Steven E. BoËr

STEVEN E.
BOËR
ON THE MULTIPLE RELATION THEORY OF JUDGMENT
0. I NTRODUCTION
The locus classicus of the multiple relation theory of judgment is, of

course, the work of Bertrand Russell in the period from 1906 to 1919.1
Motivated by a desire to excise propositions from his ontology, Russell
attempted during this period to analyse the so-called propositional attitudes
in terms of a family of “judgment relations” which would tie the thinking
subject directly to the individuals, properties and relations judged about
and which would permit a notion of judgmental truth (defined in terms
of “judgmental facts”) to supplant the traditional notion of propositional
truth. It is generally conceded that Russell’s original attempts were unsuc-
cessful; indeed, so serious were their shortcomings that Russell himself
eventually abandoned the whole project. Since then, the multiple relation
approach has come to be regarded as a mere historical curiosity. While
the fate of those early versions is no doubt well-deserved, the lesson to be
learned from their failure is not that multiple relation strategies per se are
unworkable but that the particular blend of ingredients favored by Russell
was inadequate for their implementation.
The aim of this paper is to show how, by developing apparatus that
has roots in Russell’s own early work, one can vindicate a version (call
it ‘MRTJ’) of the multiple relation theory of judgment by formally redu-
cing it to a plausible representationalist theory. Section 1 briefly sketches
the ideas behind MRTJ and presents some adequacy conditions on any
reductive vindication of such a theory. Section 2 presents the formalities
of MRTJ: its base language, underlying logic, and some of its character-
istic axioms. Section 3 adduces some general considerations about mental
representation and, against the same formal background, discusses some
salient axioms of a representationalist theory I that treats thought as inner
speech in one’s mental language. Section 4 provides the crucial definitions
and axioms which, when added to I to obtain the theory I+ , function as
bridge principles allowing the formal reduction of MRTJ to I+ . Finally,
Section 5 argues that this reduction constitutes a vindication inasmuch as
Erkenntnis 56: 181–214, 2002.

© 2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
182 STEVEN E. BOËR
MRTJ, reconstructed within I+ , meets the adequacy conditions laid down

in Section 1.
1. ADEQUACY CONDITIONS
Before becoming immersed in the technicalities of its axiomatization, it

will be useful to say just enough about MRTJ to enable us to articu-
late certain adequacy conditions on our program of reductive vindication.
As presented here, MRTJ is modelled after Russell’s final version of his
theory, according to which the relata of judgment relations include not
only the “objects” of judgment (i.e., the individuals, properties, and re-
lations that the judgment is intuitively about) but also a “logical form”
that somehow encodes the pattern in which these constituents are judged
to be arranged, thereby “determining” the judgment’s truth condition.2
Thus, e.g., an atomic belief ascription of the superficial form (1) is to be
analysed3 along the lines of (2), in which f is the yet-to-be-explained
logical form of an n-ary predication and Bel is a yet-to-be-explained
(n + 3)ary relation of the appropriate logical type for relating items having
the respective logical types of A, f , R, a1 , . . . , an :
(1) A believes that R(a1 , . . . , an )
(2) Bel(A, f, R, a1 , . . . , an ).
(In what follows, belief will be our paradigm of a judgment relation.) Now
suppose – as will transpire in the next section – that MRTJ is set out as
a formalized theory in which the general notions of belief, logical form,
and determining a truth condition are taken as primitive, along with some
notation for describing the “logical complexity” of the logical forms of
particular beliefs. A reduction of MRTJ to another theory whose primitives
are taken as antecedently understood will not be adequate for the purpose
of vindicating the former’s notions of logical forms, multiple relations and
the like unless the reduced version of MRTJ provides plausible analyses
of beliefs of arbitrary complexity. One test of the plausibility of such ana-
lyses is their ability to accommodate and explain the intuitive validity or
invalidity of certain inferences about people’s beliefs. It is, e.g., notorious
that the Substitutivity of Identity seems to fail in inferences about psycho-
logical attitudes like belief. The reduced theory should offer some account
of this which is consistent with MRTJ’s commitment to the Substitutivity
ON THE MULTIPLE RELATION THEORY OF JUDGMENT 183
of Identity. In sum, then, we have (C1) as an adequacy condition on the

reduced version of MRTJ:
(C1) It should give a plausible analysis of ‘A believes that p’ and

‘The belief that p is true/false’ for all grammatically admiss-
ible replacements of ‘p’, not just for atomic ones like (1). In
particular, this analysis should shed light upon alleged failures
of the Substitutivity of Identity.
Moreover, because MRTJ eschews propositions in favor of a multiplicity of

typed belief relations among logical forms and various non-propositional
objects of belief, the reduced version of MRTJ must additionally meet the
adequacy conditions (C2)–(C5):
(C2) It should reveal what is common to the members of the infinitely

large family of differently typed belief relations (i.e., that in
virtue of which they are belief-relations).
(C3) It should incorporate a precise account of the nature of the

posited “logical forms”.
(C4) It should explain how the obtaining of a belief relation brings

the objects of the belief into relation with a logical form so
conceived; and this explanation should account for the role of
logical forms in fixing the logical structure of a belief – ex-
plaining, e.g., (a) how a specific “order” is thereby imposed on
the objects of the belief and (b) why certain possible orderings
“make sense” but others do not.
(C5) It should neither appeal to propositions nor use locutions that

might seem to presuppose propositions for their interpreta-
tion – such as, e.g., undefined predicates that take nominalized
sentences (as opposed to names of sentences) as arguments.
While Russell’s versions are set up to comply nominally with (C5), it

is a matter of record that none ever came close to satisfying (C1)–(C4).
This is not surprising, since everything clearly depends upon what is said,
on the one hand, about the nature of the posited logical forms and, on the
other hand, about the way in which belief (even when false) supposedly
“unites” its objects with logical forms so conceived. But both of these
topics ultimately remain mysterious in Russell’s writings. Let us see if
we can dispel the mystery.
184 STEVEN E. BOËR
2. THE FORMALITIES OF MRTJ
2.1. The Base Language and Underlying Logic

L MRTJ, we shall assume, is articulated in a quantificational language L
embodying a simple type theory in which the basic type is i (the type of
individuals) and in which t1 , . . . , tn counts as a type if t1 , . . . , tn do.4
(Type indices appear as right superscripts on terms.) L contains variables
of every type and a finite selection (borrowed from English) of primitive
names for the individuals, properties and relations that serve as objects of
judgment. (We use ‘name’ as a synonym for ‘constant’. When t = i, we
will also call a name of type t a predicate of type t. The variables and
names of a given type constitute the terms of that type.) Two sorts of com-
plex terms are permitted. When α1t1 , . . . , αntn (n ≥ 1) are variables and φ is
a formula in which none of α1 , . . . , αn occurs bound, L counts λ-abstracts
of the form [λα1t1 . . . αntn : φ]
as complex terms of type t1 , . . . , tn . And
where β t is a variable occurring free but nowhere bound in the formula ψ,
L counts a definite description of the form (ιβ t )ψ
as a complex term
of type t. For future reference, let us call a formula pure iff it contains no
primitive names.
The underlying logic treats the sentential connectives (‘∼’, ‘&’, ‘∨’,
‘→’, ‘≡) in classical fashion and subjects λ-abstracts to the familiar prin-
ciples of λ-conversion. Identity is also treated classically: subject to the
usual restrictions on free variables, every instance of α t = β t → (φ ≡
φ(β//α))
is an axiom. However, in light of L’s syntactic treatment of
definite descriptions as terms, ‘∀’ will be so restricted as to ensure a free
logic for such terms (‘∃’ being defined as usual via ‘∀’). In other words,
where τ is a term containing no definite descriptions save those whose
nonemptiness is assured by our axioms, φ(τ/α) may be inferred from
(∀α)φ
; but the conditional ψ(τ/β) → φ(τ/α)
may be inferred from
(∀α)φ
for any term τ substitutable for both α and β, provided that the
formula ψ is atomic. This departure from Russell as regards the treatment
of definite descriptions is purely for technical convenience, and nothing
essential to the results obtained below depends upon it.
To the foregoing apparatus, we add the axiom scheme (A1), which
formalizes the plausible (albeit metaphysically optional) thesis that if F
and G are the indeed one and the same n-ary relation, then F cannot
require its j th term to be identical with an object a while G requires its
j th term to be identical with a distinct object b:5
t
(A1) If φ and ψ are formulas, α1t1 , . . . , αjj , . . . , αntn are variables, σ tj
t
and τ tj are terms distinct from each of α1t1 , . . . , αjj , . . . , αntn and
foreign to both φ and ψ, then every instance of the following is
an axiom (1 ≤ j ≤ n):
t
[λα1t1 . . . αjj . . . αntn : αj = σ & φ]
t
= [λα1t1 . . . αjj . . . αntn : αj = τ & ψ] → σ = τ.
2.2. Some Primitive Vocabulary and Axioms of MRTJ

Since Russell never undertakes an axiomatic presentation of his multiple
relation theory, it is not clear what primitives or axioms he would have
favored for its articulation. For the purposes of our reconstruction, we shall
assume that MRTJ is formulated in the language LMRTJ obtained by adding
to L the four families of primitive predicates specified in (P1)–(P4):
(P1) the (n + 2)-ary predicates Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn

(n ≥ 0);
(P2) the binary predicates Determinest1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn ,i
(n ≥ 0);
(P3) the unary predicates LogicalFormt1 ,...tn ,i,i,i,i

(n ≥ 0);
and
(P4) for each pure formula φ whose free variables (if any) are
α1t1 , . . . , αktk and each variable δ i foreign to φ, the quatern-
ary predicate [λα1 . . . αk δ : φ]
, of type t1 , . . . tk , i, i, i, i,
which is counted as syntactically simple (hence as not contain-
ing occurrences of α1t1 , . . . , αktk ).
The underlined terms mentioned in (P4) serve as LMRTJ ’s official names

for particular logical forms. The reason for including the seemingly
redundant variable δ i will emerge later when we consider wholly gen-
eral judgments. The informal interpretation of these special names (and
their alphabetical variants) may be conveyed by the following sample
glosses: ‘[λGi x i d i : G(x)]’ is to be read as ‘the logical form of a
(first-order) unary predication’; ‘[λGi x i d i : ∼ G(x)]’ is to be read as
‘the logical form of the negation of a (first-order) unary predication’;
‘[λF i,i x1i x2i Gi,i y1i y2i d i : F (x1 , x2 ) ∨ G(y1 , y2 )]’ is to be read as ‘the lo-
gical form of the disjunction of two (possibly unrelated, first-order) unary
predications’; and ‘[λd i : (∀x i )(x = x)]’ is to be read as ‘the logical form
of the (first-order) universal quantification of a predication of self-identity’.
186 STEVEN E. BOËR
We cannot undertake here to provide a full axiomatic development of

MRTJ. For our purposes it will be enough to concentrate upon certain key
axiom schemes that might plausibly be proposed to govern the vocabulary
introduced in (P1)–(P4). Let us begin with the connections between belief
relations and logical forms. Since belief is supposed to essentially involve
a relation to a logical form, [I] is an obvious candidate for axiomatic status:
[I] Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn (α i , ρ t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i , β1t1 , . . . , βntn ) →
LogicalForm(ρ).
(Axioms peculiar to MRTJ will be indexed with bracketed roman numer-

als; logical axioms and the additional axioms of I and I+ will be numbered
as (A1), (A2), etc.)
The intuitive logic of de re belief ascriptions might be expected to
supply more candidates for axiomhood. For example, although we pre-
sumably do not want MRTJ to rule out someone’s having two “implicitly”
contradictory beliefs regarding the same object – say, one under the lo-
gical form [λGi x i d i : G(x)] and the other under [λGi x i d i : ∼G(x)]
– we might well be averse to the prospect of someone’s having an
“explicitly” contradictory belief about an object under the logical form
[λGi x i d i : G(x) & ∼G(x)]. For the sake of argument, let us legislate this
aversion into the axiom scheme [II]:
[II] ∼Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn (α0i , [λα1t1 . . . αntn δ i : φ & ∼φ],
β1t1 , . . . , βntn ).
Notoriously, people’s beliefs are not closed under logical consequence,

but we might at least expect some of their beliefs to respect the simple
valid inferences that characterize the logical constants. Thus, e.g., a “con-
junctive” de re belief should be accompanied by de re beliefs matching the
“conjuncts” (though not always conversely). An appropriate axiom scheme
for this kind of conjunctive belief would thus be [III]:
[III] Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn (α0 , [λα1 . . . αn δ : φ & ψ],

β1 , . . . , βn ) →
{Beli,tg1 ,...,tgn ,i,i,i,i,tg1 ,...,tgn (α0 , [λαg1 . . . αgn δ : φ],
βg1 , . . . , βgn ) &
Beli,tj1 ,...,tjn ,i,i,i,i,tj1 ,...,tjn (α0 , [λαj1 . . . αjn δ : ψ],
βj1 , . . . , βjn )},
where (i) αg1 , . . ., αgn are those of the variables α1 , . . ., αn free in φ,

and βg1 , . . ., βgn are the corresponding terms from among β1 , . . ., βn ; (ii)
αj1 , . . ., αjn are those of the variables α1 , . . ., αn free in ψ, and βj1 , . . ., βjn
are the corresponding terms from among β1 , . . ., βn . Again, under the as-
sumptions (i) and (ii), we might lay down [IV], which (roughly speaking)
requires that when objects are believed to satisfy neither of two conditions,
they should be separately believed not to satisfy each of those conditions:
[IV] Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn (α0 , [λα1 . . . αn δ : ∼(φ ∨ ψ)],

β1 , . . . , βn ) →
{Beli,tg1 ,...,tgn ,i,i,i,i,tg1 ,...,tgn (α0 , [λαg1 . . . αgn δ : ∼φ],
βg1 , . . . , βgn ) &
Beli,tj1 ,...,tjn ,i,i,i,i,tj1 ,...,tjn (α0 , [λαj1 . . . αjn δ : ∼ψ],
βj1 , . . . , βjn )},
Similarly, we might stipulate [V], which says (again roughly) that believ-
ing objects to satisfy some condition rules out believing that condition to
be unsatisfied:
[V] Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn (α0 , [λα1 . . . αn δ : φ], β1 , . . . , βn ) →

∼Beli,i,i,i,i (α0 , [λδ : ∼(∃α1 ) . . . (∃αn )φ]).
No doubt numerous other principles of this ilk could be justified for beliefs
of other basic logical forms, but having a complete list of them is not
important for present purposes.
As for the nature of logical forms themselves, we may lay down at least
this much at the outset. A logical form f is a relational entity that “de-
termines” a particular ontological structure Rf , the latter being a (possibly
unexemplified) formal relation between ordinary properties, relations, and
individuals. The chief constraint on the identity of the structure Rf derives
from the role that a logical form is supposed to play vis-à-vis the condi-
tions for someone’s believing truly/falsely under it: viz., a case of believing
under f is a case of believing truly/falsely under f iff the entities believed-
about are/are not related by Rf . Accordingly, the logical form f must be
distinct from the determined structure Rf . For in a case of believing falsely
under f , the entities believed-about are of course not related by Rf . Yet
even if Rf is not exemplified by anything at all, f must still be the logical
form under which the subject believes, where this naturally suggests that
f (itself a relational entity) must somehow be “exemplified in the belief”.
By this we do not mean that there is an extra entity, “the belief”, which is a
relatum of f , but merely that any case of believing “under” f must involve
f ’s actually relating some items. (As it stands, MRTJ offers no account of
f ’s relata; in our proposed reduction, we shall identify them with certain
188 STEVEN E. BOËR
mental representations.) In sum, whether or not the structure it determines

relates anything “on the side of the world”, the logical form under which
one believes must relate certain things “on the side of the believer”, fixing
(in a way that Russell never explains) the distinctive way that the believer
is related to the entities believed-about.
Now for technical reasons that will emerge in due course, we have
chosen to speak of the ontological structures in question at one remove,
by way of correlated relations with an extra argument-place. Thus, e.g., the
structure determined by the logical form [λGi x i d i : G(x)] of a first-order
unary predication is taken to be the corresponding ternary formal relation
[λGi x i d i : G(x)] instead of the binary formal relation [λGi x i : G(x)].
Generalizing, we have the axiom scheme [VI]:
[VI] Determines([λα1t1 . . . αntn δ i : φ], [λα1t1 . . . αntn δ i : φ]).
(Since ‘Determines’ requires arguments of different types, the very idea

of a logical form being identical to the corresponding structure cannot be
mooted in LMRTJ .)
We shall leave unsettled the question whether a given structure can
be determined by more than one logical form. But we shall adopt axiom
scheme [VII], which disallows the possibility of the same logical form
determining two distinct structures:
[VII] (Determines([λα1t1 . . . αntn δ i : φ], y t1 ,...,tn ,i ) &

Determines([λα1t1 . . . αttn δ i : φ], zt1 ,...,tn ,i )) → y = z.
What motivates [VII] is the intuitive notion of “determining” at work here,

according to which the logical form of a belief about e1 , . . . , en somehow
encodes a unique ontological structure that e1 , . . . , en must exemplify for
that belief to be true. Two beliefs about the same entities e1 , . . . , en un-
der the same logical form must ipso facto have identical truth conditions.
Indeed, it would seem that from the standpoint of their role in a multiple re-
lation theory of judgment, logical forms just are the determiners of unique
ontological structures. Accordingly, let us add the axiom scheme [VIII]:
[VIII] (∀x t1 ,...,tk ,i,i,i,i ){LogicalForm(x) ≡

(∃!y t1 ,...,tk ,i )Determines(x, y)}.
Given the foregoing, (T1) is a theorem scheme:
(T1) LogicalForm([λα1t1 . . . αntn δ i : φ]).

MRTJ, of course, treats belief ascriptions transparently. Some (e.g.,

Salmon (1986) and Soames (1987a, b)) have argued on Russell’s behalf
that so-called attitudinal opacity is an illusion – not a syntactic/semantic
datum but merely a pragmatic phenomenon – hence that there are no
real substitution-failures in attitudinal contexts to contend with in the first
place. Be that as it may, MRTJ does at least have a way of handling ap-
parent substitution-failures involving definite descriptions, despite treating
them syntactically as terms. Consider, e.g., the inference from (3a–b) to
(3c):
(3)a. George IV believes that Scott = the author of Waverly.
b. The author of Waverly = the author of Marmion.
c. George IV believes that Scott = the author of Marmion.
Because it can make fine-grained distinctions of logical form, MRTJ can
in principle formalize this inference in any of the four ways (4)–(7):
(4)a. Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (GeorgeI V , [λx i y i d i : x = y],

Scott, (ιy i )AuthorOf(y, Waverly)).
b. (ιy i )AuthorOf(y, Waverly) = (ιy i )AuthorOf(y, Marmion).
c. Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (GeorgeI V , [λx i y i d i : x = y],
Scott, (ιy i )AuthorOf(y, Marmion)).
(5)a. Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (GeorgeI V , [λx i F i d i : x = (ιzi )F z],

Scott, [λy i : AuthorOf(y, Waverly)]).
b. (ιx i )AuthorOf(x, Waverly) = (ιx i )AuthorOf(x, Marmion).
c. Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (GeorgeI V , [λx i F i d i : x = (ιzi )F z],
Scott, [λy i : AuthorOf(y, Marmion)]).
(6)a. Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (GeorgeI V , [λx i F i d i : x = (ιzi )F z],

Scott, [λy i : AuthorOf(y, Waverly)]).
b. (ιx i )AuthorOf(x, Waverly) = (ιx i )AuthorOf(x, Marmion).
c. Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (GeorgeI V , [λx i y i d i : x = y],
Scott, (ιy i )AuthorOf(y, Marmion)).
(7)a. Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (GeorgeI V , [λx i y i d i : x = y],

Scott, (ιy i )AuthorOf(y, Waverly)).
b. (ιy i )AuthorOf(y, Waverly) = (ιy i )AuthorOf(y, Marmion).
c. Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (GeorgeI V , [λx i F i d i : x = (ιzi )F z],
Scott, [λy i : AuthorOf(y, Marmion)]).
190 STEVEN E. BOËR
Now (4), which is univocal with respect to ‘Bel’ and the logical form
assignment in premisses and conclusion, not only is a plausible analysis of
the transparent reading of (3) but also is formally valid, being an instance
of the Substitutivity of Identity. This leaves (5)–(7) as candidates for rep-
resenting the wholly or partly opaque readings of (3) on which it is invalid.
Each of (5)–(7) either equivocates on ‘Bel’ and the logical form assignment
or “changes the subject” by making the statements about properties instead
of (or in addition to) individuals. None of (5)–(7) is valid solely in virtue of
our logical axioms, although this leaves it open that a deeper understanding
of what it is to have a belief “under” a logical form might lead us to accept
one of them. (5), which involves no equivocation, looks promising as a
rendering of the fully opaque construal of (3) and is intuitively invalid.
Here the intuition is that if George IV thinks of Scott as uniquely authoring
Waverly, then the mere fact that Scott uniquely authored both Waverly
and Marmion offers no assurance that George IV also thinks of Scott as
uniquely authoring Marmion. (7) likewise seems invalid. The fact that the
two novels had the same author and that George IV has an identity-belief
that happens to be about Scott and the author of Waverly is insufficient
grounds for concluding that George IV thinks of Scott as the author of
Marmion (or “as” of any other kind, for that matter). The intuitive status
of (6) is less clear and will be left to our reduction to settle.
2.3. Truth in MRTJ

Where f is a logical form, let us call the ontological structure it determines
the value of f and introduce for it the following abbreviatory notation:
(D1) Where ρ is a term of type t1 , . . . tn , i, i, i, i:

|ρ| =def (ιγ t1 ,...,tn ,I )Determines(ρ, γ ).
We have seen that the value |f | of a logical form f is intuitively con-

nected with the truth conditions for beliefs under f . Can this intuitive
connection be made explicit in MRTJ itself? As regards the truth-values
of “belief facts”, it is easy to define typed counterparts of ‘truly believes’
and ‘falsely believes’. The basic idea is simple: one bears the multiple
relation of truly/falsely believing to such-and-such items under a given
logical form f iff (i) one bears to those items under f the multiple relation
of believing and (ii) the value of f does/does not relate those items (in
the indicated order). Formally, this amounts to taking (D2) and (D3) as
definition schemes:
(D2) TrBeli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...tn =def [λα i ρ t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i β1t1 . . . βntn :
Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn (α, ρ, β1 , . . . , βn ) & |ρ|(β1 , . . . , βn , α)].6
(D3) FlsBeli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...tn =def [λα i ρ t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i β1t1 . . . βntn :
Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn (α, ρ, β1 , . . . , βn ) &
∼|ρ|(β1 , . . . , βn , α)].
Thus, e.g., (8) will be paraphrased in MRTJ by (9), which is provably

equivalent in MRTJ to (10):
(8) Othello truly believes that Desdemona loves Cassio.
(9) TrBeli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (Othello, [λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)],

Loves, Desdemona, Cassio).
(10) Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (Othello, [λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)],

Loves, Desdemona, Cassio) & Loves(Desdemona, Cassio).
Clearly, however, the definition schemes (D2) and (D3) will not sup-
ply what Russell wanted of MRTJ, viz. (stratified) notions of truth and
falsehood for beliefs that will serve in place of the traditional notions of
propositional truth and falsehood that he jettisoned along with the propos-
itions themselves. The obvious problem is that infinitely many truths and
falsehoods may go unbelieved, so that there will not be enough surrogate
“belief facts” to go around (hence not enough real cases of believing-truly
or believing-falsely for (D2) and (D3) to take up the slack). However,
even where there is no fact that someone believes, say, that Rab, there
is still the corresponding relation between a thinker x and a logical form f
that consists in (i) x’s bearing the appropriate multiple relation to R, a, b
under f and (ii) f ’s being such-and-such a logical form h. Taking h to be
[λF i,i y1i y2i d i : F (y1 , y2 )], this relation between thinker and logical form
would be the complex relation Bh:R,a,b defined by (D4):
(D4) Bh:R,a,b =def [λx i f i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i :

f = [λF i,i y1i y2i d i : F (y1 , y2 )] &
Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (x, f, R i,i , a, b)].
In sentences of the sort ‘The belief that a bears R to b is true’, we can now
think of (11) as para-phraseable by (12), to which the relation Bh:R,a,b is
assigned as referent:
(11) the belief that a bears R to b.
(12) beliefs under the logical form of a binary predication involving

R, a, b respectively.
192 STEVEN E. BOËR
In general, then, for any logical form g t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i and entities e1 , . . . ,
en of respective types t1 , . . . , tn , we will have as a belief-surrogate the
complex relation Bg:e1 ,...,en defined by (D5):
(D5) Bg:e1 ,...,en =def [λx i f t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i : f = g &

Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn (x, f, e1 , . . . , en )].
To complete the picture, we need a suitable family of typed truth-

predicates for such belief-surrogates. What immediately suggests itself is
an appeal to the notion of the value of the logical form relating the objects
of the belief. Tailored to fit (D5), a suitable definition scheme would be
(D6):
(D6) For any term ρ of type t1 , . . . , tn , i, i, i, i and terms
α1t1 , . . ., αntn :
Truei,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i (Bρ:α1 ,...,αn )
=def (∃β i )|ρ|(α1 , . . . , αn , β),
with ‘Falsei,t1 ,...,tn ,i ’ being defined as ‘∼Truei,t1 ,...,tn ,i ’. In other
words, a belief-surrogate Bg:e1 ,...,en is “true" just in case the value of g
actually relates e1 , . . . , en to some object w. Trivially, we will have as
theorems all instances of the corresponding truth scheme (T2), and from
the instance of (T2) for the particular belief-surrogate Bh:R,a,b discussed
above, theorem (T3) will follow:
(T2) True(B[λα1 ...αn δ:φ]:β1 ,...,βn ) ≡ (∃γ i )([λα1t1 . . . αntn δ i : φ]

(β1 , . . . , βn , γ )).
(T3) True(Bh:R,a,b ) ≡ R(a, b).
Using this apparatus, we can translate a vernacularism like (13) by its

perspicuous counterpart (14), which, however unwieldy, will at least have
the virtue of being demonstrably equivalent to (15):
(13) The belief that Desdemona loves Cassio is true. [I.e.: Beliefs
under the logical form of a binary predication involving loving,
Desdemona, and Cassio respectively are true.]
(14) Truei,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i ([λx i f i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i :

f = [λF i,i y1i y2i d i : F (y1 , y2 )] &
Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (x, f, Loves, Desdemona, Cassio)]).
(15) Loves(Desdemona, Cassio).
These results, together with the fact that MRTJ treats the logical com-
plexity of a belief’s content as a function of its logical form, ensure that
the foregoing account of truth for belief-surrogates applies not just to the
“atomic” ones but to the “molecular” ones as well.
3. THE THEORY I
Our concern is to vindicate MRTJ, not the various doctrines entangled

with Russell’s own versions of the multiple relation theory (e.g., his Prin-
ciple of Acquaintance and his sense-datum phenomenalism). In particular,
we carry no brief for his curious view that the mind somehow directly
“arranges” the (nonmental) objects of judgment in accordance with a cer-
tain logical form. Instead, we look for vindication in the direction of a
representational theory of mind (RTM) according to which what gets “ma-
nipulated” in thought are not the nonmental objects of thought per se but
mental representations of those objects. Specifically, we shall consider a
formal theory I that embraces RTM in the specific form of the so-called
language of thought hypothesis (LOT), according to which (at the level
of representation-types) the mind’s stock of representations is regarded
as forming a language-like system (the thinker’s “Mentalese”) for which
an appropriate syntax and semantics could in principle be provided. We
shall be assuming rather than arguing for the plausibility of LOT here; for
arguments see Fodor (1975, 1987) and Maloney (1989).
Ironically, Russell’s first, very brief and tentative sketch of his theory
(Russell 1906/08) did involve mental representatives of objects in addi-
tion to the objects themselves; and after officially renouncing the multiple
relation approach (Russell 1919) he immediately embraced a new view
of belief as a relation to certain mental representations constructed from
mental images standing for objects, properties, and relations. Perhaps what
prevented Russell from exploiting his latent affinity for mental represent-
ations in the interest of his multiple relation theory of judgment was his
failure to get beyond the unprofitable traditional talk of “mental imagery”
to some version of LOT. In any event, let us see whether, availing ourselves
of LOT, we can do better on behalf of MRTJ.
As loyal type-theorists, we assume that languages of thought have a
type-structure like that of L. Since we will both be talking in English about
the extended language LI of I and using LI in turn to talk about the
syntax and semantics of Mentalese, it will be useful to adopt the following
194 STEVEN E. BOËR
notational conventions to keep track of our hierarchy of languages. In our

English metalanguage for LI :
– Expressions of the form φ[α1 , . . ., αk ; αk+1 , . . ., αn ]
are restric-
ted variables ranging over formulas of LI whose free variables (in
order of first occurrence) are α1 , . . ., αk and whose bound variables (in
order of first occurrence) are αk+1 , . . ., αn .
– Uppercase Greek letters are restricted metavariables that range solely
over the boldfaced variables of LI (see below).
– Sellarsian dot-quotes are used for talking about the grammatical and
inferential role of expressions of Mentalese. (For any expression σ of
MRTJ, an expression of a’s Mentalese is a •σ • iff it plays therein the
same grammatical/inferential role that σ plays in MRTJ.)
The language LI itself contains the following additions to the basic
formalism of L:
– Boldfaced Roman letters are used as restricted variables of type i
ranging over Mentalese expression-kinds (construed as type i prop-
erties, so that to token an expression-kind is literally to exemplify
it).
– Where α is a term designating an agent a, Mα
designates a’s lan-
guage of thought, iα
is a name for the Ma -type of individuals, and
tα
(with or without subscripts) is a variable ranging over Ma -types
(where the identity of the agent a is obvious, the superscripts will be
omitted).7
– The vergules ‘«’ and ‘»’ are used to form structural-descriptive names
of complex Mentalese expression-kinds. Thus, e.g., where ‘∧ ’ signifies
concatenation of Mentalese tokens, the expression «(S1 & S2 )»
is
a type i name for the property of being an individual x such that
x = y1 ∧ y2 ∧ y3 ∧ y4 ∧ y5 for some individuals y1 ,y2 , y3 , y4 , y5 such that
y1 is a •(• and y2 = S1 and y3 is a •&• and y4 = S2 and y5 is a •)•.
– Boldfaced logical symbols are names for the Mentalese symbol-kinds
that are their counterparts: e.g., ‘&’ names the property of being a
Mentalese •&•; ‘)’ names the property of being a Mentalese •)•; and
so on). In particular, bold underlining stands for a Mentalese syn-
tactic operation that converts Mentalese λ-terms of type t1 , . . .tk , i
into simple names of type t1 , . . . tk , i, i, i, i (intuitively, Mentalese
names for logical forms). In other words, ‘«r»’ signifies the result of
applying to the Mentalese expression r the Mentalese equivalent of
underlining – viz., an operation whose grammatical role parallels that
of underlined terms in our formalism (i.e., if r is a •[λν1 . . . νk δ : ψ]•
then «r» is a •[λν1 . . . νk δ : ψ]•).
– The following vocabulary (minus type indices and with obvious

or bracketed interpretations) is employed for discussing the syntax
and semantics of a thinker’s Mentalese sentences and the thinker’s
psychological relations to those sentences:
VarType(), t, Mα ); NameType(), t, Mα ); TermType(), t, Mα );
Sentence(*, Mα );
Expression(), Mα ); SimpleIn(), Mα ); FreeIn(), *);
OccursIn(), *); )(+1 . . . +n /,1 . . . ,n );
DesIn(), β t , Mα ) [i.e., ) designates β t in Mα ];
Distinct()1 , )2 , . . . , )m ) [i.e., &1≤i=j ≤m ()i = )j )];
SynRel(µ) [i.e., µ is a syntactic relation among Mentalese
expressions]; Accepts(α, *).
In axiom, theorem and definition schemes where ‘t’ is employed as a
schematic letter whose replacements are particular type indices of our
formalism, its primed counterpart ‘t ’ is to be understood as a schematic
letter whose replacements are the boldfaced indices for the corresponding
Mentalese types. (Thus, e.g., if ‘t’ is replaced by ‘i, i’ in an instance of
a scheme also containing ‘t ’, then ‘t ’ must be replaced by ‘i, i’ in that
instance.) The metalinguistic expression ‘t ’ must not be confused with the
object language variable ‘t’.
In the case of LI ’s syntactic vocabulary, the corresponding axiom
schemes of I are predictable. There will be, e.g., an axiom scheme
to guarantee that «[λ)1 . . . )m : *]» will count as a term of type
t1 , . . ., tm in Mα if * is a sentence and )1 , . . . , )m are variables of re-
spective types t1 , . . ., tm in Mα ; another axiom scheme to guarantee that if
«[λ)1 . . . )m / : *]» is a term of type t1 , . . ., tk , i in Mα with / foreign
to *, then «[λ)1 . . . )m / : *]» is a term of type t1 , . . ., tk , i, i, i, i in
Mα ; and so on. Since these axiom schemes are as uninteresting as they are
predictable, there is no point to enumerating and formalizing them here.
For present purposes there is no need for assumptions about the make-
up or semantics of anyone’s non-logical Mentalese vocabulary. It will,
however, be important to specify the designation of “pure” Mentalese λ-
abstracts – i.e., terms of the sort «[λv1 . . . vk : S]» in which S contains no
primitive Mentalese names of any type. So I will require a corresponding
“semantic” axiom scheme. To formulate this axiom scheme (and others to
come), we introduce below the useful notion of the “shadow” of a pure
formula.
Suppose φ[α1 , . . . , αk ; αk+1 , . . . , αn ] is a pure formula of L. Then,
for any distinct boldfaced letters 01 , . . ., 0k , 0k+1 , . . ., 0n , we say that
an expression 1 is the shadow of φ[α1 , . . ., αk ; αk+1 , . . ., αn ] un-
der [01 , . . ., 0k ; 0k+1 , . . ., 0n ] iff: 1 results from φ[α1 , . . ., αk ;
196 STEVEN E. BOËR
αk+1 , . . ., αn ] by first replacing α1 , . . ., αk , αk+1 , . . ., αn with 01 , . . ., 0k ,

0k+1 , . . ., 0n and then replacing any remaining non-boldfaced sym-
bols with their boldface counterparts from LI ’s special vocabulary
for Mentalese. (For example: (∃v4 )(v1 (v4 ) & v2 (v3 ))
would be the
shadow of (∃x)(F (x) & G(y))
under [‘v1 ’, ‘v2 ’, ‘v3 ’; ‘v4 ’] and
(∃v1 )(∃v2 )v2 (v1 )
would be the shadow of (∃x)(∃F )F (x)
under [ ;
‘v1 ’, ‘v2 ’].)
Where 1 is the shadow of the pure formula φ[α1t1 , . . ., αktk ;
tk+1
αk+1 , . . ., αntn ] under [01 , . . ., 0k ; 0k+1 , . . ., 0n ] and / is a bold-
faced letter foreign to 1, I has the axiom scheme (A2) for the semantic
predicate ‘DesIn’ of type i, t1 , . . ., tk , i:
(A2) (Distinct(01 , . . ., 0n , /) & VarType(01 , t1 , Mγ ) & · · · &

VarType(0n , tn , Mγ ) & VarType(/, i, Mγ ) &
∼OccursIn(/, 1)) →
DesIn(«[λ01 . . .0k / : 1]», [λα1t1 . . .αktk δ i :
φ[α1 , . . ., αk ; αk+1 , . . ., αn ]], Mγ ).
Thus, since ‘f(x)’ is the shadow of ‘F (x)’, under [‘f’, ‘x’; ], it follows
from (A2) that if f, x, d are distinct variables of respective types i, i and
i in y’s Mentalese, (d foreign to «f(x)»), then y’s Mentalese name «[λfxd:
f(x)]» designates the type i, i, i relation [λF i x i d i : F (x)].
Given the adoption of LOT, it is natural to model the having of beliefs as
the “acceptance” of certain sentences of one’s Mentalese. Since, however,
most of a person’s beliefs at any moment are merely tacit, the correspond-
ing notion of acceptance must not require occurrent tokening of Mentalese
sentences. Accordingly, let us gloss Accepts(x, S)
as x is disposed as
if x inwardly and assertively tokens S
,8 where to token S – a property –
is to produce something exemplifying it. I will of course contain axioms
characterizing this relation. The following, admittedly incomplete list of
axioms (derived, with modifications, from Loar (1981: 72)) may serve to
convey the flavor of what would be involved:
(A3.1) (Sentence(S1 , Mx ) & Sentence(S2 , Mx )) → ∼Accepts(x, «S1 &

∼S2 »).
(A3.2) (Sentence(S, Mx ) & Accepts(x, S) → ∼Accepts(x, «∼S»).
(A3.3) (Sentence(S1 , Mx ) & Sentence(S2 , Mx ) & Accepts(x, «S1 &

S2 »)) → (Accepts(x, «S1 ») & Accepts(x, «S2 »)).
(A3.4) (Sentence(S1 , Mx ) & Sentence(S2 , Mx )) & Accepts(x, S1 ) &

Accepts(x, S2 )) → ∼Accepts(x, «∼(S1 & S2 )»).
(A3.5) (Sentence(S1 , Mx ) & Sentence(S2 , Mx )) & Accepts(x, «∼(S1 ∨

S2 )»)) → (Accepts(x, «∼S1 ») & Accepts(x, «∼S2 »)).
(A3.6) (NameType(a, t, Mx ) & NameType(b, t, Mx ) &

Sentence(S, Mx ) & Accepts(x, S) & Accepts(x, «a = b»))
→ Accepts(x, S(a//b)).9
(A3.7) (Sentence(S, Mx ) & Accepts(x, S)) → ∼(∃v)(∃a)(∃t)

{VarType(v, t, Mx ) & NameType(a, t, Mx ) & ∼OccursIn(v, S)
& OccursIn(a, S) & Accepts(x, «∼(∃v)S(v/a)»)}.
A comprehensive list of axioms for ‘Accepts’, supplemented with prin-

ciples relating acceptance to other psychological relations to Mentalese
sentences, might even provide the basis for a functional definition of ‘Ac-
cepts’. But since it is controversial exactly what such a list should contain,
we shall content ourselves here with the foregoing sample. The question
now is how the resources of I could be pressed into the service of MRTJ.
4. THE BRIDGE PRINCIPLES AND REDUCTION OF MRTJ TO I+
The reducing theory I+ is the extension of I obtained by adding ap-

propriate definition and axiom schemes to serve as bridge principles
connecting the primitive vocabulary (P1)–(P4) of LMRTJ to that of I+ .
Let us begin with the crucial definition scheme that allows the predic-
ates [λα1t1 . . . αktk δ i : φ]
– hence MRTJ’s talk of logical forms – to be
understood purely in terms of the vocabulary of LI .
tk+1
Where φ is the shadow of the pure formula φ[α1t1 , . . . , αktk ; αk+1 , ...,
αntn ] under [01 , . . . , 0k ; 0k+1 , . . . , 0n ] and / is a boldfaced letter
foreign to 1, we take (D7) as a definition scheme of I+ :
(D7) [λα1t1 . . .αktk δ i : φ[α1 , . . ., αk ; αk+1 , . . ., αn ]] =def

[λx t1 ,...,tk ,i y i zd i : x = [λα1t1 . . .αktk δ i : φ[α1 , . . ., αk ;
αk+1 , . . ., αn ]] & (∃w){NameType(w, t1 , . . . , tk , My ) &
DesIn(w, x, My ) & [λrs i u: (∃01 ) . . . (∃0n )(∃/)
(Distinct(01 , . . . , 0n , /)
& VarType(01 , t1 , Ms ) & . . . & VarType(0n , tn , Ms ) &
VarType(/, i, Ms ) & ∼OccursIn(/, «1») & r =
«[λ01 . . . 0k /: 1]») & u = «r»)]wyz}].10
198 STEVEN E. BOËR
The import of this complicated definition scheme is best appreciated by

way of a simple example. Since ‘f(x)’ is the shadow of the pure formula
‘F i (x i )’ under [‘f’, ‘x’; ], we have the definition (16) as an instance
of (D7):
(16) [λF i x i d i : F (x)] =def [λν i,i,i y i zd i : ν = [λF i x i d i : F (x)]
& (∃w){NameType(w, i, i, i, My ) & DesIn(w, ν, My ) &
[λrs i u: (∃f)(∃x)(∃d)(Distinct(f, x, d) & VarType(f, i, Ms ) &
VarType(x, i, Ms ) & VarType(d, i, Ms ) & ∼OccursIn(d, «f(x)»)
& r = «[λfxd : f(x)]») & u = «r»)]wyz}].
From (16) we learn that what MRTJ calls ‘[λF i x i d i : F (x)]’ – alias ‘the
logical form of a (first-order) unary predication’ – may be identified with
a certain complex relation R between a structure ν, person y, expression
z of My , and arbitrary individual d. In effect, Rνyzd obtains just in case:
(a) ν is the structure ‘[λF i x i d i : F (x)]; (b) for some distinct variables f,
x, d of respective My -types i, i, i, the term «[λfxd : f(x)]» designates the
structure ν in My , and (c) z is the term «[λfxd : f(x)]» of My .
According to MRTJ, [λF i x i d i : F (x)] determines the ontological
structure [λF i x i d i : F (x)]. But by (16), [λF i x i d i : F (x)] “contains”
[λF i x i d i : F (x)] in the sense of being a relation that requires its first term
to be that very structure. This suggests a general definition of determining
via “containing”, which is spelled out in (D8) with the aid of the predicate
‘SynRel’ expressing the higher-order property of being a syntactic relation
among expressions of a person’s Mentalese:
(D8) Determinest1 ,...,tk ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tk ,i =def

[λF t1 ,...,tk ,i,i,i,i Gt1 ,...,tk ,i : (∃K i,i,i ){SynReli,i,i (K)
& F = [λx t1 ,...,tk ,i y i zd i : x = G & (∃w){NameType(w,
t1 , . . . , tk , i, My ) & DesIn(w, x, My ) & Kwyz}]}].
For present purposes, it is not important exactly how ‘SynRel’ is ultimately

characterized. All we need assume here is that it has been so axiomatized
in I+ as to yield as a theorem any formula in which ‘SynRel’ is applied to
an instance of the schematic λ-term used in (D7); in other words, we shall
assume that (T4) is a theorem scheme:
(T4) SynRel([λrs i u: (∃01 ). . .(∃0n )(∃/)(Distinct(01 , . . . , 0n /) &

VarType(01 , t1 , Ms ) & . . . & VarType0n , tn , Ms ) &
VarType(/, i, Ms ) & ∼OccursIn(/, 1) &
r = «[λ01 . . . 0k / : 1]») & u = «r»)]).
(T4) ensures that instances of this schematic λ-term count as expressing a

“syntactic condition” on expressions of a person’s Mentalese. Courtesy of
(A1) and the definitions (D7) and (D8), the axiom scheme [VII] of MRTJ
is now a theorem scheme of I+ .11
With ‘Determines’ defined, we can now equate what MRTJ calls “be-
ing a logical form of a given type t1 , . . . , tk , i, i, i, i”, with being a
certain relation of type t1 , . . . , tk , i, i, i, i that determines relations of
the corresponding lower type t1 , . . . , tk , i. This is recorded in (D9):
(D9) LogicalFormt1 ,...,tk ,i,i,i,i =def [λx t1 ,...,tk ,i,i,i,i :

(∃y t1 ,...,tk ,i )Determines(x, y)].
In light of (A1), (D8), and (D9), MRTJ’s axiom schemes [VIII] and [VI]
are theorem schemes of I+ .
Having embraced LOT, we shall naturally wish to speak not only about
a logical form determining a structure but also about its being a logical
form of something – viz., someone’s Mentalese sentence. While it would
be possible to define a relation FormOf that would apply to any Men-
talese sentence, our project here requires only a more restricted version
that applies to “pure” Mentalese sentences, i.e., those all of whose simple
terms are variables. Accordingly, we schematically define FormOf as the
following complex relation:
(D10) FormOft1 ,...,tk ,i,i,i,i,i,i =def [λf t1 ,...,tk ,i,i,i,i Sx i :

LogicalForm(f ) & Sentence(S, Mx ) &
(∃v1 ) . . . (∃vk )(∃d){(Distinct(v1 , . . . , vk , d) &
VarType(v1 , t1 , Mx ) & . . . & VarType(vk , tk , Mx ) &
VarType(d, i, Mx ) & (∀v0 )(FreeIn(v0 , S) ≡ (v0 =
v1 ∨ · · · ∨ v0 = vk )) & ∼OccursIn(d, S) &
(∀r)(∀tx )((NameType(r, t, Mx ) & SimpleIn(r, Mx )) →
∼OccursIn(r, S)) & f (|f |, x, «[λv1 . . . vk d : S]», x)}].
In other words, FormOf is that relation between a logical form f , sentence

S, and agent x consisting in S’s being a “pure” sentence of Mx containing
free variables v1 , . . . , vk such that, for some Mx -type i variable d foreign to
S, f relates its value to x and to the corresponding term «[λv1 . . . vk d : S]»
of Mx .
200 STEVEN E. BOËR
(D10) enables us to prove every instance of the important scheme

(T5), in which 1 is the shadow of the pure formula φ[α1t1 , . . . , αktk ;
tk+1
αk+1 , . . . , αntn ] under [01 , . . . , 0k ; 0k+1 , . . . , 0n ]:
(T5) (Distinct(01 , . . . , 0n ) & VarType(01 , t1 , Mγ ) & . . . &
VarType(0n , tn , Mγ )) →
FormOf([λα1t1 . . . αktk δ i : φ[α1 , . . . , αk ; αk+1 , . . . , αn ]],
«1», γ i ).
Thus, e.g., (‘G(v)’ being the shadow of ‘Gi (x i )’ under [‘G’, ‘v’; ])
we can prove that where G and v are free variables of respective Ma -
types i and i, the logical form [λGi x i d i : G(x)] is a logical form of
the elementary Ma -sentence «G(v)». This is recorded in theorem (T6):
(T6) (∀a i )(∀G)(∀v){{Distinct(G, v) & VarType(G, i, Ma ) &
VarType(v, i, Ma )} → FormOf(([λGi x i d i : G(x)],
«G(v)», a)}.
The axiom scheme (A2) that I+ inherits from I specifies the designata
of Mentalese counterparts of relational names of the form [λα1 . . . αk δ :
φ]
. But in order to complete the connection of MRTJ’s vocabulary for
logical forms with I’s vocabulary for their mental representations, we
need to specify the designata of the Mentalese counterparts of relational
names of the form [λα1 . . . αk δ : φ]
. Intuitively, these Mentalese coun-
terparts are supposed to be names of logical forms. Accordingly, we
suppose that, where 1 is the shadow of the pure formula φ[α1t1 , . . . , αktk ;
tk+1
αk+1 , . . . , αntn ] under [01 , . . . , 0k ; 0k+1 , . . . , 0n ] and is / is a bold-
faced letter foreign to 1, the instances of scheme (A4) are axioms of
I+ :
(A4) (Distinct(01 , . . . , 0n , /) & VarType(01 , t1 , Mγ ) & . . . &
VarType(0n , tn , Mγ ) & VarType(/, i, Mγ ) &
∼OccursIn(/, 1)) → DesIn(«[λ01 . . . 0k / : 1]»,
[λα1 . . . αk δ : φ[α1 , . . . , αk ; αk+1 , . . . , αn ]], Mγ ).12
Having said in I+ what sort of relation MRTJ’s logical forms are and
what it is for one of them to be a logical form of a (“pure”) Mentalese
sentence, we must now specify the nature of the “multiple relation” of
belief in which logical forms are to figure as terms. Suppose, for the sake
of illustration, that [λF i,i y1i y2i d i : F (y1 , y2 )] is the logical form invoked
for ‘Desdemona loves Cassio’ and that (17) is MRTJ’s analysis of (18):
(17) Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (Othello, [λF i,i y1i y2i d i : F (y1 , y2 )],
Loves, Desdmona, Cassio).
(18) Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio.13
The idea about ‘Bel’ we want to articulate in I+ is that the truth of (18)
requires something like the following: (i) that Othello assertively tokens in
his language of thought some sentence S comprising names of loving, Des-
demona, and Cassio; and (ii) that these names are syntactically arranged in
S in exactly the way dictated by [λF i,i y1i y2i d i : F (y1 , y2 )], (so that S will
be a relational sentence of Othello’s Mentalese whose binary predicate,
first argument, and second argument are respectively the aforementioned
names of loving, Desdemona, and Cassio). This would be straightforward
were it not for a difficulty that arises in trying to generalize the account to
cover “nested” beliefs.
A purported vindication of MRTJ must surely take seriously its guiding
idea – that belief is a multiple relation involving thinker, logical form,
and the various entities thought about. If so, however, then that guiding
idea should be applied across the board, to any proffered analysis of belief
ascriptions in Mentalese as well as in English! (This is part of the point of
(C5), which bars appeal to any unanalysed Mentalese analogue of a ‘that’-
clause construction.) Now MRTJ analyses an iterated belief ascription like
(19) by something of the form (20):
(19) Iago believes that Othello believes that Desdemona loves

Cassio.
(20) Bel1 (Iago, f1 , Bel2 , Othello, f2 , Loves, Desdemona, Cassio).
In (20), however, there are two logical forms to contend with – f1 , which
determines how Bel1 relates Iago to all the other constituents, and f2 ,
which determines how Iago thinks of Bel2 as relating Othello, loving,
Desdemona and Cassio! In other words, logical forms must be capable
of figuring among the objects of a belief as well.
The difficulty facing the attempt to generalize the account to cover (20)
is this: it is not enough merely that Iago should accept a Mentalese sentence
whose structure is dictated by f1 and whose terms respectively designate
believing, Othello, loving, Desdemona, Cassio, and a certain logical form
f2 (for Othello’s belief). Rather, Iago must represent the logical form of
Othello’s alleged belief in some “canonical” way that reveals to Iago the
conditions under which Othello’s belief would be true, i.e., puts Iago in
a position to appreciate those truth conditions (if he considers the matter,
is smart enough, etc.). The need for such canonical representation of the
logical forms of others’ beliefs is intrinsic to any view of thinking as a kind
of “inner speech”. This is most easily seen when we pretend that the inner
202 STEVEN E. BOËR
speech in question occurs in a natural language like English. Imagine, e.g.,

a situation like the following. Iago, peering through a telescope, dimly sees
a man a crouched behind a bush spying on a woman b who is embracing
a man c. Iago, thinking in approved multiple-relation jargon, then says to
himself (21) while mentally ostending a, b, c in connection with the tokens
of ‘he’, ‘her’, and ‘him’:
(21) He has a belief of the binary first-order relational sort about her
and him.
But – unbeknown to Iago – a = Othello, b = Desdemona and c = Cassio. In

such a situation, a wholly transparent construal of (19) would presumably
be true, and the logical form of Othello’s alleged belief (viz., binary first-
order relational predication) is recoverable from what Iago has said to
himself. On the other hand, suppose Iago had instead said to himself (22):
(18) He has a belief of his favorite sort about her and him.
This is plainly not enough to make true even a wholly transparent con-
strual of (19), precisely because the logical form of Othello’s alleged belief
would no longer be recoverable from what Iago had said to himself.
In light of the foregoing, we need to ensure that when a logical form
[λν1 . . . νk δ : ψ] occurs among the objects of a person’s belief, the per-
son’s mental name for it is “canonical” in the sense of being a Mentalese
•[λν1 . . . νk δ : ψ]•. Accordingly, we define by cases the ternary predicate
‘CNO’ (read: ‘. . . is a canonical name of . . . in . . . ’s Mentalese’). For the
cases in which t ∗ is a type of the sort t1 , . . . tk , i, i, i, i, we provide
definition scheme (D11):
∗ ∗
(D11) CNOi,t ,i =def [λwx t y i : {LogicalForm(x) &
(∃r)(∃S){Sentence(S, My ) & (∃v1 )(∃v2 )(∃v3 )(∃d)
{Distinct(v1 , v2 , v3 , d) & VarType(v1 , t1 , . . . , tk , i, My ) &
VarType(v2 , i, My ) & VarType(v3 , i, My ) & VarType(d, i, My )
& (∀v0 )(FreeIn(v0 , S) ≡ (v0 = v1 ∨ v0 = v2 ∨ v0 =
v3 )) & ∼OccursIn(d, S) & (∀n)(∀ty )(NameType(n, t, My )
→ ∼OccursIn(n, S)) & r = «[λv1 v2 v3 d : S]» &
DesIn(r, |x|, My ) & w = «r»}} ∨ {∼LogicalForm(x) &
DesIn(w, x, My )}].
For types t 5 not of the sort t1 , . . .tk , i, i, i, i, canonical naming may
be equated with ordinary designation, as in (D12), since no type t 5 entity
could be a logical form:
(D12) CNOi,t
5 ,i 5 5
=def [λwx t y i : DesIn(w, x t , My )].
At last we are in a position to define the family of predicates

Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn
. Despite the proliferation of Bel-relations to
which MRTJ is committed, it is nevertheless possible to capture them all
in I+ by means of the definition scheme (D13):
(D13) Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn =def [λx i f t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i y1t1 . . . yntn :
(∃S)(∃v1 ) . . . (∃vn ){Sentence(S, Mx ) & VarType(v1 , t1 , Mx )
& . . . & VarType(vn , tn , Mx ) & Distinct(v1 , . . . , vn ) &
(∀w)(FreeIn(w, S) ≡ (w = v1 ∨ · · · ∨ w = vn ) &
FormOf(f, S, x) & (∃b1 ) . . . (∃bn ){NameType(b1 , t1 , Mx )
& . . . {NameType(bn , tn , Mx ) & CNO(b1, y1 , x) & . . . &
CNO(bn, yn , x) & Accepts(x, S(b1 . . . bn /v1 . . . vn ))}}].
(n ≥ 0)
What (D13) tells us is that an (n + 2)-ary Bel-relation of given type

is the relation between an agent, a logical form, and entities y1 , . . . yn
(of corresponding types) that consists in the agent’s being disposed as
one who inwardly and assertively tokens the (closed) Mentalese sentence
which results from uniformly substituting names b1 , . . . bn for the free
variables of an n-ary open Mentalese sentence having the given logical
form, where each bi is a canonical name of yi in the agent’s Mentalese. The
description of b1 , . . . , bn is couched in terms of canonical names for the
sake of generality: we want MRTJ to apply to iterated belief ascriptions,
its analysis of which requires logical forms to appear among the entities
y1 , . . . yn . However, in cases not involving nested belief predicates – hence
where none of y1 , . . . yn is a logical form – the description of b1 , . . . , bn
simply amounts to the requirement that b1 , . . . , bn respectively designate
y1 , . . .yn in agent’s Mentalese. So, in the non-nested cases, to have a belief
about y1 , . . . yn under a logical form f is to accept the substitution-instance
S(b1 . . . bn /v1 . . . vn ) of a “pure” sentence S of one’s Mentalese which is
such that (i) f is a form of S and (ii) b1 , . . . , bn respectively designate
y1 , . . . yn in one’s Mentalese. In the formulation of (D13) the Mentalese
names b1 , . . ., bn , unlike the Mentalese variables v1 , . . ., vn they replace,
are not required to be distinct from one another, for (like Russell) we
are dealing with “relational” rather than “notional” belief, hence allowing
that identities among the objects of a belief may not tracked by identities
among their Mentalese names.
The unity of the family of Bel-relations is thus more intimate than
that of a group of relations that merely obey the same or similar laws:
members of the family of Bel-relations are all structurally alike in the
way depicted in (D13). It is this structural likeness, together with their
incorporation of the relation Accepts, which makes them all belief relations
204 STEVEN E. BOËR
– though of course this cannot be “said” in I+ itself but only “shown” by

the definitional status of (D13)’s instances.
Given (D10) and (D13), MRTJ’s axiom scheme [I] becomes a theorem
scheme of I+ . Indeed, in light of (D7) and (D13), all the remaining axiom
schemes of MRTJ also become theorem schemes of I+ : [II] via (A3.1);
[III] via (A3.3); [IV] via (A3.5); and [V] via (A3.7). Furthermore, it is
now possible to say what it is for a type-indexed expression of Mx to be
a “belief predicate” (a •Bel•) or a “believes-truly predicate” (a •TrBel•)
of that Mentalese type – two notions that will loom large in the next sec-
tion. To simplify the formulation, let us take ‘Vocab(vt11 , . . ., vtnn , di , ui , yt11 ,
. . . ytnn , S; Mx )’ to say that v1 , . . . , vn , d, u, y1 , . . . yn are distinct variables of
respective Mx -types t1 , . . ., tn , i, i, t1 , . . ., tn and that S is a “pure” formula
of Mx in which the free variables are exactly v1 , . . .vn but in which d does
not occur. Now consider the schematic formula (23), in which ‘x’, ‘B’, and
‘t1 ’, . . . , ‘t1 ’are the only free variables:
(23) (∀v1 ) . . . (∀vn )(∀d)(∀u)(∀y1) . . . (∀yn )(∀S){Vocab(vt11 , . . ., vtnn ,

di , ui , yt11 , . . .ytnn , S; Mx ) →Accepts(x,
«(∀u) ∼ Bi,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn (u, [λv1 . . . vn d : S & ∼S],
y1 , . . ., yn )»)}.
(23) attributes to x acceptance of Mentalese sentences that mimic instances

of the axiom scheme [II] of MRTJ. It seems clear that, whatever the plaus-
ible axiom schemes for ‘Bel’ turn out to be in MRTJ (including ones that
might be added to relate belief to desire and intention), there will be corres-
ponding open formulas of I analogous to (23) for attributing acceptance
of instances of those schemes. Since ‘x’, ‘B’, and ‘t1 ’, . . . , ‘tn ’ are the
only free variables involved, let ‘R(x, B, t1 , . . . , tn )’ denote the conjunc-
tion of all such open acceptance-attribution formulas of I. Then what it
is for a type-indexed expression «Bi,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn » of Mx to be an
(n + 2)-ary “belief predicate” of that Mentalese type can be equated with
x’s accepting (i.e., being disposed as one who assertively tokens) all the
relevant axioms. In other words, we can lay down (D14) as a definition
scheme in I+ :
(D14) BeliefPredn =def [λbtx x: (∃tx1 ) . . . (∃txn )(t = i, t1 , . . . , tn , i,
i, i, i, t1 , . . . , tn & (∃e)(Expression(e, Mx ) & b = «et »
& ∼(∃d)(∃tx0 )(Expression(d, Mx ) & e = «dt0 »)) & R(x, e,
t1 , . . . , tn )))]. (n > 0)
Given (D14), we can define in I+ what it is for an expression p

of Mx to be a “believes-truly predicate” of suitable type. This is ac-
complished by adoption of the definition scheme (D15), in which t∗ =

i, t1 , . . . , tn , i, i, i, i, t1 , . . . , tn :
(D15) TrueBeliefPredn =def [λptx x: (∃tx1 ). . .(∃txn )(∃e){t = t∗ &
Expression(e, Mx ) & p = «et » & ∼(∃d)(∃tx0 )
Expression(d, Mx ) & e = «dt0 ») & (∃b)BeliefPredn (b, t, x) &
(∀b)(∀v1) . . . (∀vn )(∀d)(∀a)(∀y1 ) . . . (∀yn )(∀S)
{(BeliefPredn (b, t, x) & Vocab(vt11 , . . ., vtnn , di , ui , yt11 , . . .ytnn , S,
Mα )) → Accepts(x, «(∀y1 ). . .(∀yn )([λu : p(u,
[λv1 . . . vn d : S], y1 , . . .yn )] = [λu : b(u, [λv1 . . . vn d : S],
y1 , . . ., yn ) & S(y1 , . . ., yn /v1 . . .vn )])»)}}].
The idea (near enough) is that a “believes-truly” predicate of x’s Men-

talese is one for which x accepts a Mentalese analogue of (D2), MRTJ’s
definition of ‘Trbel’ in terms of ‘Bel’. If we pretend that x thinks in re-
gimented English, we could put the idea by saying that τ is a Mentalese
“believes-truly” predicate for x just in case x accepts every instance of
(24):
(24) For any y1 , . . ., yn : being a u such that τ (u, [λν1 . . . νk δ : ψ],
y1 , . . ., yn ) = being a u such that u has a belief about y1 , . . ., yn
under [λν1 . . . νk δ : ψ] where ψ(y1 , . . ., yn /ν1 . . .νk ).
In particular (and continuing the “inner English” pretense), it follows that

if β and τ are respectively Mentalese belief and true-belief predicates for
x, then x accepts every instance of (25):
(25) For any y1 , . . ., yn : being a u such that τ (u, [λν1 . . .νk δ : ψ],
y1 , . . ., yn ) = being a u such that β(u, [λν1 . . . νk δ : ψ],
y1 , . . ., yn ) where ψ(y1 , . . ., yn /ν1 . . .νk ).
This is recorded in theorem scheme (T7), where t∗ = i, t1 , . . ., tn , i, i,

i, i, t, . . ., tn :
(T7) (∀x i )(∀b)(∀v1). . .(∀vn )(∀d)(∀u)(∀y1). . .(∀yn )(∀S)(∀p)
{{TrueBeliefPredn (p, t∗ , x) & BeliefPredn (b, t∗ , x) &
Vocab(vt11 , . . . vtnn , di , ui , yt11 , . . . , ytnn , S; Mx )} →
Accepts(x, «(∀y1 ) . . . (∀yn )([λu : p(u, [λv1 . . . vn d : S],
y1 , . . . , yn )] = [λu : b(u, [λv1 . . . vn d : S], y1 , . . . yn ) &
S(y1 , . . . , yn /v1 . . . vn )])»)}.
This completes the apparatus needed for the reduction of MRTJ to I+ .

Assuming (as we have) the plausibility of LOT in general and of I in par-
ticular, the status of this reduction as a vindication of MRTJ depends upon
206 STEVEN E. BOËR
whether the reduced version of MRTJ satisfies the adequacy conditions

(C1)–(C5) laid down in Section 1. We shall now argue that these conditions
have indeed been satisfied.
5. VINDICATION AND THE ADEQUACY CONDITIONS
Since we have neither appealed to propositions nor made use of any un-
defined predicates of a language that take nominalized sentences of that
language as arguments, condition (C5) has clearly been met. Moreover,
the definition schemes (D7)–(D13) provide a precise ontological account
of the “logical forms” posited by MRTJ and reveal (via the systematic
connection with the single relation ‘Acceptsi,i ’) what is structurally
common to the members of the family of differently typed belief relations
in virtue of which they are “belief” relations; so (C2) and (C3) are satisfied.
What remains to be shown is that (C1) and (C4) are met as well.
Let us begin with (C1). There are two issues here: viz., (a) whether
MRTJ, understood via the reduction to I+ , can provide analyses of ‘A
believes that p’ and ‘The belief that p is true/false’ for all grammat-
ically admissible replacements of ‘p’; and (b) whether the proffered
analyses are plausible. The answer to question (a) is clearly affirmat-
ive. Since logical forms themselves can be of arbitrary truth-functional
and/or quantificational complexity, and since according to MRTJ all of
a judgment’s structure derives from its logical form, it should be obvi-
ous that MRTJ is not restricted merely to “atomic” judgments but can
provide analyses of belief ascriptions with content-clauses of any degree
of complexity.14 Question (b) is not so easily settled. Even assuming, as we
have, the acceptability of the general framework of LOT, we can only argue
from representative examples in which the analyses of belief ascriptions
provided by the reduced version of MRTJ can be seen to plausible.
Let us begin with (18), an ascription to Othello of the “atomic” belief
that Desdemona loves Cassio. MRTJ’s analysis of (18) is (26):
(26) Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i, (Othello, [λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)], Loves,
Desdemona, Cassio).
In I+ , (26) will be provably equivalent to (27):

(27) (∃b1 )(∃b2 )(∃b3 ){(NameType(b1 , i,i, MOthello ) &
NameType(b2 , i, MOthello ) & NameType(b3 , i, MOthello )) &
DesIn(b1 , Loves, MOthello ) & DesIn(b2 , Desdemona, MOthello )
& DesIn(b3 , Cassio, MOthello )
& Accepts(Othello, «b1 (b2 , b3 )»)}.
According to I+ , then, (18)/(26) obtains iff Othello is disposed as one who

inwardly and assertively tokens in his language of thought a relational
sentence whose binary predicate, first argument, and second argument
respectively designate loving, Desdemona, and Cassio.
Consider next (28), which (suppressing the type-indices) is analysed by
MRTJ as (29):
(28) A believes that either R(a1 , . . ., an ) or S(b1 , . . ., bk ).
(29) Bel(A;
[λF x1 . . . xn Gy1 . . . yk d i : F (x1 , . . ., xn ) ∨ G(y1 , . . ., yk )];
R, a1 , . . ., an , S, b1 , . . ., bk ).
According to I+ , (29) obtains just in case A accepts a Mentalese sentence

of the sort «R(a1 , . . . , an ) ∨ S(b1 , . . . , bk )» in which (i) the Mentalese
names R and S respectively designate the relations R and S and (ii) the
Mentalese names a1 , . . . , an , b1 , . . . bk respectively designate the indi-
viduals a1 , . . ., an , b1 , . . ., bk . No peculiar “logical object” is required to
correspond to the disjunction sign itself, whether in English or in A’s
Mentalese. The same results holds, mutatis mutandis, for belief ascriptions
with content-clauses involving other connectives, quantifiers, etc.
In our examples so far, the “dummy variable” in logical form specifica-
tions has merely been along for the ride. However, when the content-clause
in a belief ascription is wholly general, this otherwise inert element finally
comes into play. Thus, e.g., (30) is analyzed as (31):
(30) A believes that everything has properties.
(31) Beli,i,i,i,i (A; [λd i : (∀ν i )(∃F i )F (ν)]).
Now by (D7) the logical form [λd i : (∀ν i )(∃F i )F (ν)] is the relation
[λx i y i zd i : x = [λd i : (∀ν)(∃F )F (ν)] &

(∃w){DesIn(w, x, My ) & [λrs i u : (∃v)(∃F)(∃d)
((VarType(d, i, Ms ) & VarType(v, i, Ms ) &
VarType(F, i, Ms ) & r = «[λd : (∀v)(∃F)F(v)]») &
u = «r»}]wyz].
So (31) is ultimately equivalent to (32):
(32) (∃v)(∃F){VarType(v, i, MOthello ) & VarType(F, i, MOthello ) &

Accepts(Othello, «(∀v)(∃F)F(v)»)}.
208 STEVEN E. BOËR
A wholly general belief is thus a binary relation between a thinker and

a “general” logical form f , i.e., one which is a logical form for certain
wholly general sentences of the thinker’s Mentalese; and to be so related
to f is inwardly and assertively to token a sentence of that form (or at least
to be disposed as if one did so).
The reduced version of MRTJ easily handles iterated belief ascriptions
like (33):
(33) Iago believes that Othello believes that Desdemona loves
Cassio.
Where the two occurrences of ‘believes’ in (33) are translated as predicates
‘Belt1 ’ and ‘Belt2 ’ of appropriate (and, of course, distinct) types t1 and t2 ,
we have the analysis (34) of (33):
(34) Belt1 (Iago, [λH t2 zi Gi,i,i,i,i J i,i x i y i d i : H (z, G, J, x, y)],
Belt2 , Othello, [λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)], Loves, Desdemona,
Cassio).
Skipping the derivation and stating the result less formally, (34) obtains
just in case (35) does:
(35) Iago [is disposed as if he] assertively tokens a certain sentence
in MIago of the form «b(o, f, l, d, c)» in which (i) b, o, f, l, d,
and c are names in Miago respectively designating Belt2 , Othello,
[λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)], loving, Desdemona, Cassio; and (ii) f
has the form «[λv1 v2 v3 d : v1 (v2 , v3 )» for distinct variables v1 ,
v2 , v3 , and d of respective MIago -types i, i, i, i, and i.
By our definitions and axioms, Iago’s belief is true (i.e., Iago truly be-
lieves that Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio) iff, in addition
to (35), (36) also obtains:
(36) [λH t2 zi Gi,i,i,i,i J i,i x i y i d i : H (z, G, J, x, y)](Belt2 ,
Othello, [λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)], Loves, Desdemona, Cassio).
But (36) is equivalent to (26), which we unpacked above. So, in the end,
Iago’s belief is true iff (35) obtains and Othello accepts in his language of
thought a relational sentence whose binary predicate, first argument, and
second argument respectively designate loving, Desdemona, and Cassio.
Moreover, independently of any assumptions about what “belief facts”
there are, we are now entitled to assert (37):
(37) The belief that Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio is
true iff Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio.
For MRTJ’s translation of (37) is (38):
(38) True([λui f : f =
[λH t2 zi Gi,i,i,i,i J i,i x i y i d i : H (z, G, J, x, y)] & Belt1 (u, f ,
Belt2 , Othello, [λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)], Loves, Desdemona,
Cassio)]) ≡ Belt2 (Othello, [λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)], Loves,
Desdemona, Cassio).
And (38) follows from the corresponding instance of theorem scheme (T2)
in which g is the logical form
[λH t2 zi Gi,i,i,i,i J i,i x i y i d i : H (z, G, J, x, y)]
and e1 − e6 are respectively the relation Belt2 , Othello, the logical form
[λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)], the relation Loves, and the individuals Desde-
mona and Cassio.
By forcing Mentalese to incorporate the kind of multiple rela-
tion treatment of belief ascriptions found in MRTJ, our account of
(33)/(34) requires Iago’s Mentalese representation of the logical form
[λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)] of Othello’s belief to be of the canonical sort
«[λv1 v2 v3 d : v1 (v2 , v3 )]» This satisfies our original demand that Iago must
represent the logical form of Othello’s alleged belief in some canonical
way that reveals (to Iago) the conditions under which Othello’s belief
would be true. For suppose that in Iago’s Mentalese O, L, D, and C are
respectively names for, Othello, loving, Desdemona, and Cassio. Suppose
also that Iago’s Mentalese contains predicates B and T (both of Mentalese
type i, i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i, i,i,i,i) for believing and truly-believing re-
spectively. Then it follows from (T7) that Iago accepts (39):
(39) «(∀y1 )(∀y2 )(∀y3 )([λu : T(u, [λv1 v2 v3 d : v1 (v2 , v3 )], y1 , y2 , y3 )]

= [λu : B(u, [λv1 , v2 , v3 d : v1 (v2 , v3 )], y1 , y2 , y3 ) &
y1 (y2 , y3 )])».
Although we cannot presume upon Iago’s logical acumen, he is nonethe-

less now in a position to reason validly from (39) to (40), and hence to
(41):
(40) «[λu : T(u, [λv1 v2 v3 d : v1 (v2 , v3 )], L, D, C)] =

[λu : B(u, [λv1 v2 v3 d : v1 (v2 , v3 )], L, D, C) & L(D, C)]»
(41) «T(O, [λv1 v2 v3 d : v1 (v2 , v3 )], L, D, C)] ≡

B(O, [λv1 v2 v3 d : v1 (v2 , v3 )], L, D, C) & L(D, C)]»
210 STEVEN E. BOËR
By requiring Iago to employ a canonical representation of the sort

«[λv1 v2 v3 d : v1 (v2 , v3 )]» we ensure that he is primed to exploit the
inferential connections between his three Mentalese sentences «T(O,
[λv1 v2 v3 d : v1 (v2 , v3 )], L, D, C)», «(B(O, [λv1 v2 v3 d : v1 (v2 , v3 )], L, D,
C)» and «L(D, C)» –hence to appreciate what he is attributing to Othello
– even if for some reason he fails to do so.
To handle alleged failures of Substitutivity of Identity in natural lan-
guage arguments like (3), MRTJ appealed to the alternative formalizations
(5)–(7) of (3). I+ provides interpretations for (5)–(7) that show how this
appeal sheds genuine light on the subject. The argument (5) is invalid
because, despite the identity of the author of Waverly with the author of
Marmion, the fact that George IV accepts a Mentalese equation «a =
(ιx)fx» for some name a of Scott and predicate f designating Waverly-
authorship cannot guarantee that George IV accepts a Mentalese equation
«b = (ιx)gx» for some for some name b of Scott and predicate g desig-
nating Marmion-authorship. For the distinctness of these two authorship
properties requires the distinctness of f and g. Similarly, the argument (7)
is invalid because, despite the identity of the author of Waverly with the
author of Marmion, the fact that George IV accepts a Mentalese equation
«a = b» for two names a and b of Scott/the author of Waverly cannot guar-
antee that George IV accepts a Mentalese equation «c = (ιx)gx» for some
for some name c of Scott and predicate g designating Marmion-authorship.
For there is no guarantee that George IV has any such a predicate g in his
Mentalese!
As it happens, the argument (6) will go through provided (as seems
plausible) that a full axiomatization of I would yield (42) as a semantic
theorem scheme:
(42) (∀y i )(∀F i )(∀f)(∀x){(NameType(f, t , My ) & VarType(x, t ,

My ) & DesIn(f, F , My )) → (∀zt )(DesIn(«(ιx)f(x)», z, My ) ≡ z
= (ιx t )F (x))}.
For if George IV accepts a Mentalese equation «a = (ιx)fx» for some

name a of Scott and predicate f designating Waverly-authorship, then by
(42) the ingredient name «(ιx)fx» will designate the author of Waverly; so
the identity of the author of Waverly with the author of Marmion would
guarantee that George IV accepts a Mentalese equation «a = b» for two
names a and b of the author of Marmion.
Finally, we turn to (C4). Given our explanation of how the obtaining
of a belief relation brings various constituents into relation with a logical
form, do we face either (a) a residual problem of accounting for the specific
“order” thereby imposed on these constituents or (b) a residual problem of
accounting for the fact that certain possible orderings “make sense” but
others do not? Following Griffen (1985), we may call (a) the “Direction”
Problem and (b) the “Nonsense” Problem.
It should be clear that MRTJ, as reduced to I+ , does not suffer from the
Direction Problem. So long as ‘believes’ is translated by an appropriately
typed predicate, the ingredient type theory prevents any permutation of
arguments of unlike type. Moreover, the residual difference within a type
between, say,
(43) Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (Othello, [λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)], Loves,

Desdemona, Cassio)
and
(44) Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (Othello, [λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)], Loves,
Cassio, Desdemona)
is reproduced at the level of Othello’s Mentalese in terms of the difference

between (i) a sentence «a1 (a2 , a3 )» whose three terms respectively des-
ignate the loving relation, Desdemona, and Cassio and (ii) an isomorphic
sentence «b1 (b2 , b3 )» whose three terms respectively designate the loving
relation, Cassio, and Desdemona. Likewise, no problems are occasioned
by differences in the alphabetical order of variables in the canonical names
of logical forms. Consider, e.g., the differences between (43), (45), and
(46):
(45) Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (Othello, [λF i,i y i x i d i : F (x, y)], Loves,

Desdemona, Cassio)
(46) Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (Othello, [λF i,i x i y i d i : F (y, x)], Loves,

Desdemona, Cassio)
In I+ , (45) and (46) are both equivalent to (44). And of course both (47)
and (48) are equivalent in I+ to (43):
(47) Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (Othello, [λF i,i y i x i d i : F (x, y)], Loves,

Cassio, Desdemona)
(48) Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (Othello, [λF i,i x i y i d i : F (y, x)], Loves,

Cassio, Desdemona)
Nor does MRTJ, as reduced to I+ , confront any Nonsense Problem. For

logical forms and belief relations, as these are defined in I+ , do provide
212 STEVEN E. BOËR
the requisite restrictions on meaningful combinations in the form of type-

constraints on free variables in certain of the thinker’s Mentalese sentences
into which the Mentalese names of the various objects of the judgment are
to be inserted.15 Provided the logical types are respected, every sentence
of the form
(49) Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn (α0i , ([λα1t1 . . . αntn δ i : φ],

β1t1 , . . . , βntn )
receives via the reduction an interpretation that not only is intelligible but
is – so we have urged – plausible as well.
In light of our results, it may be hoped that multiple relation theories of
judgment will at least no longer be glibly dismissed as unworkable oddities
but will instead be accorded the respect they deserve. For whatever the
ultimate fate of multiple relation theories may be, we have seen how to
elaborate at least one of them in a way that renders it just as viable as many
of the more “standard” theories that have paraded through the literature
since Russell’s day.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I am indebted to the referees for several valuable suggestions for improving

the original manuscript.
NOTES
1 Although Russell tentatively proposed a multiple relation theory in (1906–1908), his

first publicly endorsed versions appear in (1910) and (1910/11). He revised the theory in
(1912) and further modified it in his 1913 book manuscript (posthumously published as
Russell 1992). Russell was still propounding a multiple relation theory in (1918/19), but
officially abandoned it in (1919).
2 Our concentration on the final version of Russell’s theory is not meant to suggest
the impossibility of vindicating any of his earlier versions, in which the belief relations
themselves are supposed to provide the “pattern”. These earlier versions have their own
attractions (and problems) and may well be independently defensible (see Jubien (to ap-
pear)). The main reason for ignoring them here is that the technical apparatus employed in
the reduction of MRTJ to I+ requires isolating the structure-determining factors as discrete
elements. Doing so is trivial in MRTJ but not in a version that “hides” these factors inside
the belief relations – unless, that is, the corresponding belief predicates are formalized in
such a way that the resulting theory becomes a mere notational variant on MRTJ. Insofar
as these other versions are intended to be substantive alternatives to MRTJ, their defense
would require different strategies, but limitations of space preclude pursuing them here.
3 In the spirit of Russell’s “ideal language” philosophy, talk of MRTJ “analysing” a nat-
ural language sentence S via a formula φ should be understood as meaning that φ is the
translation of S into the (allegedly more perspicuous) language of MRTJ. No commitment
is undertaken here as to what role, if any, MRTJ might play in a theoretical account of
natural language syntax.
4 Types themselves may be thought of as symbols that categorize both linguistic and
extralinguistic items. So we could regard the letter ‘i’ in the text as naming itself and
think of the set of types as being the smallest set T such that ‘i’∈ T and ‘t1 , . . . , tn ’ ∈ T
for every t1 , . . . , tn ∈ T (n ≥ 1).
5 (A1), of course, entails the numerical distinctness of at least some necessarily coextens-
ive relations.
6 Since |ρ| will be an (n + 1)ary relation in which the (n + 1)th argument-place is a
“dummy” position, we have put α in that slot just for definiteness. Alternatively, we could
existentially quantify over it.
7 Mentalese types, like the types of L, may be thought of as symbols – in this case,
Mentalese symbols. This is important, since I needs to quantify univocally over these
symbols in “syntactic” axioms like
(∀w)(∀x)(∀tx1 ){TermType(w, t1 , Mx ) ≡ (∃!e(Expression(e, Mx ) & w = «et1 »
& ∼(∃d)(∃tx2 )(Expression(d, Mx ) & e = «dt2 »)},
which requires a term of a given Mentalese type to be the result of indexing a unique (un-
indexed) Mentalese expression with that very type. We exploit this treatment of Mentalese
types in (D14) and (D15) of Section 4.
8 For an interesting and persuasive account of “tacit belief” and “being disposed as if”,
see §2.3 of Crimmins (1992). Crimmins, however, is no fan of the language of thought
hypothesis.
9 Of the principles listed, only this one runs afoul of the fact that limitations of memory
will put an upper bound on the complexity of Mentalese sentences that x can process,
for S(a//b) may be more complex than S, where the latter is already at x’s limit. To keep
the principle with its present consequent, an appropriate clause should be added to its
antecedent. Alternatively, we could weaken the consequent to ‘∼Accepts(x, «∼S(a//b)»’.
10 With its nesting of λ-abstracts, the formulation of the relation in question might seem to
be needlessly complex. There is a purely technical reason for this prolixity, but limitations
of space preclude explaining the details here.
11 Once the salient definitions and axioms of I+ are in place, the derivation of MRTJ’s
axioms is trivial and hence will not be spelled out here.
12 There is no circle here, for definition scheme (D7) appeals merely to the designation of
«[λ01 , . . . 0k / : 1]», identified by (A2) as
[λα1 . . . αk δ : φ[α1 , . . . , αk ; αk+1 , . . . , αn ]],
in order to define the logical form
[λα1 . . . αk δ : φ[α1 , . . . , αk ; αk+1 , . . . , αn ]],
which is then invoked by (A4) as designatum for «[λ01 . . . 0k / : 1]». The status of
(A4) as a bridge principle would perhaps be clearer if its consequent had been written
in biconditional form as
‘(∀x){DesIn(«[λ01 . . .0k / : 1]», x, My ) ≡ x =
[λα1 . . .αk δ : φ[α1 , . . ., αk ; αk+1 , . . . , αn ]]}’.
214 STEVEN E. BOËR
13 As is customary, we pretend that the ingredient proper names designate real individuals.
14 For ease of exposition, we have restricted attention to replacements of ‘p’ whose logical
forms could be formalized in the base language L. But it should be clear that the addition,
e.g., of tense and modal operators would be straightforward, so that L could be brought
ever closer to full-blown (albeit regimented) English.
15 Of course, some sentences are called nonsensical for reasons that have nothing to do
with their type-theoretical well-formedness. Thus, e.g., if numbers are entities of type i
and having a beard is a property of type i, type restrictions cannot rule out such Rylean
“category mistakes” as ‘The number 6 has a beard’. Such residual oddities, however, are
perhaps best viewed not as literal nonsense but merely as gross absurdities – particularly
blatant necessary falsehoods.
REFERENCES
Crimmins, M.: 1992, Talk About Beliefs, Bradford/MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Fodor, J.: 1975, The Language of Thought, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York.
Fodor, J.: 1987, Psychosemantics, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Griffin, N.: 1985, ‘Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment’, Philosophical Studies
47, 213–247.
Jubien, M.: to appear, ‘Propositions and the Objects of Thought’, Philosophical Studies.
Maloney, J. C.: 1989, The Mundane Matter of the Mental Language, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge.
Richard, M.: 1990, Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe
Them, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Russell, B.: 1906–1908, ‘The Nature of Truth’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 7,
28–49.
Russell, B.: 1910, ‘On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood’, in his Philosophical Essays,
Simon and Schuster, New York.
Russell, B.: 1910/1911, ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’,
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11, 108–128.
Russell, B.: 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Russell, B.: 1918/1919, ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’, Monist 28, 495–527.
Russell, B.: 1919, ‘On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean’, Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 2, pp. 1–43.
Russell, B.: 1992, E. R. Eames and K. Blackwell (eds), Theory of Knowledge: The 1913
Manuscript, Routledge, New York.
Russell, B. and A. N. Whitehead: 1910, Principia Mathematica, Vol. I, 2nd edn, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Salmon, N.: 1986, Frege’s Puzzle, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Soames, S.: 1987a, ‘Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes and Semantic Content’,
Philosophical Topics 15, 44–87.
Soames, S.: 1987b, ‘Substitutivity’, in J. J. Thomson (ed.), Essays in Honor of Richard
Cartwright, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Department of Philosophy
The Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio 43210, USA

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STEVEN E.

ON THE MULTIPLE RELATION THEORY OF JUDGMENT

The locus classicus of the multiple relation theory of judgment is, of

Erkenntnis 56: 181–214, 2002.

MRTJ, reconstructed within I+ , meets the adequacy conditions laid down

Before becoming immersed in the technicalities of its axiomatization, it

(1) A believes that R(a1 , . . . , an )

of Identity. In sum, then, we have (C1) as an adequacy condition on the

(C1) It should give a plausible analysis of ‘A believes that p’ and

Moreover, because MRTJ eschews propositions in favor of a multiplicity of

(C2) It should reveal what is common to the members of the infinitely

(C3) It should incorporate a precise account of the nature of the

(C4) It should explain how the obtaining of a belief relation brings

(C5) It should neither appeal to propositions nor use locutions that

While Russell’s versions are set up to comply nominally with (C5), it

2. THE FORMALITIES OF MRTJ

2.1. The Base Language and Underlying Logic

2.2. Some Primitive Vocabulary and Axioms of MRTJ

(P1) the (n + 2)-ary predicates Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn

(P2) the binary predicates Determinest1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn ,i

(P3) the unary predicates LogicalFormt1 ,...tn ,i,i,i,i

The underlined terms mentioned in (P4) serve as LMRTJ ’s official names

We cannot undertake here to provide a full axiomatic development of

(Axioms peculiar to MRTJ will be indexed with bracketed roman numer-

Notoriously, people’s beliefs are not closed under logical consequence,

[III] Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn (α0 , [λα1 . . . αn δ : φ & ψ],

where (i) αg1 , . . ., αgn are those of the variables α1 , . . ., αn free in φ,

[IV] Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn (α0 , [λα1 . . . αn δ : ∼(φ ∨ ψ)],

[V] Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn (α0 , [λα1 . . . αn δ : φ], β1 , . . . , βn ) →

mental representations.) In sum, whether or not the structure it determines

[VI] Determines([λα1t1 . . . αntn δ i : φ], [λα1t1 . . . αntn δ i : φ]).

(Since ‘Determines’ requires arguments of different types, the very idea

[VII] (Determines([λα1t1 . . . αntn δ i : φ], y t1 ,...,tn ,i ) &

What motivates [VII] is the intuitive notion of “determining” at work here,

[VIII] (∀x t1 ,...,tk ,i,i,i,i ){LogicalForm(x) ≡

Given the foregoing, (T1) is a theorem scheme:

(T1) LogicalForm([λα1t1 . . . αntn δ i : φ]).

MRTJ, of course, treats belief ascriptions transparently. Some (e.g.,

(4)a. Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (GeorgeI V , [λx i y i d i : x = y],

(5)a. Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (GeorgeI V , [λx i F i d i : x = (ιzi )F z],

(6)a. Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (GeorgeI V , [λx i F i d i : x = (ιzi )F z],

(7)a. Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (GeorgeI V , [λx i y i d i : x = y],

2.3. Truth in MRTJ

(D1) Where ρ is a term of type t1 , . . . tn , i, i, i, i:

We have seen that the value |f | of a logical form f is intuitively con-

Thus, e.g., (8) will be paraphrased in MRTJ by (9), which is provably

(8) Othello truly believes that Desdemona loves Cassio.

(9) TrBeli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (Othello, [λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)],

(10) Beli,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i (Othello, [λF i,i x i y i d i : F (x, y)],

(D4) Bh:R,a,b =def [λx i f i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i :

(11) the belief that a bears R to b.

(12) beliefs under the logical form of a binary predication involving

(D5) Bg:e1 ,...,en =def [λx i f t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i : f = g &

To complete the picture, we need a suitable family of typed truth-

(T2) True(B[λα1 ...αn δ:φ]:β1 ,...,βn ) ≡ (∃γ i )([λα1t1 . . . αntn δ i : φ]

(T3) True(Bh:R,a,b ) ≡ R(a, b).

Using this apparatus, we can translate a vernacularism like (13) by its

(14) Truei,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i ([λx i f i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i :

(15) Loves(Desdemona, Cassio).

Our concern is to vindicate MRTJ, not the various doctrines entangled

notational conventions to keep track of our hierarchy of languages. In our

– The following vocabulary (minus type indices and with obvious

(P1) the (n + 2)-ary predicates Beli,t1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn

(P2) the binary predicates Determinest1 ,...,tn ,i,i,i,i,t1 ,...,tn ,i

(P3) the unary predicates LogicalFormt1 ,...tn ,i,i,i,i

(A2) (Distinct(01 , . . ., 0n , /) & VarType(01 , t1 , Mγ ) & · · · &

(42) (∀y i )(∀F i )(∀f)(∀x){(NameType(f, t , My ) & VarType(x, t ,