plain honesty dictates that I should make of record here the pertinent contents of the official report of the
Executive Committee of the Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian submitted to the Katipunan itself about the
proceedings held on August 14, 1976. It is stated in that public document that:
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THE ISSUE WITH REGARDS To THE CONVENING OF A LEGISLATIVE body came out
when the President express his desire to share his powers with other people.
Aware of this, a five-man Committee members of the Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
headed by Supreme Court Justice Antonio Barredo proposed on July 28, the establishment of
'Sangguniang Pambansa' or 'Batasang Pambansa' which would help the President in the performance of
his legislative functions. The proposed new body will take the place of the interim National Assembly
which is considered not practical to convene at this time considering the constitution of its membership.
Upon learning the proposal of Justice Barredo, the country's 42,000 barangay assemblies on August 1
suggested that the people be consulted on a proposal to create a new legislative body to replace the
interim assembly provided for by the Constitution. The suggestion of the barangay units was made
through their national association, Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay headed by Mrs. Nora Z.
Patines. She said that the people have shown in at least six instances including in the two past referenda
that they are against the convening of the interim National Assembly. She also said that since the people
had ruled out the calling of such assembly and that they have once proposed that the President create
instead the Sangguniang Pambansa or a legislative advisory body, then the proposal to create a new
legislative must necessarily be referred to the people.
The federation of Kabataang Barangay, also numbering 42,000 units like their elder counterparts in the
Katipunan ng mga Barangay also asserted their own right to be heard on whatever plans are afoot to
convene a new legislative body.
On August 6, a meeting of the national directorate of PKB was held to discuss matters pertaining to the
stand of the PKB with regards to the convening of a new legislative body. The stand of the PKB is to
create a legislative advisory council in place of the old assembly. Two days after, August 8, the
Kabataang Barangay held a symposium and made a stand which is the creation of a body with full
legislative powers.
A nationwide clamor for the holding of meeting in their respective localities to discuss more intellegently
the proposal to create a new legislative body was made by various urban and rural Sangguniang Bayans.
Numerous requests made by some members coming from 75 provincial and 61 city SB assemblies, were
forwarded to the Department of Local Government and Community Development (DLGCD).
On August 7, Local Government Secretary, Jose A. Rono granted the request by convening the 91
member National Executive Committee of the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian on August 14
which was held at Session Hall, Quezon City. Invited also to participate were 13 Regional Federation
Presidents each coming from the PKB and the PKKB
Actually, the extent of my active participation in the events and deliberations that have culminated in the
holding of the proposed referendum- plebiscite on October 16, 1976, which petitioners are here seeking
to enjoin, has been more substantial and meaningful than the above report imparts. Most importantly,
aside from being probably the first person to publicly articulate the need for the creation of an interim
legislative body to take the place of. the interim National Assembly provided for in the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, as suggested in the above report, I might say that I was the one most
vehement and persistent in publicly advocating and urging the authorities concerned to directly submit to
the people in a plebiscite whatever amendments of the Constitution might be considered necessary for
the establishment of such substitute interim legislature. In the aforementioned session of the Executive
Committee of the Katipunan, I discourse on the indispensability of a new interim legislative body as the
initial step towards the early lifting of martial law and on the fundamental considerations why in our
present situation a constitutional convention would be superfluous in amending the Constitution.
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Moreover, it is a matter of public knowledge that in a speech I delivered at the Coral Ballroom of the
Hilton Hotel in the evening of August 17, 1976, I denounced in no uncertain terms the plan to call a
constitutional convention. I reiterated the same views on September 7, 1976 at the initial conference
called by the Comelec in the course of the information and educational campaign it was enjoined to
conduct on the subject. And looking back at the subsequent developments up to September 22, 1976,
when the Batasang Bayan approved and the President signed the now impugned Presidential Decree No.
1033, it is but human for me to want to believe that to a certain extent my strong criticisms and resolute
stand against any other alternative procedure of amending the Constitution for the purpose intended had
borne fruit.
I must hasten to add at this point, however, that in a larger sense, the initiative for all I have done, was not
altogether mine alone. The truth of the matter is that throughout the four years of this martial law
government, it has always been my faith, as a result of casual and occasional exchanges of thought with
President Marcos, that when the appropriate time does come, the President would somehow make it
known that in his judgment, the situation has already so improved as to permit the implementation, if
gradual, of the constitutionally envisioned evolution of our government from its present state to a
parliamentary one. Naturally, this would inevitably involve the establishment of a legislative body to
replace the abortive interim National Assembly. I have kept tract of all the public and private
pronouncements of the President, and it was the result of my reading thereof that furnished the
immediate basis for my virtually precipitating, in one way or another, the materialization of the forthcoming
referendum-plebiscite. In other words, in the final analysis, it was the President's own attitude on the
matter that made it opportune for me to articulate my own feelings and Ideas as to how the nation can
move meaningfully towards normalization and to publicly raise the issues that have been ventilated by the
parties in the instant cases.
I would not be human, if I did not consider myself privileged in having been afforded by Divine Providence
the opportunity to contribute a modest share in the formulation of the steps that should lead ultimately to
the lifting of martial law in our country. Indeed, I am certain every true Filipino is anxiously looking forward
to that eventuality. And if for having voiced the sentiments of our people, where others would have
preferred to be comfortably silent, and if for having made public what every Filipino must have been
feeling in his heart all these years, I should be singled out as entertaining such preconceived opinions
regarding the issues before the Court in the cases at bar as to preclude me from taking part in their
disposition, I can only say that I do not believe there is any other Filipino in and out of the Court today
who is not equally situated as I am .
The matters that concern the Court in the instant petitions do not involve merely the individual interests of
any single person or group of persons. Besides, the stakes in these cases affect everyone commonly, not
individually. The current of history that has passed through the whole country in the wake of martial law
has swept all of us, sparing none, and the problem of national survival and of restoring democratic
institutions and Ideals is seeking solution in the minds of all of us. That I have preferred to discuss
publicly my own thoughts on the matter cannot mean that my colleagues in the Court have been
indifferent and apathetic about it, for they too are Filipinos. Articulated or not, all of us must have our own
preconceived Ideas and notions in respect to the situation that confronts the country. To be sure, our
votes and opinions in the- major political cases in the recent past should more or less indicate our
respective basic positions relevant to the issues now before Us. Certainly, contending counsels cannot be
entirely in the dark in this regard. I feel that it must have been precisely because of such awareness that
despite my known public participation in the discussion of the questions herein involved, none of the
parties have sought my inhibition or disqualification.
Actually, although it may be difficult for others to believe it, I have never allowed my preconceptions and
personal inclinations to affect the objectivity needed in the resolution of any judicial question before the
Court. I feel I have always been able to appreciate, fully consider and duly weigh arguments and points
raised by all counsels, even when they conflict with my previous views. I am never beyond being
convinced by good and substantial ratiocination. Nothing has delighted me more than to discover that
somebody else has thought of more weighty arguments refuting my own, regardless of what or whose
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interests are at stake. I would not have accepted my position in the Court had I felt I would not be able to
be above my personal prejudices. To my mind, it is not that a judge has preconceptions that counts, it is
his capacity and readiness to absorb contrary views that are indispensable for justice to prevail. That
suspicions of prejudgment may likely arise is unavoidable; but I have always maintained that whatever
improper factors might influence a judge will unavoidably always appear on the face of the decision. In
any event, is there better guarantee of justice when the preconceptions of a judge are concealed?
Withal, in point of law, I belong to the school of thought that regards members of the Supreme Court as
not covered by the general rules relative to disqualification and inhibition of judges in cases before them.
If I have in practice actually refrained from participating in some cases, it has not been because of any
legal ground founded on said rules, but for purely personal reasons, specially because, anyway, my vote
would not have altered the results therein.
It is my considered opinion that unlike in the cases of judges in the lower courts, the Constitution does not
envisage compulsory disqualification or inhibition in any case by any member of the Supreme Court. The
Charter establishes a Supreme Court "composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices", with
the particular qualifications therein set forth and to be appointed in the manner therein provided. Nowhere
in the Constitution is there any indication that the legislature may designate by law instances wherein any
of the justices should not or may not take part in the resolution of any case, much less who should take
his place. Members of the Supreme Court are definite constitutional officers; it is not within the power of
the lawmaking body to replace them even temporarily for any reason. To put it the other way, nobody who
has not been duly appointed as a member of the Supreme Court can sit in it at any time or for any
reason. The Judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court composed as the Constitution ordains - that
power cannot be exercised by a Supreme Court constituted otherwise. And so, when as in the instant
where, if any of the member of Court is to abstain from taking part, there would be no quorum - and no
court to render the decision - it is the includible duty of all the incumbent justices to participate in the
proceedings and to cast their votes, considering that for the reasons stated above, the provisions of
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act do not appear to conform with the concept of the office of Justice of the
Supreme Court contemplated in the Constitution.
The very nature of the office of Justice of the Supreme Court as the tribunal of last resort and bulwark of
the rights and liberties of all the people demands that only one of dependable and trustworthy probity
should occupy the same. Absolute integrity, mental and otherwise, must be by everyone who is appointed
thereto. The moral character of every member of the Court must be assumed to be such that in no case
whatsoever. regardless of the issues and the parties involved, may it be feared that anyone's life, liberty
or property, much less the national interests, would ever be in jeopardy of being unjustly and improperly
subjected to any kind of judicial sanction. In sum, every Justice of the Supreme Court is expected to be
capable of rising above himself in every case and of having full control of his emotions and prejudices,
such that with the legal training and experience he must of necessity be adequately equipped with, it
would be indubitable that his judgment cannot be but objectively impartial, Indeed, even the appointing
power, to whom the Justices owe their positions, should never hope to be unduly favored by any action of
the Supreme Court. All appointments to the Court are based on these considerations, hence the ordinary
rules on inhibition and disqualification do not have to be applied to its members.
With the preliminary matter of my individual circumstances out of the way, I shall now address myself to
the grave issues submitted for Our resolution.
- I -
In regard to the first issue as to whether the questions posed in the petitions herein are political or
justiciable, suffice it for me to reiterate the fundamental position I took in the Martial Law cases,
1
thus
As We enter the extremely delicate task of resolving the grave issues thus thrust upon
Us. We are immediately encountered by absolute verities to guide Us all the way. The
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first and most important of them is that the Constitution (Unless expressly stated
otherwise, all references to the Constitution in this discussion are to both the 1935 and
1973 charters, since, after all, the pertinent provisions are practically Identical in both is
the supreme law of the land. This means among other things that all the powers of the
government and of all its officials from the President down to the lowest emanate from it.
None of them may exercise any power unless it can be traced thereto either textually or
by natural and logical implication. "The second is that it is settled that the Judiciary
provisions of the Constitution point to the Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter of all
conflicts as to what the Constitution or any part thereof means. While the other
Departments may adopt their own construction thereof, when such construction is
challenged by the proper party in an appropriate case wherein a decision would be
impossible without determining the correct construction, the Supreme Court's word on the
matter controls.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
The fifth is that in the same manner that the Executive power conferred upon the
Executive by the Constitution is complete, total and unlimited, so also, the judicial power
vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior courts, is the very whole of that power,
without any limitation or qualification.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
From these incontrovertible postulates, it results, first of all, that the main question before
Us is not in reality one of jurisdiction, for there can be no conceivable controversy,
especially one involving a conflict as to the correct construction of the Constitution, that is
not contemplated to be within the judicial authority of the courts to hear and decide. The
judicial power of the courts being unlimited and unqualified, it extends over all situations
that call for the as certainment and protection of the rights of any party allegedly violated,
even when the alleged violator is the highest official of the land or the government itself. It
is, therefore, evidence that the Court's jurisdiction to take cognizance of and to decide the
instant petitions on their merits is beyond challenge.
In this connection, however, it must be borne in mind that in the form of government
envisaged by the framers of the Constitution and adopted by our people, the Court's
indisputable and plenary authority to decide does not necessarily impose upon it the duty
to interpose its fiat as the only means of settling the conflicting claims of the parties
before it. It is ingrained in the distribution of powers in the fundamental law that hand in
hand with the vesting of the judicial power upon the Court, the Constitution has coevally
conferred upon it the discretion to determine, in consideration of the constitutional
prerogatives granted to the other Departments, when to refrain from imposing judicial
solutions and instead defer to the judgment of the latter. It is in the very nature of
republican governments that certain matters are left in the residual power of the people
themselves to resolve, either directly at the polls or thru their elected representatives in
the political Departments of the government. And these reserved matters are easily
distinguishable by their very nature, when one studiously considers the basic functions
and responsibilities entrusted by the charter to each of the great Departments of the
government. To cite an obvious example, the protection, defense and preservation of the
state against internal or external aggression threatening its very existence is far from
being within the ambit of judicial responsibility. The distinct role then of the Supreme
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Court of being the final arbiter in the determination of constitutional controversies does
not have to be asserted in such contemplated situations, thereby to give way to the
ultimate prerogative of the people articulated thru suffrage or thru the acts of their political
representatives they have elected for the purpose.
Indeed, these fundamental considerations are the ones that lie at the base of what is known in American
constitutional law as the political question doctrine, which in that jurisdiction is unquestionably deemed to
be part and parcel of the rule of law, exactly like its apparently more attractive or popular opposite, judicial
activism, which is the fullest exertion of judicial power, upon the theory that unless the courts intervene
injustice might prevail. It has been invoked and applied by this Court in varied forms and mode of
projection in several momentous instances in the past, (Barcelona vs. Baker, 5 Phil. 87; Severino vs.
Governor-General, 16 Phil. 366; Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612; Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 85;
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Cabin vs. Francisco, 88 Phil. 654;
Montenegro vs. Castaneda, 91 Phil. 882, Santos vs. Yatco, 55 O.G. 8641 [Minute Resolution of Nov. 6,
19591 Osmena vs. Pendatun, Oct. 28, 1960.) and it is the main support of the stand of the Solicitor
General on the issue of jurisdiction in the cases at bar. It is also referred to as the doctrine of judicial self-
restraint or abstention. But as the nomenclatures themselves imply, activism and self- restraint are both
subjective attitudes, not inherent imperatives. The choice of alternatives in any particular eventuality is
naturally dictated by what in the Court's considered opinion is what the Constitution envisions should be
by in order to accomplish the objectives of government and of nationhood. And perhaps it may be added
here to avoid confusion of concepts, that We are not losing sight of the traditional approach based on the
doctrine of separation of powers. In truth, We perceive that even under such mode of rationalization, the
existence of power is secondary, respect for the acts of a co-ordinate, co-equal and independent
Department being the general rule, particularly when the issue is not encroachment of delimited areas of
functions but alleged abuse of a Department's own basic prerogatives. (59 SCRA, pp. 379-383.)
Applying the foregoing considerations to the cases at bar, I hold that the Court has jurisdiction to pass on
the merits of the various claims of petitioners. At the same time, however, I maintain that the basic nature
of the issues herein raised requires that the Court should exercise its constitutionally endowed
prerogative to refrain from exerting its judicial authority in the premises.
Stripped of incidental aspects, the constitutional problem that confronts Us stems from the absence of
any clear and definite express provision in the Charter applicable to the factual milieu herein involved.
The primary issue is, to whom, under the circumstances, does the authority to propose amendments to
the Constitution property belong? To say, in the light of Section 15 of Article XVII of the Charter, that that
faculty lies in the interim National Assembly is to beg the main question. Indeed, there could be no
occasion for doubt or debate, if it could ' only be assumed that the interim National Assembly envisaged
in Sections 1 and 2 of the same Article XVII may be convoked. But precisely, the fundamental issue We
are called upon to decide is whether or not it is still constitutionally possible to convene that body. And
relative to that question, the inquiry centers on whether or not the political developments since the
ratification of the Constitution indicate that the people have in effect enjoined the convening of the interim
National Assembly altogether. On this score, it is my assessment that the results of the referenda of
January 10-15, 1973, July 27-28, 1973 and February 27, 1975 clearly show that the great majority of our
people, for reasons plainly obvious to anyone who would consider the composition of that Assembly, what
with its more than 400 members automatically voted into it by the Constitutional Convention together with
its own members, are against its being convoked at all.
Whether or not such a manifest determination of the sentiments of the people should be given effect
without a formal amendment of the Constitution is something that constitutional scholars may endlessly
debate on. What cannot be disputed, however, is that the government and the nation have acquiesced to,
it and have actually operated on the basis thereof. Proclamation 1103 which, on the predicate that the
overwhelming majority of the people desire that the interim Assembly be not convened, has ordained the
suspension of its convocation, has not been assailed either judicially or otherwise since the date of its
promulgation on January 17, 1973.
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In these premises, it is consequently the task of the Court to determine what, under these circumstances,
is the constitutional relevance of the interim National Assembly to any proposal to amend the Constitution
at this time. It is my considered opinion that in resolving that question, the Court must have to grapple
with the problem of what to do with the will of the people, which although manifested in a manner not
explicitly provided for in the Constitution, was nevertheless official, and reliable, and what is more
important clear and unmistakable, despite the known existence of well-meaning, if insufficiently
substantial dissent. Such being the situation, I hold that it is not proper for the Court to interpose its
judicial authority against the evident decision of the people and should leave it to the political department
of the government to devise the ways and means of resolving the resulting problem of how to amend the
Constitution, so long as in choosing the same, the ultimate constituent power is left to be exercised by the
people themselves in a well- ordered plebiscite as required by the fundamental law.
- 2 -
Assuming We have to inquire into the merits of the issue relative to the constitutional authority behind the
projected amendment of the Charter in the manner provided in Presidential Decree 1033, I hold that in
the peculiar situation in which the government is today, it is not incompatible with the Constitution for the
President to propose the subject amendments for ratification by the people in a formal plebiscite under
the supervision of the Commission on Elections. On the contrary, in the absence of any express
prohibition in the letter of the Charter, the Presidential Decree in question is entirely consistent with the
spirit and the principles underlying the Constitution. The correctness of this conclusion should become
even more patent, when one considers the political developments that the people have brought about
since the ratification of the Constitution on January 17,1973.
I consider it apropos at this juncture to repeat my own words in a speech I delivered on the occasion of
the celebration of Law Day on September 18, 1975 before the members of the Philippine Constitution
Association and their guests:
To fully comprehend the constitutional situation in the Philippines today, one has to bear
in mind that, as I have mentioned earlier, the martial law proclaimed under the 1935
Constitution overtook the drafting of the new charter by the Constitutional Convention of
1971. It was inevitable, therefore, that the delegates had to take into account not only the
developments under it but, most of all, its declared objectives and what the President, as
its administrator, was doing to achieve them. In this connection, it is worthy of mention
that an attempt to adjourn the convention was roundly voted down to signify the
determination of the delegates to finish earliest their work, thereby to accomplish the
mission entrusted to them by the people to introduce meaningful reforms in our
government and society. Indeed, the constituent labors gained rapid tempo, but in the
process, the delegates were to realize that the reforms they were formulating could be
best implemented if the martial law powers of the President were to be allowed to subsist
even after the ratification of the Constitution they were approving. This denouement was
unusual. Ordinarily, a constitution born out of a crisis is supposed to provide all the
needed cures and can, therefore, be immediately in full force and effect after ratification.
Not so, with our 1973 Constitution, Yes, according to the Supreme Court, 'there is no
more judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect', but in
truth, it is not yet so in full. Let me explain.
To begin with, in analyzing the new Constitution, we must be careful to distinguish between the body or
main part thereof and its transitory provisions. It is imperative to do so because the transitory provisions of
our Constitution are extraordinary in the sense that obviously they have been designed to provide not
only for the transition of our government from the presidential form under the past charter to a
parliamentary one as envisaged in the new fundamental law, but also to institutionalize, according to the
President, the reforms introduced thru the exercise of his martial law powers. Stated differently, the
transitory provisions, as it has turned out, has in effect established a transition government, not, I am
sure, perceived by many. It is a government that is neither presidential nor parliamentary. It is headed, of
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course, by President Marcos who not on retains all his powers under the 1935 Constitution but enjoys as
well those of the President and the Prime Minister under the new Constitution. Most importantly, he can
and does legislate alone. But to be more accurate, I should say that he legislates alone in spite of the
existence of the interim National Assembly unequivocally ordained by the Constitution, for the simple
reason that he has suspended the convening of said assembly by issuing Proclamation No. 1103
purportedly 'in deference to the sovereign will of the Filipino people' expressed in the January 10-15, 1973
referendum.
Thus, we have here the unique case of a qualified ratification. The whole Constitution was submitted for
approval or disapproval of the people, and after the votes were counted and the affirmative majority
known, we were told that the resulting ratification was subject to the condition that the interim National
Assembly evidently established in the Constitution as the distinctive and indispensable element of a
parliamentary form of government should nevertheless be not convened and that no elections should be
held for about seven years, with the consequence that we have now a parliamentary government without
a parliament and a republic without any regular election of its officials. And as you can see, this
phenomenon came into being not by virtue of the Constitution but of the direct mandate of the sovereign
people expressed in a referendum. In other words, in an unprecedented extra-constitutional way, we have
established, wittingly or unwittingly, a direct democracy through the Citizens Assemblies created by
Presidential Decree No. 86, which later on have been transformed into barangays, a system of
government proclaimed by the President as 'a real achievement in participatory democracy.' What I am
trying to say, my friends, is that as I perceive it, what is now known as constitutional authoritarianism
means, in the final analysis, that the fundamental source of authority of our existing government may not
be necessarily found within the four corners of the Constitution but rather in the results of periodic
referendums conducted by the Commission on Elections in a manner well known to all of us This, as I
see it, is perhaps what the President means by saying that under the new Constitution he has extra-
ordinary powers independently of martial law - powers sanctioned directly by the people which may not
even be read in the language of the Constitution. in brief, when we talk of the rule of law nowadays, our
frame of reference should not necessarily be the Constitution but the outcome of referendums called from
time to time by the President. The sooner we imbibe this vital concept the more intelligent will our
perspective be in giving our support and loyalty to the existing government. What is more, the clearer will
it be that except for the fact that all the powers of government are being exercised by the President, we -
do not in reality have a dictatorship but an experimental type of direct democracy."
In the foregoing disquisition, I purposely made no mention of the referendum of February 27, 1975. It is
important to note, relative to the main issue now before Us, that it was originally planned to ask the
people in that referendum whether or not they would like the interim National Assembly to convene, but
the Comelec to whom the task of preparing the questions was assigned was prevailed upon not to include
any -such question anymore, precisely because it was the prevalent view even among the delegates to
the Convention as well as the members of the old Congress concerned that that matter had already been
finally resolved in the previous referenda of January and July 1973 in the sense that. the Assembly
should not be convened comparable to res adjudicata.
It is my position that as a result of the political developments since January 17, 1973 the transitory
provisions envisioning the convening of the interim National Assembly have been rendered legally
inoperative. There is no doubt in my mind that for the President to convoke the interim National Assembly
as such would be to disregard the will of the people - something no head of a democratic republican state
like ours should do. And I find it simply logical that the reasons that motivated the people to enjoin the
convening of the Assembly - the unusually large and unmanageable number of its members and the
controversial morality of its automatic composition consisting of all the incumbent elective national
executive and legislative officials under the Old Constitution who would agree to join it and the delegates
themselves to the Convention who had voted in favor of the Transitory Provisions - apply not only to the
Assembly as an ordinary legislature but perhaps more to its being a constituent body. And to be more
realistic, it is but natural to conclude that since the people are against politicians in the old order having
anything to do with the formulation of national policies, there must be more reasons for them to frown on
said politicians taking part in amendment of the fundamental law, specially because the particular
215

amendment herein involved calls for the abolition of the interim National Assembly to which they belong
and its substitution by the Batasang Pambansa.
It is argued that in law, the qualified or conditional ratification of a constitution is not contemplated. I
disagree. It is inconsistent with the plenary power of the people to give or withhold their assent to a
proposed Constitution to maintain that they can do so only wholly. I cannot imagine any sound principle
that can be invoked to support the theory that the proposing authority can limit the power of ratification of
the people. As long as there are reliable means by which only partial approval can be manifested, no
cogent reason exists why the sovereign people may not do so. True it is that no proposed Constitution
can be perfect and it may therefore be taken with the good and the bad in it, but when there are feasible
ways by which it can be determined which portions of it, the people disapprove. it would be stretching
technicality beyond its purported office to render the final authority - the people impotent to act according
to what they deem best suitable to their interests.
In any event, I feel it would be of no consequence to debate at length regarding the legal feasibility of
qualified ratification. Proclamation 1103 categorically declares that:
WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy six thousand five hundred sixty-one
(14,976.561) members of all the Barangays voted for the adoption of the proposed
Constitution, as against seven hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine
(743,869) who voted for its rejection; but a majority of those who approved the new
Constitution conditioned their votes on the demand that the interim National Assembly
provided in its Transitory Provisions should not be convened.
and in consequence, the President has acted accordingly by not convening the Assembly. The above
factual premises of Proclamation 1103 is not disputed by petitioners. Actually, it is binding on the Court,
the same being a political act of a coordinate department of the government not properly assailed as
arbitrary or whimsical. At this point, it must be emphasized in relation to the contention that a referendum
is only consultative, that Proclamation 1103, taken together with Proclamation 1102 which proclaimed the
ratification of the Constitution, must be accorded the same legal significance as the latter proclamation,
as indeed it is part and parcel if the Act of ratification of the Constitution, hence not only persuasive but
mandatory. In the face of the incontrovertible fact that the sovereign people have voted against the
convening of the interim National Assembly, and faced with the problem of amending the Constitution in
order precisely to implement the people's rejection of that Assembly, the problem of constitutional
dimension that confronts Us, is how can any such amendment be proposed for ratification by the people?
To start with, it may not be supposed that just because the office or body designed by the constitutional
convention to perform the constituent function of formulating proposed amendments has been rendered
inoperative by the people themselves, the people have thereby foreclosed the possibility of amending the
Constitution no matter how desirable or necessary this might be. In this connection, I submit that by the
very nature of the office of the Presidency in the prevailing scheme of government we have - it being the
only political department of the government in existence - it is consistent with basic principles of
constitutionalism to acknowledge the President's authority to perform the constituent function, there being
no other entity or body lodged with the prerogative to exercise such function.
There is another consideration that leads to the same conclusion. It is conceded by petitioners that with
the non-convening of the interim Assembly, the legislative authority has perforce fallen into the hands of
the President, if only to avoid a complete paralysis of law-making and resulting anarchy and chaos. It is
likewise conceded that the provisions of Section 3 (2) of Article XVII invest the President with legislative
power for the duration of the transition period. From these premises, it is safe to conclude that in effect
the President has been substituted by the people themselves in place of the interim Assembly. Such
being the case, the President should be deemed as having been granted also the cognate prerogative of
proposing amendments to the Constitution. In other words, the force of necessity and the cognate nature
of the act justify that the department exercising the legislative faculty be the one to likewise perform the
constituent function that was attached to the body rendered impotent by the people's mandate.
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Incidentally, I reject most vehemently the proposition that the President may propose amendments to the
Constitution in the exercise of his martial law powers. Under any standards, such a suggestion cannot be
reconciled with the Ideal that a Constitution is the free act of the people.
It was suggested during the oral, argument that instead of extending his legislative powers by proposing
the amendment to create a new legislative body, the President should issue a decree providing for the
necessary apportionment of the seats in the Regular National Assembly and call for an election of the
members thereof and thus effect the immediate normalization of the parliamentary government envisaged
in the Constitution. While indeed procedurally feasible, the suggestion overlooks the imperative need
recognized by the constitutional convention as may be inferred from the obvious purpose of the transitory
provisions, for a period of preparation and acquaintance by all concerned with the unfamiliar distinctive
features and practices of the parliamentary system. Accustomed as we are to the presidential system, the
Convention has seen to it that there should be an interim parliament under the present leadership, which
will take the corresponding measures to effectuate the efficient and smooth transition from the present
system to the new one. I do not believe this pattern set by the convention should be abandoned.
The alternative of calling a constitutional convention has also been mentioned. But, in the first place,
when it is considered that whereas, under Section 1 (1) and (2) of Article XVI, the regular National
Assembly may call a Constitutional Convention or submit such a call for approval of the people, Section
15 of Article XVII, in reference to interim National Assembly, does not grant said body the prerogative of
calling a convention, one can readily appreciate that the spirit of the Constitution does not countenance or
favor the calling of a convention during the transition, if only because such a procedure would be time
consuming, cumbersome and expensive. And when it is further noted that the requirement as to the
number of votes needed for a proposal is only a majority, whereas it is three-fourths in respect to regular
Assembly, and, relating this point to the provision of Section 2 of Article XVI to the effect that all
ratification plebiscites must be held "not later than three months after the approval" of the proposed
amendment by the proposing authority, the adoption of the most simple manner of amending the charter,
as that provided for in the assailed Presidential Decree 1033 suggests itself as the one most in accord
with the intent of the fundamental law.
There is nothing strange in adopting steps not directly based on the letter of the Constitution for the
purpose of amending or changing the same. To cite but one important precedent, as explained by Mr.
Justice Makasiar in his concurring opinion in Javellana 2, the present Constitution of the United States
was neither proposed nor ratified in the manner ordained by the original charter of that country, the
Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union.
In brief. if the convening and operation of the interim National Assembly has been effectuated through a
referendum-plebiscite in January, 1973, and ratified expressly and impliedly in two subsequent referenda,
those of July, 1973 and February, 1975, why may not a duly held plebiscite suffice for the purpose of
creating a substitute for that Assembly? It should be borne in mind that after all, as indicated in the
whereas of the impugned Presidential Decree, actually, the proposed amendments were initiated by the
barangays and sanggunian members. In other words, in submitting the amendments for ratification, the
President is merely acting as the conduit thru whom a substantial portion of the people, represented in
the Katipunan ng Mga Sanggunian, Barangay at Kabataang Barangay, seek the approval of the people
as a whole of the amendments in question. If all these mean that the sovereign people have arrogated
unto themselves the functions relative to the amendment to the Constitution, I would regard myself as
totally devoid of legal standing to question it, having in mind that the most fundamental tenet on which our
whole political structure rests is that "sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them."
In the light of the foregoing considerations, I hold that Presidential Decree No. 1033 does not infringe the
Constitution, if only because the specific provision it is supposed to infringe does not exist in legal
contemplation since it was coevally made inoperative when the people ratified the Constitution on
January 17, 1973. I am fully convinced that there is nothing in the procedure of amendment contained in
said decree that is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of constitutionalism. On the contrary, I find
217

that the Decree, in issue conforms admirably with the underlying tenet of our government - the
sovereignty and plenary power of the people.
On the issue of whether or not October 16, 1976 is too proximate to enable the people to sufficiently
comprehend the issues and intelligently vote in the referendum and plebiscite set by Presidential Decree
1033, all I can say is that while perhaps my other colleagues are right in holding that the period given to
the people is adequate, I would leave it to the President to consider whether or not it would be wiser to
extend the same. Just to avoid adverse comments later I wish the President orders a postponement. But
whether such postponement is ordered or not, date of the referendum- plebiscite anywhere from October
16, 1976 to any other later date, would be of no vital import.
In conclusion, I vote to dismiss all the three petitions before Us.
MAKASIAR, J ., concurring and dissenting:
Since the validity or effectivity of the proposed amendments is to be decided ultimately by the people in
their sovereign capacity, the question is political as the term is defined in Tanada, et al. vs. Cuenco, et al.
(103 Phil. 1051), which is a bar to any judicial inquiry, for the reasons stated in Our opinion in Javellana,
et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al. (L-36142); Tan, et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al. (L,36164);
Roxas, et al. vs Executive Secretary, et al. (L-36165); Monteclaro, etc., et al. vs' Executive Secretary, et
al. (@36236); and Ditag et al. vs. Executive Secretary, et al. (L-W283, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30,
204-283). The procedure for amendment is not important Ratification by the people is all that is
indispensable to validate an amendment. Once ratified, the method of making the proposal and the period
for submission become relevant.
The contrary view negates the very essence of a republican democracy - that the people are sovereign -
and renders meaningless the emphatic declaration in the very first provision of Article II of the 1973
Constitution that the Philippines is a republican state, sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them. It is axiomatic that sovereignty is illimitable The
representatives cannot dictate to the sovereign people. They may guide them; but they cannot supplant
their judgment, Such an opposite view likewise distrusts the wisdom of the people as much as it despises
their intelligence. It evinces a presumptuous pretension to intellectual superiority. There are thousands
upon thousands among the citizenry, who are not in the public service, who are more learned and better
skilled than many of their elected representatives.
Moreover, WE already ruled in Aquino, et al. vs- Comelec, et al. (L 40004, Jan. 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275,
298-302) that the President as enforcer or administrator of martial rule during the period of martial law
can legislate; and that he has the discretion as to when the convene the interim National Assembly
depending on prevailing conditions of peace and order. In view of the fact that the interim National
Assembly has not been convoked in obedience to the desire of the people clearly expressed in the 1973
referenda, the President therefore remains the lone law-making authority while martial law subsists.
Consequently, he can also exercise the power of the interim National Assembly to propose amendments
to the New Constitution (Sec. 15,,Art. XVII If, as conceded by petitioner Vicente Guzman (L-44684),
former delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention which drafted the 1973 Constitution. the President,
during the period of martial law, can call a constitutional convention for the purpose, admittedly a
constituent power, it stands to reason that the President can likewise legally propose amendments to the
fundamental law.
ANTONIO, J ., concurring:
I
At the threshold, it is necessary to clarify what is a "political question". It must be noted that this device
has been utilized by the judiciary "to avoid determining questions it is ill equipped to determine or that
218

could be settled in any event only with the effective support of the political branches."
1
According to
Weston, judges, whether "personal representatives of a truly sovereign king, or taking their seats as the
creatures of a largely popular sovereignty speaking through a written constitution, derive their power by a
delegation, which clearly or obscurely as the case may be, deliminates and delimits their delegated
jurisdiction.* * * Judicial questions * * * are those which the sovereign has set to be decided in the courts.
Political questions, similarly, are those which the sovereign has entrusted to the so-called political
departments of government or has reserved to be settled by its own extra-government or has reserved to
be settled by its own extra-governmental action."
2
Reflecting a similar concept, this Court has defined a
"political question" as a "matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity or
that has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government,
with discretionary power to act."
3
In other words, it refers to those questions which, under the
Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government.
4

In determining whether an issue falls within the political question category, the absence of satisfactory
creterion for a judicial determination or the appropriateness of attributing finality to the action of the
political departments of government is a dominant consideration. This was explained by Justice Brennan
in Baker v. Carr,
5
thus :
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional lack of judicially discoverrable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question. . . .
To decide whether a matter has in a measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of
government or retained be the people to be decided by them in their sovereign capacity, or whether that
branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is indeed a delicate exercise in constitutional
interpretation.
In Coleman v. Miller,
6
the United States Supreme Court held that the efficacy of the ratification by state
legislatures of a constitutional amendment is a political question. On the question of whether the State
Legislature could constitutionally relative an amendment, after the same had been previously rejected by
it, it was held that the ultimate authority over the question was in Congress in the exercise of its control
over the promulgation of the adoption of the amendment. And in connection with the second question of
whether the amendment has lost its, vitality through the lapse of time, the Court held that the question
was likewise political, involving "as it does ... an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions,
political, social and economic, which can hardly be said to be within the appropriate range of evidence
receivable in a court of justice and as to which it would be an extravagant extension of juridical authority
to assert judicial notice as the basis of deciding a controversy with respect to the validity of an
amendment actually ratified. On the other hand, these conditions are appropriate for the consideration of
the political departments of the Government. The questions they involve are essentially political and not
justiciable." '
In their concurring opinions, Justices Black, Roberts, Frankfurter and Douglas stressed that:
The Constitution grants Congress exclusive power to control submission off constitutional
amendments. Final determination by Congress their ratification by three-fourths of the
States has taken place 'is conclusive upon the courts.' In the exercise of that power,
Congress, of course, is governed by the Constitution. However, A whether submission,
intervening procedure for Congressional determination of ratification conforms to the
commands of the Constitution, call for decisions by apolitical department of questions of
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a t@ which this Court has frequently designated 'political.' And decision of a 'political
question' by the political department' to which the Constitution has committed it
'conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens and subjects of ...
government. Proclamation under authority of Congress that an amendment has been
ratified will carry with it a solemn assurance by the Congress that ratification has taken
place as the Constitution commands. Upon this assurance a proclaimed amendment
must be accepted as a part of the Constitution, learning to the judiciary its traditional
authority of interpretation. To the extent that the Court's opinion in the present case even
by implieding assumes a power to make judicial interpretation of the exclusive
constitutional authority of Congress over submission and by ratification of amendments,
we are unable to agree.
Relying on this doctrine enunciated in Coleman v. Miller supra this Court, in Mabanag v. Lopez
Vitol,
7
speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason, ruled that the process of constitutional amendment,
involving proposal and ratification, is a political question. In the Mabang case, the petitioners sought to
prevent the enforcement of a resolution of Congress proposing the "Parity Amendment" to the Philippine
Constitution on the ground that it had not been approved by the three-fourths vote of all the members of
each house as required be Article XV of the 1935 Constitution. It was claimed that three (3) Senators and
eight (8) members of the House of Representatives had been suspended and that their membership was
not considered in the determination of the three- fourths %- ore In dismissing the petition on the ground
that the question of the validity of the proposal was political, the Court stated:
"If ratification of an amendment is a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has to be a
political question. The question to steps complement each other in a scheme intended to achieve a single
objective. It is to be noted that amendatory process as provided in Section I of Article XV of the Philippine
Constitution 'consists of (only) two distinct parts: proposal and ratification.' There is no logic in attaching
political character to one and withholding that character from the other. Proposal to amend the
Constitution is a highly political function performed by the Congress in its sovereign legislative capacity
and committed to its charge by the Constitution itself. ..." (At pages 4-5, Italics supplied.)
It is true that in Gonzales v. Comelec,
8
this Court held that "the issue whether or not a Resolution of
Congress, acting as a constituent assembly - violates the Constitution is essentially justiciable, not
political, and hence, subject to judicial review." What was involved in Gonzales, however, was not a
proposed What was involved in Gonzales, however, was not a proposed amendment to the Constitution
but an act of Congress,
9
submitting proposed amendments to the Constitution. Similarly, in Tolentino v.
Commission an Elections, 10 what was involved was not the validity of the proposal to lower the voting
age but rather that of the resolution of the Constitutional Convention submitting the proposal for
ratification. The question was whether piecemeal amendments to the Constitution could submitted to the
people for approval or rejection.
II
Here, the point has been stressed that the President is acting as agent for and in behalf of the people in
proposing the amendment. there can be no question that in the referendums of January, 1973 and in the
subsequent referendums the people had clearly and categorically rejected the calling of the interim
National Assembly. As stated in the main opinion, the Lupang Tagapagpaganap of the Katipunan ng mga
Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, the
Kabataang Barangay organizations and the various sectoral groups had proposed the replacement of the
interim National Assembly. These barangays and the Sanggunian assemblies are effective
instrumentalities through which the desires of the people are articulated and expressed. The Batasang
Bayan (Legislative Council), composed of nineteen (19) cabinet members and nine (9) officials with
cabinet rank, and ninety-one (91) members of the Lupang Tagapagpaganap (Executive Committee) of
the Katipunan ng mga Sangguniang Bayani voted in their special session to submit directly to the people
in a plebiscite on October 16, 1976 the afore-mentioned constitutional amendments. Through the
Pambansang Katipunan by Barangay and the Pampurok ng Katipunan Sangguniang Bayan, the people
220

have expressed their desire not only to abolish the interim National Assembly, but to replace it with a
more representative body acceptable to them in order to effect the desirable constitutional changes
necessary to hasten the political evolution of the government towards the parliamentary system, while at
the same time ensuring that the gains of the New Society, which are vital to the welfare of the people,
shall be safeguarded. The proposed constitutional amendments, therefore, represent a consensus of the
people.
It would be futile to insist that the intemi National Assembly should have been convened to propose those
amendments pursuant to Section 15 of Article XVII of the Constitution. This Court, in the case of Aquino
v. Commission or Elections,
11
took judicial notice of the fact that in the referendum of January, 1973, a
majority of those who approved the new Constitution conditioned their votes on the demand that the
interim National Assembly provided in the Transitory Provisions should not be and the President "in
deference to the sovereign will of the Filipino people" declared that the convening of said body shall be
suspended.
12
As this Court observed in the Aquino case:
His decision to defer the initial convocation of the byiitttit National Assembly was
supported by the sovereign people at the by referendum in January, 1973 when the
people voted to postpone the convening of the interim National Assembly until after at
least seven (7) years from the approval of the new Constitution. And the reason why the
same question was eliminated from the questions to be submitted at the referendum on
February 27, 1975, is that even some members of the Congress and delegates of the
Constitutional Convention, who are already byjso ofitto members of the intetini National
Assembly are against such inclusion; because the issue was already bycciled in the
January, 1973 referendum by the sovereign people indicating thereby their
disenchantment with any Assembly as the former Congress failed to institutionalize the
reforms they demanded and wasted public funds through endless debates without
relieving the suffering of the general mass of citizenry (p. 302.) The action of the
President in suspending the convening of the interim National Assembly has met the
overwhelming approval of the people in subsequent referenda.
Since it was the action by the people that gave binding force and effect to the new Constitution, then it
must be accepted as a necessary consequence that their objection against the immediate convening of
the interim National Assembly must be respected as a positive mandate of the sovereign.
In the Philippines, which is a unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them."13 The term "People" as sovereign is comprehensive in its context. The people, as
sovereign creator of all political reality, is not merely the enfranchised citizens but the political unity of the
people. 14 It connotes, therefore, a people which exists not only in the urgent present but in the
continuum of history. The assumption that the opinion of The People as voters can be treated as the
expression of the interests of the People as a historic community was, to the distinguished American
journalist and public philosopher, Walter Lipunan, unwarranted.
Because of the discrepancy between The People as Voters and the People as the
corporate nation, the voters have no title to consider themselves the proprietors of the
commonwealth and to claim that their interests are Identical to the public interest. A
prevailing plurality of the voters are not The People. The claim that they are is a bogus
title invoked to justify the usurpation of the executive power by representative assemblies
and the intimidation of public men by demagogue politicians. In fact demagoguery can be
described as the sleight of hand by which a faction of The People as voters are invested
with the authority of The People. That is why so many crimes are committed in the
People's name
15

In Gonzales v. Comelec, supra, the Court clearly emphasized that the power to propose amendments or
to amend the Constitution is part of the inherent power of the people as the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state. While Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution, it acts pursuant to
221

authority granted to it by the people through the Constitution. Both the power to propose and the authority
to approve, therefore, inhere in the people as the bearer of the Constitution making power.
Absent an interim National Assembly upon whom the people, through the Constitution, have delegated
the authority to exercise constituent powers, it follows from necessity that either the people should
exercise that power themselves or through any other instrumentality they may choose. For Law, like
Nature, abhors a vacuum (natural vacuum abhorret).
The question then is whether the President has authority to act for the people in submitting such
proposals for ratification at the plebiscite of October 16. The political character of the question is,
therefore, particularly manifest, considering that ultimately it is the people who will decide whether the
President has such authority. It certainly involves a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their
sovereign capacity, hence, it is essentially political, not judicial.
While it is true that the constituent power is not to be confuse with legislative power in general because
the prerogative to propose amendments is not embraced within the context of ordinary lawmaking, it must
be noted that the proposals to be submitted for ratification in the forthcoming referendum are, in the final
analysis, actually not of the President but directly of the people themselves, speaking through their
authorized instrumentalities.
As the Chief Justice aptly stated in his concurring opinion in this case:
... The President merely formalized the said proposals in Presidential Decree No. 1033. It
being conceded in all quarters that sovereignty resides in the people and it having been
demonstrated that their constituent power to amend the Constitution has not been
delegated by them to any instrumentality of the Government during the present stage of
the transition period of our political development, the conclusion is ineluctable that their
exertion of that residuary power cannot be vulnerable to any constitutional challenge as
beingultravires. Accordingly, without venturing to rule on whether or not the President is
vested with constituent power - as it does not appear necessary to do so in the premises
- the proposals here challenged, being acts of the sovereign people no less, cannot be
said to be afflicted with unconstitutionality. A fortiori, the concomitant authority to call a
plebiscite and to appropriate funds therefor is even less vulnerable not only because the
President, in exercising said authority, has acted as a mere ofiffet byf of the people who
made the proposals, but likewise because the said authority is legislative in nature rather
than constituent.
This is but a recognition that the People of the Philippines have the inherent, sole and
exclusive right of regulating their own government, and of altering or abolishing their
Constitution whenever it may be necessary to their safety or happiness. There appears to
be no justification, under the existing, circumstances, for a Court to create by implication
a limitation on - the sovereign power of the people. As has been clearly explained in a
previous case:
There is nothing in the nature of the submission which should cause the free exercise of
it to be obstructed, or that could render it dangerous to the stability of the government;
because the measure derives all its vital force from the action of the people at the ballot
box, and there can never be danger in submitting in an established form to a free people,
the proposition whether they will change their fundamental law The means provided for
the exercise of their Sovereign right of changing their constitution should receive such a
construction as not to trammel the exercise of the right. Difficulties and embarrassments
in its exercise are in derogation of the right of free government, which is inherent in the
people; and the best security against tumult and revolution is the free and unobstructed
222

privilege to the people of the State to change their constitution in the mode prescribed by
the instrument.
III
The paramount consideration that impelled Us to arrive at the foregoing opinion is the necessity of
ensuring popular control over the constituent power. "If the people are to control the constituent power -
the power to make and change the fundamental law of the State," observed Wheeler," "the process of
Constitutional change must not be based too heavily upon existing agencies of government." Indeed, the
basic premise of republicanism is that the ordinary citizen, the common man. can be trusted to determine
his political destiny. Therefore, it is time that the people should be accorded the fullest opportunity to
decide the laws that shall provide for their governance. For in the ultimate analysis, the success of the
national endeavor shall depend on the vision, discipline and I by ininess of the moqqqtai will of every
Filipino.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, We vote to dismiss the petitions.
Aquino, J., concur.

MUNOZ PALMA, J ., dissenting:
I concur fully with the remarkably frank (so characteristic of him) dissenting opinion of my distinguished
colleague, Justice Claudio Teehankee. If I am writing this brief statement it is only to unburden myself of
some thoughts which trouble my mind and leave my conscience with no rest nor peace.
Generally, one who dissents from a majority view of the Court takes a lonely and at times precarious
road, the burden byeing lightened only by the thought that in this grave task of administering justice, when
matters of conscience are at issue, one must be prepared to espouse and embrace a rightful cause
however unpopular it may be.
1. That sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them is a
fundamental, basic principle of government which cannot be disputed, but when the people have opted to
govern themselves under the mantle of a written Constitution, each and every citizen, from the highest to
the lowliest, has the sacred duty to respect and obey the Character they have so ordained.
By the Constitution which they establish, they not only tie up he hands of their official
agencies, but their own hands as well; and neither the officers of the state, nor the whole
people as an aggregate body, are at liberty to take action in opposition to this
fundamental law. (Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 7th Ed. p. 56, Italics Our).
The afore-quoted passage from the eminent jurist and author Judge Cooley although based on
declarations of law of more than a century ago, lays down a principle which to my mind is one of the
enduring cornerstones of the Rule of Law. it is a principle with which I have been familiar as a student of
law under the tutelage of revered Professors, Dr. Vicente G. Sinco and Justice Jose P. Laurel, and which
I pray will prevail at all times to ensure the existence of a free, stable, and civilized society.
The Filipino people,. wanting to ensure to themselves a democratic republican form of government, have
promulgated a Constitution whereby the power to govern themselves has been entrusted to and
distributed among three branches of government; they have also mandated in clear and unmistakable
terms the method by which provisions in their fundamental Charter may be amended or revised. Having
done so, the people are bound by these constitutional limitations. For while there is no surrender or
223

abdication of the people's ultimate authority to amend, revise, or adopt a new Constitution, sound reason
demands that they keep themselves within the procedural bounds of the existing fundamental law. The
right of the people to amend or change their Constitution if and when the need arises is not to be denied,
but we assert that absent a revolutionary state or condition in the country the change must be
accomplished through the ordinary, regular and legitimate processes provided for in the Constitution.'
I cannot subscribe therefore to the view taken by the Solicitor General that the people, being sovereign,
have the authority to amend the Constitution even in a manner different from and contrary to that
expressly provided for in that instrument, and that the amendatory process is intended more as a
limitation of a power rather than a grant of power to a particular agency and it should not be construed as
limiting the ultimate sovereign will of the people to decide on amendments to the Constitution .2 Such a
view will seriously undermine the very existence of a constitutional government and will permit anarchy
and/or mob rule to set afoot and prevail. Was it the Greek philosopher Plato who warned that the rule of
the mob is a prelude to the rule of the tyrant?
I would use the following excerpt from Bernas, S.J. 'The 1973 Philippine Constitution, Notes and Cases"
as relevant to my point:
. . . the amendatory provisions are called a 'constitution of sovereighty' because they
define the constitutional meaning of 'sovereignty of the people.' Popular sovereignty, as
embodied in the Philippine Constitution, is not extreme popular sovereignty. As one
American writer put it:
A constitution like the American one serves as a basic check upon the popular will at any
given time. It is the distinctive function of such written document to classify certain things
as legal fundamentals; these fundamentals may not be changed except by the slow and
cumbersome process of amendment. The people themselves have decided, in
constitutional convention assembled, to limit themselves ana future generations in the
exercise of the sovereign power which they would otherwise possess. And it is precisely
such limitation that enables those subject to governmental authority to appeal from the
people drunk to the people sober in time of excitement and hysteria. The Constitution, in
the neat phrase of the Iowa court, is the protector of the people against injury by the
.people. *
Truly, what need is there for providing in the Constitution a process by which the fundamental law may be
amended if, after all, the people by themselves can set the same at naught even in times of peace when
civil authority reigns supreme? To go along with the respondents' theory in this regard is to render written
Constitutions useless or mere "ropes of sand allowing for a government of men instead of one of laws.
For it cannot be discounted that a situation may arise where the people are heralded to action at a point
of a gun or by the fiery eloquence of a demagogue, and where passion overpowers reason, and mass
action overthrows legal processes. History has recorded such instances, and I can think of no better
example than that of Jesus Christ of Judea who was followed and loved by the people while curing the
sick, making the lame walk and the blind see, but shortly was condemned by the same people turned into
fanatic rabble crying out "Crucify Him, Crucify Him" upon being incited into action by chief priests and
elders of Jerusalem. Yes, to quote once more from Judge Cooley:
A good Constitution should be beyond the reason of temporary excitement and popular
caprice or passion. It is needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of
the people; not to the whim of the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot
blood, but the sober second thought, which alone, if the government is to be sale can be
allowed efficiency. .... Changes in government are to be feared unless the benefit is
certain." (quoted in Ellingham v. Dye, 99 N.E. 1, 15,)
3

224

Crawford v. Gilchrist 64 Fla. 41., 59., So. 963, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 916; State v. Hall, 159 N.W., 281;
Opinion of Marshall, J. in State ex. rel. Poster v. Marcus, 152 N.W., 419;
From Kochier v. Hill, Vol. 15, N.W., 609, we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
It has been said that changes in the constitution may be introduced in disregard of its
provisions; that if the majority of the people desire a change the majority must be
respected, no matter how the change may be effected; and that the change, if revolution,
is peaceful resolution. ...
We fear that the advocates of this new doctrine, in a zeal to accomplish an end which the
majority of the people desire, have looked at but one phase of the question, and have not
fully considered the terrible consequences which would almost certainly follow a
recognition of the doctrine for which they contend. It may be that the incorporation of this
amendment in the constitution, even if the constitution has to be broken to accomplish it,
would not of itself produce any serious results. But if it should be done by sanctioning the
doctrine contended for, a precedent would be set which would plague the state for all
future time. A Banquo's ghost would arise at our incantation which would not down at our
bidding.
xxx xxx xxx
We ought to ponder long before we adopt a doctrine so fraught with danger to republican
institutions. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Appellants' counsel cite and rely upon section 2, art. 1, of the constitution of the staff This section is a
portion of the bill of rights, and is as follows: 'All political power is inherent in the people. Government is
instituted for the protection, security, and benefit of of the people; and they have the right at all times to
alter or reform the same, whenever the public good may require.' Abstractly considered, there can bye no
doubt of the correctness of the propositions embraced in this suction. These principles are older than
constitutions and older than governments. The people did not derive the rights referred to by on the
constitution. and, in their nature, thee are such that the people cannot surrender them ... .
2. Presidential Decrees Nos. 991 and 1033 which call for a national referendum-plebiscite on October 16,
1976 for the purpose, among other things, of amending certain provisions of the 1973 Constitution are
null and void as they contravene the express provisions on the amending process of the 1973
Constitution laid down in Article XVI, Section 1 (1) and Article XVII, Section 15, more particularly the latter
which applies during the present transition period. The Opinion of Justice Teehankee discusses in detail
this particular matter.
I would just wish to stress the point that although at present there is no by tterint National Assembly which
may propose amendments to the Constitution, the existence of a so-called "vacuum" or "hiatus" does not
justify a transgression of the constitutional provisions on the manner of amending the fundamental law.
We cannot cure one infirmity - the existence of a "vacuum" caused by the non-convening of the interim
National Assembly - with another infirmity, that is, doing violence to the Charter.
All great mutations shake and disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil;
another evil may succeed and a worse. (Am. Law Rev. 1889, p. 311., quoted in
Ellingham v. Dye, supra, p. 15)
225

Respondents contend that the calling of the referendum-plebiscite for the purpose indicated is a step
necessary to restore the state of normalcy in the country. To my mind, the only possible measure that will
lead our country and people to a condition of normalcy is the lifting or ending of the state of martial law. If
I am constrained to make this statement it is because so much stress was given during the hearings of
these cases on this particular point, leaving one with the impression that for petitioners to contest the
holding of the October 16 referendum-plebiscite is for them to assume a position of blocking or installing
the lifting of martial law, which I believe is unfair to the petitioners. Frankly, I cannot see the connection
between the two. My esteemed colleagues should pardon me therefore if I had ventured to state that the
simple solution to the simple solution to the present dilemma is the lifting of martial law and the
implementation of the constitutional provisions which will usher in the parliamentary form of government
ordained in the Constitution, which, as proclaimed in Proclamation 1102, the people themselves have
ratified.
If the people have indeed ratified the 1973 Constitution, then they are bound by their act and cannot
escape from the pretended unfavorable consequences thereof, the only y being to set in motion the
constitutional machinery by which the supposed desired amendments may properly be adopted and
submitted to the electorate for ratification. Constitutional processes are to be observed strictly, if we have
to maintain and preserve the system of government decreed under the fundamental Charter. As said by
Justice Enrique Fernando in Mutuc vs. Commission on Elections
... The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for
the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest
funcitonary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the
rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal
hierarchy. ... (36 SCRA, 228, 234, italics Ours)
A contrary view would lead to disastrous consequences for, in the words of Chief Justice Cox of the
Supreme Court of Indiana in Ellingham v. Dye, (supra, p. 7) liberty and popular sovereignty are not meant
to give rein to passion or thoughtless impulse but to allow the exercise of power by the people for the
general good by tistlercoitaitt restraints of law.
3
. The true question before Us is is one of power. Does the
incumbent President of the Philippines possess constituent powers? Again, the negative answer is
explained in detail in the dissenting opinion of Justice Teehankee.
Respondents would justify the incumbent President's exercise of constituent powers on theory that he is
vested with legislative powers as held by this Court in Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., et al. vs. Commission on
Elections, et al., L-40004, January 31, 1975. 1 wish to stress that although in my separate opinion in said
case I agreed that Section 3 (2) of the Transitory provisions grants to the incumbent President legislative
powers, I qualified my statement as follows:
.... As to, whether, or not, this unlimited legislative qqqjwwel of the President continues by
exist even after the ratification of the Constitution is a matter which I am not ready to
concede at the moment, and which at any rate I believe is not essential in resolving this
Petition for reasons to be given later. Nonetheless, I hold the view that the President is
empowered to issue proclamations, orders, decrees, etc. to carry out and implement the
objectives of the proclamation of martial law be it under the 1935 or 1973 Constitution,
and for the orderly and efficient functioning of the government, its instrumentalities, and
agencies. This grant of legislative power is necessary to fill up a vacuum during the
transition period when the interim National Assembly is not yet convened and functioning,
for otherwise, there will be a disruption of official functions resulting in a collapse of the
government and of the existing social order. (62 SCRA, pp. 275,347)
I believe it is not disputed that legislative power is essentially different from constituent power; one does
not encompass the other unless so specified in the Charter, and the 1973 Constitution contains
provisions in this regard. This is well-explained in Justice Teehankee's Opinion. The state of necessity
brought about by the current political situation, invoked by the respondents, provides no source of power
226

to propose amendments to the existing Constitution. Must we "bend the Constitution to suit the law of the
hour or cure its defects "by inflicting upon it a wound which nothing can heal commit one assault after the
other "until all respect for the fundamental law is lost and the powers of government are just what those in
authority please to call them?'"
5
Or can we now ignore what this Court, speaking through Justice Barredo,
said in Tolentino vs. Comelec:
... let those who would put aside, invoking grounds at best controversial, any mandate of
the fundamental law purportedly by order to attain some laudable objective bear in mind
that someday somehow others with purportedly more laudable objectives may take
advantages of the precedent in continue the destruction of the Constitution, making those
who laid down the precedent of justifying deviations from the requirements of the
Constitution the victims of their own folly.
6

Respondents emphatically assert that the final word is the people's word and that ultimately it is in the
hands of the people where the final decision rests. (Comment, pp. 18, 19, 22) Granting in gratia argument
that it is so, let it be an expression of the will of the people a normal political situation and not under the
aegis of martial rule for as I have stated in Aquino vs. Comelec, et al., supra, a referendum (and now a
plebiscite) held under a regime of martial law can be of no far reaching significance because it is being
accomplished under an atmosphere or climate of fear as it entails a wide area of curtailment and
infringement of individual rights, such as, human liberty, property rights, rights of free expression and
assembly, protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, liberty of abode and of travel, and so
on.
4. The other issues such as the sufficiency and proper submission of the proposed amendments for
ratification by the people are expounded in Justice Teehankee's Opinion. I wish to stress indeed that it is
incorrect to state that the thrust of the proposed amendments is the abolition of the interim National
Assembly and its substitution with an "interim Batasang Pambansa their in by in Proposed amendment
No. 6 will permit or allow the concentration of power in one man - the Executive - Prime Minister or
President or whatever you may call him - for it gives him expressly (which the 1973 Constitution or the
1935 Constitution does not) legislative powers even during the existence of the appropriate legislative
body, dependent solely on the executive's judgment on the existence of a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof **
I must be forgiven if, not concerned with the present, I am haunted however by what can happen in the
future, when we shall all be gone. Verily, this is a matter of grave concern which necessitates full, mature,
sober deliberation of the people but which they can do only in a climate of freedom without the restraints
of martial law. I close, remembering what Claro M. Recto, President of the Constitutional Convention
which drafted the 1935 Philippine Constitution, once said: .
... Nor is it enough that our people possess a written constitution in order that their
government may be called constitutional. To be deserving of this name, and to drive
away all lanirer of anarchy as well as of dictatorship whether by one man or a few, it is
necessary that both the government authorities and the people faithfully observe and
obey the constitution, and that the citizens be duly conversant not only with their rights
but also with their duties...
7

Jose P. Laurel who served his people as Justice of the Supreme Court of this country gave this reminder;
the grave and perilous task of halting transgressions and vindicating cherished rights is reposed mainly oil
the Judiciary and therefore let the Courts be the vestal keepers of the purity and sanctity of our
Constitution.' On the basis of the foregoing, I vote to declare Presidential Decrees Nos. 991 and 1033
unconstitutional and enjoin the implementation thereof.
CONCEPCION JR., J ., concurring:
227

I vote for the dismissal of the petitions.
1. The issue is not political and therefore justiciable.
The term "political question", as this Court has previously defined, refers to those questions which, under
the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is
concerned with the issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
1

Here, the question raised is whether the President has authority to propose to the people amendments to
the Constitution which the petitioners claim is vested solely upon the National Assembly, the
constitutional convention called for the purpose, and the by the National Assembly. This is not a political
question since it involves the determination of conflicting claims of authority under the constitution.
In Gonzales vs. Comelec, 2 this Court, resolving the issue of whether or not a Resolution of Congress,
acting as a constituent assembly, violates the Constitution, ruled that the question is essentially
justiciable, not political, and hence, subject to judicial review.
In Tolentino vs. Comelec 3 this Court finally dispelled all doubts as to its position regarding its jurisdiction
vis-a-vis the constitutionality of the acts of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, as well as those
of a constitutional convention called for the purpose of proposing amendments to the constitution. Insofar
as observance of constitutional provisions on the procedure for amending the constitution is concerned,
the issue is cognizable by this Court under its powers of judicial review.
2. As to the merits, a brief backdrop of the decision to hold the referendum-plebiscite will help resolve the
issue. It is to be noted that under the 1973 Constitution, an interim National Assembly was organized to
bring about an orderly transition from the presidential to the parliamentary system of government.' The
people, however, probably distrustful of the members who are old time politicians and constitutional
delegates who had voted themselves by to membership in the interim National Assembly, voted against
the convening of the said interim assembly for at least seven years thus creating a political stalemate and
a consequent delay' in the transformation of the government into the parliamentary system. To resolve
the impasse, the President, at the instance of the barangays and sanggunian assemblies through their
duly authorized instrumentalities who recommended a study of the feasibility of abolishing and replacing
the by interim National Assembly with another interim body truly representative of the people in a
reformed society, issued Presidential Decree No. 991, on September 2, 1976, calling for a national
referendum on October -16, 1976 to ascertain the wishes of the people as to the ways and means that
may be available to attain the objective; providing for a period of educational and information campaign
on the issues; and establishing the mechanics and manner for holding thereof. But the people, through
their barangays, addressed resolutions to the Batasang Bayan, expressing their desire to have the
constitution amended, thus prompting the President to issue Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the
questions to @ submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16,1976.
As will be seen, the authority to amend the Constitution was removed from the interim National Assembly
and transferred to the seat of sovereignty itself. Since the Constitution emanates from the people who are
the repository of all political powers, their authority to amend the Constitution through the means they
have adopted, aside from those mentioned in the Constitution, cannot be gainsaid. Not much reflection is
also needed to show that the President did not exercise his martial law legislative powers when he
proposed the amendments to the Constitution. He was merely acting as an instrument to carry out the will
of the people. Neither could he convene the interim National Assembly, as suggested by the petitioners,
without doing violence to the people's will expressed overwhelmingly when they decided against
convening the interim assembly for at least seven years.
3. The period granted to the people to consider the proposed amendments is reasonably long and
enough to afford intelligent discussion of the issues to be voted upon. PD 991 has required the barangays
228

to hold assemblies or meetings to discuss and debate on the referendum questions, which in fact they
have been doing. Considering that the proposed amendments came from the representatives of the
people themselves, the people must have already formed a decision by this time on what stand to take on
the proposed amendments come the day for the plebiscite. Besides, the Constitution itself requires the
holding of a plebiscite for the ratification of an amendment not later than three (3) months after the
approval of such amendment or revision but without setting a definite period within which such plebiscite
shall not be held. From this I can only conclude that the framers of the Constitution desired that only a
short period shall elapse from the approval of such amendment or resolution to its ratification by the
people.
Footnotes
1 Sec. 3, PD 991, September 2, 1976.
2 SEC. 4 Who shall participate.-Every Filipino citizen, literate or not, fifteen years of age
or over who has resided in the barangay for at least six months shall participate in the
consultation in his barangay. Provided, however, That any person who may not be able
to participate in the consultations of his barangay may do so in any barangay member
shall participate in more than one barangay consultation.
3 SEC. 15. The National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may,
by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such
amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen thereof."
4 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960).
5 Section 18.
6 Section 5.
7 Tan v. Macapagal, L-34161, Feb. 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677, Fernando, J., ponente. See
also Standing to Secure Judicial Review, Jaffe, 74 Harvard Law Review 1265 (May
1961).
8 Concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Fernando in the Plebiscite Cases (Planas
v. Comelec, 49 SCRA 105). See Martial Law and the New Society in the Philippines,
Supreme Court, 1976, at 152.
9 Orfield Amending the Federal Constitution, 111.
10 Separate Opinion of Justice Concepcion in the Ratification Casts v. the Executive
Secretary 50 SCRA 30), Martial Law and the New Society in the Philippines, 1976,
Supreme Court, 210-224, quoting Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051.
11 See Martial Law and the New Society in the Philippines, Supreme Court, 1976, at 121.
12 Idem, at 210.
13 The view of the Chief Justice was shared by Justices Makalintal (later Chief Justice),
Zaldivar, Castro (present Chief Justice), Fernando, and Teehankee. Justice Barredo
qualified his vote, stating that "inasmuch as it is claimed that there has been approval by
the people, the Court may inquire into the question of whether or not there has actually
been such an approval, and, in the affirmative, the Court should keep its hands-off out of
229

respect to the people's will, but, in the negative, the Court may determine from both
factual and legal angles whether or not Article XV of the 1935 Constitution has been
complied with." Justices Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that the issue is political
and "beyond the ambit of judicial inquiry."
14 62 SCRA 275, Referendum Case, Martial Law and the New Society in the Philippines,
Supreme Court, 1976, at 1071.
15 Idem, at 10791081.
16 In the United States, all amendments to the Federal constitution, except the Twenty-
first Amendment, had been proposed by the U.S. Congress, Modern Constitutional Law,
Antieau Vol. 2,1969 ed., at 482.
17 The Amending of the Federal Constitution by Orfield 1942, 48-53; 103-105.
18 Black's Constitutional Law, Hornkbook series, at 42.
19 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall 378.
20 There are 3 types of crisis in the life of a democratic nation. First is particularly a war
to repel invasions, when a state must convert its peacetime political and social order into
a wartime fighting machine and overmatch the skill and efficiency of the enemy. Second,
is rebellion, when the authority of a constitutional government is resisted openly by a
large numbers of its citizens who are engaged in violent insurrection against the
enforcement of its laws or are bent on capturing it illegally or even destroying it
altogether. Third is economic depression-a crisis greater than war. Rossiter,
Constitutional Dictatorship, at 6.
21 Constitutional Dictatorship by Clinton Rossiter, 288-290.
22 Corwin, The President Office and Powers, at 371.
23 See Separate Opinion of the Chief Justice (the Justice Castro in the Referendum
Case (Aquino v. Comelec), at p. 1084, Martial Law and the New Society in the
Philippines, Supreme Court, 1976.
26 Orfield, Amending the Federal Constitution, at 55.
27 Daily Express, Sept. 27,1976; Times Journal, Sept. 17, 1976.
28 Sunday Express, September 23, 1976.
29 Daily Express, September 23, 1976.
30 Section 1, Article II, 1973 Constitution.
31 See Orfield, Amending the Federal Constitution, 140-143. The first meaning includes
all persons. living within the state during the whole time of the existence of the state; the
second, the sum of all individuals as an organized group living within the state at the
same time: and the third, the organized group of individuals living the state with the
exception of the government.
230

32 Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective, 1963, at 221.
33 Orfield Amending the Federal Constitution, at 105.
34 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630.
35 Op Cit., at 221.
39 Separate opinion of Justice Palma in the Referendum Case (Aquino v. COMELEC), at
1135, Martial Law and the New Society in the Philippines, 1976, Supreme Court.
40 Separate opinion of Justices Makalintal and Castro in the Ratification Case (Javellana
v. The Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 30), at 292-293, Martial Law and the New Society
in the Philippines
41 Sec. 1, Article VI, 1973 Constitution.
42 Daily Express, September 29, 1976.
43 See Times Journal, September 30, 1976.
44 Times journal, October 2, 1976.
45 See Martial Law and the New Society, 1976, Supreme Court, at 1082-83.
46 307 U.S. 433, see Cases in Constitutional Law, 3rd ed., Cushman and Cushman, 12-
13.
47 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368.
48 Willoughby on the Constitution of the Untied States, Vol. 1,595-96.
L-35925, January 22, 1973, 49 SCRA 105. The other cases disposed of by the Court are
not referred to.
2 L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30. Again, no reference is made to the other
petitions raising the same question as to te validity of Proclamation No. 1102 announcing
the ratification of the Constitution proposed by the Constitutional Convention.
3 L-35546, September 17, 1974, 59 SCRA 183. It must be noted that there were other
petitions decided likewise seeking the nullification of Proclamation No. 1081 declaring
martial law.
4 L-4004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275. This decision affirmed the power of the
incumbent President to issue decrees having the force and effect of law. There was in the
main opinion in this case, penned by Justice Makasiar, an explicit recognition that the
incumbent President possesses legislative competence so that during the period of
Martial Law he could assure "the security and preservation of the Republic, ... the
defense of the political and social liberties of the people and... the institution of reforms to
prevent the resurgence of rebellion or insurrection or secession or the threat thereof as
well as to meet the impact of a worldwide recession, inflation or economic crisis which
presently threatens all nations including highly developed countries ..." (At 298) Justices
231

Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Munoz Palma and Aquino concurred, although in a
separate opinion, Justice Munoz Palma qualified it by saying that the grant of legislative
power "is necessarily to fill up a vacuum during the transition period when the interim
National Assembly is not yet convened and functioning, for otherwise, there will be a
disruption of official functions resulting in a collapse of the government and of the existing
social order." (At 347) There was likewise a concurring opinion by the then Justice, now
Chief Justice Justice Makalintal and Justices Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra and Fernandez
concurred with this opinion. In a concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice Teehankee
would confine "his legislative and appropriation powers under martial law ... to the law of
necessity of preservation of the state which gave rise to its proclamation (including
appropriations for operations of the government and its agencies and instrumentalities)."
(At 316-317) The writer of this opinion had his own concurrence and predicated his vote
without an expression of his views as to the grant of legislative power to the President. "
5 L-37364, May 9,1975, 63 SCRA 546. The Court ruled in this case that military
commissions may try civilians for certain specified offenses according to applicable
presidential decrees.
6 SCRA 183, 281-309.
7 Ibid, 301.
8 Ex parte Milligan is reported in 4 Wall. 2 (1966). It was likewise noted that Story, the
first eminent commentator in American constitutional law made no reference to martial
law. Cooley's work, now in its 8th edition, is entitled Constitutional Limitations while that
of Watson bears the title of Constitution of the United States. At 302
9 Ibid. Sterling is found in 287 US 378 (1932) and Duncan in 327 US 304 (1946). Among
the casebooks on constitutional law referred to are those by Dodd (1949), Dowling
(1950), Sholley (1951), Frank (1932), Freund and Associates (1954), Barrett and
Associates (1963), Kauper (1966), Lockhart and Associates (1970).
10 Ibid. It may be observed parenthetically that when I collaborated with Senator Lorenzo
M. Tanada in the Constitution of the Philippines Annotated published almost thirty Nears
ago in 1947 (at 588-589) with two later editions that came out in 1949 (at 694-695) and
1993 (at 1013-1014), it was Willoughby's view that was cited.
11 Ibid. 302-303. This was the formulation of Burdick in his The Law of the American
Constitution, 261 (1922).
12 Ibid. 303.
13 Ibid. The citation is from Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed.
1591 (1929).
14 Ibid. The excerpt is from Williams on Constitutional Law, 449 (1936). It is to be made
clear that in our Constitution, it is only the privilege of the writ, not the writ itself that is
suspended.
15 Ibid. :30:3-304. The quotation is from volume 2 of the treatise of Schwartz on the
American Constitution, entitled The Powers of Government 244 (1963) that the citation
came from.
232

16 Ibid. The reference is to Dicey on the Law of the Constitution, 287-288 (1962).
17 327 US 304, 322.
18 Cf. Aquino v. Commission on Elections, 62 SCRA 275.
19 Ibid, 305. The citation from Rossiter is from the first chapter of his work on
Constitutional Dictatorship. 9 (1948).
20 Ibid. 306.
21 SCRA 275, 298. Justice Makasiar cited pages 7 and 303 of Rossiter's Constitutional
Dictatorship.
22 The extensive citation in the opinion of Justice martin is found in Chapter XIX of
Rossiter's opus entitled Constitutional Dictatorship: The Forms, the Dangers, the Criteria,
the Future. that is the last chapter of his work, after a rather exhaustive discussion of
what are referred to by him as Constitutional Dictatorship in Germany (Chapters III to V),
Crisis Government in the French Republic (Chapters VI to IX), Crisis Government in the
United States (chapters XIV to XVII).
23 Ibid. 294.
24 Imelda Romualdez Marcos, The Filipino Between Two Worlds, Philippines Daily
Express lo, October 9,1976.
25 Ibid.
26 Corwin, The President Office and Powers, 4th rev. ed., 139-140 (1957).
27 According to Art XVII, Sec. 15 of the present Constitution: The interim National upon
special call by the interim Prime Minister, a majority vote of all its Members, propose to
amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with Article Sixteen hereof."
28 He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez Jr. and Trial
Attorney Nannette R. de Castro.
29 Malcolm and Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law, 3rd ed., 20-21 (1936).
30 Malcolm and Laurel, Cases on Constitutional Law (1936).
31 Ibid. Ellingham v. Dye is reported in 99 NE 1 (1912).
32 Philippine Political Law, llth ed. 63 (1962). It is precisely Ellingham v. Dye that was
cited.
33 Justice Makasiar referred to Article XVII, Sec. 3, par. 2 of the present Constitution.
The present Chief Justice would include paragraph 1 to the above. Vide in. 4.
34 L-34150, October 16,1951, 41 SCRA 702.
233

35 According to Article 11, Section 1 of the present Constitution: The Philippines is a
republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them."
36 Cf. Crammer v. Thorson 68 NE 202 (1896): Edwards v. Lesueur 83 SW 1130 (1896);
People v. Mills, 70 P. 322 (1902); Treadgill v. Cross, 109 P 558 (1910); Scott v. James,
76 SE 283 (1912); Weinland v. Fulton 121 NE 816 (1918); Gray v. Mass, 156 So. 262
(1934); Gray v. Winthrop, 156 So. 270 (1934); State v. Burns, 172 SW 259 (1943),
Hillman v. Stockett 39 A2 803 (1944).
37 L-19313, January 19,1962,4 SCRA 1.
38 Ibid, 17-18.
39 L-21897, October 22, 1964, 9 SCRA 230.
40 Ibid, 244.
41 50 SCRA 30, 310-333 (1973).
42 59 SCRA 275, 306-315 (1974).
43 Laski, Grammar of Politics, 4th ed., 34 (1937).
44 Corwin, The Higher Law Background of American Constitutional Law, Selected
Essays on Constitutional Law 3 (1938).
45 Lerner, Ideas are Weapons, 470 (1939).
46 Bryn-Jones, Toward a Democratic New Order 23 (1945).
47 McIver, The Web of Government 84 (1947).
48 L-28916, November 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774.
49 L-23415, October 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702.
50 L-35925, January 22, 1973, 49 SCRA 105.
51 L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30. If I read correctly the concurring opinion of the
then Chief Justice Makalintal and the now Chief Justice Castro, then an Associate
Justice, where the question raised concerns the adoption and enforcement of a new
Constitution, then it may be looked upon as political.
52 78 Phil. 1 (1947). To be more precise, there were only five Justices, headed by
Justice Tuason, with the then Chief Justice Moran and the then Justices Paras, later
himself a Chief Justice, Hilado, Pablo and Hontiveros, who were of that persuasion. The
other two votes necessary for a majority for dismissing the prohibition petition were
supplied by Justice, also later a Chief Justice, Bengzon and Justice Padilla.
53 307 U.S. 433. In the concurring opinion of Justice Black, with Justices Roberts,
Frankfurther and Douglas in agreement, he made the categorial statement that such
234

process "is 'political' in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of
the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any
point." At 459.
54 Cf. Hatcher v. Meredith, 173 SW 2d 665 (1943); In re Application of Borg, 35 A2d 220
(1944); Renck v. Superior Court of Maricopa County, 187 P2d 656 (1947); In re Opinion
of Justices, 47 SO2d 643 (1950); Funk v. Fielder, 243 SW2d 474 (1951); Baum v.
Newbry 267 P2d 220 (1954); Boe v. Foss, 77 NW2d 1 (1956); Goldner v, Adams, 167
SO2d 575 (1964); Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 174 SO2d 529 (1965).
55 Laurel, S., ed., VII Proceedings of the Philippine Constitutional Convention (1934-
1935), Appendix L, 800.
56 SCRA 275, 306-315.
1 Article XV, section 1.
2 Article XVI, section 1, paragraphs (1) and (2).
3 Article XVII. section 3 (1).
4 Article XVII, section 15.
5 P.D. No. 991 dated Sept. 2, 1976, as amended by P.D. No. 1031 dated Sept. 22, 1976
and P.D. No. 1033 dated Sept. 22, 1976 "Stating the questions to be submitted to te
people i the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976".
6 Art. XV, sec. 1, 1935 Constitution (see Art. XVI, secs. 1 and 2, 1973 Constitution).
7 Resolution on motion for reconsideration in Tolentino vs. Comelec dated Nov. 4, 1971,
at page 3.
8 Idem, at page 4.
9 Idem, at page 4
10 Idem, at page 4.
11 Marshall, C.J. in Marburg vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137(1803).
12 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 81
13 Idem, pp. 87-88.
14 Javellana vs' Exec. Secretary, 50 SCRA 30 (1973).
15 Majority opinion at p.20.
16 21 SCRA 774(1967)
17 Citing Sec.1,Art.VI,1935 Constitution
235

18 See sec.1,Art. VIII,1973 Constitution
19 Aquino vs. Comelec, 62 SCRA 275 (Jan. 31, 1975);see also Gonzales vs. Comelec,
L-40117, Feb. 22, 1975
20 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 224
21 63 Phil. 134(1936).
23 Sunday Express (and Times Journal) issues of August 29, 1976 reported that "(A)s
proposed by the sanggunian and barangay national executive committees, the following
questions will be submitted in the discussions and referendums:
1 Do you want martial law to be lifted?
2 Do you want to call the interim National Assembly?
3 If not, do you want to call a body with legislative powers?
4 Do you want such body to have full legislative powers?
5 If not, do you want such body to have limited legislative powers as may be determined
by the President in a presidential decree?
6 If you want to call a body with certain legislative powers, do you want to grant such
body authority to propose amendments to the Constitution to make it conform with the
aims to the New Society?
7 If you want to call the body referred to questions 4, 5, and 6, do you want the members
of such body elected by the people through the barangays in accordance with an election
code to be promulgated in a decree by the President?
"The barangay and sanggunian executive committees informed the President that it was
'the thing of the barangays to undertake the referendum on an informal manner and that
they opted to devise their own ballots, tally sheets, and all other necessary from.'
"As proposed, and approved by the President, the referendum will be done by secret
ballot, except in small barangays where the residents can be gathered in one assembly
to decide on the issues by roll call vote if desired by residents.
"The canvassing will be done by the barangay referendum committee."
24 "The other issue to be taken up in the public discussions is the question on whether
the interim national assembly should be convened or not.
"This question was asked in two previous referenda-in 1973 and 1975 - and was rejected
each time by the people
"The barangays, however, of feel it is time to again ask the people's opinion of this
matter." (Phil. Express issue of Aug. 30,1976).
25 Art. IX, see. 1, 1973 Constitution.
236

26 Cooleys Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed. Vol. 2, p. 1349, citing Chief Justice Davis in
Gibson vs. Mason, 5 Nev. 293, 291 thus; "The maxim which lies at the foundation of our
government is that all political power originates with the people. But since the
organization of government it cannot be claimed that either the legislative, executive, or
judicial powers, either wholly or in part, can be exercised by them. By the institution of
government the people surrender the exercise of all these sovereign functions of
government to agents chosen by themselves, who at least theoretically represent the
supreme will of their constituents. Thus all power possessed by the people themselves is
given and centered in their chosen representatives
27 See fns. 8-10: note in parenthesis supplied.
28 Tolentino vs. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702, 725; emphasis supplied.
29 36 SCRA 228 234 (1970).
30 Resolution denying motion for reconsideration dated Nov. 4, 1971, at page 13.
31 Idem, at page 16 fn. 6.
32 Majority opinion, at page 19.
33 Idem, at page 20.
33* Rodriguez vs. Gella 92 Phil. 603 (1953); see also Araneta vs. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368
(1949).
34 Gonzales vs. Comelec, L-40117, Resolution of Feb. 22,1975.
35 In re Egan 8 Fed. Cas. 367, holding that "Martial law is neither more nor less than the
will of the general in command of the army- It overreaches and supersedes, all civil law
by the exercise of military power.." as cited in the Secretary of Justice's outline of a study
on the exercise of Legislative Power by the President under Martial Law, dated Dec. 27,
1972, as reported in Lawyers' Journal, March 31, 1973 issue, p. 90.
36 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations. 8th Ed., Vol. 1, pp.128-129.
37 With the exception of the proposed amendments increasing the membership of the
House of Representatives from 120 to 180 and authorizing members of Congress to
become Con-Con delegates, which were widely publicized as a result of the court
proceedings and decision in Gonzales vs. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774.
38 "Perspectives and Dimensions of Constitutional Reforms" delivered as keynote
speech at the National Conference on Constitutional Amendments, July 27,1970.
39 Articles VIII, IX and X, 1973 Constitution.
40 U.P. Professor Perfecto V. Fernandez: Civil Liberties under Martial Law.
41 Louis H. Pollale The Constitution and the Supreme Court, Vol. 1, page 191.
42 Supra, fn. 16.
237

43 Supra, fn. 28.
44 Sec. Art. VIII, sec. 2 1935 Constitution; Art. X, sec. 5, 1973 Constitution
45 SCRA 30 (1973) and cases cited.
46 Now retired Justices J.B.L. Reyes and Calixto 0. Zaldivar.
47 SCRA at p. 733.
48 21 SCRA at pages 816-817, emphasis copied.
49 From Am. Law Review, 1889, p. 311, citing Ellingham vs. Dye 99 N.E. pp. 4,15;
emphasis copied.
50 21 SCRA at p. 817.
51 Phil. Daily Express issue of Oct. 11, 1976 reporting the Comelec's stand that "Young
voters, from age 15 to below 18 can vote not only on the question of martial law but also
on the question regarding the proposed constitutional amendments".
52 Phil. Daily Express issue of Oct. 3, 1976.
53 Times journal and Phil. Daily Express issues of Oct. 11, 1976.
54 In the Bulletin Today issue of October 2, 1976, the President is quoted as himself
abstaining from the debates: "I am trying to steer clear of the debates because it involves
martial law, and it involves, of course, me personally. So the less I say about it, the
better, I guess, from my point of view".
54* Pres. Marcos' address on observance of the first anniversary of the 1973 Constitution
on Jan. 17, 1974; Phil. Labor Relations Journal, Vol. VII, Jan. 1974, p. 6.
55 The resolution gave the same permission to court personnel by a 9 to 1 vote with
Justice Makasiar and the writer presenting no objection in the case of personnel as
classified civil service employees, while Justice Munoz Palma maintained the same
negative vote.
1 Aquino, J. vs Ponce Enrile and other cases, 59 SCRA 183.
2 50 SCRA 30, 209 et seq.
1 Carl Brent Swisher. The Supreme Court in the Modern Role, 1958 ed., p. 173.
2 Melville Fuller Weston, Political questions, 38 Harv. L. Rev., 296, Italics supplied.
3 Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051, 1057, citing in re McConoughy, 119 NW 408. Italics
supplied.
4 16 C.J.s. 413.
5 369 U.S. 186, 217.
238

6 307 U.S. 433.
7 78 Phil, 1 (1947).
8 21 SCRA 774.
9 Republic Act No. 413.
10 41 SCRA 702,
11 L-40004, January 3l, 1975. 62 SCRA 275.
12 Proclamation No. 1103, January 17,1973.
13 Section 1, Article II, Constitution.
14 Leibholz: Politics and Law, p. 24.
15 Todays Revolution: Democracy, Marcos, pp. 87-88.
16 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, supra, at page 5, citing Green v. Weller, 32 Miss., 650; note,
10 L.r.a., n.s., 150.
17 John P. wheeler, Jr., Changing the fundamental Law SALIENT ISSUES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION; 1961 ed.
18 Sinco. Philippine Political Law, 10th Ed. p. 48
19 T.S.N. of hearing, October 8,1976, pp. 8,11,12,15.
* p. 716, 1974 Ed., citing B. Schwartz, I The Powers of Government (1963) 10.
xxx xxx xxx
It is well that the powers of the people and their relations to organized society should be
understood. No heresy has ever been taught in this country so fraught with evil as the
doctrine that the people have a constitutional right to disregard the constitution, and that
they can set themselves above the instrumentalities appointed by the constitution for the
administration of law. It tends directly to the encouragement of revolution and anarchy. It
is incumbent upon all who influence and mold public opinion to repudiate and
discountenance so dangerous a doctrine before it bears fruits destructive of republican
institutions. It will be well if the people come to understand the difference between natural
and constitutional freedom. before license becomes destructive of liberty ." (pp. 611-616)
4 Green castle Township v. Black, 5 Ind.,557, 56,5.
5 Oakley vs. Aspinwall, 3 N.Y., 547,568.
6 Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, L-34150, November 4, 1971, per Barredo,
J., pp 19-20, Supreme Court Decisions, November 1971
239

6 Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister there exists a brave
emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang
Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any
matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may in order to
meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which
shall form part of the law of the land. (Taken from the Barangay Ballot Form distributed
by COMELEC for Referendum-Plebiscite, October 16, 1976)
7 Speech upon conferment of the Doctor of Laws, Honoris Causa, by the Manila
University, the Lawyers' Journal, June 15, 1936, italics Ours.
8 The Lawyers' Journal, March 15, 1936,
1 Tagada & by Macapagal v. Cuenco, et al.. 103 Phil. 1051
2 L-28196. Nov. 9,1967; 21 SCRA 774.
3 L-34150, Oct. 16, 1971, 41 SCRA 702.
4 Article XVII, Section 1, Constitution.
5 Aquino vs.. Comelec, L-40004, Jan. 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275, 302.
9 Idem, at page 4.
10 Idem, at page 4.
11 Marshall, C.J. in Marburg vs. Madison, I Cranch 137 (1803).
12 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 81.

3. By the people through initiative (R.A. 6735, August 4, 1989)
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Eighth Congress

Republic Act No. 6735 August 4, 1989
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM AND APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
I. General Provisions
240

Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as "The Initiative and Referendum Act."
Section 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum
to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose
and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress
or the local legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an
election called for the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law,
or part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or
rejected by the people.
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the required number of
signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by and submitted to the Commission on
Elections, hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
(g) "Local government units" refers to provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
(h) "Local legislative bodies" refers to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod,
Sangguniang Bayan, and Sangguniang Nayon.
(i) "Local executives" refers to the Provincial Governors, City or Municipal Mayors and Punong
Barangay, as the case may be.
241

Section 4. Who may exercise. The power of initiative and referendum may be exercised by all
registered voters of the country, autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays.
Section 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least ten per
centum (10%) of the total number of the registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented
by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition for the purpose and
register the same with the Commission.
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum
(12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative
on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2. the proposition;
c.3. the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4. that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.5. signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(d) A referendum or initiative affecting a law, resolution or ordinance passed by the legislative
assembly of an autonomous region, province or city is deemed validly initiated if the petition
thereof is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in the province or city,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the
registered voters therein; Provided, however, That if the province or city is composed only of one
(1) legislative district, then at least each municipality in a province or each barangay in a city
should be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein.
(e) A referendum of initiative on an ordinance passed in a municipality shall be deemed validly
initiated if the petition therefor is signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters
in the municipality, of which every barangay is represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
the registered voters therein.
(f) A referendum or initiative on a barangay resolution or ordinance is deemed validly initiated if
signed by at least ten per centum (10%) of the registered voters in said barangay.
Section 6. Special Registration. The Commission on Election shall set a special registration day at
least three (3) weeks before a scheduled initiative or referendum.
Section 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis
of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the immediately
preceding election.
242

II. National Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 8. Conduct and Date of Initiative or Referendum. The Commission shall call and
supervise the conduct of initiative or referendum.
Within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, the Commission shall, upon determining the
sufficiency of the petition, publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of general
and local circulation and set the date of the initiative or referendum which shall not be earlier than forty-
five (45) days but not later than ninety (90) days from the determination by the Commission of the
sufficiency of the petition.
Section 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition. (a) The Proposition of the
enactment, approval, amendment or rejection of a national law shall be submitted to and approved by a
majority of the votes cast by all the registered voters of the Philippines.
If, as certified to by the Commission, the proposition is approved by a majority of the votes cast,
the national law proposed for enactment, approval, or amendment shall become effective fifteen
(15) days following completion of its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. If, as certified by the Commission, the proposition to reject a
national law is approved by a majority of the votes cast, the said national law shall be deemed
repealed and the repeal shall become effective fifteen (15) days following the completion of
publication of the proposition and the certification by the Commission in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
However, if the majority vote is not obtained, the national law sought to be rejected or amended
shall remain in full force and effect.
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in
the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election
called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation
by the Commission.
Section 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or referendum
petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically vested in
Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90) days after its
effectivity.
Section 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by law, may file
a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies. The
petition shall contain a summary of the chief purposes and contents of the bill that the organization
proposes to be enacted into law by the legislature.
The procedure to be followed on the initiative bill shall be the same as the enactment of any legislative
measure before the House of Representatives except that the said initiative bill shall have precedence
over the pending legislative measures on the committee.
243

Section 12. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency or insufficiency
of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court within thirty (30) days
from notice thereof.
III. Local Initiative and Referendum
SECTION 13. Procedure in Local Initiative. (a) Not less than two thousand (2,000) registered voters
in case of autonomous regions, one thousand (1,000) in case of provinces and cities, one hundred (100)
in case of municipalities, and fifty (50) in case of barangays, may file a petition with the Regional
Assembly or local legislative body, respectively, proposing the adoption, enactment, repeal, or
amendment, of any law, ordinance or resolution.
(b) If no favorable action thereon is made by local legislative body within (30) days from its
presentation, the proponents through their duly authorized and registered representative may
invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned.
(c) The proposition shall be numbered serially starting from one (1). The Secretary of Local
Government or his designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the
proposition.
(d) Two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.
(e) Proponents shall have one hundred twenty (120) days in case of autonomous regions, ninety
(90) days in case of provinces and cities, sixty (60) days in case of municipalities, and thirty (30)
days in case of barangays, from notice mentioned in subsection (b) hereof to collect the required
number of signatures.
(f) The petition shall be signed before the Election Registrar, or his designated representative, in
the presence of a representative of the proponent, and a representative of the regional
assemblies and local legislative bodies concerned in a public place in the autonomous region or
local government unit, as the case may be. Signature stations may be established in as many
places as may be warranted.
(g) Upon the lapse of the period herein provided, the Commission on Elections, through its office
in the local government unit concerned shall certify as to whether or not the required number of
signatures has been obtained. Failure to obtain the required number is a defeat of the
proposition.
(h) If the required number of the signatures is obtained, the Commission shall then set a date for
the initiative at which the proposition shall be submitted to the registered voters in the local
government unit concerned for their approval within ninety (90) days from the date of certification
by the Commission, as provided in subsection (g) hereof, in case of autonomous regions, sixty
(60) days in case of the provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities, and
thirty (30) days in case of barangays. The initiative shall then be held on the date set, after which
the results thereof shall be certified and proclaimed by the Commission on Elections.
Section 14. Effectivity of Local Propositions. If the proposition is approved by a majority of the
votes cast, it shall take effect fifteen (15) days after certification by the Commission as if affirmative action
thereon had been made by the local legislative body and local executive concerned. If it fails to obtain
said number of votes, the proposition is considered defeated.
Section 15. Limitations on Local Initiatives. (a) The power of local initiative shall not be exercised
more than once a year.
244

(b) Initiative shall extend only to subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the local
legislative bodies to enact.
(c) If at any time before the initiative is held, the local legislative body shall adopt in toto the
proposition presented, the initiative shall be cancelled. However, those against such action may,
if they so desire, apply for initiative in the manner herein provided.
Section 16. Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies. Any proposition or ordinance or resolution
approved through the system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not be repealed,
modified or amended, by the local legislative body concerned within six (6) months from the date
therefrom, and may be amended, modified or repealed by the local legislative body within three (3) years
thereafter by a vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all its members: Provided, however, that in case of
barangays, the period shall be one (1) year after the expiration of the first six (6) months.
Section 17. Local Referendum. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 4 hereof, any local
legislative body may submit to the registered voters of autonomous region, provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays for the approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution duly enacted or
approved.
Said referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Commission within sixty (60) days in
case of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of
barangays.
The Commission shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
Section 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from
declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or
want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
IV. Final Provisions
SECTION 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code and other
election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all initiatives and referenda.
Section 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
Section 21. Appropriations. The amount necessary to defray the cost of the initial implementation of
this Act shall be charged against the Contingent Fund in the General Appropriations Act of the current
year. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for the full implementation of this Act shall be included
in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 22. Separability Clause. If any part or provision of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional,
the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective.
Section 23. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper
of general circulation.
Approved: August 4, 1989
Santiago vs. Comelec
245

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in
their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK),
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC.
(MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.

DAVIDE, JR., J .:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands special
attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps to a few
scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through
the original proponent
1
and the main sponsor
2
of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the
Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative".
3
Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were
recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a
constitutional convention.
4
For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due
course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission
on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition)
5
wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an
order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative,
6
a
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and the
246

members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the
exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established
all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures
affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures, it
is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be
issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is
likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be
published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of
Article VI,
7
Section 4 of Article VII,
8
and Section 8 of Article X
9
of the Constitution. Attached to the petition
is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution"
10
embodying the proposed amendments
which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning term limits, and
with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is signed
by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be formally filed
with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE), the
COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order
11
(a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of the
petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the proposal,
proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in three (3) daily
newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996; and (b) setting
the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete
Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA);
intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and representatives of, or
counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK),
Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN).
12
Senator Roco, on that
same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition
properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda
and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days.
13

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only
be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact,
Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution
Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24
November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments.
247

(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative
on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any
subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are
specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission indicates
that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law.
Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege
speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in that law which
can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such
implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print
media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments
because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct
of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws,
is ultra vires insofar asinitiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since
the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the right
of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the Constitution to
pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not
to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is,
therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the
COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds
for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the
event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would entail
expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180 million,
not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the conduct of the
initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the issues raised
demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities
of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's suit.
14
Besides, there is no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-
extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding
with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a
signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment
15
on the petition.
They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL
TREASURY FOR GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT
LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE
"COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE
COMELEC.
248

2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL
EXPENSES IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF
RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF
ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE COMELEC. THE
ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL
TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID
BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE
GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE
CLOSELY" PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE
CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO.
125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS
TO THE CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO.
1290 IS A DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT
NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991
PURSUANT TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE
RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY
METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE
HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS
BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES
FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A
PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE
SUCH RULES AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE
PURPOSES OF THIS ACT." (SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E,
PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF
THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN
ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO
DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413,
2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment
16
which starts off
with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an "Initiatory
Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign to amend
the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and function. On
the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs
the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for
249

such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or
sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in
an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a)
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which
empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the
Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or
more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or
overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180
million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite
it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements for initiative will
be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment
17
for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its
Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that
power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes
initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose amendments
to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentionsinitiative on the
Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735
because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked
pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was provided
for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735
does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the
Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735
and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to
implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted the
aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private
250

respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas;
and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed
him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on
23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention.
Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended
Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,
18
it would involve a
change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts
unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties.
19
Arevision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other
national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to open
up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of
leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in the hands of a
few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and
decision-making for the common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and
nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-
of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by
the people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but
not as a premium for good performance.
20

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that
implements the people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a)
the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the
petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of the same, (e)
the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3% per
legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the
signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the
sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the
holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such people's initiative.
Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear
Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure
for a people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function
exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal
basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid
delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in
Intervention.
21
He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to
251

initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise
submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the
initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is the
filing of a petition for initiative which is signedby the required number of registered voters. He also submits
that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources of the
COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in an
initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition and
the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention
raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII
of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law
on the initiative to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the
required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only
by Congress or a constitutional convention.
22

On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the
DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b)
admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five
days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to
file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the
respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said
Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which
the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or
cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as worded,
adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations
Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on
National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
conduct of such initiative.
252

3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in
the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision of, or
an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition
solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b)
instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia,
the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when
there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the
deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin
Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do so
constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of
the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the
transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee, Committee
on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in
Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP.
23
The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their
separate memoranda.
24

As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears
to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE
DELFIN PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth issue, i.e.,
whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a pending
case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private
respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from
proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for
prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior
jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior
tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People v.
253

Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly
divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of the questioned
Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs
for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the
political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution.
25

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition
on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition.
26
The
COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the
oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their
memoranda or oppositions/memoranda.
27
Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave
due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together with
the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the case
for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the
petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin
Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these
claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush aside
technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.
28

A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because
the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO
THE CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of
254

registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall
be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book,
29
Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional
action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through
the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason,
does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or Revision
proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332).
30
That section reads as
follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section
___of the Constitution.
31

After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a
new formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call
attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of the
complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I
quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose
amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the
registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.
32

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:
255

FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10
percent, there are no details in the provision on how to carry this out. Do
we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the
legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as
the legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on this,
this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee
hearing, especially with respect to the budget appropriations which would
have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We deemed it
best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In
any event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power of initiative
can be called until after five years from the date of the ratification of this
Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed
through the exercise of this initiative power would be after five years. It is
reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National
Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise
of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature the details on
how this is to be carried out is it possible that, in effect, what will be
presented to the people for ratification is the work of the legislature rather
than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the
legislature itself as a body could propose that amendment, maybe
individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in
order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that
proposal to the people for ratification through the process of an initiative.
xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the
proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to amend the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in
terms of institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the
Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of
difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would
the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate,
constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
256

MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy
of legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates and that
therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in
the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of
constituent power we have a separate article in the constitution that
would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are
drafted now, to again concede to the legislature the process or the
requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution
by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed
in the hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate
into this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover all the
conceivable situations.
33

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to
AMEND not to REVISE the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this
matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes
of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to the
revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of
Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
34

xxx xxx xxx
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this
process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment.
Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a
while ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment
and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total
overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by
the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to
distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the
257

process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is
given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the
Committee.
35

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the
entire Section 2 with the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed
amendment after taking into account the modifications submitted by the
sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod,
Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in
substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as follows:
"SECTION 2. AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF
THE TOTAL NUMBER Of REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST
THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed
amendment is reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our
completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment.
36

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly showed that
it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible
for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the initiative.
. .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent
the legislature from asking another body to set the proposition in proper
form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the
implementation of this particular right would be subject to legislation,
258

provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of the
requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the
proper form for submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to
initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the
legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures
which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
37

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to NOT REVISION of the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed
amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the word
"revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision"
should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it
can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
38

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what
is involved is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a
Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National
Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional
convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit the
issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National
Assembly is required, the import being that the process of amendment
must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating an
ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by the National
Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to reducing the
requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it
would require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as
precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I might present
such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall
take up the Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on
plenary sessions.
39

The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version,
which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
259

MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended,
reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST
THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO
AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
40

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9
July 1986.
41
Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed
to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the
Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986.
42

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing
"percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second
paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress
43
shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right.
44
This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph of
Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section 2
of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the
question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A. No.
6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than through
the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute amendment
by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article XVII then
reading:
The Congress
45
shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be
carried out."
46

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No.
17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of
Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497,
47
which dealt
with the initiative and referendum mentioned
260

in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988,
48
which dealt with the
subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X
(Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill
No. 17
49
solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill
No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate
50
and by the
House of Representatives.
51
This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as
to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is
confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly
propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system
of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of
Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and
appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part."
52

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)
restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit
the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition forinitiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other
things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads
in full as follows:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
261

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Emphasis
supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle
therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of
the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on
national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed under
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of Subtitle
II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves no room
for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be
adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the governments
of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This classification
of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis
and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms
xxx xxx xxx
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national
legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on
53

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane to
the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c) of
Section 9, which reads:
262

(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an
election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification
and proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies of
local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by
law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other
legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for
both national and localinitiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced,
54
since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and
referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper
courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for
violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the
said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them special
attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.
55

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
263

(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of
initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit
concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters
for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.
56

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its
twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative on
the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be
approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of
voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.
57

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.
58

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.
59
The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
60

264

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate
rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every
case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if
the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented
by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
61
A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected.
62

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably
failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND
REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system
of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power under
Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred to
therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution, or
(b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the
"sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the COMELEC
the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the COMELEC
acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin
Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has
not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his
drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is
the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the
form of the petition;
63
(2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the
total number of registered voters in each legislative district;
64
(3) to assist, through its election registrars,
in the establishment of signature stations;
65
and (4) to verify, through its election registrars, the
signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards used
in the immediately preceding election.
66

265

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission
must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the
petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed.
That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the
Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits of
elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is rendered
unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining
or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law
shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no
longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not
tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the right
of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part.

266

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the
COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 5735
and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to
stand on and should be dismissed. With due respect:
I
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to
the Constitution thru initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No. 6735 should start with the
search of the intent of our lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is critical for the intent of the legislature
is the law and the controlling factor in its interpretation.
1
Stated otherwise, intent is the essence of the
law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment.
2

Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution." It ought to be so for this intent is crystal clear from the history
of the law which was a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505
3
and Senate Bill No. 17.
4
Senate Bill No. 17
was entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception Therefrom,
Whereby People in Local Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and
Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body."
Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505
5
expressly included people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. Congressman (now Senator) Raul Roco emphasized in his sponsorship
remarks:
6

xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder on the constitutional basis of
the proposed measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential system which was introduced by
the 1935 Constitution saw the application of the principle of separation of powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle remained
applicable, the 1981 amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured presidential
dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of legislative powers between the
Legislature and the Executive departments. Transcending changes in the exercise of
legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine Constitution that the Philippines is a
republican state where sovereignty resides in the people and all sovereignty emanates
from them.
267

3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress;
however, to institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986
Revolution, the Constitution recognizes the power of the people, through the system of
initiative and referendum.
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have plenary
powers since reserve powers are given to the people expressly. Section 32 of the same
Article mandates Congress to pass at the soonest possible time, a bill on referendum and
initiative, and to share its legislative powers with the people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, vests in the people the
power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, upon petition
of at least 12 percent of the total number of registered voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's response to the duty imposed on
Congress to implement the exercise by the people of the right to initiative and
referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the beginnings of the system of initiative and referendum
under Philippine Law. He cited Section 99 of the Local Government Code which vests in
the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative processes, decide the holding of
plebiscite and hear reports of the Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations of
the power of initiative and referendum. He added that the holding of barangay plebiscites
and referendum are likewise provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that pertinent quotation on the
subject which he will later submit to the Secretary of the House be incorporated as part of
his sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar to those contained in the
instant Bill among which are the constitutions of states in the United States which
recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any statute or to
project any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These states, he said, are
Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and practically
all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and
referendum apply is also without limitation, except for emergency measures, which are
likewise incorporated in House Bill No. 21505. He added that the procedure provided by
the Bill from the filing of the petition, the requirements of a certain percentage of
supporters to present a proposition, to the submission to electors are substantially similar
to the provisions in American laws. Although an infant in Philippine political structure, the
system of initiative and referendum, he said, is a tried and tested system in other
jurisdictions, and the Bill is patterned after American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and recalled that the Constitutional
Commissioners saw the system of the initiative and referendum as an instrument which
can be used should the legislature show itself to be indifferent to the needs of the people.
This is the reason, he claimed, why now is an opportune time to pass the Bill even as he
noted the felt necessity of the times to pass laws which are necessary to safeguard
individual rights and liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative and referendum as advocated
in House Bill No. 21505. He stated that:
268

1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit a Bill for the
consideration of the general electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative, namely; the initiative to amend the
Constitution once every five years; the initiative to amend statutes approved by
Congress; and the initiative to amend local ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to define rules and regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the consent of the people on measures
that they have approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a referendum which is a mode of
plebiscite by presenting a petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as the
signing of said petition by at least 10 percent of the total of registered voters at which
every legislative district is represented by at least three percent of the registered voters
thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition, the COMELEC shall determine the
sufficiency of the petition, publish the same, and set the date of the referendum within 45
to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is approved by the required number of
votes, it shall become effective 15 days following the completion of its publication in the
Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed that the Members cannot
ignore the people's call for initiative and referendum and urged the Body to approve
House Bill No. 21505.
At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared text of his speech together
with the footnotes be reproduced as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was stressed by then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador
Escudero III in his sponsorship remarks, viz:
7

xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO
Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been clamoring for a truly popular
democracy ever since, especially in the so-called parliament of the streets. A substantial
segment of the population feels, he said, that the form of democracy is there, but not the
reality or substance of it because of the increasingly elitist approach of their
representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution has provided a means
whereby the people can exercise the reserved power of initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution, and requested that Sections 1 and 32, Article VI; Section 3, Article X;
and Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution be made part of his sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is needed for the aforecited
Constitutional provisions. While the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong
269

competition among cause-oriented and sectoral groups, he continued, it will hasten the
politization of the citizenry, aid the government in forming an enlightened public opinion,
and produce more responsive legislation. The passage of the Bill will also give street
parliamentarians the opportunity to articulate their ideas in a democratic forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the early approval of the Bill so that
it can be initially used for the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage of House
Bill No. 21505 will show that the Members can set aside their personal and political
consideration for the greater good of the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 were threshed out in a
Bicameral Conference Committee.
8
In the meeting of the Committee on June 6, 1989,
9
the
members agreed that the two (2) bills should be consolidated and that the consolidated version
should include people's initiative to amend the Constitution as contemplated by House Bill No.
21505. The transcript of the meeting states:
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as I have said, because this is
new in our political system, the Senate decided on a more cautious
approach and limiting it only to the local government units because even
with that stage where . . . at least this has been quite popular, ano? It
has been attempted on a national basis. Alright. There has not been a
single attempt. Now, so, kami limitado doon. And, second, we consider
also that it is only fair that the local legislative body should be given a
chance to adopt the legislation bill proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing
indirect system of initiative. If after all, the local legislative assembly or
body is willing to adopt it in full or in toto, there ought to be any reason
for initiative, ano for initiative. And, number 3, we feel that there should
be some limitation on the frequency with which it should be applied.
Number 4, na the people, thru initiative, cannot enact any ordinance that
is beyond the scope of authority of the local legislative body, otherwise,
my God, mag-aassume sila ng power that is broader and greater than
the grant of legislative power to the Sanggunians. And Number 5,
because of that, then a proposition which has been the result of a
successful initiative can only carry the force and effect of an ordinance
and therefore that should not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to
declare it null and void for want of authority. Ha, di ba? I mean it is
beyond powers of local government units to enact. Iyon ang main
essence namin, so we concentrated on that. And that is why . . . so ang
sa inyo naman includes iyon sa Constitution, amendment to the
Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa amin, if you insist on that, alright,
although we feel na it will in effect become a dead statute. Alright, and
we can agree, we can agree. So ang mangyayari dito, and magiging
basic nito, let us not discuss anymore kung alin and magiging basic bill,
ano, whether it is the Senate Bill or whether it is the House bill. Logically
it should be ours sapagkat una iyong sa amin eh. It is one of the first bills
approved by the Senate kaya ang number niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh.
Huwag na nating pagusapan. Now, if you insist, really iyong features ng
national at saka constitutional, okay. ____ gagawin na natin na
consolidation of both bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.
270

CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of the Senate and House Bill
No. so and so.
10

When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for approval, then Congressman Roco
upon interpellation by Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it covered people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. The record of the House Representative states:
11

xxx xxx xxx
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from Camarines Sur is
recognized.
MR. ROCO. On the Conference Committee Report on the disagreeing
provisions between Senate Bill No. 21505 which refers to the system
providing for the initiative and referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker,
we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so both versions
are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for local
initiative and referendum and the House Representatives correctly
provided for initiative and referendum on the Constitution and on national
legislation.
I move that we approve the consolidated bill.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What is the pleasure of the Minority
Floor Leader?
MR. ALBANO. Will the distinguished sponsor answer just a few
questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentlemen will please proceed.
MR. ALBANO. I heard the sponsor say that the only difference in the two
bills was that in the Senate version there was a provision for local
initiative and referendum, whereas the House version has none.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provide purely for local initiative
and referendum, whereas in the House version, we provided purely for
national and constitutional legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding therefore, that the two provisions
were incorporated?
MR. ROCO. Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. So that we will now have a complete initiative and
referendum both in the constitutional amendment and national
legislation.
MR. ROCO. That is correct.
271

MR. ALBANO. And provincial as well as municipal resolutions?
MR. ROCO. Down to barangay, Mr. Speaker.
MR. ALBANO. And this initiative and referendum is in consonance with
the provision of the Constitution whereby it mandates this Congress to
enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can be
done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution?
MR. ROCO. That is correct, Mr. Speaker. For constitutional amendments
in the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr. Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot have multiple initiatives and
referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was no substantial difference
between the two versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by the Senate which, as I
said earlier, ironically was about local, provincial and municipal
legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were consolidated?
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
APPROVAL OF C.C.R.
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to approve this consolidated bill
on Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the people's initiative to
amend the Constitution, it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was intended by the
legislature. We have ruled that once intent is ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may not
be consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling is as old as the mountain. We have
also held that where a law is susceptible of more than one interpretation, that interpretation which
will most tend to effectuate the manifest intent of the legislature will be adopted.
12

The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably construed to effectuate its intent to implement
the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need not torture the text of said law to
reach the conclusion that it implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is
replete with references to this prerogative of the people.
First, the policy statement declares:
272

Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and
guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the
constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose," and
"plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by
the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution. Section 5(b)
states that "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least threeper centum (3%) of the registered voters therein." It also states that
"(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he
proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to defeat its
intent which it itself concedes is to implement people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. Thus, it laments that the word "Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant to the policy
thrust of section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not accurate. These lapses are to be expected for
laws are not always written in impeccable English. Rightly, the Constitution does not require our
legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to write bills with poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or in
lyrical prose like Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to refuse to effectuate the
intent of a law on the ground that it is badly written. As the distinguished Vicente Francisco
13
reminds us:
"Many laws contain words which have not been used accurately. But the use of inapt or inaccurate
language or words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention can be ascertained. The same is
equally true with reference to awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical expressions, that is, such expressions
and words will be construed as carrying the meaning the legislature intended that they bear, although
such a construction necessitates a departure from the literal meaning of the words used.
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not include people's initiative to amend the
Constitution simply because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the weight of helium. Again,
the hoary rule in statutory construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and sections of a
statute may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn therefrom are entitled to very little
weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting clauses.
14

All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that refuses to enforce the manifest intent or spirit
of R.A. No. 6735 to implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It blatantly disregards the
rule cast in concrete that the letter of the law must yield to its spirit for the letter of the law is its body but
its spirit is its soul.
15

II
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
16
promulgated under the stewardship of Commissioner Haydee Yorac,
then its Acting Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. This is in accord with the delegated power granted by section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 to the
COMELEC which expressly states: "The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." By no means can this delegation
273

of power be assailed as infirmed. In the benchmark case of Pelaez v. Auditor General,
17
this Court, thru
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to determine whether there is undue
delegation of legislative power, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself
it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and (b) to fix standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, which is the essence of every law, and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the
law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent
with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a
law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred
to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in promulgating the
law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, section 2 spells out the policy of the
law; viz: "The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of
signatures necessary to start a people's initiative,
18
directs how initiative proceeding is
commenced,
19
what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for initiative,
20
how a proposition
is approved,
21
when a plebiscite may be held,
22
when the amendment takes effect
23
and what matters
may not be the subject of any initiative.
24
By any measure, these standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a sufficient standard is intended to map out the
boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances
under which it is to be pursued and effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is to prevent a total
transference of legislative power from the lawmaking body to the delegate."
25
In enacting R.A. No. 6735,
it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred its power to enact the law implementing people's
initiative to COMELEC. A close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show that it merely provided
the procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. The debates
26
in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that the rules of procedure to
enforce the people's initiative can be delegated, thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, it is possible
. . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
274

xxx xxx xxx
form.
requirement.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers,
27
Father Bernas likewise affirmed: "In
response to questions of Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the extent of the power of the
legislature over the process: it could for instance, prescribe the 'proper form before (the
amendment) is submitted to the people,' it could authorize another body to check the proper form.
It could also authorize the COMELEC, for instance, to check the authenticity of the signatures of
petitioners. Davide concluded: 'As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In
other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or
impair the right conceded here.'" Quite clearly, the prohibition against the legislature is to impair
the substantive right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. It is not, however,
prohibited from legislating the procedure to enforce the people's right of initiative or to delegate it
to another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has prudentially refrained from invalidating
administrative rules on the ground of lack of adequate legislative standard to guide their promulgation. As
aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself does not expressly pinpoint the standard,
the courts will bend backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from
constitutional infirmity."
28
He cited the ruling in Hirabayashi v. United States,
29
viz:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular standard to which orders of
the military commander are to conform, or require findings to be made as a prerequisite
to any order. But the Executive Order, the Proclamations and the statute are not to be
read in isolation from each other. They were parts of a single program and must be
judged as such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an adoption by Congress of the
Executive Order and of the Proclamations. The Proclamations themselves followed a
standard authorized by the Executive Order the necessity of protecting military
resources in the designated areas against espionage and sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20 look at
the law cannot miss them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible ink. The policy and
standards can also be found in no less than section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold that the standards provided for in R.A.
No. 6735 are insufficient for in other cases we have upheld as adequate more general standards
275

such as "simplicity and dignity,"
30
"public interest,"
31
"public welfare,"
32
"interest of law and
order,"
33
"justice and equity,"
34
"adequate and efficient instruction,"
35
"public safety,"
36
"public
policy",
37
"greater national interest",
38
"protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing
domestic pump rates",
39
and "promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in government."
40
A
due regard and respect to the legislature, a co-equal and coordinate branch of government,
should counsel this Court to refrain from refusing to effectuate laws unless they are clearly
unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he dismissed with respect to the Pedrosas. The
inclusion of the Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show that the case at bar started
when respondent Delfin alone and by himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by People's Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the
petition. It was Senator Roco who moved to intervene and was allowed to do so by the COMELEC. The
petition was heard and before the COMELEC could resolve the Delfin petition, the case at bar was filed
by the petitioners with this Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and
Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The suit is an original action for prohibition with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the Pedrosas. The only allegation against the
Pedrosas is that they are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to undertake the signature
drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA itself as an organization was
not impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners then prayed that we order the Pedrosas ". . . to desist from
conducting a signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." On December 19, 1996,
we temporarily enjoined the Pedrosas ". . . from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to
amend the Constitution." It is not enough for the majority to lift the temporary restraining order against the
Pedrosas. It should dismiss the petition and all motions for contempt against them without equivocation.
One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in soliciting signatures to start a people's
initiative to amend the Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act. Their solicitation of
signatures is a right guaranteed in black and white by section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution which
provides that ". . . amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative. . ." This right springs from the principle proclaimed in section 1, Article II of the
Constitution that in a democratic and republican state "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The Pedrosas are part of the people and their voice is part of
the voice of the people. They may constitute but a particle of our sovereignty but no power can trivialize
them for sovereignty is indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The right of the people and their
organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the 1987 Constitution strengthening the
sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In soliciting signatures to amend the Constitution, the Pedrosas
are participating in the political decision-making process of our people. The Constitution says their right
cannot be abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question mark on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas' campaign to amend the Constitution is an exercise
of their freedom of speech and expression and their right to petition the government for redress of
grievances. We have memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental laws from the Malolos
Constitution to the 1987 Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our rulings that freedom of
speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important rights of our people. Undeniably, freedom of
speech enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think and let think. For this reason, the
Constitution encourages speech even if it protects the speechless.
276

It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures to start a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution does not depend on any law, much less on R.A. 6735 or COMELEC Resolution No.
2300. No law, no Constitution can chain the people to an undesirable status quo. To be sure, there are no
irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress and
we should not fear change. Mankind has long recognized the truism that the only constant in life is
change and so should the majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power as expanded in the 1987 Constitution. On
October 5, 1993, we observed that people's might is no longer a myth but an article of faith in our
Constitution.
41
On September 30, 1994, we postulated that people power can be trusted to check
excesses of government and that any effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be
rejected.
42
On September 26, 1996, we pledged that ". . . this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will
exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise."
43
Just a few days ago, or on
March 11, 1997, by a unanimous decision,
44
we allowed a recall election in Caloocan City involving the
mayor and ordered that he submits his right to continue in office to the judgment of the tribunal of the
people. Thus far, we have succeeded in transforming people power from an opaque abstraction to a
robust reality. The Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to blossom in full. The Court
cannot halt any and all signature campaigns to amend the Constitution without setting back the flowering
of people empowerment. More important, the Court cannot seal the lips of people who are pro-change but
not those who are anti-change without concerting the debate on charter change into a sterile talkaton.
Democracy is enlivened by a dialogue and not by a monologue for in a democracy nobody can claim any
infallibility.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

VITUG, J ., concurring and dissenting:
The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part of the Court to engross, let alone to commit,
itself on all the issues raised and debated upon by the parties. What is essential at this time would only be
to resolve whether or not the petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by Atty. Jesus S. Delfin in his
capacity as a "founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative" and seeking through a people
initiative certain modifications on the 1987 Constitution, can properly be regarded and given its due
course. The Constitution, relative to any proposed amendment under this method, is explicit. Section 2,
Article XVII, thereof provides:
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the constitutional imperatives, the
petition would rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect, to the COMELEC. The petition would
require COMELEC to schedule "signature gathering all over the country," to cause the necessary
publication of the petition "in newspapers of general and local circulation," and to instruct "Municipal
277

Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent
under theponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as
having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a
right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative.
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those who reign are the governed themselves. The
postulate is no longer lightly taken as just a perceived myth but a veritable reality. The past has taught us
that the vitality of government lies not so much in the strength of those who lead as in the consent of
those who are led. The role of free speech is pivotal but it can only have its true meaning if it comes with
the correlative end of being heard.
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in form and substance, it behooves the Court, I
most respectfully submit, to yet refrain from resolving the question of whether or not Republic Act No.
6735 has effectively and sufficiently implemented the Constitutional provision on right of the people to
directly propose constitutional amendments. Any opinion or view formulated by the Court at this point
would at best be only a non-binding, albeit possibly persuasive, obiter dictum.
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the
Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional
amendments.

FRANCISCO, J ., dissenting and concurring:
There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-
written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to
cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
1
Unlike our previous constitutions, the present 1987 Constitution has given more
significance to this declaration of principle for the people are now vested with power not only to propose,
enact or reject any act or law passed by Congress or by the local legislative body, but to propose
amendments to the constitution as well.
2
To implement these constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989
enacted Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as "The initiative and Referendum Act". This law, to my
mind, amply covers an initiative on the constitution. The contrary view maintained by petitioners is based
principally on the alleged lack of sub-title in the law on initiative to amend the constitution and on their
allegation that:
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print
media. [And] [t]his indicates that Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments, because constitutional amendments take effect upon
ratification not after publication.
3

which allegation manifests petitioners' selective interpretation of the law, for under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 6735 on the Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition paragraph (b)
thereof is clear in providing that:
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
278

It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference the context, i.e., that every part
of the statute must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.
4
Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may not be interpreted in isolation.
The legislative intent behind every law is to be extracted from the statute as a whole.
5

In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines initiative as "the power of the people to propose
amendments to the constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose".
6
The same section, in enumerating the three systems of initiative, included an "initiative on the
constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the constitution"
7
Paragraph (e) again of
Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the constitution is
approved or rejected by the people" And as to the material requirements for an initiative on the
Constitution, Section 5(b) distinctly enumerates the following:
A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of the registered voters as signatories, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered
voters therein. Initiative on the constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five years thereafter.
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the intent being to provide for the
implementation of the right to propose an amendment to the Constitution by way of initiative. "A
legal provision", the Court has previously said, "must not be construed as to be a useless
surplusage, and accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no
effect whatsoever thereon".
8
That this is the legislative intent is further shown by the
deliberations in Congress, thus:
. . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration of the Conference Committee
Report on the disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505, it
was noted:
provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and the consolidated House Bill
No. 21505 which refers to the system providing for the initiative and
referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate
and the House versions, so both versions are totally intact in the bill. The
Senators ironically provided for local initiative and referendum and the
House of Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum
an the Constitution and on national legislation.
MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.
Floor Leader?
questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
279

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please proceed.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local initiative
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two provisions
were incorporated?
legislation.
the provision of the Constitution to enact the enabling law, so that we
shall have a system which can be done every five years. Is it five years
in the provision of the Constitution?
to the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years." (Id. [Journal and Record
of the House of Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8 June 1989, p. 960; quoted
in Garcia v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 279, 292-293 [1994]; emphasis
supplied)
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have comprehended initiatives on the
Constitution. When consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill and as
approved and enacted into law, the proposal included initiative on both the Constitution
and ordinary laws.
9

Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on the constitution. Any other
construction as what petitioners foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and spirit
behind the enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission on Elections, at present, cannot take any
action (such as those contained in the Commission's orders dated December 6, 9, and 12, 1996
[Annexes B, C and B-1]) indicative of its having already assumed jurisdiction over private respondents'
petition. This is so because from the tenor of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would appear that proof of
procurement of the required percentage of registered voters at the time the petition for initiative is filed, is
a jurisdictional requirement.
Thus:
280

centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years
from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the required signatures. This defect
notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the refiling of their petition once compliance with the
required percentage is satisfactorily shown by private respondents. In the absence, therefore, of
an appropriate petition before the Commission on Elections, any determination of whether private
respondents' proposal constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached in the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735 is an
"inadequate" legislation to cover a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. I,
however, register my concurrence with the dismissal, in the meantime, of private respondents' petition for
initiative before public respondent Commission on Elections until the same be supported by proof of strict
compliance with Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.

PANGANIBAN, J ., concurring and dissenting:
Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the "initiatory"
Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be directly proposed by the people through initiative,"
there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of
signatures in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every
legislative district no public funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an
initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the Constitution cannot be
amended at all through a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by Pirma, not by anyone, not even by all
the voters of the country acting together. This decision will effectively but unnecessarily curtail, nullify,
abrogate and render inutile the people's right to change the basic law. At the very least, the majority holds
the right hostage to congressional discretion on whether to pass a new law to implement it, when there is
already one existing at present. This right to amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed by
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:
281

With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent to
burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What
Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future
effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a
misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right
thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution, RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 Are Sufficient to Implement Constitutional Initiatives
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was as the majority openly concedes intended by the
legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on
the Constitution.
1
I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently
implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no
longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings
in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections,
2
that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to
be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters
of the rights granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec,
3
that any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of
people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, RA 6735
wisely empowered
4
the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution
2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct of
initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws," not by the
incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac,
Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B.
Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission,
and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort
to give life to a cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local legislations, it
is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such differentiation. The source of
and authority for the Resolution is the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution
(particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R4 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.
Petitioner Delfin and the Pedrosa
Spouses Should Not Be Muzzled
I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by this Court
on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising
their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against private respondents should
not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the Comelec should be stopped from using
public funds and government resources to help them gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has
no power to restrain them from exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose amendments to the
Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be
282

tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others to conform to his/her
beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the
death your right to say it." After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice
Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we hate."
5

Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum and
recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All three are institutionalized
legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed
expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic rights of our people to be used as their
final weapons against political excesses, opportunism, inaction, oppression and misgovernance; as well
as their reserved instruments to exact transparency, accountability and faithfulness from their chosen
leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and abuse must be resolutely struck down, on the other,
their legitimate exercise should be carefully nurtured and zealously protected.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al. and to DIRECT
Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of prematurity, but
not on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order
issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa
from exercising their right to free speech in proposing amendments to the Constitution.

Separate Opinions
PUNO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
I join the ground-breaking ponencia of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Davide insofar as it orders the
COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition. I regret, however, I cannot share the view that R.A. No. 5735
and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 are legally defective and cannot implement the people's initiative to
amend the Constitution. I likewise submit that the petition with respect to the Pedrosas has no leg to
stand on and should be dismissed. With due respect:
I
First, I submit that R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to
the Constitution thru initiative. Our effort to discover the meaning of R.A. No. 6735 should start with the
search of the intent of our lawmakers. A knowledge of this intent is critical for the intent of the legislature
is the law and the controlling factor in its interpretation.
1
Stated otherwise, intent is the essence of the
law, the spirit which gives life to its enactment.
2

Significantly, the majority decision concedes that ". . . R.A. No. 6735 was intended to cover initiative to
propose amendments to the Constitution." It ought to be so for this intent is crystal clear from the history
of the law which was a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505
3
and Senate Bill No. 17.
4
Senate Bill No. 17
was entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and the Exception Therefrom,
Whereby People in Local Government Units Can Directly Propose and Enact Resolutions and
Ordinances or Approve or Reject any Ordinance or Resolution Passed by the Local Legislative Body."
Beyond doubt, Senate Bill No. 17 did not include people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. In checkered contrast, House Bill No. 21505
5
expressly included people's initiative to
283

amend the Constitution. Congressman (now Senator) Raul Roco emphasized in his sponsorship
remarks:
6

xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ROCO
At the outset, Mr. Roco provided the following backgrounder on the constitutional basis of
the proposed measure.
1. As cited in Vera vs. Avelino (1946), the presidential system which was introduced by
the 1935 Constitution saw the application of the principle of separation of powers.
2. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the principle remained
applicable, the 1981 amendments to the Constitution of 1973 ensured presidential
dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Constitutional history then saw the shifting and sharing of legislative powers between the
Legislature and the Executive departments. Transcending changes in the exercise of
legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine Constitution that the Philippines is a
republican state where sovereignty resides in the people and all sovereignty emanates
from them.
3. Under the 1987 Constitution, the lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress;
however, to institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986
Revolution, the Constitution recognizes the power of the people, through the system of
As cited in Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have plenary
powers since reserve powers are given to the people expressly. Section 32 of the same
Article mandates Congress to pass at the soonest possible time, a bill on referendum and
initiative, and to share its legislative powers with the people.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, vests in the people the
power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, upon petition
of at least 12 percent of the total number of registered voters.
Stating that House Bill No. 21505 is the Committee's response to the duty imposed on
Congress to implement the exercise by the people of the right to initiative and
referendum, Mr. Roco recalled the beginnings of the system of initiative and referendum
under Philippine Law. He cited Section 99 of the Local Government Code which vests in
the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative processes, decide the holding of
plebiscite and hear reports of the Sangguniang Barangay, all of which are variations of
the power of initiative and referendum. He added that the holding of barangay plebiscites
and referendum are likewise provided in Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Thereupon, for the sake of brevity, Mr. Roco moved that pertinent quotation on the
subject which he will later submit to the Secretary of the House be incorporated as part of
his sponsorship speech.
He then cited examples of initiative and referendum similar to those contained in the
instant Bill among which are the constitutions of states in the United States which
recognize the right of registered voters to initiate the enactment of any statute or to
284

project any existing law or parts thereof in a referendum. These states, he said, are
Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusets, Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and practically
all other states.
Mr. Roco explained that in certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and
referendum apply is also without limitation, except for emergency measures, which are
likewise incorporated in House Bill No. 21505. He added that the procedure provided by
the Bill from the filing of the petition, the requirements of a certain percentage of
supporters to present a proposition, to the submission to electors are substantially similar
to the provisions in American laws. Although an infant in Philippine political structure, the
system of initiative and referendum, he said, is a tried and tested system in other
jurisdictions, and the Bill is patterned after American experience.
He further explained that the bill has only 12 sections, and recalled that the Constitutional
Commissioners saw the system of the initiative and referendum as an instrument which
can be used should the legislature show itself to be indifferent to the needs of the people.
This is the reason, he claimed, why now is an opportune time to pass the Bill even as he
noted the felt necessity of the times to pass laws which are necessary to safeguard
individual rights and liberties.
At this juncture Mr. Roco explained the process of initiative and referendum as advocated
in House Bill No. 21505. He stated that:
1. Initiative means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit a Bill for the
consideration of the general electorate.
2. The instant Bill provides three kinds of initiative, namely; the initiative to amend the
Constitution once every five years; the initiative to amend statutes approved by
Congress; and the initiative to amend local ordinances.
3. The instant Bill gives a definite procedure and allows the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to define rules and regulations on the power of initiative.
4. Referendum means that the legislators seek the consent of the people on measures
that they have approved.
5. Under Section 4 of the Bill the people can initiate a referendum which is a mode of
plebiscite by presenting a petition therefor, but under certain limitations, such as the
signing of said petition by at least 10 percent of the total of registered voters at which
every legislative district is represented by at least three percent of the registered voters
thereof. Within 30 days after receipt of the petition, the COMELEC shall determine the
sufficiency of the petition, publish the same, and set the date of the referendum within 45
to 90-day period.
6. When the matter under referendum or initiative is approved by the required number of
votes, it shall become effective 15 days following the completion of its publication in the
Official Gazette.
In concluding his sponsorship remarks, Mr. Roco stressed that the Members cannot
ignore the people's call for initiative and referendum and urged the Body to approve
House Bill No. 21505.
285

At this juncture, Mr. Roco also requested that the prepared text of his speech together
with the footnotes be reproduced as part of the Congressional Records.
The same sentiment as to the bill's intent to implement people's initiative to amend the
Constitution was stressed by then Congressman (now Secretary of Agriculture) Salvador
Escudero III in his sponsorship remarks, viz:
7

xxx xxx xxx
SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF MR. ESCUDERO
Mr. Escudero first pointed out that the people have been clamoring for a truly popular
democracy ever since, especially in the so-called parliament of the streets. A substantial
segment of the population feels, he said, that the form of democracy is there, but not the
reality or substance of it because of the increasingly elitist approach of their
representatives to the country's problem.
Whereupon, Mr. Escudero pointed out that the Constitution has provided a means
whereby the people can exercise the reserved power of initiative to propose amendments
to the Constitution, and requested that Sections 1 and 32, Article VI; Section 3, Article X;
and Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution be made part of his sponsorship remarks.
Mr. Escudero also stressed that an implementing law is needed for the aforecited
Constitutional provisions. While the enactment of the Bill will give way to strong
competition among cause-oriented and sectoral groups, he continued, it will hasten the
politization of the citizenry, aid the government in forming an enlightened public opinion,
and produce more responsive legislation. The passage of the Bill will also give street
parliamentarians the opportunity to articulate their ideas in a democratic forum, he added.
Mr. Escudero stated that he and Mr. Roco hoped for the early approval of the Bill so that
it can be initially used for the Agrarian Reform Law. He said that the passage of House
Bill No. 21505 will show that the Members can set aside their personal and political
consideration for the greater good of the people.
The disagreeing provisions in Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 were threshed out in a
Bicameral Conference Committee.
8
In the meeting of the Committee on June 6, 1989,
9
the
members agreed that the two (2) bills should be consolidated and that the consolidated version
should include people's initiative to amend the Constitution as contemplated by House Bill No.
21505. The transcript of the meeting states:
xxx xxx xxx
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. But at any rate, as I have said, because this is
new in our political system, the Senate decided on a more cautious
approach and limiting it only to the local government units because even
with that stage where . . . at least this has been quite popular, ano? It
has been attempted on a national basis. Alright. There has not been a
single attempt. Now, so, kami limitado doon. And, second, we consider
also that it is only fair that the local legislative body should be given a
chance to adopt the legislation bill proposed, right? Iyong sinasabing
indirect system of initiative. If after all, the local legislative assembly or
body is willing to adopt it in full or in toto, there ought to be any reason
for initiative, ano for initiative. And, number 3, we feel that there should
be some limitation on the frequency with which it should be applied.
286

Number 4, na the people, thru initiative, cannot enact any ordinance that
is beyond the scope of authority of the local legislative body, otherwise,
my God, mag-aassume sila ng power that is broader and greater than
the grant of legislative power to the Sanggunians. And Number 5,
because of that, then a proposition which has been the result of a
successful initiative can only carry the force and effect of an ordinance
and therefore that should not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to
declare it null and void for want of authority. Ha, di ba? I mean it is
beyond powers of local government units to enact. Iyon ang main
essence namin, so we concentrated on that. And that is why . . . so ang
sa inyo naman includes iyon sa Constitution, amendment to the
Constitution eh . . . national laws. Sa amin, if you insist on that, alright,
although we feel na it will in effect become a dead statute. Alright, and
we can agree, we can agree. So ang mangyayari dito, and magiging
basic nito, let us not discuss anymore kung alin and magiging basic bill,
ano, whether it is the Senate Bill or whether it is the House bill. Logically
it should be ours sapagkat una iyong sa amin eh. It is one of the first bills
approved by the Senate kaya ang number niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh.
Huwag na nating pagusapan. Now, if you insist, really iyong features ng
national at saka constitutional, okay. ____ gagawin na natin na
consolidation of both bills.
HON. ROCO. Yes, we shall consolidate.
CHAIRMAN GONZALES. Consolidation of the Senate and House Bill
No. so and so.
10

When the consolidated bill was presented to the House for approval, then Congressman Roco
upon interpellation by Congressman Rodolfo Albano, again confirmed that it covered people's
initiative to amend the Constitution. The record of the House Representative states:
11

xxx xxx xxx
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman from Camarines Sur is
recognized.
provisions between Senate Bill No. 21505 which refers to the system
providing for the initiative and referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker,
we consolidated the Senate and the House versions, so both versions
are totally intact in the bill. The Senators ironically provided for local
initiative and referendum and the House Representatives correctly
provided for initiative and referendum on the Constitution and on national
legislation.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker.
Floor Leader?
questions?
287

THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentlemen will please proceed.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provide purely for local initiative
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding therefore, that the two provisions
were incorporated?
legislation.
the provision of the Constitution whereby it mandates this Congress to
enact the enabling law, so that we shall have a system which can be
done every five years. Is it five years in the provision of the Constitution?
in the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years.
MR. ALBANO. For every five years, Mr. Speaker?
MR. ROCO. Within five years, we cannot have multiple initiatives and
referenda.
MR. ALBANO. Therefore, basically, there was no substantial difference
between the two versions?
MR. ROCO. The gaps in our bill were filled by the Senate which, as I
said earlier, ironically was about local, provincial and municipal
legislation.
MR. ALBANO. And the two bills were consolidated?
MR. ALBANO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
288

APPROVAL OF C.C.R.
ON S.B. NO. 17 AND H.B. NO. 21505
(The Initiative and Referendum Act)
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. There was a motion to approve this consolidated bill
on Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505.
Is there any objection? (Silence. The Chair hears none; the motion is approved.
Since it is crystalline that the intent of R.A. No. 6735 is to implement the people's initiative to
amend the Constitution, it is our bounden duty to interpret the law as it was intended by the
legislature. We have ruled that once intent is ascertained, it must be enforced even if it may not
be consistent with the strict letter of the law and this ruling is as old as the mountain. We have
also held that where a law is susceptible of more than one interpretation, that interpretation which
will most tend to effectuate the manifest intent of the legislature will be adopted.
12

The text of R.A. No. 6735 should therefore be reasonably construed to effectuate its intent to implement
the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. To be sure, we need not torture the text of said law to
reach the conclusion that it implements people's initiative to amend the Constitution. R.A. No. 6735 is
replete with references to this prerogative of the people.
First, the policy statement declares:
guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
Second, the law defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the
constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose," and
"plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by
the people.
Third, the law provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution. Section 5(b)
states that "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least threeper centum (3%) of the registered voters therein." It also states that
"(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987
Finally, R.A. No. 6735 fixes the effectivity date of the amendment. Section 9(b) states that "(t)he
proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
It is unfortunate that the majority decision resorts to a strained interpretation of R.A. No. 6735 to defeat its
intent which it itself concedes is to implement people's initiative to propose amendments to the
Constitution. Thus, it laments that the word "Constitution" is neither germane nor relevant to the policy
thrust of section 2 and that the statute's subtitling is not accurate. These lapses are to be expected for
laws are not always written in impeccable English. Rightly, the Constitution does not require our
legislators to be word-smiths with the ability to write bills with poetic commas like Jose Garcia Villa or in
lyrical prose like Winston Churchill. But it has always been our good policy not to refuse to effectuate the
intent of a law on the ground that it is badly written. As the distinguished Vicente Francisco
13
reminds us:
"Many laws contain words which have not been used accurately. But the use of inapt or inaccurate
289

language or words, will not vitiate the statute if the legislative intention can be ascertained. The same is
equally true with reference to awkward, slovenly, or ungrammatical expressions, that is, such expressions
and words will be construed as carrying the meaning the legislature intended that they bear, although
such a construction necessitates a departure from the literal meaning of the words used.
In the same vein, the argument that R.A. No. 7535 does not include people's initiative to amend the
Constitution simply because it lacks a sub-title on the subject should be given the weight of helium. Again,
the hoary rule in statutory construction is that headings prefixed to titles, chapters and sections of a
statute may be consulted in aid of interpretation, but inferences drawn therefrom are entitled to very little
weight, and they can never control the plain terms of the enacting clauses.
14

All said, it is difficult to agree with the majority decision that refuses to enforce the manifest intent or spirit
of R.A. No. 6735 to implement the people's initiative to amend the Constitution. It blatantly disregards the
rule cast in concrete that the letter of the law must yield to its spirit for the letter of the law is its body but
its spirit is its soul.
15

II
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
16
promulgated under the stewardship of Commissioner Haydee Yorac,
then its Acting Chairman, spelled out the procedure on how to exercise the people's initiative to amend
the Constitution. This is in accord with the delegated power granted by section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 to the
COMELEC which expressly states: "The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." By no means can this delegation
of power be assailed as infirmed. In the benchmark case of Pelaez v. Auditor General,
17
this Court, thru
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion laid down the test to determine whether there is undue
delegation of legislative power, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself
it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate and (b) to fix standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, which is the essence of every law, and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the
law, but, also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent
with the end sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently,
undermining the very foundation of our republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well-settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a
law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred
to.
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in promulgating the
law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, section 2 spells out the policy of the
law; viz: "The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to directly propose, enact,
approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any
290

legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A. No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of
signatures necessary to start a people's initiative,
18
directs how initiative proceeding is
commenced,
19
what the COMELEC should do upon filing of the petition for initiative,
20
how a proposition
is approved,
21
when a plebiscite may be held,
22
when the amendment takes effect
23
and what matters
may not be the subject of any initiative.
24
By any measure, these standards are adequate.
Former Justice Isagani A. Cruz, similarly elucidated that "a sufficient standard is intended to map out the
boundaries of the delegates' authority by defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances
under which it is to be pursued and effected. The purpose of the sufficient standard is to prevent a total
transference of legislative power from the lawmaking body to the delegate."
25
In enacting R.A. No. 6735,
it cannot be said that Congress totally transferred its power to enact the law implementing people's
initiative to COMELEC. A close look at COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 will show that it merely provided
the procedure to effectuate the policy of R.A. No. 6735 giving life to the people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. The debates
26
in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that the rules of procedure to
enforce the people's initiative can be delegated, thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, it is possible
. . ?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
xxx xxx xxx
form.
requirement.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
In his book, The Intent of the 1986 Constitution Writers,
27
Father Bernas likewise affirmed: "In
response to questions of Commissioner Romulo, Davide explained the extent of the power of the
legislature over the process: it could for instance, prescribe the 'proper form before (the
amendment) is submitted to the people,' it could authorize another body to check the proper form.
It could also authorize the COMELEC, for instance, to check the authenticity of the signatures of
petitioners. Davide concluded: 'As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In
other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or
impair the right conceded here.'" Quite clearly, the prohibition against the legislature is to impair
the substantive right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. It is not, however,
291

prohibited from legislating the procedure to enforce the people's right of initiative or to delegate it
to another body like the COMELEC with proper standard.
A survey of our case law will show that this Court has prudentially refrained from invalidating
administrative rules on the ground of lack of adequate legislative standard to guide their promulgation. As
aptly perceived by former Justice Cruz, "even if the law itself does not expressly pinpoint the standard,
the courts will bend backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare the statute, if it can, from
constitutional infirmity."
28
He cited the ruling in Hirabayashi v. United States,
29
viz:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that the Act does not in terms establish a particular standard to which orders of
the military commander are to conform, or require findings to be made as a prerequisite
to any order. But the Executive Order, the Proclamations and the statute are not to be
read in isolation from each other. They were parts of a single program and must be
judged as such. The Act of March 21, 1942, was an adoption by Congress of the
Executive Order and of the Proclamations. The Proclamations themselves followed a
standard authorized by the Executive Order the necessity of protecting military
resources in the designated areas against espionage and sabotage.
In the case at bar, the policy and the standards are bright-lined in R.A. No. 6735. A 20-20 look at
the law cannot miss them. They were not written by our legislators in invisible ink. The policy and
standards can also be found in no less than section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on
Amendments or Revisions. There is thus no reason to hold that the standards provided for in R.A.
No. 6735 are insufficient for in other cases we have upheld as adequate more general standards
such as "simplicity and dignity,"
30
"public interest,"
31
"public welfare,"
32
"interest of law and
order,"
33
"justice and equity,"
34
"adequate and efficient instruction,"
35
"public safety,"
36
"public
policy",
37
"greater national interest",
38
"protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing
domestic pump rates",
39
and "promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in government."
40
A
due regard and respect to the legislature, a co-equal and coordinate branch of government,
should counsel this Court to refrain from refusing to effectuate laws unless they are clearly
unconstitutional.
III
It is also respectfully submitted that the petition should he dismissed with respect to the Pedrosas. The
inclusion of the Pedrosas in the petition is utterly baseless. The records show that the case at bar started
when respondent Delfin alone and by himself filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Amend the
Constitution to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials by People's Initiative. The Pedrosas did not join the
petition. It was Senator Roco who moved to intervene and was allowed to do so by the COMELEC. The
petition was heard and before the COMELEC could resolve the Delfin petition, the case at bar was filed
by the petitioners with this Court. Petitioners sued the COMELEC. Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and
Carmen Pedrosa in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reform,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA). The suit is an original action for prohibition with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
The petition on its face states no cause of action against the Pedrosas. The only allegation against the
Pedrosas is that they are founding members of the PIRMA which proposes to undertake the signature
drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Strangely, the PIRMA itself as an organization was
not impleaded as a respondent. Petitioners then prayed that we order the Pedrosas ". . . to desist from
conducting a signature drive for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." On December 19, 1996,
we temporarily enjoined the Pedrosas ". . . from conducting a signature drive for people's initiative to
amend the Constitution." It is not enough for the majority to lift the temporary restraining order against the
Pedrosas. It should dismiss the petition and all motions for contempt against them without equivocation.
292

One need not draw a picture to impart the proposition that in soliciting signatures to start a people's
initiative to amend the Constitution the Pedrosas are not engaged in any criminal act. Their solicitation of
signatures is a right guaranteed in black and white by section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution which
provides that ". . . amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
through initiative. . ." This right springs from the principle proclaimed in section 1, Article II of the
Constitution that in a democratic and republican state "sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them." The Pedrosas are part of the people and their voice is part of
the voice of the people. They may constitute but a particle of our sovereignty but no power can trivialize
them for sovereignty is indivisible.
But this is not all. Section 16 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides: "The right of the people and their
organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political and economic
decision-making shall not be abridged. The State shall by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate
consultation mechanisms." This is another novel provision of the 1987 Constitution strengthening the
sinews of the sovereignty of our people. In soliciting signatures to amend the Constitution, the Pedrosas
are participating in the political decision-making process of our people. The Constitution says their right
cannot be abridged without any ifs and buts. We cannot put a question mark on their right.
Over and above these new provisions, the Pedrosas' campaign to amend the Constitution is an exercise
of their freedom of speech and expression and their right to petition the government for redress of
grievances. We have memorialized this universal right in all our fundamental laws from the Malolos
Constitution to the 1987 Constitution. We have iterated and reiterated in our rulings that freedom of
speech is a preferred right, the matrix of other important rights of our people. Undeniably, freedom of
speech enervates the essence of the democratic creed of think and let think. For this reason, the
Constitution encourages speech even if it protects the speechless.
It is thus evident that the right of the Pedrosas to solicit signatures to start a people's initiative to amend
the Constitution does not depend on any law, much less on R.A. 6735 or COMELEC Resolution No.
2300. No law, no Constitution can chain the people to an undesirable status quo. To be sure, there are no
irrepealable laws just as there are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of progress and
we should not fear change. Mankind has long recognized the truism that the only constant in life is
change and so should the majority.
IV
In a stream of cases, this Court has rhapsodized people power as expanded in the 1987 Constitution. On
October 5, 1993, we observed that people's might is no longer a myth but an article of faith in our
Constitution.
41
On September 30, 1994, we postulated that people power can be trusted to check
excesses of government and that any effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives ought to be
rejected.
42
On September 26, 1996, we pledged that ". . . this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will
exert every effort to nurture, protect and promote their legitimate exercise."
43
Just a few days ago, or on
March 11, 1997, by a unanimous decision,
44
we allowed a recall election in Caloocan City involving the
mayor and ordered that he submits his right to continue in office to the judgment of the tribunal of the
people. Thus far, we have succeeded in transforming people power from an opaque abstraction to a
robust reality. The Constitution calls us to encourage people empowerment to blossom in full. The Court
cannot halt any and all signature campaigns to amend the Constitution without setting back the flowering
of people empowerment. More important, the Court cannot seal the lips of people who are pro-change but
not those who are anti-change without concerting the debate on charter change into a sterile talkaton.
Democracy is enlivened by a dialogue and not by a monologue for in a democracy nobody can claim any
infallibility.

293

VITUG, J ., concurring and dissenting:
The COMELEC should have dismissed, outrightly, the Delfin Petition.
It does seem to me that there is no real exigency on the part of the Court to engross, let alone to commit,
itself on all the issues raised and debated upon by the parties. What is essential at this time would only be
to resolve whether or not the petition filed with the COMELEC, signed by Atty. Jesus S. Delfin in his
capacity as a "founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative" and seeking through a people
initiative certain modifications on the 1987 Constitution, can properly be regarded and given its due
course. The Constitution, relative to any proposed amendment under this method, is explicit. Section 2,
Article XVII, thereof provides:
The Delfin petition is thus utterly deficient. Instead of complying with the constitutional imperatives, the
petition would rather have much of its burden passed on, in effect, to the COMELEC. The petition would
require COMELEC to schedule "signature gathering all over the country," to cause the necessary
publication of the petition "in newspapers of general and local circulation," and to instruct "Municipal
Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing
signing stations at the time and on the dates designated for the purpose.
I submit, even then, that the TRO earlier issued by the Court which, consequentially, is made permanent
under theponencia should be held to cover only the Delfin petition and must not be so understood as
having intended or contemplated to embrace the signature drive of the Pedrosas. The grant of such a
right is clearly implicit in the constitutional mandate on people initiative.
The distinct greatness of a democratic society is that those who reign are the governed themselves. The
postulate is no longer lightly taken as just a perceived myth but a veritable reality. The past has taught us
that the vitality of government lies not so much in the strength of those who lead as in the consent of
those who are led. The role of free speech is pivotal but it can only have its true meaning if it comes with
the correlative end of being heard.
Pending a petition for a people's initiative that is sufficient in form and substance, it behooves the Court, I
most respectfully submit, to yet refrain from resolving the question of whether or not Republic Act No.
6735 has effectively and sufficiently implemented the Constitutional provision on right of the people to
directly propose constitutional amendments. Any opinion or view formulated by the Court at this point
would at best be only a non-binding, albeit possibly persuasive, obiter dictum.
I vote for granting the instant petition before the Court and for clarifying that the TRO earlier issued by the
Court did not prescribe the exercise by the Pedrosas of their right to campaign for constitutional
amendments.

FRANCISCO, J ., dissenting and concurring:
294

There is no question that my esteemed colleague Mr. Justice Davide has prepared a scholarly and well-
written ponencia. Nonetheless, I cannot fully subscribe to his view that R. A. No. 6735 is inadequate to
cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
To begin with, sovereignty under the constitution, resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.
1
Unlike our previous constitutions, the present 1987 Constitution has given more
significance to this declaration of principle for the people are now vested with power not only to propose,
enact or reject any act or law passed by Congress or by the local legislative body, but to propose
amendments to the constitution as well.
2
To implement these constitutional edicts, Congress in 1989
enacted Republic Act No. 6735, otherwise known as "The initiative and Referendum Act". This law, to my
mind, amply covers an initiative on the constitution. The contrary view maintained by petitioners is based
principally on the alleged lack of sub-title in the law on initiative to amend the constitution and on their
allegation that:
Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print
media. [And] [t]his indicates that Republic Act No. 6735 covers only laws and not
constitutional amendments, because constitutional amendments take effect upon
ratification not after publication.
3

which allegation manifests petitioners' selective interpretation of the law, for under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 6735 on the Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition paragraph (b)
thereof is clear in providing that:
The proposition in an initiative on the constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
It is a rule that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference the context, i.e., that every part
of the statute must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.
4
Thus, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 may not be interpreted in isolation.
The legislative intent behind every law is to be extracted from the statute as a whole.
5

In its definition of terms, Republic Act No. 6735 defines initiative as "the power of the people to propose
amendments to the constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the
purpose".
6
The same section, in enumerating the three systems of initiative, included an "initiative on the
constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the constitution"
7
Paragraph (e) again of
Section 3 defines "plebiscite" as "the electoral process by which an initiative on the constitution is
approved or rejected by the people" And as to the material requirements for an initiative on the
Constitution, Section 5(b) distinctly enumerates the following:
centum (12%) of the total number of the registered voters as signatories, of which every
voters therein. Initiative on the constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five years thereafter.
These provisions were inserted, on purpose, by Congress the intent being to provide for the
implementation of the right to propose an amendment to the Constitution by way of initiative. "A
legal provision", the Court has previously said, "must not be construed as to be a useless
surplusage, and accordingly, meaningless, in the sense of adding nothing to the law or having no
effect whatsoever thereon".
8
That this is the legislative intent is further shown by the
deliberations in Congress, thus:
295

. . . More significantly, in the course of the consideration of the Conference Committee
Report on the disagreeing provisions of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505, it
was noted:
provisions between Senate Bill No. 17 and the consolidated House Bill
No. 21505 which refers to the system providing for the initiative and
referendum, fundamentally, Mr. Speaker, we consolidated the Senate
and the House versions, so both versions are totally intact in the bill. The
Senators ironically provided for local initiative and referendum and the
House of Representatives correctly provided for initiative and referendum
an the Constitution and on national legislation.
MR. ALBANO, Mr. Speaker.
Floor Leader?
questions?
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. What does the sponsor say?
MR. ROCO. Willingly, Mr. Speaker.
THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE. The Gentleman will please proceed.
MR. ROCO. In fact, the Senate version provided purely for local initiative
MR. ALBANO. Is it our understanding, therefore, that the two provisions
were incorporated?
legislation.
296

the provision of the Constitution to enact the enabling law, so that we
shall have a system which can be done every five years. Is it five years
in the provision of the Constitution?
to the 1987 Constitution, it is every five years." (Id. [Journal and Record
of the House of Representatives], Vol. VIII, 8 June 1989, p. 960; quoted
in Garcia v. Comelec, 237 SCRA 279, 292-293 [1994]; emphasis
supplied)
. . . The Senate version of the Bill may not have comprehended initiatives on the
Constitution. When consolidated, though, with the House version of the Bill and as
approved and enacted into law, the proposal included initiative on both the Constitution
and ordinary laws.
9

Clearly then, Republic Act No. 6735 covers an initiative on the constitution. Any other
construction as what petitioners foist upon the Court constitute a betrayal of the intent and spirit
behind the enactment.
At any rate, I agree with the ponencia that the Commission on Elections, at present, cannot take any
action (such as those contained in the Commission's orders dated December 6, 9, and 12, 1996
[Annexes B, C and B-1]) indicative of its having already assumed jurisdiction over private respondents'
petition. This is so because from the tenor of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735 it would appear that proof of
procurement of the required percentage of registered voters at the time the petition for initiative is filed, is
a jurisdictional requirement.
Thus:
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every
voters therein. Initiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years
from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter.
Here private respondents' petition is unaccompanied by the required signatures. This defect
notwithstanding, it is without prejudice to the refiling of their petition once compliance with the
required percentage is satisfactorily shown by private respondents. In the absence, therefore, of
an appropriate petition before the Commission on Elections, any determination of whether private
respondents' proposal constitutes an amendment or revision is premature.
ACCORDINGLY, I take exception to the conclusion reached in the ponencia that R.A. No. 6735 is an
"inadequate" legislation to cover a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. I,
however, register my concurrence with the dismissal, in the meantime, of private respondents' petition for
initiative before public respondent Commission on Elections until the same be supported by proof of strict
compliance with Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 6735.

PANGANIBAN, J ., concurring and dissenting:
297

Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the "initiatory"
Delfin Petition.
(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to "be directly proposed by the people through initiative,"
there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned."
(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2330, "insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void."
I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required number of
signatures in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at least 3% in every
legislative district no public funds may be spent and no government resources may be used in an
initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot even entertain any petition absent such
signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.
Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the Constitution cannot be
amended at all through a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by Pirma, not by anyone, not even by all
the voters of the country acting together. This decision will effectively but unnecessarily curtail, nullify,
abrogate and render inutile the people's right to change the basic law. At the very least, the majority holds
the right hostage to congressional discretion on whether to pass a new law to implement it, when there is
already one existing at present. This right to amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed by
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution, as follows:
With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is equivalent to
burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve him of pain. What
Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not thereby preempt any future
effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a
misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its proper use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right
thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly, the Constitution, RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution
While RA 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was as the majority openly concedes intended by the
legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate an initiative on
the Constitution.
1
I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr. Justice Reynato S.
Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on initiative, sufficiently
implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution. Such views, which I shall no
longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this Court's unanimous en banc rulings
in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections,
2
that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to
be) liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters
of the rights granted thereby"; and in Garcia vs. Comelec,
3
that any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of
people's initiatives ought to be rejected."
298

No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, RA 6735
wisely empowered
4
the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec issued its Resolution
2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was promulgated "to govern the conduct of
initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws," not by the
incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac,
Comms. Alfredo E. Abueg Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B.
Dimaampao. All of these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission,
and thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary effort
to give life to a cherished right of our people.
The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local legislations, it
is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such differentiation. The source of
and authority for the Resolution is the same law, RA 6735.
I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution
(particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R4 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than sufficient
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution.
I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by this Court
on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses Pedrosa from exercising
their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining order as against private respondents should
not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the Comelec should be stopped from using
public funds and government resources to help them gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has
no power to restrain them from exercising their right of initiative. The right to propose amendments to the
Constitution is really a species of the right of free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be
tyrannical and despotic to stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others to conform to his/her
beliefs. As the eminent Voltaire once said, "I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the
death your right to say it." After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice
Holmes wrote, "freedom for the thought that we hate."
5

Epilogue
By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like referendum and
recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All three are institutionalized
legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power. Like elections and plebiscites, they are hallowed
expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic rights of our people to be used as their
final weapons against political excesses, opportunism, inaction, oppression and misgovernance; as well
as their reserved instruments to exact transparency, accountability and faithfulness from their chosen
leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and abuse must be resolutely struck down, on the other,
their legitimate exercise should be carefully nurtured and zealously protected.
WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al. and to DIRECT
Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of prematurity, but
not on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the temporary restraining order
issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa
from exercising their right to free speech in proposing amendments to the Constitution.
Footnotes
299

1 Commissioner Blas Ople.
2 Commissioner Jose Suarez.
3 I Record of the Constitutional Commission, 371, 378.
4 Section 1, Article XV of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1(1), Article XVI of the 1973
Constitution.
5 Annex "A" of Petition, Rollo, 15.
6 Later identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action, or
PIRMA for brevity.
7 These sections read:
Sec. 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three
years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
8 The section reads:
Sec. 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote of the people
for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following
the day of the election and shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter. The
President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has succeeded as
President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election
to the same office at any time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length or time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was elected.
9 The section reads:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
300

not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
10 Rollo, 19.
11 Annex "B" of Petition, Rollo, 25.
12 Order of 12 December 1996, Annex "B-1" of Petition, Rollo, 27.
13 Id.
14 Citing Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 [1949]; Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333
[1976].
15 Rollo, 68.
16 Rollo, 100.
17 Rollo, 130.
18 A Member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
19 Section 26, Article II, Constitution.
20 Citing Commissioner Ople of the Constitutional Commission, I Record of the
Constitutional Commission, 405.
21 Rollo, 239.
22 Rollo, 304.
23 Rollo, 568.
24 These were submitted on the following dates:
(a) Private respondent Delfin 31 January 1997 (Rollo, 429);
(b) Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa 10 February
1997 (Id., 446);
(c) Petitioners 12 February 1997 (Id., 585);
(d) IBP 12 February 1997 (Id., 476);
(e) Senator Roco 12 February 1997 (Id., 606);
(f) DIK and MABINI 12 February 1997 (Id., 465);
(g) COMELEC 12 February 1997 (Id., 489);
(h) LABAN 13 February 1997 (Id., 553).
301

25 Rollo, 594.
26 Annex "D" of Roco's Motion for Intervention in this case, Rollo, 184.
27 Rollo, 28.
28 232 SCRA 110, 134 [1994].
29 II The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary 571 [1988].
30 I Record of the Constitutional Commission 370-371.
31 Id., 371.
32 Id., 386.
33 Id., 391-392. (Emphasis supplied).
34 Id., 386.
35 Id., 392.
36 Id., 398-399.
37 Id., 399. Emphasis supplied.
38 Id., 402-403.
39 Id., 401-402.
40 Id., 410.
41 Id., 412.
42 II Record of the Constitutional Commission 559-560.
43 The Congress originally appeared as The National Assembly. The change came
about as a logical consequence of the amended Committee Report No. 22 of the
Committee on Legislative which changed The National Assembly to "The Congress of the
Philippines" in view of the approval of the amendment to adopt the bicameral system (II
Record of the Constitutional Commission 102-105). The proposed new Article on the
Legislative Department was, after various amendments approved on Second and Third
Readings on 9 October 1986 (Id., 702-703)
44 V Record of the Constitutional Commission 806.
45 See footnote No. 42.
46 As Stated by Commissioner Bernas in his interpellation of Commissioner Suarez,
footnote 28.
302

47 Entitled "Initiative and Referendum Act of 1987," introduced by then Congressmen
Raul Roco, Raul del Mar and Narciso Monfort.
48 Entitled "An Act Implementing the Constitutional Provisions on Initiative and
Referendum and for Other Purposes," introduced by Congressmen Salvador Escudero.
49 Entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum, and the
Exceptions Therefrom, Whereby People in Local Government Units Can Directly Propose
and Enact Resolutions and Ordinances or Approve or Reject Any Ordinance or
Resolution Passed By the Local Legislative Body," introduced by Senators Gonzales,
Romulo, Pimentel, Jr., and Lina, Jr.
50 IV Record of the Senate, No. 143, pp. 1509-1510.
51 VIII Journal and Record of the House of Representatives, 957-961.
52 That section reads:
referendum to directly propose and enact resolutions and ordinances or approve or
reject, in whole or in part, any ordinance or resolution passed by any local legislative
body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized
and guaranteed.
53 It must be pointed out that Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505, as approved
on Third Reading, did not contain any subtitles.
54 If some confusion attended the preparation of the subtitles resulting in the leaving out
of the more important and paramount system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, it was because there was in the Bicameral Conference Committee an initial
agreement for the Senate panel to draft that portion on local initiative and for the House
of Representatives panel to draft that portion covering national initiative and initiative on
the Constitution; eventually, however, the Members thereof agreed to leave the drafting
of the consolidated bill to their staff. Thus:
CHAIRMAN GONZALES.
. . . All right, and we can agree, we can agree. So ang mangyayari dito, ang magiging
basic nito, let us not discuss anymore kung alin ang magiging basic bill, ano, whether it is
the Senate Bill or whether it is the House Bill. Logically it should be ours sapagkat una
iyong sa amin, eh. It is one of the first bills approved by the Senate kaya ang number
niyan, makikita mo, 17, eh. Huwag na nating pag-usapan. Now, if you insist, really iyong
features ng national at saka constitutional, okay. Pero gagawin na nating consolidation of
both bills. (TSN, proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee on 6 June 1989
submitted by Nora, R, pp. 1-4 1-5).
xxx xxx xxx
HON. ROCO. So how do we proceed from this? The staff will consolidate.
HON. GONZALES. Gumawa lang ng isang draft. Submit it to the Chairman, kami na ang
bahalang magconsult sa aming mga members na kung okay,
303

HON. ROCO. Within today?
HON. GONZALES. Within today and early tomorrow. Hanggang Huwebes lang tayo, eh.
HON. AQUINO. Kinakailangang palusutin natin ito. Kung mabigyan tayo ng kopya bukas
and you are not objecting naman kayo naman ganoon din.
HON. ROCO. Editing na lang because on a physical consolidation nga ito, eh. Yung mga
provisions naman namin wala sa inyo. (TSN, proceedings of Bicameral Conference
Committee of 6 June 1989, submitted by E.S. Bongon, pp. III-4 III-5).
55 Sec. 5(a & c), Sec. 8, Section 9(a).
56 Sections 13, 14, 15 and 16.
57 It would thus appear that the Senate's "cautious approach" in the implementation of
the system of initiative as a mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution, as
expressed by Senator Gonzales in the course of his sponsorship of Senate Bill No. 17 in
the Bicameral Conference Committee meeting and in his sponsorship of the Committee's
Report, might have insidiously haunted the preparation of the consolidated version of
Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505. In the first he said:
Senate Bill No. 17 recognizes the initiatives and referendum are recent
innovations in our political system. And recognizing that, it has adopted a
cautious approach by: first, allowing them only when the local legislative body
had refused to act; second, not more frequently than once a year; and, third,
limiting them to the national level. (I Record of the Senate, No. 33, p. 871).
xxx xxx xxx
First, as I have said Mr. President, and I am saying for the nth time, that we are
introducing a novel and new system in politics. We have to adopt first a cautious
approach. We feel it is prudent and wise at this point in time, to limit those
powers that may be the subject of initiatives and referendum to those exercisable
or within the authority of the local government units. (Id., p. 880).
In the second he stated:
But at any rate, as I have said, because this is new in our political system, the
Senate decided on a more cautious approach and limiting it only to the local
general units. (TSN of the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee
on 6 June 1989, submitted by stenographer Nora R, pp. 1-2 to 1-3).
In the last he declared:
The initiatives and referendum are new tools of democracy; therefore, we have decided
to becautious in our approach. Hence, 1) we limited initiative and referendum to the local
government units; 2) that initiative can only be exercised if the local legislative cannot be
exercised more frequently that once every year. (IV Records of the Senate, No. 143, pp.
15-9-1510).
58 Section 20, RA. No. 6735.
304

59 People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939]; ISAGANI A. CRUZ, Philippine Political Law
86 [1996] (hereafter CRUZ).
60 People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]; CRUZ, supra, 87.
61 Pelaez v. Auditor General, 122 Phil. 965, 974 [1965].
62 Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481,497 [1970].
63 Sec. 7, COMELEC Resolution No. 2300.
64 Sec. 28, id.
65 Sec. 29, id.
66 Sec. 30, id.
PUNO, J., concurring and dissenting::
1 Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., p. 38, citing, inter alia, US v. Tamparong 31
Phil. 321; Hernani v. Export Control Committee, 100 Phil. 973; People v. Purisima, 86
SCRA 542.
2 Ibid, citing Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil. 141.
3 Prepared and sponsored by the House Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
on the basis of H.B. No. 497 introduced by Congressmen Raul Roco, Raul del Mar and
Narciso Monfort and H.B. No. 988 introduced by Congressman Salvador Escudero.
4 Introduced by Senators Neptali Gonzales, Alberto Romulo, Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., and
Jose Lina, Jr.
5 It was entitled "An Act Providing a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds therefor.
6 Journal No. 85, February 14, 1989, p. 121.
7 Ibid.
8 The Senate Committee was chaired by Senator Neptali Gonzales with Senators
Agapito Aquino and John Osmena as members. The House Committee was chaired by
Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol with Congressmen Raul Roco, Salvador H.
Escudero III and Joaquin Chipeco, Jr., as members.
9 Held at Constancia Room, Ciudad Fernandina, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.
10 See Compliance submitted by intervenor Roco dated January 28, 1997.
11 Record No. 137, June 8, 1989, pp. 960-961.
12 Agpalo, op cit., p. 38 citing US v. Toribio, 15 Phil 7 (1910); US v. Navarro, 19 Phil 134
(1911).
305

13 Francisco, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., (1968) pp. 145-146 citing Crawford,
Statutory Construction, pp. 337-338.
14 Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws (2nd ed), pp.
258-259. See also Commissioner of Custom v. Relunia, 105 Phil 875 (1959); People v.
Yabut, 58 Phil 499 (1933).
15 Alcantara, Statutes, 1990 ed., p. 26 citing Dwarris on Statutes, p. 237.
16 Entitled In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the
Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws and promulgated
on January 16, 1991 by the COMELEC with Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting
Chairperson and Commissioners Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R.
Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao.
17 15 SCRA 569.
18 Sec. 5(b), R.A. No. 6735.
19 Sec. 5(b), R.A. No. 6735.
20 Sec. 7, R.A. No. 6735.
21 Sec. 9(b), R.A. No. 6735.
22 Sec. 8, R.A. No. 6735 in relation to Sec. 4, Art. XVII of the Constitution.
23 Sec. 9(b), R.A. No. 6735.
24 Sec. 10, R.A. No. 6735.
25 Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., p. 98.
26 See July 8, 1986 Debates of the Concom, p. 399.
27 1995 ed., p. 1207.
28 Cruz, op cit., p. 99.
29 320 US 99.
30 Balbuena v. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil 150 (1910).
31 People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil 328 (1939).
32 Calalang v. Williams, 70 Phil 726 (1940).
33 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 669 (1919).
34 International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil 602 (1940).
306

35 Phil. Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil 806
(1955).
36 Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1990); Agustin v. Edu, 88 SCRA 195 (1979).
37 Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. vs. Municipality of Tanawan Leyte, 69 SCRA 460 (1976).
38 Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 (1991).
39 Osmena v. Orbos, 220 SCRA 703 (1993).
40 Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 (1995).
41 Garcia v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 111511, October 5, 1993.
42 Garcia, et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 111230, September 30, 1994.
43 Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 125416, September
26, 1996.
44 Malonzo vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 127066, March 11, 1997.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring and dissenting:
1 Article II, Section 1, 1987 Constitution.
2 Article VI, Section 32, and Article XVII, Section 2, 1987 Constitution.
3 Petition, p. 5.
4 Paras v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 123619, December 4, 1996.
5 Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953, 980.
6 Section 3 (a), Republic Act No 6735.
7 Section 3(a) [a.1], Republic Act No 6735.
8 Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890, 893
9 Petition in Intervention filed by Sen. Raul Roco, pp. 15-16.
PANGANIBAN, J., concurring and dissenting:
1 Apart from its text on "national initiative" which could be used by analogy, RA 6735
contains sufficient provisions covering initiative on the Constitution, which are clear
enough and speak for themselves, like:
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution passed by any legislative body upon
307

guaranteed.
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution or to propose and enact legislation's through an election
called for the purpose.
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a
national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to
enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution
or ordinance.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) "Plebiscite" is the electoral process by which an initiative on the
Constitution is approved or rejected by the people
(f) "Petition" is the written instrument containing the proposition and the
required number of signatories. It shall be in a form to be determined by
and submitted to the Commission on Elections, hereinafter referred to as
the Commission
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5 Requirements. . . .
(b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least
twelve per centum (12 %) of the total number of registered voters as
signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on
the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years
thereafter.
Sec. 9. Effectivity of Initiative or Referendum Proposition.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a
majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to
the day of the plebiscite.
xxx xxx xxx
308

c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be
enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as
the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than
one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written
or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 19. Applicability of the Omnibus Election Code. The Omnibus Election Code and
other election laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to all
initiatives and referenda.
Sec. 20. Rules and Regulations. The Commission is hereby empowered to promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.
(Emphasis supplied)
2 G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996.
3 237 SCRA 279, 282, September 30, 1994.
4 Sec. 20, R.A. 6735.
5 United States vs. Rosika Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929).
Lambino vs. Comelec

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS,Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
309

x--------------------------------------------------------x
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------ x
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S.MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T.
TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE, and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., Intervenors.
x------------------------------------------------------ x
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, Intervenor.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
BAYAN represented by its Chairperson Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, BAYAN MUNA represented
by its Chairperson Dr. Reynaldo Lesaca, KILUSANG MAYO UNO represented by its Secretary
General Joel Maglunsod, HEAD represented by its Secretary General Dr. Gene Alzona Nisperos,
ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM represented by Fr. Dionito Cabillas, MIGRANTE represented by
its Chairperson Concepcion Bragas-Regalado, GABRIELA represented by its Secretary General
Emerenciana de Jesus, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY represented by Sec. Gen. Cristina Palabay,
ANAKBAYAN represented by Chairperson Eleanor de Guzman, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS
represented by Chair Vencer Crisostomo Palabay, JOJO PINEDA of the League of Concerned
Professionals and Businessmen, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO of the Solidarity of Health Against
Charter Change, DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS of Health Action for Human Rights, Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, and ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL,Intervenors.
x--------------------------------------------------------x
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Intervenor.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
LUWALHATI RICASA ANTONINO, Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C.
TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO
P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, Intervenors.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, and RUELO BAYA, Intervenors.
310

x -------------------------------------------------------- x
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and MR.
VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
SULONG BAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., Intervenor.
x ------------------------------------------------------- x
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L.
SALVADOR, and RANDALL TABAYOYONG, Intervenors.
x -------------------------------------------------------- x
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CITY AND CEBU PROVINCE
CHAPTERS, Intervenors.
x --------------------------------------------------------x
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA
III, JAMBY MADRIGAL, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO LACSON, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, Intervenors.
x -----------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and
Commissioners RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A.
BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter
Doe,, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J .:
311

The Case
These are consolidated petitions on the Resolution dated 31 August 2006 of the Commission on
Elections ("COMELEC") denying due course to an initiative petition to amend the 1987 Constitution.
Antecedent Facts
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado
("Lambino Group"), with other groups
1
and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b) and (c)
2
and
Section 7
3
of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and Referendum Act ("RA 6735").
The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelveper centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each legislative district represented by at least
three per centum(3%) of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that COMELEC election
registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3 million individuals.
The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article
VI (Legislative Department)
4
and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive Department)
5
and by adding Article
XVIII entitled "Transitory Provisions."
6
These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-
Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group prayed that
after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the following proposition in a
plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT
FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
7

The Ruling of the COMELEC
On 31 August 2006, the COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's
petition for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution. The
COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections
8
declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
9

In G.R. No. 174153, the Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus to
set aside the COMELEC Resolution of 31 August 2006 and to compel the COMELEC to give due course
to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to their petition since Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively,
the Lambino Group claims that Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves
cognizance as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."
In G.R. No. 174299, petitioners ("Binay Group") pray that the Court require respondent COMELEC
Commissioners to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt for the COMELEC's verification
of signatures and for "entertaining" the Lambino Group's petition despite the permanent injunction
in Santiago. The Court treated the Binay Group's petition as an opposition-in-intervention.
312

In his Comment to the Lambino Group's petition, the Solicitor General joined causes with the petitioners,
urging the Court to grant the petition despite the Santiago ruling. The Solicitor General proposed that the
Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of
initiative."
Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or opposing the Lambino
Group's petition. The supporting intervenors
10
uniformly hold the view that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion in relying on Santiago. On the other hand, the opposing intervenors
11
hold the
contrary view and maintain that Santiago is a binding precedent. The opposing intervenors also
challenged (1) the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature gathering
and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the minimum requirement for the
percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution;
12
(4) the nature of the proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as
provided under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's compliance
with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative petitions to only one subject.
The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments on 26 September 2006. After receiving the
parties' memoranda, the Court considered the case submitted for resolution.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution; and
3. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the Lambino
Group's petition.
The Ruling of the Court
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for
conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit Santiago, as the present petition
warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic
requirements of the Constitution. For following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion
is attributable to the Commision on Elections.
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision that allows a people's
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This section states:
through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
313

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission vividly explain the meaning of an amendment
"directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition," thus:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a
constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to
be shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ: That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before
they sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: No, because before they sign there is already a draft shown to them and
they are asked whether or not they want to propose this constitutional amendment.
MR. SUAREZ: As it is envisioned, any Filipino can prepare that proposal and pass it around
for signature.
13
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed constitutional
amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before" they sign such proposal. The framers
plainly stated that "before they sign there is already a draft shown to them." The framers also
"envisioned" that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare
that proposal and pass it around for signature."
The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is
thatthe entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements
must be present. First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" only if the
people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to
it. If so attached, the petition must state the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one
of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text of the proposed amendments
before signing. Otherwise, it is physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every one of
the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the proposed amendments before signing.
The framers of the Constitution directly borrowed
14
the concept of people's initiative from the United
States where various State constitutions incorporate an initiative clause. In almost all States
15
which allow
initiative petitions, the unbending requirement is that the people must first see the full text of the
proposed amendments before they sign to signify their assent, and that the people must sign on
an initiative petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.
16

The rationale for this requirement has been repeatedly explained in several decisions of various courts.
Thus, inCapezzuto v. State Ballot Commission, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, affirmed by
the First Circuit Court of Appeals, declared:
314

[A] signature requirement would be meaningless if the person supplying the signature has
not first seen what it is that he or she is signing. Further, and more importantly, loose
interpretation of the subscription requirement can pose a significant potential for fraud. A person
permitted to describe orally the contents of an initiative petition to a potential signer, without the
signer having actually examined the petition, could easily mislead the signer by, for example,
omitting, downplaying, or even flatly misrepresenting, portions of the petition that might not be to
the signer's liking. This danger seems particularly acute when, in this case, the person
giving the description is the drafter of the petition, who obviously has a vested interest in
seeing that it gets the requisite signatures to qualify for the ballot.
17
(Boldfacing and
Likewise, in Kerr v. Bradbury,
18
the Court of Appeals of Oregon explained:
The purposes of "full text" provisions that apply to amendments by initiative commonly are
described in similar terms. x x x (The purpose of the full text requirement is to provide
sufficient information so that registered voters can intelligently evaluate whether to sign
the initiative petition."); x x x (publication of full text of amended constitutional provision required
because it is "essential for the elector to have x x x the section which is proposed to be added to
or subtracted from. If he is to vote intelligently, he must have this knowledge. Otherwise in many
instances he would be required to vote in the dark.") (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, "an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature and effect of that
which is proposed" and failure to do so is "deceptive and misleading" which renders the initiative void.
19

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full
text of the proposed amendments. However, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly
show that the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence on people's initiative. In
particular, the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign,
and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino Group invokes as valid,
requires that the people must sign the "petition x x x as signatories."
The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties
who can impartially explain the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to the
people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the people and do not present the arguments
against their proposal. The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather the signatures.
Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents observed the constitutional requirements in gathering
the signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they complied with the constitutional
requirements in gathering the signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by attachment,
the full text of the proposed amendments.
The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of the paper that the
people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group submitted to this Court a copy of
a signature sheet
20
after the oral arguments of 26 September 2006 when they filed their Memorandum
on 11 October 2006. The signature sheet with this Court during the oral arguments was the signature
sheet attached
21
to the opposition in intervention filed on 7 September 2006 by intervenor Atty. Pete
Quirino-Quadra.
The signature sheet attached to Atty. Quadra's opposition and the signature sheet attached to the
Lambino Group's Memorandum are the same. We reproduce below the signature sheet in full:
315

Province: City/Municipality: No. of
Verified
Signatures:

Legislative District: Barangay:
PROPOSITION: "DO YOU APPROVE OF THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT BICAMERAL-
PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, IN ORDER TO
ACHIEVE GREATER EFFICIENCY, SIMPLICITY AND ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT; AND
PROVIDING AN ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM
ONE SYSTEM TO ANOTHER?"
I hereby APPROVE the proposed amendment to the 1987 Constitution. My signature herein which shall
form part of the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
Precinct
Number
Name
Last Name, First
Name, M.I.
Address Birthdate
MM/DD/YY
Signature Verification
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
_________________
Barangay Official
(Print Name and Sign)
_________________
Witness
__________________
Witness
There is not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes
in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it. Petitioner Atty. Raul Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments before
this Court on 26 September 2006.
The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not
show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature
sheet. Clearly, the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution envisioned
when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, however, explained that during the signature-gathering from February to August
2006, the Lambino Group circulated, together with the signature sheets, printed copies of the Lambino
Group's draft petition which they later filed on 25 August 2006 with the COMELEC. When asked if his
group also circulated the draft of their amended petition filed on 30 August 2006 with the COMELEC, Atty.
Lambino initially replied that they circulated both. However, Atty. Lambino changed his answer and stated
316

that what his group circulated was the draft of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, not the draft of the
25 August 2006 petition.
The Lambino Group would have this Court believe that they prepared the draft of the 30 August 2006
amended petition almost seven months earlier in February 2006 when they started gathering
signatures. Petitioner Erico B. Aumentado's "Verification/Certification" of the 25 August 2006 petition, as
well as of the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC, states as follows:
I have caused the preparation of the foregoing [Amended] Petition in my personal capacity as a
registered voter, for and on behalf of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines, as
shown by ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 hereto attached, and as representative of the mass
of signatories hereto. (Emphasis supplied)
The Lambino Group failed to attach a copy of ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 to the present petition.
However, the "Official Website of the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines"
22
has posted the full
text of Resolution No. 2006-02, which provides:
RESOLUTION NO. 2006-02
RESOLUTION SUPPORTING THE PROPOSALS OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULTATIVE
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, there is a need for the Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP) to adopt
a common stand on the approach to support the proposals of the People's Consultative
Commission on Charter Change;
WHEREAS, ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms as embodied in the ULAP Joint Declaration for
Constitutional Reforms signed by the members of the ULAP and the majority coalition of the
House of Representatives in Manila Hotel sometime in October 2005;
WHEREAS, the People's Consultative Commission on Charter Change created by Her
Excellency to recommend amendments to the 1987 Constitution has submitted its final report
sometime in December 2005;
WHEREAS, the ULAP is mindful of the current political developments in Congress which militates
against the use of the expeditious form of amending the 1987 Constitution;
WHEREAS, subject to the ratification of its institutional members and the failure of Congress to
amend the Constitution as a constituent assembly, ULAP has unanimously agreed to pursue the
constitutional reform agenda through People's Initiative and Referendum without prejudice to
other pragmatic means to pursue the same;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, THAT ALL THE MEMBER-
LEAGUES OF THE UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (ULAP)
SUPPORT THE PORPOSALS (SIC) OF THE PEOPLE'S CONSULATATIVE (SIC)
COMMISSION ON CHARTER CHANGE THROUGH PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM AS A MODE OF AMENDING THE 1987 CONSTITUTION;
DONE, during the ULAP National Executive Board special meeting held on 14 January 2006 at
the Century Park Hotel, Manila.
23
317

ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not authorize petitioner Aumentado to prepare the 25 August 2006
petition, or the 30 August 2006 amended petition, filed with the COMELEC. ULAP Resolution No. 2006-
02 "support(s) the porposals (sic) of the Consulatative (sic) Commission on Charter
Change through people's initiative and referendum as a mode of amending the 1987 Constitution." The
proposals of the Consultative Commission
24
arevastly different from the proposed changes of the
Lambino Group in the 25 August 2006 petition or 30 August 2006 amended petition filed with the
COMELEC.
For example, the proposed revisions of the Consultative Commission affect all provisions of the existing
Constitution, from the Preamble to the Transitory Provisions. The proposed revisions have profound
impact on the Judiciary and the National Patrimony provisions of the existing Constitution, provisions that
the Lambino Group's proposed changes do not touch. The Lambino Group's proposed changes purport to
affect only Articles VI and VII of the existing Constitution, including the introduction of new Transitory
Provisions.
The ULAP adopted Resolution No. 2006-02 on 14 January 2006 or more than six months before the filing
of the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended petition with the COMELEC. However,
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 does not establish that ULAP or the Lambino Group caused the circulation
of the draft petition, together with the signature sheets, six months before the filing with the COMELEC.
On the contrary, ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02 casts grave doubt on the Lambino Group's claim
that they circulated the draft petition together with the signature sheets. ULAP Resolution No.
2006-02 does not refer at all to the draft petition or to the Lambino Group's proposed changes.
In their Manifestation explaining their amended petition before the COMELEC, the Lambino Group
declared:
After the Petition was filed, Petitioners belatedly realized that the proposed amendments alleged
in the Petition, more specifically, paragraph 3 of Section 4 and paragraph 2 of Section 5 of the
Transitory Provisions were inaccurately stated and failed to correctly reflect their proposed
amendments.
The Lambino Group did not allege that they were amending the petition because the amended petition
was what they had shown to the people during the February to August 2006 signature-gathering. Instead,
the Lambino Group alleged that the petition of 25 August 2006 "inaccurately stated and failed to correctly
reflect their proposed amendments."
The Lambino Group never alleged in the 25 August 2006 petition or the 30 August 2006 amended
petition with the COMELEC that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the
signature sheets. Likewise, the Lambino Group did not allege in their present petition before this Court
that they circulated printed copies of the draft petition together with the signature sheets. The signature
sheets do not also contain any indication that the draft petition is attached to, or circulated with, the
signature sheets.
It is only in their Consolidated Reply to the Opposition-in-Interventions that the Lambino Group first
claimed that they circulated the "petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC," thus:
[T]here is persuasive authority to the effect that "(w)here there is not (sic) fraud, a signer who
did not read the measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature
on the ground that he did not understand the nature of the act." [82 C.J.S. S128h. Mo. State
v. Sullivan, 224, S.W. 327, 283 Mo. 546.] Thus, the registered voters who signed the
signature sheets circulated together with the petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC
below, are presumed to have understood the proposition contained in the petition. (Emphasis
supplied)
318

The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for initiative filed with
the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature
sheets did not contain the text of the proposed changes. In their Consolidated Reply, the Lambino Group
alleged that they circulated "the petition for initiative" but failed to mention the amended petition. This
contradicts what Atty. Lambino finally stated during the oral arguments that what they circulated was the
draft of the amended petition of 30 August 2006.
The Lambino Group cites as authority Corpus Juris Secundum, stating that "a signer who did not read the
measure attached to a referendum petition cannot question his signature on the ground that he did not
understand the nature of the act." The Lambino Group quotes an authority that cites a proposed
changeattached to the petition signed by the people. Even the authority the Lambino Group quotes
requires that the proposed change must be attached to the petition. The same authority the Lambino
Group quotes requires the people to sign on the petition itself.
Indeed, it is basic in American jurisprudence that the proposed amendment must be incorporated with, or
attached to, the initiative petition signed by the people. In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes were not incorporated with, or attached to, the signature sheets. The Lambino Group's
citation of Corpus Juris Secundum pulls the rug from under their feet.
It is extremely doubtful that the Lambino Group prepared, printed, circulated, from February to August
2006 during the signature-gathering period, the draft of the petition or amended petition they filed later
with the COMELEC. The Lambino Group are less than candid with this Court in their belated claim that
they printed and circulated, together with the signature sheets, the petition or amended
petition. Nevertheless, even assuming the Lambino Group circulated the amended petition during
the signature-gathering period, the Lambino Group admitted circulating only very limited
copies of the petition.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino expressly admitted that they printed only 100,000 copies
of the draft petition they filed more than six months later with the COMELEC. Atty. Lambino added
that he also asked other supporters to print additional copies of the draft petition but he could not state
with certainty how many additional copies the other supporters printed. Atty. Lambino could only
assure this Court of the printing of 100,000 copies because he himself caused the printing of
these 100,000 copies.
Likewise, in the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006, the Lambino Group
expressly admits that "petitioner Lambino initiated the printing and reproduction of 100,000
copies of the petition for initiative x x x."
25
This admission binds the Lambino Group and
establishes beyond any doubt that the Lambino Group failed to show the full text of the proposed
changes to the great majority of the people who signed the signature sheets.
Thus, of the 6.3 million signatories, only 100,000 signatories could have received with certainty one copy
each of the petition, assuming a 100 percent distribution with no wastage. If Atty. Lambino and company
attached one copy of the petition to each signature sheet, only 100,000 signature sheets could have
circulated with the petition. Each signature sheet contains space for ten signatures. Assuming ten people
signed each of these 100,000 signature sheets with the attached petition, the maximum number of people
who saw the petition before they signed the signature sheets would not exceed 1,000,000.
With only 100,000 printed copies of the petition, it would be physically impossible for all or a great
majority of the 6.3 million signatories to have seen the petition before they signed the signature
sheets. The inescapable conclusion is that the Lambino Group failed to show to the 6.3 million
signatories the full text of the proposed changes. If ever, not more than one million signatories saw
the petition before they signed the signature sheets.
319

In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of the proposed changes,
either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment with an indication in the signature sheet of
such attachment.Petitioner Atty. Lambino admitted this during the oral arguments, and this
admission binds the Lambino Group. This fact is also obvious from a mere reading of the
signature sheet. This omission is fatal. The failure to so include the text of the proposed changes in
the signature sheets renders the initiative void for non-compliance with the constitutional requirement that
the amendment must be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition." The
signature sheet is not the "petition" envisioned in the initiative clause of the Constitution.
For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets did not see the full
text of the proposed changes before signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the
proposed changes, among which are:
1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of
Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;
26

2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are almost
all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new parliamentary elections. Thus,
the members of the interim Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of
office;
27

3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose further amendments or revisions to the Constitution.
28

These three specific amendments are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature
sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea that they were proposing these
amendments. These three proposed changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred
or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or rereading of the contents of the signature
sheets.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Atty. Lambino stated that he and his group assured the people
during the signature-gathering that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held during
the 2007 local elections if the proposed changes were ratified before the 2007 local elections. However,
the text of the proposed changes belies this.
The proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, as found in the amended petition,
states:
Section 5(2). The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of
Parliament, which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all
local government officials. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Section 5(2) does not state that the elections for the regular Parliament will be held simultaneously with
the 2007 local elections. This section merely requires that the elections for the regular Parliament shall be
held simultaneously with the local elections without specifying the year.
Petitioner Atty. Lambino, who claims to be the principal drafter of the proposed changes, could have
easily written the word "next" before the phrase "election of all local government officials." This would
have insured that the elections for the regular Parliament would be held in the next local elections
following the ratification of the proposed changes. However, the absence of the word "next" allows the
interim Parliament to schedule the elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with any future
local elections.
320

Thus, the members of the interim Parliament will decide the expiration of their own term of office. This
allows incumbent members of the House of Representatives to hold office beyond their current three-year
term of office, and possibly even beyond the five-year term of office of regular members of the
Parliament. Certainly, this is contrary to the representations of Atty. Lambino and his group to the
6.3 million people who signed the signature sheets. Atty. Lambino and his group deceived the 6.3
million signatories, and even the entire nation.
This lucidly shows the absolute need for the people to sign an initiative petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments to avoid fraud or misrepresentation. In the present initiative, the 6.3 million
signatories had to rely on the verbal representations of Atty. Lambino and his group because the
signature sheets did not contain the full text of the proposed changes. The result is a grand
deception on the 6.3 million signatories who were led to believe that the proposed changes would
require the holding in 2007 of elections for the regular Parliament simultaneously with the local elections.
The Lambino Group's initiative springs another surprise on the people who signed the signature sheets.
The proposed changes mandate the interim Parliament to make further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. The proposed Section 4(4), Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions, provides:
Section 4(4). Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim
Parliament shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this
Constitution consistent with the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong
bureaucracy. (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, Atty. Lambino stated that this provision is a "surplusage" and the Court and
the people should simply ignore it. Far from being a surplusage, this provision invalidates the Lambino
Group's initiative.
Section 4(4) is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the
Unicameral-Parliamentary system. American jurisprudence on initiatives outlaws this as logrolling - when
the initiative petition incorporates an unrelated subject matter in the same petition. This puts the people in
a dilemma since they can answer only either yes or no to the entire proposition, forcing them to sign a
petition that effectively contains two propositions, one of which they may find unacceptable.
Under American jurisprudence, the effect of logrolling is to nullify the entire proposition and not only
the unrelated subject matter. Thus, in Fine v. Firestone,
29
the Supreme Court of Florida declared:
Combining multiple propositions into one proposal constitutes "logrolling," which, if our
judicial responsibility is to mean anything, we cannot permit. The very broadness of the
proposed amendment amounts to logrolling because the electorate cannot know what it is voting
on - the amendment's proponents' simplistic explanation reveals only the tip of the iceberg. x x x x
The ballot must give the electorate fair notice of the proposed amendment being voted on. x x x x
The ballot language in the instant case fails to do that. The very broadness of the proposal makes
it impossible to state what it will affect and effect and violates the requirement that proposed
amendments embrace only one subject. (Emphasis supplied)
Logrolling confuses and even deceives the people. In Yute Air Alaska v. McAlpine,
30
the Supreme Court
of Alaska warned against "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in logrolling:
Whenever a bill becomes law through the initiative process, all of the problems that the single-subject rule
was enacted to prevent are exacerbated. There is a greater danger of logrolling, or the deliberate
intermingling of issues to increase the likelihood of an initiative's passage, and there is a greater
opportunity for "inadvertence, stealth and fraud" in the enactment-by-initiative process. The
drafters of an initiative operate independently of any structured or supervised process. They often
emphasize particular provisions of their proposition, while remaining silent on other (more complex or less
321

appealing) provisions, when communicating to the public. x x x Indeed, initiative promoters typically
use simplistic advertising to present their initiative to potential petition-signers and eventual
voters. Many voters will never read the full text of the initiative before the election. More importantly,
there is no process for amending or splitting the several provisions in an initiative proposal. These
difficulties clearly distinguish the initiative from the legislative process. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the present initiative appears merely a preliminary step for further amendments or revisions to be
undertaken by the interim Parliament as a constituent assembly. The people who signed the signature
sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to propose an
amendment mandating the interim Parliament to propose further amendments or revisions to the
Constitution.
Apparently, the Lambino Group inserted the proposed Section 4(4) to compel the interim Parliament to
amend or revise again the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, or
before the May 2007 elections. In the absence of the proposed Section 4(4), the interim Parliament has
the discretion whether to amend or revise again the Constitution. With the proposed Section 4(4), the
initiative proponents want the interim Parliament mandated to immediately amend or revise again the
Constitution.
However, the signature sheets do not explain the reason for this rush in amending or revising again so
soon the Constitution. The signature sheets do not also explain what specific amendments or revisions
the initiative proponents want the interim Parliament to make, and why there is a need for such further
amendments or revisions. The people are again left in the dark to fathom the nature and effect of the
proposed changes. Certainly, such an initiative is not "directly proposed by the people" because the
people do not even know the nature and effect of the proposed changes.
There is another intriguing provision inserted in the Lambino Group's amended petition of 30 August
2006. The proposed Section 4(3) of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 4(3). Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be members of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
After 30 June 2010, not one of the present Senators will remain as member of Parliament if the interim
Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular Parliament by 30 June 2010. However, there is no
counterpart provision for the present members of the House of Representatives even if their term of office
will all end on 30 June 2007, three years earlier than that of half of the present Senators. Thus, all the
present members of the House will remain members of the interim Parliament after 30 June 2010.
The term of the incumbent President ends on 30 June 2010. Thereafter, the Prime Minister exercises all
the powers of the President. If the interim Parliament does not schedule elections for the regular
Parliament by 30 June 2010, the Prime Minister will come only from the present members of the House of
Representatives to theexclusion of the present Senators.
The signature sheets do not explain this discrimination against the Senators. The 6.3 million people who
signed the signature sheets could not have known that their signatures would be used to
discriminate against the Senators. They could not have known that their signatures would be used
to limit, after 30 June 2010, the interim Parliament's choice of Prime Minister only to members of
the existing House of Representatives.
An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the
proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people.
That is why the Constitution requires that an initiative must be "directly proposed by the people x x x in
a petition" - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed
amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation's fundamental law, the writing of the text of the
322

proposed amendments cannot behidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney
to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals.
The Constitution entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution.
This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even if the members of this Court do not personally know the
people who sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental assumption: the full
text of the proposed amendment is first shown to the people before they sign the petition, not
after they have signed the petition.
In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with
the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed
by the people through initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives
A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not
to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and
revisions to the Constitution. Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is
through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The second mode is through a
constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people's initiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to "[A]ny amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution." In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only
to "[A]mendments to this Constitution." This distinction was intentional as shown by the following
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
May we respectfully call the attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7
which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
registered voters.
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This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. This proposal was
suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of
amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this
system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not
extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of
Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x x
x x x x
MS. AQUINO: [I] am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
amendment in terms of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of
setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ: We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision
which contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was
conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of
modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ: That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
MS. AQUINO: I thank the sponsor; and thank you, Madam President.
x x x x
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line
1 refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by
Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision."
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
31
(Emphasis supplied)
There can be no mistake about it. The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear
distinction between "amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote,
that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to the Constitution. The
framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may propose only amendments to the
Constitution. Where the intent and language of the Constitution clearly withhold from the people the
power to propose revisions to the Constitution, the people cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments.
This has been the consistent ruling of state supreme courts in the United States. Thus, in McFadden v.
J ordan,
32
the Supreme Court of California ruled:
324

The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution x x x
applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of 'laws and amendments to
the Constitution' and does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. x x x x It is
thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the
people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined
hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed
'the measure') now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision
of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be
submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention,
and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Oregon ruled in Holmes v. Appling:
33

It is well established that when a constitution specifies the manner in which it may be amended or
revised, it can be altered by those who favor amendments, revision, or other change only through
the use of one of the specified means. The constitution itself recognizes that there is a difference
between an amendment and a revision; and it is obvious from an examination of the measure
here in question that it is not an amendment as that term is generally understood and as it is used
in Article IV, Section 1. The document appears to be based in large part on the revision of the
constitution drafted by the 'Commission for Constitutional Revision' authorized by the 1961
Legislative Assembly, x x x and submitted to the 1963 Legislative Assembly. It failed to receive in
the Assembly the two-third's majority vote of both houses required by Article XVII, Section 2, and
hence failed of adoption, x x x.
While differing from that document in material respects, the measure sponsored by the plaintiffs
is, nevertheless, a thorough overhauling of the present constitution x x x.
To call it an amendment is a misnomer.
Whether it be a revision or a new constitution, it is not such a measure as can be submitted to the
people through the initiative. If a revision, it is subject to the requirements of Article XVII, Section
2(1); if a new constitution, it can only be proposed at a convention called in the manner provided
in Article XVII, Section 1. x x x x
Similarly, in this jurisdiction there can be no dispute that a people's initiative can only propose
amendments to the Constitution since the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments. There can
be no deviation from the constitutionally prescribed modes of revising the Constitution. A popular clamor,
even one backed by 6.3 million signatures, cannot justify a deviation from the specific modes prescribed
in the Constitution itself.
As the Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled in In re Initiative Petition No. 364:
34

It is a fundamental principle that a constitution can only be revised or amended in the
manner prescribed by the instrument itself, and that any attempt to revise a constitution in
a manner other than the one provided in the instrument is almost invariably treated as
extra-constitutional and revolutionary. x x x x "While it is universally conceded that the people
are sovereign and that they have power to adopt a constitution and to change their own work at
will, they must, in doing so, act in an orderly manner and according to the settled principles of
constitutional law. And where the people, in adopting a constitution, have prescribed the method
by which the people may alter or amend it, an attempt to change the fundamental law in violation
of the self-imposed restrictions, is unconstitutional." x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
325

This Court, whose members are sworn to defend and protect the Constitution, cannot shirk from its
solemn oath and duty to insure compliance with the clear command of the Constitution that a people's
initiative may only amend, never revise, the Constitution.
The question is, does the Lambino Group's initiative constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution? If the Lambino Group's initiative constitutes a revision, then the present petition should be
dismissed for being outside the scope of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. One
of the earliest cases that recognized the distinction described the fundamental difference in this manner:
[T]he very term "constitution" implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and
the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the
underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the
instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance
of the term "amendment" implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original
instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was
framed.
35
(Emphasis supplied)
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several
provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being
amended.
In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in
our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The
quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly
the 'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing
provisions."
36
The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the
degree of the change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The
main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic
governmental plan as to amount to a revision."
37
Whether there is an alteration in the structure of
government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan"
includes "change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches."
38
A change in
the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that "jeopardize the traditional form of
government and the system of check and balances."
39

Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not
merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles -
Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution.
40
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government,
from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-
equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the
separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive
branches is a radical change in the structure of government.
326

The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of
powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of
Congress alters the system of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment. On the face alone of the
Lambino Group's proposed changes, it is readily apparent that the changes will radically alter the
framework of government as set forth in the Constitution. Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J., a leading
member of the Constitutional Commission, writes:
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The guiding
original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions deemed
necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have become obsolete or that
are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original intention and plan contemplates a
re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the document which have over-all implications
for the entire document, to determine how and to what extent they should be altered. Thus, for instance
a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision because of
its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch from a bicameral
system to a unicameral system be because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution.
41
(Emphasis supplied)
In Adams v. Gunter,
42
an initiative petition proposed the amendment of the Florida State constitution
to shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. The issue turned on whether the initiative "was
defective and unauthorized where [the] proposed amendment would x x x affect several other provisions
of [the] Constitution." The Supreme Court of Florida, striking down the initiative as outside the scope of
the initiative clause, ruled as follows:
The proposal here to amend Section 1 of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a
Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but
provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been
in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since
the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept
of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only
radically change the whole pattern of government in this state and tear apart the whole
fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry
on government.
x x x x
We conclude with the observation that if such proposed amendment were adopted by the people
at the General Election and if the Legislature at its next session should fail to submit further
amendments to revise and clarify the numerous inconsistencies and conflicts which would result,
or if after submission of appropriate amendments the people should refuse to adopt them, simple
chaos would prevail in the government of this State. The same result would obtain from an
amendment, for instance, of Section 1 of Article V, to provide for only a Supreme Court and
Circuit Courts-and there could be other examples too numerous to detail. These examples point
unerringly to the answer.
The purpose of the long and arduous work of the hundreds of men and women and many
sessions of the Legislature in bringing about the Constitution of 1968 was to eliminate
inconsistencies and conflicts and to give the State a workable, accordant, homogenous and up-
327

to-date document. All of this could disappear very quickly if we were to hold that it could be
amended in the manner proposed in the initiative petition here.
43
(Emphasis supplied)
The rationale of the Adams decision applies with greater force to the present petition. The Lambino
Group's initiative not only seeks a shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, it also seeks to
merge the executive and legislative departments. The initiative in Adams did not even touch the
executive department.
In Adams, the Supreme Court of Florida enumerated 18 sections of the Florida Constitution that would be
affected by the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. In the Lambino Group's present
initiative, no less than 105 provisions of the Constitution would be affected based on the count of
Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr.
44
There is no doubt that the Lambino Group's present initiative
seeks far more radical changes in the structure of government than the initiative in Adams.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between "amendment" and "revision" is only one of
procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and
proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called "revisions" because members of
the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. However, the same substantive changes, when
proposed through an initiative, are called "amendments" because the changes are made by ordinary
people who do not make an "occupation, profession, or vocation" out of such endeavor.
Thus, the Lambino Group makes the following exposition of their theory in their Memorandum:
99. With this distinction in mind, we note that the constitutional provisions expressly provide for
both "amendment" and "revision" when it speaks of legislators and constitutional delegates, while
the same provisions expressly provide only for "amendment" when it speaks of the people. It
would seem that the apparent distinction is based on the actual experience of the people, that on
one hand the common people in general are not expected to work full-time on the matter of
correcting the constitution because that is not their occupation, profession or vocation; while on
the other hand, the legislators and constitutional convention delegates are expected to work full-
time on the same matter because that is their occupation, profession or vocation. Thus, the
difference between the words "revision" and "amendment" pertain only to the process or
procedure of coming up with the corrections, for purposes of interpreting the constitutional
provisions.
100. Stated otherwise, the difference between "amendment" and "revision" cannot
reasonably be in the substance or extent of the correction. x x x x (Underlining in the original;
boldfacing supplied)
The Lambino Group in effect argues that if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the same
proposed changes that the Lambino Group wrote in the present initiative, the changes would constitute a
revision of the Constitution. Thus, the Lambino Group concedes that the proposed changes in the
present initiative constitute a revision if Congress or a constitutional convention had drafted the
changes. However, since the Lambino Group as private individuals drafted the proposed changes, the
changes are merely amendments to the Constitution. The Lambino Group trivializes the serious matter of
changing the fundamental law of the land.
The express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino
Group's theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are clear and plainly
stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.
45
Any theory espousing a
construction contrary to such intent and language deserves scant consideration. More so, if such theory
wreaks havoc by creating inconsistencies in the form of government established in the Constitution. Such
a theory, devoid of any jurisprudential mooring and inviting inconsistencies in the Constitution, only
exposes the flimsiness of the Lambino Group's position. Any theory advocating that a proposed change
328

involving a radical structural change in government does not constitute a revision justly deserves
rejection.
The Lambino Group simply recycles a theory that initiative proponents in American jurisdictions have
attempted to advance without any success. In Lowe v. Keisling,
46
the Supreme Court of
Oregon rejected this theory, thus:
Mabon argues that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to changes to the constitution proposed
by initiative. His theory is that Article XVII, section 2 merely provides a procedure by which
the legislature can propose a revision of the constitution, but it does not affect proposed
revisions initiated by the people.
Plaintiffs argue that the proposed ballot measure constitutes a wholesale change to the
constitution that cannot be enacted through the initiative process. They assert that the distinction
between amendment and revision is determined by reviewing the scope and subject matter of the
proposed enactment, and that revisions are not limited to "a formal overhauling of the
constitution." They argue that this ballot measure proposes far reaching changes outside the lines
of the original instrument, including profound impacts on existing fundamental rights and radical
restructuring of the government's relationship with a defined group of citizens. Plaintiffs assert
that, because the proposed ballot measure "will refashion the most basic principles of Oregon
constitutional law," the trial court correctly held that it violated Article XVII, section 2, and cannot
appear on the ballot without the prior approval of the legislature.
We first address Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2(1), does not prohibit revisions
instituted by initiative. In Holmes v. Appling, x x x, the Supreme Court concluded that a revision of
the constitution may not be accomplished by initiative, because of the provisions of Article XVII,
section 2. After reviewing Article XVII, section1, relating to proposed amendments, the court said:
"From the foregoing it appears that Article IV, Section 1, authorizes the use of the initiative as a
means of amending the Oregon Constitution, but it contains no similar sanction for its use as a
means of revising the constitution." x x x x
It then reviewed Article XVII, section 2, relating to revisions, and said: "It is the only section of the
constitution which provides the means for constitutional revision and it excludes the idea that an
individual, through the initiative, may place such a measure before the electorate." x x x x
Accordingly, we reject Mabon's argument that Article XVII, section 2, does not apply to
constitutional revisions proposed by initiative. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, this Court must reject the Lambino Group's theory which negates the express intent of the
framers and the plain language of the Constitution.
We can visualize amendments and revisions as a spectrum, at one end green for amendments and at the
other end red for revisions. Towards the middle of the spectrum, colors fuse and difficulties arise in
determining whether there is an amendment or revision. The present initiative is indisputably located at
the far end of the red spectrum where revision begins. The present initiative seeks a radical overhaul of
the existing separation of powers among the three co-equal departments of government, requiring far-
reaching amendments in several sections and articles of the Constitution.
Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any
other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For
example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years
47
is an amendment and not a
revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100 percent to
329

60 percent is an amendment and not a revision.
48
Also, a change requiring a college degree as an
additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.
49

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of the Constitution
other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not also affect the structure of
government or the system of checks-and-balances among or within the three branches. These three
examples are located at the far green end of the spectrum, opposite the far red end where the revision
sought by the present petition is located.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a
single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example,
the substitution of the word "republican" with "monarchic" or "theocratic" in Section 1, Article II
50
of the
Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis
of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on
how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure of government, the carefully crafted
system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution,
a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision
requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain
unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or
constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people's
initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to
undertake only amendments and not revisions.
In the present initiative, the Lambino Group's proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions states:
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with
the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which shall
hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other Sections of Article
VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 26, unless
they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they
shall be amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
The basic rule in statutory construction is that if a later law is irreconcilably inconsistent with a prior law,
the later law prevails. This rule also applies to construction of constitutions. However, the Lambino
Group's draft of Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions turns on its head this rule of construction by stating
that in case of such irreconcilable inconsistency, the earlier provision "shall be amended to conform with
a unicameral parliamentary form of government." The effect is to freeze the two irreconcilable provisions
until the earlier one "shall be amended," which requires a future separate constitutional amendment.
Realizing the absurdity of the need for such an amendment, petitioner Atty. Lambino readily conceded
during the oral arguments that the requirement of a future amendment is a "surplusage." In short, Atty.
Lambino wants to reinstate the rule of statutory construction so that the later provision automatically
prevails in case of irreconcilable inconsistency. However, it is not as simple as that.
The irreconcilable inconsistency envisioned in the proposed Section 2 of the Transitory Provisions is not
between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and a provision in the proposed changes. The
inconsistency is between a provision in Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and the "Parliamentary
system of government," and the inconsistency shall be resolved in favor of a "unicameral
parliamentary form of government."
330

Now, what "unicameral parliamentary form of government" do the Lambino Group's proposed
changes refer to the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or New Zealand models, which are among
the few countries withunicameral parliaments? The proposed changes could not possibly refer to the
traditional and well-known parliamentary forms of government the British, French, Spanish, German,
Italian, Canadian, Australian, or Malaysian models, which have all bicameral parliaments. Did the people
who signed the signature sheets realize that they were adopting the Bangladeshi, Singaporean, Israeli, or
New Zealand parliamentary form of government?
This drives home the point that the people's initiative is not meant for revisions of the Constitution but only
for amendments. A shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system
requires harmonizing several provisions in many articles of the Constitution. Revision of the Constitution
through a people's initiative will only result in gross absurdities in the Constitution.
In sum, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Lambino Group's initiative is a revision and not an
amendment. Thus, the present initiative is void and unconstitutional because it violates Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of a people's initiative to "[A]mendments to this
Constitution."
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic requirements of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
There is no need to revisit this Court's ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or
wanting in essential terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution. An
affirmation or reversal of Santiago will not change the outcome of the present petition. Thus, this Court
must decline to revisit Santiago which effectively ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with the
requirements of the Constitution to implement the initiative clause on amendments to the Constitution.
This Court must avoid revisiting a ruling involving the constitutionality of a statute if the case before the
Court can be resolved on some other grounds. Such avoidance is a logical consequence of the well-
settled doctrine that courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case can be resolved
on some other grounds.
51

Nevertheless, even assuming that RA 6735 is valid to implement the constitutional provision on initiatives
to amend the Constitution, this will not change the result here because the present petition violates
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. To be a valid initiative, the present initiative must first
comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution even before complying with RA 6735.
Even then, the present initiative violates Section 5(b) of RA 6735 which requires that the "petition for an
initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number of
registered voters as signatories." Section 5(b) of RA 6735 requires that the people must sign
the "petition x x x as signatories."
The 6.3 million signatories did not sign the petition of 25 August 2006 or the amended petition of 30
August 2006 filed with the COMELEC. Only Atty. Lambino, Atty. Demosthenes B. Donato, and Atty.
Alberto C. Agra signed the petition and amended petition as counsels for "Raul L. Lambino and
Erico B. Aumentado, Petitioners." In the COMELEC, the Lambino Group, claiming to act "together with"
the 6.3 million signatories, merely attached the signature sheets to the petition and amended petition.
Thus, the petition and amended petition filed with the COMELEC did not even comply with the basic
requirement of RA 6735 that the Lambino Group claims as valid.
The Lambino Group's logrolling initiative also violates Section 10(a) of RA 6735 stating, "No petition
embracing more than one (1) subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x." The proposed
Section 4(4) of the Transitory Provisions, mandating the interim Parliament to propose further
331

amendments or revisions to the Constitution, is a subject matter totally unrelated to the shift in the form of
government. Since the present initiative embraces more than one subject matter, RA 6735 prohibits
submission of the initiative petition to the electorate. Thus, even if RA 6735 is valid, the Lambino Group's
initiative will still fail.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the Lambino Group's
Initiative
In dismissing the Lambino Group's initiative petition, the COMELEC en banc merely followed this Court's
ruling inSantiago and People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v.
COMELEC.
52
For following this Court's ruling, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to the
COMELEC. On this ground alone, the present petition warrants outright dismissal. Thus, this Court
should reiterate its unanimous ruling in PIRMA:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed
to the public respondent COMELEC in dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it appearing
that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decisions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325,
promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution, as the fundamental law of the land, deserves the utmost respect and obedience of all
the citizens of this nation. No one can trivialize the Constitution by cavalierly amending or revising it in
blatant violation of the clearly specified modes of amendment and revision laid down in the Constitution
itself.
To allow such change in the fundamental law is to set adrift the Constitution in unchartered waters, to be
tossed and turned by every dominant political group of the day. If this Court allows today a cavalier
change in the Constitution outside the constitutionally prescribed modes, tomorrow the new dominant
political group that comes will demand its own set of changes in the same cavalier and unconstitutional
fashion. A revolving-door constitution does not augur well for the rule of law in this country.
An overwhelming majority 16,622,111 voters comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes cast
53

approved our Constitution in a national plebiscite held on 11 February 1987. That approval is the
unmistakable voice of the people, the full expression of the people's sovereign will. That approval
included the prescribed modes for amending or revising the Constitution.
No amount of signatures, not even the 6,327,952 million signatures gathered by the Lambino Group, can
change our Constitution contrary to the specific modes that the people, in their sovereign capacity,
prescribed when they ratified the Constitution. The alternative is an extra-constitutional change, which
means subverting the people's sovereign will and discarding the Constitution. This is one act the
Court cannot and should never do. As the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, this Court is sworn to
perform its solemn duty to defend and protect the Constitution, which embodies the real sovereign will of
the people.
Incantations of "people's voice," "people's sovereign will," or "let the people decide" cannot override the
specific modes of changing the Constitution as prescribed in the Constitution itself. Otherwise, the
Constitution the people's fundamental covenant that provides enduring stability to our society
becomes easily susceptible to manipulative changes by political groups gathering signatures through
false promises. Then, the Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the nation's stability.
The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the "people's voice." However, the Lambino Group
unabashedly states in ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the
COMELEC, that "ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the agenda of Her Excellency President
332

Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms." The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's"
initiative is an "unqualified support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution.
This forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in the present
initiative.
This Court cannot betray its primordial duty to defend and protect the Constitution. The Constitution,
which embodies the people's sovereign will, is the bible of this Court. This Court exists to defend and
protect the Constitution. To allow this constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled by deceptively gathered
signatures, to alter basic principles in the Constitution is to allow a desecration of the Constitution. To
allow such alteration and desecration is to lose this Court's raison d'etre.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ERICO B. AUMENTADO, TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ET AL.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
PANGANIBAN, CJ .:
Without the rule of law, there can be no lasting prosperity and certainly no liberty.
Beverley McLachlin
1

Chief Justice of Canada
After a deep reflection on the issues raised and a careful evaluation of the parties' respective arguments -
- both oral and written -- as well as the enlightened and enlightening Opinions submitted by my esteemed
colleagues, I am fully convinced that the present Petition must be dismissed.
I write, however, to show that my present disposition is completely consistent with my previous Opinions
and votes on the two extant Supreme Court cases involving an initiative to change the Constitution.
In my Separate Opinion in Santiago v. Comelec,
2
I opined "that taken together and interpreted properly
and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), Republic Act 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 provide more than sufficient
__________________
'SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
333

registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.'
"With all due respect, I find the majority's position all too sweeping and all too extremist. It is
equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and to killing the patient to relieve
him of pain. What Citizen Delfin wants the Comelec to do we should reject. But we should not
thereby preempt any future effort to exercise the right of initiative correctly and judiciously. The
fact that the Delfin Petition proposes a misuse of initiative does not justify a ban against its proper
use. Indeed, there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time and for the right reason.
Taken Together and Interpreted Properly,
the Constitution, R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution
"While R.A. 6735 may not be a perfect law, it was as the majority openly concedes intended
by the legislature to cover and, I respectfully submit, it contains enough provisions to effectuate
an initiative on the Constitution. I completely agree with the inspired and inspiring opinions of Mr.
Justice Reynato S. Puno and Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco that RA 6735, the Roco law on
initiative, sufficiently implements the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution.
Such views, which I shall no longer repeat nor elaborate on, are thoroughly consistent with this
Court's unanimous en banc rulings in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on
Elections, that "provisions for initiative . . . are (to be) liberally construed to effectuate their
purposes, to facilitate and not hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby";
and in Garcia vs. Comelec, that any "effort to trivialize the effectiveness of people's initiatives
ought to be rejected."
"No law can completely and absolutely cover all administrative details. In recognition of this, R.A.
6735 wisely empowered the Commission on Election "to promulgate such rules and regulations
as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." And pursuant thereto, the Comelec
issued its Resolution 2300 on 16 January 1991. Such Resolution, by its very words, was
promulgated "to govern the conduct of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum
on national and local laws," not by the incumbent Commission on Elections but by one then
composed of Acting Chairperson Haydee B. Yorac, Comms. Alfredo
authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the Constitution."
__________________
E. Abueg, Jr., Leopoldo L. Africa, Andres R. Flores, Dario C. Rama and Magdara B. Dimaampao.
All of these Commissioners who signed Resolution 2300 have retired from the Commission, and
thus we cannot ascribe any vile motive unto them, other than an honest, sincere and exemplary
effort to give life to a cherished right of our people.
"The majority argues that while Resolution 2300 is valid in regard to national laws and local
legislations, it is void in reference to constitutional amendments. There is no basis for such
differentiation. The source of and authority for the Resolution is the same law, R.A. 6735.
"I respectfully submit that taken together and interpreted properly and liberally, the Constitution
(particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), R.A. 6735 and Comelec Resolution 2300 provide more than
sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's power to amend the
Constitution.
334

"I am glad the majority decided to heed our plea to lift the temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibited Petitioner Delfin and the Spouses
Pedrosa from exercising their right of initiative. In fact, I believe that such restraining order as
against private respondents should not have been issued, in the first place. While I agree that the
Comelec should be stopped from using public funds and government resources to help them
gather signatures, I firmly believe that this Court has no power to restrain them from exercising
their right of initiative. The right to propose amendments to the Constitution is really a species of
the right of free speech and free assembly. And certainly, it would be tyrannical and despotic to
stop anyone from speaking freely and persuading others to conform to his/her beliefs. As the
eminent Voltaire once said, 'I may disagree with what you say, but I will defend to the death your
right to say it.' After all, freedom is not really for the thought we agree with, but as Justice Holmes
wrote, 'freedom for the thought that we hate.'
Epilogue
"By way of epilogue, let me stress the guiding tenet of my Separate Opinion. Initiative, like
referendum and recall, is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. All
three are institutionalized legacies of the world-admired EDSA people power. Like elections and
plebiscites, they are hallowed expressions of popular sovereignty. They are sacred democratic
rights of our people to be used as
Six months after, in my Separate Opinion in People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA) v. Comelec,
3
I joined the rest of the members of the Court in ruling "by a unanimous vote, that
no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the Comelec in dismissing the petition filed by
__________________
Constitution x x x." While concededly, petitioners in this case were not direct parties in Santiago,
nonetheless the Court's injunction against the Comelec covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin
petition which was the immediate subject of said case. As a dissenter in Santiago, I believed,
and still do, that the majority gravely erred in rendering such a sweeping injunction, but I
cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said
decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest
Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave
abuse of discretion. Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the
Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have
been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's
supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies.
Second Issue:
Sufficiency of RA 6735
"I repeat my firm legal position that RA 6735 is adequate to cover initiatives on the
Constitution, and that whatever administrative details may have been omitted in said law
are satisfactorily provided by Comelec Resolution 2300. The promulgation of Resolution
2300 is sanctioned by Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which vests upon the Comelec
the power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall." The Omnibus Election Code likewise
empowers the electoral body to "promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of
this Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer x x x." Finally
and most relevantly, Section 20 of Ra 6735 specifically authorizes Comelec "to promulgate rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act."
335

"In my dissent in Santiago, I wrote that "there is a right way to do the right thing at the right
time and for the right reason." Let me explain further.
The Right Thing
"A people's initiative is direct democracy in action. It is the right thing that citizens may avail
themselves of to articulate their will. It is a new and treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional
system. Even the majority implicitly conceded its value and worth in our legal firmament when it
implored Congress "not to tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to
provide for implementation of the right (of initiative) of the people x x x." Hence, in the en
banc case of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Comelec, [G.R. No. 125416, September 26,
1996], this Court unanimously held that "(l)ike elections, initiative and referendum are powerful
and valuable modes of expressing popular
PIRMA therein," since the Commission had "only complied" with the Santiago Decision.
__________________
sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture,
protect and promote their legitimate exercise."
The Right Way
"From the outset, I have already maintained the view that "taken together and interpreted properly
and liberally, the Constitution (particularly Art. XVII, Sec. 2), RA 6735 and Comelec Resolution
2300 provide more than sufficient authority to implement, effectuate and realize our people's
power to amend the Constitution." Let me now demonstrate the adequacy of RA 6735 by
outlining, in concrete terms, the steps to be taken the right way to amend the Constitution
through a people's initiative.
"Pursuant to Section 3(f) of the law, the Comelec shall prescribe the form of the petition which
shall contain the proposition and the required number of signatories. Under Sec. 5(c) thereof, the
petition shall state the following:
'c.1 contents or text of the [provision or provisions] sought to be x x x amended, x x x;
c.2 the proposition [in full text];
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor [fully and clearly explained];
c.4 that it is not one of exceptions provided herein;
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which
shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.'
"Section 8(f) of Comelec Resolution 2300 additionally requires that the petition include a formal
designation of the duly authorized representatives of the signatories.
336

"Being a constitutional requirement, the number of signatures becomes a condition precedent to
the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional. Without such requisite signatures, the Commission
shall motu proprio reject the petition.
"Where the initiators have substantially complied with the above requirements, they may thence
file the petition with the Comelec which is tasked to determine the sufficiency thereof and to verify
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification
cards. In deciding whether the petition is sufficient, the Comelec shall also determine if the
proposition is proper for an initiative, i.e., if it consists of an amendment, not a revision, of the
Constitution. Any decision of the electoral body may be appealed to the Supreme Court within
thirty (30) days from notice.
I added "that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and the validity of Comelec Resolution
2300 will notipso
__________________
"Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the petition, and after the determination of its sufficiency,
the Comelec shall publish the same in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of
general and local circulation, and set the date of the plebiscite. The conduct of the plebiscite
should not be earlier than sixty (60) days, but not later than ninety (90) days after certification by
the Comelec of the sufficiency of the petition. The proposition, if approved by a majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite, becomes effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
"From the foregoing, it should be clear that my position upholding the adequacy of RA 6735 and
the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 will not ipso facto validate the PIRMA petition and
automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far from it. Among others, PIRMA
must still satisfactorily hurdle the following searching issues:
1. Does the proposed change the lifting of the term limits of elective officials -- constitute a mere
amendment and not a revision of the Constitution?
2. Which registry of voters will be used to verify the signatures in the petition? This question is
relevant considering that under RA 8189, the old registry of voters used in the 1995 national
elections was voided after the barangay elections on May 12, 1997, while the new list may be
used starting only in the elections of May 1998.
3. Does the clamor for the proposed change in the Constitution really emanate from the people
who signed the petition for initiative? Or it is the beneficiaries of term extension who are in fact
orchestrating such move to advance their own political self-interest?
4. Are the six million signatures genuine and verifiable? Do they really belong to qualified warm
bodies comprising at least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative
district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein?
"I shall expound on the third question in the next section, The Right Reason. Question Nos. 1 and
2 above, while important, are basically legal in character and can be determined by
argumentation and memoranda. However, Question No. 4 involves not only legal issues but
gargantuan hurdles of factual determination. This to my mind is the crucible, the litmus test, of a
people's petition for initiative. If herein petitioners, led by PIRMA, succeed in proving -- not just
alleging -- that six million voters of this country indeed want to amend the Constitution, what
power on earth can stop them? Not this Court, not the Comelec, not even the President or
Congress.
337

facto validate the PIRMA petition and automatically lead to a plebiscite to amend the Constitution. Far
from it." I stressed that PIRMA must show the following, among others:
__________________
"It took only one million people to stage a peaceful revolution at EDSA, and the very rafters and
foundations of the martial law society trembled, quaked and crumbled. On the other hand, PIRMA
and its co-petitioners are claiming that they have gathered six million signatures. If, as claimed by
many, these six million signatures are fraudulent, then let them be exposed and damned for all
history in a signature-verification process conducted under our open system of legal advocacy.
"More than anything else, it is the truth that I, as a member of this Court and as a citizen of this
country, would like to seek: Are these six million signatures real? By insisting on an entirely new
doctrine of statutory inadequacy, the majority effectively suppressed the quest for that truth.
The Right Reason
"As mentioned, the third question that must be answered, even if the adequacy of RA 6735 and
the validity of Comelec Resolution 2300 were upheld by the majority is: Does the clamor for the
proposed change to the Constitution really emanate from the people who signed the petition for
initiative? Or is it the beneficiaries of term extension who are in fact orchestrating such move to
advance their own political self-interests? In other words, is PIRMA's exercise of the right to
initiative being done in accordance with our Constitution and our laws? Is such attempted
exercise legitimate?
"In Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, we described initiative, along with referendum, as the
'ultimate weapon of the people to negate government malfeasance and misfeasance.' In Subic
Bay, we specified that 'initiative is entirely the work of the electorate x x x a process of lawmaking
by the people themselves without the participation and against the wishes of their elected
representatives.' As ponente of Subic Bay, I stand foursquare on this principle: The right to
amend through initiative belongs only to the people not to the government and its
minions. This principle finds clear support from utterances of many constitutional commissioners
like those quoted below:
"[Initiative is] a reserve power of the sovereign people, when they are dissatisfied with the
National Assembly x x x [and] precisely a fallback position of the people in the event that they are
dissatisfied." -- Commissioner Ople
"[Initiative is] a check on a legislative that is not responsive [and resorted to] only if the legislature
is not as responsive to the vital and urgent needs of people." -- Commissioner Gascon
(1) The proposed change -- the lifting of term limits of elective officials -- "constitute[s] a mere amendment
and not a revision of the Constitution."
_________________
"[Initiative is an] extraordinary power given to the people [and] reserved for the people [which]
should not be frivolously resorted to." -- Commissioner Romulo
"Indeed, if the powers-that-be desire to amend the Constitution, or even to revise it, our Charter
itself provides them other ways of doing so, namely, by calling a constitutional convention or
constituting Congress into a constituent assembly. These are officialdom's weapons. But initiative
belongs to the people.
338

"In the present case, are PIRMA and its co-petitioners legitimate people's organizations or are
they merely fronts for incumbents who want to extend their terms? This is a factual question
which, unfortunately, cannot be judicially answered anymore, because the Supreme Court
majority ruled that the law that implements it, RA 6735, is inadequate or insufficient insofar as
initiatives to the Constitutions are concerned. With such ruling, the majority effectively abrogated
a constitutional right of our people. That is why in my Separate Opinion in Santiago, I exclaimed
that such precipitate action "is equivalent to burning the whole house to exterminate the rats, and
to killing the patient to relieve him of pain." I firmly maintain that to defeat PIRMA's effort, there is
no need to "burn" the constitutional right to initiative. If PIRMA's exercise is not "legitimate," it can
be exposed as such in the ways I have discussed short of abrogating the right itself. On the
other hand, if PIRMA's position is proven to be legitimate if it hurdles the four issues I outlined
earlier by all means, we should allow and encourage it. But the majority's theory of statutory
inadequacy has pre-empted unnecessarily and invalidly, in my view any judicial determination
of such legitimacy or illegitimacy. It has silenced the quest for truth into the interstices of the
PIRMA petition.
The Right Time
"The Constitution itself sets a time limitation on when changes thereto may be proposed. Section
2 of Article XVII precludes amendments "within five years following [its] ratification x x x nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter." Since its ratification, the 1987 Constitution has
never been amended. Hence, the five-year prohibition is now inoperative and amendments may
theoretically be proposed at any time.
"Be that as it may, I believe given the present circumstances that there is no more time to lift
term limits to enable incumbents to seek reelection in the May 11, 1998 polls. Between today and
the next national
(2) The "six million signatures are genuine and verifiable"; and they "really belong to qualified warm
bodies comprising at
__________________
elections, less than eight (8) months remain. Santiago, where the single issue of the sufficiency of
RA 6735 was resolved, took this Court three (3) months, and another two (2) months to decide
the motion for reconsideration. The instant case, where the same issue is also raised by the
petitioners, took two months, not counting a possible motion for reconsideration. These time
spans could not be abbreviated any further, because due process requires that all parties be
given sufficient time to file their pleadings.
"Thus, even if the Court were to rule now in favor of the adequacy of RA 6735 as I believe it
should and allow the Comelec to act on the PIRMA petition, such eight-month period will not be
enough to tackle the four weighty issues I mentioned earlier, considering that two of them involve
tedious factual questions. The Comelec's decision on any of these issues can still be elevated to
this Court for review, and reconsiderations on our decisions on each of those issues may again
be sought.
"Comelec's herculean task alone of verifying each of the six million signatures is enormously
time-consuming, considering that any person may question the authenticity of each and every
signature, initially before the election registrar, then before the Comelec on appeal and finally,
before this Court in a separate proceeding. Moreover, the plebiscite itself assuming such stage
can be reached may be scheduled only after sixty (60) but not more than ninety (90) days, from
the time the Comelec and this Court, on appeal, finally declare the petition to be sufficient.
339

"Meanwhile, under Comelec Resolution 2946, political parties, groups organizations or coalitions
may start selecting their official candidates for President, Vice President and Senators on
November 27, 1997; the period for filing certificates of candidacy is from January 11 to February
9, 1998; the election period and campaign for national officials start on February 10, 1998, while
the campaign period for other elective officials, on March 17, 1998. This means, by the time
PIRMA's proposition is ready if ever for submission directly to the voters at large, it will have
been overcome by the elections. Time will simply run out on PIRMA,if the intention is to lift term
limits in time for the 1998 elections.
"That term limits may no longer be lifted prior to the 1998 elections via a people's initiative does
not detract one whit from (1) my firm conviction that RA 6735 is sufficient and adequate to
implement this constitutional right and, more important, (2) my faith in the power of the people to
initiate changes in local and national laws and the Constitution. In fact, I think the Court can
deliberate on these two items even more serenely and wisely now that the debates will be free
from the din and distraction of the 1998 elections. After all, jurisprudence is not merely for the
here and now but, more so, for the hereafter and the morrow. Let me therefore stress, by way of
epilogue, my unbending credo in favor of our people's right to initiative.
least 12% of the registered voters nationwide, of which every legislative district is represented by at least
3% of the registered voters therein."
__________________
Epilogue
"I believe in democracy in our people's natural right to determine our own destiny.
"I believe in the process of initiative as a democratic method of enabling our people to express
their will and chart their history. Initiative is an alternative to bloody revolution, internal chaos and
civil strife. It is an inherent right of the people as basic as the right to elect, the right to self-
determination and the right to individual liberties. I believe that Filipinos have the ability and the
capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative wisely and maturely, and to
choose what is best for themselves and their posterity.
"Such beliefs, however, should not be equated with a desire to perpetuate a particular official or
group of officials in power. Far from it. Such perpetuation is anathema to democracy. My firm
conviction that there is an adequate law implementing the constitutional right of initiative does
not ipso facto result in the victory of the PIRMA petition or of any proposed constitutional change.
There are, after all, sufficient safeguards to guarantee the proper use of such constitutional right
and to forestall its misuse and abuse. First, initiative cannot be used to revise the Constitution,
only to amend it. Second, the petitioners' signatures must be validated against an existing list of
voters and/or voters' identification cards. Third, initiative is a reverse power of and by the people,
not of incumbent officials and their machinators. Fourth and most important of all, the signatures
must be verified as real and genuine; not concocted, fictitious or fabricated. The only legal way to
do this is to enable the Commission on Elections to conduct a nationwide verification process as
mandated by the Constitution and the law. Such verification, it bears stressing, is subject to
review by this Court.
"There were, by the most generous estimate, only a million people who gathered at EDSA in
1986, and yet they changed the history of our country. PIRMA claims six times that number, not
just from the National Capital Region but from all over the country. Is this claim through the
invention of its novel theory of statutory insufficiency, the Court's majority has stifled the only legal
method of determining whether PIRMA is real or not, whether there is indeed a popular clamor to
lift term limits of elected officials, and whether six million voters want to initiate amendments to
340

their most basic law. In suppressing a judicial answer to such questions, the Court may have
unwittingly yielded to PIRMA the benefit of the legal presumption of legality and regularity. In its
misplaced zeal to exterminate the rats, it burned down the whole house. It unceremoniously
divested the people of a basic constitutional right.
In both Opinions, I concluded that we must implement "the right thing [initiative] in the right way at the
right time and for the right reason."
In the present case, I steadfastly stand by my foregoing Opinions in Santiago and PIRMA. Tested against
them, the present Petition of Raul Lambino and Erico Aumentado must be DISMISSED. Unfortunately,
the right thingis being rushed in the wrong way and for the wrong reasons. Let me explain.
No Grave Abuse
of Discretion by Comelec
As in PIRMA, I find no grave abuse of discretion in Comelec's dismissal of the Lambino Petition. After all,
the Commission merely followed the holding in Santiago permanently
____________________
"In the ultimate, the mission of the judiciary is to discover truth and to make it prevail. This
mission is undertaken not only to resolve the vagaries of present events but also to build the
pathways of tomorrow. The sum total of the entire process of adversarial litigation is the verity of
facts and the application of law thereto. By the majority cop-out in this mission of discovery, our
country and our people have been deprived not only of a basic constitutional right, as earlier
noted, but also of the judicial opportunity to verify the truth."
enjoining the poll body "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system."
Indeed, the Comelec did not violate the Constitution, the laws or any jurisprudence.
4
Neither can
whim, caprice, arbitrariness or personal bias be attributed to the Commission.
5
Quite the contrary, it
prudently followed this Court's jurisprudence in Santiago and PIRMA. Even assuming arguendo that
Comelec erred in ruling on a very difficult and unsettled question of law, this Court still cannot attribute
grave abuse of discretion to the poll body with respect to that action.
6

The present Lambino Petition is in exactly the same situation as that of PIRMA in 1997. The differences
pointed out by Justice Reynato S. Puno are, with due respect, superficial. It is argued that, unlike the
present Lambino Petition, PIRMA did not contain verified signatures. These are distinctions that do not
make a difference. Precisely, Justice Puno is urging a remand, because the verification issue is
"contentious" and remains unproven by petitioners. Clearly, both the PIRMA and the Lambino
Petitions contain unverified signatures. Therefore, they both deserve the same treatment:
DISMISSAL.
Besides, the only reason given in the unanimous Resolution on PIRMA v. Comelec was that the
Commission had "only complied" with this Court's Decision in Santiago, the same reason given by
Comelec in this case. The Separate Opinions in PIRMA gave no other reason. No one argued, even
remotely, that the PIRMA Petition should have been dismissed because the signatures were
unverified.
341

To stress, I adhere to my Opinion in PIRMA that, "[b]eing a constitutional requirement, the number of
signatures becomes a condition precedent to the filing of the petition, and is jurisdictional.
7
Without those
signatures, the Comelec shall motu proprio reject the petition."
So, until and unless Santiago is revisited and changed by this Court or the legal moorings of the exercise
of the right are substantially changed, the Comelec cannot be faulted for acting in accord with this
Court's pronouncements. Respondent Commission has no discretion, under any guise, to refuse
enforcement of any final decision of this Court.
8
The refusal of the poll body to act on the Lambino
Petition was its only recourse. Any other mode of action would appear not only presumptuous, but also
contemptuous. It would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have surely been struck down
as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of the supremacy of this Court as the final
arbiter of justiciable controversies.
Even assuming further that this Court rules, as I believe it should (for the reasons given in my Opinions in
Santiago and PIRMA), that Republic Act 6735 is indeed sufficient to implement an initiative to amend the
Constitution, still, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Comelec for merely following
prevailing jurisprudence extant at the time it rendered its ruling in question.
Only Amendments,
Not Revisions
I reiterate that only amendments, not revisions, may be the proper subject of an initiative to change
the Constitution. This principle is crystal clear from even a layperson's reading of the basic law.
9

I submit that changing the system of government from presidential to parliamentary and the form of the
legislature from bicameral to unicameral contemplates an overhaul of the structure of government.
The ponencia has amply demonstrated that the merger of the legislative and the executive branches
under a unicameral-parliamentary system, "[b]y any legal test and under any jurisdiction," will "radically
alter the framework of government as set forth in the Constitution." Indeed, the proposed changes have
an overall implication on the entire Constitution; they effectively rewrite its most important and basic
provisions. The prolixity and complexity of the changes cannot be categorized, even by semantic
generosity, as "amendments."
In addition, may I say that of the three modes of changing the Constitution, revisions (or amendments)
may be proposed only through the first two: by Congress or by a constitutional convention. Under the
third mode -- people's initiative -- only amendments are allowed. Many of the justices' Opinions have cited
the historical, philosophical and jurisprudential bases of their respective positions. I will not add to the
woes of the reader by reiterating them here.
Suffice it to say that, to me, the practical test to differentiate an amendment from a revision is found in the
Constitution itself: a revision may be done only when the proposed change can be drafted, defined,
articulated, discussed and agreed upon after a mature and democratic debate in a deliberative
body like Congress or a Convention. The changes proposed must necessarily be scrutinized, as their
adoption or non-adoption must result from an informed judgment.
Indeed, the constitutional bodies that drafted the 1935, the 1972 and the 1987 Constitutions had to spend
many months of purposeful discussions, democratic debates and rounds of voting before they could
agree on the wordings covering the philosophy, the underlying principles, and the structure of government
of our Republic.
Verily, even bills creating or changing the administrative structure of local governments take several
weeks or even months of drafting, reading, and debating before Congress can approve them. How much
more when it comes to constitutional changes?
342

A change in the form of government of our country from presidential-bicameral to parliamentary-
unicameral is monumental. Even the initiative proponents admit this fact. So, why should a revision be
rammed down our people's throats without the benefit of intelligent discussion in a deliberative assembly?
Added to the constitutional mandate barring revisions is the provision of RA 6735 expressly prohibiting
petitions for initiative from "embracing more than one subject matter."
10
The present initiative covers at
least two subjects: (1) the shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government; and (2) the
change from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
11
Thus, even under Republic Act 6735 -- the law that
Justice Puno and I hold to be sufficient and valid -- the Lambino Petition deserves dismissal.
12 Percent and 3 Percent Thresholds
Not Proven by Petitioners
The litmus test of a people's petition for initiative is its ability to muster the constitutional requirement that
it be supported by at least 12 percent of the registered voters nationwide, of which at least 3 percent of
the registered voters in every legislative district must be represented. As pointed out by Intervenors One
Voice, Inc., et al., however, records show that there was a failure to meet the minimum percentages
required.
12

Even Justice Puno concedes that the 12 percent and 3 percent constitutional requirements involve
"contentious facts," which have not been proven by the Lambino Petition. Thus, he is urging a remand to
the Comelec.
But a remand is both imprudent and futile. It is imprudent because the Constitution itself mandates the
said requisites of an initiative petition. In other words, a petition that does not show the required
percentages is fatally defective and must be dismissed, as the Delfin Petition was, in Santiago.
Furthermore, as the ponencia had discussed extensively, the present Petition is void and unconstitutional.
It points out that the Petition dismally fails to comply with the constitutional requirement that an initiative
must be directly proposed by the people. Specifically, the ponencia has amply established that petitioners
were unable to show that the Lambino Petition contained, or incorporated by attachment, the full text of
the proposed changes.
So, too, a remand is futile. Even if the required percentages are proven before the Commission, the
Petition must still be dismissed for proposing a revision, not an amendment, in gross violation of
the Constitution. At the very least, it proposes more than one subject, in violation of Republic Act 6735.
Summation
Petitioners plead with this Court to hear the voice of the people because, in the words of Justice Puno
who supports them, the "people's voice is sovereign in a democracy."
I, too, believe in heeding the people's voice. I reiterate my Separate Opinion in PIRMA that "initiative is
a democratic method of enabling our people to express their will and chart their history. x x x. I believe
that Filipinos have the ability and the capacity to rise above themselves, to use this right of initiative
wisely and maturely, and to choose what is best for themselves and their posterity."
This belief will not, however, automatically and blindly result in an initiative to change the Constitution,
because the present Petition violates the following:
The Constitution (specifically Article XVII, which allows only amendments, not revisions, and requires
definite percentages of verified signatures)
343

The law (specifically, Republic Act 6735, which prohibits petitions containing more than one subject)
Jurisprudence (specifically, PIRMA v. Comelec, which dismissed the Petition then under consideration
on the ground that, by following the Santiago ruling, the Comelec had not gravely abused its discretion).
I submit further that a remand of the Lambino Petition is both imprudent and futile. More tellingly, it is
a cop-out, a hand-washing already discredited 2000 years ago. Instead of finger-pointing, I believe
we must confront the issues head on, because the people expect no less from this august and venerable
institution of supreme justice.
Epilogue
At bottom, the issue in this case is simply the Rule of Law.
13
Initiative, like referendum and recall, is a
treasured feature of the Filipino constitutional system. It was born out of our world-admired and often-
imitated People Power, but its misuse and abuse must be resolutely rejected. Democracy must be
cherished, but mob rule vanquished.
The Constitution is a sacred social compact, forged between the government and the people, between
each individual and the rest of the citizenry. Through it, the people have solemnly expressed their will that
all of them shall be governed by laws, and their rights limited by agreed-upon covenants to promote the
common good. If we are to uphold the Rule of Law and reject the rule of the mob, we must faithfully
abide by the processes the Constitution has ordained in order to bring about a peaceful, just and
humane society. Assuming arguendothat six million people allegedly gave their assent to the proposed
changes in the Constitution, they are nevertheless still bound by the social covenant -- the present
Constitution -- which was ratified by a far greater majority almost twenty years ago.
14
I do not denigrate
the majesty of the sovereign will; rather, I elevate our society to the loftiest perch, because our
government must remain as one of laws and not of men.
Upon assuming office, each of the justices of the Supreme Court took a solemn oath to uphold the
Constitution. Being the protectors of the fundamental law as the highest expression of the sovereign will,
they must subject to the strictest scrutiny any attempt to change it, lest it be trivialized and degraded
by the assaults of the mob and of ill-conceived designs. The Court must single-mindedly defend the
Constitution from bogus efforts falsely attributed to the sovereign people.
The judiciary may be the weakest branch of government. Nonetheless, when ranged against incessant
voices from the more powerful branches of government, it should never cower in submission. On the
other hand, I daresay that the same weakness of the Court becomes its strength when it speaks
independently through decisions that rightfully uphold the supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule
of Law. The strength of the judiciary lies not in its lack of brute power, but in its moral courage to perform
its constitutional duty at all times against all odds. Its might is in its being right.
15

During the past weeks, media outfits have been ablaze with reports and innuendoes about alleged carrots
offered and sticks drawn by those interested in the outcome of this case.
16
There being no judicial proof of
these allegations, I shall not comment on them for the nonce, except to quote the Good Book, which
says, "There is nothing hidden that will not be revealed, and nothing secret that will not be known and
come to light."
17

Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the crossroads of history. By its decision, the Court and each of its
members shall be judged by posterity. Ten years, fifty years, a hundred years -- or even a thousand years
-- from now, what the Court did here, and how each justice opined and voted, will still be talked about,
either in shame or in pride. Indeed, the hand-washing of Pontius Pilate, the abomination of Dred
Scott, and the loathing of Javellana still linger and haunt to this day.
344

Let not this case fall into the same damnation. Rather, let this Court be known throughout the nation and
the world for its independence, integrity, industry and intelligence.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS, Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL., Respondents.
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR. and
BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
I agree with the opinion of our esteemed colleague, Justice Reynato Puno, that the Court's ruling
in Santiago v. COMELEC
1
is not a binding precedent. However, it is my position that even
if Santiago were reversed and Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. 6735) be held as sufficient law for the
purpose of people's initiative to amend the Constitution, the petition for initiative in this case must
nonetheless be dismissed.
There is absolutely no showing here that petitioners complied with R.A. 6735, even as they blindly invoke
the said law to justify their alleged people's initiative. Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735 requires that "[a] petition
for an initiativeon the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum (12%) of the total number
of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein." On the other hand, Section 5(c)
2
of the same law
requires that the petition should state, among others, the proposition
3
or the "contents or text of the
proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed." If we were to apply
Section 5(c) to an initiative to amend the Constitution, as petitioners submit, the petition for initiative
signed by the required number of voters should incorporate therein a text of the proposed changes to the
Constitution. However, such requirement was not followed in the case at bar.
During the oral arguments, petitioner Lambino admitted that they printed a mere 100,000 copies of the
text of the proposed changes to the Constitution. According to him, these were subsequently distributed
345

to their agents all over the country, for attachment to the sheets of paper on which the signatures were to
be affixed. Upon being asked, however, if he in fact knew whether the text was actually attached to the
signature sheets which were distributed for signing, he said that he merely assumed that they were. In
other words, he could not tell the Court for certain whether their representatives complied with this
requirement.
The petition filed with the COMELEC, as well as that which was shown to this Court, indubitably establish
that the full text of the proposed changes was not attached to the signature sheets. All that the signature
sheets contained was the general proposition and abstract, which falls short of the full text requirement of
R.A. 6735.
The necessity of setting forth the text of the proposed constitutional changes in the petition for initiative to
be signed by the people cannot be seriously disputed. To begin with, Article XVII, Section 2 of the
Constitution unequivocally states that "[a]mendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein." Evidently, for the people to propose amendments to the
Constitution, they must, in the first instance, know exactly what they are proposing. It is not enough that
they merely possess a general idea of the proposed changes, as the Constitution speaks of a "direct"
proposal by the people.
Although the framers of the Constitution left the matter of implementing the constitutional right of initiative
to Congress, it might be noted that they themselves reasonably assumed that the draft of the proposed
constitutional amendments would be shown to the people during the process of signature gathering. Thus

MR. RODRIGO. Section 2 of the complete committee report provides: "upon petition of at least
10 percent of the registered voters." How will we determine that 10 percent has been achieved?
How will the voters manifest their desire, is it by signature?
MR. SUAREZ. Yes, by signatures.
MR. RODRIGO. Let us look at the mechanics. Let us say some voters want to propose a
constitutional amendment. Is the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment ready to be
shown to the people when they are asked to sign?
MR. SUAREZ. That can be reasonably assumed, Madam President.
MR. RODRIGO: What does the sponsor mean? The draft is ready and shown to them before they
sign. Now, who prepares the draft?
MR. SUAREZ: The people themselves, Madam President.
4

It may thus be logically assumed that even without Section 5(c) of R.A. 6735, the full text of the proposed
changes must necessarily be stated in or attached to the initiative petition. The signatories to the petition
must be given an opportunity to fully comprehend the meaning and effect of the proposed changes to
enable them to make a free, intelligent and well-informed choice on the matter.
Needless to say, the requirement of setting forth the complete text of the proposed changes in the petition
for initiative is a safeguard against fraud and deception. If the whole text of the proposed changes is
contained in or attached to the petition, intercalations and riders may be duly avoided. Only then can we
be assured that the proposed changes are truly of the people and that the signatories have been fully
apprised of its implications.
346

If a statutory provision is essential to guard against fraud, corruption or deception in the initiative and
referendum process, such provision must be viewed as an indispensable requirement and failure to
substantially comply therewith is fatal.
5
The failure of petitioners in this case to comply with the full text
requirement resultantly rendered their petition for initiative fatally defective.
The petition for initiative is likewise irretrievably infirm because it violates the one subject rule under
Section 10(a) of R.A. 6735:
SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or
referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate; x x x
The one subject rule, as relating to an initiative to amend the Constitution, has the same object and
purpose as the one subject-one bill rule embodied in Article VI, Section 26(1)
6
of the Constitution.
7
To
elaborate, the one subject-one bill rule was designed to do away with the practice of inserting two or more
unrelated provisions in one bill, so that those favoring one provision would be compelled to adopt the
others. By this process of log-rolling, the adoption of both provisions could be accomplished and ensured,
when neither, if standing alone, could succeed on its own merits.
As applied to the initiative process, the one subject rule is essentially designed to prevent surprise and
fraud on the electorate. It is meant to safeguard the integrity of the initiative process by ensuring that no
unrelated riders are concealed within the terms of the proposed amendment. This in turn guarantees that
the signatories are fully aware of the nature, scope and purpose of the proposed amendment.
Petitioners insist that the proposed changes embodied in their petition for initiative relate only to one
subject matter, that is the shift from presidential to a parliamentary system of government. According to
petitioners, all of the other proposed changes are merely incidental to this main proposal and are
reasonably germane and necessary thereto.
8
An examination of the text of the proposed changes
reveals, however, that this is not the case.
The proposed changes to the Constitution cover other subjects that are beyond the main proposal
espoused by the petitioners. Apart from a shift from the presidential to a parliamentary form of
government, the proposed changes include the abolition of one House of Congress,
9
and the convening
of a constituent assembly to propose additional amendments to the Constitution.
10
Also included within its
terms is an omnibus declaration that those constitutional provisions under Articles VI and VII, which are
inconsistent with the unicameral-parliamentary form of government, shall be deemed amended to
conform thereto.
It is not difficult to see that while the proposed changes appear to relate only to a shift in the form of
government, it actually seeks to affect other subjects that are not reasonably germane to the
constitutional alteration that is purportedly sought. For one, a shift to a parliamentary system of
government does not necessarily result in the adoption of a unicameral legislature. A parliamentary
system can exist in many different "hybrid" forms of government, which may or may not embrace
unicameralism.
11
In other words, the shift from presidential to parliamentary structure and from a
bicameral to a unicameral legislature is neither the cause nor effect of the other.
I also fail to see the relation of convening a constituent assembly with the proposed change in our system
of government. As a subject matter, the convening of a constituent assembly to amend the Constitution
presents a range of issues that is far removed from the subject of a shift in government. Besides, the
constituent assembly is supposed to convene and propose amendments to the Constitution after the
proposed change in the system of government has already taken place. This only goes to show that the
convening of the constituent assembly is not necessary to effectuate a change to a parliamentary system
of government.
347

The omnibus statement that all provisions under Articles VI and VII which are inconsistent with a
unicameral-parliamentary system of government shall be deemed amended is equally bothersome. The
statement does not specify what these inconsistencies and amendments may be, such that everyone is
left to guess the provisions that could eventually be affected by the proposed changes. The subject and
scope of these automatic amendments cannot even be spelled out with certainty. There is thus no
reasonable measure of its impact on the other constitutional provisions.
The foregoing proposed changes cannot be the subject of a people's initiative under Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution. Taken together, the proposed changes indicate that the intendment is not simply
to effect substantial amendments to the Constitution, but a revision thereof. The distinction between an
amendment and revision was explained by Dean Vicente G. Sinco, as follows:
"Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the
entire document. It may result in the rewriting either of the whole constitution, or the greater
portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision
may produce, the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan
authorized to be carried out. That intention and plan must contemplate a consideration of all the
provisions of the constitution to determine which one should be altered or suppressed or whether
the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one.
The act of amending a constitution, on the other hand, envisages a change of only a few specific
provisions. The intention of an act to amend is not to consider the advisability of changing the
entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific
parts of the existing constitution or to add to it provisions deemed essential on account of
changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading
in their effect."
12

The foregoing traditional exposition of the difference between amendment and revision has indeed guided
us throughout our constitutional history. However, the distinction between the two terms is not, to my
mind, as significant in the context of our past constitutions, as it should be now under the 1987
Constitution. The reason for this is apparent. Under our past constitutions, it was Congress alone, acting
either as a constituent assembly or by calling out a constitutional convention, that exercised authority to
either amend or revise the Constitution through the procedures therein described. Although the distinction
between the two terms was theoretically recognized under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the
need to highlight the difference was not as material because it was only Congress that could effect
constitutional changes by choosing between the two modalities.
However, it is different now under the 1987 Constitution. Apart from providing for the two modes of either
Congress constituting itself as a constituent assembly or calling out for a constitutional convention, a third
mode was introduced for proposing changes to the Constitution. This mode refers to the people's right to
propose amendments to the fundamental law through the filing of a petition for initiative.
Otherwise stated, our experience of what constitutes amendment or revision under the past constitutions
is not determinative of what the two terms mean now, as related to the exercise of the right to propose
either amendments or revision. The changes introduced to both the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 could
have indeed been deemed an amendment or revision, but the authority for effecting either would
never have been questioned since the same belonged solely to Congress. In contrast, the 1987
Constitution clearly limits the right of the people to directly propose constitutional changes to amendments
only. We must consequently not be swayed by examples of constitutional changes effected prior to the
present fundamental law, in determining whether such changes are revisory or amendatory in nature.
In this regard, it should be noted that the distinction laid down by Justice Felix Q. Antonio in J avellana v.
Executive Secretary
13
related to the procedure to be followed in ratifying a completely new charter
proposed by a constitutional convention. The authority or right of the constitutional convention itself to
348

effect such a revision was not put in issue in that case. As far as determining what constitutes
"amendments" for the purpose of a people's initiative, therefore, we have neither relevant precedent nor
prior experience. We must thus confine ourselves to Dean Sinco's basic articulation of the two terms.
It is clear from Dean Sinco's explanation that a revision may either be of the whole or only part of the
Constitution. The part need not be a substantial part as a change may qualify as a revision even if it only
involves some of the important provisions. For as long as the intention and plan to be carried out
contemplate a consideration of all the provisions of the Constitution "to determine which should be altered
or suppressed, or whether the whole document should be replaced with an entirely new one," the
proposed change may be deemed a revision and not merely an amendment.
Thus, it is not by the sheer number alone of the proposed changes that the same may be considered as
either an amendment or revision. In so determining, another overriding factor is the "original intention and
plan authorized to be carried out" by the proposed changes. If the same relates to a re-examination of the
entire document to see which provisions remain relevant or if it has far-reaching effects on the entire
document, then the same constitutes a revision and not a mere amendment of the Constitution.
From the foregoing, it is readily apparent that a combination of the quantitative and qualitative test is
necessary in assessing what may be considered as an amendment or revision. It is not enough that we
focus simply on the physical scope of the proposed changes, but also consider what it means in relation
to the entire document. No clear demarcation line can be drawn to distinguish the two terms and each
circumstance must be judged on the basis of its own peculiar conditions. The determination lies in
assessing the impact that the proposed changes may have on the entire instrument, and not simply on an
arithmetical appraisal of the specific provisions which it seeks to affect.
In McFadden v. J ordan,
14
the California Supreme Court laid down the groundwork for the combination of
quantitative and qualitative assessment of proposed constitutional changes, in order to determine
whether the same is revisory or merely amendatory. In that case, the McFadden court found the
proposed changes extensive since at least 15 of the 25 articles contained in the California Constitution
would either be repealed in their entirety or substantially altered, and four new topics would be
introduced. However, it went on to consider the qualitative effects that the proposed initiative measure
would have on California's basic plan of government. It observed that the proposal would alter the
checks and balances inherent in such plan, by delegating far-reaching and mixed powers to an
independent commission created under the proposed measure. Consequently, the proposal
inMcFadden was not only deemed as broad and numerous in physical scope, but was also held as
having a substantive effect on the fundamental governmental plan of the State of California.
The dual aspect of the amendment/revision analysis was reiterated by the California Supreme Court
in Raven v. Deukmeijan.
15
Proposition 115, as the initiative in that case was called, would vest in the
United States Supreme Court all judicial interpretative powers of the California courts over fundamental
criminal defense rights in that state. It was observed that although quantitatively, the proposition did "not
seem so extensive as to change directly the substantial entirety of the Constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions," the same, nonetheless, "would substantially alter the
substance and integrity of the state Constitution as a document of independent force and effect."
Quoting Amador Valley J oint Union High School District v. State Board of
Equalization,
16
the Raven court said:
". . . apart from a measure effecting widespread deletions, additions and amendments involving
many constitutional articles, 'even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision
also[A]n enactment which purported to vest all judicial power in the Legislature would amount
to a revision without regard either to the length or complexity of the measure or the number of
existing articles or sections affected by such change.'" (Underscoring supplied and citations
omitted)
349

Thus, in resolving the amendment/revision issue, the California Court examines both the quantitative and
qualitative effects of a proposed measure on its constitutional scheme. Substantial changes in either
respect could amount to a revision.
17

I am persuaded that we can approach the present issue in the same manner. The experience of the
courts in California is not far removed from the standards expounded on by Dean Sinco when he set out
to differentiate between amendment and revision. It is actually consistent, not only with our traditional
concept of the two terms, but also with the mindset of our constitutional framers when they referred to the
disquisition of Justice Antonio inJ avellana.
18
We must thus consider whether the proposed changes in
this case affect our Constitution in both its substantial physical entirety and in its basic plan of
government.
The question posed is: do the proposed changes, regardless of whether these are simple or
substantial, amount to a revision as to be excluded from the people's right to directly propose
amendments to the fundamental law?
As indicated earlier, we may apply the quantitative/qualitative test in determining the nature of the
proposed changes. These tests are consistent with Dean Sinco's traditional concept of amendment and
revision when he explains that, quantitatively, revision "may result in the rewriting either of the whole
constitution, or the greater part of it, or perhaps only some of its provisions." In any case, he continues,
"the factor that characterizes it as an act of revision is the original intention and plan authorized to be
carried out." Unmistakably, the latter statement refers to the qualitative effect of the proposed changes.
It may thus be conceded that, quantitatively, the changes espoused by the proponents in this case will
affect only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution, namely, Article VI (Legislative
Department) and Article VII (Executive Department), as well as provisions that will ensure the smooth
transition from a presidential-bicameral system to a parliamentary-unicameral structure of government.
The quantitative effect of the proposed changes is neither broad nor extensive and will not affect the
substantial entirety of the 1987 Constitution.
However, it is my opinion that the proposed changes will have serious qualitative consequences on the
Constitution. The initiative petition, if successful, will undoubtedly alter, not only our basic governmental
plan, but also redefine our rights as citizens in relation to government. The proposed changes will set into
motion a ripple effect that will strike at the very foundation of our basic constitutional plan. It is therefore
an impermissible constitutional revision that may not be effected through a people's initiative.
Petitioners' main proposal pertains to the shifting of our form of government from the presidential to the
parliamentary system. An examination of their proposal reveals that there will be a fusion of the executive
and legislative departments into one parliament that will be elected on the basis of proportional
representation. No term limits are set for the members of parliament except for those elected under the
party-list system whose terms and number shall be provided by law. There will be a President who shall
be the head of state, but the head of government is the Prime Minister. The latter and his cabinet shall be
elected from among the members of parliament and shall be responsible to parliament for the program of
government.
The preceding proposal indicates that, under the proposed system, the executive and legislature shall be
one and the same, such that parliament will be the paramount governing institution. What this implies is
that there will be no separation between the law-making and enforcement powers of the state, that are
traditionally delineated between the executive and legislature in a presidential form of government.
Necessarily, the checks and balances inherent in the fundamental plan of our U.S.-style presidential
system will be eliminated. The workings of government shall instead be controlled by the internal political
dynamics prevailing in the parliament.
350

Our present governmental system is built on the separation of powers among the three branches of
government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the
enforcement of laws and the judiciary to the application of laws. This separation is intended to prevent a
concentration of authority in one person or group that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its
exercise to the detriment of our republican institutions. In the words of Justice Laurel, the doctrine of
separation of powers is intended to secure action, to forestall overaction, to prevent despotism and obtain
efficiency.
19

In the proposed parliamentary system, there is an obvious lack of formal institutional checks on the
legislative and executive powers of the state, since both the Prime Minister and the members of his
cabinet are drawn from parliament. There are no effective limits to what the Prime Minister and parliament
can do, except the will of the parliamentary majority. This goes against the central principle of our present
constitutional scheme that distributes the powers of government and provides for counteraction among
the three branches. Although both the presidential and parliamentary systems are theoretically consistent
with constitutional democracy, the underlying tenets and resulting governmental framework are
nonetheless radically different.
Consequently, the shift from presidential to parliamentary form of government cannot be regarded as
anything but a drastic change. It will require a total overhaul of our governmental structure and involve a
re-orientation in the cardinal doctrines that govern our constitutional set-up. As explained by Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J., a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would be a revision
because of its over-all impact on the entire constitutional structure.
20
It cannot, by any standard, be
deemed as a mere constitutional amendment.
An amendment envisages an alteration of one or a few specific and separable provisions. The
guiding original intention of an amendment is to improve specific parts or to add new provisions
deemed necessary to meet new conditions or to suppress specific portions that may have
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original
intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions of the
document which have over-all implications for the entire document, to determine how and to what
extent they should be altered.
21
The inclusion of a proposal to convene a constituent assembly likewise shows the intention of the
proponents to effect even more far-reaching changes in our fundamental law. If the original intent were to
simply shift the form of government to the parliamentary system, then there would have been no need for
the calling out of a constituent assembly to propose further amendments to the Constitution. It should be
noted that, once convened, a constituent assembly can do away and replace any constitutional provision
which may not even have a bearing on the shift to a parliamentary system of government. The inclusion
of such a proposal reveals the proponents' plan to consider all provisions of the constitution, either to
determine which of its provisions should be altered or suppressed or whether the whole document should
be replaced with an entirely new one.
Consequently, it is not true that only Articles VI and VII are covered by the alleged people's initiative. The
proposal to convene a constituent assembly, which by its terms is mandatory, will practically jeopardize
the future of the entire Constitution and place it on shaky grounds. The plan of the proponents, as
reflected in their proposed changes, goes beyond the shifting of government from the presidential to the
parliamentary system. Indeed, it could even extend to the "fundamental nature of our state as a
democratic and republican state."
To say that the proposed changes will affect only the constitution of government is therefore a fallacy. To
repeat, the combined effect of the proposed changes to Articles VI and VII and those pertaining to the
Transitory Provisions under Article XVIII indubitably establish the intent and plan of the proponents to
possibly affect even the constitutions of liberty and sovereignty. Indeed, no valid reason exists for
authorizing further amendments or revisions to the Constitution if the intention of the proposed changes is
truly what it purports to be.
351

There is no question here that only amendments to the Constitution may be undertaken through a
people's initiative and not a revision, as textually reflected in the Constitution itself. This conclusion is
inevitable especially from a comparative examination of Section 2 in relation to Sections 1 and 4 of Article
XVII, which state:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
x x x x
SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be
valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier
than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the
certification by the Commission of Elections of the sufficiency of the petition. (Underscoring
supplied)
It is clear that the right of the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution is limited to
amendments and does not include a revision thereof. Otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to
provide for Section 2 to distinguish its scope from the rights vested in Congress under Section 1. The
latter lucidly states that Congress may propose both amendments and a revision of the Constitution by
either convening a constituent assembly or calling for a constitutional convention. Section 2, on the other
hand, textually commits to the people the right to propose only amendments by direct action.
To hold, therefore, that Section 2 allows substantial amendments amounting to revision
obliterates the clear distinction in scope between Sections 1 and 2. The intention, as may be seen
from a cursory perusal of the above provisions, is to provide differing fields of application for the three
modes of effecting changes to the Constitution. We need not even delve into the intent of the
constitutional framers to see that the distinction in scope is definitely marked. We should thus apply these
provisions with a discerning regard for this distinction. Again, McFadden
22
is instructive:
". . . The differentiation required is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between
two procedures and between their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow
elementary principles of statutory construction, must be understood to have a substantial field of
application, not to be x x x a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two words,
then, must be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of
application appropriate to its procedure. The people of this state have spoken; they made it clear
when they adopted article XVIII and made amendment relatively simple but provided the
formidable bulwark of a constitutional convention as a protection against improvident or hasty (or
any other) revision, that they understood that there was a real difference between amendment
352

and revision. We find nothing whatsoever in the language of the initiative amendment of 1911
(art. IV, 1) to effect a breaking down of that difference. On the contrary, the distinction appears
to be x x x scrupulously preserved by the express declaration in the amendment x x x that the
power to propose and vote on "amendments to the Constitution" is reserved directly to the people
in initiative proceedings, while leaving unmentioned the power and the procedure relative to
constitutional revision, which revisional power and procedure, it will be remembered, had already
been specifically treated in section 2 of article XVIII.Intervenors' contention--that any change less
than a total one is but amendatory--would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so
carefully erected and preserved. Each situation involving the question of amendment, as
contrasted with revision, of the Constitution must, we think, be resolved upon its own facts."
Thus, our people too have spoken when they overwhelmingly ratified the 1987 Constitution, with the
provisions on amendments and revisions under Article XVII. The voice and will of our people cannot be
any clearer when they limited people's initiative to mere amendments of the fundamental law and
excluded revisions in its scope. In this regard, the task of the Court is to give effect to the people's voice,
as expressed unequivocally through the Constitution.
Article XVII on amendments and revisions is called a "constitution of sovereignty" because it defines the
constitutional meaning of "sovereignty of the people." It is through these provisions that the sovereign
people have allowed the expression of their sovereign will and have canalized their powers which would
otherwise be plenary. By approving these provisions, the sovereign people have decided to limit
themselves and future generations in the exercise of their sovereign power.
23
They are thus bound by the
constitution and are powerless, whatever their numbers, to change or thwart its mandates, except through
the means prescribed by the Constitution itself.
24

It is thus misplaced to argue that the people may propose revisions to the Constitution through people's
initiative because their representatives, whose power is merely delegated, may do so. While Section 1 of
Article XVII may be considered as a provision delegating the sovereign powers of amendment and
revision to Congress, Section 2, in contrast, is a self-limitation on that sovereign power. In the
words of Cooley:
x x x Although by their constitutions the people have delegated the exercise of sovereign powers
to the several departments, they have not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. They
retain in their own hands, so far as they have thought it needful to do so, a power to control the
governments they create, and the three departments are responsible to and subject to be
ordered, directed, changed or abolished by them. But this control and direction must be exercised
in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon. The voice of the people, acting in their sovereign
capacity, can be of legal force only when expressed at the times and under the conditions which
they themselves have prescribed and pointed out by the Constitution, or which, consistently with
the Constitution, have been prescribed and pointed out for them by statute; and if by any portion
of the people, however large, an attempt should be made to interfere with the regular working of
the agencies of government at any other time or in any other mode than as allowed by existing
law, either constitutional or statutory, it would be revolutionary in character, and must be resisted
and repressed by the officers who, for the time being, represent legitimate
government.
25
Consequently, there is here no case of "the spring rising above its source." Nor is it one where the
people's sovereign power has been relegated to a lesser plane than that of Congress. In choosing to
exercise self-limitation, there is no absence or lack of even a fraction of the sovereign power of the people
since self-limitation itself is an expression of that sovereign power. The people have chosen to
delegate and limit their sovereign power by virtue of the Constitution and are bound by the parameters
that they themselves have ordained. Otherwise, if the people choose to defy their self-imposed
constitutional restraints, we will be faced with a revolutionary situation.
26

353

It has repeatedly been emphasized that ours is a democratic and republican state.
27
Even as we affirm,
however, that aspect of direct democracy, we should not forget that, first and foremost, we are
a constitutional democracy. To uphold direct democracy at the expense of the fundamental law is to
sanction, not a constitutional, but an extra-constitutional recourse. This is clearly beyond the powers of
the Court who, by sovereign mandate, is the guardian and keeper of the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. NO. 174153
RAUL L. LAMBINO AND ENRICO B. AUMENTADO TOGETHER WITH 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS,petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), petitioners-intervenors,
RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, petitioners-intervenors,
SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., petitioner-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) AND VICTORINO
F. BALAIS,petitioners-intervenors,
ONEVOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN
T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE AND CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., oppositors-intervenors,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., oppositor-intervenor,
ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, oppositor-intervenor,
BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FROUM,
MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO
STUDENTS,LEONARDO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, AND DR. REGINALD
PAMUGAS, oppositors-intervenors,
LORETA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL, oppositors-intervenors,
LUWALHATI ANTONINO, oppositor-intervenor,
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F.ESTRELLA, TOMAS C.
TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO
P. AGUAS AND AMADO GAT INCION, oppositors-intervenors,
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR. AND SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMENA
III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCIRO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S.
LIM, AND PANFILO M. LACSON, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA AND PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, oppositors-intervenors,
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY AND CEBU CHAPTER, oppositors-intervenors,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L.
SALVADOR AND RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, oppostors-intervenors,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MANUEL VILLAR,
JR., oppositor-intervenor;
G.R. NO. 174299
354

MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. AND RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REPRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR. AND
COMMISSIONERS RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR. ROMEO A.
BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO AND JOHN DOE AND PETER DOE, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
CONCURRING OPINION
SANDOVALGUTIERREZ, J .:
Vox populi vox Dei -- the voice of the people is the voice of God. Caution should be exercised in choosing
one's battlecry, lest it does more harm than good to one's cause. In its original context, the complete
version of this Latin phrase means exactly the opposite of what it is frequently taken to mean. It originated
from a holy man, the monk Alcuin, who advised Charlemagne, "nec audiendi qui solent dicere vox populi
vox Dei quum tumultuositas vulgi semper insaniae proxima sit," meaning, "And those people should
not be listened to who keep on saying, 'The voice of the people is the voice of God,' since the
riotousness of the crowd is always very close to madness."
1
Perhaps, it is by providence that the true
meaning of the Latin phrase is revealed upon petitioners and their allies that they may reflect upon
the sincerity and authenticity of their "people's initiative."
History has been a witness to countless iniquities committed in the name of God. Wars were waged,
despotism tolerated and oppressions justified all these transpired as man boasted of God's imprimatur.
Today, petitioners and their allies hum the same rallying call, convincing this Court that the people's
initiative is the "voice of the people" and, therefore, the "voice of God." After a thorough consideration
of the petitions, I have come to realize that man, with his ingenuity and arrogance, has perfected the craft
of imitating the voice of God. It is against this kind of genius that the Court must guard itself.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative sought to exercise the power of initiative under Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,
The exercise was thwarted by a petition for prohibition filed with this Court by Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, et al., entitled "Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel Ongpin,
petitioners, v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Jesus Delfin, Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen
Pedrosa, in their capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA), respondents."
2
The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325. On March 19, 1997,
this Court rendered its Decision in favor of petitioners, holding that Republic Act No. 6735 (R.A. No.
6735), An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, is
"incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned." A majority of eight (8) Justices fully concurred with this
ruling, while five (5) subscribed to the opposite view. One (1) opined that there is no need to rule on the
adequacy of R.A. No. 6735.
355

On motion for reconsideration, two (2) of the eight (8) Justices reconsidered their positions. One (1) filed
an inhibition and the other one (1) joined the minority opinion. As a consequence, of the thirteen (13)
Justices who participated in the deliberation, six (6) voted in favor of the majority opinion, while the other
six (6) voted in favor of the minority opinion.
3

A few months thereafter, or on September 23, 1997, the Court dismissed a similar case, entitled People's
Initiative for Reform, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections
4
on the ground that
the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed PIRMA's Petition for Initiative
to Propose Amendments to the Constitution "it appearing that that it only complied with the
dispositions in the Decision of the Court in G.R. no. 127325 (Santiago v. COMELEC) promulgated
on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997." Seven (7) Justices voted that there was no
need to re-examine its ruling, as regards the issue of the sufficiency of R.A. No. 6735. Another Justice
concurred, but on the different premise that the case at bar is not the proper vehicle for such re-
examination. Five (5) Justice opined otherwise.
This time, another group known as Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with the Union of Local Authorities of
the Philippines (ULAP), have gathered signatures in support of the proposed amendments to the
Constitution, which entail a change in the form of government from bicameral-
presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, thus:
A. Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI shall be amended to read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament
which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to be apportioned
among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand inhabitants per district, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and each province must have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-
five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one year prior thereto,
and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of five years without limitation
as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list system which shall be provided for by
law and whose number shall be equal to twenty per centum of the total membership coming from
the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read,
as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall
be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be
elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be
responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
C. For the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-Presidential to a
unicameral-Parliamentary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled
"Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their
term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under
the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim
parliament.
356

(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the incumbent
President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case of death, permanent
disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent President and Vice President,
the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and responsibilities of Prime Minister
under Article VII as amended.
VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatium up to 26, unless
they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of government, in which case, they shall be
amended to conform with a unicameral parliamentary form of government; provided, however,
that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and
"Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein
to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all
references to the "President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby be
amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all other Sections of
Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14,
unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed
amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided,
however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives"
and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references
therein to "Member(s) of Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives"
shall be changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim Parliament
which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and
shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of the Senate and the
House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the Cabinet who are heads of
executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until noon of the
thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall head a ministry. He
shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of
the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have been elected by a majority vote of all
the members of the interim Parliament from among themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until noon of the
thirtieth day of June 2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament shall
convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with the
principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among
the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be elected by a
majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall oversee the various
ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may be delegated to him by the
incumbent President."
357

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament which shall
be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The
duty elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the expiration of the term of the incumbent
President and Vice President.
Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, and written on its upper right hand portion is the abstract of
the proposed amendments, quoted as follows:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Article VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution,
changing the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-
parliamentary system of government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and
economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly
shift from one system to another?
On August 25, 2006, Raul L. Lambino and Enrico B. Aumentado, herein petitioners, filed with the
COMELEC aPetition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution.
5
Five (5) days thereafter, they filed an
Amended Petition alleging that they are filing the petition in their own behalf and together with some
6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached
thereto. They claimed that the signatures of registered voters appearing on the signature sheets,
constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative
district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters, were verified by their
respective city or municipal election officers.
Several organizations opposed the petition.
6

In a Resolution dated August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the petition, citing as basis
this Court's ruling in Santiago, permanently enjoining it "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been
validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system."
Hence, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus praying that this Court set aside the COMELEC
Resolution and direct the latter tocomply with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 4 x x x
certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
I vote to dismiss the petition of Lambino, et al. in G.R. No. 174153 and grant the petition of Mar-len
Abigail Binay, et al. in G.R. No. 174299. Here, petitioners pray that the COMELEC Chairman and
Commissioners be required to show why they should not be punished for contempt
7
of court for
disregarding the permanent injunction issued by this Court in Santiago.
I
Respondent COMELEC did not act with grave abuse of discretion
Without necessarily brushing aside the other important issues, I believe the resolution of the present
petition hinges on this singular issue -- did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion when it
denied Lambino, et al.'s petition for initiative to amend the Constitution on the basis of this Court's
Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC?
358

In other words, regardless of how the other remaining issues are resolved, still, the ultimate yardstick is
the attendance of "grave abuse of discretion" on the part of the COMELEC.
Jurisprudence teaches that an act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave
abuse of discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment.
The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or
to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility.
8

The Resolution of respondent COMELEC denying due course to the petition for initiative on the basis of a
case (Santiago) decided by this Court cannot, in any way, be characterized as "capricious or
whimsical," "patent and gross," or "arbitrary and despotic." On the contrary, it was the most prudent
course to take. It must be stressed that in Santiago, this Court permanently enjoins respondent
COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to
the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted." It being a fact that Congress
has not enacted a sufficient law, respondent COMELEC has no alternative but to adhere to Santiago.
Otherwise, it is vulnerable to a citation for contempt. As succinctly stated by Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban (then Associate Justice) in his Separate Opinion in the subsequent case of PIRMA vs.
COMELEC:
9

x x x I cannot fault the Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said
decision's ratio decidendi. Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the
land. It had no choice but to obey. Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Refusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other
mode of action would have constituted defiance of the Court and would have been struck down
as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this Court's supremacy as the final
arbiter of justiciable controversies.
It need not be emphasized that in our judicial hierarchy, this Court reigns supreme. All courts, tribunals
and administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions are obliged to conform to its
pronouncements. It has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable
controversy. In other words, there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other
courts should take their bearings.
10
As a warning to lower court judges who would not adhere to its
rulings, this Court, in People v. Santos,
11
held:
Now, if a judge of a lower Court feels, in the fulfillment of his mission of deciding cases, that the
application of a doctrine promulgated by this Superiority is against his way of reasoning, or
against his conscience, he may state his opinion on the matter, but rather than disposing of the
case in accordance with his personal views he must first think that it is his duty to apply the law
as interpreted by the Highest Court of the Land, and that any deviation from a principle laid down
by the latter would unavoidably cause, as a sequel, unnecessary inconveniences, delays and
expenses to the litigants. And if despite of what is here said, a Judge still believes that he cannot
follow Our rulings, then he has no other alternative than to place himself in the position that he
could properly avoid the duty of having to render judgment on the case concerned (Art. 9, C.C.),
and he has only one legal way to do that.
Clearly, respondent COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the petition of Lambino,
et al. for it merely followed this Court's ruling in Santiago.
Significantly, in PIRMA vs. COMELEC,
12
a unanimous Court implicitly recognized that its ruling in
Santiago is the established doctrine and that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
invoking it, thus:
359

that it only complied with the dispositions of this Court in G.R. No. 127325 promulgated on March
19, 1997, and its resolution on June 10, 1997.
Indeed, I cannot characterize as a "grave abuse of discretion" the COMELEC's obedience and respect to
the pronouncement of this Court in Santiago.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis
bars the re-examination of Santiago
It cannot be denied that in Santiago, a majority of the members of this Court or eight (8) Justices (as
against five (5) Justices) concurred in declaring R.A. No. 6735 an insufficient law. When the motion for
reconsideration was denied via an equally-divided Court or a 6-6 vote, it does not mean that the Decision
was overturned. It only shows that the opposite view fails to muster enough votes to modify or reverse the
majority ruling. Therefore, the original Decision was upheld.
13
In Ortigas and Company
Limited Partnership vs. Velasco,
14
this Court ruled that the denial of a motion or reconsideration
signifies that the ground relied upon have been found, upon due deliberation, to be without merit,
as not being of sufficient weight to warrant a modification of the judgment or final order.
With Santiago being the only impediment to the instant petition for initiative, petitioners persistently stress
that the doctrine of stare decisis does not bar its re-examination.
I am not convinced. The maxim stare decisis et non quieta movere translates "stand by the decisions
and disturb not what is settled."
15
As used in our jurisprudence, it means that "once this Court has
laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it would adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially the same as in the
earlier controversy."
16

There is considerable literature about whether this doctrine of stare decisis is a good or bad one, but the
doctrine is usually justified by arguments which focus on the desirability of stability and certainty in the law
and also by notions of justice and fairness. Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his treatise, The Nature of the
Judicial Process stated:
It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and the opposite
way between another. 'If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the
same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite
principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look
for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a feeling of
resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement, material and moral, of my
rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to
have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in the courts.
17

That the doctrine of stare decisis is related to justice and fairness may be appreciated by considering the
observation of American philosopher William K. Frankena as to what constitutes injustice:
The paradigm case of injustice is that in which there are two similar individuals in similar
circumstances and one of them is treated better or worse than the other. In this case, the
cry of injustice rightly goes up against the responsible agent or group; and unless that agent or
group can establish that there is some relevant dissimilarity after all between the individuals
concerned and their circumstances, he or they will be guilty as charged.
18

360

Although the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent re-examining and, if need be, overruling prior
decisions, "It is x x x a fundamental jurisprudential policy that prior applicable precedent usually must be
followed even though the case, if considered anew, might be decided differently by the current
justices. This policy x x x 'is based on the assumption that certainty, predictability and stability in
the law are the major objectives of the legal system; i.e., that parties should be able to regulate
their conduct and enter into relationships with reasonable assurance of the governing rules of
law.
19
Accordingly, a party urging overruling a precedent faces a rightly onerous task, the difficulty of
which is roughly proportional to a number of factors, including the age of the precedent, the nature and
extent of public and private reliance on it, and its consistency or inconsistency with other related rules
of law. Here, petitioners failed to discharge their task.
Santiago v. COMELEC was decided by this Court on March 19, 1997 or more than nine (9) years ago.
During that span of time, the Filipino people, specifically the law practitioners, law professors, law
students, the entire judiciary and litigants have recognized this Court's Decision as a precedent. In fact,
the Santiago doctrine was applied by this Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA. Even the legislature
has relied on said Decision, thus, several bills have been introduced in both Houses of Congress to cure
the deficiency. I cannot fathom why it should be overturned or set aside merely on the basis of the petition
of Lambino, et al. Indeed, this Court's conclusion inSantiago that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate
or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned remains a precedent and must be upheld.
III
The proposed constitutional changes constitute revisions and not mere amendments
Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution lays down the means for its amendment and revision. Thus:
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(2) A Constitutional Convention.
throughinitiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
votes, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the
registered voters therein. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
At the outset, it must be underscored that initiative and referendum, as means by which the people can
directly propose changes to the Constitution, were not provided for in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
Thus, under these two (2) Constitutions, there was no demand to draw the distinction between an
amendment and a revision, both being governed by a uniform process. This is not so under our present
Constitution. The distinction between an amendment and a revision becomes crucial because only
amendments are allowed under the system of people's initiative. Revisions are within the exclusive
domain of Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members, or of a Constitutional Convention.
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission is explicit that Section 2, Article XVII covers
onlyamendments, thus:
The sponsor, Commissioner Suarez, is recognized.
MR. SUAREZ: Thank you, Madam President.
361

mandate given us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7
which embodies the proposed provision governing initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of
the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote Section 2:
registered voters.
suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative which came about because of the
system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not
extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of
Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG: Madam President, will the distinguished proponent of the amendment yield to
a few questions?
MR. DAVIDE: With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG: My first question, Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line
I refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by
Commissioner Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments"
and "revision?"
MR. DAVIDE: No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by
Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not
"revision"
MR. MAAMBONG: Thank you.
20

Considering that the initiative on the Constitution only permits amendments, it is imperative to examine
whether petitioners' proposed changes partake of the nature of amendments, not revisions.
The petition for initiative filed with the COMELEC by Lambino, et al. sought to amend the following
provisions of the 1987 Constitution: Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Article VI (The Legislative
Department); Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII (The Executive Department). It further includes Article
XVIII (Transitory Provisions) for the purpose of insuring an orderly transition from the bicameral-
presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary form of government.
Succinctly, the proposals envision a change in the form of government, from bicameral-presidential to
unicameral-parliamentary; conversion of the present Congress of the Philippines to an Interim National
Assembly; change in the terms of Members of Parliament; and the election of a Prime Minister who shall
be vested with executive power.
Petitioners contend that the proposed changes are in the nature of amendments, hence, within the
coverage of a "people's initiative."
I disagree.
362

The noted constitutionalist, Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who was also a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, characterized an amendment and a revision to the Constitution as follows:
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision however, the guiding original
intention and plan contemplates a re-examination of the entire document, or of provisions
of the document which have over-all implications for the document to determine how and
to what extent they should be altered.
21

Obviously, both "revision" and amendment" connote change; any distinction between the two must be
based upon the degree of change contemplated. In Kelly v. Laing,
22
the Supreme Court of Michigan made
the following comparison of the two terms:
"Revision" and "amendment" have the common characteristics of working changes in the charter,
and are sometimes used in exactly the same sense but there is an essential difference between
them.
"Revision" implies a reexamination of the whole law and a redraft without obligation to
maintain the form, scheme, or structure of the old. As applied to fundamental law, such as a
constitution or charter, it suggests a convention to examine the whole subject and to prepare and
submit a new instrument whether the desired changes from the old are few or
many. Amendment implies continuance of the general plan and purpose of the law, with
corrections to better accomplish its purpose. Basically, revision suggests fundamental
change, while amendment is a correction of detail.
Although there are some authorities which indicate that a change in a city's form of government may be
accomplished by a process of "amendment," the cases which so hold seem to involve statutes which only
distinguish between amendment and totally new charters.
23
However, as in Maine law, where the statute
authorizing the changes distinguishes between "charter amendment" and "charter revision," it has been
held that "(a) change in the form of government of a home rule city may be made only by revision
of the city charter, not by its amendment."
24

In summary, it would seem that any major change in governmental form and scheme would probably be
interpreted as a "revision" and should be achieved through the more thorough process of deliberation.
Although, at first glance, petitioners' proposed changes appear to cover isolated and specific provisions
only, however, upon careful scrutiny, it becomes clear that the proposed changes will alter the very
structure of our government and create multifarious ramifications. In other words, the proposed
changes will have a "domino effect" or, more appropriately, "ripple effect" on other provisions of the
Constitution.
At this juncture, it must be emphasized that the power reserved to the people to effect changes in the
Constitution includes the power to amend anysection in such a manner that the proposed change, if
approved, would "be complete within itself, relate to one subject and not substantially affect any
other section or article of the Constitution or require further amendments to the Constitution to
accomplish its purpose."
25
This is clearly not the case here.
Firstly, a shift from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government affects the well-enshrined
doctrine of separation of powers of government, embodied in our Constitution, by providing for an
Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches. In a Parliamentary form of government, the Executive
Branch is to a certain degree, dependent on the direct or indirect support of the Parliament, as expressed
through a "vote of confidence." To my mind, this doctrine of separation of powers is so interwoven
363

in the fabric of our Constitution, that any change affecting such doctrine must necessarily be a
revision.
In McFadden vs. Jordan,
26
the California Supreme Court ruled as follows:
It is thus clear that that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through
ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that
purpose x x x. Consequently, if the scope of the proposed initiative measure now before us
is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state
Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the
electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention. x x x.
Secondly, the shift from a bicameral to a unicameral form of government is not a mere amendment, but is
in actuality a revision, as set forth in Adams v. Gunter
27
:
The proposal here to amend Section I of Article III of the 1968 Constitution to provide for a
Unicameral Legislature affects not only many other provisions of the Constitution but
provides for a change in the form of the legislative branch of government, which has been
in existence in the United States Congress and in all of the states of the nation, except one, since
the earliest days. It would be difficult to visualize a more revolutionary change. The concept
of a House and a Senate is basic in the American form of government. It would not only
radically change the whole pattern of the government in this state and tear apart the whole
fabric of the Constitution, but would even affect the physical facilities necessary to carry
on government.
Thirdly, the proposed changes, on their face, signify revisions rather than amendments, especially, with
the inclusion of the following "omnibus provision":
unicameral-Parliamnetary form of government, there shall be a new Article XVIII, entitled
"Transitory Provisions" which shall read, as follows:
x x x x x x x x x
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President, with
the exceptions of Section 1,2,3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby
amended x x x x x x and all other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and numbered
sequentially as Section 2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section
1 hereof, in which case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral
Parliamentary system of government x x x x x x .
x x x x x x x x x
Section 4. (1) x x x
(3) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the Interim Parliament shall
convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution, consistent with the
The above provisions will necessarily result in a "ripple effect" on the other provisions of the Constitution
to make them conform to the qualities of unicameral-parliamentary form of government. With one
sweeping stroke, these proposed provisions automatically revise some provisions of the
Constitution. In McFadden, the same practice was considered by the Court to be in the nature
364

of substantial revision, necessitating a constitutional convention. I quote the pertinent portion of its
ruling, thus:
There is in the measure itself, no attempt to enumerate the various and many articles and
sections of our present Constitution which would be affected, replaced or repealed. It purports
only to add one new article but its framers found it necessary to include the omnibus provision
(subdivision (7) of section XII) that "If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the
constitution is in conflict with any of the provisions of this article, such section, subsection,
sentence, clause, or phrase is to the extent of such conflict hereby repealed. x x x Consequently,
if the scope of the proposed intitiative measure now before us is so broad that if such measure
become law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be be effected, then the
measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by
a constitutional convention.
28

Undoubtedly, the changes proposed by the petitioners are not mere amendments which will only affect
the Articles or Sections sought to be changed. Rather, they are in the nature of revisions which will affect
considerable portions of the Constitution resulting in the alteration of our form of government. The
proposed changes cannot be taken in isolation since these are connected or "interlocked" with the other
provisions of our Constitution. Accordingly, it has been held that: "If the changes attempted are so
sweeping that it is necessary to include the provisions interlocking them, then it is plain that the
plan would constitute a recasting of the whole Constitution and this, we think, it was intended to
be accomplished only by a convention under Section 2 which has not yet been disturbed."
29

I therefore conclude that since the proposed changes partake of the nature of a revision of the
Constitution, then they cannot be the subject of an initiative. On this matter, Father Bernas expressed this
insight:
But why limit initiative and referendum to simple amendments? The answer, which one can easily
glean from the rather long deliberation on initiative and referendum in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, is practicality. In other words, who is to formulate the revision or how is it to be
formulated? Revision, as concretely being proposed now, is nothing less than a rebuilding of
the Philippine constitutional structure. Who were involved in formulating the structure? What
debates ensued? What records are there for future use in interpreting the provisions which may
be found to be unclear?
In a deliberative body like Congress or a Constitutional Convention, decisions are reached after
much purifying debate. And while the deliberations proceed, the public has the opportunity to get
involved. It is only after the work of an authorized body has been completed that it is presented to
the electorate for final judgment. Careful debate is important because the electorate tends to
accept what is presented to it even sight unseen.
30

IV
R.A. No. 6735 is insufficient to implement the People's initiative
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter,
365

On its face, Section 2 is not a self-executory provision. This means that an enabling law is imperative for
its implementation. Thus, Congress enacted R.A. No. 6735 in order to breathe life into this constitutional
provision. However, as previously narrated, this Court struck the law in Santiago for being incomplete,
inadequate, orwanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is concerned.
The passage of time has done nothing to change the applicability of R.A. No. 6735. Congress neither
amended it nor passed a new law to supply its deficiencies.
Notwithstanding so, this Court is being persuaded to take a 360-degree turn, enumerating three (3)
justifications why R.A. No. 6735 must be considered a sufficient law, thus:
1) The text of R.A. No. 6735 is replete with references to the right of people to
initiate changes to the Constitution;
2) The legislative history of R.A. No. 6735 reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as
instrument to implement the people's initiative; and
3) The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. No. 6735 demonstrate the legislative
intent to use it as instrument to implement people's initiative.
I regret to say that the foregoing justifications are wanting.
A thorough reading of R.A. No. 6735 leads to the conclusion that it covers only initiatives
on national and local legislation. Its references to initiatives on the Constitution are few,
isolated and misplaced. Unlike in the initiatives on national and local legislation, where R.A. No. 6735
provides a detailed, logical, and exhaustive enumeration on their implementation,
31
however, as regards
initiative on the Constitution, the law merely:
(a) mentions the word "Constitution" in Section 2;
32

(b) defines "initiative on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems
of initiative in Section 3;
33

(c) speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people;
34

(d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of voters who should sign the
petition;
35
and
(e) provides the date for the effectivity of the approved proposition.
36

In other words, R.A. No. 6735 does not specify the procedure how initiative on the Constitution may be
accomplished. This is not the enabling law contemplated by the Constitution. As pointed out by oppositor-
intervenor Alternative Law Groups Inc., since the promulgation of the Decision in Santiago, various bills
have been introduced in both Houses of Congress providing for a complete and adequate process for
people's initiative, such as:
Names, signatures and addresses of petitioners who shall be registered voters;
A statement of the provision of the Constitution or any part thereof sought to be amended and
the proposed amendment;
366

The manner of initiation - in a congressional district through a petition by any individual, group,
political party or coalition with members in the congressional district;
The language used: the petition should be printed in English and translated in the local
language;
Signature stations to be provided for;
Provisions pertaining to the need and manner of posting, that is, after the signatures shall have
been verified by the Commission, the verified signatures shall be posted for at least thirty days in
the respective municipal and city halls where the signatures were obtained;
Provisions pertaining to protests allowed any protest as to the authenticity of the signatures to
be filed with the COMELEC and decided within sixty (60) days from the filing of said protest.
None of the above necessary details is provided by R.A. No. 6735, thus, demonstrating
its incompleteness and inadequacy.
V
Petitioners are not Proper Parties to
File the Petition for Initiative
VI
The Petition for Initiative Filed with the COMELEC Does not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution and R.A. No. 6735
I shall discuss the above issues together since they are interrelated and inseparable. The determination
of whether petitioners are proper parties to file the petition for initiative in behalf of the alleged 6.3 million
voters will require an examination of whether they have complied with the provisions of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution.
To reiterate, Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized
within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five
years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right. (Underscoring
supplied)
The mandate of the above constitutional provisions is definite and categorical. For a people's initiative to
prosper, the following requisites must be present:
1. It is "the people" themselves who must "directly propose" "amendments" to the
Constitution;
2. The proposed amendments must be contained in "a petition of at least twelve per centum
of the total number of registered voters;" and
367

3. The required minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters "must be represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters" of "every legislative district."
In this case, however, the above requisites are not present.
The petition for initiative was filed with the COMELEC by petitioners Lambino and Aumentado, two
registered voters. As shown in the "Verification/Certification with Affidavit of Non-Forum
Shopping" contained in their petition, they alleged under oath that they have caused the preparation of
the petition in their personal capacity as registered voters "and as representatives" of the supposed 6.3
million registered voters. This goes to show that the questioned petition was not initiated directly by the
6.3 million people who allegedly comprised at least 12% of the total number of registered voters, as
required by Section 2. Moreover, nowhere in the petition itself could be found the signatures of the
6.3 million registered voters. Only the signatures of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado were affixed
therein "as representatives" of those 6.3 million people. Certainly, that is not the petition for people's
initiative contemplated by the Constitution.
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no authority whatsoever to file the petition "as
representatives" of the alleged 6.3 million registered voters. Such act of representation is
constitutionally proscribed. To repeat, Section 2 strictly requires that amendments to the Constitution
shall be "directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters." Obviously, the phrase "directly proposed by the
people" excludes any person acting as representative or agent of the 12% of the total number of
registered voters. The Constitution has bestowed upon the people the right to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. Such right cannot be usurped by anyone under the guise of being the
people's representative. Simply put, Section 2 does not recognize acts of representation. For it is only
"the people" (comprising the minimum of 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein) who
are the proper parties to initiate a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution. Verily, the petition
filed with the COMELEC by herein petitioners Lambino and Aumentado is not a people's initiative.
Necessarily, it must fail.
Cororarilly, the plea that this Court should "hear" and "heed" "the people's voice" is baseless and
misleading.There is no people's voice to be heard and heeded as this petition for initiative is not
truly theirs, but only of petitioners Lambino and Aumentado and their allies.
VII
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Lambino and Aumentado, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, vehemently argue that: (1) "the validity of the
exercise of the right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution and their will, as expressed by the
fact that over six million registered voters indicated their support of the Petition for initiative is a purely
political question;" and (2) "[t]he power to propose amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly
bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right to
propose amendments under the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit
of a political question."
The "political question doctrine" was first enunciated by the US Supreme Court in Luther v.
Borden.
37
Faced with the difficult question of whether the Supreme Court was the appropriate institution
to define the substantive content of republicanism, the US Supreme Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Roger B. Taney, concluded that "the sovereignty in every State resides in the people, as to how and
whether they exercised it, was under the circumstances of the case, a political question to be
settled by the political power." In other words, the responsibility of settling certain constitutional
questions was left to the legislative and executive branches of the government.
368

The Luther case arose from the so-called "Dorr Rebellion" in the State of Rhode Island. Due to increased
migration brought about by the Industrial Revolution, the urban population of Rhode Island increased.
However, under the 1663 Royal Charter which served as the State Constitution, voting rights were largely
limited to residents of the rural districts. This severe mal-apportionment of suffrage rights led to the "Dorr
Rebellion." Despairing of obtaining remedies for their disenfranchisement from the state government,
suffrage reformers invoked their rights under the American Declaration of Independence to "alter or
abolish" the government and to institute a new one. The reformers proceeded to call for and hold an
extralegal constitutional convention, drafted a new State Constitution, submitted the document for popular
ratification, and held elections under it. The State government, however, refused to cede power, leading
to an anomalous situation in that for a few months in 1842, there were two opposing state governments
contending for legitimacy and possession of state of offices.
The Rhode Island militia, under the authority of martial law, entered and searched the house of Martin
Luther, a Dorr supporter. He brought suit against Luther Borden, a militiaman. Before the US Supreme
Court, Luther's counsel argued that since the State's archaic Constitution prevented a fair and peaceful
address of grievances through democratic processes, the people of Rhode Island had instead chosen to
exercise their inherent right in popular sovereignty of replacing what they saw as an oppressive
government. The US Supreme Court deemed the controversy as non-justiciable and inappropriate
for judicial resolution.
In Colgrove v. Green,
38
Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, coined the phrase "political thicket" to describe
situations where Federal courts should not intervene in political questions which they have neither the
competence nor the commission to decide. In Colgrove, the US Supreme Court, with a narrow 4-3 vote
branded the apportionment of legislative districts in Illinois "as a political question and that the
invalidation of the districts might, in requiring statewide elections, create an evil greater than that
sought to be remedied."
While this Court has adopted the use of Frankfurter's "political thicket," nonetheless, it has sought to
come up with a definition of the term "political question." Thus, in Vera v. Avelino,
39
this Court ruled that
properly, political questions are "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." In Taada and Macapagal v.
Cuenco,
40
the Court held that the term political question connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in
ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In Aquino v. Enrile,
41
this Court adopted the following guidelines laid down in Baker v. Carr
42
in
determining whether a question before it is political, rather than judicial in nature, to wit:
1) there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or
2) there is a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or
3) there is the sheer impossibility of deciding the matter without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or
4) there is the sheer impossibility of the Court's undertaking an independent resolution without
expressing lack of respect due the coordinate branches of government; or
5) there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
6) there exists the potentiality of embarrassment arising from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
369

None of the foregoing standards is present in the issues raised before this Court. Accordingly, the issues
are justiciable. What is at stake here is the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that the issues raised before this Court are political in nature, it is not
precluded from resolving them under its expanded jurisdiction conferred upon it by Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution, following Daza v. Singson.
43
As pointed out in Marcos v. Manglapus,
44
the present
Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial power which
the Court, under previous charters, would have normally and ordinarily left to the political departments to
decide.
CONCLUSION
In fine, considering the political scenario in our country today, it is my view that the so-called people's
initiative to amend our Constitution from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary is actually not
an initiative of the people, but an initiative of some of our politicians. It has not been shown by petitioners,
during the oral arguments in this case, that the 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures
understood what they signed. In fact, petitioners admitted that the Constitutional provisions sought to be
amended and the proposed amendments were not explained to all those registered voters. Indeed, there
will be no means of knowing, to the point of judicial certainty, whether they really understood what
petitioners and their group asked them to sign.
Let us not repeat the mistake committed by this Court in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary.
45
The
Court then ruled that "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect," although it had notice that the Constitution proposed by
the 1971 Constitutional Convention was not validly ratified by the people in accordance with the 1935
Constitution. The Court concluded, among others, that the viva voce voting in the Citizens' Assemblies
"was and is null and void ab initio." That was during martial law when perhaps majority of the justices
were scared of the dictator. Luckily at present, we are not under a martial law regime. There is, therefore,
no reason why this Court should allow itself to be used as a legitimizing authority by the so-called
people's initiative for those who want to perpetuate themselves in power.
At this point, I can say without fear that there is nothing wrong with our present government structure.
Consequent1y, we must not change it. America has a presidential type of government. Yet, it thrives
ideally and has become a super power. It is then safe to conclude that what we should change are
some of the people running the government, NOT the SYSTEM.
According to petitioners, the proposed amendment would effect a more efficient, more economical and
more responsive government.
Is there hope that a new breed of politicians, more qualified and capable, may be elected as members
and leaders of the unicameral-parliament? Or will the present members of the Lower House continue to
hold their respective positions with limitless terms?
Will the new government be more responsive to the needs of the poor and the marginalized? Will it be
able to provide homes for the homeless, food for the hungry, jobs for the jobless and protection for the
weak?
This is a defining moment in our history. The issue posed before us is crucial with transcendental
significance. And history will judge us on how we resolve this issue shall we allow the revision of our
Constitution, of which we are duty bound to guard and revere, on the basis of a doubtful people's
initiative?
370

Amending the Constitution involving a change of government system or structure is a herculean task
affecting the entire Filipino people and the future generations. Let us, therefore, entrust this duty to more
knowledgeable people elected as members of a Constitutional Convention.
Yes, the voice of the people is the voice of God. But under the circumstances in this case, the voice
of God is not audible.
WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No.
174299.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
G.R. No. 174299
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and
BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and JOHN DOE and PETER DOE, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
I am convinced beyond cavil that the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) did not commit
an abuse of its discretion in dismissing the amended petition before it. The proposals of petitioners
incorporated in said amended petition are for the revision of the 1987 Constitution. Further, the amended
petition before the respondent COMELEC is insufficient in substance.
The Antecedents
On August 25, 2006, petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the COMELEC a
petition entitled "IN THE MATTER OF PROPOSING AMENDMENTS TO THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
THROUGH A PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE: A SHIFT FROM A BICAMERAL PRESIDENTIAL TO A
UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT BY AMENDING ARTICLES VI AND VII; AND
PROVIDING TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT FROM THE PRESIDENTIAL TO
THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM." The case was docketed as EM (LD)-06-01. On August 30, 2006,
petitioners filed an amended petition. For brevity, it is referred to as the petition for initiative.
371

Petitioners alleged therein, inter alia, that they filed their petition in their own behalf and together with
those who have affixed their signatures to the signature sheets appended thereto who are Filipino
citizens, residents and registered voters of the Philippines, and they constitute at least twelve percent
(12%) of all the registered voters in the country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least
three percent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.
Petitioners further alleged therein that the filing of the petition for initiative is based on their constitutional
right to propose amendments to the 1987 Constitution by way of people's initiative, as recognized in
Section 2, Article XVII thereof, which provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."
According to petitioners, while the above provision states that "(T)he Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right," the provisions of Section 5(b) and (c), along with Section 7 of
Republic Act (RA) 6735,
1
are sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise of the power. The said
sections of RA 6735 state:
Sec. 5. Requirements. (a) To exercise the power x x x
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
x x x x
Sec. 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the basis
of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election.
372

They also alleged that the COMELEC has the authority, mandate and obligation to give due course to the
petition for initiative, in compliance with the constitutional directive for the COMELEC to "enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum
and recall."
2

Petitioners incorporated in their petition for initiative the changes they proposed to be incorporated in the
1987 Constitution and prayed that the COMELEC issue an order:
1. Finding the Petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the Petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of
general and local circulation; and
3. Calling a plebiscite to be held not earlier than sixty nor later than ninety days after the
Certification by this Honorable Commission of the sufficiency of this Petition, to allow the Filipino
people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Petitioners pray for such other reliefs deemed just and equitable in the premises.
The Ruling of the respondent COMELEC
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC promulgated the assailed Resolution denying due course and
dismissing the petition for initiative. The COMELEC ruled that:
We agree with the petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution
particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may, likewise, be directly proposed by the
people through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number
of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right."
The aforequoted provision of the Constitution being a non-self-executory provision needed an
enabling law for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the constitutional right of the
people under a system of initiative to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution, Congress enacted RA 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago v. Commission on
Elections struck down the said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned
The Supreme Court, likewise, declared that this Commission should be permanently enjoined
from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
373

Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due
course since the Supreme Court categorically declared RA 6735 as inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the people
under a system of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of
the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the people remains nothing
but an "empty right," and that this Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution. (Citations
omitted.)
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to this Court on a petition for certiorari and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Petitioners' Case
In support of their petition, petitioners alleged, inter alia, that:
I.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO
THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, BECAUSE THE CITED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH
1997 CANNOT BE CONSIDERED THE MAJORITY OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT EN
BANC, CONSIDERING THAT UPON ITS RECONSIDERATION AND FINAL VOTING ON 10
JUNE 1997, NO MAJORITY VOTE WAS SECURED TO DECLARE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735
AS INADEQUATE, INCOMPLETE AND INSUFFICIENT IN STANDARD.
II.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6735, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 AND
EXISTING APPROPRIATION OF THE COMELEC PROVIDE FOR SUFFICIENT DETAILS AND
AUTHORITY FOR THE EXERCISE OF PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE, THUS, EXISTING LAWS TAKEN
TOGETHER ARE ADEQUATE AND COMPLETE.
III.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF, AND IN REFUSING TO GIVE DUE
COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR INITIATIVE, THEREBY VIOLATING AN EXPRESS
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE AND DISREGARDING AND CONTRAVENING THE WILL OF
THE PEOPLE.
A.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT
PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS.
1.
374

THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION INTENDED TO GIVE THE PEOPLE
THE POWER TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS AND THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES ARE NOW GIVING VIBRANT LIFE TO THIS CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION
2.
PRIOR TO THE QUESTIONED SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997, THE
RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO EXERCISE THE SOVEREIGN POWER OF
INITIATIVE AND RECALL HAS BEEN INVARIABLY UPHELD
3.
THE EXERCISE OF THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS IS A
POLITICAL QUESTION WHICH SHALL BE DETERMINED SOLELY BY THE
SOVEREIGN PEOPLE.
4.
BY SIGNING THE SIGNATURE SHEETS ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR
INITIATIVE DULY VERIFIED BY THE ELECTION OFFICERS, THE PEOPLE
HAVE CHOSEN TO PERFORM THIS SACRED EXERCISE OF THEIR
SOVEREIGN POWER.
B.
THE SANTIAGO RULING OF 19 MARCH 1997 IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT
PETITION FOR INITIATIVE FILED BY THE PETITIONERS
C.
THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED IN SANTIAGO V. COMELEC ONLY APPLIES
TO THE DELFIN PETITION.
1.
IT IS THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION AND NOT OTHER
STATEMENTS IN THE BODY OF THE DECISION THAT GOVERNS THE
RIGHTS IN CONTROVERSY.
IV.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FAILED OR NEGLECTED TO ACT OR PERFORM
A DUTY MANDATED BY LAW.
A.
THE MINISTERIAL DUTY OF THE COMELEC IS TO SET THE INITIATIVE FOR
PLEBISCITE.
3

Petitioners Failed to Allege and Demonstrate All the Essential
Facts To Establish the Right to a Writ of Certiorari
375

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule
46.
A writ for certiorari may issue only when the following requirements are set out in the petition and
established:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or any officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions;
(2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
(3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. x
x x
4

The Court has invariably defined "grave abuse of discretion," thus:
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and it must be shown that the discretion was exercised arbitrarily
or despotically. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of
power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law
and common law traditions.
5

There is thus grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it acts in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
6
The only question involved is jurisdiction, either the lack or
excess thereof, and abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari only when the same is grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility. A writ of certiorari is a remedy designed for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
7
An error of judgment is one in which the
court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, which error is reversible only by an appeal.
8

In the present case, it appears from the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC that it denied the petition
for initiative solely in obedience to the mandate of this Court in Santiago v. Commission on Elections.
9
In
said case, the Court En Banc permanently enjoined the COMELEC from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have
been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system. When the COMELEC denied the
petition for initiative, there was as yet no valid law enacted by Congress to provide for the implementation
of the system.
376

It is a travesty for the Court to declare the act of the COMELEC in denying due course to the petition for
initiative as "capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." In fact, in so doing, the COMELEC merely followed or applied, as it ought to do, the Court's
ruling in Santiago to the effect that Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is
a non self-executory provision and requires an enabling law for its implementation. In relation thereto, RA
6735 was found by the Court to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions"
to implement the constitutional provision on initiative. Consequently, the COMELEC was "permanently
enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the
Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the
system." The decision of the Court En Banc interpreting RA 6735 forms part of the legal system of the
Philippines.
10
And no doctrine or principle laid down by the Court En Banc may be modified or reversed
except by the Court En Banc,
11
certainly not by the COMELEC. Until the Court En Banc modifies or
reverses its decision, the COMELEC is bound to follow the same.
12
As succinctly held in Fulkerson v.
Thompson:
13

Whatever was before the Court, and is disposed of, is considered as finally settled. The inferior
court is bound by the judgment or decree as the law of the case, and must carry it into execution
according to the mandate. The inferior court cannot vary it, or judicially examine it for any other
purpose than execution. It can give no other or further relief as to any matter decided by the
Supreme Court even where there is error apparent; or in any manner intermeddle with it further
than to execute the mandate and settle such matters as have been remanded, not adjudicated by
the Supreme Court.
The principles above stated are, we think, conclusively established by the authority of adjudged
cases. And any further departure from them would inevitably mar the harmony of the whole
judiciary system, bring its parts into conflict, and produce therein disorganization, disorder, and
incalculable mischief and confusion. Besides, any rule allowing the inferior courts to disregard the
adjudications of the Supreme Court, or to refuse or omit to carry them into execution would be
repugnant to the principles established by the constitution, and therefore void.
14

At this point, it is well to recall the factual context of Santiago as well as the pronouncement made by the
Court therein. Like petitioners in the instant case, in Santiago, Atty. Jesus Delfin, the People's Initiative for
Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), et al., invoked Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution as
they filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, By People's Initiative" (the Delfin petition). They asked the COMELEC to issue an order fixing
the time and date for signature gathering all over the country; causing the necessary publications of said
order and their petition in newspapers of general and local circulation and instructing municipal election
registrars in all regions all over the country and to assist petitioners in establishing signing stations. Acting
thereon, the COMELEC issued the order prayed for.
Senator Miriam Santiago, et al. forthwith filed with this Court a petition for prohibition to enjoin the
COMELEC from implementing its order. The Court, speaking through Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (later
Chief Justice), granted the petition as it declared:
1. RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned";
2. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
15
invalid insofar as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution because the COMELEC is without authority to promulgate
the rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of initiative; and
3. The Delfin petition insufficient as it did not contain the required number of signatures of registered
voters.
377

The Court concluded in Santiago that "the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining
or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law
shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system." The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
b) DECLARING RA 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution;
and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the Delfin petition (UND-96-
037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on December 18, 1996 is made permanent as against
the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
16

The Court reiterated its ruling in Santiago in another petition which was filed with the Court by PIRMA and
the spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (who were parties in Santiago) docketed as PIRMA v.
Commission on Elections.
17
The said petitioners, undaunted by Santiago and claiming to have gathered
5,793,213 signatures, filed a petition with the COMELEC praying, inter alia, that COMELEC officers be
ordered to verify all the signatures collected in behalf of the petition and, after due hearing, that it
(COMELEC) declare the petition sufficient for the purpose of scheduling a plebiscite to amend the
Constitution. Like the Delfin petition in Santiago, the PIRMA petition proposed to submit to the people in a
plebiscite the amendment to the Constitution on the lifting of the term limits of elected officials.
The opinion of the minority that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in PIRMA has no basis.
The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated July 8, 1997, dismissed the PIRMA petition citing the permanent
restraining order issued against it by the Court in Santiago. PIRMA and the spouses Pedrosa forthwith
elevated the matter to the Court alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in
refusing to exercise jurisdiction over, and thereby dismissing, their petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution.
The Court dismissed outright, by a unanimous vote, the petition filed by PIRMA and the spouses Albert
Pedrosa. The Court declared that the COMELEC merely complied with the dispositions in the decision of
the Court in Santiago and, hence, cannot be held to have committed a grave abuse of its discretion in
dismissing the petition before it:
that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325,
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second issue
posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On
this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide,
Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J.,
agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second issue since the case a bar is not
378

the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno,
Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was need for such a re-
examination. x x x
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
18
(Underscoring supplied.)
In the present case, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) takes the side of petitioners and argues that
the COMELEC should not have applied the ruling in Santiago to the petition for initiative because the
permanent injunction therein referred only to the Delfin petition. The OSG buttresses this argument by
pointing out that the Temporary Restraining Order dated December 18, 1996 that was made permanent
in the dispositive portion referred only to the Delfin petition.
The OSG's attempt to isolate the dispositive portion from the body of the Court's decision in Santiago is
futile. It bears stressing that the dispositive portion must not be read separately but in connection with the
other portions of the decision of which it forms a part. To get to the true intent and meaning of a decision,
no specific portion thereof should be resorted to but the same must be considered in its entirety. Hence, a
resolution or ruling may and does appear in other parts of the decision and not merely in
the fallo thereof.
19

The pronouncement in the body of the decision in Santiago permanently enjoining the COMELEC "from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system" is thus as
much a part of the Court's decision as its dispositive portion. The ruling of this Court is of the nature of
an in rem judgment barring any and all Filipinos from filing a petition for initiative on amendments
to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted. Clearly, the COMELEC, in
denying due course to the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution conformably
with the Court's ruling in Santiago did not commit grave abuse of discretion. On the contrary, its actuation
is in keeping with the salutary principle of hierarchy of courts. For the Court to find the COMELEC to have
abused its discretion when it dismissed the amended petition based on the ruling of this Court in Santiago
would be sheer judicial apostasy.
As eloquently put by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "there is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all
other courts should take their bearings."
20
This truism applies with equal force to the COMELEC as a
quasi-judicial body for, after all, judicial decisions applying or interpreting laws or the Constitution
"assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become,
to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those
called upon to abide thereby but also of those duty bound to enforce obedience thereto."
21

Petitioners Cannot Ascribe
Grave Abuse of Discretion on
the COMELEC Based on the
Minority Opinion in Santiago
It is elementary that the opinion of the majority of the members of the Court, not the opinion of the
minority, prevails. As a corollary, the decision of the majority cannot be modified or reversed by the
minority of the members of the Court.
However, to eschew the binding effect of Santiago, petitioners argue, albeit unconvincingly, that the
Court's declaration therein on the inadequacy, incompleteness and insufficiency of RA 6735 to implement
the system of initiative to propose constitutional amendments did not constitute the majority opinion. This
contention is utterly baseless.
Santiago was concurred in, without any reservation, by eight Justices,
22
or the majority of the members of
the Court, who actually took part in the deliberations thereon. On the other hand, five Justices,
23
while
379

voting for the dismissal of the Delfin petition on the ground of insufficiency, dissented from the majority
opinion as they maintained the view that RA 6735 was sufficient to implement the system of initiative.
Given that a clear majority of the members of the Court, eight Justices, concurred in the decision
in Santiago, the pronouncement therein that RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" constitutes a
definitive ruling on the matter.
In the Resolution dated June 10, 1997, the motions for reconsideration of the Santiago decision were
denied with finality as only six Justices, or less than the majority, voted to grant the same. The Resolution
expressly stated that the motion for reconsideration failed "to persuade the requisite majority of the Court
to modify or reverse the Decision of 19 March 1977."
24
In fine, the pronouncement in Santiago as
embodied in the Decision of March 19, 1997 remains the definitive ruling on the matter.
It bears stressing that in PIRMA, petitioners prayed for the Court to resolve the issue posed by them and
to re-examine its ruling as regards RA 6735. By a vote of seven members of the Court, including Justice
Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Justice Jose C. Vitug, the Court voted that there was no need to resolve the
issue. Five members of the Court opined that there was a need for the re-examination of said ruling.
Thus, the pronouncement of the Court in Santiago remains the law of the case and binding on petitioners.
If, as now claimed by the minorty, there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago, the Court
should have resolved to set aside its original resolution dismissing the petition and to grant the motion for
reconsideration and the petition. But the Court did not. The Court positively and unequivocally declared
that the COMELEC merely followed the ruling of the Court in Santiago in dismissing the petition before it.
No less than Senior Justice Reynato S. Puno concurred with the resolution of the Court. It behooved
Justice Puno to dissent from the ruling of the Court on the motion for reconsideration of petitioners
precisely on the ground that there was no doctrine enunciated by the Court in Santiago. He did not.
Neither did Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, who was a member of the Court.
That RA 6735 has failed to validly implement the people's right to directly propose constitutional
amendments through the system of initiative had already been conclusively settled in Santiago as well as
in PIRMA. Heeding these decisions, several lawmakers, including no less than Solicitor General Antonio
Eduardo Nachura when he was then a member of the House of Representatives,
25
have filed separate
bills to implement the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
In the present Thirteenth (13
th
) Congress, at least seven (7) bills are pending. In the Senate, the three (3)
pending bills are: Senate Bill No. 119 entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the
Constitution introduced by Senator Luisa "Loi" P. Ejercito Estrada; Senate Bill No. 2189 entitled An Act
Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the Constitution introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago; and Senate Bill No. 2247 entitled An Act Providing for a System of People's Initiative to
Propose Amendments to the Constitution introduced by Senator Richard Gordon.
In the House of Representatives, there are at least four (4) pending bills: House Bill No. 05281 filed by
Representative Carmen Cari, House Bill No. 05017 filed by Representative Imee Marcos, House Bill No.
05025 filed by Representative Roberto Cajes, and House Bill No. 05026 filed by Representative Edgardo
Chatto. These House bills are similarly entitled An Act Providing for People's Initiative to Amend the
Constitution.
The respective explanatory notes of the said Senate and House bills uniformly recognize that there is, to
date, no law to govern the process by which constitutional amendments are introduced by the people
directly through the system of initiative. Ten (10) years after Santiago and absent the occurrence of any
compelling supervening event, i.e., passage of a law to implement the system of initiative under Section
2, Article XVII of the Constitution, that would warrant the re-examination of the ruling therein, it behooves
the Court to apply to the present case the salutary and well-recognized doctrine of stare decisis. As
380

earlier shown, Congress and other government agencies have, in fact, abided by Santiago. The Court
can do no less with respect to its own ruling.
Contrary to the stance taken by petitioners, the validity or constitutionality of a law cannot be made to
depend on the individual opinions of the members who compose it the Supreme Court, as an institution,
has already determined RA 6735 to be "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and
conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned" and therefore the same
remains to be so regardless of any change in the Court's composition.
26
Indeed, it is vital that there be
stability in the courts in adhering to decisions deliberately made after ample consideration. Parties should
not be encouraged to seek re-examination of determined principles and speculate on fluctuation of the
law with every change in the expounders of it.
27

Proposals to Revise the Constitution,
As in the Case of the Petitioners'
Proposal to Change the Form of
Government, Cannot be Effected
Through the System of Initiative,
Which by Express Provision of
Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, is Limited to Amendments
Even granting arguendo the Court, in the present case, abandons its pronouncement in Santiago and
declares RA 6735, taken together with other extant laws, sufficient to implement the system of initiative,
still, the amended petition for initiative cannot prosper. Despite the denomination of their petition, the
proposals of petitioners to change the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a
unicameral-parliamentary system of government are actually for the revision of the Constitution.
Petitioners propose to "amend" Articles VI and VII of the Constitution in this manner:
"Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament
"(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-
the parliamentary districts."
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read, as
follows:
"Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall
be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be
elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be
responsible to the Parliament for the program of government.
381

"Transitory Provisions," which shall read as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their
term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under
the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim
parliament.,
Section 2. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with
that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and
"House of Congress," "Senator[s] or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" and "House of
Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references therein to
"Member[s] of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of
Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or "Acting President" shall be
changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. "Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President, with
the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby
amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided,
however, that any and all references therein to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives"
and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references
therein to "Member[s] of Congress," "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of Parliament" and
any and all references to the "President" and of "Acting President" shall be changed to read
"Prime Minister."
shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its session for the election of
382

"Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among
incumbent President."
(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament, which shall
be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government
officials. [Thereafter, the Vice-President, as Member of Parliament, shall immediately convene the
Parliament and shall initially preside over its session for the purpose of electing the Prime
Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all its members, from among themselves.] The
duly-elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
28

Petitioners claim that the required number of signatures of registered voters have been complied with,
i.e., the signatories to the petition constitute twelve percent (12%) of all the registered voters in the
country, wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three percent (3%) of all the registered
voters therein. Certifications allegedly executed by the respective COMELEC Election Registrars of each
municipality and city verifying these signatures were attached to the petition for initiative. The verification
was allegedly done on the basis of the list of registered voters contained in the official COMELEC list
used in the immediately preceding election.
The proposition, as formulated by petitioners, to be submitted to the Filipino people in a plebiscite to be
called for the said purpose reads:
DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY SHIFT
FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
29

According to petitioners, the proposed amendment of Articles VI and VII would effect a more efficient,
more economical and more responsive government. The parliamentary system would allegedly ensure
harmony between the legislative and executive branches of government, promote greater consensus, and
provide faster and more decisive governmental action.
Sections 1 and 2 of Article XVII pertinently read:
Article XVII
SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
383

It can be readily gleaned that the above provisions set forth different modes and procedures for proposals
for the amendment and revision of the Constitution:
1. Under Section 1, Article XVII, any amendment to, or revision of, the Constitution may be
proposed by
a. Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
b. A constitutional convention.
2. Under Section 2, Article XVII, amendments to the Constitution may be likewise directly
proposed by the people through initiative.
The framers of the Constitution deliberately adopted the terms "amendment" and "revision" and provided
for their respective modes and procedures for effecting changes of the Constitution fully cognizant of the
distinction between the two concepts. Commissioner Jose E. Suarez, the Chairman of the Committee on
Amendments and Transitory Provisions, explained:
MR. SUAREZ. One more point, and we will be through.
We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, "amendment." However, the
Committee finally agreed to use the terms "amendment" or "revision" when our attention was
called by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the connotation and
significance between the said terms. As a result of our research, we came up with the
observations made in the famous or notorious Javellana doctrine, particularly the decision
rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar, wherein he made the following distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve a rewriting of the
whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution envisages a change of
specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the change of the entire
Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed
essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered
obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.
The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new
fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be employed in
the formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.
30

Further, the framers of the Constitution deliberately omitted the term "revision" in Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution because it was their intention to reserve the power to propose a revision of the
Constitution to Congress or the constitutional convention. Stated in another manner, it was their manifest
intent that revision thereof shall not be undertaken through the system of initiative. Instead, the revision of
the Constitution shall be done either by Congress or by a constitutional convention.
384

It is significant to note that, originally, the provision on the system of initiative was included in Section 1 of
the draft Article on Amendment or Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory
Provisions. The original draft provided:
SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article __ Section __ of the
Constitution.
31

However, after deliberations and interpellations, the members of the Commission agreed to remove the
provision on the system of initiative from Section 1 and, instead, put it under a separate provision, Section
2. It was explained that the removal of the provision on initiative from the other "traditional modes" of
changing the Constitution was precisely to limit the former (system of initiative) to amendments to the
Constitution. It was emphasized that the system of initiative should not extend to revision.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President.
mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete Committee Report No. 7
which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by
Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
registered voters.
suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about because of the
system of initiative should be limited to amendments to the Constitution and should not extend to
the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the
proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. x x x
32

The intention to exclude "revision" of the Constitution as a mode that may be undertaken through the
system of initiative was reiterated and made clear by Commissioner Suarez in response to a suggestion
of Commissioner Felicitas Aquino:
MR. SUAREZ. Section 2 must be interpreted together with the provisions of Section 4, except
that in Section 4, as it is presently drafted, there is no take-off date for the 60-day and 90-day
periods.
MS. AQUINO. Yes. In other words, Section 2 is another alternative mode of proposing
amendments to the Constitution which would further require the process of submitting it in a
plebiscite, in which case it is not self-executing.
MR. SUAREZ. No, not unless we settle and determine the take-off period.
385

MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
MR SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense conveyed by the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of
modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas, the process of
initiation to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned by the Committee.
33

Then Commissioner Hilario P. Davide, Jr. (later Chief Justice) also made the clarification with respect to
the observation of Commissioner Regalado Maambong:
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1
refers to "amendments." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner
Padilla when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by
Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to
"amendments" not "revision."
34

After several amendments, the Commission voted in favor of the following wording of Section 2:
AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY
THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT
OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED
VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED
WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR
OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII as eventually worded read:
Article XVII
through initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
386

The final text of Article XVII on Amendments or Revisions clearly makes a substantial differentiation not
only between the two terms but also between two procedures and their respective fields of application.
Ineluctably, the system of initiative under Section 2, Article XVII as a mode of effecting changes in the
Constitution is strictly limited to amendments not to a revision thereof.
As opined earlier, the framers of the Constitution, in providing for "amendment" and "revision" as different
modes of changing the fundamental law, were cognizant of the distinction between the two terms. They
particularly relied on the distinction made by Justice Felix Antonio in his concurring opinion in Javellana v.
Executive Secretary,
35
the controversial decision which gave imprimatur to the 1973 Constitution of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, as follows:
There is clearly a distinction between revision and amendment of an existing constitution.
Revision may involve a rewriting of the whole constitution. The act of amending a constitution, on
the other hand, envisages a change of only specific provisions. The intention of an act to amend
is not the change of the entire constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts of the
existing constitution of the addition of provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new
conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of
the times. The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a
completely new fundamental charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.
36

Other elucidation on the distinction between "amendment" and "revision" is enlightening. For example,
Dean Vicente G. Sinco, an eminent authority on political law, distinguished the two terms in this manner:
Strictly speaking, the act of revising a constitution involves alterations of different portions of the
portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revisions
entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific
changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect.
37

In the United States, the Supreme Court of Georgia in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees
38
had the occasion to
make the distinction between the two terms with respect to Ga.L. 1945, an instrument which "amended"
the 1877 Constitution of Georgia. It explained the term "amendment:"
"Amendment" of a statute implies its survival and not destruction. It repeals or changes some
provision, or adds something thereto. A law is amended when it is in whole or in part permitted to
remain, and something is added to or taken from it, or it is in some way changed or altered to
make it more complete or perfect, or to fit it the better to accomplish the object or purpose for
which it was made, or some other object or purpose.
39

On the other hand, the term "revision" was explained by the said US appellate court:
387

x x x When a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same location, do
you have a changed, repaired and altered house, or do you have a new house? Some of the
materials contained in the old house may be used again, some of the rooms may be constructed
the same, but this does not alter the fact that you have altogether another or a new house. We
conclude that the instrument as contained in Ga.L. 1945, pp. 8 to 89, inclusive, is not an
amendment to the constitution of 1877; but on the contrary it is a completely revised or new
constitution.
40

Fairly recently, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, SJ, a member of the Constitutional Commission, expounded on the
distinction between the two terms thus:
become obsolete or that are judged to be dangerous. In revision, however, the guiding original
intention and plan contemplate a re-examination of the entire document or of provisions of the
document (which have overall implications for the entire document or for the fundamental
philosophical underpinnings of the document) to determine how and to what extent it should be
altered. Thus, for instance, a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system would
be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a
switch from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other important
provisions of the Constitution.
It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of change in
the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision. Hence, I
must reject the puerile argument that the use of the plural form of "amendments" means that a
revision can be achieved by the introduction of a multiplicity of amendments!
41

Given that revision necessarily entails a more complex, substantial and far-reaching effects on the
Constitution, the framers thereof wisely withheld the said mode from the system of initiative. It should be
recalled that it took the framers of the present Constitution four months from June 2, 1986 until October
15, 1986 to come up with the draft Constitution which, as described by the venerable Justice Cecilia
Muoz Palma, the President of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, "gradually and painstakingly took
shape through the crucible of sustained sometimes passionate and often exhilarating debates that
intersected all dimensions of the national life."
42

Evidently, the framers of the Constitution believed that a revision thereof should, in like manner, be a
product of the same extensive and intensive study and debates. Consequently, while providing for a
system of initiative where the people would directly propose amendments to the Constitution, they
entrusted the formidable task of its revision to a deliberative body, the Congress or Constituent Assembly.
The Constitution is the fundamental law of the state, containing the principles upon which the government
is founded, and regulating the division of sovereign powers, directing to what persons each of those
powers is to be confided and the manner in which it is to be exercised.
43
The Philippines has followed the
American constitutional legal system in the sense that the term constitution is given a more restricted
meaning, i.e., as a written organic instrument, under which governmental powers are both conferred and
circumscribed.
44

The Constitution received its force from the express will of the people. An overwhelming 16,622,111,
out of 21,785,216 votes cast during the plebiscite, or 76.30% ratified the present Constitution on
February 2, 1987.
45
In expressing that will, the Filipino people have incorporated therein the method and
manner by which the same can be amended and revised, and when the electorate have incorporated into
the fundamental law the particular manner in which the same may be altered or changed, then any
course which disregards that express will is a direct violation of the fundamental law.
46

388

Further, these provisions having been incorporated in the Constitution, where the validity of a
constitutional amendment or revision depends upon whether such provisions have been complied with,
such question presents for consideration and determination a judicial question, and the courts are the
only tribunals vested with power under the Constitution to determine such question.
47

Earlier, it was mentioned that Article XVII, by the use of the terms "amendment" and "revision," clearly
makes a differentiation not only between the two terms but also between two procedures and their
respective fields of application. On this point, the case of McFadden v. Jordan
48
is instructive. In that
case, a "purported initiative amendment" (referred to as the proposed measure) to the State Constitution
of California, then being proposed to be submitted to the electors for ratification, was sought to be
enjoined. The proposed measure, denominated as "California Bill of Rights," comprised a single new
article with some 208 subsections which would repeal or substantially alter at least 15 of the 25 articles of
the California State Constitution and add at least four new topics. Among the likely effects of the
proposed measure were to curtail legislative and judicial functions, legalize gaming, completely revise the
taxation system and reduce the powers of cities, counties and courts. The proposed measure also
included diverse matters as ministers, mines, civic centers, liquor control and naturopaths.
The Supreme Court of California enjoined the submission of the proposed measure to the electors for
ratification because it was not an "amendment" but a "revision" which could only be proposed by a
convention. It held that from an examination of the proposed measure itself, considered in relation to the
terms of the California State Constitution, it was clear that the proposed initiative enactment amounted
substantially to an attempted revision, rather than amendment, thereof; and that inasmuch as the
California State Constitution specifies (Article XVIII 2 thereof) that it may be revised by means of
constitutional convention but does not provide for revision by initiative measure, the submission of the
proposed measure to the electorate for ratification must be enjoined.
As piercingly enunciated by the California State Supreme Court in McFadden, the differentiation required
(between amendment and revision) is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between two
procedures and between their respective fields of application. Each procedure, if we follow elementary
principles of statutory construction, must be understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be
a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Each of the two words, then, must be understood to
denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of application appropriate to its procedure.
49

Provisions regulating the time and mode of effecting organic changes are in the nature of safety-valves
they must not be so adjusted as to discharge their peculiar function with too great facility, lest they
become the ordinary escape-pipes of party passion; nor, on the other hand, must they discharge it with
such difficulty that the force needed to induce action is sufficient also to explode the machine. Hence, the
problem of the Constitution maker is, in this particular, one of the most difficult in our whole system, to
reconcile the requisites for progress with the requisites for safety.
50

Like in McFadden, the present petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution is, despite its
denomination, one for its revision. It purports to seek the amendment only of Articles VI and VII of the
Constitution as well as to provide transitory provisions. However, as will be shown shortly, the
amendment of these two provisions will necessarily affect other numerous provisions of the Constitution
particularly those pertaining to the specific powers of Congress and the President. These powers would
have to be transferred to the Parliament and the Prime Minister and/or President, as the case may be.
More than one hundred (100) sections will be affected or altered thereby:
1. Section 19 of Article III (Bill of Rights) on the power of Congress to impose the death penalty
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes;
2. Section 2 of Article V (Suffrage) on the power of Congress to provide for securing the secrecy
and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting;
389

3. All 32 Sections of Article VI on the Legislative Department;
4. All 23 Sections of Article VII on the Executive Department;
5. The following Sections of Article VIII (Judicial Department):
- Section 2 on power of Congress to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts;
- Section 7 on the power of Congress to prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower
courts;
- Section 8 on the composition of Judicial Bar Council (JBC) which includes
representatives of Congress as ex officio members and on the power of the President to
appoint the regular members of the JBC;
- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the members of the Supreme Court
and judges of lower courts;
- Section 16 on duty of Supreme Court to make annual report to the President and
Congress.
6. The following Sections of Article IX (Constitutional Commissions);
- (B) Section 3 on duty of Civil Service Commission to make annual report to the
President and Congress;
- (B) Section 5 on power of Congress to provide by law for the standardization of
compensation of government officials;
- (B) Section 8 which provides in part that "no public officer shall accept, without the
consent of Congress, any present, emolument, etc. x x x"
- (C) Section 1 on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Commission on Elections with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments;
- (C) Section 2 (7) on the power of the COMELEC to recommend to Congress measures
to minimize election spending x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (8) on the duty of the COMELEC to recommend to the President the
removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action x x x;
- (C) Section 2 (9) on the duty of the COMELEC to submit to the President and Congress
a report on the conduct of election, plebiscite, etc.;
- (C) Section 5 on the power of the President, with the favorable recommendation of the
COMELEC, to grant pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of
election laws, rules and regulations;
390

- (C) Section 7 which recognizes as valid votes cast in favor of organization registered
under party-list system;
- (C) Section 8 on political parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system;
- (D) Section 1 (2) on the power of the President to appoint the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) with the consent of the Commission
of Appointments;
- Section 4 on duty of the COA to make annual report to the President and Congress.
7. The following Sections of Article X (Local Government):
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to enact a local government code;
- Section 4 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over local
government units (LGUs);
- Section 5 on the power of LGUs to create their own sources of income x x x, subject to
such guidelines as Congress may provide;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to create special metropolitan political
subdivisions;
- Section 14 on the power of the President to provide for regional development councils x
x x;
- Section 16 on the power of the President to exercise general supervision over
autonomous regions;
- Section 18 on the power of Congress to enact organic act for each autonomous region
as well as the power of the President to appoint the representatives to the regional
consultative commission;
- Section 19 on the duty of the first Congress elected under the Constitution to pass the
organic act for autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
8. The following Sections of Article XI (Accountability of Public Officers):
- Section 2 on the impeachable officers (President, Vice-President, etc.);
- Section 3 on impeachment proceedings (exclusive power of the House to initiate
complaint and sole power of the Senate to try and decide impeachment cases);
- Section 9 on the power of the President to appoint the Ombudsman and his deputies;
- Section 16 which provides in part that "x x x no loans or guaranty shall be granted to the
President, Vice-President, etc.
- Section 17 on mandatory disclosure of assets and liabilities by public officials including
the President, Vice-President, etc.
391

9. The following Sections of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to allow, by law, small-scale utilization of natural
resources and power of the President to enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations and duty to notify Congress of every contract;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to determine size of lands of public domain;
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to determine specific limits of forest lands;
- Section 5 on the power of Congress to provide for applicability of customary laws;
- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish an independent economic and planning
agency to be headed by the President;
- Section 10 on the power of Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens or domestic
corporations(at least 60% Filipino-owned) certain areas of investment;
- Section 11 on the sole power of Congress to grant franchise for public utilities;
- Section 15 on the power of Congress to create an agency to promote viability of
cooperatives;
- Section 16 which provides that Congress shall not, except by general law, form private
corporations;
- Section 17 on the salaries of the President, Vice-President, etc. and the power of
Congress to adjust the same;
- Section 20 on the power of Congress to establish central monetary authority.
10. The following Sections of Article XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights):
- Section 1 on the mandate of Congress to give highest priority to enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of people x x x
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to prescribe retention limits in agrarian reform;
- Section 18 (6) on the duty of the Commission on Human Rights to recommend to
Congress effective measures to promote human rights;
- Section 19 on the power of Congress to provide for other cases to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Human Rights.
11. The following Sections of Article XIV (Education, Science and Technology, etc.):
- Section 4 on the power of Congress to increase Filipino equity participation in
educational institutions;
- Section 6 which provides that subject to law and as Congress may provide, the
Government shall sustain the use of Filipino as medium of official communication;
392

- Section 9 on the power of Congress to establish a national language commission;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to provide for incentives to promote scientific
research.
12. The following Sections of Article XVI (General Provisions):
- Section 2 on the power of Congress to adopt new name for the country, new national
anthem, etc.;
- Section 5 (7) on the tour of duty of the Chief of Staff which may be extended by the
President in times of war or national emergency declared by Congress;
- Section 11 on the power of Congress to regulate or prohibit monopolies in mass media;
- Section 12 on the power of Congress to create consultative body to advise the
President on indigenous cultural communities.
13. The following Sections of Article XVII (Amendments or Revisions):
- Section 1 on the amendment or revision of Constitution by Congress;
- Section 2 on the duty of Congress to provide for the implementation of the system of
initiative;
- Section 3 on the power of Congress to call constitutional convention to amend or revise
the Constitution.
14. All 27 Sections of Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions).
The foregoing enumeration negates the claim that "the big bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be
affected."
51
Petitioners' proposition, while purportedly seeking to amend only Articles VI and VII of the
Constitution and providing transitory provisions, will, in fact, affect, alter, replace or repeal other numerous
articles and sections thereof. More than the quantitative effects, however, the revisory character of
petitioners' proposition is apparent from the qualitative effects it will have on the fundamental law.
I am not impervious to the commentary of Dean Vicente G. Sinco that the revision of a constitution, in its
strict sense, refers to a consideration of the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such
change; whileamendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or to be altered in a
constitution.
52

For clarity and accuracy, however, it is necessary to reiterate below Dean Sinco's more comprehensive
differentiation of the terms:
portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revisions
393

entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve the specific
changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seemed obsolete, or dangerous, or
misleading in their effect.
53

A change in the form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary, following
the above distinction, entails a revision of the Constitution as it will involve "alteration of different portions
of the entire document" and "may result in the rewriting of the whole constitution, or the greater portion of
it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions."
More importantly, such shift in the form of government will, without doubt, fundamentally change the basic
plan and substance of the present Constitution. The tripartite system ordained by our fundamental law
divides governmental powers into three distinct but co-equal branches: the legislative, executive and
judicial. Legislative power, vested in Congress which is a bicameral body consisting of the House of
Representatives and the Senate, is the power to make laws and to alter them at discretion. Executive
power, vested in the President who is directly elected by the people, is the power to see that the laws are
duly executed and enforced. Judicial power, vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts, is the
power to construe and apply the law when controversies arise concerning what has been done or omitted
under it. This separation of powers furnishes a system of checks and balances which guards against the
establishment of an arbitrary or tyrannical government.
Under a unicameral-parliamentary system, however, the tripartite separation of power is dissolved as
there is a fusion between the executive and legislative powers. Essentially, the President becomes a
mere "symbolic head of State" while the Prime Minister becomes the head of government who is elected,
not by direct vote of the people, but by the members of the Parliament. The Parliament is a unicameral
body whose members are elected by legislative districts. The Prime Minister, as head of government,
does not have a fixed term of office and may only be removed by a vote of confidence of the Parliament.
Under this form of government, the system of checks and balances is emasculated.
Considering the encompassing scope and depth of the changes that would be effected, not to mention
that the Constitution's basic plan and substance of a tripartite system of government and the principle of
separation of powers underlying the same would be altered, if not entirely destroyed, there can be no
other conclusion than that the proposition of petitioners Lambino, et al. would constitute a revision of the
Constitution rather than an amendment or "such an addition or change within the lines of the original
instrument as will effect an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed."
54
As has
been shown, the effect of the adoption of the petitioners' proposition, rather than to "within the lines of the
original instrument" constitute "an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed," is
to "substantially alter the purpose and to attain objectives clearly beyond the lines of the Constitution as
now cast."
55

To paraphrase McFadden, petitioners' contention that any change less than a total one is amendatory
would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. A case might,
conceivably, be presented where the question would be occasion to undertake to define with nicety the
line of demarcation; but we have no case or occasion here.
As succinctly by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, "a switch from the presidential system to a parliamentary system
would be a revision because of its overall impact on the entire constitutional structure. So would a switch
from a bicameral system to a unicameral system because of its effect on other important provisions of the
Constitution. It is thus clear that what distinguishes revision from amendment is not the quantum of
change in the document. Rather, it is the fundamental qualitative alteration that effects revision."
56

394

The petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution filed by petitioners Lambino, et al., being in
truth and in fact a proposal for the revision thereof, is barred from the system of initiative upon any legally
permissible construction of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
The Petition for Initiative on
Amendments to the Constitution
is, on its Face, Insufficient in
Form and Substance
Again, even granting arguendo RA 6735 is declared sufficient to implement the system of initiative and
that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, as it prescribed rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, is valid, still, the petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
must be dismissed for being insufficient in form and substance.
Section 5 of RA 6735 requires that a petition for initiative on the Constitution must state the following:
1. Contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed, as the case may be;
2. The proposition;
3. The reason or reasons therefor;
4. That it is not one of the exceptions provided herein;
5. Signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
6. An abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
Section 7 thereof requires that the signatures be verified in this wise:
SEC. 7. Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the
The law mandates upon the election registrar to personally verify the signatures. This is a solemn and
important duty imposed on the election registrar which he cannot delegate to any other person, even
to barangay officials. Hence, a verification of signatures made by persons other than the election
registrars has no legal effect.
In patent violation of the law, several certifications submitted by petitioners showed that the verification of
signatures was made, not by the election registrars, but by barangay officials. For example, the
certification of the election officer in Lumbatan, Lanao del Sur reads in full:
LOCAL ELECTION OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION
57

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that based on the verifications made by the Barangay Officials in this
City/Municipality, as attested to by two (2) witnesses from the same Barangays, which is part of
the 2
nd
Legislative District of the Province of Lanao del Sur, the names appearing on the attached
signature sheets relative to the proposed initiative on Amendments to the 1987 Constitution, are
those of bonafide resident of the saidBarangays and correspond to the names found in the official
395

list of registered voters of the Commission on Elections and/or voters' affidavit and/or voters'
identification cards.
It is further certified that the total number of signatures of the registered voters for the
City/Municipality of LUMBATAN, LANAO DEL SUR as appearing in the affixed signatures sheets
is ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (1,180).
April 2, 2006
IBRAHIM M. MACADATO
Election Officer
The ineffective verification in almost all the legislative districts in the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM) alone is shown by the certifications, similarly worded as above-quoted, of the election
registrars of Buldon, Maguindanao;
58
Cotabato City (Special Province);
59
Datu Odin Sinsuat,
Maguindanao;
60
Matanog, Maguindanao;
61
Parang, Maguindanao;
62
Kabantalan, Maguindanao;
63
Upi,
Maguinadano;
64
Barira, Maguindanao;
65
Sultan, Mastura;
66
Ampatuan, Maguindanao;
67
Buluan,
Maguindanao;
68
Datu Paglas, Maguindanao;
69
Datu Piang, Maguindanao;
70
Shariff Aguak,
Maguindanao;
71
Pagalungan, Maguindanao;
72
Talayan, Maguindanao;
73
Gen. S.K. Pendatun,
Maguindanao;
74
Mamasapano, Maguindanao;
75
Talitay, Maguindanao;
76
Guindulungan,
Maguindanao;
77
Datu Saudi Ampatuan, Maguindanao;
78
Datu Unsay, Maguindanao;
79
Pagagawan,
Maguindanao;
80
Rajah Buayan, Maguindanao;
81
Indanan, Sulu;
82
Jolo, Sulu;
83
Maimbung, Sulu;
84
Hadji
Panglima, Sulu;
85
Pangutaran, Sulu;
86
Parang, Sulu;
87
Kalingalan Caluang, Sulu;
88
Luuk,
Sulu;
89
Panamao, Sulu;
90
Pata, Sulu;
91
Siasi, Sulu;
92
Tapul, Sulu;
93
Panglima Estino, Sulu;
94
Lugus,
Sulu;
95
and Pandami, Sulu.
96

Section 7 of RA 6735 is clear that the verification of signatures shall be done by the election registrar, and
by no one else, including the barangay officials. The foregoing certifications submitted by petitioners,
instead of aiding their cause, justify the outright dismissal of their petition for initiative. Because of the
illegal verifications made bybarangay officials in the above-mentioned legislative districts, it necessarily
follows that the petition for initiative has failed to comply with the requisite number of signatures, i.e., at
least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein.
Petitioners cannot disclaim the veracity of these damaging certifications because they themselves
submitted the same to the COMELEC and to the Court in the present case to support their contention that
the requirements of RA 6735 had been complied with and that their petition for initiative is on its face
sufficient in form and substance. They are in the nature of judicial admissions which are conclusive and
binding on petitioners.
97
This being the case, the Court must forthwith order the dismissal of the petition
for initiative for being, on its face, insufficient in form and substance. The Court should make the
adjudication entailed by the facts here and now, without further proceedings, as it has done in other
cases.
98

It is argued by petitioners that, assuming arguendo that the COMELEC is correct in relying
on Santiago that RA 6735 is inadequate to cover initiative to the Constitution, this cannot be used to
legitimize its refusal to heed the people's will. The fact that there is no enabling law should not prejudice
the right of the sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution, which right has already
been exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective and resounding act of the particles of sovereignty
must not be set aside. Hence, the COMELEC should be ordered to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of
the 1987 Constitution via a writ of mandamus. The submission of petitioners, however, is unpersuasive.
396

Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and to compel the persons of
a public duty most especially when mandated by the Constitution.
99
However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Court, for a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the
petition is a ministerial act or duty and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person,
and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof. A purely
ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public official
and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty should be performed, such duty is discretionary
and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of an official discretion nor judgment.
100

To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear and certain right to
warrant the grant thereof.
101
In this case, petitioners failed to establish their right to a writ of mandamus as
shown by the foregoing disquisitions.
Remand of the Case to the
COMELEC is Not Authorized by
RA 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300
The dissenting opinion posits that the issue of whether or not the petition for initiative has complied with
the requisite number of signatures of at least twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three percent (3%) of the
registered voters therein, involves contentious facts. The dissenting opinion cites the petitioners' claim
that they have complied with the same while the oppositors-intervenors have vigorously refuted this claim
by alleging, inter alia, that the signatures were not properly verified or were not verified at all. Other
oppositors-intervenors have alleged that the signatories did not fully understand what they have signed as
they were misled into signing the signature sheets.
According to the dissenting opinion, the sufficiency of the petition for initiative and its compliance with the
requirements of RA 6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a question that should be resolved by
the COMELEC at the first instance. It thus remands the case to the COMELEC for further proceedings.
To my mind, the remand of the case to the COMELEC is not warranted. There is nothing in RA 6735, as
well as in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, granting that it is valid to implement the former statute, that
authorizes the COMELEC to conduct any kind of hearing, whether full-blown or trial-type hearing,
summary hearing or administrative hearing, on a petition for initiative.
Section 41 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 provides that "[a]n initiative shall be conducted under the
control and supervision of the Commission in accordance with Article III hereof." Pertinently, Sections 30,
31 and 32 of Article III of the said implementing rules provide as follows:
Sec. 30. Verification of signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on the
basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters' identification cards used in the
Sec. 31. Determination by the Commission. The Commission shall act on the findings of the
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has not been obtained, the petition shall
be deemed defeated and the Commission shall issue a declaration to that effect.
If it should appear that the required number of signatures has been obtained, the Commission
shall set the initiative or referendum in accordance with the succeeding sections.
397

Sec. 32. Appeal. The decision of the Commission on the findings of the sufficiency and
insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum may be appealed to the Supreme Court
within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Clearly, following the foregoing procedural rules, the COMELEC is not authorized to conduct any kind of
hearing to receive any evidence for or against the sufficiency of the petition for initiative. Rather, the
foregoing rules require of the COMELEC to determine the sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for
initiative on its face. And it has already been shown, by the annexes submitted by the petitioners
themselves, their petition is, on its face, insufficient in form and substance. The remand of the case to the
COMELEC for reception of evidence of the parties on the contentious factual issues is, in effect, an
amendment of the abovequoted rules of the COMELEC by this Court which the Court is not empowered
to do.
The Present Petition Presents a
Justiciable Controversy; Hence,
a Non-Political Question. Further,
the People, Acting in their Sovereign
Capacity, Have Bound Themselves
to Abide by the Constitution
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government.
102
A political question has two aspects: (1) those matters
that are to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity; and (2) matters which have been
specifically designated to some other department or particular office of the government, with discretionary
power to act.
103

In his concurring and dissenting opinion in Arroyo v. De Venecia,
104
Senior Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno explained the doctrine of political question vis--vis the express mandate of the present Constitution
for the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government:
In the Philippine setting, there is more compelling reason for courts to categorically reject the
political question defense when its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For Section 1,
Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to empower courts "... to determine
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government." This power is new
and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was also not xeroxed
from the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The CONCOM [Constitutional
Commission] granted this enormous power to our courts in view of our experience under martial
law where abusive exercises of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of
the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, the
CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the Executive
and the Legislative departments of government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that the government
can no longer invoke the political question defense.
x x x x
To a great degree, it diminished its [political question doctrine] use as a shield to protect other
abuses of government by allowing courts to penetrate the shield with new power to review acts of
any branch or instrumentality of the government ". . . to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."
398

Even if the present petition involves the act, not of a governmental body, but of purportedly more than six
million registered voters who have signified their assent to the proposal to amend the Constitution, the
same still constitutes a justiciable controversy, hence, a non-political question. There is no doubt that the
Constitution, under Article XVII, has explicitly provided for the manner or method to effect amendments
thereto, or revision thereof. The question, therefore, of whether there has been compliance with the terms
of the Constitution is for the Court to pass upon.
105

In the United States, in In re McConaughy,
106
the State Supreme Court of Minnesota exercised
jurisdiction over the petition questioning the result of the general election holding that "an examination of
the decisions shows that the courts have almost uniformly exercised the authority to determine the validity
of the proposal, submission, or ratification of constitutional amendments." The cases cited were Dayton v.
St. Paul,
107
Rice v. Palmer,
108
Bott v. Wurtz,
109
State v. Powell,
110
among other cases.
There is no denying that "the Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them."
111
However, I find to be tenuous the
asseveration that "the argument that the people through initiative cannot propose substantial
amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty in its head. At the very least, the submission
constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of the people."
112
In effect, it is
theorized that despite the unambiguous text of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution withholding the
power to revise it from the system of initiative, the people, in their sovereign capacity, can conveniently
disregard the said provision.
I strongly take exception to the view that the people, in their sovereign capacity, can disregard the
Constitution altogether. Such a view directly contravenes the fundamental constitutional theory that while
indeed "the ultimate sovereignty is in the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority"; nonetheless,
"by the Constitution which they establish, they not only tie up the hands of their official agencies, but their
own hands as well; and neither the officers of the state, nor the whole people as an aggregate body, are
at liberty to take action in opposition to this fundamental law."
113
The Constitution, it should be
remembered, "is the protector of the people, placed on guard by them to save the rights of the people
against injury by the people."
114
This is the essence of constitutionalism:
Through constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and ourselves, hoping
that democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic and even despotic, might now become
restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound ourselves over to a law that we made and
promised to keep. And though a government of laws did not displace governance by men, it did
mean that now men, democratic men, would try to live by their word.
115

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the system of initiative is limited only to proposals to amend
to the Constitution, and does not extend to its revision. The Filipino people have bound themselves to
observe the manner and method to effect the changes of the Constitution. They opted to limit the exercise
of the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, but did not extend the
same to the revision thereof. The petition for initiative, as it proposes to effect the revision thereof,
contravenes the Constitution. The fundamental law of the state prescribes the limitations under which the
electors of the state may change the same, and, unless such course is pursued, the mere fact that a
majority of the electors are in favor of a change and have so expressed themselves, does not work a
change. Such a course would be revolutionary, and the Constitution of the state would become a mere
matter of form.
116

The very term Constitution implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions
contained therein for its revision indicated the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which
it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding
nature.
117

399

The Filipino people have incorporated the safety valves of amendment and revision in Article XVII of the
Constitution. The Court is mandated to ensure that these safety valves embodied in the Constitution to
guard against improvident and hasty changes thereof are not easily trifled with. To be sure, by having
overwhelmingly ratified the Constitution, the Filipino people believed that it is "a good Constitution" and in
the words of the learned Judge Cooley:
x x x should be beyond the reach of temporary excitement and popular caprice or passion. It is
needed for stability and steadiness; it must yield to the thought of the people; not to the whim of
the people, or the thought evolved in excitement or hot blood, but the sober second thought,
which alone, if the government is to be safe, can be allowed efficiency. Changes in government
are to be feared unless the benefit is certain. As Montaign says: "All great mutations shake and
disorder a state. Good does not necessarily succeed evil; another evil may succeed and
worse.
118

Indisputably, the issues posed in the present case are of transcendental importance. Accordingly, I have
approached and grappled with them with full appreciation of the responsibilities involved in the present
case, and have given to its consideration the earnest attention which its importance demands. I have
sought to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution at whatever hazard. I share the concern of Chief
Justice Day in Koehler v. Hill:
119
"it is for the protection of minorities that constitutions are framed.
Sometimes constitutions must be interposed for the protection of majorities even against themselves.
Constitutions are adopted in times of public repose, when sober reason holds her citadel, and are
designed to check the surging passions in times of popular excitement. But if courts could be coerced by
popular majorities into a disregard of their provisions, constitutions would become mere 'ropes of sand,'
and there would be an end of social security and of constitutional freedom. The cause of temperance can
sustain no injury from the loss of this amendment which would be at all comparable to the injury to
republican institutions which a violation of the constitution would inflict. That large and respectable class
of moral reformers which so justly demands the observance and enforcement of law, cannot afford to take
its first reformatory step by a violation of the constitution. How can it consistently demand of others
obedience to a constitution which it violates itself? The people can in a short time re-enact the
amendment. In the manner of a great moral reform, the loss of a few years is nothing. The constitution is
the palladium of republican freedom. The young men coming forward upon the stage of political action
must be educated to venerate it; those already upon the stage must be taught to obey it. Whatever
interest may be advanced or may suffer, whoever or whatever may be 'voted up or voted down,' no
sacrilegious hand must be laid upon the constitution."
120

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153 and to GRANT the petition in G.R. No.
174299.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 (RAUL LAMBINO, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.) and
G.R. No. 174299 (MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.).
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
400

AZCUNA, J .:
"Why, friends, you go to do you know not what."
-- Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. 2.
Article XVII of the Constitution states:
AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered
votes therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
Sec. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of
calling such a convention.
Sec. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
This Article states the procedure for changing the Constitution.
Constitutions have three parts the Constitution of Liberty, which states the fundamental rights of the
people; the Constitution of Government, which establishes the structure of government, its branches and
their operation; and the Constitution of Sovereignty, which provides how the Constitution may be
changed.
Article XVII is the Constitution of Sovereignty.
As a result, the powers therein provided are called constituent powers. So when Congress acts under this
provision, it acts not as a legislature exercising legislative powers. It acts as a constituent body exercising
constituent powers.
The rules, therefore, governing the exercise of legislative powers do not apply, or do not apply strictly, to
the actions taken under Article XVII.
401

Accordingly, since Article XVII states that Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of
the people's right directly to propose amendments to the Constitution through initiative, the act of
Congress pursuant thereto is not strictly a legislative action but partakes of a constituent act.
As a result, Republic Act No. 6735, the act that provides for the exercise of the people of the right to
propose a law or amendments to the Constitution is, with respect to the right to propose amendments to
the Constitution, a constituent measure, not a mere legislative one.
The consequence of this special character of the enactment, insofar as it relates to proposing
amendments to the Constitution, is that the requirements for statutory enactments, such as sufficiency of
standards and the like, do not and should not strictly apply. As long as there is a sufficient and clear intent
to provide for the implementation of the exercise of the right, it should be sustained, as it is simply a
compliance of the mandate placed on Congress by the Constitution.
Seen in this light, the provisions of Republic Act No. 6735 relating to the procedure for proposing
amendments to the Constitution, can and should be upheld, despite shortcomings perhaps in legislative
headings and standards.
For this reason, I concur in the view that Santiago v. Comelec
1
should be re-examined and, after doing
so, that the pronouncement therein regarding the insufficiency or inadequacy of the measure to sustain a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution should be reconsidered in favor of allowing the exercise of
this sovereign right.
And applying the doctrine stated in Senarillos v. Hermosisima,
2
penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in
relation to Article 8 of the Civil Code, that a decision of this Court interpreting a law forms part of the law
interpreted as of the time of its enactment, Republic Act No. 6735 should be deemed sufficient and
adequate from the start.
This next point to address, there being a sufficient law, is whether the petition for initiative herein involved
complies with the requirements of that law as well as those stated in Article XVII of the Constitution.
True it is that ours is a democratic state, as explicitated in the Declaration of Principles, to emphasize
precisely that there are instances recognized and provided for in the Constitution where our people
directly exercise their sovereign powers, new features set forth in this People Power Charter, namely, the
powers of recall, initiative and referendum.
Nevertheless, this democratic nature of our polity is that of a democracy under the rule of law. This
equally important point is emphasized in the very Preamble to the Constitution, which states:
". . . the blessings of . . . democracy under the rule of law . . . ."
Such is the case with respect to the power to initiate changes in the Constitution. The power is subject to
limitations under the Constitution itself, thus: The power could not be exercised for the first five years after
the Constitution took effect and thereafter can only be exercised once every five years; the power only
extends to proposing amendments but not revisions; and the power needs an act of Congress providing
for its implementation, which act is directed and mandated.
The question, therefore, arises whether the proposed changes in the Constitution set forth in the petition
for initiative herein involved are mere amendments or rather are revisions.
Revisions are changes that affect the entire Constitution and not mere parts of it.
402

The reason why revisions are not allowed through direct proposals by the people through initiative is a
practical one, namely, there is no one to draft such extensive changes, since 6.3 million people cannot
conceivably come up with a single extensive document through a direct proposal from each of them.
Someone would have to draft it and that is not authorized as it would not be a direct proposal from the
people. Such indirect proposals can only take the form of proposals from Congress as a Constituent
Assembly under Article XVII, or a Constitutional Convention created under the same provision.
Furthermore, there is a need for such deliberative bodies for revisions because their proceedings and
debates are duly and officially recorded, so that future cases of interpretations can be properly aided by
resort to the record of their proceedings.
Even a cursory reading of the proposed changes contained in the petition for initiative herein involved will
show on its face that the proposed changes constitute a revision of the Constitution. The proposal is to
change the system of government from that which is bicameral-presidential to one that is unicameral-
parliamentary.
While purportedly only Articles VI, VII, and XVIII are involved, the fact is, as the petition and text of the
proposed changes themselves state, every provision of the Constitution will have to be examined to see if
they conform to the nature of a unicameral-parliamentary form of government and changed accordingly if
they do not so conform to it. For example, Article VIII on Judicial Department cannot stand as is, in a
parliamentary system, for under such a system, the Parliament is supreme, and thus the Court's power to
declare its act a grave abuse of discretion and thus void would be an anomaly.
Now, who is to do such examination and who is to do such changes and how should the changes be
worded? The proposed initiative does not say who nor how.
Not only, therefore, is the proposed initiative, on this score, a prohibited revision but it also suffers from
being incomplete and insufficient on its very face.
It, therefore, in that form, cannot pass muster the very limits contained in providing for the power under
the Constitution.
Neither does it comply with Republic Act No. 6735, which states in Section 10 that not more than one
subject shall be proposed as an amendment or amendments to the Constitution. The petition herein
would propose at the very least two subjects a unicameral legislature and a parliamentary form of
government. Again, for this clear and patent violation of the very act that provides for the exercise of the
power, the proposed initiative cannot lie.
This does not mean, however, that all is lost for petitioners.
For the proposed changes can be separated and are, in my view, separable in nature a unicameral
legislature is one; a parliamentary form of government is another. The first is a mere amendment and
contains only one subject matter. The second is clearly a revision that affects every article and every
provision in the Constitution to an extent not even the proponents could at present fully articulate.
Petitioners Lambino, et al. thus go about proposing changes the nature and extent of which they do not
as yet know exactly what.
The proposal, therefore, contained in the petition for initiative, regarding a change in the legislature from a
bicameral or two-chamber body to that of a unicameral or one-chamber body, is sustainable. The text of
the changes needed to carry it out are perfunctory and ministerial in nature. Once it is limited to this
proposal, the changes are simply one of deletion and insertions, the wordings of which are practically
automatic and non-discretionary.
As an example, I attach to this opinion an Appendix "A" showing how the Constitution would read if we
were to change Congress from one consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives to one
403

consisting only of the House of Representatives. It only affects Article VI on the Legislative Department,
some provisions on Article VII on the Executive Department, as well as Article XI on the Accountability of
Public Officers, and Article XVIII on Transitory Provisions. These are mere amendments, substantial ones
indeed but still only amendments, and they address only one subject matter.
Such proposal, moreover, complies with the intention and rationale behind the present initiative, which is
to provide for simplicity and economy in government and reduce the stalemates that often prevent
needed legislation.
For the nonce, therefore, I vote to DISMISS the petition, without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate
initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution to change Congress into a unicameral body. This is
not say that I favor such a change. Rather, such a proposal would come within the purview of an initiative
allowed under Article XVII of the Constitution and its implementing Republic Act, and should, therefore,
be submitted to our people in a plebiscite for them to decide in their sovereign capacity. After all is said
and done, this is what democracy under the rule of law is about.
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and
Commissioners RESSURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., ROMEO A.
BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and NICODEMO T. FERRER, and John Doe and Peter Doe
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
"It is a Constitution we are expounding"
1

Chief Justice John Marshall
DISSENTING OPINION
PUNO, J .:
The petition at bar is not a fight over molehills. At the crux of the controversy is the critical understanding
of thefirst and foremost of our constitutional principles "the Philippines is a democratic and republican
State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them."
2
Constitutionalism dictates that this creed must be respected with deeds; our belief in its validity
must be backed by behavior.
404

This is a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus to set aside the resolution of respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by
petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado in their own behalf and together with some 6.3
million registered voters who have affixed their signatures thereon, and praying for the issuance of a
writ of mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to set the date of the plebiscite for the ratification of
the proposed amendments to the Constitution in accordance with Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
First, a flashback of the proceedings of yesteryears. In 1996, the Movement for People's Initiative
sought to exercise the sovereign people's power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through initiative under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Its founding member, Atty. Jesus
S. Delfin, filed with the COMELEC on December 6, 1996, a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift
Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" (Delfin Petition). It proposed to amend Sections 4
and 7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII, and Section 8 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution by deleting
the provisions on the term limits for all elective officials.
The Delfin Petition stated that the Petition for Initiative would first be submitted to the people and would
be formally filed with the COMELEC after it is signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number
of registered voters in the country. It thus sought the assistance of the COMELEC in gathering the
required signatures by fixing the dates and time therefor and setting up signature stations on the
assigned dates and time. The petition prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order (1) fixing the dates
and time for signature gathering all over the country; (2) causing the publication of said Order and the
petition for initiative in newspapers of general and local circulation; and, (3) instructing the municipal
election registrars in all the regions of the Philippines to assist petitioner and the volunteers in
establishing signing stations on the dates and time designated for the purpose.
The COMELEC conducted a hearing on the Delfin Petition.
On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla and Maria Isabel
Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition before this Court, seeking to restrain the COMELEC from
further considering the Delfin Petition. They impleaded as respondents the COMELEC, Delfin, and
Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa (Pedrosas) in their capacities as founding members of the People's
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) which was likewise engaged in signature
gathering to support an initiative to amend the Constitution. They argued that the constitutional provision
on people's initiative may only be implemented by a law passed by Congress; that no such law has yet
been enacted by Congress; that Republic Act No. 6735 relied upon by Delfin does not cover the initiative
to amend the Constitution; and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, the implementing rules adopted by
the COMELEC on the conduct of initiative, was ultra vires insofar as the initiative to amend the
Constitution was concerned. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 127325, entitled Santiago v.
Commission on Elections.
3

Pending resolution of the case, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the COMELEC
from proceeding with the Delfin Petition and the Pedrosas from conducting a signature drive for people's
initiative to amend the Constitution.
On March 19, 1997, the Court rendered its decision on the petition for prohibition. The Court ruled
that the constitutional provision granting the people the power to directly amend the Constitution through
initiative is not self-executory. An enabling law is necessary to implement the exercise of the people's
right. Examining the provisions of R.A. 6735, a majority of eight (8) members of the Court held that
said law was "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as
initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned,"
4
and thus voided portions of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300 prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution. It was also held that even if R.A. 6735 sufficiently covered the initiative to amend the
Constitution and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was valid, theDelfin Petition should still be dismissed
as it was not the proper initiatory pleading contemplated by law. Under Section 2, Article VII of the
405

1987 Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. 6735, a petition for initiative on the Constitution must be
signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters therein. The
Delfin Petition did not contain signatures of the required number of voters. The decision stated:
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution
until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the
system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should
no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress
should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the
implementation of the right of the people under that system.
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for
subordinate legislation;
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the
Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition
(UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
5

Eight (8) members of the Court, namely, then Associate Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (ponente), Chief
Justice Andres R. Narvasa, and Associate Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue
N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P. Torres, fully concurred in
the majority opinion.
While all the members of the Court who participated in the deliberation
6
agreed that the Delfin Petition
should be dismissed for lack of the required signatures, five (5) members, namely, Associate Justices
Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco and Artemio V.
Panganiban, held that R.A. 6735 was sufficient and adequate to implement the people's right to amend
the Constitution through initiative, and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 validly provided the details for
the actual exercise of such right. Justice Jose C. Vitug, on the other hand, opined that the Court should
confine itself to resolving the issue of whether the Delfin Petition sufficiently complied with the
requirements of the law on initiative, and there was no need to rule on the adequacy of R.A. 6735.
The COMELEC, Delfin and the Pedrosas filed separate motions for reconsideration of the Court's
decision.
406

After deliberating on the motions for reconsideration, six (6)
7
of the eight (8) majority members
maintained their position that R.A. 6735 was inadequate to implement the provision on the initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. Justice Torres filed an inhibition, while Justice Hermosisima submitted a
Separate Opinion adopting the position of the minority that R.A. 6735 sufficiently covers the initiative to
amend the Constitution. Hence, of the thirteen (13) members of the Court who participated in the
deliberation, six (6) members, namely, Chief Justice Narvasa and Associate Justices Regalado, Davide,
Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan voted to deny the motions for lack of merit; and six (6) members,
namely, Associate Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to
grant the same. Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication.
The motions for reconsideration were therefore denied for lack of sufficient votes to modify or reverse the
decision of March 19, 1997.
8

On June 23, 1997, PIRMA filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Propose Amendments to
the Constitution (PIRMA Petition). The PIRMA Petition was supported by around five (5) million
signatures in compliance with R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, and prayed that the
COMELEC, among others: (1) cause the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in
newspapers of general and local circulation; (2) order all election officers to verify the signatures collected
in support of the petition and submit these to the Commission; and (3) set the holding of a plebiscite
where the following proposition would be submitted to the people for ratification:
Do you approve amendments to the 1987 Constitution giving the President the chance to be
reelected for another term, similarly with the Vice-President, so that both the highest officials of
the land can serve for two consecutive terms of six years each, and also to lift the term limits for
all other elective government officials, thus giving Filipino voters the freedom of choice, amending
for that purpose, Section 4 of Article VII, Sections 4 and 7 of Article VI and Section 8 of Article X,
respectively?
The COMELEC dismissed the PIRMA Petition in view of the permanent restraining order issued by the
Court in Santiago v. COMELEC.
PIRMA filed with this Court a Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari seeking to set aside the COMELEC
Resolution dismissing its petition for initiative. PIRMA argued that the Court's decision on the Delfin
Petition did not bar the COMELEC from acting on the PIRMA Petition as said ruling was not definitive
based on the deadlocked voting on the motions for reconsideration, and because there was no identity of
parties and subject matter between the two petitions. PIRMA also urged the Court to reexamine its ruling
in Santiago v. COMELEC.
The Court dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari in its resolution dated September 23,
1997. It explained:
that it only complied with the dispositions in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No. 127325
The Court next considered the question of whether there was need to resolve the second issue
posed by the petitioners, namely, that the Court re-examine its ruling as regards R.A. 6735. On
this issue, the Chief Justice and six (6) other members of the Court, namely, Regalado, Davide,
Romero, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Torres, JJ., voted that there was no need to take it up. Vitug, J.,
agreed that there was no need for re-examination of said second issue since the case at bar is
not the proper vehicle for that purpose. Five (5) other members of the Court, namely, Melo, Puno,
Francisco, Hermosisima, and Panganiban, JJ., opined that there was a need for such a re-
examination x x x x
9

407

In their Separate Opinions, Justice (later Chief Justice) Davide and Justice Bellosillo stated that the
PIRMA petition was dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
Now, almost a decade later, another group, Sigaw ng Bayan, seeks to utilize anew the system of
initiative to amend the Constitution, this time to change the form of government from bicameral-
presidential to unicameral-parliamentary system.
Let us look at the facts of the petition at bar with clear eyes.
On February 15, 2006, Sigaw ng Bayan, in coordination with Union of Local Authorities of the
Philippines(ULAP), embarked on a nationwide drive to gather signatures to support the move to adopt the
parliamentary form of government in the country through charter change. They proposed to amend the
Constitution as follows:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral
Parliament which shall be composed of as many members as may be provided by law, to
be apportioned among the provinces, representative districts, and cities in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, with at least three hundred thousand
inhabitants per district, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. Each district
shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent territory, and
each province must have at least one member.
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-five years old on the day of the election, a resident of his district for at least one
year prior thereto, and shall be elected by the qualified voters of his district for a term of
five years without limitation as to the number thereof, except those under the party-list
system which shall be provided for by law and whose number shall be equal to twenty
per centum of the total membership coming from the parliamentary districts.
B. Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution are hereby amended to read,
as follows:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive
power shall be exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The
Prime Minister shall be elected by a majority of all the Members of Parliament from
among themselves. He shall be responsible to the Parliament for the program of
government.
"Transitory Provisions," which shall read, as follows:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration
of their term at noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their
powers under the 1987 Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the
members of the interim parliament.
(2) In case of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of the
incumbent President, the incumbent Vice President shall succeed as President. In case
of death, permanent disability, resignation or removal from office of both the incumbent
408

President and Vice President, the interim Prime Minister shall assume all the powers and
responsibilities of Prime Minister under Article VII as amended.
Section 2. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President,
with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which shall hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other
Sections of Article VI are hereby retained and renumbered sequentially as Section 2, ad
seriatim up to 26, unless they are inconsistent with the Parliamentary system of
government, in which case, they shall be amended to conform with a unicameral
parliamentary form of government; provided, however, that any and all references therein
to "Congress," "Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be
changed to read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of
Congress," "Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be
changed to read as "Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and/or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 3. Upon the expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President,
with the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
are hereby amended and Sections 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 which are hereby deleted, all
other Sections of Article VII shall be retained and renumbered sequentially as Section
2, ad seriatim up to 14, unless they shall be inconsistent with Section 1 hereof, in which
case they shall be deemed amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary
System of government; provided, however, that any all references therein to "Congress,"
"Senate," "House of Representatives" and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to
read "Parliament;" that any and all references therein to "Member(s) of Congress,"
"Senator(s)" or "Member(s) of the House of Representatives" shall be changed to read as
"Member(s) of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President" and or "Acting
President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister."
Section 4. (1) There shall exist, upon the ratification of these amendments, an interim
Parliament which shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have
been elected and shall have qualified. It shall be composed of the incumbent Members of
the Senate and the House of Representatives and the incumbent Members of the
Cabinet who are heads of executive departments.
(2) The incumbent Vice President shall automatically be a Member of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. He shall also be a member of the cabinet and shall
head a ministry. He shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over
its sessions for the election of the interim Prime Minister and until the Speaker shall have
been elected by a majority vote of all the members of the interim Parliament from among
themselves.
(3) Senators whose term of office ends in 2010 shall be Members of Parliament until
noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010.
(4) Within forty-five days from ratification of these amendments, the interim Parliament
shall convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution consistent with
the principles of local autonomy, decentralization and a strong bureaucracy.
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from
among the members of the interim Parliament, an interim Prime Minister, who shall be
elected by a majority vote of the members thereof. The interim Prime Minister shall
oversee the various ministries and shall perform such powers and responsibilities as may
be delegated to him by the incumbent President."
409

(2) The interim Parliament shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament,
which shall be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local
government officials. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and
perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the
expiration of the term of the incumbent President and Vice President.
10

Sigaw ng Bayan prepared signature sheets, on the upper portions of which were written the abstract of
the proposed amendments, to wit:
Abstract: Do you approve of the amendment of Articles VI and VII of the 1987 Constitution,
changing the form of government from the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-
parliamentary system of government, in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity and
economy in government; and providing an Article XVIII as Transitory Provisions for the orderly
shift from one system to another?
The signature sheets were distributed nationwide to affiliated non-government organizations and
volunteers of Sigaw ng Bayan, as well as to the local officials. Copies of the draft petition for initiative
containing the proposition were also circulated to the local officials and multi-sectoral groups.
Sigaw ng Bayan alleged that it also held barangay assemblies which culminated on March 24, 25 and
26, 2006, to inform the people and explain to them the proposed amendments to the Constitution.
Thereafter, they circulated the signature sheets for signing.
The signature sheets were then submitted to the local election officers for verification based on the
voters' registration record. Upon completion of the verification process, the respective local election
officers issued certifications to attest that the signature sheets have been verified. The verified
signature sheets were subsequently transmitted to the office of Sigaw ng Bayan for the counting of the
signatures.
On August 25, 2006, herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado filed with the
COMELEC a Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution entitled "In the Matter of Proposing
Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a People's Initiative: A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential
to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI and VII; and Providing Transitory
Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the Parliamentary System." They filed an
Amended Petition on August 30, 2006 to reflect the text of the proposed amendment that was actually
presented to the people. They alleged that they were filing the petition in their own behalf and together
with some 6.3 million registered voters who have affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached
thereto. Petitioners appended to the petition signature sheets bearing the signatures of registered voters
which they claimed to have been verified by the respective city or municipal election officers, and
allegedly constituting at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters in the country, wherein each
legislative district is represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein.
As basis for the filing of their petition for initiative, petitioners averred that Section 5 (b) and (c),
together with Section 7 of R.A. 6735, provide sufficient enabling details for the people's exercise
of the power. Hence, petitioners prayed that the COMELEC issue an Order:
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of
Certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the Filipino people to
express their sovereign will on the proposition.
410

Several groups filed with the COMELEC their respective oppositions to the petition for initiative,
among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T.
Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority
Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Senators Sergio Osmea III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim,
Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada; Representatives Loretta Ann P.
Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno,
Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino
Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas; Attys. Pete
Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador,
and Randall C. Tabayoyong.
On August 31, 2006, the COMELEC denied due course to the Petition for Initiative. It cited this Court's
ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC
11
permanently enjoining the Commission from entertaining or taking
cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have
been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
Forthwith, petitioners filed with this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus praying that the
Court set aside the August 31, 2006 resolution of the COMELEC, direct respondent COMELEC to comply
with Section 4, Article XVII of the Constitution, and set the date of the plebiscite. They state the following
grounds in support of the petition:
I.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
take cognizance of, and to give due course to the petition for initiative, because the
cited Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 cannot be considered the majority opinion of the Supreme
Court en banc, considering that upon its reconsideration and final voting on 10 June 1997, no
majority vote was secured to declare Republic Act No. 6735 as inadequate, incomplete and
insufficient in standard.
II.
The 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, Republic Act No. 8189 and existing appropriation
of the COMELEC provide for sufficient details and authority for the exercise of people's initiative,
thus, existing laws taken together are adequate and complete.
III.
The Honorable public respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
take cognizance of, and in refusing to give due course to the petition for initiative, thereby
violating an express constitutional mandate and disregarding and contravening the will of the
people.
A.
Assuming in arguendo that there is no enabling law, respondent COMELEC cannot
ignore the will of the sovereign people and must accordingly act on the petition for
initiative.
1.
411

The framers of the Constitution intended to give the people the power to propose
amendments and the people themselves are now giving vibrant life to this
constitutional provision.
2.
Prior to the questioned Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997, the right of the people
to exercise the sovereign power of initiative and recall has been invariably
upheld.
3.
The exercise of the initiative to propose amendments is a political question which
shall be determined solely by the sovereign people.
4.
By signing the signature sheets attached to the petition for initiative duly verified
by the election officers, the people have chosen to perform this sacred exercise
of their sovereign power.
B.
The Santiago ruling of 19 March 1997 is not applicable to the instant petition for initiative
filed by the petitioners.
C.
The permanent injunction issued in Santiago vs. COMELEC only applies to the Delfin
petition.
1.
It is the dispositive portion of the decision and not other statements in the body of
the decision that governs the rights in controversy.
IV.
The Honorable public respondent failed or neglected to act or perform a duty
mandated by law.
A.
The ministerial duty of the COMELEC is to set the initiative for
plebiscite.
12

The oppositors-intervenors, ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon
III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.;
Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party,
Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, and Dr.
Reginald Pamugas; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmea III,
Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim, Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada;
412

Representatives Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel; and
Attys. Pete Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L.
Salvador, and Randall C. Tabayoyong moved to intervene in this case and filed their respective
Oppositions/Comments-in-Intervention.
The Philippine Constitution Association, Conrado F. Estrella, Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan
M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas, and Amado Gat Inciong; the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines Cebu City and Cebu Province Chapters; former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and
Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino; and the Senate of the Philippines, represented by Senate President Manuel
Villar, Jr., also filed their respective motions for intervention and Comments-in-Intervention.
The Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Sulongbayan Movement Foundation, Inc., Ronald L.
Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya, Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization,
and Victorino F. Balais likewise moved to intervene and submitted to the Court a Petition-in-Intervention.
All interventions and oppositions were granted by the Court.
The oppositors-intervenors essentially submit that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in denying due course to the petition for initiative as it merely followed this Court's ruling
in Santiago v. COMELECas affirmed in the case of PIRMA v. COMELEC, based on the principle of stare
decisis; that there is no sufficient law providing for the authority and the details for the exercise of people's
initiative to amend the Constitution; that the proposed changes to the Constitution are actually revisions,
not mere amendments; that the petition for initiative does not meet the required number of signatories
under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; that it was not shown that the people have been
informed of the proposed amendments as there was disparity between the proposal presented to them
and the proposed amendments attached to the petition for initiative, if indeed there was; that the
verification process was done ex parte, thus rendering dubious the signatures attached to the petition for
initiative; and that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado have no legal capacity to represent the signatories
in the petition for initiative.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in compliance with the Court's resolution of September 5,
2006, filed its Comment to the petition. Affirming the position of the petitioners, the OSG prayed that the
Court grant the petition at bar and render judgment: (1) declaring R.A. 6735 as adequate to cover or as
reasonably sufficient to implement the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and as
having provided sufficient standards for subordinate legislation; (2) declaring as valid the provisions of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; (3) setting
aside the assailed resolution of the COMELEC for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, (4) directing the COMELEC to grant the petition for
initiative and set the corresponding plebiscite pursuant to R.A. 6735, COMELEC Resolution No. 2300,
and other pertinent election laws and regulations.
The COMELEC filed its own Comment stating that its resolution denying the petition for initiative is not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in Santiago v.
COMELEC which declared that R.A. 6735 does not adequately implement the constitutional provision on
initiative to amend the Constitution. It invoked the permanent injunction issued by the Court against the
COMELEC from taking cognizance of petitions for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
valid enabling law shall have been passed by Congress. It asserted that the permanent injunction covers
not only the Delfin Petition, but also all other petitions involving constitutional initiatives.
On September 26, 2006, the Court heard the case. The parties were required to argue on the following
issues:
13

1. Whether petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition in
behalf of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend the
Constitution.
413

2. Whether the Petitions for Initiative filed before the Commission on Elections complied with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
3. Whether the Court's decision in Santiago v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997)
bars the present petition.
4. Whether the Court should re-examine the ruling in Santiago v. COMELEC that there is no
sufficient law implementing or authorizing the exercise of people's initiative to amend the
Constitution.
5. Assuming R.A. 6735 is sufficient, whether the Petitions for Initiative filed with the COMELEC
have complied with its provisions.
5.1 Whether the said petitions are sufficient in form and substance.
5.2 Whether the proposed changes embrace more than one subject matter.
6. Whether the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision of the Constitution.
6.1 Whether the proposed changes are the proper subject of an initiative.
7. Whether the exercise of an initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is a political
question to be determined solely by the sovereign people.
8. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
Petitions for Initiative filed before it.
With humility, I offer the following views to these issues as profiled:
I
Petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are proper parties to file the present Petition in behalf
of the more than six million voters who allegedly signed the proposal to amend the
Constitution.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that petitioners Lambino and Aumentado are not the proper parties to file
the instant petition as they were not authorized by the signatories in the petition for initiative.
The argument deserves scant attention. The Constitution requires that the petition for initiative should be
filed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of all registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein. The petition for initiative
filed by Lambino and Aumentado before the COMELEC was accompanied by voluminous signature
sheets which prima facie show the intent of the signatories to support the filing of said petition. Stated
above their signatures in the signature sheets is the following:
x x x My signature herein which shall form part of the petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution signifies my support for the filing thereof.
14

There is thus no need for the more than six (6) million signatories to execute separate documents to
authorize petitioners to file the petition for initiative in their behalf.
414

Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and Aumentado to file the petition for
certiorari and mandamus before this Court. Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides who
may file a petition for certiorari and mandamus. Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 65 read:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court x x x x.
Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal, board or officer may file a
petition for certiorari or mandamus before the appropriate court. Certainly, Lambino and Aumentado, as
among the proponents of the petition for initiative dismissed by the COMELEC, have the standing to file
the petition at bar.
II
The doctrine of stare decisis does not bar the reexamination of Santiago.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the
calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts.
15
Blackstone observed that at the beginning of
the 18
th
century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come
again in litigation."
16
As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would
not be followed if it were "plainly unreasonable;" (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting
decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for
the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."
17

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution.
18
According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary
discretion in the courts."
19
Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into
the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected."
20
Prof. Consovoy well noted that
Hamilton and Madison "disagreeabout the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge
to abandon a precedent."
21
He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between the
concreteness required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal
conflict that the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."
22

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare
decisisdeveloped its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by
legal scholars.
23
The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply
the decisions of thehigher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known
as horizontal stare decisis requires thathigh courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy
correctly observes that vertical stare decisishas been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare
decisis, has been viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command.
24
Indeed, stare decisis is not
one of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.
It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis constitutional stare
decisis andstatutory stare decisis.
25
Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution whilestatutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is
415

important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional
litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still
holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and
inexorable command. The rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed
from, is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a
question once decided."
26
In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurteropined: "the ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it."
27
In
contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. AsJustice
Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of
decision by other federal judges and agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the
judicial gloss had been drafted by the Congress itself."
28
This stance reflects both respect for Congress'
role and the need to preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons,
29
viz: (1) it legitimizes judicial
institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts
refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where
30
(1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and
unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it
leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist
judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing
with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed
its decisions in 192 cases.
31
The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of
Education
32
which junkedPlessy v. Ferguson's
33
"separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as
constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the
U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself
from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains
of inequality. In the Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare
decisis rule in order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,
34
we
reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly,
in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,
35
we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for
reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process.
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed
on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability,
reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the
balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its
merits.
36

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional
litigations isPlanned Parenthood v. Casey.
37
It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1)
determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2)
consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related
principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an
abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as
to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.
Following these guidelines, I submit that the stare decisis rule should not bar the reexamination of
Santiago. On the factor of intolerability, the six (6) justices in Santiago held R.A. 6735 to be
insufficient as it provided no standard to guide COMELEC in issuing its implementing rules.
The Santiago ruling that R.A. 6735 is insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional is
an intolerable aberration, the only one of its kind in our planet. It improperly assails the ability of
legislators to write laws. It usurps the exclusive right of legislators to determine how far laws implementing
416

constitutional mandates should be crafted. It is elementary that courts cannot dictate on Congress the
style of writing good laws, anymore than Congress can tell courts how to write literate decisions. The
doctrine of separation of powers forbids this Court to invade the exclusive lawmaking domain of Congress
for courts can construe laws but cannot construct them. The end result of the ruling of the six (6)
justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient is intolerable for it rendered lifeless the sovereign right of the people
to amend the Constitution via an initiative.
On the factor of reliance, the ruling of the six (6) justices in Santiago did not induce any expectation
from the people. On the contrary, the ruling smothered the hope of the people that they could amend the
Constitution by direct action. Moreover, reliance is a non-factor in the case at bar for it is more
appropriate to consider in decisions involving contracts where private rights are adjudicated. The case at
bar involves no private rights but the sovereignty of the people.
On the factor of changes in law and in facts, certain realities on ground cannot be blinked away. The
urgent need to adjust certain provisions of the 1987 Constitution to enable the country to compete in the
new millennium is given. The only point of contention is the mode to effect the change - - - whether
through constituent assembly, constitutional convention or people's initiative. Petitioners claim that they
have gathered over six (6) million registered voters who want to amend the Constitution through people's
initiative and that their signatures have been verified by registrars of the COMELEC. The six (6) justices
who ruled that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement the direct right of the people to amend the
Constitution through an initiative cannot waylay the will of 6.3 million people who are the bearers
of our sovereignty and from whom all government authority emanates. New developments in our
internal and external social, economic, and political settings demand the reexamination of
the Santiago case. The stare decisis rule is no reason for this Court to allow the people to step into
the future with a blindfold.
III
A reexamination of R.A. 6735 will show that it is sufficient to implement the people's
initiative.
Let us reexamine the validity of the view of the six (6) justices that R.A. 6735 is insufficient to implement
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution allowing amendments to the Constitution to be directly
proposed by the people through initiative.
When laws are challenged as unconstitutional, courts are counseled to give life to the intent of legislators.
In enacting R.A. 6735, it is daylight luminous that Congress intended the said law to implement the right
of the people, thru initiative, to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action. This all-
important intent is palpable from the following:
First. The text of R.A. 6735 is replete with references to the right of the people to initiate changes to the
Constitution:
The policy statement declares:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,
laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed. (emphasis supplied)
It defines "initiative" as "the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to
propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose," and "plebiscite" as "the
electoral process by which an initiative on the Constitution is approved or rejected by the people."
417

It provides the requirements for a petition for initiative to amend the Constitution, viz:
(1) That "(a) petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per
centum (12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters
therein;"
38
and
(2) That "(i)nitiative on the Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution and only once every five (5) years thereafter."
39

It fixes the effectivity date of the amendment under Section 9(b) which provides that "(t)he proposition in
an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become
effective as to the day of the plebiscite."
Second. The legislative history of R.A. 6735 also reveals the clear intent of the lawmakers to use it as the
instrument to implement people's initiative. No less than former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
the ponentein Santiago, concedes:
40

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate
Bill No. 17 x x x x The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and
House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the
Senate and by the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
Third. The sponsorship speeches by the authors of R.A. 6735 similarly demonstrate beyond doubt this
intent. In his sponsorship remarks, the late Senator Raul Roco (then a Member of the House of
Representatives) emphasized the intent to make initiative as a mode whereby the people can propose
amendments to the Constitution. We quote his relevant remarks:
41

SPONSORSHIP REMAKRS OF REP. ROCO
MR. ROCO. Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the committee, we wish to speak in support of
House Bill No. 497, entitled: INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT OF 1987, which later on may
be called Initiative and Referendum Act of 1989.
As a background, we want to point out the constitutional basis of this particular bill. The grant of
plenary legislative power upon the Philippine Congress by the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, Mr. Speaker, was based on the principle that any power deemed to be legislative
by usage and tradition is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress unless the Organic
Act has lodged it elsewhere. This was a citation from Vera vs. Avelino (1946).
The presidential system introduced by the 1935 Constitution saw the application of the principle
of separation of powers. While under the parliamentary system of the 1973 Constitution the
principle remained applicable, Amendment 6 or the 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution
ensured presidential dominance over the Batasang Pambansa.
Our constitutional history saw the shifting and sharing of legislative power between the legislature
and the executive.
Transcending such changes in the exercise of legislative power is the declaration in the Philippine
Constitution that he Philippines is a Republican State where sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them.
418

In a Republic, Mr. Speaker, the power to govern is vested in its citizens participating through the
right of suffrage and indicating thereby their choice of lawmakers.
Under the 1987 Constitution, lawmaking power is still preserved in Congress. However, to
institutionalize direct action of the people as exemplified in the 1986 Revolution, there is a
practical recognition of what we refer to as people's sovereign power. This is the recognition of a
system of initiative and referendum.
Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, and I quote:
The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the
people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, under the 1987 Constitution, Congress does not have plenary
powers. There is a reserved legislative power given to the people expressly.
Section 32, the implementing provision of the same article of the Constitution provides, and I
quote:
The Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and
referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and
enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or
local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per
centum of the total number of registered voters, or which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters thereof.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, in Section 1 of Article VI which describes legislative power, there are
reserved powers given to the people. In Section 32, we are specifically told to pass at the soonest
possible time a bill on referendum and initiative. We are specifically mandated to share the
legislative powers of Congress with the people.
Of course, another applicable provision in the Constitution is Section 2, Article XVII, Mr. Speaker.
Under the provision on amending the Constitution, the section reads, and I quote:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years thereafter.
We in Congress therefore, Mr. Speaker, are charged with the duty to implement the exercise by
the people of the right of initiative and referendum.
House Bill No. 21505, as reported out by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms last
December 14, 1988, Mr. Speaker, is the response to such a constitutional duty.
Mr. Speaker, if only to allay apprehensions, allow me to show where initiative and referendum
under Philippine law has occurred.
Mr. Speaker, the system of initiative and referendum is not new. In a very limited extent, the
system is provided for in our Local Government Code today. On initiative, for instance, Section 99
419

of the said code vests in the barangay assembly the power to initiate legislative processes, to
hold plebiscites and to hear reports of the sangguniang barangay. There are variations of
initiative and referendum. The barangay assembly is composed of all persons who have been
actual residents of the barangay for at least six months, who are at least 15 years of age and
citizens of the Philippines. The holding of barangay plebiscites and referendum is also provided in
Sections 100 and 101 of the same Code.
Mr. Speaker, for brevity I will not read the pertinent quotations but will just submit the same to the
Secretary to be incorporated as part of my speech.
To continue, Mr. Speaker these same principles are extensively applied by the Local Government
Code as it is now mandated by the 1987 Constitution.
In other jurisdictions, Mr. Speaker, we have ample examples of initiative and referendum similar
to what is now contained in House Bill No. 21505. As in the 1987 Constitutions and House Bill
No. 21505, the various constitutions of the states in the United States recognize the right of
registered voters to initiate the enactment of any statute or to reject any existing law or parts
thereof in a referendum. These states are Alaska, Alabama, Montana, Massachusetts, Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, and practically all other states.
In certain American states, the kind of laws to which initiative and referendum applies is also
without ay limitation, except for emergency measures, which is likewise incorporated in Section
7(b) of House Bill No. 21505.
The procedure provided by the House bill from the filing of the petition, the requirement of a
certain percentage of supporters to present a proposition to submission to electors is
substantially similar to those of many American laws. Mr. Speaker, those among us who may
have been in the United States, particularly in California, during election time or last November
during the election would have noticed different propositions posted in the city walls. They were
propositions submitted by the people for incorporation during the voting. These were in the nature
of initiative, Mr. Speaker.
Although an infant then in Philippine political structure, initiative and referendum is a tried and
tested system in other jurisdictions, and House Bill No. 21505 through the various consolidated
bills is patterned after American experience in a great respect.
What does the bill essentially say, Mr. Speaker? Allow me to try to bring our colleagues slowly
through the bill. The bill has basically only 12 sections. The constitutional Commissioners, Mr.
Speaker, saw this system of initiative and referendum as an instrument which can be used should
the legislature show itself indifferent to the needs of the people. That is why, Mr. Speaker, it may
be timely, since we seem to be amply criticized, as regards our responsiveness, to pass this bill
on referendum and initiative now. While indifference would not be an appropriate term to use at
this time, and surely it is not the case although we are so criticized, one must note that it is a felt
necessity of our times that laws need to be proposed and adopted at the soonest possible time to
spur economic development, safeguard individual rights and liberties, and share governmental
power with the people.
With the legislative powers of the President gone, we alone, together with the Senators when
they are minded to agree with us, are left with the burden of enacting the needed legislation.
Let me now bring our colleagues, Mr. Speaker, to the process advocated by the bill.
420

First, initiative and referendum, Mr. Speaker, is defined. Initiative essentially is what the term
connotes. It means that the people, on their own political judgment, submit fore the consideration
and voting of the general electorate a bill or a piece of legislation.
Under House Bill No. 21505, there are three kinds of initiative. One is an initiative to amend the
Constitution. This can occur once every five years. Another is an initiative to amend statutes that
we may have approved. Had this bill been an existing law, Mr. Speaker, it is most likely that an
overwhelming majority of the barangays in the Philippines would have approved by initiative the
matter of direct voting.
The third mode of initiative, Mr. Speaker, refers to a petition proposing to enact regional,
provincial, city, municipal or barangay laws or ordinances. It comes from the people and it must
be submitted directly to the electorate. The bill gives a definite procedure and allows the
COMELEC to define rules and regulations to give teeth to the power of initiative.
On the other hand, referendum, Mr. Speaker, is the power of the people to approve or reject
something that Congress has already approved.
For instance, Mr. Speaker, when we divide the municipalities or the barangays into two or three,
we must first get the consent of the people affected through plebiscite or referendum.
Referendum is a mode of plebiscite, Mr. Speaker. However, referendum can also be petitioned by
the people if, for instance, they do not life the bill on direct elections and it is approved
subsequently by the Senate. If this bill had already become a law, then the people could petition
that a referendum be conducted so that the acts of Congress can be appropriately approved or
rebuffed.
The initial stage, Mr. Speaker, is what we call the petition. As envisioned in the bill, the initiative
comes from the people, from registered voters of the country, by presenting a proposition so that
the people can then submit a petition, which is a piece of paper that contains the proposition. The
proposition in the example I have been citing is whether there should be direct elections during
the barangay elections. So the petition must be filed in the appropriate agency and the
proposition must be clear stated. It can be tedious but that is how an effort to have direct
democracy operates.
Section 4 of the bill gives requirements, Mr. Speaker. It will not be all that easy to have
referendum or initiative petitioned by the people. Under Section 4 of the committee report, we are
given certain limitations. For instance, to exercise the power of initiative or referendum, at least
10 percent of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is
represented by at least 3 percent of the registered voters thereof, shall sign a petition. These
numbers, Mr. Speaker, are not taken from the air. They are mandated by the Constitution. There
must be a requirement of 10 percent for ordinary laws and 3 percent representing all districts. The
same requirement is mutatis mutandis or appropriately modified and applied to the different
sections. So if it is, for instance, a petition on initiative or referendum for a barangay, there is a 10
percent or a certain number required of the voters of the barangay. If it is for a district, there is
also a certain number required of all towns of the district that must seek the petition. If it is for a
province then again a certain percentage of the provincial electors is required. All these are
based with reference to the constitutional mandate.
The conduct of the initiative and referendum shall be supervised and shall be upon the call of the
Commission on Elections. However, within a period of 30 days from receipt of the petition, the
COMELEC shall determine the sufficiency of the petition, publish the same and set the date of
the referendum which shall not be earlier than 45 days but not later than 90 days from the
determination by the commission of the sufficiency of the petition. Why is this so, Mr. Speaker?
421

The petition must first be determined by the commission as to its sufficiency because our
Constitution requires that no bill can be approved unless it contains one subject matter. It is
conceivable that in the fervor of an initiative or referendum, Mr. Speaker, there may be more than
two topics sought to be approved and that cannot be allowed. In fact, that is one of the
prohibitions under this referendum and initiative bill. When a matter under initiative or referendum
is approved by the required number of votes, Mr. Speaker, it shall become effective 15 days
following the completion of its publication in the Official Gazette. Effectively then, Mr. Speaker, all
the bill seeks to do is to enlarge and recognize the legislative powers of the Filipino people.
Mr. Speaker, I think this Congress, particularly this House, cannot ignore or cannot be insensitive
to the call for initiative and referendum. We should have done it in 1987 but that is past. Maybe
we should have done it in 1988 but that too had already passed, but it is only February 1989, Mr.
Speaker, and we have enough time this year at least to respond to the need of our people to
participate directly in the work of legislation.
For these reasons, Mr. Speaker, we urge and implore our colleagues to approve House Bill No.
21505 as incorporated in Committee Report No. 423 of the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms.
In closing, Mr. Speaker, I also request that the prepared text of my speech, together with the
footnotes since they contain many references to statutory history and foreign jurisdiction, be
reproduced as part of the Record for future purposes.
Equally unequivocal on the intent of R.A. 6735 is the sponsorship speech of former
Representative Salvador Escudero III, viz:
42

SPONSORSHIP REMARKS OF REP. ESCUDERO
MR. ESCUDERO. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues: Events in recent years highlighted the need to heed the
clamor of the people for a truly popular democracy. One recalls the impatience of those who
actively participated in the parliament of the streets, some of whom are now distinguished
Members of this Chamber. A substantial segment of the population feel increasingly that under
the system, the people have the form but not the reality or substance of democracy because of
the increasingly elitist approach of their chosen Representatives to many questions vitally
affecting their lives. There have been complaints, not altogether unfounded, that many candidates
easily forge their campaign promises to the people once elected to office. The 1986 Constitutional
Commission deemed it wise and proper to provide for a means whereby the people can exercise
the reserve power to legislate or propose amendments to the Constitution directly in case their
chose Representatives fail to live up to their expectations. That reserve power known as initiative
is explicitly recognized in three articles and four sections of the 1987 Constitution, namely: Article
VI Section 1; the same article, Section 312; Article X, Section 3; and Article XVII, Section 2. May I
request that he explicit provisions of these three articles and four sections be made part of my
sponsorship speech, Mr. Speaker.
These constitutional provisions are, however, not self-executory. There is a need for an
implementing law that will give meaning and substance to the process of initiative and
referendum which are considered valuable adjuncts to representative democracy. It is needless
to state that this bill when enacted into law will probably open the door to strong competition of
the people, like pressure groups, vested interests, farmers' group, labor groups, urban dwellers,
the urban poor and the like, with Congress in the field of legislation.
422

Such probability, however, pales in significance when we consider that through this bill we can
hasten the politization of the Filipino which in turn will aid government in forming an enlightened
public opinion, and hopefully produce better and more responsive and acceptable legislations.
Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this would give the parliamentarians of the streets and cause-oriented
groups an opportunity to articulate their ideas in a truly democratic forum, thus, the competition
which they will offer to Congress will hopefully be a healthy one. Anyway, in an atmosphere of
competition there are common interests dear to all Filipinos, and the pursuit of each side's
competitive goals can still take place in an atmosphere of reason and moderation.
Mr. Speaker and my dear colleagues, when the distinguished Gentleman from Camarines Sur
and this Representation filed our respective versions of the bill in 1987, we were hoping that the
bill would be approved early enough so that our people could immediately use the agrarian
reform bill as an initial subject matter or as a take-off point.
However, in view of the very heavy agenda of the Committee on Local Government, it took
sometime before the committee could act on these. But as they say in Tagalog, huli man daw at
magaling ay naihahabol din. The passage of this bill therefore, my dear colleagues, could be one
of our finest hours when we can set aside our personal and political consideration for the greater
good of our people. I therefore respectfully urge and plead that this bill be immediately approved.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
We cannot dodge the duty to give effect to this intent for the "[c]ourts have the duty to interpret the
law as legislated and when possible, to honor the clear meaning of statutes as revealed by its language,
purpose and history."
43

The tragedy is that while conceding this intent, the six (6) justices, nevertheless, ruled that "x x x R.A.
No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned" for the following reasons: (1) Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution; (2) the Act does not provide for the contents of
the petition for initiative on the Constitution; and (3) while the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative
and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided
for initiative on the Constitution.
To say the least, these alleged omissions are too weak a reason to throttle the right of the sovereign
people to amend the Constitution through initiative. R.A. 6735 clearly expressed the legislative policy for
the people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action. The fact that the legislature may
have omitted certain details in implementing the people's initiative in R.A. 6735, does not justify the
conclusion that, ergo, the law is insufficient. What were omitted were mere details and not
fundamental policies which Congress alone can and has determined. Implementing details of a
law can be delegated to the COMELEC and can be the subject of its rule-making power. Under Section
2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC has the power to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of initiatives. Its rule-making power has long been recognized by this
Court. In ruling R.A. 6735 insufficient but without striking it down as unconstitutional, the six (6) justices
failed to give due recognition to the indefeasible right of the sovereign people to amend the Constitution.
IV
The proposed constitutional changes, albeit substantial, are mere amendments and can be
undertaken through people's initiative.
Oppositors-intervenors contend that Sections 1 and 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution, only allow the
use of people's initiative to amend and not to revise the Constitution. They theorize that the changes
423

proposed by petitioners are substantial and thus constitute a revision which cannot be done through
people's initiative.
In support of the thesis that the Constitution bars the people from proposing substantial
amendmentsamounting to revision, the oppositors-intervenors cite the following deliberations during the
Constitutional Commission, viz:
44

MR. SUAREZ: x x x x This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative,
which came about because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated
from the traditional modes of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The
Committee members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to the revision of the
entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of the proposed Article on
Amendment or Revision.
x x x x x x x x x x x x
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a
separate section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of
initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which
contemplates a total overhaul of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of
modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation
to amend, which is given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
Commissioner (later Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., espoused the same view:
45

MR. DAVIDE. x x x x We are limiting the right of the people, by initiative, to submit a proposal for
amendment only, not for revision, only once every five years x x x x
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1
refers to "amendment." Does it cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla
when he made the distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision?"
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by
Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
Commissioner (now a distinguished Associate Justice of this Court) Adolfo S. Azcuna also clarified this
point
46
-
MR. OPLE. To more closely reflect the intent of Section 2, may I suggest that we add to
"Amendments" "OR REVISIONS OF" to read: "Amendments OR REVISION OF this Constitution."
MR. AZCUNA. I think it was not allowed to revise the Constitution by initiative.
MR. OPLE. How is that again?
424

MR. AZCUNA. It was not our intention to allow a revision of the Constitution by initiative but
merely by amendments.
MR. BENGZON. Only by amendments.
MR. AZCUNA. I remember that was taken on the floor.
MR. RODRIGO. Yes, just amendments.
The oppositors-intervenors then point out that by their proposals, petitioners will "change the very system
of government from presidential to parliamentary, and the form of the legislature from bicameral to
unicameral," among others. They allegedly seek other major revisions like the inclusion of a minimum
number of inhabitants per district, a change in the period for a term of a Member of Parliament, the
removal of the limits on the number of terms, the election of a Prime Minister who shall exercise the
executive power, and so on and so forth.
47
In sum, oppositors-intervenors submit that "the proposed
changes to the Constitution effect major changes in the political structure and system, the fundamental
powers and duties of the branches of the government, the political rights of the people, and the modes by
which political rights may be exercised."
48
They conclude that they are substantial amendments which
cannot be done through people's initiative. In other words, they posit the thesis that only simple but
not substantial amendments can be done through people's initiative.
With due respect, I disagree. To start with, the words "simple" and "substantial" are not subject to any
accurate quantitative or qualitative test. Obviously, relying on the quantitative test, oppositors-
intervenors assert that the amendments will result in some one hundred (100) changes in the
Constitution. Using the same test, however, it is also arguable that petitioners seek to change basically
only two (2) out of the eighteen (18) articles of the 1987 Constitution, i.e. Article VI (Legislative
Department) and Article VII (Executive Department), together with the complementary provisions for a
smooth transition from a presidential bicameral system to a parliamentary unicameral structure. The big
bulk of the 1987 Constitution will not be affected including Articles I (National Territory), II (Declaration
of Principles and State Policies), III (Bill of Rights), IV (Citizenship), V (Suffrage), VIII (Judicial
Department), IX (Constitutional Commissions), X (Local Government), XI (Accountability of Public
Officers), XII (National Economy and Patrimony), XIII (Social Justice and Human Rights), XIV (Education,
Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports), XV (The Family), XVI (General Provisions), and even
XVII (Amendments or Revisions). In fine, we stand on unsafe ground if we use simple arithmetic to
determine whether the proposed changes are "simple" or "substantial."
Nor can this Court be surefooted if it applies the qualitative test to determine whether the said
changes are "simple" or "substantial" as to amount to a revision of the Constitution. The well-regarded
political scientist,Garner, says that a good constitution should contain at least three (3) sets of provisions:
the constitution of liberty which sets forth the fundamental rights of the people and imposes certain
limitations on the powers of the government as a means of securing the enjoyment of these rights;
the constitution of government which deals with the framework of government and its powers, laying
down certain rules for its administration and defining the electorate; and, the constitution of
sovereignty which prescribes the mode or procedure for amending or revising the constitution.
49
It is
plain that the proposed changes will basically affect only the constitution of government. The
constitutions of liberty and sovereignty remain unaffected. Indeed, the proposed changes will not
change the fundamental nature of our state as "x x x a democratic and republican state."
50
It is
self-evident that a unicameral-parliamentary form of government will not make our State any less
democratic or any less republican in character. Hence, neither will the use of the qualitative test
resolve the issue of whether the proposed changes are "simple" or "substantial."
For this reason and more, our Constitutions did not adopt any quantitative or qualitative test to
determine whether an "amendment" is "simple" or "substantial." Nor did they provide that
"substantial" amendments are beyond the power of the people to propose to change the
425

Constitution. Instead, our Constitutions carried the traditional distinction between "amendment" and
"revision," i.e., "amendment" means change, including complex changes while "revision"
means complete change, including the adoption of an entirely new covenant. The legal
dictionaries express this traditional difference between "amendment" and "revision." Black's Law
Dictionary defines "amendment" as "[a] formal revision or addition proposed or made to a statute,
constitution, pleading, order, or other instrument; specifically, a change made by addition, deletion, or
correction."
51
Black's also refers to "amendment" as "the process of making such a revision."
52
Revision,
on the other hand, is defined as "[a] reexamination or careful review for correction or improvement."
53
In
parliamentary law, it is described as "[a] general and thorough rewriting of a governing document, in
which the entire document is open to amendment."
54
Similarly, Ballentine's Law Dictionary
defines "amendment" as "[a] correction or revision of a writing to correct errors or better to state its
intended purpose"
55
and "amendment of constitution" as "[a] process of proposing, passing, and ratifying
amendments to the x x x constitution."
56
In contrast, "revision," when applied to a statute (or
constitution), "contemplates the re-examination of the same subject matter contained in the statute (or
constitution), and the substitution of a new, and what is believed to be, a still more perfect rule."
57

One of the most authoritative constitutionalists of his time to whom we owe a lot of intellectual debt, Dean
Vicente G. Sinco, of the University of the Philippines College of Law, (later President of the U.P. and
delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1971) similarly spelled out the difference between
"amendment" and "revision." He opined: "the revision of a constitution, in its strict sense, refers to a
consideration of the entire constitution and the procedure for effecting such change;
while amendment refers only to particular provisions to be added to or to be altered in a constitution."
58

Our people were guided by this traditional distinction when they effected changes in our 1935 and
1973 Constitutions. In 1940, the changes to the 1935 Constitution which included the conversion
from a unicameral system to a bicameral structure, the shortening of the tenure of the President and
Vice-President from a six-year term without reelection to a four-year term with one reelection, and the
establishment of the COMELEC, together with the complementary constitutional provisions to effect the
changes, were considered amendments only, not a revision.
The replacement of the 1935 Constitution by the 1973 Constitution was, however, considered a
revisionsince the 1973 Constitution was "a completely new fundamental charter embodying new
political, social and economic concepts."
59
Among those adopted under the 1973 Constitution were: the
parliamentary system in place of the presidential system, with the leadership in legislation and
administration vested with the Prime Minister and his Cabinet; the reversion to a single-chambered
lawmaking body instead of the two-chambered, which would be more suitable to a parliamentary system
of government; the enfranchisement of the youth beginning eighteen (18) years of age instead of twenty-
one (21), and the abolition of literacy, property, and other substantial requirements to widen the basis for
the electorate and expand democracy; the strengthening of the judiciary, the civil service system, and the
Commission on Elections; the complete nationalization of the ownership and management of mass
media; the giving of control to Philippine citizens of all telecommunications; the prohibition against alien
individuals to own educational institutions, and the strengthening of the government as a whole to
improve the conditions of the masses.
60

The 1973 Constitution in turn underwent a series of significant changes in 1976, 1980, 1981, and
1984. Thetwo significant innovations introduced in 1976 were (1) the creation of an interim Batasang
Pambansa, in place of the interim National Assembly, and (2) Amendment No. 6 which conferred on the
President the power to issue decrees, orders, or letters of instruction, whenever the Batasang Pambansa
fails to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, or
there is grave emergency or threat or imminence thereof, with such decrees, or letters of instruction to
form part of the law of the land. In 1980, the retirement age of seventy (70) for justices and judges was
restored. In 1981, the presidential system with parliamentary features was installed. The transfer of
private land for use as residence to natural-born citizens who had lost their citizenship was also allowed.
Then, in 1984, the membership of the Batasang Pambansa was reapportioned by provinces, cities, or
districts in Metro Manila instead of by regions; the Office of the Vice-President was created while the
426

executive committee was abolished; and, urban land reform and social housing programs were
strengthened.
61
These substantial changes were simply considered as mere amendments.
In 1986, Mrs. Corazon C. Aquino assumed the presidency, and repudiated the 1973 Constitution. She
governed under Proclamation No. 3, known as the Freedom Constitution.
In February 1987, the new constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite and superseded the
Provisional or Freedom Constitution. Retired Justice Isagani Cruz underscored the outstanding features
of the 1987 Constitution which consists of eighteen articles and is excessively long compared to the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973, on which it was largely based. Many of the original provisions of the 1935
Constitution, particularly those pertaining to the legislative and executive departments, have been
restored because of the revival of the bicameral Congress of the Philippines and the strictly presidential
system. The independence of the judiciary has been strengthened, with new provisions for appointment
thereto and an increase in its authority, which now covers even political questions formerly beyond its
jurisdiction. While many provisions of the 1973 Constitution were retained, like those on the Constitutional
Commissions and local governments, still the new 1987 Constitution was deemed as a revision of the
1973 Constitution.
It is now contended that this traditional distinction between amendment and revision was abrogated by
the 1987 Constitution. It is urged that Section 1 of Article XVII gives the power to amend or revise to
Congress acting as a constituent assembly, and to a Constitutional Convention duly called by Congress
for the purpose. Section 2 of the same Article, it is said, limited the people's right to change the
Constitution via initiative through simple amendments. In other words, the people cannot propose
substantial amendments amounting to revision.
With due respect, I do not agree. As aforestated, the oppositors-intervenors who peddle the above
proposition rely on the opinions of some Commissioners expressed in the course of the debate on how to
frame the amendment/revision provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is familiar learning, however, that
opinions in a constitutional convention, especially if inconclusive of an issue, are of very limited
value as explaining doubtful phrases, and are an unsafe guide (to the intent of the people) since the
constitution derives its force as a fundamental law, not from the action of the convention but from the
powers (of the people) who have ratified and adopted it.
62
"Debates in the constitutional convention 'are
of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of
the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law.'"
63
Indeed, a careful perusal of the debates of the Constitutional Commissioners can likewise
lead to the conclusion that there was no abandonment of the traditional distinction between
"amendment" and "revision." For during the debates, some of the commissioners referred to the
concurring opinion of former Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive
Secretary,
64
that stressed the traditional distinction between amendment and revision, thus:
65

MR. SUAREZ: We mentioned the possible use of only one term and that is, "amendment."
However, the Committee finally agreed to use the terms "amendment" or "revision" when our
attention was called by the honorable Vice-President to the substantial difference in the
connotation and significance between the said terms. As a result of our research, we came up
with the observations made in the famous or notorious Javellana doctrine, particularly the
decision rendered by Honorable Justice Makasiar,
66
wherein he made the following distinction
between "amendment" and "revision" of an existing Constitution: "Revision" may involve a
rewriting of the whole Constitution. On the other hand, the act of amending a constitution
envisages a change of specific provisions only. The intention of an act to amend is not the
change of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of
provisions deemed essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts
already considered obsolete or unresponsive to the needs of the times.
427

The 1973 Constitution is not a mere amendment to the 1935 Constitution. It is a completely new
fundamental Charter embodying new political, social and economic concepts.
So, the Committee finally came up with the proposal that these two terms should be employed in
the formulation of the Article governing amendments or revisions to the new Constitution.
To further explain "revision," former Justice Antonio, in his concurring opinion, used an analogy "When
a house is completely demolished and another is erected on the same location, do you have a changed,
repaired and altered house, or do you have a new house? Some of the material contained in the old
house may be used again, some of the rooms may be constructed the same, but this does not alter the
fact that you have altogether another or a new house."
67

Hence, it is arguable that when the framers of the 1987 Constitution used the word "revision," they had in
mind the "rewriting of the whole Constitution," or the "total overhaul of the Constitution." Anything
less is an "amendment" or just "a change of specific provisions only," the intention being "not the change
of the entire Constitution, but only the improvement of specific parts or the addition of provisions deemed
essential as a consequence of new conditions or the elimination of parts already considered obsolete or
unresponsive to the needs of the times." Under this view, "substantial" amendments are still
"amendments" and thus can be proposed by the people via an initiative.
As we cannot be guided with certainty by the inconclusive opinions of the Commissioners on the
difference between "simple" and "substantial" amendments or whether "substantial" amendments
amounting to revision are covered by people's initiative, it behooves us to follow the cardinal rule in
interpreting Constitutions, i.e., construe them to give effect to the intention of the people who
adopted it. The illustrious Cooley explains its rationale well, viz:
68

x x x the constitution does not derive its force from the convention which framed, but from the
people who ratified it, the intent to be arrived at is that of the people, and it is not to be supposed
that they have looked for any dark or abstruse meaning in the words employed, but rather that
they have accepted them in the sense most obvious to the common understanding, and ratified
the instrument in the belief that that was the sense designed to be conveyed. These proceedings
therefore are less conclusive of the proper construction of the instrument than are legislative
proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since in the latter case it is the intent of the
legislature we seek, while in the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people
through the discussion and deliberations of their representatives. The history of the calling of the
convention, the causes which led to it, and the discussions and issues before the people at the
time of the election of the delegates, will sometimes be quite as instructive and satisfactory as
anything to be gathered form the proceedings of the convention.
Corollarily, a constitution is not to be interpreted on narrow or technical principles, but liberally and on
broad general lines, to accomplish the object of its establishment and carry out the great
principles of government not to defeat them.
69
One of these great principles is the sovereignty of the
people.
Let us now determine the intent of the people when they adopted initiative as a mode to amend the
1987 Constitution. We start with the Declaration of Principles and State Policies which Sinco describes as
"the basic political creed of the nation"
70
as it "lays down the policies that government is bound to
observe."
71
Section 1, Article II of the 1935 Constitution and Section 1, Article II of the 1973
Constitution, similarly provide that "the Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them." In a republican state, the power of the
sovereign people is exercised and delegated to their representatives. Thus in Metropolitan
Transportation Service v. Paredes, this Court held that "a republican state, like the Philippines x x x (is)
derived from the will of the people themselves in freely creating a government 'of the people, by the
428

people, and for the people' a representative government through which they have agreed to exercise
the powers and discharge the duties of their sovereignty for the common good and general welfare."
72

In both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the sovereign people delegated to Congress or to a
convention, the power to amend or revise our fundamental law. History informs us how this delegated
power to amend or revise the Constitution was abused particularly during the Marcos regime. The
Constitution was changed several times to satisfy the power requirements of the regime.
Indeed, Amendment No. 6 was passed giving unprecedented legislative powers to then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. A conspiracy of circumstances from above and below, however, brought down the
Marcos regime through an extra constitutional revolution, albeit a peaceful one by the people. A main
reason for the people's revolution was the failure of the representatives of the people to effectuate
timely changes in the Constitution either by acting as a constituent assembly or by calling a
constitutional convention. When the representatives of the peopledefaulted in using this last peaceful
process of constitutional change, the sovereign people themselves took matters in their own hands.
They revolted and replaced the 1973 Constitution with the 1987 Constitution.
It is significant to note that the people modified the ideology of the 1987 Constitution as it
stressed the power of the people to act directly in their capacity as sovereign people.
Correspondingly, the power of the legislators to act as representatives of the people in the matter
of amending or revising the Constitution was diminished for the spring cannot rise above its
source. To reflect this significant shift, Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution was reworded.
It now reads: "the Philippines is a democratic and republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them." The commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission explained the addition of the word "democratic," in our first Declaration of Principles, viz:
MR. NOLLEDO. I am putting the word "democratic" because of the provisions that we are now adopting
which are covering consultations with the people. For example, we have provisions on recall, initiative,
the right of the people even to participate in lawmaking and other instances that recognize the validity of
interference by the people through people's organizations x x x x
73

MR. OPLE. x x x x The Committee added the word "democratic" to "republican," and, therefore,
the first sentence states: "The Philippines is a republican and democratic state x x x x
May I know from the committee the reason for adding the word "democratic" to "republican"? The
constitutional framers of the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions were content with "republican." Was
this done merely for the sake of emphasis?
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x x "democratic" was added because of the need to emphasize people
power and the many provisions in the Constitution that we have approved related to recall,
people's organizations, initiative and the like, which recognize the participation of the
people in policy-making in certain circumstances x x x x
MR. OPLE. I thank the Commissioner. That is a very clear answer and I think it does meet a need
x x x x
MR. NOLLEDO. According to Commissioner Rosario Braid, "democracy" here is understood as
participatory democracy.
74
(emphasis supplied)
The following exchange between Commissioners Rene V. Sarmiento and Adolfo S. Azcuna is of the
same import:
75

MR. SARMIENTO. When we speak of republican democratic state, are we referring to
representative democracy?
429

MR. AZCUNA. That is right.
MR. SARMIENTO. So, why do we not retain the old formulation under the 1973 and 1935
Constitutions which used the words "republican state" because "republican state" would refer to a
democratic state where people choose their representatives?
MR. AZCUNA. We wanted to emphasize the participation of the people in government.
MR. SARMIENTO. But even in the concept "republican state," we are stressing the participation
of the people x x x x So the word "republican" will suffice to cover popular representation.
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, the Commissioner is right. However, the committee felt that in view of the
introduction of the aspects of direct democracy such as initiative, referendum or recall, it was
necessary to emphasize the democratic portion of republicanism, of representative democracy as
well. So, we want to add the word "democratic" to emphasize that in this new Constitution
there are instances where the people would act directly, and not through their
representatives. (emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the stress on direct democracy, the systems of initiative, referendum, and recall were
enthroned as polestars in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, Commissioner Blas F. Ople who introduced the
provision on people's initiative said:
76

MR. OPLE. x x x x I think this is just the correct time in history when we should introduce an
innovative mode of proposing amendments to the Constitution, vesting in the people and their
organizations the right to formulate and propose their own amendments and revisions of the
Constitution in a manner that will be binding upon the government. It is not that I believe this
kind of direct action by the people for amending a constitution will be needed frequently in the
future, but it is good to know that the ultimate reserves of sovereign power still rest upon
the people and that in the exercise of that power, they can propose amendments or
revision to the Constitution. (emphasis supplied)
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez also explained the people's initiative as a safety valve, as a peaceful way
for the people to change their Constitution, by citing our experiences under the Marcos government, viz:
77

MR. SUAREZ. We agree to the difficulty in implementing this particular provision, but we are
providing a channel for the expression of the sovereign will of the people through this initiative
system.
MR. BENGZON. Is Section 1, paragraphs (a) and (b), not sufficient channel for expression of the
will of the people, particularly in the amendment or revision of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. Under normal circumstances, yes. But we know what happened during the 20
years under the Marcos administration. So, if the National Assembly, in a manner of
speaking, is operating under the thumb of the Prime Minister or the President as the case may
be, and the required number of votes could not be obtained, we would have to provide for
a safety valve in order that the people could ventilate in a very peaceful way their desire for
amendment to the Constitution.
It is very possible that although the people may be pressuring the National Assembly to
constitute itself as a constituent assembly or to call a constitutional convention, the
members thereof would not heed the people's desire and clamor. So this is a third
avenue that we are providing for the implementation of what is now popularly known as people's
power. (emphasis supplied)
430

Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong opined that the people's initiative could avert a
revolution, viz:
78

MR. MAAMBONG. x x x x the amending process of the Constitution could actually avert a
revolution by providing a safety valve in bringing about changes in the Constitution through
pacific means. This, in effect, operationalizes what political law authors call the "prescription of
sovereignty." (emphasis supplied)
The end result is Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution which expressed the right of the
sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution by direct action or through initiative. To that
extent, the delegated power of Congress to amend or revise the Constitution has to be adjusted
downward. Thus, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution has to be reminted and now provides:
"The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives,except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum."
Prescinding from these baseline premises, the argument that the people through initiative cannot
propose substantial amendments to change the Constitution turns sovereignty on its head. At the
very least, thesubmission constricts the democratic space for the exercise of the direct sovereignty of
the people. It also denigrates the sovereign people who they claim can only be trusted with the power to
propose "simple" but not "substantial" amendments to the Constitution. According to Sinco, the
concept of sovereignty should be strictly understood in its legal meaning as it was originally developed in
law.
79
Legal sovereignty, he explained, is "the possession of unlimited power to make laws. Its
possessor is the legal sovereign. It implies the absence of any other party endowed with legally superior
powers and privileges. It is not subject to law 'for it is the author and source of law.' Legal
sovereignty is thus the equivalent of legal omnipotence."
80

To be sure, sovereignty or popular sovereignty, emphasizes the supremacy of the people's will over the
state which they themselves have created. The state is created by and subject to the will of the people,
who are the source of all political power. Rightly, we have ruled that "the sovereignty of our people is not
a kabalistic principle whose dimensions are buried in mysticism. Its metes and bounds are familiar to the
framers of our Constitutions. They knew that in its broadest sense, sovereignty is meant to be supreme,
the jus summi imperu, the absolute right to govern."
81

James Wilson, regarded by many as the most brilliant, scholarly, and visionary lawyer in the United
States in the 1780s, laid down the first principles of popular sovereignty during the Pennsylvania ratifying
convention of the 1787 Constitution of the United States:
82

There necessarily exists, in every government, a power from which there is no appeal, and which,
for that reason, may be termed supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable.
x x x x Perhaps some politician, who has not considered with sufficient accuracy our political
systems, would answer that, in our governments, the supreme power was vested in the
constitutions x x x x This opinion approaches a step nearer to the truth, but does not reach it. The
truth is, that in our governments, the supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power
remains in the people. As our constitutions are superior to our legislatures, so the people are
superior to our constitutions. Indeed the superiority, in this last instance, is much greater; for the
people possess over our constitution, control in act, as well as right. (emphasis supplied)
I wish to reiterate that in a democratic and republican state, only the people is sovereign - - - not
the elected President, not the elected Congress, not this unelected Court. Indeed, the sovereignty of the
people which is indivisible cannot be reposed in any organ of government. Only its exercise may be
delegated to any of them. In our case, the people delegated to Congress the exercise of the
sovereign power to amend or revise the Constitution. If Congress, as delegate, can exercise this
431

power to amend or revise the Constitution, can it be argued that the sovereign people who delegated the
power has no power to substantially amend the Constitution by direct action? If the sovereign people do
not have this power to make substantial amendments to the Constitution, what did it delegate to
Congress? How can the people lack this fraction of a power to substantially amend the Constitution
when by their sovereignty, all power emanates from them? It will take somemumbo jumbo to argue that
the whole is lesser than its part. Let Sinco clinch the point:
83

But although possession may not be delegated, the exercise of sovereignty often is. It is
delegated to the organs and agents of the state which constitute its government, for it is only
through this instrumentality that the state ordinarily functions. However ample and complete
this delegation may be, it is nevertheless subject to withdrawal at any time by the state. On
this point Willoughby says:
Thus, States may concede to colonies almost complete autonomy of government and
reserve to themselves a right to control of so slight and so negative a character as to
make its exercise a rare and improbable occurrence; yet so long as such right of control
is recognized to exist, and the autonomy of the colonies is conceded to be founded upon
a grant and continuing consent of the mother countries the sovereignty of those mother
countries over them is complete and they are to be considered as possessing only
administrative autonomy and not political independence.
At the very least, the power to propose substantial amendments to the Constitution is shared with
the people. We should accord the most benign treatment to the sovereign power of the people to
propose substantial amendments to the Constitution especially when the proposed amendments
will adversely affect the interest of some members of Congress. A contrary approach will suborn
the public weal to private interest and worse, will enable Congress (the delegate) to frustrate the
power of the people to determine their destiny (the principal).
All told, the teaching of the ages is that constitutional clauses acknowledging the right of the people to
exercise initiative and referendum are liberally and generously construed in favor of the
people.
84
Initiative and referendum powers must be broadly construed to maintain maximum power in
the people.
85
We followed this orientation in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Commission on
Elections.
86
There is not an iota of reason to depart from it.
V
The issues at bar are not political questions.
Petitioners submit that "[t]he validity of the exercise of the right of the sovereign people to amend the
Constitution and their will, as expressed by the fact that over six million registered voters indicated their
support of the Petition for Initiative, is a purely political question which is beyond even the very long
arm of this Honorable Court's power of judicial review. Whether or not the 1987 Constitution should be
amended is a matter which the people and the people alone must resolve in their sovereign
capacity."
87
They argue that "[t]he power to propose amendments to the Constitution is a right explicitly
bestowed upon the sovereign people. Hence, the determination by the people to exercise their right to
propose amendments under the system of initiative is a sovereign act and falls squarely within the ambit
of a 'political question.'"
88

The petitioners cannot be sustained. This issue has long been interred by Sanidad v. Commission on
Elections, viz:
89

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the legality of a particular act.
Where the vortex of the controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that
matter is definitely justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom
432

of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments to the Constitution, but his
constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly.
Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is
therefore a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the
President would merely be a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended,
the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or
the authority assumed was valid or not.
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that
the question of the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the
procedure adopted for submission of the proposals to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of
the latter. A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious cycle. Is it not that the people themselves, by their
sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when they
ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has
been followed or not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of
course who exercise no power of judicial review, but by the Supreme Court in whom the people
themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to determine whether the
constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done
a priori not a posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
In the instant case, the Constitution sets in black and white the requirements for the exercise of the
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. The amendments must be proposed by the people "upon a
petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment
under this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor
oftener than once every five years thereafter."
90
Compliance with these requirements is clearly a
justiciable and not a political question. Be that as it may, how the issue will be resolved by the people is
addressed to them and to them alone.
VI
Whether the Petition for Initiative filed before the COMELEC complied with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution and R.A. 6735 involves contentious issues of fact which should first be
resolved by the COMELEC.
Oppositors-intervenors impugn the Petition for Initiative as it allegedly lacks the required number of
signatures under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Said provision requires that the petition for
initiative be supported by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered voters
therein. Oppositors-intervenors contend thatno proper verification of signatures was done in several
legislative districts. They assert that mere verification of the names listed on the signature sheets without
verifying the signatures reduces the signatures submitted for their respective legislative districts to mere
scribbles on a piece of paper.
Oppositor-intervenor ONEVOICE, Inc., submitted to this Court a certification dated August 23, 2006
issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, Election Officer IV, Third District and OIC, First and Second District,
Davao City, stating that his office has not verified the signatures submitted by the proponents of the
people's initiative. The certification reads:
This is to CERTIFY that this office (First, Second and Third District, Davao City) HAS NOT
VERIFIED the signatures of registered voters as per documents submitted in this office by the
proponents of the People's Initiative. Consequently, NO ELECTION DOCUMENTS AND/OR
ORDER ISSUED BY HIGHER SUPERIORSused as basis for such verification of signatures.
91

433

Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., among others, further clarified that although Atty. Casquejo
and Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Acting Election Officer IV, First District, Davao City, later issued certifications
stating that the Office of the City Election Officer has examined the list of individuals appearing in the
signature sheets,
92
the certifications reveal that the office had verified only the names of the signatories,
but not their signatures. Oppositors-intervenors submit that not only the names of the signatories should
be verified, but also their signatures to ensure the identities of the persons affixing their signatures on the
signature sheets.
Oppositor-intervenor Luwalhati Antonino also alleged that petitioners failed to obtain the signatures of at
least three per cent (3%) of the total number of registered voters in the First Legislative District of South
Cotabato. For the First District of South Cotabato, petitioners submitted 3,182 signatures for General
Santos City, 2,186 signatures for Tupi, 3,308 signatures for Tampakan and 10,301 signatures for
Polomolok, or 18,977 signatures out of 359,488 registered voters of said district. Antonino, however,
submitted to this Court a copy of the certification by Glory D. Rubio, Election Officer III, Polomolok, dated
May 8, 2006, showing that the signatures from Polomolok were not verified because the Book of Voters
for the whole municipality was in the custody of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38,
Polomolok, South Cotabato.
93
Excluding the signatures from Polomolok from the total number of
signatures from the First District of South Cotabato would yield only a total of 8,676 signatures which falls
short of the three per cent (3%) requirement for the district.
Former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino likewise submitted to this
Court a certification issued by Atty. Stalin A. Baguio, City Election Officer IV, Cagayan de Oro City, stating
that the list of names appearing on the signature sheets corresponds to the names of registered voters in
the city, thereby implying that they have not actually verified the signatures.
94

The argument against the sufficiency of the signatures is further bolstered by Alternative Law Groups,
Inc., which submitted copies of similarly worded certifications from the election officers from Zamboanga
del Sur
95
and from Compostela Valley.
96
Alternative Law Groups, Inc., further assails the regularity of the
verification process as it alleged that verification in some areas were conducted by Barangay officials and
not by COMELEC election officers. It filed with this Court copies of certifications from Sulu and Sultan
Kudarat showing that the verification was conducted by local officials instead of COMELEC personnel.
97

Petitioners, on the other hand, maintain that the verification conducted by the election officers
sufficiently complied with the requirements of the Constitution and the law on initiative.
Contravening the allegations of oppositors-intervenors on the lack of verification in Davao City and in
Polomolok, South Cotabato, petitioner Aumentado claimed that the same election officers cited by the
oppositors-intervenors also issued certifications showing that they have verified the signatures submitted
by the proponents of the people's initiative. He presented copies of the certifications issued by Atty.
Marlon S. Casquejo for the Second and Third Legislative Districts of Davao City stating that he verified
the signatures of the proponents of the people's initiative. His certification for the Second District states:
This is to CERTIFY that this Office has examined the list of individuals as appearing in the
Signature Sheets of the Registered Voters of District II, Davao City, submitted on April 7, 2006 by
MR. NONATO BOLOS, Punong Barangay, Centro, Davao City for verification which consists of
THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662) signatures.
Anent thereto, it appears that of the THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO (30,662)
individuals, only TWENTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY-EIGHT (22,668) individuals
were found to be REGISTERED VOTERS, in the Computerized List of Voters of SECOND
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, DAVAO CITY.
98

It was also shown that Atty. Casquejo had issued a clarificatory certification regarding the verification
process conducted in Davao City. It reads:
434

Regarding the verification of the signatures of registered voters, this Office has previously issued
two (2) separate certifications for the 2
nd
and 3
rd
Districts of Davao City on April 20, 2006 and
April 26, 2006, respectively, specifically relating to the voters who supported the people's
initiative. It was stated therein that the names submitted, comprising 22,668 individual voters in
the 2
nd
District and 18,469 individual voters in the 3
rd
District, were found [to] be registered voters
of the respective districts mentioned as verified by this Office based on the Computerized List of
Voters.
It must be clarified that the August 23, 2006 Certification was issued in error and by mistake for
the reason that the signature verification has not been fully completed as of that date.
I hereby CERTIFY that this Office has examined the signatures of the voters as appearing in the
signature sheets and has compared these with the signatures appearing in the book of voters and
computerized list of voters x x x
99

Petitioner Aumentado also submitted a copy of the certification dated May 8, 2006 issued by Polomolok
Election Officer Glory D. Rubio to support their claim that said officer had conducted a verification of
signatures in said area. The certification states:
This is to certify further, that the total 68,359 registered voters of this municipality, as of the May
10, 2004 elections, 10,804 names with signatures were submitted for verification and out of which
10,301 were found to be legitimate voters as per official list of registered voters, which is
equivalent to 15.07% of the total number of registered voters of this Municipality.
100

In addition to the lack of proper verification of the signatures in numerous legislative districts, allegations
of fraud and irregularities in the collection of signatures in Makati City were cited by Senator Pimentel,
among others, to wit:
(1) No notice was given to the public, for the benefit of those who may be concerned, by the
Makati COMELEC Office that signature sheets have already been submitted to it for "verification."
The camp of Mayor Binay was able to witness the "verification process" only because of their pro-
active stance;
(2) In District 1, the proponents of charter change submitted 43,405 signatures for verification.
36,219 alleged voters' signatures (83% of the number of signatures submitted) were rejected
outright. 7,186 signatures allegedly "passed" COMELEC's initial scrutiny. However, upon
examination of the signature sheets by Atty. Mar-len Abigail Binay, the said 7,186 signatures
could not be accounted for. Atty. Binay manually counted 2,793 signatures marked with the word
"OK" and 3,443 signatures marked with a check, giving only 6,236 "apparently verified
signatures." Before the COMELEC officer issued the Certification, Atty. Binay already submitted
to the said office not less than 55 letters of "signature withdrawal," but no action was ever taken
thereon;
(3) In District 2, 29,411 signatures were submitted for verification. 23,521 alleged voters'
signatures (80% of those submitted) were rejected outright. Of the 5,890 signatures which
allegedly passed the COMELEC's initial scrutiny, some more will surely fail upon closer
examination;
(4) In the absence of clear, transparent, and uniform rules the COMELEC personnel did not know
how to treat the objections and other observations coming from the camp of Mayor Binay. The
oppositors too did not know where to go for their remedy when the COMELEC personnel merely
"listened" to their objections and other observations. As mentioned earlier, the COMELEC
personnel did not even know what to do with the many "letters of signature withdrawal" submitted
to it;
435

(5) Signatures of people long dead, in prison, abroad, and other forgeries appear on the Sigaw ng
Bayan Signature Sheets. There is even a 15-year old alleged signatory;
(6) There are Signature Sheets obviously signed by one person;
(7) A Calara M. Roberto and a Roberto M. Calara both allegedly signed the Signature Sheets.
101

Also, there are allegations that many of the signatories did not understand what they have signed as they
were merely misled into signing the signature sheets. Opposed to these allegations are rulings that a
person who affixes his signature on a document raises the presumption that the person so signing has
knowledge of what the document contains. Courts have recognized that there is great value in the
stability of records, so to speak, that no one should commit herself or himself to something in writing
unless she or he is fully aware and cognizant of the effect it may have upon her on him.
102
In the same
vein, we have held that a person is presumed to have knowledge of the contents of a document he has
signed.
103
But as this Court is not a trier of facts, it cannot resolve the issue.
In sum, the issue of whether the petitioners have complied with the constitutional requirement that the
petition for initiative be signed by at least twelve per cent (12%) of the total number of registered voters,
of which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per cent (3%) of the registered
voters therein, involves contentious facts. Its resolution will require presentation of evidence and
their calibration by the COMELEC according to its rules. During the oral argument on this case,
the COMELEC, through Director Alioden Dalaig of its Law Department, admitted that it has not examined
the documents submitted by the petitioners in support of the petition for initiative, as well as the
documents filed by the oppositors to buttress their claim that the required number of signatures has not
been met. The exchanges during the oral argument likewise clearly show the need for further clarification
and presentation of evidence to prove certain material facts.
104

The only basis used by the COMELEC to dismiss the petition for initiative was this Court's ruling
in Santiago v. COMELEC that R.A. 6735 was insufficient. It has yet to rule on the sufficiency of the
form and substance of the petition. I respectfully submit that this issue should be properly litigated
before the COMELEC where both parties will be given full opportunity to prove their allegations.
For the same reasons, the sufficiency of the Petition for Initiative and its compliance with the
requirements of R.A. 6735 on initiative and its implementing rules is a question that should be resolved
by the COMELEC at the first instance, as it is the body that is mandated by the Constitution to administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall.
105

VII
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied due course to the Lambino and
Aumentado petition.
In denying due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition, COMELEC relied on this Court's ruling
inSantiago permanently enjoining it from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
Again, I respectfully submit that COMELEC's reliance on Santiago constitutes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Santiago case did not establish the firm doctrine that R.A. 6735
is not a sufficient law to implement the constitutional provision allowing people's initiative to amend the
Constitution. To recapitulate, the records show that in the original decision, eight (8) justices
106
voted
that R.A. 6735 was not a sufficient law; five (5) justices
107
voted that said law was sufficient; and one (1)
436

justice
108
abstained from voting on the issue holding that unless and until a proper initiatory pleading is
filed, the said issue is not ripe for adjudication.
109

Within the reglementary period, the respondents filed their motion for reconsideration. On June 10, 1997,
the Court denied the motion. Only thirteen (13) justices resolved the motion for Justice Torres inhibited
himself.
110
Of the original majority of eight (8) justices, only six (6) reiterated their ruling that R.A.
6735 was an insufficient law. Justice Hermosisima, originally part of the majority of eight (8) justices,
changed his vote and joined the minority of five (5) justices. He opined without any equivocation that R.A.
6735 was a sufficient law, thus:
It is one thing to utter a happy phrase from a protected cluster; another to think under fire to
think for action upon which great interests depend." So said Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and
so I am guided as I reconsider my concurrence to the holding of the majority that "R.A. No. 6735
is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and to have
failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation" and now to interpose my dissent
thereto.
x x x
WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the Delfin petition.
I vote, however, to declare R.A. No. 6735 as adequately providing the legal basis for the
exercise by the people of their right to amend the Constitution through initiative
proceedings and to uphold the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 insofar as it does not
sanction the filing of the initiatory petition for initiative proceedings to amend the Constitution
without the required names and/or signatures of at least 12% of all the registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein.
(emphasis supplied)
Justice Vitug remained steadfast in refusing to rule on the sufficiency of R.A. 6735. In fine, the final
vote on whether R.A. 6735 is a sufficient law was 6-6 with one (1) justice inhibiting himself and another
justice refusing to rule on the ground that the issue was not ripe for adjudication.
It ought to be beyond debate that the six (6) justices who voted that R.A. 6735 is an insufficient law failed
to establish a doctrine that could serve as a precedent. Under any alchemy of law, a deadlocked vote of
six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value. The opinion of the
late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco is instructive, viz:
As it stands, of the thirteen justices who took part in the deliberations on the issue of whether the
motion for reconsideration of the March 19, 1997 decision should be granted or not, only the
following justices sided with Mr. Justice Davide, namely: Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices
Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan. Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Hermosisima,
Panganiban and the undersigned voted to grant the motion; while Justice Vitug "maintained his
opinion that the matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication." In other words, only five, out of the
other twelve justices, joined Mr. Justice Davide's June 10, 1997 ponencia finding R.A. No. 6735
unconstitutional for its failure to pass the so called "completeness and sufficiency standards"
tests. The "concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations"
which Article VII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution requires to declare a law unconstitutional was,
beyond dispute, not complied with. And even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the
constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the "majority" was initially reached in the March
19, 1997 ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for
reconsideration. It was only on June 10, 1997 that the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6735 was
settled with finality, sans the constitutionally required "majority." The Court's declaration,
therefore, is manifestly grafted with infirmity and wanting in force necessitating, in my view, the
437

reexamination of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 127325. It behooves the Court "not to tarry any
longer" nor waste this opportunity accorded by this new petition (G.R. No. 129754) to relieve the
Court's pronouncement from constitutional infirmity.
The jurisprudence that an equally divided Court can never set a precedent is well-settled. Thus, in the
United States, an affirmance in the Federal Supreme Court upon equal division of opinion is not an
authority for the determination of other cases, either in that Court or in the inferior federal courts. In Neil
v. Biggers,
111
which was a habeas corpus state proceeding by a state prisoner, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that its equally divided affirmance of petitioner's state court conviction was not an "actual
adjudication" barring subsequent consideration by the district court on habeas corpus. In discussing
the non-binding effect of an equal division ruling, the Court reviewed the history of cases explicating
the disposition "affirmed by an equally divided Court:"
In this light, we review our cases explicating the disposition "affirmed by an equally divided
Court." On what was apparently the first occasion of an equal division, The Antelope, 10
Wheat, 66, 6 L. Ed. 268 (1825), the Court simply affirmed on the point of division without much
discussion. Id., at 126-127. Faced with a similar division during the next Term, the Court again
affirmed, Chief Justice Marshall explaining that "the principles of law which have been argued,
cannot be settled; but the judgment is affirmed, the court being divided in opinion upon it." Etting
v. Bank of United States, 11 Wheat. 59, 78, 6 L. Ed. 419 (1826). As was later elaborated in
such cases, it is the appellant or petitioner who asks the Court to overturn a lower court's decree.
"If the judges are divided, the reversal cannot be had, for no order can be made. The judgment of
the court below, therefore, stands in full force. It is indeed, the settled practice in such case to
enter a judgment of affirmance; but this is only the most convenient mode of expressing the fact
that the cause is finally disposed of in conformity with the action of the court below, and that that
court can proceed to enforce its judgment. The legal effect would be the same if the appeal, or
writ of error, were dismissed."Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107, 112, 19 L. Ed. 154 (1869). Nor
is an affirmance by an equally divided Court entitled to precedential weight. Ohio ex rel. Eaton v.
Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264, 80 S. Ct. 1463, 1464, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1708 (1960).xxx"
This doctrine established in Neil has not been overturned and has been cited with approval in a number
of subsequent cases,
112
and has been applied in various state jurisdictions.
In the case of In the Matter of the Adoption of Erin G., a Minor Child,
113
wherein a putative father
sought to set aside a decree granting petition for adoption of an Indian child on grounds of noncompliance
with the requirements of Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), the Supreme Court of Alaska held that its
decision in In re Adoption of T.N.F. (T.N.F.),
114
which lacked majority opinion supporting
holding that an action such as the putative father's would be governed by the state's one-year statute of
limitations, was not entitled to stare decisis effect. In T.N.F., a majority of the justices sitting did not
agree on a common rationale, as two of four participating justices agreed that the state's one-year
statute of limitations applied, one justice concurred in the result only, and one justice dissented. There
was no "narrower" reasoning agreed upon by all three affirming justices. The concurring justice expressed
no opinion on the statute of limitations issue, and in agreeing with the result, he reasoned that ICWA did
not give the plaintiff standing to sue.
115
The two-justice plurality, though agreeing that the state's one-year
statute of limitations applied, specifically disagreed with the concurring justice on the standing
issue.
116
Because a majority of the participating justices in T.N.F. did not agree on any one ground for
affirmance, it was not accorded stare decisis effect by the state Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Michigan likewise ruled that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to
plurality decisions in which no majority of the justices participating agree to the reasoning and as such
are not authoritative interpretations binding on the Supreme Court.
117

In State ex rel. Landis v. Williams,
118
the Supreme Court of Florida, in an equally divided opinion on
the matter,
119
held that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933 must be allowed to stand, dismissing a quo
warranto suit without prejudice. The Court held:
438

In a cause of original jurisdiction in this court a statute cannot be declared unconstitutional nor its
enforcement nor operation judicially interfered with, except by the concurrence of a majority of the
members of the Supreme Court sitting in the cause wherein the constitutionality of the statute is
brought in question or judicial relief sought against its enforcement. Section 4 of Article 5, state
Constitution.
Therefore in this case the concurrence of a majority of the members of this court in holding
unconstitutional said chapter 15938, supra, not having been had, it follows that the statute in
controversy must be allowed to stand and accordingly be permitted to be enforced as a
presumptively valid act of the Legislature, and that this proceeding in quo warranto must be
dismissed without prejudice. Spencer v. Hunt (Fla.) 147 So. 282.This decision is not to be
regarded as a judicial precedent on the question of constitutional law involved concerning the
constitutionality vel non of chapter 15938. State ex rel. Hampton v. McClung, 47 Fla. 224, 37
So. 51.
Quo warranto proceeding dismissed without prejudice by equal division of the court on question
of constitutionality of statute involved.
In U.S. v. Pink,
120
the Court held that the affirmance by the U.S. Supreme Court by an equally divided
vote of a decision of the New York Court of Appeals that property of a New York branch of a Russian
insurance company was outside the scope of the Russian Soviet government's decrees terminating
existence of insurance companies in Russia and seizing their assets, while conclusive and binding upon
the parties as respects the controversy in that action, did not constitute an authoritative "precedent."
In Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc.,
121
the U.S. Court of Appeals Second Circuit, in holding that printed
lyrics which had the same meter as plaintiffs' lyrics, but which were in form a parody of the latter, did not
constitute infringement of plaintiffs' copyrights, ruled that the prior case of Benny v. Loew's,
Inc.,
122
which was affirmed by an equally divided court, was not binding upon it, viz:
Under the precedents of this court, and, as seems justified by reason as well as by authority, an
affirmance by an equally divided court is as between the parties, a conclusive determination and
adjudication of the matter adjudged; but the principles of law involved not having been agreed
upon by a majority of the court sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority for the
determination of other cases, either in this or in inferior courts.
123

In Perlman v. First National Bank of Chicago,
124
the Supreme Court of Illinois dismissed the appeal as
it was unable to reach a decision because two judges recused themselves and the remaining members of
the Court were so divided, it was impossible to secure the concurrence of four judges as is
constitutionally required. The Court followed the procedure employed by the U.S. Supreme Court when
the Justices of that Court are equally divided,i.e. affirm the judgment of the court that was before it for
review. The affirmance is a conclusive determination and adjudication as between the parties to the
immediate case, it is not authority for the determination of other cases, either in the Supreme Court or in
any other court. It is not "entitled to precedential weight." The legal effect of such an affirmance is the
same as if the appeal was dismissed.
125

The same rule is settled in the English Courts. Under English precedents,
126
an affirmance by an equally
divided Court is, as between the parties, a conclusive determination and adjudication of the matter
adjudged; but the principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the court sitting
prevents the case from becoming an authority for the determination of other cases, either in that or in
inferior courts.
After a tour of these cases, we can safely conclude that the prevailing doctrine is that, the affirmance by
an equally divided court merely disposes of the present controversy as between the parties and settles no
issue of law; the affirmance leaves unsettled the principle of law presented by the case and is not entitled
439

to precedential weight or value. In other words, the decision only has res judicata and not stare decisis
effect. It is not conclusive and binding upon other parties as respects the controversies in other actions.
Let us now examine the patent differences between the petition at bar and the Delfin Petition in the
Santiago case which will prevent the Santiago ruling from binding the present petitioners. To start with,
the parties are different. More importantly, the Delfin Petition did not contain the signatures of the
required number of registered voters under the Constitution: the requirement that twelve per cent (12%)
of all the registered voters in the country wherein each legislative district is represented by at least three
per cent (3%) of all the registered voters therein was not complied with. For this reason, we ruled
unanimously that it was not the initiatory petition which the COMELEC could properly take cognizance
of. In contrast, the present petition appears to be accompanied by the signatures of the required number
of registered voters. Thus, while the Delfin Petition prayed that an Order be issued fixing the time and
dates for signature gathering all over the country, the Lambino and Aumentado petition, prayed for the
calling of a plebiscite to allow the Filipino people to express their sovereign will on the proposition.
COMELEC cannot close its eyes to these material differences.
Plainly, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying
due course to the Lambino and Aumentado petition on the basis of its mistaken notion
that Santiago established the doctrine that R.A. 6735 was an insufficient law. As aforestressed, that
ruling of six (6) justices who do not represent the majority lacks precedential status and is non-binding on
the present petitioners.
The Court's dismissal of the PIRMA petition is of no moment. Suffice it to say that we dismissed the
PIRMA petition on the principle of res judicata. This was stressed by former Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide Jr., viz:
The following are my reasons as to why this petition must be summarily dismissed:
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in Santiago v.
COMELEC (G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that the former is
substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of the roles played by the principal
parties and inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable, parties in the present petition. But
plainly, the same issues and reliefs are raised and prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM, MODERNIZATION,
AND ACTION (PIRMA) and spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is
self-described as "a non-stock, non-profit organization duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403, Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi
Village, Makati City," with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its
"officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made respondents as founding members of PIRMA
which, as alleged in the body of the petition therein, "proposes to undertake the signature drive
for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were sued
in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at the hearing of
the Delfin petition in the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner
therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding member of the Movement for
People's Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted that said movement was
"[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for
brevity." In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the PEDROSAS did not deny that they were
founding members of PIRMA, and by their arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a doubt
that they had joined Delfin or his cause.
440

No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well
as the others joining them, from the operation of the principle of res judicata, which needs no
further elaboration. (emphasis supplied)
Justice Josue N. Bellosillo adds:
The essential requisites of res judicata are: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be
a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions identity of
parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.
127

Applying these principles in the instant case, we hold that all the elements of res judicata are
present. For sure, our Decision in Santiago v. COMELEC, which was promulgated on 19 March
1997, and the motions for reconsideration thereof denied with finality on 10 June 1997, is
undoubtedly final. The said Decision was rendered by this Court which had jurisdiction over the
petition for prohibition under Rule 65. Our judgment therein was on the merits, i.e., rendered only
after considering the evidence presented by the parties as well as their arguments in support of
their respective claims and defenses. And, as between Santiago v. COMELEC case and
COMELEC Special Matter No. 97-001 subject of the present petition, there is identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action.
Petitioners contend that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC are not identical to the parties in the
instant case as some of the petitioners in the latter case were not parties to the former case.
However, a perusal of the records reveals that the parties in Santiago v. COMELEC included the
COMELEC, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, in their capacities as
founding members of PIRMA, as well as Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra, another founding member of
PIRMA, representing PIRMA, as respondents. In the instant case, Atty. Delfin was never
removed, and the spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa were joined by several others who were
made parties to the petition. In other words, what petitioners did was to make it appear that the
PIRMA Petition was filed by an entirely separate and distinct group by removing some of the
parties involved in Santiago v. COMELEC and adding new parties. But as we said in Geralde v.
Sabido
128
-
A party may not evade the application of the rule of res judicata by simply including
additional parties in the subsequent case or by not including as parties in the later case
persons who were parties in the previous suit. The joining of new parties does not
remove the case from the operation of the rule on res judicata if the party against whom
the judgment is offered in evidence was a party in the first action; otherwise, the parties
might renew the litigation by simply joining new parties.
The fact that some persons or entities joined as parties in the PIRMA petition but were not parties
in Santiago v. COMELEC does not affect the operation of the prior judgment against those parties
to the PIRMA Petition who were likewise parties in Santiago v. COMELEC, as they are bound by
such prior judgment.
Needless to state, the dismissal of the PIRMA petition which was based on res judicata binds only
PIRMA but not the petitioners.
VIII
Finally, let the people speak.
"It is a Constitution we are expounding" solemnly intoned the great Chief Justice John Marshall of
the United States in the 1819 case of M'cCulloch v. Maryland.
129
Our Constitution is not a mere
441

collection of slogans. Every syllable of our Constitution is suffused with significance and requires our full
fealty. Indeed, the rule of law will wither if we allow the commands of our Constitution to underrule us.
The first principle enthroned by blood in our Constitution is the sovereignty of the people. We ought to
be concerned with this first principle, i.e., the inherent right of the sovereign people to decide whether to
amend the Constitution. Stripped of its abstractions, democracy is all about who has the sovereign right
to make decisions for the people and our Constitution clearly and categorically says it is no other than the
people themselves from whom all government authority emanates. This right of the people to make
decisions is the essence of sovereignty, and it cannot receive any minimalist interpretation from
this Court. If there is any principle in the Constitution that cannot be diluted and is non-negotiable, it is
this sovereign right of the people to decide.
This Court should always be in lockstep with the people in the exercise of their sovereignty. Let
them who will diminish or destroy the sovereign right of the people to decide be warned. Let not their
sovereignty be diminished by those who belittle their brains to comprehend changes in the Constitution as
if the people themselves are not the source and author of our Constitution. Let not their sovereignty be
destroyed by the masters of manipulation who misrepresent themselves as the spokesmen of the people.
Be it remembered that a petition for people's initiative that complies with the requirement that it "must be
signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of which every legislative district is
represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein" is but the first step in a long
journey towards the amendment of the Constitution. Lest it be missed, the case at bar involves but
a proposal to amend the Constitution. The proposalwill still be debated by the people and at this time,
there is yet no fail-safe method of telling what will be the result of the debate. There will still be a last
step to the process of amendment which is the ratification of the proposal by a majority of the people in
a plebiscite called for the purpose. Only when the proposal is approved by a majority of the people
in the plebiscite will it become an amendment to the Constitution. All the way, we cannot tie the
tongues of the people. It is the people who decide for the people are not an obscure footnote in
our Constitution.
The people's voice is sovereign in a democracy. Let us hear them. Let us heed them. Let us not
only sing paens to the people's sovereignty. Yes, it is neither too soon nor too late to let the
people speak.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, I vote to REVERSE and SET ASIDE the resolution of the Commission on Elections
dated August 31, 2006, denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by Raul L. Lambino and Erico
B. Aumentado in their own behalf and together with some 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their
signatures thereon and toREMAND the petition at bar to the Commission on Elections for further
proceedings.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent; TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
442

(TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN
MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS, Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC.,
CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L. QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR.,
SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR., ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE
QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA, KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL
BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA, GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE
OF FILIPINO STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR.
REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESIA
HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION
(PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M.
BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR., FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG,
SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P. PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEA
III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P. EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S.
LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG
PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER,
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D. BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANTONIO L.
SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its
President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Oppositors-Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, Petitioners
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
QUISUMBING, J .:
1. With due respect to the main opinion written by J. Antonio T. Carpio, and the dissent of J. Reynato S.
Puno, I view the matter before us in this petition as one mainly involving a complex political
question.
1
While admittedly the present Constitution lays down certain numerical requirements for the
conduct of a People's Initiative, such as the percentages of signatures being 12% of the total number of
registered voters, provided each legislative district is represented by at least 3% they are not the main
points of controversy. Stated in simple terms, what this Court must decide is whether the Commission on
Elections gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition to submit the proposed changes to the
Constitution directly to the vote of the sovereign people in a plebiscite. Technical questions, e.g. whether
petitioners should have filed a Motion for Reconsideration before coming to us, are of no moment in the
face of the transcendental issue at hand. What deserve our full attention are the issues concerning the
applicable rules as well as statutory and constitutional limitations on the conduct of the People's Initiative.
2. It must be stressed that no less than the present Constitution itself empowers the people to "directly"
propose amendments through their own "initiative." The subject of the instant petition is by way of
exercising that initiative in order to change our form of government from presidential to parliamentary.
Much has been written about the fulsome powers of the people in a democracy. But the most basic
concerns the idea that sovereignty resides in the people and that all government authority emanates from
them. Clearly, by the power of popular initiative, the people have the sovereign right to change the
present Constitution. Whether the initial moves are done by a Constitutional Convention, a Constitutional
Assembly, or a People's Initiative, in the end every amendment -- however insubstantial or radical -- must
443

be submitted to a plebiscite. Thus, it is the ultimate will of the people expressed in the ballot, that
matters.
2

3. I cannot fault the COMELEC, frankly, for turning down the petition of Messrs. Lambino, et al. For the
COMELEC was just relying on precedents, with the common understanding that, pursuant to the cases
of Santiago v. COMELEC
3
and PIRMA v. COMELEC,
4
the COMELEC had been permanently enjoined
from entertaining any petition for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution by no less than this Court.
In denying due course below to Messrs. Lambino and Aumentado's petition, I could not hold the
COMELEC liable for grave abuse of discretion when they merely relied on this Court's unequivocal
rulings. Of course, the Santiago and the PIRMA decisions could be reviewed and reversed by this Court,
as J. Reynato S. Puno submits now. But until the Court does so, the COMELEC was duty bound to
respect and obey this Court's mandate, for the rule of law to prevail.
4. Lastly, I see no objection to the remand to the COMELEC of the petition of Messrs. Lambino and
Aumentado and 6.327 million voters, for further examination of the factual requisites before a plebiscite is
conducted. On page 4 of the assailed Resolution of the respondent dated August 31, 2006, the
COMELEC tentatively expressed its view that "even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to
meet the required minimum per centum of the total number of registered voters", the COMELEC could not
give the Petition due course because of our view that R.A. No. 6735 was inadequate. That, however, is
now refuted by Mr. Justice Puno's scholarly ponencia. Now that we have revisited the Santiago v.
COMELEC decision, there is only one clear task for COMELEC. In my view, the only doable option left for
the COMELEC, once factual issues are heard and resolved, is to give due course to the petition for the
initiative to amend our Constitution so that the sovereign people can vote on whether a parliamentary
system of government should replace the present presidential system.
5. I am therefore in favor of letting the sovereign people speak on their choice of the form of government
as a political question soonest. (This I say without fear of media opinion that our judicial independence
has been tainted or imperiled, for it is not.) Thus I vote for the remand of the petition. Thereafter, as
prayed for, COMELEC should forthwith certify the Petition as sufficient in form and substance and call for
the holding of a plebiscite within the period mandated by the basic law, not earlier than sixty nor later than
ninety days from said certification. Only a credible plebiscite itself, conducted peacefully and honestly,
can bring closure to the instant political controversy.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS, petitioners,
vs.
G. R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR. and RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners,
vs.
HE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, SR., and
444

BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DISSENTING OPINION
CORONA, J .:
The life of the law is not logic but experience.
1
Our collective experience as a nation breathes life to our
system of laws, especially to the Constitution. These cases promise to significantly contribute to our
collective experience as a nation. Fealty to the primary constitutional principle that the Philippines is not
merely a republican State but a democratic one as well behooves this Court to affirm the right of the
people to participate directly in the process of introducing changes to their fundamental law. These
petitions present such an opportunity. Thus, this is an opportune time for this Court to uphold the
sovereign rights of the people.
I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato Puno who has sufficiently explained the rationale for
upholding the people's initiative. However, I wish to share my own thoughts on certain matters I deem
material and significant.
Santiago Does Not Apply to This Case But Only to the 1997 Delfin Petition
The COMELEC denied the petition for initiative filed by petitioners purportedly on the basis of this Court's
ruling inSantiago v. COMELEC
2
that: (1) RA 6753 was inadequate to cover the system of initiative
regarding amendments to the Constitution and (2) the COMELEC was permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative regarding amendments to the Constitution
until a sufficient law was validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the initiative provision.
However, Santiago should not apply to this case but only to the petition of Delfin in 1997. It would be
unreasonable to make it apply to all petitions which were yet unforeseen in 1997. The fact is
that Santiago was focused on the Delfin petition alone.
Those who oppose the exercise of the people's right to initiate changes to the Constitution via initiative
claim thatSantiago barred any and all future petitions for initiative by virtue of the doctrines of stare
decisis and res judicata. The argument is flawed.
The ponencia of Mr. Justice Puno has amply discussed the arguments relating to stare decisis. Hence, I
will address the argument from the viewpoint of res judicata.
Res judicata is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a
subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action.
3
It has the following requisites:
(1) the former judgment or order must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties; (3) it must be a judgment or order on the merits and
(4) there must be identity of parties, of subject matter, and of cause of action between the first and
second actions.
4

There is no identity of parties in Santiago and the instant case. While the COMELEC was also the
respondent inSantiago, the petitioners in that case and those in this case are different. More significantly,
there is no identity of causes of action in the two cases. Santiago involved amendments to Sections 4 and
7 of Article VI, Section 4 of Article VII and Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution while the present
petition seeks to amend Sections 1to 7 of Article VI and Sections 1 to 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Clearly,
445

therefore, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the present petition for
initiative was barred by Santiago and, on that ground, dismissed the petition.
The present petition and that in Santiago are materially different from each other. They are not based on
the same facts. There is thus no cogent reason to frustrate and defeat the present direct action of the
people to exercise their sovereignty by proposing changes to their fundamental law.
People's Initiative Should Not
Be Subjected to Conditions
People's initiative is an option reserved by the people for themselves exclusively. Neither Congress nor
the COMELEC has the power to curtail or defeat this exclusive power of the people to change the
Constitution. Neither should the exercise of this power be made subject to any conditions, as some would
have us accept.
Oppositors to the people's initiative point out that this Court ruled in Santiago that RA 6735 was
inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution and, thus, no law existed
to enable the people to directly propose changes to the Constitution. This reasoning is seriously
objectionable.
The pronouncement on the insufficiency of RA 6735 was, to my mind, out of place. It was unprecedented
and dangerously transgressed the domain reserved to the legislature.
While the legislature is authorized to establish procedures for determining the validity and sufficiency of a
petition to amend the constitution,
5
that procedure cannot unnecessarily restrict the initiative privilege.
6
In
the same vein, this Court cannot unnecessarily and unreasonably restrain the people's right to directly
propose changes to the Constitution by declaring a law inadequate simply for lack of a sub-heading and
other grammatical but insignificant omissions. Otherwise, the constitutional intent to empower the people
will be severely emasculated, if not rendered illusory.
People's Right and Power to Propose Changes to the Constitution Directly Should not be
Unreasonably Curtailed
If Congress and a constitutional convention, both of which are mere representative bodies, can propose
changes to the Constitution, there is no reason why the supreme body politic itself the people may not
do sodirectly.
Resort to initiative to amend the constitution or enact a statute is an exercise of "direct democracy" as
opposed to "representative democracy." The system of initiative allows citizens to directly propose
constitutional amendments for the general electorate to adopt or reject at the polls, particularly in a
plebiscite. While representative government was envisioned to "refine and enlarge the public views, by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to
temporary or partial considerations,"
7
the exercise of "direct democracy" through initiative reserves direct
lawmaking power to the people by providing them a method to make new laws via the constitution, or
alternatively by enacting statutes.
8
Efforts of the represented to control their representatives through
initiative have been described as curing the problems of democracy with more democracy.
9

The Constitution celebrates the sovereign right of the people and declares that "sovereignty resides in the
10
Unless the present petition is granted, this
constitutional principle will be nothing but empty rhetoric, devoid of substance for those whom it seeks to
empower.
446

The right of the people to pass legislation and to introduce changes to the Constitution is a fundamental
right and must be jealously guarded.
11
The people should be allowed to directly seek redress of the
problems of society and representative democracy with the constitutional tools they have reserved for
their use alone.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 174513.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153
RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO
MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE
TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L.
QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA,
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA,
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN
JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI
ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,
TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P.
PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P.
EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D.
BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANOTNIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Oppositors-
Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299 entitled
vs.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
447

TINGA, J :
I join in full the opinion of Senior Associate Justice Puno. Its enviable sang-froid, inimitable lucidity, and
luminous scholarship are all so characteristic of the author that it is hardly a waste of pen and ink to write
separately if only to express my deep admiration for his disquisition. It is compelling because it derives
from the fundamental democratic ordinance that sovereignty resides in the people, and it seeks to
effectuate that principle through the actual empowerment of the sovereign people. Justice Puno's opinion
will in the short term engender reactions on its impact on present attempts to amend the Constitution, but
once the political passion of the times have been shorn, it will endure as an unequivocal message to
the taongbayan that they are to be trusted to chart the course of their future.
Nothing that I inscribe will improve on Justice Puno's opinion. I only write separately to highlight a few
other points which also inform my vote to grant the petitions.
I.
I agree with Justice Puno that Santiago v. COMELEC
1
and PIRMA v. COMELEC
2
had not acquired value
as precedent and should be reversed in any case. I add that the Court has long been mindful of the rule
that it necessitates a majority, and not merely a plurality, in order that a decision can stand as precedent.
That principle has informed the members of this Court as they deliberated and voted upon contentious
petitions, even if this consideration is not ultimately reflected on the final draft released for promulgation.
The curious twist to Santiago and PIRMA is that for all the denigration heaped upon Rep. Act No. 6735 in
those cases, the Court did not invalidate any provision of the statute. All the Court said then was that the
law was "inadequate". Since this "inadequate" law was not annulled by the Court, or repealed by
Congress, it remained part of the statute books.
3

I maintain that even if Rep. Act No. 6735 is truly "inadequate", the Court in Santiago should not have
simply let the insufficiency stand given that it was not minded to invalidate the law itself. Article 9 of the
Civil Code provides that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws."
4
As explained by the Court recently in Reyes v. Lim,
5
"[Article 9]
calls for the application of equity, which[, in the revered Justice Cardozo's words,] 'fills the open spaces in
the law.'"
6
Certainly, any court that refuses to rule on an action premised on Rep. Act No. 6735 on the
ground that the law is "inadequate" would have been found in grave abuse of discretion. The previous
failure by the Court to "fill the open spaces" in Santiago further highlights that decision's status as an
unfortunate aberration.
I am mindful of the need to respect stare decisis, to the point of having recently decried a majority ruling
that was clearly minded to reverse several precedents but refused to explicitly say so.
7
Yet the principle is
not immutable.
8
The passionate words of Chief Justice Panganiban in Osmea v. COMELEC
9
bear
quoting:
Before I close, a word about stare decisis. In the present case, the Court is maintaining the ad
ban to be consistent with its previous holding in NPC vs. Comelec. Thus, respondent urges
reverence for the stability of judicial doctrines. I submit, however, that more important than
consistency and stability are the verity, integrity and correctness of jurisprudence. As Dean
Roscoe Pound explains, "Law must be stable but it cannot stand still." Verily, it must correct itself
and move in cadence with the march of the electronic age. Error and illogic should not be
perpetuated. After all, the Supreme Court, in many cases, has deviated from stare decisis and
reversed previous doctrines and decisions.
10
It should do no less in the present case.
11

Santiago established a tenet that the Supreme Court may affirm a law as constitutional, yet declare its
provisions as inadequate to accomplish the legislative purpose, then barred the enforcement of the law.
That ruling is erroneous, illogical, and should not be perpetuated.
448

II.
Following Justice Puno's clear demonstration why Santiago should not be respected as precedent, I
agree that the COMELEC's failure to take cognizance of the petitions as mandated by Rep. Act No. 6735
constitutes grave abuse of discretion correctible through the petitions before this Court.
The Court has consistently held in cases such as Abes v. COMELEC
12
, Sanchez v. COMELEC
13
,
and Sambarani v. COMELEC
14
that "the functions of the COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially
executive and administrative in nature".
15
More pertinently, in Buac v. COMELEC
16
, the Court held that
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC relative to the enforcement and administration of a law relative to a
plebiscite fell under the jurisdiction of the poll body under its constitutional mandate "to enforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of a xxx plebiscite".
17

Rep. Act No. 6735 is a law relative to the conduct of a plebiscite. The primary task of the COMELEC
under Rep. Act No. 6735 is to enforce and administer the said law, functions that are essentially
executive and administrative in nature. Even the subsequent duty of the COMELEC of determining the
sufficiency of the petitions after they have been filed is administrative in character. By any measure, the
COMELEC's failure to perform its executive and administrative functions under Rep. Act No. 6735
constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
III.
It has been argued that the subject petitions for initiative are barred under Republic Act No. 6735 as they
allegedly embrace more than one subject. Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 classifies as a "prohibited
measure," a petition submitted to the electorate that embraces more than one subject.
18
On this point,
reliance is apparently placed on the array of provisions which are to be affected by the amendments
proposed in the initiative petition.
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is a reflection of the long-enshrined constitutional principle that the laws
passed by Congress "shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof".
19
The
one-subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and
are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject and title.
20
An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may
contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject
by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object.
21

The precedents governing the one-subject, one-title rule under the Constitution should apply as well in
the interpretation of Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735. For as long as it can be established that an initiative
petition embraces a single general subject, the petition may be allowed no matter the number of
constitutional provisions proposed for amendment if the amendments are germane to the subject of the
petition.
Both the Sigaw ng Bayan and the Lambino initiative petitions expressly propose the changing of the form
of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-parliamentary. Such a proposal may strike as
comprehensive, necessitating as it will the reorganization of the executive and legislative branches of
government, nevertheless it ineluctably encompasses only a single general subject still.
The 1987 Constitution (or any constitution for that matter) is susceptible to division into several general
spheres. To cite the broadest of these spheres by way of example, Article III enumerates the guaranteed
rights of the people under the Bill of Rights; Articles VI, VII and VIII provide for the organizational structure
of government; while Articles II, XII, XIII & XIV, XV and XVI enunciate policy principles of the State. What
would clearly be prohibited under Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735 is an initiative petition that seeks to
amend provisions which do not belong to the same sphere. For example, had a single initiative petition
449

sought not only to change the form of government from presidential to parliamentary but also to amend
the Bill of Rights, said petition would arguably have been barred under Section 10, as that petition
ostensibly embraces more than one subject, with each subject bearing no functional relation to the other.
But that is not the case with the present initiative petitions.
Neither can it be argued that the initiative petitions embrace more than one subject since the proposed
amendments seek to affect two separate branches of government. The very purpose of the initiative
petitions is to fuse the powers of the executive and legislative branches of government; hence, the
amendments intended to effect such general intent necessarily affects the two branches. If it required that
to propose a shift in government from presidential to parliamentary, the amendments to Article VII
(Executive Branch) have to be segregated to a different petition from that which would propose
amendments to Article VI (Legislative Branch), then the result would be two initiative petitions both
subject to separate authentications, consideration and even plebiscites, all to effect one general
proposition. This scenario, which entertains the possibility that one petition would ultimately fail while the
other succeeds, could thus allow for the risk that the executive branch could be abolished without
transferring executive power to the legislative branch. An absurd result, indeed.
I am not even entirely comfortable with the theoretical underpinnings of Section 10. The Constitution
indubitably grants the people the right to seek amendment of the charter through initiative, and mandates
Congress to "provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right." In doing so, Congress may not
restrict the right to initiative on grounds that are not provided for in the Constitution. If for example the
implementing law also provides that certain provisions of the Constitution may not be amended through
initiative, that prohibition should not be sustained. Congress is tasked with the implementation, and not
the restriction of the right to initiative.
The one-subject requirement under Section 10 is not provided for as a bar to amendment under the
Constitution. Arguments can be supplied for the merit of such a requirement, since it would afford a
measure of orderliness when the vital question of amending the Constitution arises. The one-subject
requirement does allow the voters focus when deliberating whether or not to vote for the amendments.
These factors of desirability nonetheless fail to detract from the fact that the one-subject requirement
imposes an additional restriction on the right to initiative not contemplated by the Constitution. Short of
invalidating the requirement, a better course of action would be to insist upon its liberal interpretation.
After all, the Court has consistently adhered to a liberal interpretation of the one-subject, one-title
rule.
22
There is no cause to adopt a stricter interpretative rule with regard to the one-subject rule under
Section 10 of Rep. Act No. 6735.
IV.
During the hearing on the petitions, the argument was raised that provisions of the Constitution amended
through initiative would not have the benefit of a reference source from the record of a deliberative body
such as Congress or a constitutional convention. It was submitted that this consideration influenced the
Constitutional Commission as it drafted Section 2, Article XVII, which expressly provided that only
amendments, and not revisions, may be the subject of initiative petitions.
This argument clearly proceeds from a premise that accords supreme value to the record of deliberations
of a constitutional convention or commission in the interpretation of the charter. Yet if the absence of a
record of deliberations stands as so serious a flaw as to invalidate or constrict processes which change a
constitution or its provisions, then the entire initiative process authorized by the Constitution should be
scarlet-marked as well.
Even if this position can be given any weight in the consideration of these petitions, I would like to point
out that resort to the records of deliberations is only one of many aids to constitutional construction. For
one, it should be abhorred if the provision under study is itself clear, plain, and free from ambiguity. As the
Court held in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:
23

450

While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the
constitutional convention in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution,
resort thereto may be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary
the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention
"are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the reasons for
their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk . . . We
think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face."
24

Even if there is need to refer to extrinsic sources in aid of constitutional interpretation, the constitutional
record does not provide the exclusive or definitive answer on how to interpret the provision. The intent of
a constitutional convention is not controlling by itself, and while the historical discussion on the floor of the
constitutional convention is valuable, it is not necessarily decisive. The Court has even held in Vera v.
Avelino
25
that "the proceedings of the [constitutional] convention are less conclusive of the proper
construction of the fundamental law than are legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a
statute, since in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature that courts seek, while in the former courts
are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives."
26
The proper interpretation of a constitution depends more on how it was understood by
the people adopting it than the framers' understanding thereof.
27

If there is fear in the absence of a constitutional record as guide for interpretation of any amendments
adopted via initiative, such absence would not preclude the courts from interpreting such amendments in
a manner consistent with how courts generally construe the Constitution. For example, reliance will be
placed on the other provisions of the Constitution to arrive at a harmonized and holistic constitutional
framework. The constitutional record is hardly the Rosetta Stone that unlocks the meaning of the
Constitution.
V.
I fully agree with Justice Puno that all issues relating to the sufficiency of the initiative petitions should be
remanded to the COMELEC. Rep. Act No. 6735 clearly reposes on the COMELEC the task of
determining the sufficiency of the petitions, including the ascertainment of whether twelve percent (12%)
of all registered voters, including three percent (3%) of registered voters in every legislative district have
indeed signed the initiative petitions.
28
It should be remembered that the COMELEC had dismissed the
initiative petitions outright, and had yet to undertake the determination of sufficiency as required by law.
It has been suggested to the end of leading the Court to stifle the initiative petitions that the Court may at
this juncture pronounce the initiative petitions as insufficient. The derivation of the factual predicates
leading to the suggestion is uncertain, considering that the trier of facts, the COMELEC in this instance,
has yet to undertake the necessary determination. Still, the premise has been floated that petitioners
have made sufficient admissions before this Court that purportedly established the petitions are
insufficient.
That premise is highly dubitable. Yet the more fundamental question that we should ask, I submit, is
whether it serves well on the Court to usurp trier of facts even before the latter exercises its functions? If
the Court, at this stage, were to declare the petitions as insufficient, it would be akin to the Court
pronouncing an accused as guilty even before the lower court trial had began.
Matugas v. COMELEC
29
inveighs against the propriety of the Court uncharacteristically assuming the role
of trier of facts, and resolving factual questions not previously adjudicated by the lower courts or tribunals:
[P]etitioner in this case cannot "enervate" the COMELEC's findings by introducing new evidence
before this Court, which in any case is not a trier of facts, and then ask it to substitute its
own judgment and discretion for that of the COMELEC.
451

The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the first time on
appeal, and documents forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be
considered in disposing of the issues of an action. This is true whether the decision elevated for
review originated from a regular court or an administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, and
whether it was rendered in a civil case, a special proceeding, or a criminal case. Piecemeal
presentation of evidence is simply not in accord with orderly justice.
30

Any present determination by the Court on the sufficiency of the petitions constitutes in effect a trial de
novo, the Justices of the Supreme Court virtually descending to the level of trial court judges. This is an
unbecoming recourse, and it simply is not done.
VI.
The worst position this Court could find itself in is to acquiesce to a plea that it make the choice whether
to amend the Constitution or not. This is a matter which should not be left to fifteen magistrates who have
not been elected by the people to make the choice for them.
A vote to grant the petitions is not a vote to amend the 1987 Constitution. It is merely a vote to allow the
people to directly exercise that option. In fact, the position of Justice Puno which I share would not even
guarantee that the Lambino and Sigaw ng Bayan initiative petitions would be submitted to the people in a
referendum. The COMELEC will still have to determine the sufficiency of the petition. Among the
questions which still have to be determined by the poll body in considering the sufficiency of the petitions
is whether twelve percent (12%) of all registered voters nationwide, including three percent (3%) of
registered voters in every legislative district, have indeed signed the initiative petitions.
31

And even should the COMELEC find the initiative petitions sufficient, the matter of whether the
Constitution should be amended would still depend on the choice of the electorate. The oppositors are
clearly queasy about some of the amendments proposed, or the imputed motives behind the
amendments. A referendum, should the COMELEC find the petitions as sufficient, would allow them to
convey their uneasiness to the public at large, as well as for the proponents of the amendment to defend
their proposal. The campaign period alone would allow the public to be involved in the significant
deliberation on the course our nation should take, with the ensuing net benefit of a more informed, more
politically aware populace. And of course, the choice on whether the Constitution should be amended
would lie directly with the people. The initiative process involves participatory democracy at its most
elemental; wherein the consequential debate would not be confined to the august halls of Congress or
the hallowed chambers of this Court, as it would spill over to the public squares and town halls, the
academic yards and the Internet blogosphere, the dining areas in the homes of the affluent and the
impoverished alike.
The prospect of informed and widespread discussion on constitutional change engaged in by a people
who are actually empowered in having a say whether these changes should be enacted, gives fruition to
the original vision of pure democracy, as formulated in Athens two and a half millennia ago. The great
hero of Athenian democracy, Pericles, was recorded as saying in his famed Funeral Oration, "We differ
from other states in regarding the man who keeps aloof from public life not as 'private' but as useless; we
decide or debate, carefully and in person all matters of policy, and we hold, not that words and
deeds go ill together, but that acts are foredoomed to failure when undertaken undiscussed."
32

Unfortunately, given the highly politicized charge of the times, it has been peddled that an act or vote that
assists the initiative process is one for the willful extinction of democracy or democratic institutions. Such
a consideration should of course properly play its course in the public debates and deliberations attendant
to the initiative process. Yet as a result of the harum-scarum, the temptation lies heavy for a member of
this Court perturbed with the prospect of constitutional change to relieve those anxieties by simply voting
to enjoin any legal procedure that initiates the amendment or revision of the fundamental law, even at the
expense of the people's will or what the Constitution allows. A vote so oriented takes the conservative
452

path of least resistance, even as it may gain the admiration of those who do not want to see the
Constitution amended.
Still, the biases we should enforce as magistrates are those of the Constitution and the elements of
democracy on which our rule of law is founded. Direct democracy, as embodied in the initiative process,
is but a culmination of the evolution over the centuries of democratic rights of choice and self-governance.
The reemergence of the Athenian democratic ideal after centuries of tyrannical rules arrived very slowly,
the benefits parceled out at first only to favored classes. The Magna Carta granted limited rights to self-
determination and self-governance only to a few English nobles; the American Constitution was originally
intended to give a meaningful voice only to free men, mostly Caucasian, who met the property-holding
requirements set by the states for voting. Yet even the very idea of popular voting, limited as it may have
already been within the first few years of the American Union, met resistance from no less a revered
figure as Alexander Hamilton, to whom the progressive historian Howard Zinn attributes these
disconcerting words:
The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim
has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they
seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct permanent share in the
government Can a democratic assembly who annually revolve in the mass of the people be
supposed steadily to pursue the public good? Nothing but a permanent body can check the
imprudence of democracy
33

This utterly paternalistic and bigoted view has not survived into the present age of modern democracy
where a person's poverty, color, or gender no longer impedes the exercise of full democratic rights. Yet a
democracy that merely guarantees its citizens the right to live their lives freely is incomplete if there is no
corresponding allowance for a means by which the people have a direct choice in determining their
country's direction. Initiative as a mode of amending a constitution may seem incompatible with
representative democracy, yet it embodies an even purer form of democracy. Initiative, which our 1987
Constitution saw fit to grant to the people, is a progressive measure that is but a continuation of the line of
evolution of the democratic ideal.
By allowing the sovereign people to directly propose and enact constitutional amendments, the initiative
process should be acknowledged as the purest implement of democratic rule under law. This right
granted to over sixty million Filipinos cannot be denied by the votes of less than eight magistrates for
reasons that bear no cogitation on the Constitution.
I VOTE to GRANT the petitions.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G. R. No. 174153
RAUL LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED
VOTERS, Petitioners
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent;
TRADE UNION CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (TUCP), RONALD L. ADAMAT, ROLANDO
MANUEL RIVERA, RUELO BAYA, SULONGBAYAN MOVEMENT FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE
453

TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS ORGANIZATION (PTGWO) and VICTORINO F. BALAIS,
Petitioners-Intervenors; ONE VOICE INC., CHRISTIAN S. MONSOD, RENE B. AZURIN, MANUEL L.
QUEZON III, BENJAMIN T. TOLOSA, JR., SUSAN V. OPLE and CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR.,
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC., ATTY. PETE QUIRINO-QUADRA, BAYAN, BAYAN MUNA,
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, HEAD, ECUMENICAL BISHOPS FORUM, MIGRANTE, GABRIELA,
GABRIELA WOMEN'S PARTY, ANAKBAYAN, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS, LEONADO SAN
JOSE, JOJO PINEDA, DR. DARBY SANTIAGO, and DR. REGINALD PAMUGAS, LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, MARIO JOYO AGUJA, ANA THERESIA HONTIVEROS-BARAQUEL, LUWALHATI
ANTONINO, PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), CONRADO F. ESTRELLA,
TOMAS C. TOLEDO, MARIANO M. TAJON, FROILAN M. BACUNGAN, JOAQUIN T. VENUS, JR.,
FORTUNATO P. AGUAS, and AMADO GAT INCIONG, SENATE MINORITY LEADER AQUILINO P.
PIMENTEL, JR., and SENATORS SERGIO R. OSMEA III, JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, LUISA P.
EJERCITO-ESTRADA, JINGGOY ESTRADA, ALFREDO S. LIM and PANFILO M. LACSON, JOSEPH
EJERCITO ESTRADA and PWERSA NG MASANG PILIPINO, INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES CEBU CITY CHAPTER and CEBU CHAPTER, JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, BYRON D.
BOCAR, MA. TANYA KARINA A. LAT, ANOTNIO L. SALVADOR and RANDALL C. TABAYOYONG,
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by its President, MANUEL VILLAR, JR., Oppositors-
Intervenors;
G.R. No. 174299
vs.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DISSENTING OPINION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
"The people made the constitution, and the people can unmake it. It is the creature of their will, and lives
only by their will. But this supreme and irresistible power to make or unmake, resides only in the whole
body of the people; not in any subdivision of them."
-- Marshall, C.J., Cohens v. Virginia (1821, US) 6 Wheat 264, 389, 5 L ed. 257, 287.
I express my concurrence in the discussions and conclusions presented in the persuasive and erudite
dissent of Justice Reynato S. Puno. However, I make some additional observations in connection with my
concurrence.
While it is but proper to accord great respect and reverence to the Philippine Constitution of 1987 for
being the supreme law of the land, we should not lose sight of the truth that there is an ultimate authority
to which the Constitution is also subordinate the will of the people. No less than its very first
paragraph, the Preamble,
1
expressly recognizes that the Constitution came to be because it was ordained
and promulgated by the sovereign Filipino people. It is a principle reiterated yet again in Article II, Section
1, of the Constitution, which explicitly declares that "[t]he Philippines is a democratic and republican State.
Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." Thus, the
resolution of the issues and controversies raised by the instant Petition should be guided accordingly by
the foregoing principle.
454

If the Constitution is the expression of the will of the sovereign people, then, in the event that the people
change their will, so must the Constitution be revised or amended to reflect such change. Resultantly, the
right to revise or amend the Constitution inherently resides in the sovereign people whose will it is
supposed to express and embody. The Constitution itself, under Article XVII, provides for the means by
which the revision or amendment of the Constitution may be proposed and ratified.
Under Section 1 of the said Article, proposals to amend or revise the Constitution may be made (a) by
Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or (b) by constitutional convention. The
Congress and the constitutional convention possess the power to propose amendments to, or revisions
of, the Constitution not simply because the Constitution so provides, but because the sovereign people
had chosen to delegate their inherent right to make such proposals to their representatives either through
Congress or through a constitutional convention.
On the other hand, the sovereign people, well-inspired and greatly empowered by the People Power
Revolution of 1986, reserved to themselves the right to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through initiative, to wit
2

The afore-quoted section does not confer on the Filipino people the right to amend the Constitution
because, as previously discussed, such right is inherent in them. The section only reduces into writing
this right to initiate amendments to the Constitution where they collectively and willfully agreed in the
manner by which they shall exercise this right: (a) through the filing of a petition; (b) supported by at least
twelve percent (12%) of the total number of registered voters nationwide; (c) with each legislative district
represented by at least three percent (3%) of the registered voters therein; (d) subject to the limitation that
no such petition may be filed within five years after the ratification of the Constitution, and not oftener than
once every five years thereafter; and (e) a delegation to Congress of the authority to provide the formal
requirements and other details for the implementation of the right.
It is my earnest opinion that the right of the sovereign people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through initiative is more superior than the power they delegated to Congress or to a
constitutional convention to amend or revise the Constitution. The initiative process gives the sovereign
people the voice to express their collective will, and when the people speak, we must be ready to listen.
Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution recognizes and guarantees the sovereign people's right to
initiative, rather than limits it. The enabling law which Congress has been tasked to enact must give life to
the said provision and make the exercise of the right to initiative possible, not regulate, limit, or restrict it
in any way that would render the people's option of resorting to initiative to amend the Constitution more
stringent, difficult, and less feasible, as compared to the other constitutional means to amend or revise
the Constitution. In fact, it is worth recalling that under Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution, the
legislative power of Congress is limited to the extent reserved to the people by the provisions on
It is with this frame of mind that I review the issues raised in the instant Petitions, and which has led me to
the conclusions, in support of the dissent of Justice Puno, that (a) The Commission on Election
(COMELEC) had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for
initiative to amend the Constitution filed by herein petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado;
(b) The Court should revisit the pronouncements it made in Santiago v. Commission on Elections;
3
(c) It is
the sovereign people's inherent right to propose changes to the Constitution, regardless of whether they
455

constitute merely amendments or a total revision thereof; and (d) The COMELEC should take cognizance
of Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative and, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, determine the
factual issues raised by the oppositors before this Court.
I
The COMELEC had indeed committed grave abuse of discretion when it summarily dismissed Lambino
and Aumentado's petition for initiative entirely on the basis of the Santiago case which, allegedly,
permanently enjoined it from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution in the absence of a sufficient law.
After a careful reading, however, of the Santiago case, I believe in earnest that the permanent injunction
actually issued by this Court against the COMELEC pertains only to the petition for initiative filed by Jesus
S. Delfin, and not to all subsequent petitions for initiative to amend the Constitution.
The Conclusion
4
in the majority opinion in the Santiago case reads
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
system.
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-
037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against
the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
It is clear from the fallo, as it is reproduced above, that the Court made permanent the Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) it issued on 18 December 1996 against the COMELEC. The said TRO enjoined
the COMELEC from proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for people's initiative.
5
It was this restraining order, more particularly the
portion thereof referring to the Delfin Petition, which was expressly made permanent by the Court. It
456

would seem to me that the COMELEC and all other oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for
initiative gave unwarranted significance and weight to the first paragraph of the Conclusion in
the Santiago case. The first and second paragraphs of the Conclusion, preceding the dispositive
portion, merely express the opinion of the ponente; while the definite orders of the Court for
implementation are found in the dispositive portion.
We have previously held that
The dispositive portion or the fallo is what actually constitutes the resolution of the court and
which is the subject of execution, although the other parts of the decision may be resorted to in
order to determine the ratio decidendi for such a resolution. Where there is conflict between the
dispositive part and the opinion of the court contained in the text of the decision, the former must
prevail over the latter on the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order while the opinion
is merely a statement ordering nothing. Hence execution must conform more particularly to that
ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.
6

Is there a conflict between the first paragraph of the Conclusion and the dispositive portion of
the Santiago case? Apparently, there is. The first paragraph of the Conclusion states that the COMELEC
should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution until the enactment of a valid law. On the other hand, the fallo only
makes permanent the TRO
7
against COMELEC enjoining it from proceeding with the Delfin Petition.
While the permanent injunction contemplated in the Conclusion encompasses all petitions for initiative on
amendments to the Constitution, the fallo is expressly limited to the Delfin Petition. To resolve the conflict,
the final order of the Court as it is stated in the dispositive portion or the fallo should be controlling.
Neither can the COMELEC dismiss Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative on the basis of this
Court's Resolution, dated 23 September 1997, in the case of People's Initiative for Reform, Modernization
and Action (PIRMA) v. The Commission on Elections, et al.
8
The Court therein found that the COMELEC
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the PIRMA Petition for initiative to amend the
Constitution for it only complied with the Decision in the Santiago case.
It is only proper that the Santiago case should also bar the PIRMA Petition on the basis of res
judicata because PIRMA participated in the proceedings of the said case, and had knowledge of and,
thus, must be bound by the judgment of the Court therein. As explained by former Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. in his separate opinion to the Resolution in the PIRMA case
First, it is barred by res judicata. No one aware of the pleadings filed here and in Santiago v.
COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997) may plead ignorance of the fact that the former is
substantially identical to the latter, except for the reversal of the roles played by the principal
parties and inclusion of additional, yet not indispensable, parties in the present petition. But
plainly, the same issues and reliefs are raised and prayed for in both cases.
The principal petitioner here is the PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE FOR REFORM, MODERNIZATION,
AND ACTION (PIRMA) and Spouses ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA. PIRMA is
self-described as "a non-stock, non-profit organization duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws with office address at Suite 403, Fedman Suites, 199 Salcedo Street, Legaspi
Village, Makati City," with "ALBERTO PEDROSA and CARMEN PEDROSA" as among its
"officers." In Santiago, the PEDROSAS were made respondents as founding members of PIRMA
which, as alleged in the body of the petition therein, "proposes to undertake the signature drive
for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution." In Santiago then, the PEDROSAS were sued
in their capacity as founding members of PIRMA.
The decision in Santiago specifically declared that PIRMA was duly represented at the hearing of
the Delfin petition in the COMELEC. In short, PIRMA was intervenor-petitioner
457

therein. Delfin alleged in his petition that he was a founding member of the Movement for
People's Initiative, and under footnote no. 6 of the decision, it was noted that said movement was
"[l]ater identified as the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action, or PIRMA for
brevity." In their Comment to the petition in Santiago, the PEDROSA'S did not deny that they
were founding members of PIRMA, and by their arguments, demonstrated beyond a shadow of a
doubt that they had joined Delfin or his cause.
No amount of semantics may then shield herein petitioners PIRMA and the PEDROSAS, as well
as the others joining them, from the operation of the principle of res judicata, which needs no
further elaboration.
9

While the Santiago case bars the PIRMA case because of res judicata, the same cannot be said to the
Petition at bar. Res judicata is an absolute bar to a subsequent action for the same cause; and its
requisites are: (a) the former judgment or order must be final; (b) the judgment or order must be one on
the merits; (c) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
parties; and (d) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter
and of causes of action.
10

Even though it is conceded that the first three requisites are present herein, the last has not been
complied with. Undoubtedly, the Santiago case and the present Petition involve different parties, subject
matter, and causes of action, and the former should not bar the latter.
In the Santiago case, the petition for initiative to amend the Constitution was filed by Delfin alone. His
petition does not qualify as the initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC can acquire jurisdiction,
being unsupported by the required number of registered voters, and actually imposing upon the
COMELEC the task of gathering the voters' signatures. In the case before us, the petition for initiative to
amend the Constitution was filed by Lambino and Aumentado, on behalf of the 6.3 million registered
voters who affixed their signatures on the signature sheets attached thereto. Their petition prays that the
COMELEC issue an Order
1. Finding the petition to be sufficient pursuant to Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution;
2. Directing the publication of the petition in Filipino and English at least twice in newspapers of
Certification by the COMELEC of the sufficiency of the petition, to allow the Filipino people to
express their sovereign will on the proposition.
Although both cases involve the right of the people to initiate amendments to the Constitution, the
personalities concerned and the other factual circumstances attendant in the two cases differ. Also
dissimilar are the particular prayer and reliefs sought by the parties from the COMELEC, as well as from
this Court. For these reasons, I find that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
summarily dismissed the petition for initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado. It behooves the
COMELEC to accord due course to a petition which on its face complies with the rudiments of the law.
COMELEC was openly negligent in summarily dismissing the Lambino and Aumentado petition. The
haste by which the instant Petition was struck down is characteristic of bad faith, which, to my mind, is a
patent and gross evasion of COMELEC's positive duty. It has so obviously copped out of its duty and
responsibility to determine the sufficiency thereof and sought protection and justification for its craven
decision in the supposed permanent injunction issued against it by the Court in the Santiago case. The
COMELEC had seemingly expanded the scope and application of the said permanent injunction, reading
into it more than what it actually states, which is surprising, considering that the Chairman and majority of
the members of COMELEC are lawyers who should be able to understand and appreciate, more than a
458

lay person, the legal consequences and intricacies of the pronouncements made by the Court in the
Santiago case and the permanent injunction issued therein.
No less than the Constitution itself, under the second paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, imposes upon
the COMELEC the mandate to set a date for plebiscite after a positive determination of the sufficiency of
a petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution, viz
SEC. 4. x x x
As a rule, the word "shall" commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion, and that the presumption is that the word "shall" when used, is mandatory.
11
Under the above-
quoted constitutional provision, it is the mandatory or imperative obligation of the COMELEC to (a)
determine the sufficiency of the petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution and issue a
certification on its findings; and (b) in case such petition is found to be sufficient, to set the date for the
plebiscite on the proposed amendments not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after its
certification. The COMELEC should not be allowed to shun its constitutional mandate under the second
paragraph of Article XVII, Section 4, through the summary dismissal of the petition for initiative filed by
Lambino and Aumentado, when such petition is supported by 6.3 million signatures of registered voters.
Should all of these signatures be authentic and representative of the required percentages of registered
voters for every legislative district and the whole nation, then the initiative is a true and legitimate
expression of the will of the people to amend the Constitution, and COMELEC had caused them grave
injustice by silencing their voice based on a patently inapplicable permanent injunction.
II
We should likewise take the opportunity to revisit the pronouncements made by the Court in its Decision
in theSantiago case, especially as regards the supposed insufficiency or inadequacy of Republic Act No.
6735 as the enabling law for the implementation of the people's right to initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
The declaration of the Court that Republic Act No. 6735 is insufficient or inadequate actually gave rise to
more questions rather than answers, due to the fact that there has never been a judicial precedent
wherein the Court invalidated a law for insufficiency or inadequacy. The confusion over such a declaration
thereby impelled former Chief Justice Davide, Jr., the ponente in the Santiago case, to provide the
following clarification in his separate opinion to the Resolution in the PIRMA case, thus
Simply put, Santiago did, in reality, declare as unconstitutional that portion of R.A. No. 6735
relating to Constitutional initiatives for failure to comply with the "completeness and sufficient
standard tests" with respect to permissible delegation of legislative power or subordinate
legislation. However petitioners attempt to twist the language in Santiago, the conclusion is
inevitable; the portion of R.A. No. 6735 was held to be unconstitutional.
It is important to note, however, that while the Decision in the Santiago case pronounced repeatedly that
Republic Act No. 6735 was insufficient and inadequate, there is no categorical declaration therein that the
said statute was unconstitutional. The express finding that Republic Act No. 6735 is unconstitutional can
only be found in the separate opinion of former Chief Justice Davide to the Resolution in the PIRMA case,
which was not concurred in by the other members of the Court.
459

Even assuming arguendo that the declaration in the Santiago case, that Republic Act No. 6735 is
insufficient and inadequate, is already tantamount to a declaration that the statute is unconstitutional, it
was rendered in violation of established rules in statutory construction, which state that
[A]ll presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt (Victoriano v. Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [19741). In fact, this Court does not decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases
and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be lis mota
presented (Tropical Homes v. National Housing Authority, 152 SCRA 540 [1987]).
First, the Court, in the Santiago case, could have very well avoided the issue of constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 6735 by ordering the COMELEC to dismiss the Delfin petition for the simple reason that
it does not constitute an initiatory pleading over which the COMELEC could acquire jurisdiction. And
second, the unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 has not been adequately shown. It was by and
large merely inferred or deduced from the way Republic Act No. 6735 was worded and the provisions
thereof arranged and organized by Congress. The dissenting opinions rendered by several Justices in the
Santiago case reveal the other side to the argument, adopting the more liberal interpretation that would
allow the Court to sustain the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735. It would seem that the majority in
the Santiago case failed to heed the rule that all presumptions should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of the statute.
The Court, acting en banc on the Petition at bar, can revisit its Decision in the Santiago case and again
open to judicial review the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735; in which case, I shall cast my vote in
favor of its constitutionality, having satisfied the completeness and sufficiency of standards tests for the
valid delegation of legislative power. I fully agree in the conclusion made by Justice Puno on this matter in
his dissenting opinion
12
in the Santiago case, that reads
R.A. No. 6735 sufficiently states the policy and the standards to guide the COMELEC in
promulgating the law's implementing rules and regulations of the law. As aforestated, Section 2
spells out the policy of the law; viz: "The power of the people under a system of initiative and
referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution,
laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the
requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and guaranteed." Spread out all over R.A.
No. 6735 are the standards to canalize the delegated power to the COMELEC to promulgate
rules and regulations from overflowing. Thus, the law states the number of signatures necessary
to start a people's initiative, directs how initiative proceeding is commenced, what the COMELEC
should do upon filing of the petition for initiative, how a proposition is approved, when a plebiscite
may be held, when the amendment takes effect, and what matters may not be the subject of any
initiative. By any measure, these standards are adequate.
III
The dissent of Justice Puno has already a well-presented discourse on the difference between an
"amendment" and a "revision" of the Constitution. Allow me also to articulate my additional thoughts on
the matter.
Oppositors to Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative argue that the proposed changes therein to
the provisions of the Constitution already amount to a revision thereof, which is not allowed to be done
through people's initiative; Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution on people's initiative refers only to
proposals for amendments to the Constitution. They assert the traditional distinction between an
amendment and a revision, with amendment referring to isolated or piecemeal change only, while revision
as a revamp or rewriting of the whole instrument.
13

460

However, as pointed out by Justice Puno in his dissent, there is no quantitative or qualitative test that can
establish with definiteness the distinction between an amendment and a revision, or between a
substantial and simple change of the Constitution.
The changes proposed to the Constitution by Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative basically
affect only Article VI on the Legislative Department and Article VII on the Executive Department. While
the proposed changes will drastically alter the constitution of our government by vesting both legislative
and executive powers in a unicameral Parliament, with the President as the Head of State and the Prime
Minister exercising the executive power; they would not essentially affect the other 16 Articles of the
Constitution. The 100 or so changes counted by the oppositors to the other provisions of the Constitution
are constituted mostly of the nominal substitution of one word for the other, such as Parliament for
Congress, or Prime Minister for President. As eloquently pointed out in the dissent of Justice Puno, the
changes proposed to transform our form of government from bicameral-presidential to unicameral-
parliamentary, would not affect the fundamental nature of our state as a democratic and republican state.
It will still be a representative government where officials continue to be accountable to the people and
the people maintain control over the government through the election of members of the Parliament.
Furthermore, should the people themselves wish to change a substantial portion or even the whole of the
Constitution, what or who is to stop them? Article XVII, Section 2 of the Constitution which, by the way it
is worded, refers only to their right to initiative on amendments of the Constitution? The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention who, according to their deliberations, purposely limited Article XVII, Section 2
of the Constitution to amendments? This Court which has the jurisdiction to interpret the provision?
Bearing in mind my earlier declaration that the will of the sovereign people is supreme, there is nothing or
no one that can preclude them from initiating changes to the Constitution if they choose to do so. To
reiterate, the Constitution is supposed to be the expression and embodiment of the people's will, and
should the people's will clamor for a revision of the Constitution, it is their will which should prevail. Even
the fact that the people ratified the 1987 Constitution, including Article XVII, Section 2 thereof, as it is
worded, should not prevent the exercise by the sovereign people of their inherent right to change the
Constitution, even if such change would be tantamount to a substantial amendment or revision thereof,
for their actual exercise of the said right should be a clear renunciation of the limitation which the said
provision imposes upon it. It is the inherent right of the people as sovereign to change the Constitution,
regardless of the extent thereof.
IV
Lastly, I fail to see the injustice in allowing the COMELEC to give due course to and take cognizance of
Lambino and Aumentado's petition for initiative to amend the Constitution. I reiterate that it would be a
greater evil if one such petition which is ostensibly supported by the required number of registered voters
all over the country, be summarily dismissed.
Giving due course and taking cognizance of the petition would not necessarily mean that the same would
be found sufficient and set for plebiscite. The COMELEC still faces the task of reviewing the petition to
determine whether it complies with the requirements for a valid exercise of the right to initiative. Questions
raised by the oppositors to the petition, such as those on the authenticity of the registered voters'
signatures or compliance with the requisite number of registered voters for every legislative district, are
already factual in nature and require the reception and evaluation of evidence of the parties. Such
questions are best presented and resolved before the COMELEC since this Court is not a trier of facts.
In view of the foregoing, I am of the position that the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 31 August 2006
denying due course to the Petition for Initiative filed by Lambino and Aumentado be reversed and set
aside for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and that the
Petition be remanded to the COMELEC for further proceedings.
In short, I vote to GRANT the petition for Initiative of Lambino and Aumentado.
461

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
____________________
EN BANC
G.R. No. 174153 October 25, 2006
RAUL L. LAMBINO and ERICO B. AUMENTADO, together with 6,327,952 REGISTERED VOTERS,
petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. 174299 October 25, 2006
MAR-LEN ABIGAIL BINAY, SOFRONIO UNTALAN, JR., and RENE A. Q. SAGUISAG, petitioners
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Represented by Chairman BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, JR., and
BRAWNER, RENE V. SARMIENTO, and John Doe and Peter Doe, respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
SEPARATE OPINION
VELASCO, JR., J .:
Introduction
The fate of every democracy, of every government based on the Sovereignty of
the people, depends on the choices it makes between these opposite principles:
absolute power on the one hand, and on the other the restraints of legality and
the authority of tradition.
John Acton
In this thorny matter of the people's initiative, I concur with the erudite and highly persuasive opinion of
Justice Reynato S. Puno upholding the people's initiative and raise some points of my own.
The issue of the people's power to propose amendments to the Constitution was once discussed in the
landmark case of Santiago v. COMELEC.
1
Almost a decade later, the issue is once again before the
Court, and I firmly believe it is time to reevaluate the pronouncements made in that case.
The issue of Charter Change is one that has sharply divided the nation, and its proponents and
opponents will understandably take all measures to advance their position and defeat that of their
opponents. The wisdom or folly of Charter Change does not concern the Court. The only thing that the
Court must review is the validity of the present step taken by the proponents of Charter Change, which is
the People's Initiative, as set down in Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution:
Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following
the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
462

In the Santiago case, the Court discussed whether the second paragraph of that section had been
fulfilled. It determined that Congress had not provided for the implementation of the exercise of the
people's initiative, when it held that Republic Act No. 6735, or "The Initiative and Referendum Act," was
"inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and to have failed to
provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation."
2

With all due respect to those Justices who made that declaration, I must disagree.
Republic Act No. 6735 is the proper law for proposing constitutional amendments and it should
not have been considered inadequate.
The decision in Santiago focused on what it perceived to be fatal flaws in the drafting of the law, in the
failings of the way the law was structured, to come to the conclusion that the law was inadequate. The
Court itself recognized the legislators' intent, but disregarded this intent. The law was found wanting. The
Court then saw the inclusion of the Constitution in RA 6735 as an afterthought. However, it was included,
and it should not be excluded by the Court via a strained analysis of the law. The difficult construction of
the law should not serve to frustrate the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution: to give the people
the power to propose amendments as they saw fit. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that the
intent of the legislature is the controlling factor in the interpretation of a statute.
3
The intent of the
legislature was clear, and yet RA 6735 was declared inadequate. It was not specifically struck down or
declared unconstitutional, merely incomplete. The Court focused on what RA 6735 was not, and lost sight
of what RA 6735 was.
It is my view that the reading of RA 6735 in Santiago should have been more flexible. It is also a basic
precept of statutory construction that statutes should be construed not so much according to the letter
that killeth but in line with the purpose for which they have been enacted.
4
The reading of the law should
not have been with the view of its defeat, but with the goal of upholding it, especially with its avowed
noble purpose.
Congress has done its part in empowering the people themselves to propose amendments to the
Constitution, in accordance with the Constitution itself. It should not be the Supreme Court that stifles the
people, and lets their cries for change go unheard, especially when the Constitution itself grants them that
power.
The court's ruling in the Santiago case does not bar the present petition because the fallo in the
Santiago case is limited to the Delfin petition.
The Santiago case involved a petition for prohibition filed by Miriam Defensor-Santiago, et al., against the
COMELEC, et al., which sought to prevent the COMELEC from entertaining the "Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" filed by Atty. Jesus Delfin. In
the body of the judgment, the Court made the following conclusion, viz:
This petition must then be granted and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition or initiative on amendments on the Constitution
system (emphasis supplied).
463

In the said case, the Court's fallo states as follows:
b) DECLARING R. A. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections
and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-
037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against
the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
The question now is if the ruling in Santiago is decisive in this case. It is elementary that when there is
conflict between the dispositive portion or fallo of the decision and the opinion of the court contained in
the text or body of the judgment, the former prevails over the latter. An order of execution is based on the
disposition, not on the body, of the decision.
5
The dispositive portion is its decisive resolution; thus, it is
the subject of execution. The other parts of the decision may be resorted to in order to determine the ratio
decidendi for the disposition. Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and the opinion of
the court contained in the text or body of the decision, the former must prevail over the latter on
the theory that the dispositive portion is the final order, while the opinion is merely a statement
ordering nothing. Hence, the execution must conform with that which is ordained or decreed in the
dispositive portion of the decision.
6

A judgment must be distinguished from an opinion. The latter is an informal expression of the views of the
court and cannot prevail against its final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one
instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So there is a distinction between the findings and
conclusions of a court and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to the
rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. It is not infrequent that the grounds of a decision
fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We
often encounter in judicial decisions lapses, findings, loose statements and generalities which do not bear
on the issues or are apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result reached by the
court as expressed in the dispositive part, so called, of the decision.
7

Applying the foregoing argument to the Santiago case, it immediately becomes apparent that the
disposition in the latter case categorically made permanent the December 18, 1996 Temporary
Restraining Order issued against the COMELEC in the Delfin petition but did NOT formally incorporate
therein any directive PERMANENTLY enjoining the COMELEC "from entertaining or taking cognizance of
any petition for initiative on amendments." Undeniably, the perpetual proscription against the COMELEC
from assuming jurisdiction over any other petition on Charter Change through a People's Initiative is just a
conclusion and cannot bind the poll body, for such unending ban would trench on its constitutional power
to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall under Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution. RA
464

6735 gave the COMELEC the jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the petition on the initiative under
Section 8, Rule 11 and the form of the petition under Section 3, Rule I; hence, it cannot be barred from
entertaining any such petition.
In sum, the COMELEC still retains its jurisdiction to take cognizance of any petition on initiative under RA
6735 and it can rule on the petition and its action can only be passed upon by the Court when the same is
elevated through a petition for certiorari. COMELEC cannot be barred from acting on said petitions since
jurisdiction is conferred by law (RA 6735) and said law has not been declared unconstitutional and hence
still valid though considered inadequate in the Santiago case.
Respondents, however, claim that the Court in the subsequent case of PIRMA v. Commission on
Elections
8
confirmed the statement of the Court in the Santiago case that the COMELEC was
"permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on
amendments." Much reliance is placed on the ruling contained in a Minute Resolution which reads:
The Court ruled, first, by a unanimous vote, that no grave abuse of Discretion could be attributed
to the public respondent COMELEC in Dismissing the petition filed by PIRMA therein, it
appearing that it only Complied with the DISPOSITIONS in the Decision of this Court in G.R. No.
127325, promulgated on March 19, 1997, and its Resolution of June 10, 1997.
Take note that the Court specifically referred to "dispositions" in the March 19, 1997 Decision. To
reiterate, the dispositions in the Santiago case decision refer specifically to the December 18, 1996 TRO
being made permanent against the COMELEC but do not pertain to a permanent injunction against any
other petition for initiative on amendment. Thus, what was confirmed or even affirmed in the Minute
Resolution in the PIRMA case pertains solely to the December 18, 1996 TRO which became permanent,
the declaration of the inadequacy of RA 6735, and the annulment of certain parts of Resolution No. 2300
but certainly not the alleged perpetual injunction against the initiative petition. Thus, the resolution in the
PIRMA case cannot be considered res judicata to the Lambino petition.
Amendment or Revision
One last matter to be considered is whether the petition may be allowed under RA 6735, since only
amendments to the Constitution may be the subject of a people's initiative.
The Lambino petition cannot be considered an act of revising the Constitution; it is merely an attempt to
amend it. The term amendment has to be liberally construed so as to effectuate the people's efforts to
amend the Constitution.
As an eminent constitutionalist, Dean Vicente G. Sinco,
9
explained:
portion of it, or perhaps only some of its important provisions. But whatever results the revision
entire constitution or of considering that possibility. The intention rather is to improve specific
changed conditions or to suppress portions of it that seem obsolete, or dangerous, or misleading
in their effect.
465

In this case, the Lambino petition is not concerned with rewriting the entire Constitution. It was never its
intention to revise the whole Constitution. It merely concerns itself with amending a few provisions in our
fundamental charter.
When there are gray areas in legislation, especially in matters that pertain to the sovereign people's
political rights, courts must lean more towards a more liberal interpretation favoring the people's right to
exercise their sovereign power.
Conclusion
Sovereignty residing in the people is the highest form of sovereignty and thus deserves the highest
respect even from the courts. It is not something that can be overruled, set aside, ignored or stomped
over by whatever amount of technicalities, blurred or vague provisions of the law.
As I find RA 6735 to be adequate as the implementing law for the People's Initiative, I vote to grant the
petition in G.R. No. 174153 and dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 174299. The Amended Petition for
Initiative filed by petitioners Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado should be remanded to the
COMELEC for determination whether or not the petition is sufficient under RA 6735, and if the petition is
sufficient, to schedule and hold the necessary plebiscite as required by RA 6735.
It is time to let the people's voice be heard once again as it was twenty years ago. And should this voice
demand a change in the Constitution, the Supreme Court should not be one to stand in its way.
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1
Including Sigaw ng Bayan and Union of Local Authorities of the Philippines (ULAP).
2
This provision states: "Requirements. x x x x
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
466

c.6. an abstract or summary in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly
written or printed at the top of every page of the petition."
3
This provision states: "Verification of Signatures. The Election Registrar shall verify the signatures on
the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits and voters identification cards used in the
immediately preceding election."
4
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Article VI will be changed thus:
Section 1. (1) The legislative and executive powers shall be vested in a unicameral Parliament
(2) Each Member of Parliament shall be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-
the parliamentary districts.
5
Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Article VII will be changed thus:
Section 1. There shall be a President who shall be the Head of State. The executive power shall be
exercised by a Prime Minister, with the assistance of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister shall be elected by
a majority of all the Members of Parliament from among themselves. He shall be responsible to the
Parliament for the program of government.
6
Sections 1-5 of the Transitory Provisions read:
Section 1. (1) The incumbent President and Vice President shall serve until the expiration of their term at
noon on the thirtieth day of June 2010 and shall continue to exercise their powers under the 1987
Constitution unless impeached by a vote of two thirds of all the members of the interim parliament.
hereby be amended and Sections 18 and 24 which shall be deleted, all other sections of Article
that any and all references therein to "Congress", "Senate", "House of Representatives" and
"Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references therein
to "Member[s] of Congress", "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives" shall
be changed to read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to the "President"
and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister".
467

the exception of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which are hereby
amended so as to conform to a unicameral Parliamentary System of government; provided
however that any and all references therein to "Congress", "Senate", "House of Representatives"
and "Houses of Congress" shall be changed to read "Parliament"; that any and all references
therein to "Member[s] of Congress", "Senator[s]" or "Member[s] of the House of Representatives"
shall be changed to read as "Member[s] of Parliament" and any and all references to the
"President" and or "Acting President" shall be changed to read "Prime Minister".
shall initially convene the interim Parliament and shall preside over its sessions for the election of
Section 5. (1) The incumbent President, who is the Chief Executive, shall nominate, from among
incumbent President.
be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials.
Thereafter, the Vice President, as Member of Parliament, shall immediately convene the
Parliament and shall initially preside over its session for the purpose of electing the Prime
Minister, who shall be elected by a majority vote of all
its members, from among themselves. The duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise
and perform the powers, duties and responsibilities of the interim Prime Minister until the
expiration of the term of incumbent President and Vice President.
7
As revised, Article XVIII contained a new paragraph in Section 4 (paragraph 3) and a modified
paragraph 2, Section 5, thus:
Section 4. x x x x
x x x x
468

Section 5. x x x x
be synchronized and held simultaneously with the election of all local government officials. The
duly elected Prime Minister shall continue to exercise and perform the powers, duties and
8
336 Phil. 848 (1997); Resolution dated 10 June 1997.
9
The COMELEC held:
We agree with the Petitioners that this Commission has the solemn Constitutional duty to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of, as in this case, initiative.
This mandate, however, should be read in relation to the other provisions of the Constitution
particularly on initiative.
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative, upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
voters therein. x x x.
The afore-quoted provision of the Constitution being a non self-executory provision needed an
enabling law for its implementation. Thus, in order to breathe life into the constitutional right of the
people under a system of initiative to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolution, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735.
However, the Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Santiago vs. Commission on
Elections struck down the said law for being incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential
terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned.
The Supreme Court likewise declared that this Commission should be permanently enjoined from
system.
Thus, even if the signatures in the instant Petition appear to meet the required minimum per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district is represented
by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein, still the Petition cannot be given due
course since the Supreme Court categorically declared R.A. No. 6735 as inadequate to cover the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
This Commission is not unmindful of the transcendental importance of the right of the people
under a system of initiative. However, neither can we turn a blind eye to the pronouncement of
the High Court that in the absence of a valid enabling law, this right of the people remains nothing
but an "empty right", and that this Commission is permanently enjoined from entertaining or
taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
469

Considering the foregoing, We are therefore constrained not to entertain or give due course to the
instant Petition.
10
Arturo M. De Castro; Ronald L. Adamat, Rolando Manuel Rivera, Ruelo Baya; Philippine Transport and
General Workers Organization (PTGWO); Trade Union Congress of the Philippines; Sulong Bayan
Movement Foundation, Inc.
11
Onevoice Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T. Tolosa, Jr.,
Susan V. Ople and Carlos P. Medina, Jr.; Alternative Law Groups, Inc.; Atty. Pete Quirino Quadra;
Bayan, Bayan Muna, Kilusang Mayo Uno, Head, Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela,
Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino Students, Jojo Pineda, Dr. Darby Santiago, Dr.
Reginald Pamugas; Loretta Ann P. Rosales, and Mario Joyo Aguja, Ana Theresa Hontiveros-Baraquel,
Luwalhati Ricasa Antonino; Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA), Conrado F. Estrella,
Tomas C. Toledo, Mariano M. Tajon, Froilan M. Bacungan, Joaquin T. Venus, Jr., Fortunato P. Aguas,
and Amado Gat Inciong; Senate of the Philippines; Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya
Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador and Randall C. Tabayoyong, Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Cebu
City and Cebu Province Chapters; Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio
R. Osmea III, Jamby Madrigal, Jinggoy Estrada, Alfredo S. Lim and Panfilo Lacson; Joseph Ejercito
Estrada and Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino.
12
This provision states: "Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
registered voters therein. No amendment under this section shall be authorized within five years following
the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years."
13
I RECORD, 387-388.
14
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento made the
following report (I RECORD 389):
MR. SARMIENTO: Madam President, I am happy that the Committee on Amendments and
Transitory Provisions decided to retain the system of initiative as a mode of amending the
Constitution. I made a survey of American constitutions and I discovered that 13 States provide
for a system of initiative as a mode of amending the Constitution Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma
and Oregon. The initiative for ordinary laws only is used in Idaho, Maine, Montana and South
Dakota. So, I am happy that this was accepted or retained by the Committee.
x x x x
The Americans in turn copied the concept of initiatives from the Swiss beginning in 1898 when
South Dakota adopted the initiative in its constitution. The Swiss cantons experimented with
initiatives in the 1830s. In 1891, the Swiss incorporated the initiative as a mode of amending their
national constitution. Initiatives promote "direct democracy" by allowing the people to directly
propose amendments to the constitution. In contrast, the traditional mode of changing the
constitution is known as "indirect democracy" because the amendments are referred to the voters
by the legislature or the constitutional convention.
15
Florida requires only that the title and summary of the proposed amendment are "printed in clear and
unambiguous language." Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General RE Right of Citizens to Choose Health
Care Providers, No. 90160, 22 January 1998, Supreme Court of Florida.
470

16
State ex. rel Patton v. Myers, 127 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E. 872 (1933); Whitman v. Moore, 59 Ariz. 211,
125 P.2d 445 (1942); Heidtman v. City of Shaker Heights, 99 Ohio App. 415, 119 N.E. 2d 644 (1954);
Christen v. Baker, 138 Colo. 27, 328 P.2d 951 (1958); Stop the Pay Hike Committee v. Town Council of
Town of Irvington, 166 N.J. Super. 197, 399 A.2d 336 (1979); State ex rel Evans v. Blackwell, Slip copy,
2006 WL 1102804 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.), 2006-Ohio-2076.
17
407 Mass. 949, 955 (1990). Affirmed by the District Court of Massachusetts in Henry v. Conolly, 743 F.
Supp. 922 (1990) and by the Court of Appeals, First Circuit, in Henry v. Conolly, 9109 F. 2d. 1000 (1990),
and cited in Marino v. Town Council of Southbridge, 13 Mass.L.Rptr. 14 (2001).
18
89 P.3d 1227, 1235 (2004).
19
Stumpf v. Law, 839 P. 2d 120, 124 (1992).
20
Exhibit "B" of the Lambino Group's Memorandum filed on 11 October 2006.
21
Annex "B" of the Comment/Opposition in Intervention of Atty. Pete Quirino-Quadra filed on 7
September 2006.
22
www.ulap.gov.ph.
23
www.ulap.gov.ph/reso2006-02.html.
24
The full text of the proposals of the Consultative Commission on Charter Change can be downloaded at
its official website at www.concom.ph.
25
The Lambino Group's Memorandum, p. 5.
26
Under the proposed Section 1(2), Article VI of the Constitution, members of Parliament shall be elected
for a term of five years "without limitation as to the number thereof."
27
Under the proposed Section 4(1), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, the interim
Parliament "shall continue until the Members of the regular Parliament shall have been elected and shall
have qualified." Also, under the proposed Section 5(2), Article XVIII, of the same Transitory Provisions,
the interim Parliament "shall provide for the election of the members of Parliament."
28
Under the proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII, Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, the interim
Parliament, within 45 days from ratification of the proposed changes, "shall convene to propose
amendments to, or revisions of, this Constitution."
29
448 So.2d 984, 994 (1984), internal citations omitted.
30
698 P.2d 1173, 1184 (1985).
31
I RECORD 386, 392, 402-403.
32
196 P.2d 787, 790 (1948). See also Lowe v. Keisling, 130 Or.App. 1, 882 P.2d 91 (1994).
33
392 P.2d 636, 638 (1964).
34
930 P.2d 186, 196 (1996), internal citations omitted.
471

35
Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113, 118-119 (1894).
36
Amador Valley Joint Union High School District v. State Board of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286
(1978).
37
Id.
38
Legislature of the State of California v. EU, 54 Cal.3d 492, 509 (1991).
39
California Association of Retail Tobacconists v. State, 109 Cal.App.4
th
792, 836 (2003).
40
See note 44, infra.
41
Joaquin Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, p. 1294
(2003).
42
238 So.2d 824 (1970).
43
Id. at 830-832.
44
As stated by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. during the 26 September 2006 oral arguments.
45
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003, 415 SCRA 44; J.M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 142 Phil. 393 (1970); Gold Creek Mining Corporation
v. Rodriguez, 66 Phil. 259 (1938).
46
882 P.2d 91, 96-97 (1994). On the merits, the Court in Lowe v. Keisling found the amendment in
question was not a revision.
47
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
48
Section 11(1), Article XVI of the Constitution.
49
Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution.
50
This section provides: "The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the
51
Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 760 (2001); Intia Jr. v. COA, 366 Phil. 273 (1999).
52
G.R. No. 129754, Resolution dated 23 September 1997.
53
Presidential Proclamation No. 58 dated February 11, 1987, entitled "Proclaiming the Ratification of the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines Adopted by the Constitutional Commission of 1986,
including the Ordinance Appended thereto."
PANGANIBAN, CJ .:
1
Chief Justice McLachlin spoke on "Liberty, Prosperity and the Rule of Law" in her speech before the
Global Forum on Liberty and Prosperity held on October 18-20, 2006 in Manila. She further stated:
"Without the rule of law, government officials are not bound by standards of conduct. Without the rule of
law, the dignity and equality of all people is not affirmed and their ability to seek redress for grievances
472

and societal commitments is limited. Without the rule of law, we have no means of ensuring meaningful
participation by people in formulating and enacting the norms and standards which organize the kinds of
societies in which we want to live."
2
GR No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 336 Phil. 848. For ease of reference, my Separate Opinion is
reproduced in full:
"Our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., writing for the majority, holds that:
'(1) The Comelec acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
'initiatory' Delfin Petition.
'(2) While the Constitution allows amendments to 'be directly proposed by the people through
initiative,' there is no implementing law for the purpose. RA 6735 is 'incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution
is concerned.'
'(3) Comelec Resolution No. 2300, 'insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct
of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void.'
"I concur with the first item above. Until and unless an initiatory petition can show the required
number of signatures in this case, 12% of all the registered voters in the Philippines with at
least 3% in every legislative district no public funds may be spent and no government
resources may be used in an initiative to amend the Constitution. Verily, the Comelec cannot
even entertain any petition absent such signatures. However, I dissent most respectfully from the
majority's two other rulings. Let me explain.
"Under the above restrictive holdings espoused by the Court's majority, the Constitution cannot
be amended at all through a people's initiative. Not by Delfin, not by PIRMA, not by anyone, not
even by all the voters of the country acting together. This decision will effectively but
unnecessarily curtail, nullify, abrogate and render inutile the people's right to change the basic
law. At the very least, the majority holds the right hostage to congressional discretion on whether
to pass a new law to implement it, when there is already one existing at present. This right to
amend through initiative, it bears stressing, is guaranteed by Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution, as follows:
their final weapons against political excesses, opportunism, inaction, oppression and
misgovernance; as well as their reserved instruments to exact transparency, accountability and
faithfulness from their chosen leaders. While on the one hand, their misuse and abuse must be
resolutely struck down, on the other, their legitimate exercise should be carefully nurtured and
zealously protected.
"WHEREFORE, I vote to GRANT the petition of Sen. Miriam D. Santiago et al. and to DIRECT
Respondent Commission on Elections to DISMISS the Delfin Petition on the ground of
prematurity, but not on the other grounds relied upon by the majority. I also vote to LIFT the
temporary restraining order issued on 18 December 1996 insofar as it prohibits Jesus Delfin,
Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa from exercising their right to free speech in proposing
amendments to the Constitution."
3
GR No. 129754, September 23, 1997 (still unpublished in the Philippine Reports or in the Supreme
Court Reports Annotated). Again, for ease of reference, I reproduce my Separate Opinion in full:
473

"Petitioners assail the July 8, 1997 Resolution of Respondent Commission dismissing their
petition for a people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Said petition before the Comelec
(henceforth, PIRMA petition) was backed up by nearly six (6) million signatures constituting about
16% of the registered voters of the country with at least 3% in each legislative district. The
petition now before us presents two grounds:
"1. In refusing to act on the PIRMA petition, the Comelec allegedly acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and
"2. In declaring R.A. 6735 "inadequate to cover its system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution" and "declaring void those parts of Resolution 2300 of the Commission on Elections
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of [an] initiative [on] amendments to the
Constitution," the Supreme Court's Decision in G.R. No. 127325 entitled Miriam Defensor
Santiago vs. Commission on Elections (hereafter referred to as Santiago) should be reexamined
because said Decision is allegedly "unconstitutional," and because, in any event, the Supreme
Court itself, in reconsidering the said issue per its June 10, 1997 Resolution, was deadlocked at
six votes one each side.
"The following in my position on each of these two issues:
First Issue:
No Grave Abuse of Discretion in Comelec's Refusal to Act
"The Respondent Commission's refusal to act on the "prayers" of the PIRMA petition cannot in
any wise be branded as "grave abuse of discretion." Be it remembered that the Court's Decision
in Santiago permanently enjoined the Comelec "from entertaining or taking cognizance of any
petition for initiative on amendments to the
4
Republic v. COCOFED, 423 Phil. 735, December 14, 2001.
5
Well-entrenched is this definition of grave abuse of discretion. Id.; Benito v. Comelec, 349 SCRA 705,
January 19, 2001; Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona Jr., 359 Phil. 276, November 18, 1998; and Philippine
Airlines, Inc. v. Confesor, 231 SCRA 41, March 10, 1994.
6
In PIRMA, I submitted as follows: "I believed, and still do, that the majority gravely erred in rendering
such a sweeping injunction [that covered ANY petition, not just the Delfin petition], but I cannot fault the
Comelec for complying with the ruling even if it, too, disagreed with said decision's ratio decidendi.
Respondent Comelec was directly enjoined by the highest Court of the land. It had no choice but to obey.
Its obedience cannot constitute grave abuse of discretion. Regusal to act on the PIRMA petition was the
only recourse open to the Comelec. Any other mode of action would have constituted defiance of the
Court and would have been struck down as grave abuse of discretion and contumacious disregard of this
Court's supremacy as the final arbiter of justiciable controversies."
7
42 Am. Jr. 2d, 26, citing Birmingham Gas Co. v. Bessemer; 250 Ala 137, 33 So 2d 475, 250 Ala 137;
Tacker v. Board of Comrs., 127 Fla 248, 170 So 458; Hoxie V. Scott, 45 Neb 199, 63 NW 387; Gill v.
Board of Comrs., 160 NC 176, 76, SE 204.
8
Partido ng Manggagawa v. Comelec, GR No. 164702, March 15, 2006.
9
Article XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)
"SEC. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
474

(1) The Congress, upon the vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
"SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people
though initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered
"SEC. 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members, submit to the electorate the question of
calling such a convention.
"SEC. 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than
sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.
"Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after
the certification by the Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition."
10
Republic Act 6735, Sec. 10, provides:
"SEC. 10. Prohibited Measures. The following cannot be the subject of an initiative or
referendum petition:
(a) No petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate; and
(b) Statutes involving emergency measures, the enactment of which are specifically
vested in Congress by the Constitution, cannot be subject to referendum until ninety (90)
days after its effectivity."
11
The principle of separation of powers operates at the core of a presidential form of government. Thus,
legislative power is given to the legislature; executive power, to a separate executive (from whose
prominent position in the system, the presidential nomenclature is derived); and judicial power, to an
independent judiciary. This system embodies interdependence by separation.
On the other hand, a parliamentary system personifies interdependence by integration, its essential
features being the following: "(1) The members of the government or cabinet or the executive arm are, as
a rule, simultaneously members of the legislature. (2) The government or cabinet, consisting of the
political leaders of the majority party or of a coalition who are also members of the legislative, is in effect a
committee of the legislature. (3) The government or cabinet has a pyramidal structure, at the apex of
which is the Prime Minister or his equivalent. (4) The government or cabinet remains in power only for as
long as it enjoys the support of the majority of the legislature. (5) Both government and legislature are
possessed of control devices with which each can demand of the other immediate political responsibility."
These control devices are a vote of no-confidence (censure), whereby the government may be ousted by
the legislature; and the power of the government to dissolve the legislature and call for new elections. (J.
BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES A COMMENTARY, Vol. II,
17-18 (1988 ed.).
With respect to the transformation from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature, the change involves the
form of representation and the lawmaking process.
475

12
Attached to the Opposition-in-Intervention of Intervenors OneVoice Inc., etc., is a photocopy of the
Certification dated August 23, 2006, issued by Atty. Marlon S. Casquejo, the election officer for the
3
rd
District and the officer-in-charge for the 1
st
and the 2
nd
Districts of Davao City. The Certification states
that "this office (First, Second and Third District, Davao City) has not verified the signatures of registered
voters x x x."
13
In People v. Veneracion, the Court held: "Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system
of justice. If judges, under the guide of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted
beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law
becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men, excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and
ought 'to protect and enforce it without fear or favor,' resist encroachments by governments, political
parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs." (249 SCRA 244, October 13, 1995, per
Kapunan, J.)
14
An American professor on legal philosophy, A. Altman, puts it thus: "By ratifying the constitution that
included an explicit amendment process, the sovereign people committed themselves to following the rule
of law, even when they wished to make changes in the basic system of government." A. ALTMAN,
ARGUING ABOUT LAW 94 (2001).
15
See my Separate Opinion in Francisco Jr. v. House of Representatives, 415 SCRA 45, November 10,
2003.
16
See, for instance, the front page Malaya report entitled "Lobbyists soil dignity of Supreme Court"
(October 23, 2006).
17
Lk 8:17.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J .:
1
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
2
SEC. 5. Requirements. x x x
c.1. contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
c.3. the reason or reasons therefore;
c.6. an abstract or summary proposition in not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be
3
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean: x x x
476

(d) "Proposition" is the measure proposed by the voters.
4
I Record, Constitutional Commission 387-389 (July 9, 1986).
5
Community Gas and Service Company, Inc. v. Walbaum, 404 P.2d 1014, 1965 OK 118 (1965).
6
Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
7
The late Senator (then Congressman) Raul S. Roco stated this fact in his sponsorship presentation of
H.B. No. 21505, thus:
x x x x
D. Prohibited Subjects.
The bill provides for two kinds of measures which cannot be the subject of an initiative or
referendum petition. A petition that embraces more than one subject cannot be submitted to the
electorate as it would be violative of the constitutional proscription on passing bills containing
more than one subject, and statutes involving emergency measures cannot be subject to
referendum until 90 days after its effectivity. [Journal and record of the house of representatives,
Second Regular Session, Vol. 6, p. 975 (February 14, 1989).]
8
Memorandum of petitioner Aumentado, p. 117.
9
The proposed Section 4(3) of Article XVIII of the Constitution states that Senators whose term of office
ends in 2010 shall be members of parliament until noon of the thirtieth day of June 2010. No counterpart
provision was provided for members of the House of Representatives who, as members of the interim
parliament under the proposed changes, shall schedule the elections for the regular parliament in its
discretion.
10
The proposed Section 4(3), Article XVIII of the Constitution states that the interim parliament shall
convene to propose amendments to, or revisions of, the Constitution within 45 days from ratification of the
proposed changes.
11
The United Kingdom, for instance, has a two-house parliament, the House of Lords and the House of
Commons.
12
Philippine Political Law [1954 ed.], Vicente G. Sinco, pp. 43-44, quoted in Separate Opinion of J. Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. in PIRMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997, p. 7.
13
151-A Phil. 35 (1973).
14
196 P. 2d 787 (Cal. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
15
801 P. 2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
16
583 P. 2d 1281 (Cal. 1982).
17
Raven v. Deukmeijan, supra, citing Brosnahan v. Brown, 651 P. 2d 274 (Cal. 1982).
477

18
Supra note 13. It may well be pointed out that in making the distinction between amendment and
revision, Justice Antonio relied not only in the analogy presented in Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 37 S.E.
2d 322, but cited also the seminal ruling of the California Supreme Court in McFadden v. Jordan, supra.
19
Philippine Political Law, 1995 ed., Justice Isagani A. Cruz, p. 71, citing Pangasinan Transportation Co.
v. PSC, 40 O.G., 8
th
Supp. 57.
20
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed., Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p.
1161.
21
Id.
22
Supra note 14.
23
The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1
st
ed., Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., p. 567,
citing B. Schwartz, I The Powers of Government (1963).
24
16 C.J.S. 3 at 24.
25
14 T.M. Cooley, II Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed. (1927), p. 1349.
26
A bogus revolution, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 11, 2006, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., p. A15.
27
Article II, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J .:
1
Works, Letter 164.
2
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
3
Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.
4
G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997. Joining PIRMA as petitioners were its founding members,
spouses Alberto Pedrosa and Carmen Pedrosa.
5
Entitled "In the Matter of Proposing Amendments to the 1987 Constitution through a People's Initiative:
A Shift from a Bicameral Presidential to a Unicameral Parliamentary Government by Amending Articles VI
and VII; and Providing Transitory Provisions for the Orderly Shift from the Presidential to the
Parliamentary System."
6
Among them ONEVOICE, Inc., Christian S. Monsod, Rene B. Azurin, Manuel L. Quezon III, Benjamin T.
Tolosa, Jr., Susan V. Ople, and Carlos P. Medina, Jr., Alternative Law Groups, Inc., Senate Minority
Leader Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., and Senators Sergio Osmea III, Jamby A.S. Madrigal, Alfredo S. Lim,
Panfilo M. Lacson, Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada, and Jinggoy Estrada, Representatives Loretta Ann P.
Rosales, Mario Joyo Aguja, and Ana Theresia Hontiveros-Baraquel, Bayan, Kilusang Mayo Uno,
Ecumenical Bishops Forum, Migrante, Gabriela, Gabriela Women's Party, Anakbayan, League of Filipino
Students, Leonardo San Jose, Jojo Pineda, Drs. Darby Santiago and Reginald Pamugas, and Attys. Pete
Quirino-Quadra, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, Byron D. Bocar, Ma. Tanya Karina A. Lat, Antonio L. Salvador,
and Randall C. Tabayoyong.
7
"Grounds for contempt
478

3. From the time the so-called People's Initiative (hereafter PI) now subject of Lambino v.
Comelec, was initiated, respondents did nothing to stop what was clearly lawless, and even
arguably winked at, as it were, if not condoned and allowed, the waste and misuse of its
personnel, time, facilities and resources on an enterprise that had no legal basis and in
fact was permanently enjoined by this Honorable Court in 1997. Seemingly mesmerized, it is
time to disenthrall them.
3.1. For instance, undersigned counsel happened to be in the Senate on August 29, 2006 (on
other business) when respondent Chair sought to be stopped by the body from commenting on PI
out of prudential considerations, could not be restrained. On contentious issues, he
volunteered that Sigaw ng Bayan would not cheat in Makati as it was the opposition
territory and that the fact that out of 43,405 signatures, only 7,186 were found authentic in
one Makati District, to him, showed the "efficiency" of Comelec personnel. He could not
appreciate 1) that Sigaw had no choice but to get the constitutionality-required 3% in every
district, [Const., Art. VII, Sec. 2] friendly or otherwise, including administration critics'
turfs, and 2) that falsus in 36,319 (93.30%) falsus in omnibus, in an exercise that could
never be free, orderly, honest and credible, another constitutional requirement. [Nothing
has been heard about probing and prosecuting the falsifiers.]
x x x x x x x x x
3.2. It was excessively obvious to undersigned and other observers that respondent Chairman,
straining at the leash, was lawyering for Sigaw ng Bayan in the Senate! It was discomfiting
that he would gloss over the seeming wholesale falsification of 96.30% of the signatures in
an exercise with no credibility! Even had he been asked, he should have pled to be
excused from answering as the matter could come up before the Comelec for an official
collegial position (different from conceding that it is enjoined).
x x x x x x x x x
4. Respondents Commissioners Borra and Romeo A. Brawner, for their part, even issued
widely-publicized written directives to the field, [Annex C, as to Commissioner Brawner;
that as to Commissioner Borra will follow.] while the Commission itself was trying to be
careful not to be explicit in what it was abetting implicitly, in hypocritical defiance of the
injunction of 1997.
8
Intestate Estate of Carmen de Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72424, February 13,
1989, 170 SCRA 246.
9
Supra.
10
Development Bank of the Philippines v. NLRC, March 1, 1995, 242 SCRA 59; Albert v. Court of First
Instance of Manila (Branch VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.
11
56 O.G. 3546 cited in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI), id.
12
Supra.
13
Separate Opinion of Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.
14
G.R. No. 109645, March 4, 1996, 254 SCRA 234.
479

15
Philippine National Bank v. Palma, G.R. No. 157279, August 9, 2005, 466 CSRA 307, citing Moreno,
Philippine Law Dictionary (1988), 3
rd
ed. (citing Santiago v. Valenzuela, 78 Phil. 397, [1947]).
16
Id., citing Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 303, citing
Government v. Jalandoni, No. 837-R, August 30, 1947, 44 O.G. 1840.
17
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven and London: Yale University
Press, 1921), pp. 33-34.
18
William K. Frankena, Ethics, 2
nd
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc.,) 1973, p. 49.
19
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, 296.
20
July 9, 1986. Records of the Constitutional Commission, No. 26.
21
Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 1996 Ed., p. 1161.
22
242 N. W. 891 259 Mich 212.
23
State v. Orange [Tex. x. Civ. App.] 300 SW 2d 705, People v. Perkins 137, p. 55.
18
City of Midland v. Arbury 38 Mich. App. 771, 197 N.W. 2d 134.
25
Adams v. Gunter Fla, 238 So. 2d 824.
26
196 P.2d 787.
27
Adams v. Gunter Fla. 238 So.2d 824.
28
Mc Fadden v. Jordan, supra.
29
Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So.2d 501, p. 505 (Fla. 1958).
30
Joaquin Bernas, Sounding Board: AMENDMENT OR REVISION, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September
25, 2006.
31
See Sections 8-12 for national initiative and referendum, and sections 13-19 for local initiative and
referendum.
32
Section 2. Statement of Policy. The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum
to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or
resolutions passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby
affirmed, recognized and guaranteed.
33
Section 3. Definition of terms.-
x x x
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;
480

x x x
34
See Section 3(e).
35
Section 5 (b) A petition for an initiative on the 1987 Constitution must have at least twelve per centum
(12%) of the total number of registered voters as signatories, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum (3%) of the registered voters therein. Initiative on the
Constitution may be exercised only after five (5) years from the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and
only once every five (5) years thereafter.
x x x
36
Section 9 (b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by a majority of the votes
cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
37
7 How (48 US) 1 (1849).
38
328 US 549 (1946).
39
77 Phil. 192 (1946).
40
103 Phi. 1051 (1957).
41
42
369 US 186 (1962).
43
G.R. No. 85344, December 21, 1989, 180 SCRA 496.
44
45
Nos. L-36142, L-36164, L-36165, L-36236, and L-36283, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30.
CALLEJO, SR., J .:
1
Entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
2
Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution.
3
Petition, pp. 12-14.
4
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129368, August 25, 2003, 409 SCRA 455,
480.
5
Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appears, G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480.
6
People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610.
7
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Galauran & Pilares Construction Co., G.R. No. L-35630, November
25, 1982, 118 SCRA 664.
481

8
People v. Court of Appeals, supra.
9
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
10
Article 8, New Civil Code provides that "[j]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines."
11
Suson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126749, August 27, 1997, 278 SCRA 284.
12
Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, April 23, 1992, 208 SCRA 254.
13
974 S.W.2d 451 (1998).
14
Id. at 453.
15
Entitled In Re: Rules and Regulations Governing the Conduct of Initiative in the Constitution, and
Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws.
16
Supra note 10, p. 157.
17
G.R. No. 129754.
18
Minute Resolution, September 23, 1997, pp. 1-2.
19
Republic v. De los Angeles, No. L-26112, October 4, 1971, 41 SCRA 422.
20
Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila, No. L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948.
21
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994, 235 SCRA 506.
22
Then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, Josue
N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan and Justo P. Torres, Jr. fully concurred in the ponencia of Justice
Davide.
23
Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Vicente V. Mendoza, Reynato S. Puno, Ricardo J. Francisco, Jr. and Artemio
V. Panganiban (now Chief Justice).
24
The voting on the motion for reconsideration was as follows: Six Justices, namely, Chief Justice
Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Kapunan, voted to deny the motions
for lack of merit; and six Justices, namely, Justices Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco, Jr., Regino C.
Hermosisima and Panganiban voted to grant the same. Justice Vitug maintained his opinion that the
matter was not ripe for judicial adjudication. Justices Teodoro R. Padilla and Torres inhibited from
participation in the deliberations.
25
House Bill No. 457 filed by then Rep. Nachura during the Twelfth Congress.
26
See Pagdayawon v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 154569, September 23, 2002, 389 SCRA 480.
27
London Street Tramways Co., Ltd. v. London County Council, [1898] A.C. 375, cited in COOLEY, A
Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 117-118.
28
Amended Petition for Initiative, pp. 4-7.
482

97
Arroyo, Jr. v. Taduran, G.R. No. 147012, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 423.
98
See, for example, Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, No. L-62089, March 9, 1988, 158 SCRA 508.
99
Licaros v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 145851, November 22, 2001, 370 SCRA 394.
100
Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, 393 SCRA 639.
101
Teope v. People, G.R. No. 149687, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 540.
102
Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957).
103
Id.
104
G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277 SCRA 268, 311-312.
105
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Fernando in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, supra note 36.
106
119 N.W. 408 (1909).
107
22 Minn. 400 (1876).
108
96 S.W. 396 (1906).
109
63 N.J. Law 289.
110
77 Miss. 543 (1900).
111
Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
112
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno, p. 49.
113
COOLEY, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 56, cited in Ellingham v. Dye, supra.
114
Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal. Co., 154 N.W. 1037 (1915).
115
ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT THE LAW 94 (2001), citing AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984)
116
McBee v. Brady, 100 P. 97 (1909).
117
McFadden v. Jordan, supra note 48.
118
Cooley, Am.Law.Rev. 1889, p. 311, cited in Ellingham v. Dye, supra.
119
15 N.W. 609 (1883).
120
Id. at 630.
AZCUNA, J .:
483

1
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997 and June 10, 1997.
2
100 Phil. 501 (1956).
PUNO, J .:
1
M'cCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 407 (1819).
2
Section 1, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
3
270 SCRA 106, March 19, 1997.
4
Id. at 153.
5
Id. at 157.
6
Justice Teodoro R. Padilla did not take part in the deliberation as he was related to a co-petitioner and
co-counsel of petitioners.
7
Justice Davide (ponente), Chief Justice Narvasa, and Justices Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, and
Kapunan.
8
Resolution dated June 10, 1997, G.R. No. 127325.
9
People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA) v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 129754, September 23, 1997.
10
Amended Petition for Initiative, pp. 4-7.
11
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
12
Petition, pp. 12-14.
13
Advisory issued by Court, dated September 22, 2006.
14
Exhibit "B," Memorandum of Petitioner Lambino.
15
Barnhart, Principled Pragmatic Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 80 Notre Dame Law Rev., 1911-
1912, (May 2005).
16
Ibid.
17
Id. at 1913.
18
Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis: Casey, Dickerson and the
Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 53 Utah Law Rev. 53, 67 (2002).
19
Id. at 68.
20
Id. at 69.
484

21
Id. at 67.
22
Id. at 69.
23
Consovoy, supra note 18, at 57.
24
Id. at 58.
25
Id. at 64.
26
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 405-06 (1932) (Justice Brandeis, dissenting).
27
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-492 (Justice Frankfurter, concurring).
28
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89 (1987) (Justice Stevens, dissenting).
29
Barnhart, supra note 15, at 1922.
30
Id. at 1921.
31
Filippatos, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis and the Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties in the
Rehnquist Court, 11 Boston College Third World Law Journal, 335, 343 (Summer 1991).
32
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
34
G.R. No. 127882, December 1, 2004, 445 SCRA 1.
35
G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377.
36
Barnhart, supra note 15, at 1915.
37
112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
38
Section 5(b).
39
Ibid.
40
Santiago v. Commission on Elections, supra note 11, at 145.
41
85 Record of the House of Representatives 140-142 (February 14, 1989).
42
85 Record of the house of representatives 142-143 (February 14, 1989).
43
Zeringue v. State Dept. of Public Safety, 467 So. 2d 1358.
44
I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 386, 392 (July 9, 1986).
45
Id. at 400, 402-403.
485

46
v record, constitutional commission 806 (October 10, 1986).
47
Opposition-in-Intervention filed by ONEVOICE, p. 39.
48
Opposition-in-Intervention filed by Alternative Law Groups, Inc., p. 30.
49
Introduction to Political Science, pp. 397-398.
50
Section 1, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.
51
Eighth Edition, p. 89 (2004).
52
Ibid.
53
Id. at 1346.
54
Ibid.
55
Third Edition, p. 67 (1969).
56
Id. at 68.
57
Id. at 1115.
58
Vicente G. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 2
nd
ed., p. 46.
59
Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Felix Q. Antonio in Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, No. L-
361432, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 367-368.
60
J. M. Aruego, The New Philippine Constitution Explained, iii-iv (1973).
61
E. Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine Constitutional Law, pp. 422-425 (1984).
62
N. Gonzales, Philippine Political Law 30 (1969 ed.).
63
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317, 337
quotingCommonwealth v. Ralph, 111 Pa. 365, 3 Alt. 220 (1886).
64
L-36142, March 31, 1973, 50 SCRA 30, 367.
65
i record, constitutional commission 373 (July 8, 1986).
66
The opinion was actually made by Justice Felix Antonio.
67
Javellana v. Executive Secretary, supra note 64, citing Wheeler v. Board of Trustees, 37 S.E.2d 322,
327 (1946).
68
T. M. Cooley, I A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 143-144 (8
th
ed. 1927).
69
H.C. Black, Handbook of American Constitutional Law S. 47, p. 67 (2
nd
ed. 1897).
486

70
V. Sinco, supra note 58.
71
Ibid.
72
No. L-1232, 79 Phil. 819, 826 (1948).
73
IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 735 (September 17, 1986).
74
Id. at 752.
75
Id. at 769.
76
Id. at 767-769.
77
Id. at 377.
78
Id. at 395.
79
Sinco, supra note 58, at 22.
80
Id. at 20-21.
81
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996, 257 SCRA 727.
82
G. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 530.
83
Sinco, supra note 58, at 29.
84
State v. Moore, 103 Ark 48, 145 SW 199 (1912); Whittemore v. Seydel, 74 Cal App 2d 109 (1946).
85
Town of Whitehall v. Preece, 1998 MT 53 (1998).
86
G.R. No. 125416, September 26, 1996, 262 SCRA 492, 516-517, citing 42 Am. Jur. 2d, p. 653.
87
Memorandum for petitioner Aumentado, pp. 151-152.
88
Id. at 153-154.
89
L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333, 360-361.
90
Section 2, Article XVII, 1987 Constitution.
91
Annex "3," Opposition-In-Intervention of Oppositors-Intervenors ONEVOICE, INC., et al.
92
Certification dated April 21, 2006 issued by Reynne Joy B. Bullecer, Annex "B," Memorandum of
Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.; Certification dated April 20, 2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S.
Casquejo, Annex "C," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et al.; Certification dated April 26,
2006 issued by Atty. Marlon S. Cascuejo, Annex "D," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intervenor Pimentel, et
al.
93
Annex "1," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Antonino.
487

94
Annex "10-A," Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al.
95
Annexes 1-29, Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Alternative Law Groups, Inc.
96
Annexes 30-31, Id.
97
Annexes 44-64, Id.
98
Consolidated Reply of Petitioner Aumentado, p. 54.
99
Exhibit "E," Memorandum of Petitioner Lambino.
100
Annex "A," Consolidated Response of Petitioner Aumentado.
101
Memorandum of Oppositor-Intevenor Pimentel, et al., pp. 12-13.
102
Helvey v. Wiseman, 199 F. Supp. 200, 8 A.F.T.2d 5576 (1961).
103
BNO Leasing Corp. v. Hollins & Hollins, Inc., 448 So.2d 1329 (1984).
104
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
How many copies of the petition, that you mention(ed), did you print?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
We printed 100 thousand of this petition last February and we
distributed to the different organizations that were volunteering to support us.
So, you are sure that you personally can say to us that 100 thousand of
these were printed?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
It could be more than that, Your Honor.
But you asked your friends or your associates to re-print, if they can(?)
ATTY. LAMBINO:
Yes, Your Honor.
488

Okay, so you got 6.3 Million signatures, but you only printed 100
thousand. So you're saying, how many did your friends print of the petition?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
I can no longer give a specific answer to that, Your Honor. I relied
only to the assurances of the people who are volunteering that they are going to
reproduce the signature sheets as well as the draft petition that we have given them, Your Honor.
Did you also show this amended petition to the people?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
Your Honor, the amended petition reflects the copy of the original
petition that we circulated, because in the original petition that we filed before the COMELEC, we
omitted a certain paragraph that is, Section 4 paragraph 3 which were part of the original petition
that we circulated and so we have to correct that oversight because that is what we have
circulated to the people and we have to correct that
But you just stated now that what you circulated was the petition of
August 25, now you are changing your mind, you're saying what you circulated was the petition of
August 30, is that correct?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
In effect, yes, Your Honor.
So, you circulated the petition of August 30, but what you filed in the
COMELEC on August 25 was a different petition, that's why you have to amend it?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
We have to amend it, because there was an oversight, Your Honor, that
we have omitted one very important paragraph in Section 4 of our proposition.
489

Okay, let's be clear. What did you circulate when you gathered the
signatures, the August 25 which you said you circulated or the August 30?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
Both the August 25 petition that included all the provisions, Your
Honor, and as amended on August 30. Because we have to include the one that
we have inadvertently omitted in the August 25 petition, Your Honor.
And (you cannot tell that) you can only say for certain that you printed
100 thousand copies?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
That was the original printed matter that we have circulated by the
month of February, Your Honor, until some parts of March, Your Honor.
That is all you can assure us?
ATTY. LAMBINO:
That is all I can assure you, Your Honor, except that I have asked some
friends, like for example (like) Mr. Liberato Laos to help me print out some more of this petition
(TSN, September 26, 2006, pp. 7-17)
105
Section 2 (1), Article IX C, 1987 Constitution.
106
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa and Justices Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida
Ruth P. Romero, Josue N. Bellosillo, Santiago M. Kapunan, Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. and Justo P.
Torres.
107
Justices Jose A.R. Melo, Reynato S. Puno, Vicente V. Mendoza, Ricardo J. Francisco and Artemio V.
Panganiban.
108
Justice Jose C. Vitug.
490

109
Only fourteen (14) justices participated in the deliberations as Justice Teodoro R. Padilla took no part
on account of his relationship with the lawyer of one of the parties.
110
Citing conscience as ground.
111
409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401 (1972).
112
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 97 S. Ct. 2264 (1977); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 107 S. Ct. 1722, 1730 n. 7, 95 L. Ed. 2d (1987); France v. Nelson, 292 Ark. 219, 729 S.W. 2d
161 (1987).
113
40 P. 3d 886 (2006).
114
781 P. 2d 973 (Alaska, 1989).
115
Id. at 982-84 (Compton, J., concurring).
116
Id. at 975-78.
117
Negri v. Slotkin, 244 N.W. 2d 98 (1976).
118
112 Fla. 734, 151 So. 284 (1933).
119
Penned by Justice Whitfield, and concurred in by Chief Justice Davis and Justice Terrell; Justices Ellis,
Brown and Buford are of the opinion that chapter 15938, Acts of 1933, is a special or local law not duly
advertised before its passage, as required by sections 20 and 21 of article 3 of the state Constitution, and
therefore invalid. This evenly divided vote resulted in the affirmance of the validity of the statute but did
not constitute a binding precedent on the Court.
120
62 S. Ct. 552 (1942).
121
329 F. 2d 541 (1964).
122
239 F. 2d 532 (9
th
Cir. 1956).
123
Citing Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 30 S. Ct. 621 (1910).
124
331 N.E. 2d 65 (1975).
125
Neil v. Biggers, supra note 108.
126
Catherwood v. Caslon, 13 Mees. & W. 261; Beamish v. Beamish, 9 H. L. Cas. 274.
127
Maglalang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85692, July 31, 1989, 175 SCRA 808, 811, 812;
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Pundogar, G.R. No. 96921, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 118.
128
No. L-35440, August 19, 1982, 115 SCRA 839, citing Anticamara v. Ong, No. L-29689, April 14, 1978,
82 SCRA 337.
129
Supra note 1.
491

QUISUMBING, J .:
1
Political questions have been defined as "Questions of which the courts of justice will refuse to take
cognizance, or to decide, on account of their purely political character, or because their determination
would involve an encroachment upon the executive or legislative powers; e.g., what sort of government
exists in a state." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1319 citing Kenneth v. Chambers, 14 How. 38, 14 L.Ed.
316.
2
See 1987 Const., Art. XVII, Sec. 2.
3
G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
4
G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.
CORONA, J .:
1
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616.
2
336 Phil. 848 (1997).
3
Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134787, 15 November 2005, 475 SCRA 1.
4
Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, vol. I, 2001 edition, p. 419.
5
Sec. 30, Petitions and initiatives by the people, 16 Am Jur 2d 380, citing State ex rel. Stenberg v.
Beermann, 240 Neb. 754, 485 N.W. 2d 151 (1992).
6
Id. citing Coalition for Political Honesty v. State Board of Elections, 83 Ill. 2d 236, 47 Ill. Dec. 363, 415
N.E. 2d 368 (1980).
7
Balitzer, Alfred, The Initiative and Referendum: A Study and Evaluation of Direct Legislation, The
California Roundtable 13 (1981). The American Founding Fathers recognized that direct democracy
posed a profound threat to individual rights and liberty. The U.S. Constitution was "designed to provide a
system of government that would prevent either a tyranny of the majority or a tyranny of the few." James
Madison "warned against the power of a majority or a minority of the population 'united and actuated by
some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interest of the community.'
8
Gilbert Hahn & Steven C. Morton, Initiative and Referendum Do They Encourage or Impair Better
State Government? 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 927 (1977).
9
Florida Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations, Initiatives and Referenda: Issues in Citizen
Lawmaking (1986).
10
Sec. 1, Article II, Constitution.
11
In re Initiative Petition No. 362 State Question 669, 899 P.2d 1145 (Okla. 1995).
TINGA, J .:
1
G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
492

2
G.R. No. 129754, 23 September 1997.
3
Petitioner Aumentado aptly refers to the comment of the late Senator Raul Roco that the Santiago ruling
"created a third specie of invalid laws, a mongrel type of constitutional but inadequate and, therefore,
invalid law." Memorandum for Aumentado, p. 54.
4
See Civil Code, Art. 9.
5
456 Phil. 1 (2003).
6
Id., at 10; citing I Arturo M. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines 43 (1990) and Justice Benjamin N.
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 113 (1921).
7
See Dissenting Opinion, Manila International Airport Authority v. City of Paraaque, G.R. No. 155650,
20 July 2006. In my ponencia in Globe Telecom v. NTC, G.R. No. 143964, 26 July 2004, 435 SCRA 110,
I further observed that while an administrative agency was not enslaved to obey its own precedent, it was
"essential, for the sake of clarity and intellectual honesty, that if an administrative agency decides
inconsistently with previous action, that it explain thoroughly why a different result is warranted, or if need
be, why the previous standards should no longer apply or should be overturned." Id., at 144. Happily,
Justice Puno's present opinion expressly elucidates why Santiago should be reversed.
8
As Justice Frankfurter once wrote: "We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy.
It represents an element of continuity in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable
expectations. But stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the
latest decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior
doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience This Court,
unlike the House of Lords, has from the beginning rejected a doctrine of disability at self-
correction." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119-121 (1940).
9
351 Phil. 692 (1998).
10
As Chief Justice Panganiban then cited: "For instance, Ebralinag vs. Davision Superintendent of
Schools of Cebu, 219 SCRA 256, March 1, 1993, reversed the Court's 34-year-old doctrine laid down in
Gerona vs. Secretary of Education, 106 Phil 2, August 12, 1959, and upheld the right of Jehovah's
Witnesses "to refuse to salute the Philippine flag on account of their religious beliefs." Similarly, Olaguer
vs. Military Commission, 150 SCRA 144, May 22, 1987, abandoned the 12-year-old ruling in Aquino Jr.
vs. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546, May 9, 1975, which recognized the jurisdiction of military tribunals
to try civilians for offenses allegedly committed during martial law. The Court likewise reversed itself in
EPZA vs. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305, April 29, 1987, when it vacated its earlier ruling in National Housing
Authority vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 245, June 29, 1983, on the validity of certain presidential decrees
regarding the determination of just compensation. In the much earlier case of Philippine Trust Co. vs.
Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30, December 8, 1933, the Court revoked its holding in Involuntary Insolvency of
Mariano Velasco & Co., 55 Phil 353, November 29, 1930, regarding the relation of the insolvency law with
the then Code of Civil Procedure and with the Civil Code. Just recently, the Court, in Kilosbayan vs.
Morato, 246 SCRA 540, July 17, 1995, also abandoned the earlier grant of standing to petitioner-
organization in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, May 5, 1994." Id., at 780.
11
Ibid.
12
129 Phil. 507, 516 (1967).
13
G.R. Nos. L-78461, L-79146, & L-79212, 12 August 1987, 153 SCRA 67, 75.
493

14
G.R. No. 160427, 15 September 2004, 438 SCRA 319, 326.
15
Ibid.
16
G.R. No. 155855, 26 January 2004, 421 SCRA 92.
17
Id., at 104. Relatedly, the Court held that "[c] ontests which do not involve the election, returns and
qualifications of elected officials are not subjected to the exercise of the judicial or quasi-judicial powers of
courts or administrative agencies". Ibid.
18
See e.g., Memorandum of Oppositors-Intervenors Senators Pimentel, Jr., et. al., pp. 19-22;
Memorandum for Intervenor Senate of the Philippines, pp. 34-35.
19
See 1987 Const., Art. VI, Sec. 26(1). See also Section 19[1]. 1987 Const, Art. VIII.
20
See e.g., Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 291 (1941); Cordero v. Hon. Jose Cabatuando, et al.,
116 Phil. 736, 741 (1962).
21
See Tio v. VRB, G.R. No. L-75697, 18 June 1987, 151 SCRA 208, 214-215; citing Public Service Co.,
Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314, 8 A.L.R. 466, 470. See also Farias v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 147387
& 152161, 10 December 2003, 417 SCRA 503, 519.
22
"As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title - one subject rule." Tatad v.
Secretary of Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 359 (1997).
23
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. Nos. 83896 & 83815; 22 February 1991, 194 SCRA
317.
24
Id. at 337. I have previously expressed my own doubts in relying on the constitutional or legislative
deliberations as a definitive source of construction. "It is easy to selectively cite passages, sometimes out
of their proper context, in order to assert a misleading interpretation. The effect can be dangerous.
Minority or solitary views, anecdotal ruminations, or even the occasional crude witticisms, may improperly
acquire the mantle of legislative intent by the sole virtue of their publication in the authoritative
congressional record. Hence, resort to legislative deliberations is allowable when the statute is crafted in
such a manner as to leave room for doubt on the real intent of the legislature." Southern Cross Cement
Corporation v. Phil. Cement Manufacturers, G.R. No. G.R. No. 158540, 8 July 2004, 434 SCRA 65, 95.
25
77 Phil. 192 (1946).
26
Id. at 215.
27
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, supra note 23, at 338; citing Household Finance
Corporation v. Shaffner, 203 S.W. 2d 734, 356 Mo. 808.
28
See Sections 5(b) & 8, Rep. Act No. 6735. See also 1987 Const., Sec. 2, Art. XVI.
29
G.R. No. 151944, January 20, 2004, 420 SCRA 365.
30
Id., at 377. Emphasis supplied.
31
See Sections 5(b) & 8, Rep. Act No. 6735. See also 1987 Const., Sec. 2, Art. XVI.
494

32
From the "Funeral Oration" by Pericles, as recorded by Thucydides in the History of the Peloponnesian
War.
33
H. Zinn, A People's History of the United States (1980 ed.), at 95.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:
1
The full text of the Preamble reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and
humane society and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations,
promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and
our posterity the blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of
truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
2
Article XVII, Constitution.
3
G.R. No. 127325, 19 March 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
4
Id. at 157.
5
Id. at 124.
6
Olac v. Rivera, G.R. No. 84256, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 321, 328-329; See also the more recent
cases of Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 155108, 27 April 2005, 457 SCRA 400; and PH Credit
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 421 Phil. 821 (2001).
7
8
G.R. No. 129754.
9
Separate Opinion of former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. to the Resolution, dated 23 September
1997, in G.R. No. 129754, PIRMA v. COMELEC, pp. 2-3.
10
Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil. 628, 650 (1999).
11
Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118651, 16 October 1997.
12
Santiago v. Comelec, supra note 2 at 170-171.
13
Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 352.
VELASCO, JR., J .:
1
G.R. No. 127535, March 19, 1997, 270 SCRA 106.
2
Id.
3
Commission on Audit of the Province of Cebu v. Province of Cebu, G.R. No. 141386, November 29,
2001, 371 SCRA 196, 202.
495

4
United Harbor Pilots' Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Association of International Shipping Lines,
Inc., G.R. No. 133763, November 13, 2002, 391 SCRA 522, 533.
5
PH Credit Corporation v. Court of Appeals and Carlos M. Farrales, G. R. No. 109648, November 22,
2001, 370 SCRA 155, 166-167.
6
Id.
7
Florentino v. Rivera, et al., G. R. No. 167968, January 23, 2006, 479 SCRA 522, 529.
8
G.R. No. 129754, September 23, 1997.
9
V. Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Principles and Concept 46 (1962).

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