Fundamentarea teoretic a unor bariere de

ordin politic, instituional i social care duc la

creterea deficitelor bugetare
The theoretical substantiation of certain political,
institutional and social bottlenecks that increase budget
deficits
Svetlana Dodon drd., INCE Svetlana Dodon PhD student, NIER
n articolul dat evideniaz cauzele de ordin
politic, instituional i social a existenei deficitelor
actuale n cretere, ns mai nainte de toate se va
prezentat teoria uniformizrii fiscale i modalitile de
aplicare a acesteia.
Actualitatea echilibrului bugetar este ca
niciodat evident n perioada actual deaceea este
deosebit de important de a eviden ia factorii care
impiedic realizarea acestuia i duc la nregistrarea
deficitului. Mai os vor fi prezentate doar unele aspecte
politico!institu ionale care contribuie la cre terea
deficitelor.
Cuvinte cheie: uniformizarea fiscal, instituii
bugetare, teoria alegerii publice, deficit.
"his article highlights the political, institutional and
social causes of rising of current deficits, but first of all #ill
be presented uniform tax theor$ and methods of its
application.
%mportance of budgetar$ balance is as never obvious in
special no# so it is particularl$ important to highlight factors
that hinder its performance and lead to deficits. &elo# are
listed ust some of politico!institutional aspects that
contribute to rising of deficits.
Key words: tax smoothing theory, budgetar$ institutions,
public choice theor$, deficit.
Jel Classification: I !, "#$, "%,"%%,"!&
ncepem cu o revizuire a teoriei "uniformizrii
fiscale" (tax smoothing theory) a bugetului de stat
explicat n lucrrile !arro, "ucas #i $to%ey&',(). n fapt,
de cele mai recente modele politice sunt explicaii
"pozitive" observate a abaterilor de la teoria uniformizrii
fiscale. *ai mult, susintorii acestei teorii o vizualiza nu
numai ca fiind "normativ", dar, de asemenea, ca
"pozitiv", fiind o descriere a politicii fiscale actuale.
+eoria "uniformizrii fiscale" a bugetului de stat,
consider o economie nchis, fr de capital, n care un
agent reprezentativ consum, lucreaz #i economise#te.
,uvernul este un "-lanificator social binevoitor", care
maximizeaz utilitatea agentului reprezentativ. .t/t
agentul reprezentativ ct #i guvernul au acela#i orizont de
timp, care, pentru simplitate este infinit. +eoria face
abstracie de la aspectele intergeneraionale #i de la
termeni finii ai biroului de guvernare.
,uvernul trebuie s finaneze o anumit cantitate
a cheltuielilor n fiecare perioad prin intermediul
impozitelor pe venit asupra forei de munc, care sunt
distorsionate, deoarece acestea afecteaz oferta de munc.
0uncia de utilitate a agentului representativ
depinde de consumul privat #i petrecere a timpului liber,
dar nu de cantitatea a bunurilor publice, pe care, pentru
simplitate. 1ezultatul decisiv const n ideea c
planificatorul social ar trebui s in constant rata de
impozitare. 2ivelul impozitelor este determinat de
constr/ngerea bugetar intertemporal, ceea ce nseamn
c valoarea actualizat a cheltuielilor (care se d exogen)
trebuie s fie egal cu valoarea actual a impozitelor. -rin
3e begin 4ith a revie4 of the theory of "fiscal
uniformity" (tax smoothing theory) $tate budget explained in
the 4or%s of !arro, "ucas and $to%ey &',(). 5n fact, the latest
political models are "positive" explanations of observed
deviations from the theory fiscal uniformity. *oreover,
proponents of this theory vie4 it not only as "normative" but
also as "positive" being a description of the current fiscal
policy.
+he state budget6s 7tax smoothing8 theory, considers
a closed economy 4ithout capital, in 4hich a representative
agent consumes, 4or%s and saves. ,overnment is a
"benevolent social planner" 4ho maximizes utility of
representative agent. !oth the representative agent as 4ell as
government has the same time horizon, 4hich for simplicity is
infinite. +heory ignores the intergenerational aspects and
finite term of the government in office.
,overnment should fund a certain amount of
expenditures in each period through taxes on labor income,
4hich are distorted because they affect labor supply.
1epresentative agent utility function depends on
private consumption and leisure, but not of amount of public
goods, 4hich, for simplicity, is defining as "defense
expenditure." 9ecisive result lies in the idea that the social
planner should %eep constant tax rate. +ax level is determined
by the intertemporal budget constraint, 4hich means that the
present value of costs (4hich is given exogenously) must be
e:ual to the present value of taxes. ;ence, budget deficits and
surpluses are used as a buffer, deficits occur 4hen expenses
are temporarily high and surpluses 4hen they are lo4. +hese
1
urmare, deficitele bugetare #i excedentele sunt folosite ca
un amortizator, deficite apar atunci c/nd cheltuielile sunt
temporar ridicate #i surplusuri, atunci c/nd acestea sunt
sczute. .ceste rezultate urmeaz direct din concavitatea
funciei a utilitii individuale.
< politic a bugetului echilibrat implic rate
ridicate a impozitelor azi #i rate impozitare sczute m/ine.
-olitica uniformizrii fiscale, n schimb, prevede
ratele constante a impozitelor, un deficit azi #i un surplus
m/ine, care (din punct de vedere al valorii actualizate)
compenseaz deficitul din perioada actual. =ea de a
doua politic predomin deoarece distorsiunile fiscale
suplimentare din perioada actual mai mult dec/t
compenseaz (n termeni de utilitate) c/#tigurile
bunstrii agonisite de pe urma ratelor impozitare mai
mici din perioada viitoare, din motivul scderii utiliti
marginale.
.cest principiu simplu are n mare msur
implicaii largi asupra politicii fiscale, care sunt
evideniate n descrierea a c/torva cazuri exemplificate
mai >os.
$ presupunem c cheltuielile guvernamentale
sunt constante, de?a lungul orizontului planificat. -olitica
optim atunci ar prevedea un buget echilibrat n fiecare
perioad. 5ar dac la timpul n cheltuielile guvernamentale
nea#teptat se mresc pentru totdeauna atunci politica
optim implic un buget echilibrat n fiecare perioad cu
o cre#tere permanent a impozitelor la momentul n.
$ presupunem c de la perioada zero la perioada
n cheltuielile guvernamentale sunt constante, #i se a#tept
s fie mereu constante. n perioada n are loc nea#teptat
"un #oc economic (rzboi, criza))", iar "#ocul" este
cunoscut s dureze p/n la perioada (n @ m). -olitica
optim n acest caz implic un buget echilibrat p/n n
perioada n, o "mic" cre#tere permanent a impozitelor la
n, un deficit ntre n #i (n @ m), #i un surplus dup aceea.
$ presupunem c la timpul n cheltuielile
guvernamentale nea#teptat cresc temporar, apoi la (n @ m)
scad permanent sub nivelul iniial, astfel nc/t din punct
de vedere valorii actuale avem o reducere a sumei totale a
cheltuielilor. 1educerea permanent de dup (n @ m) mai
mult dec/t compenseaz cre#terea temporar. -olitica
optim presupune o reacie a impozitelor la timpul n, un
deficit ntre n #i (n @ m), #i un surplus dup (n @ m).
-rincipiul uniformizrii fiscale este destul de clarA
deficitele bugetare #i excedente sunt utilizate n mod
optim pentru minimizarea efectelor de distorsionare ale
impozitrii, av/nd n vedere o anumit reacie a
cheltuielilor.
9in acelea#i motive prezentate mai sus, principiul
uniformizrii fiscale implic faptul c ratele de impozitare
trebuie s fie constante pe parcursul ciclului de afaceri,
prin urmare, ar trebui s observm deficite n timpul
recesiunilor compensate de excedentele n perioade de
expansiune.
results follo4 directly from the concavity of the individual
utility function. $uppose that government expenditures must
be "high" today and tomorro4 "lo4".
. policy of balanced budget implies today high rates
of taxes and at lo4er level tomorro4.
+he state budget6s 7tax smoothing8 theory instead,
provides constant tax rates a deficit today and tomorro4 a
surplus, 4hich (in terms of present value) compensates
shortage of current period. +he second policy prevails because
the additional tax distortions in the current period more than
compensates (in terms of utility) ac:uired 4elfare gains as a
result of lo4er tax rates in future periods, due to decrease of
marginal utility.
+his simple principle has largely 4idespread
implications on fiscal policy, 4hich are highlighted in the
description of several cases mentioned belo4.
5t is assumed that government expenditures are
constant along the planned time horizon. +hen the optimal
policy 4ould provide a balanced budget in each period. .nd if
at time n unexpected increase government expenditures
forever then the optimal policy 4ould involve a balanced
budget in each period 4ith a permanent increase in taxes at
the time n.
5t is assumed that from time zero to time n
government expenditures are constant and are expected to be
al4ays constant. 5n the period n occurs unexpectedly an
"economic shoc% (4ar, crisis))" and "shoc%" is %no4n to last
up to time (n @ m). <ptimal policy in this case involves a
balanced budget until time n, a "small" permanent increase in
taxes at a deficit bet4een n and (n @ m), and a surplus
thereafter.
$uppose that at time n unexpected temporarily
increase government expenditures, and then at (n @ m)
permanent decrease belo4 the initial so that in terms of actual
value 4e have a reduction in the amount of costs. -ermanent
reduction after (n @ m) period more than compensates the
temporary increase. <ptimal policy involves a tax reaction at
time n, a deficit bet4een n and (n @ m), and a surplus after (n
@ m).
+he principle of tax smoothing theory is clear enoughA
budget deficits and surpluses are used optimally to minimize
the effects distortion of taxation assuming a certain reaction of
expenditures.
0or the same reasons outlined above, the principle of
fiscal unification implies that tax rates should be constant over
the business cycle, therefore 4e should observe deficits during
recessions compensated by surpluses in periods of expansion.
+herefore, in the examples described above, being
extended to a model 4ith cyclical fluctuations in production
involves cyclical ad>ustment of budget balancing ruleA budget
2
-rin urmare, n cazul exemplelor prezentate
anterior, fiind extinse la un model cu fluctuaiile ciclice a
produciei, implic o a>ustare ciclic a regulii de
echilibrare bugetarA bugetul trebuie s fie echilibrat pe
parcursul ciclului de afaceri, dar nu n fiecare an fiscal. n
acest model, nu se ofer rol unei politici de stabilizare
%eynesiene, deoarece producia nu este determinat prin
cerere. n modelul care prevede aplicarea politicilor de
stabilizare, fluctuaiile ciclice ale bugetului ar trebui s fie
chiar #i mai pronunate.
5deea esenial ? deficitele bugetare ar trebui s fie
observate n timpul "rzboaielor" #i recesiunii.
=a o teorie normativ, modelul uniformizrii
fiscale este extrem de valoros. <rice model pozitiv al
politicii fiscale trebuie s ia uniformizrea fiscal drept
punct de referin ca o teorie "pozitiv", a deficitelor
bugetare.
!arro a testat modelul uniformizrii fiscale asupra
a dou sute de ani de date americane #i britanice. Bl a
artat c experiena american #i britanic, n general,
sunt n concordan cu principiile de baz ale teoriei
uniformizrii fiscaleA coraportul a datoriei la -2! cre#te
n timpul rzboaielor, scade n timp de pace #i fluctueaz
mpreun cu ciclul de afaceri.
n continuare se vor prezenta unele din premise de
ordin politico?instiuional care mpiedic buna guvernare
intrnd n contradicie cu principiile teoriei "uniformizrii
fiscale" astfel contribuind la cre#terea deficitelor
bugetare.
Rolul instituiilor bugetare i concep ia
alegerii publice
5nstitutiile publice reprezint acele unit i
economice institutionalizate, a caror func ie principal
const n redistribuirea veniturilor i a avu iei pe seama
serviciilor prestate popula iei, n cazurile n care
ntreprinderile, firmele nu ofera astfel de servicii pe pia
sau le ofera n cantit i insuficiente.
5nstitu iile publice mai sunt numite i
administra ii publice i sunt formate din administratia
central, administra ii sociale i administra ii locale.
5nstitutiile publice cuprindA -arlamentul,
.dministratia -rezidentiala, ministerele, celelalte organe
de specialitate ale administratiei publice centrale si locale,
alte autoritati publice, institutiile publice autonome,
precum si institutiile din subordinea acestora, indiferent
de modul de finantare a activitatii acestora.
1esursele financiare publice provin din
impzite,taxe, contribu ii i venituri nefiscale, preluate de
la personae >uridice i fizice, cu luarea n consideratie a
poten ialului lor economic i a altor criterii stabilite de
lege.
5nstituiile bugetare ntrunesc totalitatea regulilor
#i reglementrilor n conformitate cu care bugetele sunt
elaborate, aprobate #i implementate. .ceste reguli variaz
foarte mult de la o ar la alt, astfel ei pot explica
should be balanced over the business cycle, but not in each
fiscal year. 5n this model, there is no place for part Ceynesian
stabilization policy because production is determined by
demand. 5n the model that provides for the application of
stabilization policies, cyclical fluctuations of the budget
should be even more pronounced.
+he essential idea ? budget deficits should be
observed during "4ars" and the recessions.
.s a normative theory, tax smoothing model is
extremely valuable. .ny positive model of tax policy should
ta%e as a reference point the tax smoothing model as a
"positive" theory of budget deficits.
!arro tested the over t4o hundred years of .merican
and !ritish data. ;e noted that .merican and !ritish
experiences generally are consistent 4ith the basic principles
of tax smoothing theoryA correlation of debt to ,2- increases
during 4ars, decreases in peacetime and fluctuates 4ith the
business cycle.
0urther 4ill be presented some political?institutional
premises that prevent application of good governance
contradicting 4ith principles of 7fiscal uniformity" theory
thus contributing to rising budget deficits.
The role of budgetary institutions and public choice
concept
-ublic institutions represent those institutionalized
economic entities 4hose main function is to redistribute
income and 4ealth on account of services rendered to
population, in cases 4here enterprises, companies do not offer
such services on the mar%et or offer it in insufficient
:uantities.
-ublic institutions are also called public administrations
and consist of central, social administration and local
administrations.
-ublic institutions includeA -arliament, the -residential
.dministration, ministries, other bodies of central and local
public administration, other public authorities, public
institutions, autonomous and subordinated institutions,
irrespective of the mode of financing their activities.
-ublic resources from taxes, contributions and non?tax
revenues, collected from businesses and individuals, ta%ing
into account their potential economic and other criteria
established by la4.
!udgetary institutions >oin all rules and regulations
according to 4hich budgets are developed, approved and
implemented. +hese rules vary greatly from one country to
another, so they can explain potential variations from one
country to another country deficits and debt.
? budgetary institutions are more difficult to change than
the budget la4 itselfD
? budgetary institutions influence the final vote and
3
potenial variaiile de la o ar la alta ar a deficitelor #i a
datoriei de stat.
? instituiile bugetare sunt mult mai dificil de a fi
schimbate, dec/t legea bugetului n sineD
? instituiile bugetare influeneaz votul final #i
implementarea a bugetului.
5nstituiile bugetare se schimb relativ rar, chiar
dac ele pot fi modificate atunci c/nd acestea nu satisfac
nevoile unei comuniti (.ctul de !uget al =ongresului
din 'EFG al $tatelor Hnite este un exemplu al unei
reforme ma>ore a instituiilor bugetare). -roblema
esenial, ns, este c instituiile bugetare nu pot fi
schimbate la fel de u#or #i n mod frecvent ca bugetul n
sine, altfel ele ar fi total ineficiente.
$hepsle&I)

arat c "structura", impus de
anumite instituii de procedur a>ut la rezolvarea
problemei imposibilitii legislative a lui .rro4 &G). 9e
exemplu, o problem?cheie const n determinarea
deinerii puterii de stabilire a agendei #i a tipurilor de
modificri care sunt admisibile la nivelul legislativA n
general vorbind, teoria sugereaz c normele procesuale
care limiteaz universalism #i reciprocitate conduc la
reinerile fiscale.
"ucrarea scris de Jon ;agen &K) pune accent pe
instituiile bugetare privind acumularea de deficite
bugetare. Bl a testat o interesant "ipotez structural",
care susine cA "procedurile bugetare duc la o mrirea
disciplinei fiscale n cazul n care acestea dau prerogativ
primului ministru sau ministrului de finane, n cazul n
care limit universalismul, reciprocitate #i amendamentele
parlamentare #i faciliteaz executarea strict a legii
bugetului ".
Jon ;agen, a>unge la concluzia c normele au
un anumit efect asupra nivelul #i structurii datoriilor de
stat. .lt, "ovry #i -oterba susin c statele americane cu
"o strict " regul a echilibrului bugetar reacioneze mai
prompt #i mai energic la #ocuri negative a veniturilor sau
#ocuri pozetive a cheltuielilor. B men ionat c deciziile
privind cheltuielile luate la nivel local, #i care sunt
finanate prin transferuri de ctre guvernul naional
aceasta va ridic nivelul taxelor. .utoritile locale nu
internalizeaz n totalitate efectele deciziilor privind
cheltuielile sale asupra bugetului general.
$tructurile autorizate de stat, la nivel central, sunt
obligate s cunoasc situaia economic curent #i s fiu
pregtite att pentru pentru soluionarea problemelor ct #i
oferirea garaniilor prompte pentru asigurarea condiiilor
stabilitii #i durabilitii a cre#terii economice. ns din
motivul inconsistenei #i necoordonrii deciziilor luate la
anumite perioade de timp de ctre diferite autoriti
publice atingerea obiectivului propus este greu de realizat.
n g/ndirea economic occidental aceast
problem este cercetat de muli savani L cercettori. n
o >umate de secol n urm, a aprut teoria alegerii sociale
(publice), care a schimbat n mod radical viziunea
implementation of the budget.
!udgetary institutions are changing relatively slo4ly, even
if they can be changed 4hen they do not meet the needs of a
community (=ongressional !udget .ct of 'EFG the Hnited
$tates is an example of a ma>or reform of budgetary
institutions). +he crucial issue, ho4ever, is that state
institutions cannot be changed as easily and fre:uently as the
budget itself, other4ise they 4ould be totally ineffective.
$hepsle&I) sho4s that the "structure" imposed by certain
of procedural institutional helps resolving the problem
of legislative impossibility of .rro4 &G). 0or example, a %ey
issue is to determine the holding po4er of agenda setting and
the types of changes that are permitted at the legislative levelA
generally spea%ing, the theory suggests that procedural rules
that limit universalism and reciprocity lead to fiscal
4ithholdings.

+he paper 4ritten by Jon ;agen &K) focuses on
budgetary institutions concerning the accumulation of deficits.
;e tested an interesting "structural hypothesis" 4hich argues
that "budgetary procedures lead to increased fiscal discipline
if they give the prerogative of the -rime *inister and *inister
of 0inance, if they limit universalism, reciprocity and
parliamentary amendments and facilitate strict execution of
the budget la4.8
Jon ;agen concludes that rules have some effect on the
level and structure of state debt. .lt, "ovry and -oterba argue
that H.$. states 4ith "strict" rule of budgetary balance react
more promptly and vigorously to negative shoc%s of income
or expenditure shoc%s positive. 5t should be noted that
expenditure decisions ta%en at local level and financed by
transfers from the national government it 4ill raise the level
of taxes. "ocal authorities do not fully internalize the effects
of its decisions on general government expenditure.
.uthorized state structures at central level are re:uired to
%no4 the current economic situation and should be prepared
for solving problems and for providing timely guarantees to
ensure stability conditions and sustainability
economic gro4th. !ut because of the reason of inconsistency
and not coordination of decisions ta%en at certain times by
various public authorities to achieve the ob>ective is difficult
to achieve.
<ccidental economic thin%ing this problem is studied
by many scientists ? researchers. ;alf a century ago appeared
social choice theory (public), 4hich radically changed the
vision of managers ? economists on the issue of collective
decision for assessment and provision of public goods.
-roceeding from this theory, the main concept of the
theory of public choice is to determine rational behavior in
decision?ma%ing argument that sho4s that they are
recommended to dra4 and use information, helping to achieve
4
managerilor L economi#tilor privind problema lurii
deciziei colective pentru evaluarea #i furnizarea de bunuri
publice.
1eie ind din aceast teorie, conceptul principal
al teoriei alegerii publice const n determinarea
comportrii raionale n procesul lurii deciziilor
argumentate care reflect c ele sunt recomandabile de a
atrage #i a utiliza informaia, maxim contribuind la
atingerea rezultatelor alegerii publice.
.stfel economistul american Cenneth Moseph
.rro4 &N) nc la sf/r#itul anilor KO ai secolului PP, a
ncercat s cerceteze problema alegerii publice ntr?un
sens mai larg ncercnd s gseasc rspunsul la existen a
unei ci de a transforma preferinele, din individuale n
colective. n acela#i timp el a formulat premise prin care
tranzitivitatea dat este posibil. 9ar, de fapt, teorema lui
coninea #i o anumit inconsenven, care exprima #i o
anumit ndoial privind posibilitatea crerii unui sistem
integrat de adoptare a deciziilor colective, satisfacerii
cerinelor deplinei ordinii #i independene fa de alte
alternative. +eorema lui .rro4 nu nsemn c realizarea
deciziilor publice raionale este ca principiu imposibil
const/nd de fapt, doar din lipsa garaniilor raionale.
-unnd la ndoial rolul coordonator al statului
#i posibilitatea alegerii colective a obiectivelor #i formrii
strategiei dezvoltrii socio?economice, prin aceast teoria
au fost introduse a>ustri semnificative n percepia
>ustiiei #i binefacerii activitii statului. .cum, de peste
cinci decenii, aceste concluzii rm/n drept obiect al
cutrii adevrului #tiinific.
0aptul c adepii teoriei economice tradiionale
conceptual #i reprezentau realizarea politicii de stat,
pornind din urmtoarea baz metodologicA economia de
pia devine efectiv sau, a#a numit Q-areto ? optimal8,
exclusiv doar n condiiile concurenei perfecte. =u alte
cuvinte, ei admit, c situaia dat poate exista doar n
cazul redistribuirii resurselor (mi>loacelor) n favoarea
intereselor unuia din departamente statale #i nu poate s
nu afecteze n acela#i timp interesele altor departamente.
*ai mult dec/t at/t, oponenii acestei teorii se
pronunau contra cerinelor generale indicate ctre
preferinele publice pentru c conform opiniei acestora
fiecare individ trebuie s aib propriile interese #i
preferine. .ceast abordare poate fi caracterizat ca
realizarea deplin a tuturor beneficiilor din cadrul
relaiilor de schimb.
ns cum a artat practica, n multe cazuri
atingerea realizrii rezultatului similar impedic diferite
Qe#ecuri ale pieei8A procese care declan#eaz un
dezechilibru macroeconomic, existena monopolurilor
naturale, sau alte externaliti diverse. . devenit tot mai
clar faptul c chiar #i cele externaliti pozitive apar din
cauza aducerii beneficiilor pentru tuturor, datorita
Qbunurilor publice8, doar n cazul, dac acestea sunt
produse #i consumate de cineva. 9in acest motiv n
maximum results of public choice.
+herefore .merican economist Cenneth Moseph .rro4
&N) since the late KORs of the t4entieth century, tried to
investigate the problem of public choice in a 4ider sense
trying to find the ans4er the existence of a 4ay to transform
individual preferences to collective . .t the same time he
made premises 4hich transitivity is possible. !ut in fact,
theorem contains a certain inconsistency, and expressing some
doubt concerning the possibility of creating an integrated
collective decision?ma%ing, meeting the re:uirements of full
order and independent of other alternatives. .rro4Rs theorem
does not mean that achieving rational public decision is in
principle impossible consisting in fact >ust the lac% timely
guarantees rational.
Suestioning the coordinating role of the state and
collective choice of ob>ectives and formation of socio?
economic development strategy, through this theory 4ere
introduced significant ad>ustments in the perception of >ustice
and beneficence of state activity. 2o4, over five decades,
these conclusions remain the ob>ect of scientific search for
truth.
+hat traditional economic theorist represented their
conceptual realization of state policy, starting from the
follo4ing basic methodologyA mar%et economy becomes
effective or so?called "-areto ? optimal" exclusively under
perfect competition. 5n other 4ords, they admit that the
situation can only exist if the redistribution of resources
(resources) to favor the interests of one of state departments
and cannot at the same time not affects the interests of other
departments.
*oreover, opponents of this theory are pronounced
against the general re:uirements set by public preferences
according to their vie4 that each individual must have their
o4n interests and preferences. +his approach can be
characterized as the full realization of the benefits of the
exchange relations.
!ut as practice sho4s, in many cases achieving of the
result prevent various "mar%et failures"A processes that trigger
a macroeconomic imbalance, the existence of natural
monopolies, or other various externalities. 5t became
increasingly clear that even the positive externalities arise
from bringing benefits to everyone, because "public goods"
>ust in case if they are produced and consumed by someone.
0or this reason, over a long period of time this problem
appeared to be a ma>or obstacle to development of
"normative" economy, and the possibility of generalization of
individual preferences.
5n addition, due to lac% of specific methodological
recommendations 4as not possible to assess the real and
effective regulation of various social conditions, using
accepted scientific methods.
5
decursul unei perioade ndelungate de timp problema dat
prea s fie un obstacol ma>or pentru dezvoltarea
Qnormativ8 a economiei, #i pentru posibilitatea
generalizrii preferinelor individuale. n afar de aceasta,
din cauza lipsei recomandrilor metodice concrete, nu a
fost posibil o evaluare real #i o reglementare eficient a
diferitor stri sociale, utiliznd metode #tiinifice
acceptabile.
.naliza problemelor metodologice pe baza
acestor permise continua mai mult de peste cincizeci de
ani. <dat cu apariia teoriei revoluionare a alegerii
publice, cadrul metodologic s?a schimbat n mod radical.
9evine tot mai clar c pentru asigurarea unei bunstri
sociale maximal posibile #i eliminarea Qe#ecurilor8
instrumentelor regulatorii ale pieei, a aprut necesitatea
interveniei statului n economie, fapt care a condus la
apariia nevoii determinrii mecanismului luri deciziilor
colective.
Tcoala "alegerii publice" care a izvort din
lucrrile lui !uchanan, +ullo% #i asociai si, care au
investigat cauzele deficitelor excesive #i a lipsei de
disciplin fiscal n democraiile moderne, acestea fiind
temele lor centrale &F).
Bste necesar de subliniat dou idei cruciale care
au stat la baza unei mari pri din activitatea aceastei
#coliA
#coala "iluziei fiscale"
politici de stabilizare asimetrice.
-e scurt, ideea teoriei iluziei fiscale const n
faptul c instituiile publice nu neleg restriciile bugetare
intertemporale a guvernului. .tunci c/nd li se ofer
deficit finanat din contul programului de cheltuieli, ei
supraestimeaz beneficiile cheltuielilor curente #i
subestimeaz greutatea poverii fiscale ulterioare.
-oliticienii oportuni#ti care doresc s fiu reale#i profit de
aceast confuzie prin cre#terea nivelului cheltuielilor mai
mult dec/t a impozitelor n special n anii electorali.
Hna din cele mai relevante lucrri asupra
conceptului de "iluziei fiscal" #i rolul su crucial pentru
abordarea "alegerii publice" a fost efectuat de !uchanan
#i 3agner n 'EFF &U) . n conformitate cu aceast lucrare,
%eynesismului este una din cauze care a contribuit la
formarea deficitelor excesive #i abandonarea a
"responsabilei" reguli ? a echilibrului bugetar.
-oliticile de stabilizare %eynesiene devin
asimetriceA politicienii sunt ntotdeauna dispu#i spre
existena deficitelor att n perioade de recesiune ct #i n
perioade de cre#tere economic. 5nstituiile publice fiind
"condu#i de iluzie fiscal" nu pedepsesc acest
comportament.
!uchanan #i 3agner sugereaz c diferite
structuri fiscale #i instituiile fiscale pot duce la existena
a unui nivel mai mult sau mai puin pronunat al iluziei
fiscale.
Hn argument legat de abordarea "iluziei fiscale"
.nalysis of methodological problems based on these
allo4 continued more than fifty years. 3ith the advent of
revolutionary theory of public choice, the methodology has
changed radically. 5t becomes increasingly clear that
to provide a social maximum possible 4elfare and elimination
of "failures" of the mar%et regulatory instruments, it 4as
necessary of state intervention in the economy, 4hich has led
to the need for determining the mechanism of collective
decision ma%ing.
$chool of "public choice" that sprang from
!uchananRs, +ullo% and his associates 4or%, they investigated
the causes of excessive deficits and the lac% of fiscal
discipline in modern democracies, being their central themes
&F).
5t is necessary to emphasize t4o crucial ideas that
formed the basis of much of the 4or% of this schoolA
V school of "fiscal illusion"
V asymmetric stabilization policies.
!riefly, the idea of fiscal illusion theory is that the
public institutions do not understand the government
intertemporal budget constraints. 3hen is given deficit
financed from expenditure program, they overestimate the
benefits and underestimate the 4eight of current expenditure
further tax burden. -oliticians 4ant to be reelected
opportunistic advantage of the confusion by increasing
spending more than taxes especially in election years.
<ne of the most relevant 4or%s on the concept of
"fiscal illusion" and its crucial role in addressing of "public
choice" 4as made by !uchanan and 3agner in'EFF &U) .
.ccording to this paper, Ceynesianism is one of the reasons
that contributed to formation of excessive deficits and the
abandonment of the "responsibility" rules ? the budget
balance.
Ceynesian stabilization policies are asymmetricA the
politicians are al4ays 4illing to existence of deficits both in
recessions and in periods of economic gro4th. -ublic
institutions are "driven by fiscal illusion" do not punish this
behavior.
!uchanan and 3agner suggest that different tax
structures and fiscal institutions can lead to the existence of a
level more or less pronounced of fiscal illusion.
. related argument addressing to the "fiscal illusion" is
sho4n in the model proposed by 2ordhaus ('EFK) "political
business cycle". +he idea of his 4or%
is that politicians during election years follo4ing
expansionary policies of budgetary institutions re4ard
politicians 4ithout understanding (or learn from the past)
that expansionary policies of pre?election years 4ill be
"re4arded" by recessions in post?election years &E). .lthough
2ordhaus model is developed in terms of inflation ?
unemployment, it can easily be applied to explain the budget
6
este prezentat n cadrul modelului propus de 2ordhaus
('EFK) a "ciclului de afaceri politic". 5deea lucrrilor sale
const faptul c n anii electorali politicienii urmeaz
politicile expansioniste iar instituiile bugetare i
alegtorii recompens politicieni fr a nelege (nici a
nva din trecut) faptul c politicile expansioniste pre?
electorale vor trebui s fie "rspltite" de recesiunile post?
electorale&E). =hiar dac modelul 2ordhaus este dezvoltat
n termeni de inflaie ? #oma>, acesta poate u#or fi aplicat
pentru explicarea deficitelor bugetare.
n noile condiiile, tendinele stabilite au
determinat necesitatea cercetrii rolului statului #i a cilor
asigurrii anumitor bunuri #i servicii publice. . devenit
evident, c fiecare membru al societii nu este n stare de
a?#i satisface nevoile proprii sau n cadrul unui grup de
persoane particulare. $oluia acestei probleme a gsit
reflecie n cunoscuta versiune mainstream a teoriei
alegerii publice, n conformite cu care, statul este
instrumentul ce particip la nlturarea conflictelor de
interese a participanilor relaiilor de pia.
+reptat, pe baza postulatului de baz a acestei
teorii privind aceea c intervenia statului care este
necesar, n limitele conceptului pozitiv a alegerii publice
se investigheaz problema privind executarea obligaiilor
sale, privind managementul eficient a distribuiei de
funcii dintre structurile de putere subordonate. +otodat,
este foarte important de subliniat, c cercetrile normative
n lumina teoriei alegerii publice sunt legate cu
identificare institutelor care permit indivizilor de a primi
de la stat ceea ce doresc, fr a fi totodat expu#i
administrrii stricte din partea acestuia.
.#a a fost reflectat analiza teoriei alegerii
publice p/n la apariia strii revoluioniste a stadiului
dezvoltrii acesteia. "a momentul actual baza
metodologic a acestor cercetri s?a schimbat substanial
L acum punctul lor de plecare este ntrebareaA care este
schema organizaional L structural a organului de
administrare a alegerii publice #i mecanismul de luare a
deciziilor colectiveW 1spunsul este urmtorulA aceste
decizii sunt luate de ctre conducerea statului ? politicieni
#i funcionari publici. +otodat, ideea de baz a teoriei
alegerii publice rm/ne neschimbat #i destul de simplA
departamentele #i ageniile ndeplinind instruciunile
alegtorilor #i indicaiile politicienilor #i a funcionrilor
publici sunt mercantile #i continua sa fie ghidate de
interese personale, care tind s depun eforturi pentru a
asigura folosul maxim pentru sine nsu#i.
Bste foarte important de a sublinia c abordarea
Qcontractual,8 susintorii creia sunt muli reprezentani
ai #colii alegerii publice, la stadiul contemporan al
realizrii practice este una din elementele direciilor
reglementrii acestei teorii. n structura acesteia se
delimiteaz Qetapa constituional8 ? n care indivizii
accept n mod unanim regulile >ocului, #i Qfaza post
constituional8 ? atunci c/nd este vorba de reguli
deficits.
5n the ne4 conditions, established trends made necessary
to research the role of state and of 4ays to ensure certain
goods and services. 5t became obvious that every member of
society is not able to satisfy o4n needs or in a group of
individuals. +he solution of this problem has found reflection
in the popular mainstream version of public choice theory,
according to 4hich, state is the instrument participating in the
removal of conflicts of interest of the participants of the
mar%et.

,radually, based on the basic postulate of this theory
concerning the fact that state intervention is necessary, 4ithin
the positive concept of public choice is investigating the
matter concerning its o4n performance,
concerning the efficient management of the distribution
function of po4er structures subordinate. ;o4ever, it is
important to note, that normative research in the light of
public choice theory are connected to the identification
of institutes that allo4 individuals to receive from the state
4hat they 4ant, 4ithout strict administration exposed from his
part.
+hat 4as reflected in the analysis of public choice
theory until the occurrence of revolutionary stage of
development. =urrently methodological basis of this research
has changed substantially ? no4 their starting point is the
:uestionA 4hich organizational ? structural scheme of
managing body of public choice and mechanism of collective
decision?ma%ingW +he ans4er isA these decisions are ta%en by
the leadership of the state ? politicians and civil servants.
;o4ever, the basic idea of public choice theory remains
unchanged and disarmingly simpleA the departments and
agencies fulfilling the instructions of voters and indications of
politicians and civil servants are mercantile and continue to be
guided by personal interests, 4hich tend to 4or% to4ards to
providing of maximum benefit for itself.
5t is important to emphasize that the "contractual"
approach supporters 4ho are many representatives of the
public choice school, at contemporary stage of practical
realization is one of the elements of regulation of directions
of this theory. 5n its structure is delimited by "constitutional
stage" ? 4here individuals accept unanimously the concept the
game rules, and "the post constitutional" ? 4hen it comes to
everyday rules of this administrative process. 5t should be
noted at the same time observes that second stage of decision
ma%ing usually does not re:uire unanimous approval, but the
support of the ma>ority.

3hen the :uestion arises, to 4hich decision should
be made in terms of production and financing of public goods
at each person appears a desire for increasing o4n
re:uirements hoping at receiving appropriate benefits. +here
are theoretical developments of the methods for
"determination of preferences" purpose of 4hich is to obtain
7
cotidiene ale acestui proces administrativ. Bste necesar de
menionat n acela#i timp, c la etap a 55?a pentru luarea
deciziilor de regul, nu se cere o aprobare n
unanimitate, ci spri>inul ma>oritii.
.tunci c/nd apare ntrebarea, asupra creia se ia
decizia n ceea ce prive#te producia #i finanarea
bunurilor publice, la fiecare individ apare un stimul
pentru ma>orarea cerinelor sale sper/nd la primirea
beneficiilor corespunztoare. Bxist elaborri teoretice a
metodelor Qdeterminrii preferinelor8, scopul crora este
de a obine informaii reale despre importana unor sau
altor alternative. 9ennis *ueller cu optimism se referea
la metodele date, considernd c acestea n cele din urm
vor a>uta la perfecionarea mecanismului de luare a
deciziilor colective, n scopul atingerii intereselor comune
naionale. .stfel, n cartea sa, ".legerea -ublic 5558&'O)
autorul analizeaz numeroase recomandri pentru
soluionarea problemei "paradoxul alegerilor", la baza
creia st ideeaA interesele departamentale (individuale)
ce nu trebuie vzute n sens ngust, ci n sens larg a
acestei noiuni. .ltfel, folosul primit de ctre instituii,
trebuie s fie legat de expresia "preferinele sociale". ns,
organele administraiei centrale (ministere, amente), de
multe ori acioneaz lund din punctul lor de vedere
decizii raionale, bazate pe interesele lor nguste
departamentale, ce nu au o legtura cu beneficiile
a#teptate din respectarea intereselor naionale #i politica
de stat desf#urat.
=onsecinele acestei concluzii sunt extrem de
importante, mai ales in/nd cont de subiectul #i obiectul
de studiu, constnd din urmtoareleA alegerea deciziei
individuale conform opiniei a unor savani aproape deloc
nu influeneaz rezultatul definitiv, adic asupra strii de
echilibru financiar #i stabilitii inflaioniste, i deci n
consecin la administraia central a rii ? ,uvernul #i
la autoritile sectoarelor (departamentele) lipsesc
stimulente pentru a obinerea a maximului de informaii
fiabile privind problemele politicii antideficitare.
Htiliz/nd aceast logic, care ncura>eaz
societatea s rm/n neinformat, unde aparatul
funcionar birocrat refuz elaborarea macroindicatorilor
echilibrului financiar #i a stabilizrii inflaiei, ce reflect
fluxurile financiare primite, distribuite, redistribuite #i
cheltuite n economia naional #i n acela#i timp tinde
spre maximizarea bugetelor departamentelor sale,
deoarece acest lucru, ma>oreaz privilegiile lor reale.
.naliznd comportamentul birocraiei
departamentale cu a>utorul teoriei alegerii publice, pot fi
menionate mai multe motive care pun la ndoial
capacitatea statului de a "potrivi" eficient preferinele
diferitor departamente #i de a agrega cererile acestora cu
obiectivele naionale, economice #i sociale. n acest caz,
teoria "alegerii publice" din nou postuleazA departament
? structura administrativ obi#nuit a administraiei
centrale care, la fel ca #i toi ceilali, tind s asigure
reliable information about the importance of one or another
alternative. 9ennis *uller optimistically concerned given
methods, considering that they ultimately 4ill help to improve
the mechanism of collective decision ma%ing in order to
achieve common national interests. +hus, in his boo%, "-ublic
=hoice 555"&'O) author analyzes numerous recommendations
to solve the problem of "the paradox of elections," 4hich lies
at the basis of the ideaA
departmental interests (individual) that should not be seen in
the narro4 sense, but in the broad sense of that term.
<ther4ise, the benefit received by the institution, must be
lin%ed to the expression of "social preferences". ;o4ever,
central government bodies (ministries, departments) often act
in their perspective ta%ing rational decisions based on their
narro4 departmental interests, 4hich do not have a connection
4ith the expected benefits from compliance 4ith national
interests and held state policy.

+he conse:uences of this finding are extremely
important, especially given the sub>ect and the ob>ect of our
study, consisting of the follo4ingA individual choice does not
influence the decision, 4hich is confirmed by the opinion of
some scientists, hardly does not influence the final outcome,
ie the steady state of inflation and financial stability, then at
central administration of the country ? government and sector
authorities (departments) is lac%ing incentives to obtain the
best reliable information concerning anti?deficit policy issues.
Hsing this logic, 4hich encourages society to remain
uninformed, 4here the unit bureaucrat cler% refuses
developing of financial balance and stabilize the macro
indicators of inflation, reflecting received financial flo4s ,
distributed, and redistributed spent in the national economy
and at the same time tends to maximize its departments
budgets because this increases their real privileges.

.nalyzing the behavior of departmental bureaucracy
4ith the help of public choice theory may be mentioned
several reasons that :uestions stateRs ability to "fit" effective
preferences to aggregate different departments and their
demands national economic and social ob>ectives. 5n this case,
the theory of "public choice" again postulatesA department ?
common administrative structure of central government, >ust
li%e all others tend to ensure maximum benefits for
themselves. ;ence the explanation of the entire range of
issues that prevents performance by ,overnment of the role of
the largest supplier in the effective macro supervision and
regulation of financial flo4s in the national economy.
0rom the series of ideas and empirical data, grouped
by position of public choice theory, 4here is a certain
ambivalence ? the essence of 4hich 4as 4ell exposed by
9ennis *ueller, in "-ublic =hoice 555"A "$ome researchers
believe the state apparatus as a voracious predator, 4hich
tends to advantage as much as possible, using its po4ers on
citizens , but others see it as an e:uivalent institutional mar%et
8
beneficii maxime pentru ei nsu#i. 9e aici rezult
explicaia ntreagei game de probleme care mpiedic
executarea de ctre ,uvern a rolului celui mai important
furnizor n supravegherea #i reglementarea eficient a
macro fluxurilor financiare n economia naional.
9in seria de idei #i a datelor empirice, grupate
dup poziia teoriei alegerii publice, unde exist o
anumit ambivalen ? esena creia a fost bine expus de
9ennis *ueller, n Q.legerea public 5558A QHnii
cercettori consider aparatul de stat ca pe un prdtor
lacom, care tinde pe ct este posibil s profite, utiliz/nd
puterile sale asupra cetenilor, alii ns l percep ca un
echivalent instituional al pieei, n limitele cruia
concurena democratic ofer un nivel de eficien
comparabil cu cel care ofer concurena economic8
10
.
-e baza >udecii expuse mai sus, printre adepii
teoriei alegerii publice sunt utilizate dou modele de statA
statul bazat pe cererea cetenilor (de exemplu societatea
civil #i interesele naionale) #i de stat?"eviathan (de
exemplu societatea intereselor statal ? capitaliste #i
preferinelor ngust departamentale).
n cadrul modelului bazat pe cererea
cetenilor, 9ennis *ueller explic c Q-olitica
guvernului reflect preferinele alegtorilor8, iar n cadrul
modelului "eviathan Q1olul decisiv >oac preferinele
statului sau a persoanelor ce ocup funcii publice8. n
dependen de care model este luat drept baz a analizei
cauzelor proliferrii statului, aceasta ofer rezultate
diferite.
9ennis *ueller menioneaz faptul c sistemul
de guvernare bazat pe principiile democraiei directe #i
federalism asigur reinerea eficient a cre#terii
"eviathan. .cest lucru i permite s presupun c
variaiile date a sistemului de stat corespund unui model
bazat pe cererea cetenilor. 9e aici #i provin
presupunerile noastre privind sistemul de stat care
permite formarea subsistemului financiar #i
implementarea cu nalt eficien a politicii
antiinflaioniste, contribuind la echilibrarea, stabilizarea #i
durabilitatea cre#terii economice.
Redistribuirea ntre genera ii
2atura intertemporal a deciziilor fiscale creaz
legturi ntre genera ii. =u toate acestea, cazul n care
fiecrei genera ie i pas suficient de urma ii ei, orizontul
finit a fiecrei genera iei este imaterial. n special,
abordarea numit ? "echivalen a ricardian" (!arro
('EFG))&'') implic faptul c, av/nd n vedere existen a a
unui suficient altruism ntre genera ii, alegerea a modul n
care este finan at anumit nivel a cheltuielilor este
irelevant. n special, repartizarea sarcinii fiscale peste
genera ie nu este influen at de mrimea datoriei,
modificrile n datoria public sunt compensate de
schimbri n mo teniri private.
n modelele unde echivalen a ricardian nu se
aplic, datoria public poate genera redistribuirea ntre
4ithin 4hich democratic competition provides a level of
efficiency comparable to that is provided by economic
competition "
'O
.
!ased on the above >udgment among public choice
theorists are used t4o state modelsA state based on the re:uest
of citizens (eg civil society and national interests) and
"eviathan state (eg state interests society ? capitalist narro4
departmental preferences).
5nto the model based on re:uest of citizens, 9ennis
*ueller explains that "government policy reflects the
preferences of voters" and in the "eviathan model Rpreferences
play a decisive role of the state, or persons occupying public
functions. "9epending on 4hich model is ta%en as a basis to
analyze the causes proliferation of state, it gives different
results.

9ennis *ueller noted that government system based
on the principles of direct democracy and federalism ensures
effective retention of "eviathan gro4th. +his allo4s assuming
that changes in the state system correspond to a model based
on re:uest of citizens. ;ence come our assumptions on the
state system that allo4s financial subsystem formation and
implementation of highly effective anti?inflationary policy,
contributing to balancing stabilization and sustainable gro4th.
!ntergenerational redistribution
5ntertemporal nature of fiscal decisions creates lin%s
bet4een generations. ;o4ever, if each generation cares
enough about its offspring, then finite horizon of each
generation is immaterial. 5n particular, the approach %no4n as
? "ricardian e:uivalence" (!arro ('EFG))&'') implies that
having regard the existence of a sufficient intergenerational
altruism the choice of ho4 it is financed certain level of
expenditures is irrelevant (taxes are not distorted in this
model). 5n particular, the distribution of the tax burden over
generation is not influenced by the size of the debt, changes in
debt are offset by changes in private be:uests.
5n the models 4here ricardian e:uivalence does not
apply to public debt may cause redistribution bet4een
generations, if the generation that is alive today leaves the
debt burden to future generations. +here is an essential
difference bet4een the current generation and future
generations (including children 4ho are currently living) only
the current generation vote. $o basically a selfish generation
could vote for policy of transfer the tax burden in the future.
.n obvious limit in this behavior is given by the existence of
intergenerational altruismA parents do care about their
children.
=u%ierman and *eltzer&'() propose an interesting
political model of intergenerational redistribution , the
essential idea of this model can be summarized briefly as
follo4s. 5t is assumed that in the current generation are
9
genera ii, dac genera ia care este n via astzi las
povara datoriei genera iilor viitoare. Bxist o diferen
esen ial ntre genera ia actual i genera iile viitoare
(inclusiv copii care sunt n prezent vii)A numai genera ia
actual voteaz. .stfel, n principiu, o genera ie egoist
ar putea vota pentru politici de transfer a sarcinei fiscale
n viitor. < limit evident n acest comportament, este
dat de existena altruismului ntre genera iiA prin ilor le
pas de copii lor.
=u%lentan i *eltzer&'() propun un model
politic interesant a redistribuirii ntre genera ii, ideea
esen ial a acestui model poate fi rezumat pe scurt dup
cum urmeaz. $e presupune c n genera ia actual avem
indivizii (prin i) "boga i" i "saraci "A primii sunt
persoane care au de doresc s lase mo teniri pozitive
urma ilor si i pentru care conceptul "echivalen ei
ricardian" sus ineA ei sunt indiferen i fa de politica
datoriei promovat de stat, deoarece acestea pot
compensa orice schimbare n impozite i deficite curente,
cu a>ustri n mo teniri lsate.
ns indivizii "saraci" sunt acei, care ar dori s
lase mo teniri negative. 9eoarece, totu i, acestea din
urm nu sunt permise (nu se poate mprumuta de la
urma ii si), deci indivizii "saraci" ar dori
existen a deficitelor guvernamentaleA ca urmare, ei
mprumut indirect de la genera iile viitoare. -rin urmare,
un grup de agen i ( "boga i"), este indiferent fa de orice
politic a datoriei de stat, cellalt grup al indivizilor
("saraci") favorizeaz existena datoriei publice. -rin
urmare, alegerea social este de natur s conduc la
cre#terea datoriei de stat. =u%ienaan i *eltier ('EUE)
subliniaz c n cazul alegerii sociale atinse prin regula
ma>orit ii, chiar si un planificator social binevoitor ar
alege existen a datoriei de stat.
!nfluen a resurselor limitate asupra in stituiilor
publice
Bxist o diferen esenial ntre instituiile
publice n func ie de A forma, structura i func iile
fiecrei fiind diferite, fiecare instituie public decide
structura #i mrimea cheltuielilor sale, acestea ns pot
duce la nregistrarea deficitului bugetar #i ca rezultat la
cre#terea datoriei publice. .stfel, n principiu, un
comportament iresponsabil al instituiilor bugetare poate
conduce la promovarea politicii de transfer a
cheltuielilor.
!nfluena conflictelor de distribuie
.lesina #i 9razen&'I) propun un model sub
denumire de 8rzboi a epuizrii8 a a>ustri fiscale
nt/rziate. n care diferite institu ii publice reprezentate de
grupuri socio?politice lupt pentru repartizarea sarcinii
fiscale. *odelul presupune c un #oc permanent perturb
bugetul de stat, astfel nc/t la ratele de impozitare
existente, apare deficit #i ncepe s se acumuleze datoria
de stat. Hn planificator social ar reaciona imediat la acest
#oc #i ar ridica veniturile fiscale, n scopul meninerii
individuals (parents) " rich" and "poor", "rich" are people 4ho
4ant to leave positive legacy to their descendants and for
them "ricardian e:uivalence" concept claimsA they are
indifferent to the policy pursued by the state debt as they can
offset any change in taxes and of current deficits, 4ith
ad>ustments into legacy.
!ut RpoorR are those 4ho 4ould li%e to leave negative
be:uests. $ince, ho4ever, people is not permitted (it canRt not
be borro4ed from descendants), so RpoorR existence of 4ould
4ant to run government deficitsA as a result, they borro4
indirectly from future generations. +herefore, a group of
("rich"), people is indifferent to any debt policy , the other
group of individuals ("poor") favors existence of public debt.
+herefore, social choice is li%ely to lead to increased debt.
=u%ierman and *eltzer ('EUE) points out that if social choice
reached by ma>ority rule, even and a benevolent social planner
4ould choose existence of debt.
The impact of redistribution bet"een public institutions
+here is an essential difference bet4een public
institutions, because of A shape, structure and functions of each
are different, each public institution decide the structure size
and of expenditures but this may lead to record budget deficit
and as a result gro4ing of public debt. $o basically
irresponsible behavior budgetary institutions may lead to
promoting of policy of transfer of expenditures.

!nfluence of distribution of conflicts
.lesina and 9razen&'I) propose an model under the
name of "4ar exhaustion" of delayed fiscal ad>ustment . +he
various public institutions represented by socio?political
groups fighting for the distribution of the tax burden. +he
model assumes that a permanent shoc% disrupts budget so at
existing tax rates, deficit occurs and begins to accumulate of
public debt. . social planner 4ould immediately react to this
shoc% and raise tax revenues in order to maintain balanced
budget. +he essence of the model is that the distributive
struggle among social groups delays the adoption of effective
policies to balance the budget.
"etRs assume that 4e need to decide on ho4 to share
the tax burden of the stabilization process. +he longer the
decision is delayed the greater the costs is because of t4o
reasonsA
V pre?tax distortions persist in stabilization timeD
V debt is accumulated so that higher taxes are needed to
stabilize the service of it.
;o4ever, rational delays occurs in t4o conditionsA
') the proposed stabilization is "unfair", i.e. some institutions
must support a disproportionate share of the tax burden, ()
institutions are not informed about the costs of eachother for
10
bugetul echilibrat. Bsena modelului const n faptul c
lupta distributiv n r/ndul grupurilor sociale nt/rzie
adoptarea politicilor eficiente pentru echilibrarea bugetul.
$ presupune c este nevoie de decis privind
modul de mprire a poverei fiscale a procesului de
stabilizare. =u ct mai mult se amn luarea deciziei cu
at/t mai mari sunt costurile, din dou motiveA
distorsiunile fiscale a pre?stabilizrii persist n
timpD
datoria se acumuleaz, astfel c taxele mai mari
sunt necesare pentru deservirea stabilizrii.
=u toate acestea, nt/rzierile raionale apar n dou
condiiiA ') stabilizarea propus este "inechitabil", adic
unele institu ii trebuie s suporte o parte disproportionata
a poverii fiscaleD () institu iile nu sunt informai despre
costurile fiecrei din ele pe care ar trebui s suporte
pentru stabilizare.
.ceste costuri pot fi interpretate n dou moduri
care nu se exclud reciprocA unul subliniaz costurile
economice ale distorsiunilor a perioadei de pre?
stabilizare, cealalt pune accentul pe costurile politice de
prevenire a celuilalt grup al institu iilor de la impunerea
unui plan fiscal nedorit. =osturi politice includ costuri de
lobby, sau costurile aciunii directe a politicii.
nvins, este grupul care va avea de pierdut mai
mult ca rezultat al stabilizrii fiscale, c/#tigtor este
cellalt grup. n general, grupurile ce reprezint
interesele institu iilor nu vor accepta imediat rolul
nvinsuluiA ei sper c alt grup va ceda primului. +impul
optim de concesiune este determinat de echivalentul a
costului marginal al a#teptrii cu beneficiul marginal al
a#teaptrii. !eneficiul marginal este dat de probabilitatea
condiionat alt grup reprezentativ va ceda n momentul
urmtor, nmulit la diferena de utilitate ntre a fi
c/#tigtorul #i nvins. .dic ntre plata mai mic sau
ponderea mai mare al poverii fiscale
=u ct e mai inegal distribuirea costurilor de
stabilizare, cu att mai t/rziu va fi timpul estimat de
stabilizare. *ai mult dec/t at/t, cu ct mai mici sunt
costurile de trai ntr?o economie instabil, mai t/rziu va fi
stabilizarea. .cest rezultat are dou interpretriA n primul
r/nd se sugereaz c mecanisme economice, cum ar fi
clauzele indexrii, care reduc costul de instabilitate
macroeconomic au tendina de am/narea a>ustri, n al
doilea r/nd, mecanismul politic care face mai u#oar #i
mai puin costisitoare de a exercita o puterea veto #i
"blocheaz "planurile de stabilizare propuse, ntrziind
stabilizare.
9razen #i ,rilli&'G) extind acest model prin
artarea c o criz economic poate anticipa stabilizrii
prin forarea a "soluiei" a rzboiului epuizrii.
5deea e c cre#tere a costurilor de pre?stabilizarea
din cauza unei crize o face foarte costisitoare pentru
continuarea rzboiul epuizrii, i deci are loc adoptarea
solu iilor de ctre institu iile publice. .stfel, ntr?o
bearing for stabilization.
+hese costs can be interpreted in t4o 4ays that are not
mutually exclusiveA one emphasizes the economic costs of
distortions of the pre?stabilization period, the other
emphasizes the political costs of preventing other group of
institutions from imposing an un4anted tax plan. -olitical
costs include costs of lobby or direct action policy costs.
9efeated is group 4hich 4ill lose more as a result of
fiscal stabilization, the 4inner is the other group. 5n general,
groups representing the interests of the institutions 4ill not
accept immediately defeated roleA they hope that another 4ill
fail first. <ptimal concession time is determined by the
marginal cost of e:uivalent to the marginal benefit of 4aiting
time. +he marginal benefit is given by conditional probability
of another representative group 4hen 4ill give up in the next
moment, multiplied by the difference in utility bet4een being
the 4inner and loser. *eaning choice bet4een paying lo4er
than or greater share of the tax burden.
+he more the uneven is distribution of cost
stabilization the later 4ill be the expected time of
stabilization. *oreover, the lo4er are the costs of living in an
unstable economy the later 4ill be stabilization. +his result
has t4o interpretationsA first suggested that economic
mechanisms such as indexation clauses that reduce the cost of
macroeconomic instability have a tendency to postpone
ad>ustments, secondly, the political mechanism that ma%es it
easier and less expensive to exercise veto po4er "bloc%s
"stabilization plans proposed delaying stabilization.

9razen and ,rilli&'G) extend this model by sho4ing
that an economic crisis can anticipate stabilization by forcing
a "solution" of 4ar of exhaustion.
+he point is that increase in costs due to pre?crisis
stabilization ma%es it very expensive to continue the 4ar of
exhaustion, and therefore ta%es place adopting of solution by
public institutions. +hus, in an economic emergency may
ultimately be socially beneficialA on the one hand causes an
economic crisis 4ith its costs, on the other hand, shortens the
delay in the adoption of stabilization re:uired measures.

"o4er cohesion involves many difficulties in reaching
an agreement on a fair distribution of the costs of fiscal
ad>ustment and hence to even longer delay of stagnated
gro4th of debt.
#tate debt as a factor of influence
+he size of debt stoc% lin%s past policies 4ith future
policies. +he current policy may affect "status 4ord" inherited
by successors, of fiscal choices that determine the size of the
debt. .lesina and +abellini&'K) argue that a government can
seize this strategic opportunity and sho4 that this game in
office politics bet4een governments at different points in time
11
situaie de urgen economic poate, n cele din urm, s
fie social beneficA pe de o parte provoac o criz
economic cu costurile sale, pe de alt parte, scurteaz
durata de nt/rziere n adoptarea de msuri privind
stabilizare necesare.
=oeziune mai mic implic mai multe dificulti
n realizarea unui acord cu privire la o distribuie
echitabil a costurilor de a>ustare fiscal #i, prin urmare,
la nt/rziere mai ndelungat n stagnarea cre#terii a
datoriei.
$atoria de stat ca element de influen
*rimea stocului a datoriei leag politicile din
trecut cu politicile viitoare. .ctuala politic poate afecta
"starea cuv/ntului" mo#tenit de succesorii, prin alegerile
sale fiscale, care determin mrimea datoriei. .lesina #i
+abellini&'K) susin c un guvern poate profita de aceast
posibilitate strategic #i arat c acest >oc politicul ntre
guvernele din oficiu, la diferite puncte n timp pot duce la
o acumulare a datoriei publice mai mari de ceea ce e
prevzut de modelul "netezirii fiscale".
=ea mai simpl ilustrare a acestei idei este, dup
cum urmeazA se consider un sistem cu dou pri iar
cele dou pri au preferine diferite asupra compoziiei
cheltuielilor publice. < institu ie public pledeaz pentru
cheltuieli privind "aprare", alta favorizeaz cheltuieli
privind "protecia social". =ele dou pri sunt
ideologice, adic ei reprezint interesele diferitor
circumscripii departamentaleA prile doresc
implementarea politicii dorite n domeniu dat.
5nteresele specifice a diferitor institu ii publice
sunt prezentate de partide politice n parlament i deci
dac se presupune c actualmente la putere este partidul
ce promoveaz politica a unor cheltuieli "de aprare"
ridicate, iar rezultatul alegerii structurii cheltuielilor
viitoare este incert din cauza #ocurilor preferinelor a
partidului la putere. n cazul dat, este evident c partidul
de la putere poate cre#te utilitatea circumscripiei sale prin
aprobarea datoriei va aproba cre terea datoriei publice
pentru a nclina structura chetuielilor viitoare n favoarea
sa, astfel ca n cazul c la guvernare va veni partidul de
opozi ie care reprezint interesele atlor institu ii
guvernamentale i va fi nevoit s deserveasc datoria
mic ornd astfel nivelul posibil al cheltuielilor.
.ceast interaciune strategic duce la deficite,
chiar dac un planificator social care maximizeaz media
ponderat a utilitilor celor dou grupuri ar alege s
echilibreze bugetul n fiecare perioad.
-rin urmare, polarizare a poziiilor #i fragilitate
guvernului explic acumularea a datoriei.
Hlterior +abellini #i .lesina n 'EE(&'K) au
dezvoltat o relaie mai precis ntre deficite #i polarizare a
preferinelor individuale, mai mult dec/t doar a
preferinelor partidului. Bi consider un model n care
deciziile sunt luate prin regula ma>oritatii, #i orice
propunere poate fi fcut #i aleas prin comparaie a
can lead to an accumulation of public debt exceeding 4hat is
provided by the model of "tax smoothing".
+he simplest illustration of this idea is as follo4sA it
is considered a system 4ith t4o parties and the t4o parties
have different preferences on the composition of public
spending. . public institution advocates for spending on
"defense" another favors expenditure on "social protection".
+he t4o parties are ideological, that means that they represent
the interests of different constituencies departmentA the parties
4ish implementation of desired policy in the given domain.
$pecific interests of various public institutions are
presented by political parties in parliament and thus supposing
that the party currently in po4er is promoting the policy of
high spending on "defense", and the election outcome is
uncertain structure of future spending because of shoc%s of the
party preferences holding the po4er. 5n this case, it is obvious
that the party in po4er can increase the usefulness of its
constituency by approving debt so 4ill approve also the
increase of government debt of future spending structure to tilt
in his favor so if that in po4er 4ill come opposition party
representing the interests of government institutions and 4ill
have to serve debt shrin%ing possible level of expenditures.
+his strategic interaction leads to deficits, even if a
social planner maximizes the 4eighted average of the utilities
of the t4o groups 4ould choose to balance the budget in each
period.
+herefore, the polarization of positions and
fragility of government explains the accumulation of debt.
+abellini and .lesina later in 'EE'&'K) developed a
more precise relationship bet4een deficits and polarization of
individual preferences more than >ust of the party preferences.
+hey consider a model 4here decisions are made by ma>ority
rule, and any proposal can be made and compared by selecting
pairs of variants. 5n these circumstances, the "theory of voting
environment" implies that the policy adopted is most preferred
by all institutions
medium. 3ith uncertainty about the future ma>ority
preferences on the structure of expenditure currently average
institutions prefers to issue debt to future composition of
expenditure tilting it in their favor. +abellini and .lesina
sho4ed that the amount of debt issued is increasing in
dispersion of votersR preferencesA the more focused to4ards
extreme are electorate preferences, the higher the debt is.
$o the strategic role of debt is to create "conditions"
for public institutions as both future and current. .ghion and
!olton&'N), *ilesi?0erretti and $polaore&'F)

argue that
existing institutions can use debt strategically to influence the
outcome of future expenditure composition.

.lesina and +abellini&'K) argue that the polarization of
public institutions and change of their preferences should be
associated 4ith higher debt. 0or example, .lesina and
+abellini, interpret deficits during deficits under 1eaganRs
12
perechilor de variante. n aceste condiii, "teoria votului
mediu" implic faptul c politica adoptat este cea mai
preferat de ctre toate instiu iile n mediu. =u
incertitudine privind preferinele ma>oriti viitoare
asupra structurii cheltuielilor, instiu iile n mediu curent
prefer s emit datoria pentru nclinarea compoziiei
viitoare a cheltuielilor n favoarea sa. +abellini #i .lesina
au artat c suma datoriei emise este n cre#tere n
dispersie cu preferinele alegtorilorA cu ct este mai
concentrat spre extrem preferinele electoratului, cu at/t
mai mare este nivelul datoriei.
9eci rolul strategic al datoriilor consta n crearea
de "condiii" pentru institu iile publice att viitoare ct i
curente. .ghion #i !olton&'N), *ilesi?0erretti #i
$polaore&'F) susin c institu iile existente pot folosi
strategic datoria public pentru a influena rezultatul
compozi iei cheltuielilor viitoare.
.lesina #i +abellini&'K) susin c polarizarea
institu iilor publice #i schimbrile a preferin elor acestora
ar trebui s fie asociate cu datorii mai mari. 9e exemplu,
.lesina #i +abellini, interpreteaz deficitele de pe timpul
lui 1eagan ca o manevr cu scopul limitrii cheltuielilor
cu privind bunstarea social a viitoarei administraii.
#itua ia din Republica %oldo&a
nainte de a purcede la formularea concluziei vom
prezenta graficul ce reflect nivelul i evolu ia soldului
bugetar n 1epublica *oldova&'U) (graficul ')
,raficul dat arat c n principiu se atest proficit
doar n anul (OOK ulterior s?a nregistrat deficit nivelul
cruia a fost destul de modest pe parcursul perioadei
(OOK?(OOF, ns odat cu producerea crizei economice
mondiale nivelul deficitului bugetar n 1. *oldova brusc
a crescut atingnd valoarea sa maxim n anul (OOE, de
IUIN,N milioane lei. Hlterior, pn n prezent, cu mare
regret se denot existen a unui nivel impuntor a
deficitului ceea ce se datoreaz n mare msur att
administration as a maneuver to limit spending on social
4elfare of future administrations.
The situation in Republic of %oldo&a
!efore proceeding to formulation of conclusion 4ill
present the chart that reflects the level and evolution of the
budget balance in *oldova&'U) (=hart ')
+he given graph sho4s that basically is attested only
during (OOK a surplus subse:uently 4as recorded a shortage
level of 4hich 4as :uite modest over the period (OOK?(OOF,
but 4ith the production of the global economic crisis budget
deficit in 1. *oldova increased sharply and reaches its
maximum value in (OOE of IUIN,N mil.lei. $ubse:uently, until
no4 4ith great regret it sho4s there is a tremendous level
deficit that is largely due to both to inefficiency also to
existence of a time gap improvement measures of current
situation also due to impediments as listed above as more are
actual for *oldova
because our country does not have rich natural resources
that 4ould allo4 to cover completely the desired level of
budgetary expenditure. $o no4 to the existence of a restricted
budget is observed even at the stage of budget planning the
programming of budget deficit although it should be later paid
bac%, but this does not concern the current government.
!n conclusion, the 4hole political?institutional approaches
mentioned in given article g suggests follo4ingA
accumulation of government debt means further
increase of tax burden debt redemption, if it does not
happen but the state again recourse to borro4ing to
finance current expenditures then the percentage of
loans ta%en increases and it is repeated from year to
year by transferring the burden of debtD
cannot be given exclusive preference (even
temporarily) to any of the elements of stateRs national
po4er structure , involved in solving of a range of
13
ineficien ei i existen ei unui decala> n timp a msurilor
de ameliorare a situa iei create ct i barierilor prezentate
mai sus cu att mai actuale pentru *oldova deoarece ara
noastr nu dispune de resurse naturale bogate care ar
permite a acoperirea n totalmente a nivelului dorit de
cheltuieli bugetare. . a dar n condi iile existen ei unui
buget restrns se observ chiar i la etapa planificrii
bugetare programarea a deficitului bugetar de i acesta
ulterior va trebui s fie rsplatit, ns aceasta pare nu
ngri>oreaz guvernarea actual.
'n ncheiere, totalitatea abordrilor de ordin politico?
instituional menionate n articolul dat sugereaz
urmtoarele concluziiA
acumularea datoriei guvernamentale nseamn
cre#terea ulterioar a poverii fiscale pentru
rscumprarea datoriei, dac acesta nu are loc, ci
statul din nou recurge la mprumuturi pentru
finanarea cheltuielilor curente atunci procentul
la mprumuturile luate cre#te #i a#a se repet din
an n an trasfernd astfel povara datorieiD
nu se poate da preferin exclusiv (chiar #i
temporar) nici unuia din elementele structurii
puterii naionale de stat, care este implicat n
rezolvarea uneia din #irul de probleme
interdepartamentale referitor la echilibrarea
financiar a economieiD
este nevoie de luat n considerare c economia
rii este c/mpul de coliziune a diferitor puteri
departamentale, de multe ori reflect/nd nu doar
interese opuse, dar #i neconcordana lor
naionalD
Bste evident c situaia creat n economiile
actuale att n rile dezvoltate ct #i n curs de
dezvoltare este destul de dificil #i sunt necesare
schimbri de ordin economic #i politico?instituional
n vederea restabilirii bunei guvernri #i regulrii
stricte a nivelului deficitului i a datoriei de stat.
-remisele eviden iate n articolul dat pot servi drept
baz pentru dep irea barierelor men ionate i
ulterioara echilibrarea a bugetului de stat. .ceasta
fiind o tem deosebit de important cu caracter
multifactorial i insuficient generalizat av/nd
necesitate de fi prezentat ntr?un alt articol.


interdepartmental issues relating to balance of state6s
budgetD
is needed to be considered the countryRs economy is
the field of collision of different departmental
structures, often reflecting not only opposing
interests but also their national inconsistencyD
5t is obvious that the current economic situation both in
developed as 4ell as in developing countries is difficult and
are re:uired economic and politico?institutional changes in
order to restore good governance and strict regulation of
deficitRs and debtRs level. +he premises outlined in given
article can serve as basis for overcoming barriers mentioned
and for further balance of the state budget. +his is a
particularly important issue 4ith multifactorial nature and that
is insufficient generalized is necessary to be presented in
another article.
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15