creterea deficitelor bugetare The theoretical substantiation of certain political, institutional and social bottlenecks that increase budget deficits Svetlana Dodon drd., INCE Svetlana Dodon PhD student, NIER n articolul dat evideniaz cauzele de ordin politic, instituional i social a existenei deficitelor actuale n cretere, ns mai nainte de toate se va prezentat teoria uniformizrii fiscale i modalitile de aplicare a acesteia. Actualitatea echilibrului bugetar este ca niciodat evident n perioada actual deaceea este deosebit de important de a eviden ia factorii care impiedic realizarea acestuia i duc la nregistrarea deficitului. Mai os vor fi prezentate doar unele aspecte politico!institu ionale care contribuie la cre terea deficitelor. Cuvinte cheie: uniformizarea fiscal, instituii bugetare, teoria alegerii publice, deficit. "his article highlights the political, institutional and social causes of rising of current deficits, but first of all #ill be presented uniform tax theor$ and methods of its application. %mportance of budgetar$ balance is as never obvious in special no# so it is particularl$ important to highlight factors that hinder its performance and lead to deficits. &elo# are listed ust some of politico!institutional aspects that contribute to rising of deficits. Key words: tax smoothing theory, budgetar$ institutions, public choice theor$, deficit. Jel Classification: I !, "#$, "%,"%%,"!& ncepem cu o revizuire a teoriei "uniformizrii fiscale" (tax smoothing theory) a bugetului de stat explicat n lucrrile !arro, "ucas #i $to%ey&',(). n fapt, de cele mai recente modele politice sunt explicaii "pozitive" observate a abaterilor de la teoria uniformizrii fiscale. *ai mult, susintorii acestei teorii o vizualiza nu numai ca fiind "normativ", dar, de asemenea, ca "pozitiv", fiind o descriere a politicii fiscale actuale. +eoria "uniformizrii fiscale" a bugetului de stat, consider o economie nchis, fr de capital, n care un agent reprezentativ consum, lucreaz #i economise#te. ,uvernul este un "-lanificator social binevoitor", care maximizeaz utilitatea agentului reprezentativ. .t/t agentul reprezentativ ct #i guvernul au acela#i orizont de timp, care, pentru simplitate este infinit. +eoria face abstracie de la aspectele intergeneraionale #i de la termeni finii ai biroului de guvernare. ,uvernul trebuie s finaneze o anumit cantitate a cheltuielilor n fiecare perioad prin intermediul impozitelor pe venit asupra forei de munc, care sunt distorsionate, deoarece acestea afecteaz oferta de munc. 0uncia de utilitate a agentului representativ depinde de consumul privat #i petrecere a timpului liber, dar nu de cantitatea a bunurilor publice, pe care, pentru simplitate. 1ezultatul decisiv const n ideea c planificatorul social ar trebui s in constant rata de impozitare. 2ivelul impozitelor este determinat de constr/ngerea bugetar intertemporal, ceea ce nseamn c valoarea actualizat a cheltuielilor (care se d exogen) trebuie s fie egal cu valoarea actual a impozitelor. -rin 3e begin 4ith a revie4 of the theory of "fiscal uniformity" (tax smoothing theory) $tate budget explained in the 4or%s of !arro, "ucas and $to%ey &',(). 5n fact, the latest political models are "positive" explanations of observed deviations from the theory fiscal uniformity. *oreover, proponents of this theory vie4 it not only as "normative" but also as "positive" being a description of the current fiscal policy. +he state budget6s 7tax smoothing8 theory, considers a closed economy 4ithout capital, in 4hich a representative agent consumes, 4or%s and saves. ,overnment is a "benevolent social planner" 4ho maximizes utility of representative agent. !oth the representative agent as 4ell as government has the same time horizon, 4hich for simplicity is infinite. +heory ignores the intergenerational aspects and finite term of the government in office. ,overnment should fund a certain amount of expenditures in each period through taxes on labor income, 4hich are distorted because they affect labor supply. 1epresentative agent utility function depends on private consumption and leisure, but not of amount of public goods, 4hich, for simplicity, is defining as "defense expenditure." 9ecisive result lies in the idea that the social planner should %eep constant tax rate. +ax level is determined by the intertemporal budget constraint, 4hich means that the present value of costs (4hich is given exogenously) must be e:ual to the present value of taxes. ;ence, budget deficits and surpluses are used as a buffer, deficits occur 4hen expenses are temporarily high and surpluses 4hen they are lo4. +hese 1 urmare, deficitele bugetare #i excedentele sunt folosite ca un amortizator, deficite apar atunci c/nd cheltuielile sunt temporar ridicate #i surplusuri, atunci c/nd acestea sunt sczute. .ceste rezultate urmeaz direct din concavitatea funciei a utilitii individuale. < politic a bugetului echilibrat implic rate ridicate a impozitelor azi #i rate impozitare sczute m/ine. -olitica uniformizrii fiscale, n schimb, prevede ratele constante a impozitelor, un deficit azi #i un surplus m/ine, care (din punct de vedere al valorii actualizate) compenseaz deficitul din perioada actual. =ea de a doua politic predomin deoarece distorsiunile fiscale suplimentare din perioada actual mai mult dec/t compenseaz (n termeni de utilitate) c/#tigurile bunstrii agonisite de pe urma ratelor impozitare mai mici din perioada viitoare, din motivul scderii utiliti marginale. .cest principiu simplu are n mare msur implicaii largi asupra politicii fiscale, care sunt evideniate n descrierea a c/torva cazuri exemplificate mai >os. $ presupunem c cheltuielile guvernamentale sunt constante, de?a lungul orizontului planificat. -olitica optim atunci ar prevedea un buget echilibrat n fiecare perioad. 5ar dac la timpul n cheltuielile guvernamentale nea#teptat se mresc pentru totdeauna atunci politica optim implic un buget echilibrat n fiecare perioad cu o cre#tere permanent a impozitelor la momentul n. $ presupunem c de la perioada zero la perioada n cheltuielile guvernamentale sunt constante, #i se a#tept s fie mereu constante. n perioada n are loc nea#teptat "un #oc economic (rzboi, criza))", iar "#ocul" este cunoscut s dureze p/n la perioada (n @ m). -olitica optim n acest caz implic un buget echilibrat p/n n perioada n, o "mic" cre#tere permanent a impozitelor la n, un deficit ntre n #i (n @ m), #i un surplus dup aceea. $ presupunem c la timpul n cheltuielile guvernamentale nea#teptat cresc temporar, apoi la (n @ m) scad permanent sub nivelul iniial, astfel nc/t din punct de vedere valorii actuale avem o reducere a sumei totale a cheltuielilor. 1educerea permanent de dup (n @ m) mai mult dec/t compenseaz cre#terea temporar. -olitica optim presupune o reacie a impozitelor la timpul n, un deficit ntre n #i (n @ m), #i un surplus dup (n @ m). -rincipiul uniformizrii fiscale este destul de clarA deficitele bugetare #i excedente sunt utilizate n mod optim pentru minimizarea efectelor de distorsionare ale impozitrii, av/nd n vedere o anumit reacie a cheltuielilor. 9in acelea#i motive prezentate mai sus, principiul uniformizrii fiscale implic faptul c ratele de impozitare trebuie s fie constante pe parcursul ciclului de afaceri, prin urmare, ar trebui s observm deficite n timpul recesiunilor compensate de excedentele n perioade de expansiune. results follo4 directly from the concavity of the individual utility function. $uppose that government expenditures must be "high" today and tomorro4 "lo4". . policy of balanced budget implies today high rates of taxes and at lo4er level tomorro4. +he state budget6s 7tax smoothing8 theory instead, provides constant tax rates a deficit today and tomorro4 a surplus, 4hich (in terms of present value) compensates shortage of current period. +he second policy prevails because the additional tax distortions in the current period more than compensates (in terms of utility) ac:uired 4elfare gains as a result of lo4er tax rates in future periods, due to decrease of marginal utility. +his simple principle has largely 4idespread implications on fiscal policy, 4hich are highlighted in the description of several cases mentioned belo4. 5t is assumed that government expenditures are constant along the planned time horizon. +hen the optimal policy 4ould provide a balanced budget in each period. .nd if at time n unexpected increase government expenditures forever then the optimal policy 4ould involve a balanced budget in each period 4ith a permanent increase in taxes at the time n. 5t is assumed that from time zero to time n government expenditures are constant and are expected to be al4ays constant. 5n the period n occurs unexpectedly an "economic shoc% (4ar, crisis))" and "shoc%" is %no4n to last up to time (n @ m). <ptimal policy in this case involves a balanced budget until time n, a "small" permanent increase in taxes at a deficit bet4een n and (n @ m), and a surplus thereafter. $uppose that at time n unexpected temporarily increase government expenditures, and then at (n @ m) permanent decrease belo4 the initial so that in terms of actual value 4e have a reduction in the amount of costs. -ermanent reduction after (n @ m) period more than compensates the temporary increase. <ptimal policy involves a tax reaction at time n, a deficit bet4een n and (n @ m), and a surplus after (n @ m). +he principle of tax smoothing theory is clear enoughA budget deficits and surpluses are used optimally to minimize the effects distortion of taxation assuming a certain reaction of expenditures. 0or the same reasons outlined above, the principle of fiscal unification implies that tax rates should be constant over the business cycle, therefore 4e should observe deficits during recessions compensated by surpluses in periods of expansion. +herefore, in the examples described above, being extended to a model 4ith cyclical fluctuations in production involves cyclical ad>ustment of budget balancing ruleA budget 2 -rin urmare, n cazul exemplelor prezentate anterior, fiind extinse la un model cu fluctuaiile ciclice a produciei, implic o a>ustare ciclic a regulii de echilibrare bugetarA bugetul trebuie s fie echilibrat pe parcursul ciclului de afaceri, dar nu n fiecare an fiscal. n acest model, nu se ofer rol unei politici de stabilizare %eynesiene, deoarece producia nu este determinat prin cerere. n modelul care prevede aplicarea politicilor de stabilizare, fluctuaiile ciclice ale bugetului ar trebui s fie chiar #i mai pronunate. 5deea esenial ? deficitele bugetare ar trebui s fie observate n timpul "rzboaielor" #i recesiunii. =a o teorie normativ, modelul uniformizrii fiscale este extrem de valoros. <rice model pozitiv al politicii fiscale trebuie s ia uniformizrea fiscal drept punct de referin ca o teorie "pozitiv", a deficitelor bugetare. !arro a testat modelul uniformizrii fiscale asupra a dou sute de ani de date americane #i britanice. Bl a artat c experiena american #i britanic, n general, sunt n concordan cu principiile de baz ale teoriei uniformizrii fiscaleA coraportul a datoriei la -2! cre#te n timpul rzboaielor, scade n timp de pace #i fluctueaz mpreun cu ciclul de afaceri. n continuare se vor prezenta unele din premise de ordin politico?instiuional care mpiedic buna guvernare intrnd n contradicie cu principiile teoriei "uniformizrii fiscale" astfel contribuind la cre#terea deficitelor bugetare. Rolul instituiilor bugetare i concep ia alegerii publice 5nstitutiile publice reprezint acele unit i economice institutionalizate, a caror func ie principal const n redistribuirea veniturilor i a avu iei pe seama serviciilor prestate popula iei, n cazurile n care ntreprinderile, firmele nu ofera astfel de servicii pe pia sau le ofera n cantit i insuficiente. 5nstitu iile publice mai sunt numite i administra ii publice i sunt formate din administratia central, administra ii sociale i administra ii locale. 5nstitutiile publice cuprindA -arlamentul, .dministratia -rezidentiala, ministerele, celelalte organe de specialitate ale administratiei publice centrale si locale, alte autoritati publice, institutiile publice autonome, precum si institutiile din subordinea acestora, indiferent de modul de finantare a activitatii acestora. 1esursele financiare publice provin din impzite,taxe, contribu ii i venituri nefiscale, preluate de la personae >uridice i fizice, cu luarea n consideratie a poten ialului lor economic i a altor criterii stabilite de lege. 5nstituiile bugetare ntrunesc totalitatea regulilor #i reglementrilor n conformitate cu care bugetele sunt elaborate, aprobate #i implementate. .ceste reguli variaz foarte mult de la o ar la alt, astfel ei pot explica should be balanced over the business cycle, but not in each fiscal year. 5n this model, there is no place for part Ceynesian stabilization policy because production is determined by demand. 5n the model that provides for the application of stabilization policies, cyclical fluctuations of the budget should be even more pronounced. +he essential idea ? budget deficits should be observed during "4ars" and the recessions. .s a normative theory, tax smoothing model is extremely valuable. .ny positive model of tax policy should ta%e as a reference point the tax smoothing model as a "positive" theory of budget deficits. !arro tested the over t4o hundred years of .merican and !ritish data. ;e noted that .merican and !ritish experiences generally are consistent 4ith the basic principles of tax smoothing theoryA correlation of debt to ,2- increases during 4ars, decreases in peacetime and fluctuates 4ith the business cycle. 0urther 4ill be presented some political?institutional premises that prevent application of good governance contradicting 4ith principles of 7fiscal uniformity" theory thus contributing to rising budget deficits. The role of budgetary institutions and public choice concept -ublic institutions represent those institutionalized economic entities 4hose main function is to redistribute income and 4ealth on account of services rendered to population, in cases 4here enterprises, companies do not offer such services on the mar%et or offer it in insufficient :uantities. -ublic institutions are also called public administrations and consist of central, social administration and local administrations. -ublic institutions includeA -arliament, the -residential .dministration, ministries, other bodies of central and local public administration, other public authorities, public institutions, autonomous and subordinated institutions, irrespective of the mode of financing their activities. -ublic resources from taxes, contributions and non?tax revenues, collected from businesses and individuals, ta%ing into account their potential economic and other criteria established by la4. !udgetary institutions >oin all rules and regulations according to 4hich budgets are developed, approved and implemented. +hese rules vary greatly from one country to another, so they can explain potential variations from one country to another country deficits and debt. ? budgetary institutions are more difficult to change than the budget la4 itselfD ? budgetary institutions influence the final vote and 3 potenial variaiile de la o ar la alta ar a deficitelor #i a datoriei de stat. ? instituiile bugetare sunt mult mai dificil de a fi schimbate, dec/t legea bugetului n sineD ? instituiile bugetare influeneaz votul final #i implementarea a bugetului. 5nstituiile bugetare se schimb relativ rar, chiar dac ele pot fi modificate atunci c/nd acestea nu satisfac nevoile unei comuniti (.ctul de !uget al =ongresului din 'EFG al $tatelor Hnite este un exemplu al unei reforme ma>ore a instituiilor bugetare). -roblema esenial, ns, este c instituiile bugetare nu pot fi schimbate la fel de u#or #i n mod frecvent ca bugetul n sine, altfel ele ar fi total ineficiente. $hepsle&I)
arat c "structura", impus de anumite instituii de procedur a>ut la rezolvarea problemei imposibilitii legislative a lui .rro4 &G). 9e exemplu, o problem?cheie const n determinarea deinerii puterii de stabilire a agendei #i a tipurilor de modificri care sunt admisibile la nivelul legislativA n general vorbind, teoria sugereaz c normele procesuale care limiteaz universalism #i reciprocitate conduc la reinerile fiscale. "ucrarea scris de Jon ;agen &K) pune accent pe instituiile bugetare privind acumularea de deficite bugetare. Bl a testat o interesant "ipotez structural", care susine cA "procedurile bugetare duc la o mrirea disciplinei fiscale n cazul n care acestea dau prerogativ primului ministru sau ministrului de finane, n cazul n care limit universalismul, reciprocitate #i amendamentele parlamentare #i faciliteaz executarea strict a legii bugetului ". Jon ;agen, a>unge la concluzia c normele au un anumit efect asupra nivelul #i structurii datoriilor de stat. .lt, "ovry #i -oterba susin c statele americane cu "o strict " regul a echilibrului bugetar reacioneze mai prompt #i mai energic la #ocuri negative a veniturilor sau #ocuri pozetive a cheltuielilor. B men ionat c deciziile privind cheltuielile luate la nivel local, #i care sunt finanate prin transferuri de ctre guvernul naional aceasta va ridic nivelul taxelor. .utoritile locale nu internalizeaz n totalitate efectele deciziilor privind cheltuielile sale asupra bugetului general. $tructurile autorizate de stat, la nivel central, sunt obligate s cunoasc situaia economic curent #i s fiu pregtite att pentru pentru soluionarea problemelor ct #i oferirea garaniilor prompte pentru asigurarea condiiilor stabilitii #i durabilitii a cre#terii economice. ns din motivul inconsistenei #i necoordonrii deciziilor luate la anumite perioade de timp de ctre diferite autoriti publice atingerea obiectivului propus este greu de realizat. n g/ndirea economic occidental aceast problem este cercetat de muli savani L cercettori. n o >umate de secol n urm, a aprut teoria alegerii sociale (publice), care a schimbat n mod radical viziunea implementation of the budget. !udgetary institutions are changing relatively slo4ly, even if they can be changed 4hen they do not meet the needs of a community (=ongressional !udget .ct of 'EFG the Hnited $tates is an example of a ma>or reform of budgetary institutions). +he crucial issue, ho4ever, is that state institutions cannot be changed as easily and fre:uently as the budget itself, other4ise they 4ould be totally ineffective. $hepsle&I) sho4s that the "structure" imposed by certain of procedural institutional helps resolving the problem of legislative impossibility of .rro4 &G). 0or example, a %ey issue is to determine the holding po4er of agenda setting and the types of changes that are permitted at the legislative levelA generally spea%ing, the theory suggests that procedural rules that limit universalism and reciprocity lead to fiscal 4ithholdings.
+he paper 4ritten by Jon ;agen &K) focuses on budgetary institutions concerning the accumulation of deficits. ;e tested an interesting "structural hypothesis" 4hich argues that "budgetary procedures lead to increased fiscal discipline if they give the prerogative of the -rime *inister and *inister of 0inance, if they limit universalism, reciprocity and parliamentary amendments and facilitate strict execution of the budget la4.8 Jon ;agen concludes that rules have some effect on the level and structure of state debt. .lt, "ovry and -oterba argue that H.$. states 4ith "strict" rule of budgetary balance react more promptly and vigorously to negative shoc%s of income or expenditure shoc%s positive. 5t should be noted that expenditure decisions ta%en at local level and financed by transfers from the national government it 4ill raise the level of taxes. "ocal authorities do not fully internalize the effects of its decisions on general government expenditure. .uthorized state structures at central level are re:uired to %no4 the current economic situation and should be prepared for solving problems and for providing timely guarantees to ensure stability conditions and sustainability economic gro4th. !ut because of the reason of inconsistency and not coordination of decisions ta%en at certain times by various public authorities to achieve the ob>ective is difficult to achieve. <ccidental economic thin%ing this problem is studied by many scientists ? researchers. ;alf a century ago appeared social choice theory (public), 4hich radically changed the vision of managers ? economists on the issue of collective decision for assessment and provision of public goods. -roceeding from this theory, the main concept of the theory of public choice is to determine rational behavior in decision?ma%ing argument that sho4s that they are recommended to dra4 and use information, helping to achieve 4 managerilor L economi#tilor privind problema lurii deciziei colective pentru evaluarea #i furnizarea de bunuri publice. 1eie ind din aceast teorie, conceptul principal al teoriei alegerii publice const n determinarea comportrii raionale n procesul lurii deciziilor argumentate care reflect c ele sunt recomandabile de a atrage #i a utiliza informaia, maxim contribuind la atingerea rezultatelor alegerii publice. .stfel economistul american Cenneth Moseph .rro4 &N) nc la sf/r#itul anilor KO ai secolului PP, a ncercat s cerceteze problema alegerii publice ntr?un sens mai larg ncercnd s gseasc rspunsul la existen a unei ci de a transforma preferinele, din individuale n colective. n acela#i timp el a formulat premise prin care tranzitivitatea dat este posibil. 9ar, de fapt, teorema lui coninea #i o anumit inconsenven, care exprima #i o anumit ndoial privind posibilitatea crerii unui sistem integrat de adoptare a deciziilor colective, satisfacerii cerinelor deplinei ordinii #i independene fa de alte alternative. +eorema lui .rro4 nu nsemn c realizarea deciziilor publice raionale este ca principiu imposibil const/nd de fapt, doar din lipsa garaniilor raionale. -unnd la ndoial rolul coordonator al statului #i posibilitatea alegerii colective a obiectivelor #i formrii strategiei dezvoltrii socio?economice, prin aceast teoria au fost introduse a>ustri semnificative n percepia >ustiiei #i binefacerii activitii statului. .cum, de peste cinci decenii, aceste concluzii rm/n drept obiect al cutrii adevrului #tiinific. 0aptul c adepii teoriei economice tradiionale conceptual #i reprezentau realizarea politicii de stat, pornind din urmtoarea baz metodologicA economia de pia devine efectiv sau, a#a numit Q-areto ? optimal8, exclusiv doar n condiiile concurenei perfecte. =u alte cuvinte, ei admit, c situaia dat poate exista doar n cazul redistribuirii resurselor (mi>loacelor) n favoarea intereselor unuia din departamente statale #i nu poate s nu afecteze n acela#i timp interesele altor departamente. *ai mult dec/t at/t, oponenii acestei teorii se pronunau contra cerinelor generale indicate ctre preferinele publice pentru c conform opiniei acestora fiecare individ trebuie s aib propriile interese #i preferine. .ceast abordare poate fi caracterizat ca realizarea deplin a tuturor beneficiilor din cadrul relaiilor de schimb. ns cum a artat practica, n multe cazuri atingerea realizrii rezultatului similar impedic diferite Qe#ecuri ale pieei8A procese care declan#eaz un dezechilibru macroeconomic, existena monopolurilor naturale, sau alte externaliti diverse. . devenit tot mai clar faptul c chiar #i cele externaliti pozitive apar din cauza aducerii beneficiilor pentru tuturor, datorita Qbunurilor publice8, doar n cazul, dac acestea sunt produse #i consumate de cineva. 9in acest motiv n maximum results of public choice. +herefore .merican economist Cenneth Moseph .rro4 &N) since the late KORs of the t4entieth century, tried to investigate the problem of public choice in a 4ider sense trying to find the ans4er the existence of a 4ay to transform individual preferences to collective . .t the same time he made premises 4hich transitivity is possible. !ut in fact, theorem contains a certain inconsistency, and expressing some doubt concerning the possibility of creating an integrated collective decision?ma%ing, meeting the re:uirements of full order and independent of other alternatives. .rro4Rs theorem does not mean that achieving rational public decision is in principle impossible consisting in fact >ust the lac% timely guarantees rational. Suestioning the coordinating role of the state and collective choice of ob>ectives and formation of socio? economic development strategy, through this theory 4ere introduced significant ad>ustments in the perception of >ustice and beneficence of state activity. 2o4, over five decades, these conclusions remain the ob>ect of scientific search for truth. +hat traditional economic theorist represented their conceptual realization of state policy, starting from the follo4ing basic methodologyA mar%et economy becomes effective or so?called "-areto ? optimal" exclusively under perfect competition. 5n other 4ords, they admit that the situation can only exist if the redistribution of resources (resources) to favor the interests of one of state departments and cannot at the same time not affects the interests of other departments. *oreover, opponents of this theory are pronounced against the general re:uirements set by public preferences according to their vie4 that each individual must have their o4n interests and preferences. +his approach can be characterized as the full realization of the benefits of the exchange relations. !ut as practice sho4s, in many cases achieving of the result prevent various "mar%et failures"A processes that trigger a macroeconomic imbalance, the existence of natural monopolies, or other various externalities. 5t became increasingly clear that even the positive externalities arise from bringing benefits to everyone, because "public goods" >ust in case if they are produced and consumed by someone. 0or this reason, over a long period of time this problem appeared to be a ma>or obstacle to development of "normative" economy, and the possibility of generalization of individual preferences. 5n addition, due to lac% of specific methodological recommendations 4as not possible to assess the real and effective regulation of various social conditions, using accepted scientific methods. 5 decursul unei perioade ndelungate de timp problema dat prea s fie un obstacol ma>or pentru dezvoltarea Qnormativ8 a economiei, #i pentru posibilitatea generalizrii preferinelor individuale. n afar de aceasta, din cauza lipsei recomandrilor metodice concrete, nu a fost posibil o evaluare real #i o reglementare eficient a diferitor stri sociale, utiliznd metode #tiinifice acceptabile. .naliza problemelor metodologice pe baza acestor permise continua mai mult de peste cincizeci de ani. <dat cu apariia teoriei revoluionare a alegerii publice, cadrul metodologic s?a schimbat n mod radical. 9evine tot mai clar c pentru asigurarea unei bunstri sociale maximal posibile #i eliminarea Qe#ecurilor8 instrumentelor regulatorii ale pieei, a aprut necesitatea interveniei statului n economie, fapt care a condus la apariia nevoii determinrii mecanismului luri deciziilor colective. Tcoala "alegerii publice" care a izvort din lucrrile lui !uchanan, +ullo% #i asociai si, care au investigat cauzele deficitelor excesive #i a lipsei de disciplin fiscal n democraiile moderne, acestea fiind temele lor centrale &F). Bste necesar de subliniat dou idei cruciale care au stat la baza unei mari pri din activitatea aceastei #coliA #coala "iluziei fiscale" politici de stabilizare asimetrice. -e scurt, ideea teoriei iluziei fiscale const n faptul c instituiile publice nu neleg restriciile bugetare intertemporale a guvernului. .tunci c/nd li se ofer deficit finanat din contul programului de cheltuieli, ei supraestimeaz beneficiile cheltuielilor curente #i subestimeaz greutatea poverii fiscale ulterioare. -oliticienii oportuni#ti care doresc s fiu reale#i profit de aceast confuzie prin cre#terea nivelului cheltuielilor mai mult dec/t a impozitelor n special n anii electorali. Hna din cele mai relevante lucrri asupra conceptului de "iluziei fiscal" #i rolul su crucial pentru abordarea "alegerii publice" a fost efectuat de !uchanan #i 3agner n 'EFF &U) . n conformitate cu aceast lucrare, %eynesismului este una din cauze care a contribuit la formarea deficitelor excesive #i abandonarea a "responsabilei" reguli ? a echilibrului bugetar. -oliticile de stabilizare %eynesiene devin asimetriceA politicienii sunt ntotdeauna dispu#i spre existena deficitelor att n perioade de recesiune ct #i n perioade de cre#tere economic. 5nstituiile publice fiind "condu#i de iluzie fiscal" nu pedepsesc acest comportament. !uchanan #i 3agner sugereaz c diferite structuri fiscale #i instituiile fiscale pot duce la existena a unui nivel mai mult sau mai puin pronunat al iluziei fiscale. Hn argument legat de abordarea "iluziei fiscale" .nalysis of methodological problems based on these allo4 continued more than fifty years. 3ith the advent of revolutionary theory of public choice, the methodology has changed radically. 5t becomes increasingly clear that to provide a social maximum possible 4elfare and elimination of "failures" of the mar%et regulatory instruments, it 4as necessary of state intervention in the economy, 4hich has led to the need for determining the mechanism of collective decision ma%ing. $chool of "public choice" that sprang from !uchananRs, +ullo% and his associates 4or%, they investigated the causes of excessive deficits and the lac% of fiscal discipline in modern democracies, being their central themes &F). 5t is necessary to emphasize t4o crucial ideas that formed the basis of much of the 4or% of this schoolA V school of "fiscal illusion" V asymmetric stabilization policies. !riefly, the idea of fiscal illusion theory is that the public institutions do not understand the government intertemporal budget constraints. 3hen is given deficit financed from expenditure program, they overestimate the benefits and underestimate the 4eight of current expenditure further tax burden. -oliticians 4ant to be reelected opportunistic advantage of the confusion by increasing spending more than taxes especially in election years. <ne of the most relevant 4or%s on the concept of "fiscal illusion" and its crucial role in addressing of "public choice" 4as made by !uchanan and 3agner in'EFF &U) . .ccording to this paper, Ceynesianism is one of the reasons that contributed to formation of excessive deficits and the abandonment of the "responsibility" rules ? the budget balance. Ceynesian stabilization policies are asymmetricA the politicians are al4ays 4illing to existence of deficits both in recessions and in periods of economic gro4th. -ublic institutions are "driven by fiscal illusion" do not punish this behavior. !uchanan and 3agner suggest that different tax structures and fiscal institutions can lead to the existence of a level more or less pronounced of fiscal illusion. . related argument addressing to the "fiscal illusion" is sho4n in the model proposed by 2ordhaus ('EFK) "political business cycle". +he idea of his 4or% is that politicians during election years follo4ing expansionary policies of budgetary institutions re4ard politicians 4ithout understanding (or learn from the past) that expansionary policies of pre?election years 4ill be "re4arded" by recessions in post?election years &E). .lthough 2ordhaus model is developed in terms of inflation ? unemployment, it can easily be applied to explain the budget 6 este prezentat n cadrul modelului propus de 2ordhaus ('EFK) a "ciclului de afaceri politic". 5deea lucrrilor sale const faptul c n anii electorali politicienii urmeaz politicile expansioniste iar instituiile bugetare i alegtorii recompens politicieni fr a nelege (nici a nva din trecut) faptul c politicile expansioniste pre? electorale vor trebui s fie "rspltite" de recesiunile post? electorale&E). =hiar dac modelul 2ordhaus este dezvoltat n termeni de inflaie ? #oma>, acesta poate u#or fi aplicat pentru explicarea deficitelor bugetare. n noile condiiile, tendinele stabilite au determinat necesitatea cercetrii rolului statului #i a cilor asigurrii anumitor bunuri #i servicii publice. . devenit evident, c fiecare membru al societii nu este n stare de a?#i satisface nevoile proprii sau n cadrul unui grup de persoane particulare. $oluia acestei probleme a gsit reflecie n cunoscuta versiune mainstream a teoriei alegerii publice, n conformite cu care, statul este instrumentul ce particip la nlturarea conflictelor de interese a participanilor relaiilor de pia. +reptat, pe baza postulatului de baz a acestei teorii privind aceea c intervenia statului care este necesar, n limitele conceptului pozitiv a alegerii publice se investigheaz problema privind executarea obligaiilor sale, privind managementul eficient a distribuiei de funcii dintre structurile de putere subordonate. +otodat, este foarte important de subliniat, c cercetrile normative n lumina teoriei alegerii publice sunt legate cu identificare institutelor care permit indivizilor de a primi de la stat ceea ce doresc, fr a fi totodat expu#i administrrii stricte din partea acestuia. .#a a fost reflectat analiza teoriei alegerii publice p/n la apariia strii revoluioniste a stadiului dezvoltrii acesteia. "a momentul actual baza metodologic a acestor cercetri s?a schimbat substanial L acum punctul lor de plecare este ntrebareaA care este schema organizaional L structural a organului de administrare a alegerii publice #i mecanismul de luare a deciziilor colectiveW 1spunsul este urmtorulA aceste decizii sunt luate de ctre conducerea statului ? politicieni #i funcionari publici. +otodat, ideea de baz a teoriei alegerii publice rm/ne neschimbat #i destul de simplA departamentele #i ageniile ndeplinind instruciunile alegtorilor #i indicaiile politicienilor #i a funcionrilor publici sunt mercantile #i continua sa fie ghidate de interese personale, care tind s depun eforturi pentru a asigura folosul maxim pentru sine nsu#i. Bste foarte important de a sublinia c abordarea Qcontractual,8 susintorii creia sunt muli reprezentani ai #colii alegerii publice, la stadiul contemporan al realizrii practice este una din elementele direciilor reglementrii acestei teorii. n structura acesteia se delimiteaz Qetapa constituional8 ? n care indivizii accept n mod unanim regulile >ocului, #i Qfaza post constituional8 ? atunci c/nd este vorba de reguli deficits. 5n the ne4 conditions, established trends made necessary to research the role of state and of 4ays to ensure certain goods and services. 5t became obvious that every member of society is not able to satisfy o4n needs or in a group of individuals. +he solution of this problem has found reflection in the popular mainstream version of public choice theory, according to 4hich, state is the instrument participating in the removal of conflicts of interest of the participants of the mar%et.
,radually, based on the basic postulate of this theory concerning the fact that state intervention is necessary, 4ithin the positive concept of public choice is investigating the matter concerning its o4n performance, concerning the efficient management of the distribution function of po4er structures subordinate. ;o4ever, it is important to note, that normative research in the light of public choice theory are connected to the identification of institutes that allo4 individuals to receive from the state 4hat they 4ant, 4ithout strict administration exposed from his part. +hat 4as reflected in the analysis of public choice theory until the occurrence of revolutionary stage of development. =urrently methodological basis of this research has changed substantially ? no4 their starting point is the :uestionA 4hich organizational ? structural scheme of managing body of public choice and mechanism of collective decision?ma%ingW +he ans4er isA these decisions are ta%en by the leadership of the state ? politicians and civil servants. ;o4ever, the basic idea of public choice theory remains unchanged and disarmingly simpleA the departments and agencies fulfilling the instructions of voters and indications of politicians and civil servants are mercantile and continue to be guided by personal interests, 4hich tend to 4or% to4ards to providing of maximum benefit for itself. 5t is important to emphasize that the "contractual" approach supporters 4ho are many representatives of the public choice school, at contemporary stage of practical realization is one of the elements of regulation of directions of this theory. 5n its structure is delimited by "constitutional stage" ? 4here individuals accept unanimously the concept the game rules, and "the post constitutional" ? 4hen it comes to everyday rules of this administrative process. 5t should be noted at the same time observes that second stage of decision ma%ing usually does not re:uire unanimous approval, but the support of the ma>ority.
3hen the :uestion arises, to 4hich decision should be made in terms of production and financing of public goods at each person appears a desire for increasing o4n re:uirements hoping at receiving appropriate benefits. +here are theoretical developments of the methods for "determination of preferences" purpose of 4hich is to obtain 7 cotidiene ale acestui proces administrativ. Bste necesar de menionat n acela#i timp, c la etap a 55?a pentru luarea deciziilor de regul, nu se cere o aprobare n unanimitate, ci spri>inul ma>oritii. .tunci c/nd apare ntrebarea, asupra creia se ia decizia n ceea ce prive#te producia #i finanarea bunurilor publice, la fiecare individ apare un stimul pentru ma>orarea cerinelor sale sper/nd la primirea beneficiilor corespunztoare. Bxist elaborri teoretice a metodelor Qdeterminrii preferinelor8, scopul crora este de a obine informaii reale despre importana unor sau altor alternative. 9ennis *ueller cu optimism se referea la metodele date, considernd c acestea n cele din urm vor a>uta la perfecionarea mecanismului de luare a deciziilor colective, n scopul atingerii intereselor comune naionale. .stfel, n cartea sa, ".legerea -ublic 5558&'O) autorul analizeaz numeroase recomandri pentru soluionarea problemei "paradoxul alegerilor", la baza creia st ideeaA interesele departamentale (individuale) ce nu trebuie vzute n sens ngust, ci n sens larg a acestei noiuni. .ltfel, folosul primit de ctre instituii, trebuie s fie legat de expresia "preferinele sociale". ns, organele administraiei centrale (ministere, amente), de multe ori acioneaz lund din punctul lor de vedere decizii raionale, bazate pe interesele lor nguste departamentale, ce nu au o legtura cu beneficiile a#teptate din respectarea intereselor naionale #i politica de stat desf#urat. =onsecinele acestei concluzii sunt extrem de importante, mai ales in/nd cont de subiectul #i obiectul de studiu, constnd din urmtoareleA alegerea deciziei individuale conform opiniei a unor savani aproape deloc nu influeneaz rezultatul definitiv, adic asupra strii de echilibru financiar #i stabilitii inflaioniste, i deci n consecin la administraia central a rii ? ,uvernul #i la autoritile sectoarelor (departamentele) lipsesc stimulente pentru a obinerea a maximului de informaii fiabile privind problemele politicii antideficitare. Htiliz/nd aceast logic, care ncura>eaz societatea s rm/n neinformat, unde aparatul funcionar birocrat refuz elaborarea macroindicatorilor echilibrului financiar #i a stabilizrii inflaiei, ce reflect fluxurile financiare primite, distribuite, redistribuite #i cheltuite n economia naional #i n acela#i timp tinde spre maximizarea bugetelor departamentelor sale, deoarece acest lucru, ma>oreaz privilegiile lor reale. .naliznd comportamentul birocraiei departamentale cu a>utorul teoriei alegerii publice, pot fi menionate mai multe motive care pun la ndoial capacitatea statului de a "potrivi" eficient preferinele diferitor departamente #i de a agrega cererile acestora cu obiectivele naionale, economice #i sociale. n acest caz, teoria "alegerii publice" din nou postuleazA departament ? structura administrativ obi#nuit a administraiei centrale care, la fel ca #i toi ceilali, tind s asigure reliable information about the importance of one or another alternative. 9ennis *uller optimistically concerned given methods, considering that they ultimately 4ill help to improve the mechanism of collective decision ma%ing in order to achieve common national interests. +hus, in his boo%, "-ublic =hoice 555"&'O) author analyzes numerous recommendations to solve the problem of "the paradox of elections," 4hich lies at the basis of the ideaA departmental interests (individual) that should not be seen in the narro4 sense, but in the broad sense of that term. <ther4ise, the benefit received by the institution, must be lin%ed to the expression of "social preferences". ;o4ever, central government bodies (ministries, departments) often act in their perspective ta%ing rational decisions based on their narro4 departmental interests, 4hich do not have a connection 4ith the expected benefits from compliance 4ith national interests and held state policy.
+he conse:uences of this finding are extremely important, especially given the sub>ect and the ob>ect of our study, consisting of the follo4ingA individual choice does not influence the decision, 4hich is confirmed by the opinion of some scientists, hardly does not influence the final outcome, ie the steady state of inflation and financial stability, then at central administration of the country ? government and sector authorities (departments) is lac%ing incentives to obtain the best reliable information concerning anti?deficit policy issues. Hsing this logic, 4hich encourages society to remain uninformed, 4here the unit bureaucrat cler% refuses developing of financial balance and stabilize the macro indicators of inflation, reflecting received financial flo4s , distributed, and redistributed spent in the national economy and at the same time tends to maximize its departments budgets because this increases their real privileges.
.nalyzing the behavior of departmental bureaucracy 4ith the help of public choice theory may be mentioned several reasons that :uestions stateRs ability to "fit" effective preferences to aggregate different departments and their demands national economic and social ob>ectives. 5n this case, the theory of "public choice" again postulatesA department ? common administrative structure of central government, >ust li%e all others tend to ensure maximum benefits for themselves. ;ence the explanation of the entire range of issues that prevents performance by ,overnment of the role of the largest supplier in the effective macro supervision and regulation of financial flo4s in the national economy. 0rom the series of ideas and empirical data, grouped by position of public choice theory, 4here is a certain ambivalence ? the essence of 4hich 4as 4ell exposed by 9ennis *ueller, in "-ublic =hoice 555"A "$ome researchers believe the state apparatus as a voracious predator, 4hich tends to advantage as much as possible, using its po4ers on citizens , but others see it as an e:uivalent institutional mar%et 8 beneficii maxime pentru ei nsu#i. 9e aici rezult explicaia ntreagei game de probleme care mpiedic executarea de ctre ,uvern a rolului celui mai important furnizor n supravegherea #i reglementarea eficient a macro fluxurilor financiare n economia naional. 9in seria de idei #i a datelor empirice, grupate dup poziia teoriei alegerii publice, unde exist o anumit ambivalen ? esena creia a fost bine expus de 9ennis *ueller, n Q.legerea public 5558A QHnii cercettori consider aparatul de stat ca pe un prdtor lacom, care tinde pe ct este posibil s profite, utiliz/nd puterile sale asupra cetenilor, alii ns l percep ca un echivalent instituional al pieei, n limitele cruia concurena democratic ofer un nivel de eficien comparabil cu cel care ofer concurena economic8 10 . -e baza >udecii expuse mai sus, printre adepii teoriei alegerii publice sunt utilizate dou modele de statA statul bazat pe cererea cetenilor (de exemplu societatea civil #i interesele naionale) #i de stat?"eviathan (de exemplu societatea intereselor statal ? capitaliste #i preferinelor ngust departamentale). n cadrul modelului bazat pe cererea cetenilor, 9ennis *ueller explic c Q-olitica guvernului reflect preferinele alegtorilor8, iar n cadrul modelului "eviathan Q1olul decisiv >oac preferinele statului sau a persoanelor ce ocup funcii publice8. n dependen de care model este luat drept baz a analizei cauzelor proliferrii statului, aceasta ofer rezultate diferite. 9ennis *ueller menioneaz faptul c sistemul de guvernare bazat pe principiile democraiei directe #i federalism asigur reinerea eficient a cre#terii "eviathan. .cest lucru i permite s presupun c variaiile date a sistemului de stat corespund unui model bazat pe cererea cetenilor. 9e aici #i provin presupunerile noastre privind sistemul de stat care permite formarea subsistemului financiar #i implementarea cu nalt eficien a politicii antiinflaioniste, contribuind la echilibrarea, stabilizarea #i durabilitatea cre#terii economice. Redistribuirea ntre genera ii 2atura intertemporal a deciziilor fiscale creaz legturi ntre genera ii. =u toate acestea, cazul n care fiecrei genera ie i pas suficient de urma ii ei, orizontul finit a fiecrei genera iei este imaterial. n special, abordarea numit ? "echivalen a ricardian" (!arro ('EFG))&'') implic faptul c, av/nd n vedere existen a a unui suficient altruism ntre genera ii, alegerea a modul n care este finan at anumit nivel a cheltuielilor este irelevant. n special, repartizarea sarcinii fiscale peste genera ie nu este influen at de mrimea datoriei, modificrile n datoria public sunt compensate de schimbri n mo teniri private. n modelele unde echivalen a ricardian nu se aplic, datoria public poate genera redistribuirea ntre 4ithin 4hich democratic competition provides a level of efficiency comparable to that is provided by economic competition " 'O . !ased on the above >udgment among public choice theorists are used t4o state modelsA state based on the re:uest of citizens (eg civil society and national interests) and "eviathan state (eg state interests society ? capitalist narro4 departmental preferences). 5nto the model based on re:uest of citizens, 9ennis *ueller explains that "government policy reflects the preferences of voters" and in the "eviathan model Rpreferences play a decisive role of the state, or persons occupying public functions. "9epending on 4hich model is ta%en as a basis to analyze the causes proliferation of state, it gives different results.
9ennis *ueller noted that government system based on the principles of direct democracy and federalism ensures effective retention of "eviathan gro4th. +his allo4s assuming that changes in the state system correspond to a model based on re:uest of citizens. ;ence come our assumptions on the state system that allo4s financial subsystem formation and implementation of highly effective anti?inflationary policy, contributing to balancing stabilization and sustainable gro4th. !ntergenerational redistribution 5ntertemporal nature of fiscal decisions creates lin%s bet4een generations. ;o4ever, if each generation cares enough about its offspring, then finite horizon of each generation is immaterial. 5n particular, the approach %no4n as ? "ricardian e:uivalence" (!arro ('EFG))&'') implies that having regard the existence of a sufficient intergenerational altruism the choice of ho4 it is financed certain level of expenditures is irrelevant (taxes are not distorted in this model). 5n particular, the distribution of the tax burden over generation is not influenced by the size of the debt, changes in debt are offset by changes in private be:uests. 5n the models 4here ricardian e:uivalence does not apply to public debt may cause redistribution bet4een generations, if the generation that is alive today leaves the debt burden to future generations. +here is an essential difference bet4een the current generation and future generations (including children 4ho are currently living) only the current generation vote. $o basically a selfish generation could vote for policy of transfer the tax burden in the future. .n obvious limit in this behavior is given by the existence of intergenerational altruismA parents do care about their children. =u%ierman and *eltzer&'() propose an interesting political model of intergenerational redistribution , the essential idea of this model can be summarized briefly as follo4s. 5t is assumed that in the current generation are 9 genera ii, dac genera ia care este n via astzi las povara datoriei genera iilor viitoare. Bxist o diferen esen ial ntre genera ia actual i genera iile viitoare (inclusiv copii care sunt n prezent vii)A numai genera ia actual voteaz. .stfel, n principiu, o genera ie egoist ar putea vota pentru politici de transfer a sarcinei fiscale n viitor. < limit evident n acest comportament, este dat de existena altruismului ntre genera iiA prin ilor le pas de copii lor. =u%lentan i *eltzer&'() propun un model politic interesant a redistribuirii ntre genera ii, ideea esen ial a acestui model poate fi rezumat pe scurt dup cum urmeaz. $e presupune c n genera ia actual avem indivizii (prin i) "boga i" i "saraci "A primii sunt persoane care au de doresc s lase mo teniri pozitive urma ilor si i pentru care conceptul "echivalen ei ricardian" sus ineA ei sunt indiferen i fa de politica datoriei promovat de stat, deoarece acestea pot compensa orice schimbare n impozite i deficite curente, cu a>ustri n mo teniri lsate. ns indivizii "saraci" sunt acei, care ar dori s lase mo teniri negative. 9eoarece, totu i, acestea din urm nu sunt permise (nu se poate mprumuta de la urma ii si), deci indivizii "saraci" ar dori existen a deficitelor guvernamentaleA ca urmare, ei mprumut indirect de la genera iile viitoare. -rin urmare, un grup de agen i ( "boga i"), este indiferent fa de orice politic a datoriei de stat, cellalt grup al indivizilor ("saraci") favorizeaz existena datoriei publice. -rin urmare, alegerea social este de natur s conduc la cre#terea datoriei de stat. =u%ienaan i *eltier ('EUE) subliniaz c n cazul alegerii sociale atinse prin regula ma>orit ii, chiar si un planificator social binevoitor ar alege existen a datoriei de stat. !nfluen a resurselor limitate asupra in stituiilor publice Bxist o diferen esenial ntre instituiile publice n func ie de A forma, structura i func iile fiecrei fiind diferite, fiecare instituie public decide structura #i mrimea cheltuielilor sale, acestea ns pot duce la nregistrarea deficitului bugetar #i ca rezultat la cre#terea datoriei publice. .stfel, n principiu, un comportament iresponsabil al instituiilor bugetare poate conduce la promovarea politicii de transfer a cheltuielilor. !nfluena conflictelor de distribuie .lesina #i 9razen&'I) propun un model sub denumire de 8rzboi a epuizrii8 a a>ustri fiscale nt/rziate. n care diferite institu ii publice reprezentate de grupuri socio?politice lupt pentru repartizarea sarcinii fiscale. *odelul presupune c un #oc permanent perturb bugetul de stat, astfel nc/t la ratele de impozitare existente, apare deficit #i ncepe s se acumuleze datoria de stat. Hn planificator social ar reaciona imediat la acest #oc #i ar ridica veniturile fiscale, n scopul meninerii individuals (parents) " rich" and "poor", "rich" are people 4ho 4ant to leave positive legacy to their descendants and for them "ricardian e:uivalence" concept claimsA they are indifferent to the policy pursued by the state debt as they can offset any change in taxes and of current deficits, 4ith ad>ustments into legacy. !ut RpoorR are those 4ho 4ould li%e to leave negative be:uests. $ince, ho4ever, people is not permitted (it canRt not be borro4ed from descendants), so RpoorR existence of 4ould 4ant to run government deficitsA as a result, they borro4 indirectly from future generations. +herefore, a group of ("rich"), people is indifferent to any debt policy , the other group of individuals ("poor") favors existence of public debt. +herefore, social choice is li%ely to lead to increased debt. =u%ierman and *eltzer ('EUE) points out that if social choice reached by ma>ority rule, even and a benevolent social planner 4ould choose existence of debt. The impact of redistribution bet"een public institutions +here is an essential difference bet4een public institutions, because of A shape, structure and functions of each are different, each public institution decide the structure size and of expenditures but this may lead to record budget deficit and as a result gro4ing of public debt. $o basically irresponsible behavior budgetary institutions may lead to promoting of policy of transfer of expenditures.
!nfluence of distribution of conflicts .lesina and 9razen&'I) propose an model under the name of "4ar exhaustion" of delayed fiscal ad>ustment . +he various public institutions represented by socio?political groups fighting for the distribution of the tax burden. +he model assumes that a permanent shoc% disrupts budget so at existing tax rates, deficit occurs and begins to accumulate of public debt. . social planner 4ould immediately react to this shoc% and raise tax revenues in order to maintain balanced budget. +he essence of the model is that the distributive struggle among social groups delays the adoption of effective policies to balance the budget. "etRs assume that 4e need to decide on ho4 to share the tax burden of the stabilization process. +he longer the decision is delayed the greater the costs is because of t4o reasonsA V pre?tax distortions persist in stabilization timeD V debt is accumulated so that higher taxes are needed to stabilize the service of it. ;o4ever, rational delays occurs in t4o conditionsA ') the proposed stabilization is "unfair", i.e. some institutions must support a disproportionate share of the tax burden, () institutions are not informed about the costs of eachother for 10 bugetul echilibrat. Bsena modelului const n faptul c lupta distributiv n r/ndul grupurilor sociale nt/rzie adoptarea politicilor eficiente pentru echilibrarea bugetul. $ presupune c este nevoie de decis privind modul de mprire a poverei fiscale a procesului de stabilizare. =u ct mai mult se amn luarea deciziei cu at/t mai mari sunt costurile, din dou motiveA distorsiunile fiscale a pre?stabilizrii persist n timpD datoria se acumuleaz, astfel c taxele mai mari sunt necesare pentru deservirea stabilizrii. =u toate acestea, nt/rzierile raionale apar n dou condiiiA ') stabilizarea propus este "inechitabil", adic unele institu ii trebuie s suporte o parte disproportionata a poverii fiscaleD () institu iile nu sunt informai despre costurile fiecrei din ele pe care ar trebui s suporte pentru stabilizare. .ceste costuri pot fi interpretate n dou moduri care nu se exclud reciprocA unul subliniaz costurile economice ale distorsiunilor a perioadei de pre? stabilizare, cealalt pune accentul pe costurile politice de prevenire a celuilalt grup al institu iilor de la impunerea unui plan fiscal nedorit. =osturi politice includ costuri de lobby, sau costurile aciunii directe a politicii. nvins, este grupul care va avea de pierdut mai mult ca rezultat al stabilizrii fiscale, c/#tigtor este cellalt grup. n general, grupurile ce reprezint interesele institu iilor nu vor accepta imediat rolul nvinsuluiA ei sper c alt grup va ceda primului. +impul optim de concesiune este determinat de echivalentul a costului marginal al a#teptrii cu beneficiul marginal al a#teaptrii. !eneficiul marginal este dat de probabilitatea condiionat alt grup reprezentativ va ceda n momentul urmtor, nmulit la diferena de utilitate ntre a fi c/#tigtorul #i nvins. .dic ntre plata mai mic sau ponderea mai mare al poverii fiscale =u ct e mai inegal distribuirea costurilor de stabilizare, cu att mai t/rziu va fi timpul estimat de stabilizare. *ai mult dec/t at/t, cu ct mai mici sunt costurile de trai ntr?o economie instabil, mai t/rziu va fi stabilizarea. .cest rezultat are dou interpretriA n primul r/nd se sugereaz c mecanisme economice, cum ar fi clauzele indexrii, care reduc costul de instabilitate macroeconomic au tendina de am/narea a>ustri, n al doilea r/nd, mecanismul politic care face mai u#oar #i mai puin costisitoare de a exercita o puterea veto #i "blocheaz "planurile de stabilizare propuse, ntrziind stabilizare. 9razen #i ,rilli&'G) extind acest model prin artarea c o criz economic poate anticipa stabilizrii prin forarea a "soluiei" a rzboiului epuizrii. 5deea e c cre#tere a costurilor de pre?stabilizarea din cauza unei crize o face foarte costisitoare pentru continuarea rzboiul epuizrii, i deci are loc adoptarea solu iilor de ctre institu iile publice. .stfel, ntr?o bearing for stabilization. +hese costs can be interpreted in t4o 4ays that are not mutually exclusiveA one emphasizes the economic costs of distortions of the pre?stabilization period, the other emphasizes the political costs of preventing other group of institutions from imposing an un4anted tax plan. -olitical costs include costs of lobby or direct action policy costs. 9efeated is group 4hich 4ill lose more as a result of fiscal stabilization, the 4inner is the other group. 5n general, groups representing the interests of the institutions 4ill not accept immediately defeated roleA they hope that another 4ill fail first. <ptimal concession time is determined by the marginal cost of e:uivalent to the marginal benefit of 4aiting time. +he marginal benefit is given by conditional probability of another representative group 4hen 4ill give up in the next moment, multiplied by the difference in utility bet4een being the 4inner and loser. *eaning choice bet4een paying lo4er than or greater share of the tax burden. +he more the uneven is distribution of cost stabilization the later 4ill be the expected time of stabilization. *oreover, the lo4er are the costs of living in an unstable economy the later 4ill be stabilization. +his result has t4o interpretationsA first suggested that economic mechanisms such as indexation clauses that reduce the cost of macroeconomic instability have a tendency to postpone ad>ustments, secondly, the political mechanism that ma%es it easier and less expensive to exercise veto po4er "bloc%s "stabilization plans proposed delaying stabilization.
9razen and ,rilli&'G) extend this model by sho4ing that an economic crisis can anticipate stabilization by forcing a "solution" of 4ar of exhaustion. +he point is that increase in costs due to pre?crisis stabilization ma%es it very expensive to continue the 4ar of exhaustion, and therefore ta%es place adopting of solution by public institutions. +hus, in an economic emergency may ultimately be socially beneficialA on the one hand causes an economic crisis 4ith its costs, on the other hand, shortens the delay in the adoption of stabilization re:uired measures.
"o4er cohesion involves many difficulties in reaching an agreement on a fair distribution of the costs of fiscal ad>ustment and hence to even longer delay of stagnated gro4th of debt. #tate debt as a factor of influence +he size of debt stoc% lin%s past policies 4ith future policies. +he current policy may affect "status 4ord" inherited by successors, of fiscal choices that determine the size of the debt. .lesina and +abellini&'K) argue that a government can seize this strategic opportunity and sho4 that this game in office politics bet4een governments at different points in time 11 situaie de urgen economic poate, n cele din urm, s fie social beneficA pe de o parte provoac o criz economic cu costurile sale, pe de alt parte, scurteaz durata de nt/rziere n adoptarea de msuri privind stabilizare necesare. =oeziune mai mic implic mai multe dificulti n realizarea unui acord cu privire la o distribuie echitabil a costurilor de a>ustare fiscal #i, prin urmare, la nt/rziere mai ndelungat n stagnarea cre#terii a datoriei. $atoria de stat ca element de influen *rimea stocului a datoriei leag politicile din trecut cu politicile viitoare. .ctuala politic poate afecta "starea cuv/ntului" mo#tenit de succesorii, prin alegerile sale fiscale, care determin mrimea datoriei. .lesina #i +abellini&'K) susin c un guvern poate profita de aceast posibilitate strategic #i arat c acest >oc politicul ntre guvernele din oficiu, la diferite puncte n timp pot duce la o acumulare a datoriei publice mai mari de ceea ce e prevzut de modelul "netezirii fiscale". =ea mai simpl ilustrare a acestei idei este, dup cum urmeazA se consider un sistem cu dou pri iar cele dou pri au preferine diferite asupra compoziiei cheltuielilor publice. < institu ie public pledeaz pentru cheltuieli privind "aprare", alta favorizeaz cheltuieli privind "protecia social". =ele dou pri sunt ideologice, adic ei reprezint interesele diferitor circumscripii departamentaleA prile doresc implementarea politicii dorite n domeniu dat. 5nteresele specifice a diferitor institu ii publice sunt prezentate de partide politice n parlament i deci dac se presupune c actualmente la putere este partidul ce promoveaz politica a unor cheltuieli "de aprare" ridicate, iar rezultatul alegerii structurii cheltuielilor viitoare este incert din cauza #ocurilor preferinelor a partidului la putere. n cazul dat, este evident c partidul de la putere poate cre#te utilitatea circumscripiei sale prin aprobarea datoriei va aproba cre terea datoriei publice pentru a nclina structura chetuielilor viitoare n favoarea sa, astfel ca n cazul c la guvernare va veni partidul de opozi ie care reprezint interesele atlor institu ii guvernamentale i va fi nevoit s deserveasc datoria mic ornd astfel nivelul posibil al cheltuielilor. .ceast interaciune strategic duce la deficite, chiar dac un planificator social care maximizeaz media ponderat a utilitilor celor dou grupuri ar alege s echilibreze bugetul n fiecare perioad. -rin urmare, polarizare a poziiilor #i fragilitate guvernului explic acumularea a datoriei. Hlterior +abellini #i .lesina n 'EE(&'K) au dezvoltat o relaie mai precis ntre deficite #i polarizare a preferinelor individuale, mai mult dec/t doar a preferinelor partidului. Bi consider un model n care deciziile sunt luate prin regula ma>oritatii, #i orice propunere poate fi fcut #i aleas prin comparaie a can lead to an accumulation of public debt exceeding 4hat is provided by the model of "tax smoothing". +he simplest illustration of this idea is as follo4sA it is considered a system 4ith t4o parties and the t4o parties have different preferences on the composition of public spending. . public institution advocates for spending on "defense" another favors expenditure on "social protection". +he t4o parties are ideological, that means that they represent the interests of different constituencies departmentA the parties 4ish implementation of desired policy in the given domain. $pecific interests of various public institutions are presented by political parties in parliament and thus supposing that the party currently in po4er is promoting the policy of high spending on "defense", and the election outcome is uncertain structure of future spending because of shoc%s of the party preferences holding the po4er. 5n this case, it is obvious that the party in po4er can increase the usefulness of its constituency by approving debt so 4ill approve also the increase of government debt of future spending structure to tilt in his favor so if that in po4er 4ill come opposition party representing the interests of government institutions and 4ill have to serve debt shrin%ing possible level of expenditures. +his strategic interaction leads to deficits, even if a social planner maximizes the 4eighted average of the utilities of the t4o groups 4ould choose to balance the budget in each period. +herefore, the polarization of positions and fragility of government explains the accumulation of debt. +abellini and .lesina later in 'EE'&'K) developed a more precise relationship bet4een deficits and polarization of individual preferences more than >ust of the party preferences. +hey consider a model 4here decisions are made by ma>ority rule, and any proposal can be made and compared by selecting pairs of variants. 5n these circumstances, the "theory of voting environment" implies that the policy adopted is most preferred by all institutions medium. 3ith uncertainty about the future ma>ority preferences on the structure of expenditure currently average institutions prefers to issue debt to future composition of expenditure tilting it in their favor. +abellini and .lesina sho4ed that the amount of debt issued is increasing in dispersion of votersR preferencesA the more focused to4ards extreme are electorate preferences, the higher the debt is. $o the strategic role of debt is to create "conditions" for public institutions as both future and current. .ghion and !olton&'N), *ilesi?0erretti and $polaore&'F)
argue that existing institutions can use debt strategically to influence the outcome of future expenditure composition.
.lesina and +abellini&'K) argue that the polarization of public institutions and change of their preferences should be associated 4ith higher debt. 0or example, .lesina and +abellini, interpret deficits during deficits under 1eaganRs 12 perechilor de variante. n aceste condiii, "teoria votului mediu" implic faptul c politica adoptat este cea mai preferat de ctre toate instiu iile n mediu. =u incertitudine privind preferinele ma>oriti viitoare asupra structurii cheltuielilor, instiu iile n mediu curent prefer s emit datoria pentru nclinarea compoziiei viitoare a cheltuielilor n favoarea sa. +abellini #i .lesina au artat c suma datoriei emise este n cre#tere n dispersie cu preferinele alegtorilorA cu ct este mai concentrat spre extrem preferinele electoratului, cu at/t mai mare este nivelul datoriei. 9eci rolul strategic al datoriilor consta n crearea de "condiii" pentru institu iile publice att viitoare ct i curente. .ghion #i !olton&'N), *ilesi?0erretti #i $polaore&'F) susin c institu iile existente pot folosi strategic datoria public pentru a influena rezultatul compozi iei cheltuielilor viitoare. .lesina #i +abellini&'K) susin c polarizarea institu iilor publice #i schimbrile a preferin elor acestora ar trebui s fie asociate cu datorii mai mari. 9e exemplu, .lesina #i +abellini, interpreteaz deficitele de pe timpul lui 1eagan ca o manevr cu scopul limitrii cheltuielilor cu privind bunstarea social a viitoarei administraii. #itua ia din Republica %oldo&a nainte de a purcede la formularea concluziei vom prezenta graficul ce reflect nivelul i evolu ia soldului bugetar n 1epublica *oldova&'U) (graficul ') ,raficul dat arat c n principiu se atest proficit doar n anul (OOK ulterior s?a nregistrat deficit nivelul cruia a fost destul de modest pe parcursul perioadei (OOK?(OOF, ns odat cu producerea crizei economice mondiale nivelul deficitului bugetar n 1. *oldova brusc a crescut atingnd valoarea sa maxim n anul (OOE, de IUIN,N milioane lei. Hlterior, pn n prezent, cu mare regret se denot existen a unui nivel impuntor a deficitului ceea ce se datoreaz n mare msur att administration as a maneuver to limit spending on social 4elfare of future administrations. The situation in Republic of %oldo&a !efore proceeding to formulation of conclusion 4ill present the chart that reflects the level and evolution of the budget balance in *oldova&'U) (=hart ') +he given graph sho4s that basically is attested only during (OOK a surplus subse:uently 4as recorded a shortage level of 4hich 4as :uite modest over the period (OOK?(OOF, but 4ith the production of the global economic crisis budget deficit in 1. *oldova increased sharply and reaches its maximum value in (OOE of IUIN,N mil.lei. $ubse:uently, until no4 4ith great regret it sho4s there is a tremendous level deficit that is largely due to both to inefficiency also to existence of a time gap improvement measures of current situation also due to impediments as listed above as more are actual for *oldova because our country does not have rich natural resources that 4ould allo4 to cover completely the desired level of budgetary expenditure. $o no4 to the existence of a restricted budget is observed even at the stage of budget planning the programming of budget deficit although it should be later paid bac%, but this does not concern the current government. !n conclusion, the 4hole political?institutional approaches mentioned in given article g suggests follo4ingA accumulation of government debt means further increase of tax burden debt redemption, if it does not happen but the state again recourse to borro4ing to finance current expenditures then the percentage of loans ta%en increases and it is repeated from year to year by transferring the burden of debtD cannot be given exclusive preference (even temporarily) to any of the elements of stateRs national po4er structure , involved in solving of a range of 13 ineficien ei i existen ei unui decala> n timp a msurilor de ameliorare a situa iei create ct i barierilor prezentate mai sus cu att mai actuale pentru *oldova deoarece ara noastr nu dispune de resurse naturale bogate care ar permite a acoperirea n totalmente a nivelului dorit de cheltuieli bugetare. . a dar n condi iile existen ei unui buget restrns se observ chiar i la etapa planificrii bugetare programarea a deficitului bugetar de i acesta ulterior va trebui s fie rsplatit, ns aceasta pare nu ngri>oreaz guvernarea actual. 'n ncheiere, totalitatea abordrilor de ordin politico? instituional menionate n articolul dat sugereaz urmtoarele concluziiA acumularea datoriei guvernamentale nseamn cre#terea ulterioar a poverii fiscale pentru rscumprarea datoriei, dac acesta nu are loc, ci statul din nou recurge la mprumuturi pentru finanarea cheltuielilor curente atunci procentul la mprumuturile luate cre#te #i a#a se repet din an n an trasfernd astfel povara datorieiD nu se poate da preferin exclusiv (chiar #i temporar) nici unuia din elementele structurii puterii naionale de stat, care este implicat n rezolvarea uneia din #irul de probleme interdepartamentale referitor la echilibrarea financiar a economieiD este nevoie de luat n considerare c economia rii este c/mpul de coliziune a diferitor puteri departamentale, de multe ori reflect/nd nu doar interese opuse, dar #i neconcordana lor naionalD Bste evident c situaia creat n economiile actuale att n rile dezvoltate ct #i n curs de dezvoltare este destul de dificil #i sunt necesare schimbri de ordin economic #i politico?instituional n vederea restabilirii bunei guvernri #i regulrii stricte a nivelului deficitului i a datoriei de stat. -remisele eviden iate n articolul dat pot servi drept baz pentru dep irea barierelor men ionate i ulterioara echilibrarea a bugetului de stat. .ceasta fiind o tem deosebit de important cu caracter multifactorial i insuficient generalizat av/nd necesitate de fi prezentat ntr?un alt articol.
interdepartmental issues relating to balance of state6s budgetD is needed to be considered the countryRs economy is the field of collision of different departmental structures, often reflecting not only opposing interests but also their national inconsistencyD 5t is obvious that the current economic situation both in developed as 4ell as in developing countries is difficult and are re:uired economic and politico?institutional changes in order to restore good governance and strict regulation of deficitRs and debtRs level. +he premises outlined in given article can serve as basis for overcoming barriers mentioned and for further balance of the state budget. +his is a particularly important issue 4ith multifactorial nature and that is insufficient generalized is necessary to be presented in another article. References '. !arro, 1obert. 'EFE. 7<n the 9etermination of the -ublic 9ebt.8 Mournal of -olitical Bconomy, UF(N)A EGO?EF'D (. "ucas, 1obert B., Mr., and 2ancy ". $to%ey, 'EUI. X<ptimal 0iscal and *onetary -olicy in an Bconomy 4ithout =apital." Mournal of *onetary Bconomics. '(A KKEID 14 3. $hepsle, C. 'EFEa. "5nstitutional .rrangements and B:uilibrium in *ultidimensional voting models". Ymerican Mournal of -olitical $cience. (IA(N?KED 4. .rro4, Cenneth M. and ,Zrard 9ebreu ('EKG). "Bxistence of an B:uilibrium for a =ompetitive Bconomy". Bconometrica (( (I)A (NKLEO. M$+<1 'EOFIKID K. Jon ;agen, M[rgen. 'EE(a. "!udgeting -rocedures and 0iscal -erformance in the Buropean =ommunities. Bconomic -apers END N. Cenneth M. .rro4 , 'EK', (nd ed., 'ENI. $ocial =hoice and 5ndividual Jalues, \ale Hniversity -ress. 5$!2 O?IOO?O'ING?FD 7. Mames *. !uchanan and ,ordon +ulloc% coauthored +he =alculus of =onsentA "ogical 0oundations of =onstitutional 9emocracy ('EN() .nn .rbor 'EN(, Hniversity of *ichigan -ressD U. !uchanan, M. and 1. 3agner. 'EFF. 9emocracy in 9eficits, liberty fund, 5ndianapolis, ?'EI pD E. 2ordhaus, 3. 'EFK. 7+he -olitical !usiness =ycle8. 1evie4 of Bconomic $tudies, G(A'NE?EOD 'O. 9ennis =. *ueller -ublic =hoice 555 (OOI =ambridge Hniversity -ress . 5$!2AEFUOK('UEGFKID ''. !arro, 1. M. ('EFG) 7.re ,overnment !onds 2et 3ealth8 Mournal of -olitical Bconomy U', 'OEK?'''FD 12. =u%ierman, .. and .. *eltzer. 'EUE. 7. -olitical theory of government debt and deficits in a neo?1icardian frame4or%". .merican Bconomic 1evie4, FEA F'I?IID 13. .lesina, . and .. 9razen. 'EE'. 73hy are $tabilizations 9elayedW8, .merican Bconomic 1evie4, U(A ''FO?UU (9ecember)D 'G. 9razen, .. and J. ,rilli. 'EEI. +he !enefit of =rises for Bconomic 1eform American Economic Review. Mune, KUU? NOUD 'K. .lesina, . and ,. +abellini. 'EE(. 7-ositive and 2ormative +heories of -ublic 9ebt and 5nflation in an ;istorical -erspective8, Buropean Bconomic 1evie4, INAIIF?GG (.pril)D 'N. -hilippe .ghion and -atric% !olton =ontracts as a !arrier to Bntry +he .merican Bconomic 1evie4, Jol. FF, 2o. I (Mun., 'EUF), pp. IUU?GO'D 'F. ,ian *aria *ilesi?0erretti, and Bnrico $polaore. 'ournal of (ublic Bconomics ))*+,-+.+!+/0 (1eptember +22/) ;o4 cynical can an incumbent beW $trategic policy in a model of government spendingD 'U. minfin.md 15