301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO.

12809620 JAN 1999]

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime
syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and
petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the
Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of
investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police
operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding and recommended the indictment
for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal,
and herein petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman
filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an
accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal accused are government officals with
Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they
did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the
phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which
provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun
as of the approval hereof.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners right to due process and the
equal protection clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the
Sandiganbayan to continue to acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination
whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.

RULING:
Petitioner and intervenors posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
protection of the law is too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument
were presented to warrant such a declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed
reasonable and the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which
are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to all cases involving certain public officials
and under the transitory provision in Section 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors argument, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan
but also in any court.

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect
of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in
character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975,
as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has
been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the
office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation must be alleged in the information which
is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the
amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the
said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated
the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge
set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is
alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.



ORTEGA vs PEOPLEGR No.
151085August 20, 2008
FACTS:
The petitioner, Joemar Ortega, who was then 14 years old, was charged with the crime of rapefor allegedly raping AAA, who
was about 8 years old. That the rape happened in 3 occasions, the firstone happened sometime August 1999, when AAA s
mother left her in the care of the petitioner smother, Luzviminda. That the petitioner woke up AAA and led her in
the sala and raped her. The secondoccasion happened the next day when the petitioner led AAA into the bathroom
and raped her there. Inall the instances, petitioner warned AAA to not tell her parents or he will spank her.
The third and lasttime happened in the house of AAA, where her brother caught her and the petitioner naked waist
downand having intercourse. The brother then told the incident to his mother. MMM testified that when sheasked AAA what
happened, AAA told her that petitioner inserted his fingers and penis into her vagina.And when MMM examined the private
part of her daughter, she noticed that it was reddish and whitefluid was coming out of it. MMM called Luzviminda
and confronted her about what happened.Luzviminda then demanded that AAA should be brought to a doctor for
examination. The Rural HealthOfficer, however, did not find any indication that AAA was molested. Subsequently, the two
familiesreached an amicable settlement that requires the petitioner to depart from their house and stay with
acertain priest. However, a year later, the family of AAA charged the petitioner with 3 counts of rape, inwhich the petitioner
plead not guilty.The RTC ruled that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the crime of rape
and issentenced to reclusion temporal. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. During the pendency of the case in the SC,
RA 9344 Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act was enacted that establishes acomprehensive system to manage children in
conflict with the law. At the case at bar, because thepetitioner was a minor under 15 years of age at the commission of the
crime, he can be relieved fromcriminal liability.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner can avail exempting circumstance provided by the newly enactedlaw on minors in conflict
with law.
HELD
: Yes
RATIO
: The petitioner can avail the exempting circumstance that will relieve him from criminal liabilitybecause the law enacted was
favorable to the accused, and is therefore retroactive in application.Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act provides that a child under
15 years of age in the commission of theoffense shall be exempt from criminal liability, but is subject to an intervention program.
Exemptionfrom criminal liability, however, does not include exemption from civil liability. Section 64 of the newlyenacted law
also provides that cases of children under 15 years of age at the commission of the crime,shall immediately be dismissed
and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare anddevelopment officer.
The Court therefore held that the case against Joemar Ortega is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner
ishereby referred to the local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriateintervention program