Constitutional Law 1

A. CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES

De Leon v. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602, August, 31, 1987

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with the other
petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay
election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by
respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as
Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same
Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be declared null and void
and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222), their terms of office
shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected
and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution,
respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials were abolished and
that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term
of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of
Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the
Provisional Constitution.


Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during the one-year
period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.


Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating
respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force
and effect.


The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be
deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3,
thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987
Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of office of 6 years
provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.


GONZALES VS. COMELEC
21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967

Facts:

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:

1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the
Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120,
as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as
nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall have, at least,
one (1) member;

2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of
two (2) elective delegates from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the
second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and

3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize
Senators and members of the House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional
convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in Congress.

Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic
Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1
and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the general elections, which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

Issue:

1. Does the Congress (through ordinary legislative process) have the power to amend or propose amendment to
the Constitution?
2. May the proposed amendments be submitted at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular
elections?

Held:

1. No.The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress.It is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state, to make, and, hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.

Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such
power. Hence, when exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a constituent assembly. When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when performing the same
function,for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution - they are the very source of all powers of
government, including the Constitution itself.

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of
Congress derive their authority from the Fundamental Law, it follows that they do not have the final say on whether or
not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. The Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme
Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional,despite the eminently political character of treaty-making power.

The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress - acting as a constituent assembly - violates the
Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.

2. Yes. The term election in article XV of the 1935 Constitution does not indicate that the election therein
referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution
had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely shows that congress deemed it best to do
so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for
ratification in general elections.


Occena vs. Commission on Elections

[GR 56350, 2 April 1981]; also Gonzales vs. National Treasurer [GR 56404]
En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 dissents in separate opinion, 1 on official leave

Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional
infirmity. Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention that framed the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox
aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to
the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions
and the present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.

Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive
portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid
its ratification, this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the
majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a
statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the
atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present Constitution came into force and effect. With
such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the Supreme
Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. Thereafter, as
a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What
cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative aspect. As
was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as
legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain
their validity. In the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally
deficient. The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in
Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v.
Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at
least ten cases may be cited.


ARTURO M. TOLENTINO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. L-34150 October 16, 1971

FACTS:
The case is a petition for prohibition to restrain respondent Commission on Elections "from
undertaking to hold a plebiscite on November 8, 1971," at which the proposed constitutional amendment
"reducing the voting age" in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution of the Philippines to eighteen years
"shall be, submitted" for ratification by the people pursuant to Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1971, and the subsequent implementing resolutions, by declaring said resolutions to be
without the force and effect of law for being violative of the Constitution of the Philippines. The
Constitutional Convention of 1971 came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress of the
Philippines approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a
convention to propose amendments to the Constitution namely, Resolutions 2 and 4 of the joint sessions of
Congress held on March 16, 1967 and June 17, 1969 respectively. The delegates to the said Convention
were all elected under and by virtue of said resolutions and the implementing legislation thereof, Republic
Act 6132.

ISSUE:
Is it within the powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 to order the holding of a plebiscite
for the ratification of the proposed amendment/s.

HELD:
The Court holds that all amendments to be proposed must be submitted to the people in a single
"election" or plebiscite. We hold that the plebiscite being called for the purpose of submitting the same for
ratification of the people on November 8, 1971 is not authorized by Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution, hence all acts of the Convention and the respondent Comelec in that direction are null and
void. It says distinctly that either Congress sitting as a constituent assembly or a convention called for the
purpose "may propose amendments to this Constitution,". The same provision also as definitely provides
that "such amendments shall be valid as part of this Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes
cast at an election at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification," thus leaving
no room for doubt as to how many "elections" or plebiscites may be held to ratify any amendment or
amendments proposed by the same constituent assembly of Congress or convention, and the provision
unequivocably says "an election" which means only one.
The petition herein is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971
and the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a
plebiscite on November 8, 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent Comelec complying therewith
(RR Resolution No. 695) are hereby declared null and void. The respondents Comelec, Disbursing Officer,
Chief Accountant and Auditor of the Constitutional Convention are hereby enjoined from taking any action
in compliance with the said organic resolution. In view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court
declares this decision immediately executory.







Sanidad vs. Commission on Elections
[GR L-44640, 12 October 1976

Facts:
On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a
national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other
things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement,
the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers.
20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree
1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree
229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies)
applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential
Decree1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991.
On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating
the questionsto he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree
recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim
National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional
amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in
the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive
supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976,
Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the
Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and
1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031,insofar
as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-
Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there
is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the
new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or
legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as
L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting
that the power to propose amendments
to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National
Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with
Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo
Salapantan, docketed asL-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the
forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.

Issue:
Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution.

Held:
Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment
to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths
of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds
of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the
question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election."Section 2 thereof provides that "Any
amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite which shall beheld not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or
revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory
Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The
interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its
Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in
accordance with Article Sixteen hereof."
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of
normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the
proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a
Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly.
However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted
upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments
may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call
by the interim Prime Minister.
The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with
that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The
Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall
initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order
in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions,
they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to
when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of
the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January
10-15, 1973,at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the
convening of the interim National Assembly.
In the referendum of 24 July1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign
will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27February
1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was
eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention,
who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion
since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it.
In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a
Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the
amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter
itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular
National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While
ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional
conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character.
In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and
that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case,
approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to
approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do
with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution