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SOLUTION NO^- ^r.-v. . . . . . .

^ ,
IR-M
THE COMMAND AND GENERAL
STAFF SCHOOL
Map Probltm No. . y. y. . L/ S^rie*..^.
IN CASE OF REFLY TO BE RETURNED TO RECEPTACLE BY 9:00 A.M.
1071C. * O. S. Sri ., Fnrt l^TnOflhJ I&-3JJSM
J/.K-IonA^Dtf.'. tOR: Tho Di r ect or , 2d "iear Cl usa, Comund and General
St aff chool , Fort Locvo.i*ort;i, Kunsuo,
;
' '
S1.IBJECT: Cor.iparis-)n of Di-itiuh r^ad H'euc! rr.e
rt
hanized
f or ces , with parl i oMl er conoi dor at i on of or -
gani zat i on, armanient, vchi cl t t i , tnd doct r i nes
toctical
ACCOMPAl.fIl<G.
1. A bi bl i ogr aphy for t hi s otudy.
I . GAIOSRAL JOIftJIDERATIONS. ' i
Pr a c t i c a l cnvv act ivn cxperl ' i ent ut i on i n riocln-nizetion
has been conductod i n Oroat Kr i t ui n si nce about 1922. Subsi di es
ar e bei.Ds paid aanui ' act ur er s in or der to i i rtonai fy development i n
tnnka imd aiiaorod cur s , and ut the mennuvers hel d sinno \9ilf tho
omplojtiont of the nmored force haa recei ved tho gr eat or Oiiphesis.
(1) Franco, on t he ot her hund, ).O3 done l i t t l e r e l a t i v e l y in
t echni cal or t a c t i c a l experi mentati on, but i o st udyi ng t ho mat t er
car ef ul l y unu i ndi cat es appr eci at i on of i t o importance and future
dovolopnont. In noi t hor country nas i t i ssed t he experi mental
3 t 0 0 . (2)
A highly mobile stri ki ng force of yreat offoncivo
povrer i s tho conception underlying the employiront of t hi s nochwiized
force in both Great Bri tai n and Franco. (3) In England, the
technical dovolopmont of t hi s forco has been placed in tho hands
of tho Deputy Master General of Ordnance; in France upon tho
' ' ' V , '
( ) ; ( , )
(2) ( 1 , 2207)
(3) ( 9, 0)
Inspector Oonoral of Artillery (creating tho oni cn of Inspector
General of Iho Motorization Servi ce). (4)
Tho befit thought in both Great Britain and France i s
that fiold ami es must tarn toward fast moving arxored machines
aa the spood end strength gained thereby wi l l increase tho r e-
sources of the comnonder frcn both a strategi c and t cat i cal point
of view. (5) As yot, experiments in mechanization have not pro-
gressed suffi ci entl y to peniit stablo conclusions. (6) The
British are coninittod to i t in a very large de(_.'ee with parti cul ar
attenti on, at present, to tho subject of tanks, the trend being
toward development of an effioient two man tank and to a lesser
degree a super tank, 'fliey are experimentinG more than any other
country, bending overy effort to solve problems of rapid movement
of troops and supplies by Mechanical neons. Uppermost in both
the mi l i tary and pol i t i cal mind io the feeling that a country
cannot, in future, withstand the casualties or oxpense that ob-
tained in tho World War nnd *hat tho raactino i s the solution for
economizing in both man power and money. (7)
As t o tho maneuverability of mechanized uni t s, Great
Britain has achievod material success when conditions wore pro-
pitious but with the present typos of vehicles, they have fuiled
on certain occasions, especially in the case of motorized infantry
uni t s, when conditions were unfavorable* (8)
(4) (0,3) (7,2)
(5) (7, 1-Incl 3) (8,2-5
(6) ( 9, 2'
(7) (1,2207) (7,64)
(8) (12,595-605)
- 2 -
> Effective employment aeeno predicated on the '
character of the terrain. While conditions in Wostom Europe '
would appear moro or leas ideal, yot lock of roado, unbridged
or light bridged rivers, rugged mountains, forest areas, jungle,
and swamp can s t i l l di3couDt their effective use. (9)
!i
In France, the excessive cost of gascllno and the
relatively a-aall automotive production i s aloo a problem not
only in prosout experimentation but also in -itointenance of war
tino needs. (10)
Obviously an exact knowledge of many phases of the
development of mechanization in England and France are not at
prosont obtainable. This i s particularly ruo in the case :>f
Great Britain, who is guarding closely nony of the results of
their much moro advanced experimentations. (11J However, a "far
Departjnont atatoncnt in Parlianont during the discuenion of the
19J0 appropriations ' that the nechanlzed force was fctill very
much in the experimental stuge" would neon to indicate that the
British are far from a solution as yot. (12)
Th* present idea in Great Britain i s to ovontually
eliminate the horse in al l except nountod coiabut units* (13)
Vfhilo they recognizo the necessity of maintaining an adequuto
cavalry ana, pack artillery, and a lliaitod proportion of horso
arti l l ery, thoy are tending toward the elimination of animal
transport e:rd supplies wherever possible. They hold that
(9) (7,5) (9,2)
(10) (7,4)
(11) (7,3)
(12) (4,6)
(13) 0, 8)
(14) (7, 27-31)
mechanization i s moro economical. The French, while eonorally
in uccord, have not aa yot docidod <"> DO radi oal a transforma-
t i on. Their motorization servi co, in which oi l studi es rel nti vo
to t hi s development are central i zed, has been given the mission
of studying means suscepti bl e of developing subst i t ut i on o;.'
automotive traoti on for animals in s t af f s , servi coa, and troop
uni t s . (15)
In ]ngland, two types of armored forces are con-
templated - light orciored brigades or di vi si ons and medium
armored brigades. While cal l ed orrrorei forcea, these uni t s are
in r eal i t y tank brigadeB. The l i ght brigade i s to conoiot of
l i ght tan
1
.*, bat t al i ons with close support tanko and may have an
armored car regiment i n place of one of i t s tank bat t al i ons. (16)
Those uu<ts have not actual l y boon or^aaized au any defi ni te
organization ie awaiting tho re>sulte of experinentation both i n
vehi cl es and t act i cal maneuvers. So far l i t t l o piogiesa has
been nade in JYance Jn developing and orcaaiaing a nechenized
Vorco. A force consisting of a raginent each of liglit and hou7y
tanks, 3 citt6lioD3 of ar t i l l or y (75 rta and 15b mm) and aviation
(attack end observation} has been considered* In 1922, 14
squadrons of amored cars, each carrying on^ 37m,i and om Hotch-
ki ss machine gun, were organized for uao with cavalry* This
bo considered in more dot ai l l ater* (17)
I t hes boon dononati*ated to the sati sfacti on of both
countri es that a well trai ned ui r force and signal corps are
pvino necessi ti es in tho successful oporation3 of an aitioret
1
force. (16)
(li>) (S/.109)
(16) (6,^)
(IV) (7.68-C3)
<1B) (7) (10,112)
- I -
r ApiTt I'VOM experimental uni tu, noc.i..nizution in tlio
Bvitiah rdgulor aniy lo boing confined to motor izatior* of truna-
portaUon, asslgnraont of tructors in proforonco to homos in the
ar t i l l er y, and the predual addition of aunorfld fitr* and tanks
, , , ' , ' ' , l
both at hoiwa and in foreign par t s. (19) In the French regular
k
< arciy no material chon^oo have boon made other than increasing
iho nuni>or of oinorod car units in tho cuvali'y recimont, (20)
11. 0R0/J1IZATI0N.
Based on i t s success with toi;ks and other automotive
vohicleo during the World War, the bri^ioh oe^on concentrating
on tho development of nechanical V.tuisport agencies ohortl>
after du'uobilisutio'n in 1929, Thia duvelopr^ent liao been c&rriod
on ty tho Royal Tank Corps, tho t i rt i l l ory, ard the i-io^al Aiuy
Service Corps, al l act i vi t i es beint coordinated by tho Got?oral
Staff. Uxperj-nen+s htve been cori'ied on involvint; the coopera-
tion of tnnkn and armored cars in combat exorcises and in tho
uovemont of ar t i l l or y and infantry by motor transport but TJOII
ordered development of a corapleto laechanized unit did not st ar t
unt i l 1927. (21) Tho force br ou^t "logcth?r ichttt yeor wao as
follows: (22)
Heed<iuartora and Signal troops (100), including one-
comprjiy trannportoJ in li(jht tanks and notorcjvlos.
(19) (1,2207)
(20) (2,8307)
(21) (1,2307)
(22) (11,3)
Royal Tank Corpo, consisting of tv;o buttrlionn (4i;
tanko), twenty aruorod euro, wid olfcht tunkottea. Ouo of f.oao
battol* >ns was organized into throe coniiianica of throo cojtioiu*
each, each eootion having five Vickori, Murk I I tunks. Tne
other battulion consisted of two coaponlos of aruoixjd cero, ono
company hnvinG two sootiona and ono with three aootiono (four
rora por section, a l l Hollo Ro/ce) Thoro vws alno u Radio ond
Tolophono Soot ion with four tank8, one tank for each company
cocnander, and two Bix whool 1;V tou truci:a for uoadquartera
tranoport. x company tankottea (one or two aon tunka of 2 or
'6 tons) consisting of four aeotiona of 2 tonka each (Moi-ric-
Martol and Cardon-Lloyd),
Art i l l ory.
:y
/ ;
; i
Tureo bsttori oa of 10 poundera 1 battery 4,Jj", one
battory lb poundero, ono buttery 3" rmti rcraft* /J.1 battori ea
vtere motorized, self-propolled nounta
f
drcvjot> tractor8, Kof:d3se
truck tractors (six wiieel track t r act om) , aix v.'lieel Karrit.n
trucko porteo, and three ton four ffhoel rear drive trucka, al l
v
Doing used* (S3)
Signal,
your oectiotui as follows:
Ono equipped with two 100 mile and four 30 ni l o
radio set s, dio with four '6 ni l o set s, one with four CO mile
sots (one sot In a tank) with a 12 ni l o range on tl.e road, and
ono aootion with 2 throo-nilo jeCa for arti l l ery* All sections
wore carried on trucko, V
(IV6) (7,56) ' \ ',
;
.
' . - . ' - ' - G - ' : ' " " ' ' ' ' . ' " '
Ono pi'ovioional machine ^un battal i on of throo
coinpanios, with 36 Vickoru and 10 Lewis machino guna, 14 hulf
traol: l i ght coru, 4 six whool light l or r i es, 33 one un<l ono
holf ton holf truck curs, 4 water carts with kitchen t r a i l e r s ,
anu 4 iwtorcyolos.
Engineers.
1
Ono bridge company carried in nine 0 wheel l or r i es.
(24)
I t it* not known how successful tho ubove munouver3
wore
f
but as i+ r esul t , tho following l'undanontul pointo in futuro
oronization of corpo and div.iuions were l ai d tiovirn:
?aat and poweri'ul conks to be the backbone of the
attec' :,
;
':;, ' .-. , ' " ,''_' ,'' ,:,'.',.
' " ":.-' TliO horae to bo cupor3ode6 by !.uiCllin9S^
Only tx minir.iuM of lioavy ar t i l l er y to cooporatoi
!!ecf.^nizod ar t i l l or y to supply tlio main ar t i l l er y
aupport, wiiich v;ill bo i i ri i ted,
Roadloos t ract i on to be oncoui'aced as tho r.ouno of
aupport
t
" "
Infantry to bo bi'0U(jit up in carri ers to rotain
captured /pjound, mopping up, dofenso, or for tlie osouult of
obstacles to tank novoinont* (25)
Arnsorod cars have now been trunaforrod to tlie
cavalry arm and organized into roginents consisting of a
hoajquartera wine und throo e^undrons of two oeotiono oach.
(24)(V,2) (7,02)
(25)(7
t
81
Til nodlun arr.iorod bri^'i.do was organized in 1930
ana consisted of three tank b'attullons find tx close support
tank battory. Tlio battelljrio wore organized into two co:::
ponlos each having sixtoon medium tunku and ono company of
t hi r t y two l i cht tanks (tho ' l ut t or company bolus represented
by Garden L^.oyd noohino sun carriora ponding tho dovolopinent
of u l i fM tcuil:) This or^unization nas modil'iod the following
joar (1031) und ut pvoaent tho lrif?ide comprises ono l i ght
tank bottulion and throe nixod battal i ons each nudo up of
three compunles and u section of clooe support tanko. Each
company hao both uodlvcn and l i cht tankfl, ono section of five
ciodiun and ono of DO von ii[?it. (26)
To date there has boon no definite organization in
France of a ot ri ot l y nechanizod force olthoutfi tho formation of
ouch a unit ia contanpletod in North Africa as a part of a
fully motorized forco. (27) For the cavalry, the ultimate
ob^ j ti vo i s tiio ncchtsTiizution of th present raountod division
(SO) baso o ^ho followinc conernl orcanizutloru
Koconjiaissonce vehicles: tin'ee or four squadrons. >
Reei^ont of nodiiD; tanks (3.1> to 2& tons, conaisting
of throe battal i ons of twenty tanks each*
[20) (J',2207)
(27) (2,41^3)
(28) (2,4109)
- 0 -
OJIO battalion oi' four uqutidrono ol' porto' s drujjoono
and one machine &xn conpany, al l trarmpovted in traclc-luyinu
vehicles,
A mixod ar t i l l er y group consisting oi' ono battory
of 75
f
o ani one buttery of 105
f
o on track-laying carriages.
An ai r Ofiuodron, . ,
Hovievor, tho present organization of ti.e Fronch
cavalry division vrtiich ia her nearest approach t o a nochanivsou
unit i s as follovjs: ,
Two horae brigades
Ono portoe dragoon regiraont (rifloaon tranoportod in
Kegreaso-Citroon cross country cars).
Ono regii.ont field ar t i l l or y 75'e (florae).
One group lOSm (Poitee) ..,>'
Ono recinient ancored cars (S9),
One Oboorvation T^uadron. (30)
7
France liajs bo&n preatly increaolnc tho criount of
t.;echanizbtion and motorization vrithin the cavalry division and
places great reliance on the nochonical groups (Portoe Dragoons)
to increase tho firo porrer of tho horse olunenta; Recent
nanouvers indicate tiiat due to different ratoa of inarch, different
cross country abi l i t y, and various other reasons, tho combination
of the two within the cavalry division i s not satisfactory. Con-
sidering t hi s and also the fine road net ami the terrai n in conoral
in France's probablo t .oator of operations, uhe vjill probably in
time completely mechanize soiao of hor cavalry divisions? Howevor,
her cavalry in the near future will bo a combination of irvochonizetion
and horso, and al l infomation indicates that i t vrill have a rolo
similbr to that of horso coTalry of tbo pest.
(29) (36) (
(SO/ ( 4, 6) [L
t
M) (2,4107)
(31) - (b,bO) ( 4, 8)
' , . ' ' .. . - 9 - - . ' ,
i n . vaiiCLas ijrj AjrAMKirr.
As previouoly ututod, experUionution to develop
vohiclOB to Bult the variously triod t act i cul mid terrai n
conditions has procoodod npeoo l'or a number of yeurs, par-
t i cul ar l y in Groat Bri tai n. Tho details of those oxporioonts
are somewhat vogue and do not permit conclusions pertinent to
t hi s research, Thereforo consideration ie plven only to tho
typse es now employed* (32} .- .
The British taodium tank vfoighs 10 tons; i t has a
100 horsepower Ariatron-iiddeley eiicooled on^ino uid
storapod st eel tracks with o l i r e of JJOOO railea or more. Tho
suspension i s much inpvovod. Three t ur r et s are fi t t ed. Tho
ralddlo turret contains a 3> pounder and a ,303 coaxially
ini. Tho two ai al l or t ur r et B have .LO or .303 Machine #
Tne buaponsion is much iraproved and arrancononts for contiol
by the corauandor havo loen oinpllfied. ITie tenk provides u very
otoady gin plotforn. Many safety devices huvo been added in-
cluding a Pyreno oxtincuioher syotua wiiicj eithor the tank
coctnander or drivor can loose at wi l l . . direction indicator
now boing tested i s giving good r esul t s. Tiio gnsoline oyolai
i s aituated on t'.;o top of tho nud guards. An el ectri c fun
provonts the ingress of poison (;us.
(32) 7,1-13, Y and C Tn-j)
-10-
Tho lirfit tank in nouutod on a Curdon-Lloyd nhaoiu with G
very short truck buoo A n^i-uu of cuaponoJon has boen produced nhich
onublos tho unor to keep Lis eye on the toloocope ovor nwst
terrai n conditions und nakos the vehicle more couu'ortablo to
ride in* A Meadows engine develops 00 horsepower und \hn tunic
thus possesses oncugh speed to scout in front of tlio nodiUii tuni: -
i t hos covorod ninety ul l os in three hoars. Tho track l i fe is
goad, Tho unnaaent io ei ther a ,'60'i naciiino gun or u ."/' nachiiie
gun* Tnore is e controversy as to rtietunr t hi s tank oaould bn a
two or three nun vehicle, but at present Uio tvro nan orow i s favorod,
.Trio lifciit o-nioi-ed cor hu5 oup..-reeded cho iieavior
type sia<^ lif>it and modiuin tanko 'IQVO toon <IovolopeA *rhicli cui
cover grout distances at hi ^i s>eed* Tl;is llfjit car curries
a crow of three men-driver, eunn"**, ane a cur ooarawider. It i s a
six whooled uiuorod car l u i l t un u Croosloy clicsie, which i s c
noti fi ed cornr:orcial chasia, unl has u oruisiug radius cf tiout
200 ni l eo. V
Tiio nachlno gun car r i er now in jflo io the Marl: VJ
Cordon-Lloyd, Tho crew of four mon i3 convoyod on a t r a i l e r ar.d
i s unprotected. Tlio uachJne j^in can bo fired froi tho carri er
or can be l i ft ed out end fiixjd on the ground, Tiio vi i i cl o itoelf
i s suffi ci entl y u^iored to reoiot ordinery nachlne ^un fi re except
from the ai r .
- 11-
The tx'cmd of proaont design io towurds & ton/. tuMt
i$ very fast ur*l powerful, capable 01* travorairig Ions distances
without rofuolinc and endowed filth tho aWiina which has been
lacking heretofore in tank construction. Tor reasons of finance
.iid to faci l i t at e production upon tho outbreak of war, i t ie
considered edviseblo to otondtrdizo each machine *^ien adopted,
(3Z) ,
v
/inothor t wk vriiich ia bein/j experinentod with,
but not yet adoptod, i c tho hri ti eh C'-rdop-lJL'jyd li^ht ai.iphi-
fciou.i tuik. In recent teato i t hao crossed wide stretchea of
deep water, climb u continuous 3lope of 30 decrees at o nl l ca
per hour, end short elone o' 4b decrees, and lies a ro&d 3peod
of 40 nph* It weigl:s about 2$ tons, carri es a crew of two men,
haa H turning ci r cl e o* 23 feet, is arood witti one i.achlne twn,
tnd huB or.tjor protection aai
n
t; r i f l e firo and eitior pierclne
ttriunition ot a ronfio of 150 yardo. (34) V
Rolttive to nair.tenunce of a Ljechuiiized force in the
field \.!.e Bri ti sh plan at preoont ia oa follows; (3&)
Minor repai rs to te dealt with by ur.it ar t l ci fer s
nit), hand tool3 /ir.d spare parts carried in the uni t .
(34) (3,37-30)
(3t>) (1O,P
i-S ever 24 l.ovva rrill be carried out
by fojsir-tion work cliopc (rtivluiott end co:v<* troojic}. TUece to .
confiiet of trio echelons in both division crd w j u so tiiut both
ocholons t c. d never be on v*heel3 et the sar-e tjjue during ui\ advance*
Repairs &nd overhauls vrhich c-re* too grott t o be huiOled
fcj mobile chope will be cone by stationary odv^nced ordnuice
wi'/i^hcps. \3&),' <,
In t;.e French Air.y, tr.e henault j;C M2Q tank i3 t t i l l
the standard nnd o fct; er^ being conttructed each ye&r. 3o-".<j
experimentation in vehicles with a view to their inclusion uid
e^ployixnt in e s t r i ct l y neci.tnized force is goinc ^n l ut 30 V
lur es con be tseortrxincd, these ezperiuents care concentrated
naLily on the ur^ored car. T;.e 3t (Tt.enor.d wheel and ctiterpiller
ariored cor -s a light oi'fensivo vehicle now ucderooin.': ^tr^lo^-
cent. On roads, where wheels ore used, i t can ratiuttiin e
of 20 kilouctcrs per hour. One nun can ci.un;^ the traction
froa trtieel to cat er pi l l t r in tiout L' > ci nuto3. 7ne crcrr co,
of 0 driver end a {juancr. Ttilcinj; off i t s air*or, t hi a cur cun
t r t nej or t e r&chlr.e ?JH gi'oup to i t s position end tiieu suppl;
1
i t rrith cti'Uijition. 'iTue iifvesse Fi_ahGjv,-.>chi?.eider i* tnotht-r
Wicel and trec*^ cur which hno Icon accepted bat not adopted.
Ti;e Derliet light foui* wiieelc6 end the P'inii'ind hefcyy four
f e e l e r hove been adopted tor Afrlco. A Berlict six wiicjl CM
la being experimented with. Tho aiVitc^r-* of these cors conflicts
Of the STTK cutid tho Iiotchk!ris nt-chine g^r.. (ii" )
(37) (3 lC
r
.*}
-13-
Maintenance of mechanized vehic.Tos in the French
emy i3 handled by ocparute companies of tank \rorkncn
both for mobile fi el d employment and depot repai r shops, (30)
Fron the above i t~wi i l be noted that the dovoloprxsnt
of mcchanizod vehicles in the French Army has been concentrated
pri nci pal l y on the armored car for use in conjunction with the
cavalry while the Bri ti sh ere working on a bnlonced force of
a l l types ceprble of independent action,
IV. TACTICS:
Both the Bri ti sh and French oelieve that a
nochanized force con be employed to advantage on the following
nis3iony: . /
Adveiico guard,
V/ide rianking Movements.
re30;*ve to overcome unexpected resi stance,
guard in the novenont of larcc bodies of
troopo into posi ti on.
Rear gusi'd.
Closing guys in tho lino of bat t l e and penetrating
hoatilo gap3.
Jx\ tho l ast fiold maneuvers (1931) the mechanized
bricude appears to have been cnployod ao a rioro or l ess independent
unit on miasiona involving tno attack of cm oneny in position (with
wid v.itliout tho protection of imtittvnk guno) and tlio attack of a
marching column. Tao buttl ofi ol d t act i cs used in tnese problonvo
(b&) (8,4100)
( ) (7,4)
-14-
should bo of intoi*o3t Q3 they cvo not only tho result of
oevoral years experimentation but wore also considered ea
highly successful by moot British observers.
Tlie tank brigade, organized as previously des-
cribed with light und medium tanks in each conpony, approach
tho hostile position in three waves - first the britidier
accompanied by his assistants (two field officers) and the
battalion canraonders, oil in tenks; ne/.t the company
commanders al3o in tanks; and last the brigade mass temporarily
comendod by a field officer of the General's Stuff* After
tho necessary reconnaissances by the two loading v/avea and
the attack orders given, company commanders rejoined their
units and led them along their respective lines of attack.
Daring the reconnaissances by the lower unit comanders, the
brigade mass is led toward tho line of departure in order to
oxpedito the action and to prevent presenting a stationary targot
to hostile fi re.
In Goncrnl tho light tanks acroon the novemont and
protect tho action of tho medium tanks by attacking the anti-tank
guns. Tito light tanks were employed also as a secondary effort,
either frontally or on tne opposite flank, to draw the hostile
antitank defense from the nain effort. A wide noneuvor attack
striking the rear of tr.o hoatilo artillery area and the exposed
flank of a marching colienn i3 tho characteristic type of action.
(40)
(40) (
. . . - . . ' - 1 5 -
In those maneuvers, che Mechanized foroe presented a
very vi si bl e, if fast nerving, target fron t i e ai r while in dr i l l
formation, but when the itannation broke up as tiie attack pro-
gressed, observation was more di ffi cul t . Whilo tho noise of
t hei r tracks gave warning of tho upproach apparently i t was a
deceptive noise to l ocate, and the presence of so largo a number
of tanks confuses the l i st ener , iinoke was vuisd to 30-
r
.e extent
to screen the approach. (41}
v
.;;. So far as reconnaissance i s concerned, i t appears
to bo the general opinion in both Great Britain and France
that horse cavelry is s t i l l superior and more effective than
mechanized uni ts cs i t alone i s capable of searching woods
or a vi l l age, c-nd of assuming in any weather, i'X a l l seasons,
in al l kinds of torrai n, the protection of the Infantry, But
duo to i t s offensive power, and i t s abi l i ty to ^over greet
distances when ti ne io of vi t al importance, i t is agreed that
both ti.o horse and the nochani/.od units aiould bo used t o-
gether on thin mission, bein3 cowplinentary to one another.
(42)
As the offoctivencoD of maneuvor of the mechanized
force deponds upon suitable t er r ai n, ai r superi ori ty, and
surpri se, to a grecrtoi
1
extent thnn does the operations of
foot troops, i t i s considered in both countries that i t s
employment wi l l be controlled by tho higher echelons. The
following problems ot i l l remain to bo solved: (43)
(41) (3, 18)
(42) (4,6) (b,LS6)
(43) (1,3209)
-16-
Protection on tho narch und at ni^vt Yfhen boyond tho
support of infantry.
Anuorod forces, aftor having found tho enoay, r.iujjt be
supported by nachino guns and ur t i l l or y.
Intercommunication between tho unita und thoir comar.dor.
(44)
V. CONCLUSIONS.
It io not boliovod that tho procress nude In ex-
perimentation j ust i fi es tho optoniatic assertions now being
node by Lritiah vrritcrc, (4l>) The problens of supply, r.alnte-
nunco, comunication, vulnerability, conti vl , fcnd torruiu would
seen lost ai^ht of to u lar^o extent because of tlio vividneos
of tho view presonted by a .ncchanized force ncneuvorint; over
fcvorallo teiTnin. Horrovor, the r esul t s obtained to Aute v.ould
cortainly indicate taut a mochunived i'oj"co i s prucuicublo, and
a potenti al v?oapon of great vuliic on oiecion.s pri-viously nen-
tiono^t j'.a'tho'* voro, dof^nciva meusuroo uyuiaot oucli a force
present u di ffi cul t problax that :.iuot be givon :.nich conaidoi'o-
ti on. (46)
As the j^rotich have not a3 yet a33or.ibled a s t r i ct l y
mechanized i'orce nor produced tbe retiuirod vohicloo for tho
aaploy.aont eonta' .platel in thoi r atudie3, no definite con-
cluatono can be dravm, of course, in u conyurison rritli thooe
of Grcit Bri tai n. Ao to tho prohablo t uct i cs and cnployrient
of ouch un a n ti.oir thoucht ooo.:o a i i i l a r but i t io to bo
noted t ht t tho iVeu^i. are :;iore cautiouu in urrivinc at uny
definite concluniona or wa'cin^ any aateri cd ehimQcs in thei r
proaont
(44) (8,3-3) (11,9)
(453) (7,3) (4,0)
-17-
It is bolioved that tao xtont to which arty force
'
:
' ' " ' / M , t t l / ' ' ' * ' > -
iiuy be nccliunized i3 &lnte4 by tho terrain ovor which vho
approach lurches tu*y to bo made, ond i t is doubtful whether
even slx-wheelers will bo able to nove at wi l l since cvory
lino of approach nuot l ' i rst bo reconnoitored and then placed
under sono sort of traffi c control, except in the case of
l'i^htiHG vohiclos in tho actual encounter. Only a definite
porcontage of any force i s l i kel y to bo enti rel y Mechanised
due to the di ffi cul ti es of maintenance and t er r ai n, and ouch.
a force wi l l probably bo kept ag a mobilo army reserve. This
porcent&GQ
m
uot bo Governed by the size of a self-contained
force which can for a very l i ni t ed tine exist unsupported by
a l i ne of communication for the purpose of a special operation
The problems i t brinco to tho ordnance and transport services
vdl l bo the moat di ffi cul t with which the staff and those
services will have to deal*
BIBLIOGRAIHY
1. Br i t i s h a npi r o - C.iJ, S. S. Combat.
2. Frcince - C. 2. ; 3. o. Combat.
3. Caval r y Jour nal ( Januar y- Febr uar y, 1932
4 . Caval r y Jour nal (March-Apr"il, 1931;)
5 . Caval r y J our na l (ITovenber-Deceiver,
6. Caval r y J our na l ( Jul y-Auei mt , 1931)
7. Foroifji devel opments i n t!io or cani zaoi on and U30 of
Mechanized For ces , War Department, 1927.
8 . A di s c us s i on on t he o f f i c i a l Handbook on Mechani zat i on -
Lt . Col . Mar t ' j l - G-.T Vfor Depai*tMcnt
9. Lecture on Mechanization, Gonoral t umot t -St uar t , Attache Hoport.
10. Furthor Aapecto of Mechanization - Drig. GOJU Ii. Rowon-Hobinoon -
Vftn. Clowes and oons, London. 1929,
11. Sorao Aspects of 1'ochanization - Col. H. Rowan-Robinson. Vftn.Clowo3
and Sons, London.
12. Mechanical l.fobility - Royal Unitod Servico Inst i t ut i ons -
AugU3t, 1931.
13. Motorization and Mechanization of An:iie3, Captain Hintorhoff-
Hoyal Tank Corps Journal, July 1931.